Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Aquino Administrations Balancing Policy Against An Emergent China Its Domestic and External Dimensions
The Aquino Administrations Balancing Policy Against An Emergent China Its Domestic and External Dimensions
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Abstract
This article examines why and how small powers balance big power
such small power is the Philippines, which - despite its military weak
applies a balancing policy on an emergent China relative to the So
China Sea imbroglio. Largely, this balancing policy is the upshot of
developments: a) the present Aquino administration's efforts to disass
itself from the previous Arroyo administration's policy of equi-bal
China and the US; b) China's heavy-handed behaviour in the South
Sea dispute; and c) the willingness of the US to assist the Philippi
constraining an assertive China. In conclusion, the article offers two r
why this balancing policy is risky and difficult. First, the Philippines
time and resources to develop the military capability to back its terri
claim in the South China Sea; and second, the US, though support
the Philippine position, is wary of triggering a full-blown geo-str
rivalry with China.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/2014871005
Renato Cruz De Castro has written over 70 articles on international relations and security that
have been published in a number of scholarly journals, edited works and monographs in the
Philippines, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia, France, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom
and the United States. He is a professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University,
Manila, and the holder of the Charles Lui Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies.
from escalating into an armed clash, the Philippines replaced its surface
combatant with a smaller coast guard vessel. Instead of reciprocating, China
raised the stakes by deploying the Yuzheng 310 - its most advanced and
largest patrol ship equipped with machine guns, light cannons and electronic
sensors. This incident underscores a stark reality: China's naval power casts
a shadow over the Philippines, which (along with Vietnam) is at the forefront
of the South China Sea dispute with China.1 China specifically targets the
Philippines in a brinkmanship game in as much as the latter openly challenges
its expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea.
Notwithstanding the dismal state of its military, the Philippines adopts a
delicate balancing policy vis-à-vis an assertive China. In mid-2011, it decided
to pursue the substantial modernization of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) that is still preoccupied with internal security operations
against domestic insurgent groups. President Benigno Simeon Aquino
ordered the Philippine Navy (PN) to speed up the acquisition of second-
hand cutters from the US Coast Guard, and the Philippine Air Force (PAF)
to scour the international market for affordable jet fighters to rebuild the
country's air defense system. His administration also acknowledged the need
for US diplomatic support and military assistance in view of the Philippines'
territorial row with China. Consequently, President Aquino deviated from
his predecessor's policy of equi-balancing China and the US and tilted the
balance in favour of the country's long-time strategic ally.2 This policy shift
has a two-pronged consequence: it strengthens the Philippine-US alliance
while straining Philippine-China bilateral relations.
This article examines past and present developments that have shaped the
Aquino administration's balancing policy on an emergent China. Relative to
this balancing policy on China, it specifically addresses this theoretical
problem: Why do small powers balance big powers despite the obvious power
asymmetry between them? It also examines the following questions: What are
the internal and external factors behind the Aquino administration's balancing
policy? What are the components of this balancing policy? What are its
attendant risks and problems? Can the Aquino administration sustain this
diplomatic posture toward China? What is the future of this balancing policy?
1 William Chong, "Path to Scarborough Far from Fair: South China Sea Rivals no Match for
China's Economic, Military Clout," The Strait Times (21 April 2012), 1; available at http://search.
proquest.com/docview/ 1008636649/fulltext/ 1 368A3A.
2 Equi-balancing is a small power's policy of fostering an array of activities and linkages with
two competing major powers to a level whereby it is able to shape or influence their policies and
protect itself from undue external influence. Patterned after Thailand's nineteenth-century policy of
balance of interests, it involves the small or weak power accepting, facilitating and pitting the big
powers against each other in an international situation where the latter will eventually square off with
each other in the process. This affords small states not only the ability to maneuver and survive, but
also the chance to use the situation to advance their own political and strategic advantage.
s Jack Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Designs," in Realism
and the Balancing of Power, eds. John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (New Jersey: Pearson Education,
2003), 129.
4 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17.
Small or minor powers are generally small or even medium-sized states whose territory,
population and resource base make it difficult for them to defend themselves against external military
attacks or other forms of big power intervention. See Laura Neack, The Nexu Foreign Policy: US and
Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21s' Century (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003),
108-L59.
Steve Chan, "Preventive War by the Weak: Loss Aversion, Strategic Anticipation and Third
Power Intervention," Tamkang Journal of International Affairs (January 201 1 ) XIV, III, 4.
The diplomatic strategy of equi-balancing the US and China was the primary
component of the foreign policy of the Arroyo administration. It surfaced
in November 2001 with the presidential pronouncement entitled "The Eight
Realities of Philippine Foreign Policy," which contained bold diplomatic
gambits such as balancing the major powers (United States, Japan, and
China) in East Asia to ensure national security.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, which occurred two months earlier,
and the global coalition against terrorism gave Manila the opportunity to
enlist Washington's support for the Philippines' internal security agenda.
After its quasi-constitutional seizure of political power in early 2001 from
then president Joseph Estrada, the fledgling Arroyo administration sorely
needed American aid to strengthen the Philippine military's counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism capabilities. President Arroyo declared
her full support for Washington's war on terror by offering American forces
access to the country's air-space and allowing US Special Forces to conduct
training operations with the AFP in Basilan, Mindanao. Subsequently, the
Philippines became one of the principal recipients of American security
assistance, and an important front in the US military's expanded counter-
terrorism operations against the al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia.
During President Arroyo's term, economic ties between China and the
Philippines expanded. Bilateral trade grew dramatically from US$2 billion
7 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, "Chinese President Predicts China-Philippine Trade Relations,"
(28 April 2005), 1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=49&did=828416651&Srch
Mode=l&Fmt=3 (accessed 28 August 2008).
8 Xinhua News Agency, "Chinese President Calls for Further Expanding and Deepening
Cooperation with Philippines," 28 April 2005, 1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqwebPinde
x=548cdid=828380501 &SrchMode= 1 &si= 1 &sid= 1 &Fmt=3 (accessed 28 August 2008).
9 Herrboy Aquino, "An Analysis of Two Key Security Challenges Facing the Philippine Republic
over the Next Ten Years," Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (3rd Quarter 2010), 51.
10 Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, "Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia's
New Democracies," Journal of East Asian Studies 9 (2009), 187.
11 Katheline Anne S. Tolosa, "Owing Sovereignty," Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues
(4th Quarter 2008), 7.
12 Noel L. Patajo, "Measuring the Cost of Insurgency," Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense
Issues (3rd Quarter 2006), 8.
10
1S Kathleen Mae M. Villamin, "Defending Philippine Territorial Integrity in the 21M Century
Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues, " ( 1M and 2nd Quarters 2009), 8.
14 Anonymous, "Philippine Air Defense Compromised by Fighter Decommissioning - Officer
BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific (03 October 2005), 1, available at http://search.proquest.com/docvie
460669464/ 1 3670C8477F6CE.
15 Anonymous, "Philippine Air Force Restructured to Focus on Internal Security," BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific (3 April 2005), available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/461043248/13670C84
77F6CE.
11
Chain" (an imaginary line that runs from Japan-Okinawa-Taiwan and down
to the Philippines) . China has had an annual double-digit increase in defense
spending since 2006. At the advent of the twenty-first century, China has also
introduced three new classes of destroyers (Luyang I, Luyang II and Luzhou)
with more capable radar and air-defense weapon systems as well as frigates
(Jiangwei II, Jingkai I andjingkai II) with improved war-fighting capabilities
and seaworthiness.16 This capability upgrade enables the PLAN to broaden
its operational range from the first island chain to the second island chain,
which extends from northern Japan to the Northern Marianas Islands, Guam
and further south to Palau.17
With its naval power, China generates regional tension by challenging the
claims of smaller littoral states over parts of the South China Sea, and by
changing the strategic pattern in the maritime commons in East Asia and
the West Pacific where the US Navy could be eased out. Interestingly, Chinese
media commentators, academics and analysts unanimously emphasize the
importance of naval power to protect China's sovereignty over its surrounding
waters. They contend that the PLAN should have limitless operational range,
and must possess blue-water capabilities to show a military presence at sea,
provide deterrence, and conduct military diplomatic missions.18 Boosted by
increased budgets and improved domestic shipbuilding capabilities, the
PLAN is at the forefront of Chinese military modernization and has been
on the cutting edge of Beijing's military diplomacy. More significantly, it
serves as an effective instrument in the pursuit of China's national policy as
East Asia's traditional great power.
As East Asia's historical great power, Chinese decision makers since 1949
have considered two objectives as the country's constant and vital security
goals:19 a) maintaining its status as the middle kingdom or the preeminent
power in East Asia; and b) erasing the memories and legacies of the "Century
of Humiliation." The first value pertains to China's ancient status as the
culturally and politically dominant power in East Asia and shaping the
regional order according to its interest. The other requires China to remove
all the legacies of the century of humiliation and to restore its rightful place
as the only great power in East Asia.
18 Ronald O'Rourke, "PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft," in The Chinese
Navy : Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, eds. Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine
and Andrew Nien-Dzu-Yang (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 154-155.
17 Nan Li, "The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From 'Near Coast' and
'Near Sea' to 'Far Seas,"' in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles , eds. Phillip C.
Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew Nien-Dzu-Yang (Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press, 2011), 129.
18 Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, "Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis
of Chinese Views since Early 1990s," in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, eds.
Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine and Andrew Nien-Dzu-Yang (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 101.
19 David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (London and New York:
Routledge, 2007), 7-14.
12
Chinese policy makers now assumed that China has the strategic initiatives
to further pursue these two goals of maintaining its status as East Asia's only
legitimate great power and removing the vestiges of the century of
humiliation. This involves not only reducing American strategic clout and
influence in the region but possibly displacing them or, as one American
scholar described it, acting as "the Game Changer."20 As the game changer,
China is pursuing its national security goals by developing its naval power,
matching its growing economic and military prowess with an equally
aggressive media strategy, and pursuing an activist foreign policy vis-à-vis
Washington, forcing the latter to evaluate its strategy vis-à-vis Beijing.21
This game changer gambit became evident in late August 2010 (two
months after President Benigno Aquino III assumed office), when China
sent a belligerent message to the other claimant states (specifically Vietnam
and the Philippines) and the US, that its claim of sovereignty over the sea
and its islands is "indisputable." The PLAN conducted a live-fire exercise in
the South China Sea that involved its three major fleets (the South China
Sea, North Sea, and East Sea Fleets) using surface combatants, along with
fighter plane strikes and missile launches against hypothetical long-range
targets.22 Such show of force proved that China has developed the capacity
to sustain a larger naval deployment deep into the South China Sea.
The change in China's behaviour in the South China Sea coincided with the
victory of an opposition candidate who won by a clear mandate from the
Filipino electorate. President Benigno Simeon Aquino III won the 2010
presidential election by capturing 42 percent of the votes cast, the largest
margin of victory since the Philippines adopted a multi-party system in 1987.
During his inauguration in July 2010, President Aquino criticized the past
administration for corruption, political impunity and indifference to the
plight of ordinary Filipinos. He announced a two-pronged approach to good
governance, namely: a) a crackdown on corruption; and b) an investigation
and prosecution of key leaders of the previous administration for political
and criminal wrongdoing.
He formed a Truth Commission to investigate former president Arroyo
for allegedly oppressing the people, fired her so-called midnight appointees;
replaced her designated AFP chief-of-staff General Delfin Bangit with General
20 Elizabeth C. Economy, "The Game Changer: Coping with China's Foreign Policy Revolution,"
Foreign Affairs 89, 6 (November/December 2010): 142-152.
21 Elizabeth C. Economy, "The Game Changer: Coping with China's Foreign Policy Revolution,"
Foreign Affairs 89, 6 (November/December 2010): 149-152.
22 Barry Wain, "Chinese Diplomacy Off Course," Wall Street Journal, 5 August 2010, 13, and
National Institute for Defense Studies, National Institute for Defense Studies: China Security Report (Tokyo:
National Institute for Defense Studies, 201 1), 17.
13
25 Edilberto C. De Jesus, "The Philippines in 2010: Reclaiming Hope," Southeast Asian Affairs
2011, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), 223.
24 "Singed by the Dragon; The Philippines Discovers that It Doesn't Pay to Appease China," Wall
Street Journal (31 March 2011), 1, available at http://proquest.umi. com/pqdweb?index=96&did=23
07204961 &Src.
14
In his campaign sorties during the 2010 election, then presidential candidat
Benigno Simeon Aquino III alleged that the Arroyo administration and the
AFP colluded in the massive 2004 electoral fraud in Mindanao, malversation
of public funds, and extrajudicial killings of political activists when the military
intensified its internal security operations against the domestic insurgents.
Upon assuming the presidency in June 2010, he vowed to observe transparency
and accountability in governance, and to modernize the AFP in line with
shifting its focus from internal security to maritime/ territorial defense.
The 2010 AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (ISP) - Oplan Bayanihan
(Operational Plan Community Spirit) - detailed the Aquino Administration's
plan for such a transition. The plan acknowledged the AFP's lack of capabilities
to perform its mandated task of guarding the Philippines' extensive maritime
borders and ensuring its security from external threats.28 It also provided for
a three-year period within which the Philippine military would redirect its
attention towards developing capabilities to undertake unilateral defensive
operations against any form of external armed aggression.29
25 Carl Thayer, "China's New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,"
International Journal of China Studies 2, 3 (December 201 1 ). 563.
26 Anonymous, "China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests in Spratlys," BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific (9June 2011), 1, available at http://proquest.umi. com/pqdweb?index=64&d
id=23697 1 578 1 &Src.
27 "China Wants Philippines to Seek Permission before Spratlys Oil Search," BBC Monitoring
Asia-Pacific (10 June 2011), 1, available at http://proquest.umi. com/pqdweb?index=281&did=2370
661661&Sr.
28 General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Armed Forces of the Philippines Inte
Peace and Security Plan (Quezon City: General Aguinaldo, 2010), 8.
29 General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Armed Forces of the Philippines Inte
Peace and Security Plan , 1 3. As part of its efforts to shift the military's focus away from internal secu
to territorial defense, the Philippine government signed a land-mark peace deal with the MIL
15
Corollary to the ISP, the Department of National Defense (DND) and the
AFP drew up the 2010 AFP Long-Term Capability Development Plan. It
proposed the re-evaluation of military priorities and the urgent upgrading
of the AFP's weapons system.30 It also called for a change in strategic planning
from counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism to maritime contingencies that
might originate from the South China Sea dispute. This posture required
joint PAF-PN capabilities for maritime domain awareness, defensive naval
operations, and interdiction. For the PAF, the plan necessitated an air defense
system development, close air support, and battlefield air interdiction
capabilities, as well as the capacity to conduct maritime patrol and
reconnaissance. For the PN, it required the acquisition of multi-role attack
vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air
missiles. Specifically, it rationalized the upgrade of the PN fleet for "combined
maritime surveillance, defense, and interdiction operations in the South
China Sea."
The March 2, 2011 incident at the Reed Bank and China's arrogan
response to the Philippines diplomatic queries drove the Aquino
Administration to hasten the development of the AFP's territorial defense
capabilities. In June 2011, the executive branch of the government and the
AFP agreed on a multi-year, multi-billion peso defense upgrade spending
and military build-up. The Department of Budget Management (DBM)
released a Multi-Year Obligation Authority (MOA) to the DND, allowing the
AFP to enter into multi-year contracts with other governments or private
arms and military hardware manufacturers. The DBM also committed Php
40 billion (estimated US$800 million) in the next five years (2012-2016) to
develop the AFP's capabilities for greater domain awareness of the Philippine
territorial waters and EZZ.
In the proposed "rolling" program, per request from the executive branch,
the Philippine Congress will allocate Php 8 billion (an estimated US$160
million) annually for the procurement of air-defense surveillance radar,
surface attack aircraft, close air support aircraft, combat utility helicopters
and long-range patrol aircraft.31 Also covered are current upgrade programs
2012. The process gained momentum in April 2012, when both sides signed the "GRP (Government
of the Republic of the Philippines)-MILF Decision Points on Principles" in Kuala Lumpur that
recognizes Bangsamoro as a secular political unit within the Philippines, located within its territory,
and subject to its sovereignty as a state. Then, during the 32nd round of the Exploratory Talks on the
Peace Process in Kuala Lumpur, in early October 2012, the two parties agreed on the framework
agreement for the creation of a Bangsamoro entity to replace the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) composed of five Muslim-dominated provinces. Asia-News Monitor, "Philippines:
GRP, MILF Express Optimism in Reaching a Peaceful Settlement to Mindanao Conflict," Asia News
Monitor (5 October 2012), 1, available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1082304042/139A8
7060651 EFB99B3/59?accountid.
3(1 Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5) , DND-AFP Current Thrust in Upgrading AFP's
Capability: AFP Long-Tern Capability Development Plan (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, July 2010).
31 William B. Depasupil, "Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade Naval, Aerial defense,"
Tribune Business News (29 June 2011), 1, available at http://proquest.umi. com/pqdweb?index=48&
did=2386470651&Src.
16
17
b ) Joint operations between the PAF and the Navy for limited naval interdiction
capabilities - Given the Philippines' inadequate defense budget and
defense capabilities, the PAF will support the Philippine Navy's limited
naval interdiction operations. The PAF's Air Defense System and the
PN's Coast Watch System will provide coverage and augmentation for
over-the-horizon reconnaissance and targeting capabilities.38 Its maritime
patrol and surveillance aircraft will serve as the primary platforms of
patrols, surveillance and interdiction, while the PN's surface combatants
would conduct helicopter patrol and provide longer on-station time, as
well as visible and enhanced naval presence/deterrence.39 The PAF's
air-defense and coastal missile system will be linked with the navy's surface
and underwater interdiction capabilities that will constitute the first layer
of maritime defense for the Philippines.
35 The Philippine News Agency, "New AFP Chief Vows to Focus on Territorial Defense, MILF
Peace Talks," Philippine News Agency ( 1 3 December 201 1 ) , 1 , available at http://search.proquest.com/
news/docview/91 0568320/fulltexr/ 1 348.
% BBC, "Philippines Mulls Reorganization of Military to Boost Territorial Defense," BBC
Monitoring Asia-Pacific (02 January 2012), 1, available at http://search.proquest.com/
docview/9 1 32 1 5230/fultext/ 1 348735E9.
37 Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City:
Camp Aguinaldo, 201 1), 27.
38 Commodore Jose Renan C. Suarez, "The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-
Defense Partnership," presentation at the Air Power Symposium 2012, 21 June 2012, SMX Convention
Center, Pasay City, Philippines, 6.
39 Commodore Jose Renan C. Suarez, "The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-
Defense Partnership," 6.
18
In May 2012, President Aquino hinted that the PAF might acquire brand-
new lead-in jet trainers that can be converted into fighter planes by modifying
their air-frame.42 In an interview, he admitted that the government finds it
too expensive to buy, and much more to maintain, second-hand fourth-
generation jet fighters that only have five serviceable years. Hence, he raised
the possibility of buying cheaper new fighter aircraft from the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, or even South Korea. Furthermore, some Aquino
administration insiders are skeptical that China poses a security threat to the
Philippines, and are strongly against the projected increase in the defense
budget.43 Some of his cabinet members point out that no amount of defense
build-up would enable the AFP to stand up against a modern and nuclear-
armed PLA. According to them, challenging China's maritime claim could
even mean losses for the Philippines in terms of trade and investments with
the second-largest economy in the world.44
4(1 Jon Grevatt, "Philippines to Hasten Recreation of Dedicated Combat Wing with Ex-USAF
F-16 Purchase," Jane's Defense Industry 29, 1 (January 1, 2012), 1, available at http://search.proquest.
com/docview/9 1 0358069/ 1 367C4 1 6F3 1 C55.
41 Rino Francisco and Jose Antonio Custodio, "The Challenge of Air Force Modernization in
an ISO-Driven Strategy," (unpublished manuscript), 3.
42 Aurea Caliça, "Aquino: Government Can Now Afford to Buy New Fighter Jets," The Philippine
Star ( 1 7 May 2012), 2.
43 Interview with a ranking official of the National Security Council, National Security Council,
Quezon City, 12 February 2013.
44 Interview with a ranking official of the National Security Council, National Security Council,
Quezon City, 12 February 2013.
19
In the case of the Philippine-US alliance, the hedging policy involves the
Pentagon's material and technical assistance to develop the AFP's capabilities.
One senior US Defense Department official commented in 2009 that "the
Pentagon will support Philippine forces fighting terrorists, while currently
45 Neil King, "Conflict Insurance: As China Boosts Defense Budget, US Military Hedges its Bets:
Pentagon Orchestrates Build-up of Forces in the Pacific; Counts onjapan," Wallstreet Journal (20 April
2006), Al.
46 Neil King, "Conflict Insurance: As China Boosts Defense Budget, US Military Hedges its Bets:
Pentagon Orchestrates Build-up of Forces in the Pacific; Counts onjapan," Al.
47 Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, "America's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific," 28th October
2010 Speech delivered in Honolulu, Hawaii, 3.
48 Abraham M. Debmark and Brian M. Burton, "The Future of US Alliances in Asia," Global Asia
5,4 (Winter 2010), 58.
20
49 Fred Baker, "Gates Visits the Philippines to Reaffirm US Commitment," Armed Forces Press
Service , 1 June 2009, available at http://defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54569.
50 Interview with mid-level AFP Officers, Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs,
17 September 2010.
51 Sheldon Simon, "U.S.-Southeast Asian Relations: Dismay at Thai-Cambodia Skirmishes,"
Comparative Connection: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (31 May 201 1 ), http://
csis.org/files/publication/ 1 1 01 gus_seasia.pdf, 3.
M Co-Chair's Statement, "Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue," United States
Embassy in Manila, 27-28 January 201 1 , 10.
21
55 Greg Torode, "US under Pressure over Sea Dispute Washington has Stopped Short of Speci
on its Position under a Defense Pact with Manila on Recent Incursion by China in the South
Sea," South China Morning Post (17 June 2011), 2, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqd
dex= 1 77&did=23765933 1 1 &Sr.
56 "Philippine Navy to Acquire Largest Ship in Inventory," GMA New, s (23 January 2011), 1,
available at http://www.gmanews.tv/print/211298.
57 Sheldon Simon, "US-Southeast Asia Relations: Dismay at Thai-Cambodia Skirmishes,"
Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (May 201 1 ) , 5, available
at http://csis,org/files/publication/l 101ques_seasia.pdf.
22
operations in the South China Sea.58 Curiously, this transfer perfectly fits
into AFP's scheme of capability upgrade for internal security operations,
disaster response, and effective long-range patrol of the Philippines' maritime
territories, but not for naval expeditionary warfare.59
Developing the PN and PAF's capabilities for early warning, surveillance and
command, control, and communications is designed for limited "joint
operations capabilities" in maritime defense and interdiction operations.
According to the AFP's 2008 Defense Plan Aguila (Hawk) , AFP units will only
engage enemy forces if the latter penetrate deep into the Philippine Defense
Area of Interest (PDA!) and not to destroy the main forces but simply to
delay them until external assistance arrives.60 In this scenario, the AFP's main
interdiction efforts will not be directed against the enemy's main attack force
but against its command, and control, and communications, and support
elements.61 In this respect, the Philippines cannot match a militarily
aggressive China in any South China Sea encounter. Thus, Manila has asked
for unequivocal US commitment to Philippine defense and security as
provided by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MÛT).
Since June 2011, the Philippines has sought American naval/air support
in the Spratlys. Philippine officials argue that an armed attack on Philippine
metropolitan territory and forces anywhere in the Pacific, including the
South China Sea, should trigger a US armed response. However, the 1951
MDT does not provide for any automatic response from either the Philippines
or the US. It only requires the allies to consult each other and determine
what military action, if any, both would take.
Former US secretary of state Clinton reaffirmed the US defense
commitment to the Philippines amid the rising tensions between Manila and
Beijing over the disputed Spratlys.62 During her June 23, 2011 meeting in
Washington with Philippine foreign affairs secretary Del Rosario, she
announced that the US would honour both its mutual defense treaty and
strategic alliance with its Southeast Asian ally. In November 2011, aboard
the USS Fitzgerald , she reiterated US assistance to the Philippines and called
for updating the defense treaty that "will require ... greater support for
5H BBC], "Philippine Military Looks Forward to Arrival of New Warship," BBC Monitoring Asia-
Pacific (25 August 2011), 2, available at http://proqust.umi. com/pqweb?index=13&did=243442382
1 &SrchMode= 1 &sid= 1 &Fmt.
59 P. Ervin A. Manalo, "A Multi-Purpose Vessel for the Philippine Navy: Options and Prospects,"
Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (4th Quarter 2008), 15.
Interview with middle-ranking AFP Officers, Foreign Service Institute, 17 September 2010.
fil Interview with middle-ranking AFP Officers, Foreign Service Institute, 17 September 2010.
('2 David Gollust, "Clinton Reaffirms US Commitment to Philippines amid Islands Dispute, "
Voice of America News/Find, (23 June 2011), 1, available at http://proquest.umi. com/pqdweb?index=
1 7 1 &did=238350095 1 &Sr.
23
24
Defense Assets in the Philippines to support MDB and SEB activities while
the AFP develops its own capability for territorial defense; b) increasedjoint
bilateral maritime security activities in the South China Sea/West Philippine
Sea; c) development of joint-use maritime security support facilities; d)
improved information-sharing between US and Philippine forces; and e)
the conduct of integrated maritime security initiatives involving the US Pacific
Command and the AFP.
Conclusion
This article shows that a small power's adoption of a balancing policy towa
a big power stems primarily from domestic politics and not from any system
or rational calculation of power relations in the international system. Despite
being the military laggard of Southeast Asia, the Philippines applies
balancing policy on an emergent and assertive China. Interestingly, thi
policy is the offshoot of a domestic development: President Aquino
determination to dissociate himself from the policies of his predecesso
particularly hedging between China and the US that led to a Philippine-China
entente. An opposition figure during the Arroyo administration, Presiden
Aquino has always been critical of former President Arroyo's policy of tilting
towards China, which generated several high-level cases of shady deals su
as the JMSU and the controversial National Broadband Network (NB
Project with the Chinese-owned ZTE. The asymmetrical power relations
69 Floyd Whaley, "Philippines in Talk to Expand US Military Ties," The International Herald Tribun
(27 January 2012), 1 and 3.
70 Cheryl Pellerin, "Carter: Strategic Guidance is Compass for 20 1 3," American Forces Press Servi
(13 February 2012), 2, available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=66705.
25
26
front. This is most evident during the two-month stand-off between the
Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels in the Scarborough Shoal; in President
Aquino's resolve to acquire ships and jet fighters for the AFP; and recently,
in his gambit to facilitate a broader American strategic footprint on Philippine
territory on a temporary and rotational basis. This resolve, however, must
be coupled with foresight and prudence. If not, the Aquino administration
would realize sooner rather than later the harsh truth of Thucydides' Melian
Dialogue. "The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept
what they have to accept."71
71 Thucydides, "Melian Dialogue," in Classics of International Relations, ed. John A. Vasquez (New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1996), 17.
27