1976 - Roll-Hansen - Critical Teleology Immanuel Kant and Claude Bernard On The Limitations of Experimental Biology

Critical Teleology: Immanuel Kant and Claude Bernard
on the Limitations of Experimental Biology
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
Roskilde University
Denmark
METHODOLOGY GUIDING THE GROWTH OF SCIENCE
Applying our knowledge to the future is an essential part of science.

With the help of science we constantly seek to make significant predic-
tions and rational decisions on how to act. This also applies to the
theory of science. By seeking a general understanding of how scientific
knowledge develops, the theory or methodology of science helps for-
mulate guidelines for future scientific efforts.
Methodology can hardly avoid giving advice or influencing decisions
about which research projects to pursue and which to drop, both on the
level of the individual research worker and on the level of national or
global research policy. This influence need not be direct through the
application of explicit methodological rules, but can be indirect
through contributions to the conceptual schemes in which scientists,
planners, politicians, and everybody else think about science.
Nevertheless, analytical philosophy of science has in recent decades
tended to narrow the field of rational methodology to the evaluation of
fully formulated theories in the light of available evidence. This philo-
sophy of science has concentrated on explaining the justification of
finished theories rather than the rationale of their discovery or creation.
There are important exceptions to the trend, like N.R. Hanson, who
explicitly sought a theory of science that covers the "context of dis-
covery" as well as the "context of justification. ''1 But Karl Popper, for
example, in his classic work The Logic o f Scientific Discovery, dis-
tinguishes sharply between "the process of conceiving a new idea, and
the methods and results of examining it logically." He claims that only
the latter belongs to "the logic of knowledge", while the former is
merely a matter for "psychology of knowledge. ''2
On this view the heuristic rules on how to make interesting dis-
1. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. (New York: Free Press,

1956).
2. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson,
1959), p. 31.
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1976), pp. 59-91.
Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland.
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
coveries are merely means to an end, namely, the more or less well
corroborated theories that result from an investigation. The heuristics
of discovery is quite external to the resulting theory, which should be
evaluated solely on the basis of factual evidence. The route by which a
theory has been reached is, according to this internalist view, com-
pletely irrelevant to its scientific status.
Popper's pupil Imre Lakatos is also an avowed internalist who sets
methodology apart from the "psychology" and "sociology" of science.
But his theory of research programs extends the field of methodology
into the heuristics of discovery. 3 According to Lakatos, the research
program is a succession of theories based on a common set of ideas, a
"hard core." Taking research programs rather than specific theories as
the basic entities of science, Lakatos is able to give a rationale for the
apparent neglect of methodological rules by the best of past scientists.
The long-term success of the program may justify the empirical or
formal weakness of a specific theory.
Lakatos does not, however, seek a methodology that can aid present
science. He only wants a "rational reconstruction" of past scientific
developments. 4 But this narrowing down to the explanation of his-
torical events alone eliminates some of the most interesting possibilities
of his theory of research programs. Lakatos's prominent use of the term
"programme" instead of "theory" points to the important role of the
initial choice and formulation of research problems in scientific work.
His methodology indicates a greater openness in the development of
science than do earlier methodologies stressing justification,
The object of the history of science is investigations and disputes that
have been concluded rather than issues that are presently alive. There-
fore, an analysis of history can more easily disregard the ambiguity
resulting from the openness of the future than can a methodology that
professes to be applicable also to present science. The past is more
amenable to an internalist approach. One can with some justification
overlook the question of whether it was external support of a program
that made it succeed or the internal success of the program that attract-
3. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and
the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); and
Lakatos, "History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction," in R.C. Buck and
R.S. Cohen, eds. PSA 1970, Boston Studies in the Philosophy o f Science,
vol. VIII (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1971).
4. Imre Lakatos, "Replies to Critics," in R.C. Buck and R.S. Cohen, eds.,
PSA 1970, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. VIII (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1971).
60
ed external support. Since we cannot change the events of the past -

cannot shift support and produce new discoveries - this problem may
be considered irrelevant to a straight historical account. But to a general
theory of scientific development the problem is crucial.
In my opinion it is an important task for the history of science to
show how its course was influenced by the choice of basic principles in
the form of a methodology or research program or by the channeling of
economic support. In both cases one may also ask for the rational
motives. My analysis of Kant and Bernard, however, is not directly
aimed at establishing counter-factual claims - how biology would have
developed differently under slightly different circumstances. I am
analyzing methodological discussions rather than the development of
concrete research programs. But given some latitude in the development
of science, it is likely that methodological principles are important in
determining the actual course of development. Therefore, methodo-
logical analysis is part of counter-factual history. My aim in this paper is
to show some of the connection between biological methodology and
the research programs and policy decisions of the discipline. Methodo-
logy has both an external function as a means of attracting support and
an internal function as a means of sifting out good or bad hypotheses.
The methodologies that I discuss are based on very general ideas about
science and nature. They belong to a level above the concrete research
program, which can be classified and systematized by their relation to
different methodologies.
In the following pages I will analyze two historical attempts to for-
mulate methodological principles for biology." The similarity of Kant's
and Bernard's methodologies justifies their juxtaposition even if there is
no direct historical link between them. In both cases there is a clear
interest in using methodology to guide further research in the field.
More or less explicit predictions about the future of biology are made.
Immanuel Kant had ethical and religious motives for proving that bio-
logy cannot possibly ever be fully explained in terms of physical
science. Claude Bernard in his R a p p o r t sur le progrks et la marche de la
physiologie gkndrale en France (1867) directly connects methodological
principles with advice on science policy, s But their perspectives on
biology fail when compared with later history. They both assume the
absolute character of certain facts, or at least of certain methodological
rules, and set too strict limits on possible future developments.
5. Claude Bernard, Rapport sur le progrks et la marche de la physiologie g~nd-

rale en France (Paris, 1867). This work is hereafter cited as RPP in the text.
61
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
To be complete, such an evaluation of a methodological theory

relative to the actual course of history demands comparison with a rival
theory. A negative evaluation should be supported by the greater
success of this rival. The obvious rival candidate in the case of Kant and
Bernard is reductionism- more precisely methodological and not
dogmatic reductionism. Methodological reductionism demands that
living organisms should be explained by the same theories as nonliving
matter, without insisting on any specific physical theory. A view of this
kind is clearly a main target of many of the methodological statements
made by Kant and Bernard. And I believe a good case can be made for
its superiority in sketching the future development of biology. But in
this paper I will concentrate on a explication of the methodology of
Kant and Bernard and not attempt any detailed and explicit com-
parison to reductionism.
The views of Bernard are of considerable interest to contemporary
discussions on the methodology of biology. He is often depicted as an
especially forward-looking methodologist, foreshadowing the develop-
ments of twentieth-century biology. 6 An example of the present in-
fluence of Bernard is Franqois Jacob's historical essay on genetics, La
logique du vivant (1970). 7 Kant's methodology of biology, besides hav-
•ng intrinsic interest, is useful for clarifying the views of Bernard. While
my account of Kant is mainly an abstracted example of a certain type
of methodology, I have tried to give the analysis of Bernard a more
concrete historical setting.
KANT'S CRITICAL TELEOLOGY
Accounts of Kant's theory of natural science usually stress his ideal of

a priori knowledge and his attempt to deduce the principles of physics
from preconditions given in the structure of human reason and percep-
tion. But after Newtonian mechanics has lost its dominating position
and the belief in absolute knowledge has dwindled, it may be more
interesting to look at another part of Kant's theory of science, namely,
the methodology of those areas where he did not believe there could be
absolute theorectical knowledge. For example, chemistry and biology
are not sciences in the same strict sense as physics, according to Kant.
6. See Joseph Schiller, Claude Bernard et les probl~mes scientifique de son

temps (Paris: Les Editions de C~dre, 1967), and Otakar Poupa, "Le probl~me de
l'~volution chez Claude Bernard," in Etienne Wolf et al., Philosophie et mOthodo-
logie de Claude Bernard (Paris: Masson, 1967).
7. Francois Jacob, La logique du vivant (Paris: Gallinard, 1970).
62
They depend essentially on empirical concepts and laws and cannot be

subjected to an a priori deduction. But the methodology of these
disciplines still contains absolutes. On such absolutes is based Kant's
critical teleology.
I have used the term "critical teleology" because Kant's introduction
of teleological principles in biology is based on his characteristic
critique of the powers of the human mind. He holds that mechanistic
treatment in terms of efficient causes is basic to a strictly scientific
biology. But there are certain phenomena that are inaccessible to such a
treatment. Therefore, biology as a whole is not reducible to physical
science, and teleological principles are necessitated by the limitations of
human science. Kant calls his teleology a "critical principle": "Der
Begriff einer objektiven Zweckm~issigkeit der Natur ist kritisches
Prinzip der Vernunft for die reflektierende Urteilskraft. ''8 :
The Living Organism as a Natural Purpose9 ("Naturzweck")
The main problem of the teleological part of Kant's Kritik der Urteils-
kraft (Critique o f JudgmentJ can be formulated as: How is the concept
of a living organism possible? For Kant it is part of the concept of a living
organism that it is an organized and purposeful entity. It is a natural
purpose ("Naturzweck"). Presupposing the actual necessity of this con-
cept of a living organism for our biological thinking, Kant shows by
"transcendental deduction" of the principle of the purposiveness of
nature ("Zweckmgssigkeit der Natur") how the concept fits into the
rest of his philosophical system. This analysis lends theoretical support
to the claim that biology is basically different from physical science.
The crucial difficulty of Kant's argument is how to make the immediat-
ely perceived organic and purposeful character of living things fit the
mechanistic concepts of science given by pure reason.
Living organisms as "Naturzwecke" is a presupposition of the Kritik
der Urteilskraft in much the same way as Newtonian mechanics is a
presupposition of the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. lo It was as im-
possible to doubt the irreducible organic nature of a living organism as
it was to doubt the truth of the principles of classical mechanics.
8. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Berlin: Philosophische Biblio-

thek, 1926), p. 33. This work is hereafter cited as KUin the text.
9. My translation of "Naturzweck" follows J.D. McFarland's in Kant's Con-
cept of Teleology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1970).
10. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernuft (Bedim Philosophische Biblio-
thek, 1956).
63
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
It is a principle of internal teleology that we are discussing here. The

structuring purpose is inherent in the organism, not external to it like
tile watchmaker in relation to the watch. Kant defines "Naturzweck" as
a thing that is its own cause and effect (KU, p. 286). He explains this
phrase by the example of a tree. First the tree always gives rise to new
trees of the same species. Second the tree by growing creates itself as an
individual. And third, the various parts of the tree are mutually
dependent upon each other for survival.
In these three senses of producing itself the organism behaves in a
way different from the way purely mechanical systems behave argues
Kant. In an explanation of organisms we have to assume a purpose
directing the processes, while in physics the sole causes of a process are
material constellations and forces. Kant's example shows his depen-
dence on Aristotelian teleology. The three senses of production cor-
respond to the formal, the efficient, and (less obviously) the final cause.
Despite the Newtonian basis of Kant's thought, his biology is still very
much Aristotelian. The important difference is, of course, that to Kant
the purpose is in our thinking rather than in the organism.
Kant was completely convinced that man will never be able fully to
understand or to create living organisms. He held that they cannot be
copied by human art. Though a living organism is made up of matter
taken from surrounding nature, its growth "shows such originality in
the separation and composition of raw matter, that all art must remain
infinitely far from" copying the process (KU, p. 287). Throughout the
teleological part of the Kritik der Urteilskraft Kant repeatedly speaks of
the impossibility of man's ever reaching a complete mechanistic expla-
nation of any living organism. "No human r e a s o n . . , can hope to
understand the creation even of a grass-straw from mechanical laws
alone" (KU, p. 353). We can never hope for a Newton of the grass-
straw, he asserts in another place (KU, p. 337). It appears that for Kant
this irreducibility is a fact rather than an arguable claim of biological
theory. It is elaborated by analogy and examples rather than supported
by biological reasons. The theoretical support that Kant gives his anti-
reductionism is more philosophical than biological.
According to Erich Adickes, Kant was closer to an objective teleo-
logy, interpreting purposiveness as a property of the organism itself, in
other works, both earlier and later, than the Kritik der Urteilskraft. 11It
is primarily here that he developed a critical interpretation of teleology.
But even if a closer analysis of Kant's later works should show that he
11. Erich Adickes, Kant als Naturforscher, 2 vols. (Berlin: Gruyter, 1924).
64
gave up his critical teleology, this view represents an important stage in

his development, and it is intrinsically interesting because similar views
have played an important role in discussions of biological methodology
up to the present.
Experimental Method and the Antinomy of Judgment
As I mentioned above, both the full scientific (that is, mechanistic)

understanding and the artificial creation of living organisms was for
Kant beyond the capabilities of man. Understanding and making (do-
ing) are very closely connected in the Kantian view, which can possibly
be paraphrased as: "We can only fully understand what we are able to
make." This pragmatic conception of scientific knowledge is the basis
for Kant's analysis of the experimental method in natural science. He
believed that it was the successful application of this method that
brought about the Galilean revolution in physics and Stahl's revolution
in chemistry, x2 By staging experiments human reason poses questions to
nature and forces it to answer.
Biology has a secondary scientific status because it cannot, in the
opinion of Kant, be fully subjected to the experimental method. It is
unable to live up to his pragmatic epistemological ideals. Therefore,
biological teleology is classified as merely preparatory, a "Prop~-
deutik," and not as an integral part of a theoretical natural science:
Dieses geschiet, um das Studium der Natur nach ihrem Mechanismus

an demjenigen festzuhalten, was wir unserer Beobachtung oder den
Experimenten so unterwerfen k6nnen, das wires gleich der Natur,
wenigstens der Ahnlichkeit der Gesetze nach, selbst hervorbringen
k6nnten; denn nur soviel sieht man vollstandig ein, als man nach
Begriffen selbst machen und zustande bringen kann. Organisation
aber, als inneres Zweck der Natur, fibersteigt unendlich alles Ver-
m6gen einer/ihnlichen Darstellung durch Kunst. (KU, p. 309-310)
This pragmatic interpretation of scientific knowledge also explains

the important role of Kant's repeated claim that no living organism can
be artificially created. If this can be taken as an undeniable fact, then
critical teleology states its transcendental conditions ("Bedingungen der
MSglichkeit").
12. See Kant's sketch of the history of science in the preface to the B edition
of Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
65
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
Kant interprets the controversy between mechanism and teleology

(reductionism and antireductionism) in biology as a conflict between
the demand for a strict scientific explanation in terms of efficient
causes and the necessity of using teleological explanations. This conflict
is focused in his antinomy of judgment: On the one hand all material
things must be explained by mechanical laws alone, and on the other
hand there are things (namely, living organisms) that cannot be ex-
plained in this way, but demand final causes for their explanation.
Alle Erzeugung materMler Dinge und ihrer Formen muss als nach bloss
mechanischen Gesetzen m6glich beurteilt w e r d e n . . .
Einige Produkte der materiellen Natur k6nnen nicht als nach bloss
mechanischen Gesetzen m6glich beurteilt werden (ihre Beurteilung
erfordert ein ganz anderes Gesetz der Kausalitgt, n/imlich das der
Eundursachen). (KU, p. 314)
The first rule is reductionist: Biological phenomena must be ex-

plained in mechanistic terms; otherwise there will be no "real knowl-
edge of nature" (KU, p. 315). The second rule is antireductionist. It
says that some biological phenomena cannot be explained by physical
laws alone. Their explanation demands a teleological principle.
Because of the link between mechanistic explanation and experimen-
tal method in Kant's theory of science, the limitation of mechanistic
explanation in biology must correspond to a limitation of experimental
method. But this limitation is just the impossibility of creating artifi-
cially any living organism, which to Kant appeared an undeniable fact.
The Principle of the Purposiveness of Nature
Since the a priori laws of human understanding are insufficient for

ordering the manifold forms of nature, we are quite dependent on
empirical concepts and laws supplied by the reflective power of judg-
ment. 13 These laws appear as contingent to us, but they are necessary in
the sense that such laws are demanded by our concept of nature as a
13. Kant's resolution of the antinomy between mechanism and teleology

builds on a distinction between the determinant and the reflective power of
judgment (KU, p. xxv). This corresponds to his distinction between the apodictic
and the problematic use of reason (Kritilc der reinen Vernunft, p. B674-5).
Reflective judgment subsumes the particulars under tentative rules supplied by
itself, while determinant judgment subsumes particulars under a priori rules.
66
coherent entity. Reason therefore presupposes a principle that can

secure unity of the empirical laws, a "Prinzip der Einheit der Mannigfal-
tigen." Kant explains this in one breathtaking sentence:
Allein es sind so mannigfaltige Formen der Natur, gleichsam so viele

Mofidikationen der allgemeinen transzendentalen Naturbegriffe, die
durch jene Gesetze, welche der reine Verstand a priori gibt, weil
dieselben nur auf die M/Sglichkeit einer Natur (als Gegenstandes der
Sinne) fiberhaupt gehen, unbestimmt gelassen werden, dass daffir
doch auch Gesetze sein mtissen, die zwar, als empirische, nach unserer
Verstandeseinsicht zuf'allig sein m/Sgen, die aber doch, wenn sic Ge-
setze heissen sollen (wie es auch der Begriff einer Natur erfordert),
aus einem, wenngleich uns unbekannten, Princip der Einheit des
Mannigfaltigen als notwendig angesehen werden mtissen. (KU,
p. xxvi)
This principle for the unity of nature can be no other, according to

Kant, than that we conceive the empirical laws in analogy to the a
priori laws. That is, we must think of them as given a priori by a
superhuman mind in such a way as to fit the demands of our reason
(KU, p. xxvii). This principle of the reflective judgment Kant calls the
principle of the purposiveness of nature ("Prinzip der Zweckm/issigkeit
der Natur").
This principle of the purposiveness of nature is valid only for the
conduct of our mind and not for nature in itself. It gives no a priori
knowledge of nature. It determines conditions for our systematic ex-
planation of things but not for their observable existence. "Denn da wir
Zwecke in der Naturals absichtliche eigentlich nicht beobachten, son-
dern nur in der Reflexion fiber ihre Produkte diesen Begriff als ein
Leitfaden der Urteilskraft hinzu denken, so sind sie uns nicht durch das
Objekt gegeben" (KU, p. 336). According to this, the concept of an
inner purpose is necessary for our theory of the organism, but not for
its observation. But, as I have shown above, this does not preclude the
internal teleology of living things from having the character of a fact
rather than a hypothesis.
Kant also assumes a basic correspondence between the structure of
our minds and the structure of the world in itself. Otherwise our minds
would not work. We cannot help believing that our minds are in
harmony with the world, though we can never give a scientific proof of
this.
This assumption of a deeper structural harmony also explains why the
67
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
antinomy is not solved simply by classifying teleology as a regulative

principle that is not constitutive for observable objects. The main part
of Kant's dialectic of teleological judgment, sections 71-78, would
make little sense if the solution were that simple. It is not enough for
Kant to show that the two methodological rules do not lead to contra-
dictions within our field of empirical experience. He must also show that
they can be reconciled in the supersensual world ("das Ubersinnliche").
Kant's insistence that the antinomy must be solved not only in the
world of our actual experience but in the supersensual world of the
subject; may be significant also for modern discussions. The conflict
between reductionism and antireductionism concerns not only the field
of immediate experience, but also the sphere of theoretical construc-
tions. A methodology that wants to cover the role of theory in the
growth of science has to look beyond our present empirical basis. It has
to consider what is theoretically possible, as Kant had to consider the
supersensual world. The difference is that modern methodologists are
not likely to consider this "extrasensual" part of science as having an a
priori structure.
Kant's Resolution of the Antinomy
As already indicated, it is througl~ a limitation of the determinate

power of judgment that Kant resolves the antinomy of judgment. Some
aspects of our experience are definitively outside the bounds of a
purely mechanistic science. This allows room for, and makes necessary,
a science that explains nature teleologically. To reach a systematic
account of our experience, we must necessarily apply our reflective judg-
ment and its principle of the purposiveness of nature. In particular,
there are the living organisms, where the concept of an inner purpose is
absolutely necessary for our understanding. It is impossible even to
think of living beings as organized things without conceiving them as
produced by purpose, says Kant (KU, pp. 334-335).
Thus the existence of living organisms stands out as a fact that clearly
points beyond the limits of human understanding as defined in the
Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Biology apparently gives us indubitable
knowledge of things that we can positively know we will never be able
to understand in a strictly scientific manner. Despite its lower scientific
status, teleology, in the field of biological phenomena, gives us superior
insight. We must in the last instance consider mechanism as subordinate
to teleology (KU, sect. 80), and conceive the mechanical processes as
tools of an organic purpose (KU, p. 374).
68
But internal teleology in biology is an absolute necessity only for the

human mind. Kant repeatedly stresses that for a superhuman mind (the
"intuitive mind" or intellectus archetypus) it may well be possible to
understand the production of the living from the nonliving by mechani-
cal laws alone. This is central to Kant's idea of a full reconciliation of
mechanism and teleology: in the superhuman world the two are united
in one higher system where purpose and causal necessity coincide.
Kant explains this argument in the Kritik der Urteilskraft. He intro-
duces the concept of a completely "intelligible" world where deter-
ruination according to natural causality totally overlaps with determina.
tion according to moral laws, where there is no difference between duty
and act, or between the possible and the real (KU, p. 343). The
"intuitive mind" has a complete understanding of this world. It is not
necessary to prove the actual existence of such an intellectus arche-
typus, says Kant. Showing that we are led to this concept by reflecting
on our own discursive minds ("Intellectus ectypus"), and that the
assumption of an Intellectus archetypus does not necessarily involve us
in contraditions, is sufficient to resolve the antinomy on our level (KU,
pp. 350-351).
Thus Kant finds that the two maxims of biological science,
mechanism and teleology, are compatible. They have separate tasks in
the systematization of empirical experience, and they are not irreconcil-
able as principles of speculative reason. But even this resolution of the
antinomy was not achieved without the sacrifice of important scientific
ideas. Kant's rejection of reductionist ideas concerning embryology and
evolution is characteristic of critical teleology. Later adherents of this
view have also attempted to clip the wings of reductionism by a priori
argument.
A Retrospective Evaluation of Kant's Biological Methodology
It is easy to ridicule Kant's transcendental analysis of biology in the

light of modern biological research. Much important work of present
day biologists consists of experimental investigations that would be
impossible or even meaningless and unthinkable according to Kant.
Still, his methodological predictions have fared no worse than those of
many later critical teleologists.
Biologists are presently studying the chemical mechanisms underlying
the organic behavior of living things, which Kant claimed could only be
explained teleologically. Studying the conditions under which living
organisms will arise from nonliving matter is also a field of vigorous
69
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
research. Even if life has not yet been created by man, such a possibility
comes within the scope of legitimate problems in modern biology.
Kant also rejected the theory of evolution from primitive to higher
organic forms. In the Kritik der Urteilskraft he asserted that the
systematic relationship between organic forms, as disclosed by com-
parative anatomy, points to a real natural relationship. But the kind of
relationship he found worth considering was begetting by a common
mother ("Urmutter" or "Mutterschoss der Erde"). Such a hypothesis
may be called a fairytale of reason, admitted Kant, but it is not incom-
prehensible, like generatio aequivoca (spontaneous generation) (KU,
pp. 370-371). He found this concept meaningless. "Living matter," he
argued, is a contradiction in terms since inertia (lifelessness) belongs to
the essential characteristics of matter (KU, p. 327).
In Kant's view evolution of one organic form to another was possible
only to a very limited extent. When heritable changes occur, they are
due to the development of a purposeful disposition originally present in
the species (KU, p. 371). Again we can see the parallel between Kantian
and Artistotelian biology. Actual form is preceded by potential form.
Nothing that is in principle new is introduced into the species by this
kind of limited evolution. The more far-reaching theories of evolution
Kant countered by an old principle of rational explanation: there can-
not be more in the effect than is present in the cause. If heritable traits
are introduced by chance, one could no longer be sure that any
character or set of characters is not purely accidental, and the whole
teleological interpretation of organisms would be threatened (KU,
p. 371). Not only a Darwinian-type principle of natural selection but
also the idea of large-scale evolution of species was for Kant incompat-
ible with the concept of the organism as "Naturzweck." In general the
living world was for Kant, as it was for Aristotle, a fixed and not an
evolving system.
What then was inadequate in Kant's approach to the problem of a
biological methodology? If his critical teleology is considered as a
general view that may have some validity today, can we learn anything
from his attempt and its shortcomings?
Kant's absolutism is an obvious weak point. His belief in scientific
certainty was part of the basis for his unacceptable conclusions about
the development of biological science. But it is important to note that
this absolutism included facts closely linked to empirical experience as
well as the a priori principles of pure reason. There is a considerable
amount of positivism in Kant's theory of science - in the sense that he
wants to build science on what is positively given as facts. Through
70
philosophical analysis the factual existence of "Naturzwecke" is raised

to a methodological a priori. One could say that Kant's absolutist con-
clusions on the limitations of biological science are no less the result of
empiricist than of rationalist philosophical method.
Critical teleology can of course be adapted to a different set of
empirical facts. The borderline for mechanistic explanation will then
have to be drawn somewhat differently - a s Claude Bernard, for
example, drew it three quarters of a century after Kant. Bernard was
also quite categorical about limits of biology. Though he was himself
very active in extending the field of mechanistic explanation, his ideas
about the limits of experimental biology were surprisingly similar to
Kant's. Philosophically, Bernard was influenced by French positivism
and was a strong believer in empirical facts as the alpha and omega of
scientific knowledge.
Today further revisions of critical teleology would be necessary.
Many relevant new facts have been discovered since the days of
Bernard. And because the belief in scientific certainty has dwindled, the
conclusions about limits are likely to be less absolute. But would this be
enough to make them acceptable? The conclusions of Kant and Bernard
would have been wrong even if they had only been proposed in a
hypothetical manner.
Another important weakness of critical teleology is its negative
character with respect to the question of research strategy. It stresses
the limits to experimental and reductionist methods in biology, but
offers few suggestions on how to develop science. For the critical teleo-
logist this is a strategically unfavorable position. He is clearly the loser
if an opponent makes progress in the crucial area, and if the opponent
fails t o make such progress, the most likely result is a metaphysical
stalemate.
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM OF CLAUDE BERNARD
Besides being one of the founders of modern physiology, Claude

Bernard (1813-1878) was also one of the great authorities on the
method of experimental science. Hardly any other of the outstanding
scientists of the nineteenth century has written a methodological text
as famous as Bernard's Introduction to the Study o f Experimental
Medicine (1865). 14
14. Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine

(New York: Dover, 1957) :, the first French edition was published in Paris in 1865.
This work is hereafter cited as IEM in the text.
71
N1LS ROLL-HANSEN
However, Bernard's methodological influence was greater outside

science than within, and the fame of his Introduction was to a large
extent posthumous. For example, the German physiologist Elie yon
Cyon, who had studied with Bernard, praised him for experimental
ingenuity and neglected his methodological theories) s The French
novelist Emile Zola, on the other hand, had a strong interest in
Bernard's writings on scientific method. When first published, the Intro-
duction was overlooked by the scientific journals, and it had no great
success with the general public, claims Grmek. Only by 1898 did it gain
a large circulation. Grmek also poir~ts out that the first English edition
was not published until 1927 and the first German edition not until
1961. :6 Bergson's address at the centennial of Bernard's birth in 1913
gave a considerable push to the interest in his methodology. He com-
pared the importance of Bernard's Introduction to that of Descartes'
Discourse on Method in marking a new era in science: Bernard, he said,
introduced experimental science, "the science of the laboratories. ''17
It is also significant for an analysis of Bernard's methodology that his
period of high scientific creativity was short. With mild puzzlement his
pupil Paul Bert (1879) noted that by 1851 Bernard had already made
his main experimental discoveries) 8 The methodology was worked out
later, when he was active as a statesman of science rather than as a
scientific discoverer. This suggests that Bernard's methodology played
its important role in debates over science policy issues rather than in
concrete research.
From these cold facts it appears that the influence of Bernard's
methodology both on the views of other people and on his own dis-
coveries has often been exaggerated. Still, there can be no doubt that
Bernard's methodological analysis of the field to which he made major
contributions is of great interest. A more sober and critical assessment
of his achievements may bring out aspects that enhance their interest
for students of the history and philosophy of science.
In two recent books Grmek and Holmes have discussed the develop-
15. Elie von Cyon, "Bernard," in Biographische Lexicon der Hervorragender

Arzte, 1st ed. (1884), p. 418.
16. Mirko Drazen Grmek, Raissonement experimental et recherches toxico-
logiques chez Claude Bernard (Paris: Droz, 1973), p. 15.
17. Henri Bergson, "The Philosophy of Claude Bernard" (address of the cen-
tenary celebration of Bernard's birth, December 30, 1913 at Coll~ge de France),
Bull. Inst. Hist. Med., 4 (1936), 421,433.
18. Paul Bert, "Les travaux de Claude Bernard," Revue Scientifique, 2nd ser.,
16 (1879); this article also appears in Mathias Duval, ed., L'oeuvre de Claude
Bernard (Paris: Ballibre, 1881).
72
ment of Bernard's methodological ideas in the early period when he was

most active in experimental research. 19 Holmes also gives a detailed
description of the physiological scene in France during Bernard's form-
ative years, concentrating on his relationships and controversies with
the chemists. A full historical understanding of Bernard's antireduc-
tionism must obviously take these controversies as a main starting point
and follow their further development, or aftermath. Here I limit myself
to analyzing the structure of Bernard's theory of biological science as it
is expressed in a few of his later writings.
The Introduction to Experimental Medicine contains the essence of
Bernard's ideas about biology. The brilliant prospects that Bernard
perceives for the new science of experimental medicine (biology) are
eloquently set forth in this book. But the method of this new science is
more clearly defined in Rapport sur le progrks et la marche de la
physiologie g~n~rale en France (1867) and Lefons sur les ph~nom~nes
de la vie communes aux animaux et aux vegetaux (1878). 2o My analysis
will be based mainly on these two works, where Bernard elaborates on
the limitations of the experimental method in biology and on the
special characteristics of physiology that distinguishes it from physico-
chemical science on the one hand and natural history on the other.
Bernard, like Kant, took experimental physical science as the
paradigm of true scientific method, and like Kant he found inherent
limits to this method in the living world. On this basis he introduced
teleology as a necessary but subjective principle in biology. Despite dif-
fering context and purpose, Bernard's compromise between teleology
and reductionism bears a structural similarity to Kant's critical teleo-
logy. Kant's basic interest in the teleological part of the Kritik der
Urteilskraft lies in the physico-teleological proof of the existence of
Cod, while Bernard's interest in the Rapport and the Phdnom~nes is to
define physiology as an autonomous science with a distinct method.
But in both cases the limitation of experimental method in the living
world is a central part of the argument. Kant's limits serve the interests
of theology and Bernard's those of the physiologists. In both cases the
19. Grmek, Raissonnement experimental; Frederick Lawrence Holmes, Claude

Bernard and Animal Chemistry (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1974).
20. Bernard, Rapport. Claude Bernard, Legons sur les ph~nom~nes de la vie
communes aux animaux et aux vdg~taux, 2 vols. (Paris, 1878); vol. II (1879) was
edited by Dastre on the basis of notes made by Bernard before his death. Vol. I of
this work will hereafter be cited as PV in the text.
73
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
integration of internal scientific and external social purpose leads to

repudiation of fruitful scientific theory.
Experiment as the Basis of Science
The pragmatic interpretation of scientific knowledge is central to

Bernard's methodology. It alleviates the universality of his scientific
determinism, and it links science with technology - on the abstract
level. Human action codified in the scientific experiment is the source
of true scientific knowledge about nature. It is through our active inter.
ference with nature that we gain knowledge. For Bernard as for Kant
the area of validity for deterministic physical science is defined by the
extent of the phenomena that can be experimentally manipulated by
Man.
Despite his pragmatic, experimental perspective Kant still had a
largejy contemplative attitude to science. Bernard was much more
activistic in his conception of natural science. He was almost aggressive
in his wish to improve nature by means of science: "The whole idea of
modern science is: to conquer nature, to take its secrets by force and
use them for the profit of humanity" (RPP, p. 142). According to
Bernard, modern man had comprehended that not contemplation, but
progress through action is the aim ("but") of mankind (RPP, p. 233).
His belief in the ability of man to change or re-create nature sometimes
seems without limits, as in this passage from the Introduction: "With
the help of these active experimental sciences, man becomes an in-
ventor of phenomena, a real foreman of creation; and under this head
we cannot set limits to the power that he may gain over nature through
future progress in the experimental sciences" (IEM, p. 18). The activist
attitude is prominent in the Introduction of 1865 and the Rapport of
1867 but considerably subdued in the Phdnomknes of 1878. This dif-
ference reflects not only a different audience - t h e general public
versus the student of b i o l o g y - but probably also a tempering of
Bernard's enthusiasm for the experimental method. In his latest work
practical applications have receded into the background andhe is more
willing to accept the value of traditional disciplines like descriptive
morphology and systematics.
The difference between Bernard and Kant is not surprising given the
fact that in Bernard's age the practical application of science had gained
an importance that was unknown at the time of Kant - a change that is
closely connected with the rise of such typically experimental
disciplines as chemistry and physiology. It is more noteworthy that
74
human action was central already to Kant's conception of scientific

knowledge. The implications of the above quotations also become less
far-reaching when we remember that Bernard, at least in his later works,
limits the scope of biological experimentation in much the same way as
Kant.
Limits to Exact Experimen tal Methods
"Physiological determinism" is a basic idea in Bernard's methodology.

It implies that "determinism" is as valid in biology as in physical
science.
As I noted above, determinism in science as Bernard conceives it is
based on experiment. Experimental science was to Bernard the highest
form of science (RPP, p. 141), and he wanted to create a new and more
progressive biology by introducing the experimental methods that had
proved so successful in physics and chemistry, with proper modifi-
cations. But because there are intrinsic limitations to human experimen-
tation, in particular with living nature, there is also a limitation to
determinism.
To Bernard determinism in experimental natural science meant in
particular two things: first, that natural phenomena are regular (law-
like) and, second, that they are subject to determinate physicochemical
conditions.
The first point can be interpreted as a general demand for deductive-
nomological explanation. A particular event is explained when it
follows deductively from a set of laws plus a set of initial conditions.
Bernard insists strongly that nature is regulated by unchangeable laws:
"there is nothing disturbed or abnormal in nature; everything happens
according to laws which are absolute, i.e., always normal and deter-
mined" (IEM, p. 10). However, before one defines what is to count as
law this claim of lawlikeness is relatively uncommitting.
But the second point is directly relevant for the question of critical
teleology versus methodological reductionism. Like Kant, Bernard pre-
supposed that only the phenomena that we can handle experimentally
are fully intelligible to science and that experimental physical science
embodies the essence of science. He stressed that we are only able to
interact with nature through physicochemical conditions: "the physio-
logist can only act on the phenomena of life through the intermediate
of determinate physicochemical conditions" (RPP, p. 134).
This aspect of Bernard's determinism implies that if there are no
accessible physicochemical conditions for certain phenomena, then
75
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
these phenomena cannot be subjected to determinist principles. They

will be outside the reach of physiology (experimental biology). Accord-
ing to Bernard's view, morphological processes are not accessible to
experimental method. Like Kant, he rejected heredity and embryology
as well as the evolution of species as topics for an experimentally based
biological science.
Bernard describes morphological development as the effect of a "vital
force," admitting that the term "force" is misleading (PV, p. 50). He
explains that the "vital force" is not a physically active force. It is only
a subjective principle necessary for our minds in the search for unitary
and comprehensive explanations. The "vital force" that directs morpho-
logical development in a purposive way is relegated to the sphere of
"metaphysics":
La force vitale, la vie, appartiennent au monde m~taphysique; leur

expression est une n6cessit~ de l'esprit: nous ne pouvons nous en
servir que subjectivement...
En un mot, cette facult~ ~volutive, directrice, morphologique, par

laquelle on caract6rise, la vie, est inutile a la physiologie exp6rimen-
tale, parce que, 6tant en dehors de monde physique, elle ne peut
exercer aucune action r~troactive sur lui. (PV,p. 54)
When interpreted along these lines, the physiological determinism of

Bernard appears as a critical teleology built on two characteristic basic
ideas: the limitation of experimental method and the necessity of a
subjective teleological priniple. The difference between the biological
methodologies of Kant and Bernard is mainly that Kant has the
perspective of the outsider while Bernard has that of the scientist work-
ing inside biology.
But it is hard to give a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of
Bernard's methodology. His statements have the eloquence appropriate
to a member of the Academie Fran~aise, but they are also imprecise
and conflicting. It is not without reason that his methodology has been
embraced by philosophers with highly diverging views. In comparison
Kant is a paradigm of clarity, once one succeeds in penetrating the
complex verbiage. I believe that my interpretation of Bernard on the
pattern of Kant is warranted by its simplicity and systematic com-
prehensiveness together with the clarification that it can give to more
specific issues in Bernard's methodology. In what follows I will analyze
more closely his views on theory and observation, on natural history,
76
on teleology, on morphological "laws," and on the evolution of species.

My interpretation does not imply that Bernard had any deep knowl-
edge of Kant's teleology or of his philosophical system in general. On
the contrary, Bernard's remarks in the Ph~nomknes (pp. 25-26), clas-
sifying Kant as a vitalist, reveal a very superficial knowledge of his
writings. Bernard's outlook was formed by the philosophical lore of the
French scientific community around the middle of the nineteenth
century, including strong currents of positivism. Without entering on a
broad comparison of Bernards thought and Kantianism, I only claim
that Bernard's methodology of biological science shows enough struc-
tural similarity to make Kant's critical teleology a very useful analytical
tool.
Positivist Epistemology
Bernard was one of the "true friends of positivism," according

D. G. Charlton's Positivist Thought in France during the Second
Empire. 21 Bernard was more positivist than famous "positivists" like
Comte, Renan, and Taine because he did not succumb to metaphysical
construction, claims Charlton. 22 The positivist ideal of knowledge was
based on a theory of knowledge in natural science. In Charlton's inter-
pretation of positivism there are two principles of special relevance to
my discussion: first, that scientific knowledge must be built from
positively given (observable) facts, not from speculative theories; second,
that science only describes the relations and laws of phenomena; the
things in themselves are inaccessible to scientific knowledge. These two
empiricist doctrines are central to Bernard's methodology of biology.
Though he insisted strongly on the indispensability of theory as a
guide to interesting discoveries, Bernard shows a typical positivist faith
in absolute facts that are the outcome of unprejudiced observation. He
stresses that without theoretical speculation there can be no science
(IEM, p. 24), and he warns against "blind belief in fact." This is "as
dangerous to experimental science as the beliefs of feeling or faith,
which also forces silence on reason" (1EM, p. 53). But the autonomous
and unambiguous nature of facts, once they have been established, is
not in doubt. The theories (hypotheses) are only scaffolding to be
removed after the completion of the structure. "Science is constituted
21. D.G. Charlton, Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959).
22. Ibid.,p. 72.
77
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
by facts but it develops ('marche et s'ddifie') with the aid of hypo-

theses" (PV, p. 32). To secure "correct and well-established" facts that
can serve as a reliable control for our theoretical ideas, we must act as
passive observers that "photograph" nature, argues Bernard: "Observers
then must be photographers of phenomena; their observations must
accurately represent nature. We must observe without any preconceived
idea; the observer's mind must be passive, that is, must hold its peace; it
listens to nature and writes at nature's dictation" (IEM, p. 22).
The distinction between secondary and primary causes is basic to
Bernard's distinction between physiology and natural history. It is the
secondary or effective causes ("causes secondes ou actuelles") that con-
stitute the field of experimental science. The primary cause ("cause
premi6re") is not accessible to our observation or manipulation. It
belongs to the sphere of things in themselves. Morphological pheno-
mena like embryological development have no secondary causes,
according to Bernard. Their causes belong to the realm of primary
causes. This implies that there can be no experimental science of such
phenomena (PV, p. 331).
The positivist character of Bernard's methodology is reflected in the
comments of Pierre Duhem. 2a He held a conventionalist theory of
science and used Bernard's analysis of the methodology of physiology
as a contrast to illustrate the nonpositivist character of physical science,
in particular the dependence of all observation on some kind of theory.
In Duhem's methodology (of physics) there is no room for absolute
observational facts isolated from all theory.
"The experimental testing of a theory does not have the same logical
simplicity in physics as in physiology" is Duhem's thesis. 24 In physics,
he argues, "it is impossible to leave outside the laboratory door the
theory that we wish to test, for without theory it is impossible to
regulate a single instrument or to interpret a single reading. ''25 Duhem
explains this apparent difference between physics and physiology by
the less advanced state of the latter. And he then remarks somewhat
condescendingly that even the less advanced disciplines of experimental
science, like physiology and certain branches of chemistry, do not
escape the general logic of scientific development. In making use of
physical instruments the physiologist and the chemist implicitly accept
23. Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (New York:
Atheneum, 1962); the first French edition was published in 1906.
24. Ibid.,p. 180.
25. Ibid., p. 182.
78
"with these instruments the theories without which their readings

would be devoid of meaning. ''26
Like a good positivist, Bernard wanted to disengage science from
metaphyscial ideas (PV, p. 45). The consideration of primary causes is a
task for philosophy and theology, but not for science. He rejects both
vitalism and materialism because they do not keep strictly to positive
science but invoke untestable metaphysical ideas. They make the mis-
take of looking for primary causes. The vitalists attempt to explain the
purposeful organization of living things by reference to a special vital
force that acts physically together with or in opposition to the physico-
chemical forces (PV, p. 47). The materialists, on the other hand, believe
that they can explain the organization of living things as the result of
purely physical processes. To Bernard it is inconceivable that purely
physical conditions can give rise to the characteristic organization of
living things and processes (PV, p. 46). He does not deny that in the
distant past living things may have arisen from inorganic matter and
evolved gradually into the species that we know today. But he holds
that such processes are outside the province of experimental science.
The investigation of their causes belongs to metaphysics, though the
traces of these processes in present-day nature can be described and
systematized by natural history.
Physiology versus Natural History
Bernard makes a sharp methodological distinction between physio-

logy on the one hand and traditional botany and zoology on the other.
The latter belong to natural history ("les sciences naturelles"), like
geology, while the former is an experimental science like physics or
chemistry. Both kinds of science treat of the same objects, living or
nonliving, "but they are nevertheless radically distinct, because their
point of view and their problems are essentially different." Natural
history is contemplative. It is based on observation and can only
achieve prediction of phenomena. The experimental sciences are active
and aim at conquering nature. "The observer considers phenomena in
the condition offered by nature; the experimentator makes them
appear under conditions of which he is the master," explains Bernard
(RPP, p. 132). Physiology can no more be subsumed under botany or
zoology than chemistry can be subsumed under mineralogy (RPP,
p. 141).
26. Ibid.,p. 183.
79
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
This characterization of the distinction is taken from the Rapport sur

le progrOs et la marche de la physiologie g~nHale en France, which was
written as part of a general survey of French science in connection with
the Paris World Exhibition in 1867. Bernard was strongly engaged in
establishing physiology as an autonomous science with adequate
material support, and this report was an occasion for marshalling the
arguments. As an experimental science, physiology is the most
advanced part of biology, claims Bernard. As the youngest and most
difficult biological science, it is also the one most urgently in need of
support (RPP, pp. 140-142).
These methodological views of Bernard where naturally disliked by
biologists working within the traditional branches of biology. They
refused to accept that Bernard's experimental method represented a
revolutionary break with general biology. An example of the criticism
that was raised is the "Note on the Role of Observation and Experi-
ment in Physiology" presented to the Academy o f Science by
J.-J.-V. Coste in 1868. Bernard gave a rather dogmatic and abstract
reply. 27 Another critic was Henri de Lacaze Duthiers. The program
article of the first issue of the Archives de zoologie experimentale et
gdnOrale (1872), which he edited, was largely concerned with establish-
ing that tile French physiological school, headed by Bernard, had no
copyright on the experimental method in biology. 2s
The historical context suggests that it was Bernard's engagement in
research politics that spurred his methodological thinking, with his
earlier experimental work being applied a s illustrative material. It was in
policy discussions rather than in research work that his methodology
had direct relevance. Bernard wanted to make room for physiology
between chemistry on the one hand and traditional biology on the
other. By borrowing principles from both sides, Bernard constructed
physiology as an autonomous discipline distinct from both of the old
ones. This double origin of his physiology is explained in the introduc-
tory lecture of his Ph~nombnes. He united the physicochemical physio-
logy of Lavoisier and the general anatomy of Bichat into a single
science, the new physiology (PV, p. 9).
Bernard balanced the mistakes of one side by the virtues of the other.
The chemists had tended to disregard the particular complexity of
27. Jean-Jacques-VictorCoste, "Note sur le rSle de l'observation et de l'exp6ri-

mentation en physiologie," CR. Acad. ScL, 66 (1868) 1278-1285; and Bernard's
reply to Coste, C.R. Acad. ScL, 67 (1868), 1285-1288.
28. Henri de Lacaze Duthiers, "Direction des 6tudes zoologiques,"Archives de
zoologie exp~rimentale et g$n~rale, I (1872), 17-64.
80
organic structures and processes. Their materialist prejudices would not

allow them to believe that the organization of the living world sets it
basically apart from the inorganic world, though the material parts of
which they consist are indistinguishable. Therefore, the chemists had
misguidedly come to hold simplistic views and make premature con-
clusions. The biologists on the other side had not appreciated the force
of chemical and physical methods. Instead of trying to explain pheno-
mena as far as possible by the determinist principles of experimental
science, they tended to appeal to vital principles inaccessible to proper
scientific testing. In Bernard's view vitalism implied a denial of the
regularity of vital phenomena. They were conceived as capricious and
unstable, and therefore inaccessible to the deterministic methods of
experimental science. Even Bichat was to some extent misled by such
vitalism, regrets Bernard (PV, pp. 57-59). But the vitalists were right
insofar as teleology is necessary as a subjective principle.
Matter and Form: Morphological Laws
Bernard supported the autonomy of physiology by elaborating the

distinction between matter and form in living things. Form is studied
by traditional disciplines like taxonomy, morphology, and anatomy,
while living matter is the object of physiology. Living matter represents
the common vital properties belonging to all living things, while
morphological form is specific for the different kinds. This is implied in
the title of Bernard's Lefons sur les ph~nom~nes de la vie communes
aux animaux et aux vOg~taux, which aims to circumscribe the field of
physiology.
Living matter, or "protoplasm" as Bernard often calls it, has no
specific biological form, but only the general form of life. It is "un-
defined life" and has all the essential properties of life, but lacks the
more diversified and well-defined expressions that are typical of higher
organisms (PV, p. 292). As the study of the general form of life, physio-
logy is set apart from chemistry on the one hand and the morphological
disciplines on the other.
Bernard illustrated the idea of protoplasm by a series of primitive
microorganisms that approximate the state of amorphous living matter.
Among them we find as a point of curiosity the infamous amoeba,
Bathybius Haeckelii (PV, p. 299). It was discovered by Huxley in 1868
and thought to cover the bottom of the oceans as a kind of primeval
slime, but later found to be an artifact. Bernard did not quite escape
the influence of frivolous evolutionist speculation, despite his positivist
precautions.
8I
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
Quite contrary to modern ideas, Bernard maintained that the

chemical properties of protoplasm cannot explain morphological
phenomena. He claimed that the differences between biological forms
have no basis in their protoplasm: "La forme ne serait donc pas une
consequence de la nature de la mati~re vitale. Une protoplasme identi-
que dans son essence ne saurait donner origine a tant de figures diff~-
rentes. Ce n'est point par une propri6t6 du protoplasme que l'on peut
expliquer la morphologie de l'animal ou de la plante" (PV, p. 293). In
this way Bernard used the distinction between form and matter to
establish a fundamental difference between morphological and chemical
synthesis in living organisms. These two kinds of processes are "con-
fused because of their simultaneity," argued Bernard, but "they are
essentially distinct in their nature" (PV, p. 296). Where the study of
forms (morphology) begins, chemistry proper ceases. According to
Bernard, the laws determining the morphological development of the
organism are quite distinct from chemical and physical laws (pIT,
p. 330).
The irreducibility of morphological laws is the basis of Bernard's
antireductionism and his claim of an autonomous physiological science.
Chemists can make the same chemical compounds as the living
organism, explains Bernard, but they cannot make them in the same
way - by means of the same process. This is impossible in principle,
and not just for present-day scientists, because the instruments of the
organism depend on the morphological structure, which is a product of
the morphological laws and cannot be artificially produced by man.
Bernard mentions the ferments (enzymes) as the simplest irreducible
components of this morphological structure: "Le chimiste pourra faire
les pro duits de l'6tre vivant, mais il ne fera jamais ses outils, parce qu'ils
sont le r~sultat m~me de la morphologie organique, qui ainsi que nous
le verrons bient6t, est hors du chimisme proprement dit; et sous ce
rapport il n'est pas plus possible au chimiste de fabriquer le ferment le
plus simple que de fabrique l'~tre vivant tout entier" (PV, p. 227).
Physiology, accordingly, investigates the processes by which the
organism produces the various chemical compounds, and is a fundamen-
tally autonomous discipline because of the irreducibility of the
morphological structures.
This view of morphology must also imply that Bernard rejects
spontaneous creation as a scientific problem, because the artificial
creation of living organisms from nonliving matter is impossible without
mastering the morphological laws. Bernard is not as emphatic as Kant
on the issue of spontaneous generation. And the general scientific
82
activism of Bernard apparently made many people believe that he con-

sidered the creation of life to be possible. For example, Lacaze Duthiers
remarked in a footnote that his expectations on the scientific conquest
of nature "are not as great as those of Mr. Bernard, and we do not, like
him, dare hope to see new organisms created by man. ''29 But the
creation of new kinds of organisms that Bernard in certain places
envisions seems limited to modifications (RPP, p. 234). For a more fun-
damental change in living organisms to be possible would be contrary
to Bernard's distinction between matter and form in the living
organism.
Morphological laws are not absolute in the same way as physical laws.
But they have to be considered as unchangeable from the point of
view of man. Bernard did not deny that evolution of species has taken
place in the distant past. But the causes of this evolution are completely
inaccessible to our science, because it is basically an experimental
science, In Bernard's terminology they were primary causes (PV,
p. 331).-From the point of view or our science, morphological develop-
ment (of the individual) must be regarded as a phenomenon that
repeats itself regularly from generation to generation without any
efficient cause, in this sense the patterns of development are morpho-
logical "laws." They are a substitute for a full scientific explanation in
terms of physical laws and efficient causes.
It is above all by studying individual development that one obtains an
idea of the laws that regulate the morphology of living organisms. From
the beginning one perceives the existence of an ideal plan that is
realized step by step, explained Bernard (PV, p. 330). The morpho-
logical laws give a systematization of developmental processes and of
the history of the evolution of species. These laws therefore belong to
the domain of classical descriptive biology (natural history) and not to
physiology (PV, p. 341).
Bernard divorced natural history from explanation in terms of
efficient causes, and by doing this he made room for the use of teleo-
logical explanations built on morphological laws. But it is quite clear
that in Bernard's system such laws and such explanations have an in-
ferior status. They are not scientific in the strict sense of experimental
science.
Bernard's Teleology
Explanation in terms of final causes is a necessary principle in

29. LacazeDuthiers, "Direction," p. 64.
83
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
Bernard's methodology of biology, but it is a necessity only for human

thinking and not for nature itself: "La finalit6 n'est point une loi
physiologique, comme le disent certaines philosophes: c'est bien plut6t
une loi rationelle de l'esprit" (PV, p. 338). Bernard did not in this
connection refer to Kant's principle of the purposiveness of nature. But
he quoted a similar idea from Spinoza: "The final causes.., do not
mark the nature of things, but only the constitution of our imaginative
faculty."
When Bernard applied the concept of "force vital" to explain the
purposive and organic nature of living things, he often used a concrete
physical language that gives the impression of an entity with direct
physical effects. But at the same time he stressed its subjective charac-
ter. It is a regulative and not a constitutive principle, in the Kantian
terminology. Bernard called it "methaphysical" (PV, p. 54).
The vital force was characterized as "legislative" and not "executive."
According to Bernard, it "directs" phenomena, but does not "produce"
them: "La force vitale dirige des ph6nombnes qu'elle ne produit pas; les
agents physiques produisent des ph6nom~nes qu'ils ne dirigent pas"
(PV, p. 51). This quaint and obscure terminology becomes intelligible
when considered in light of the above anlysis of morphological laws.
The vital force corresponds to the primary causes behind morphological
development. It does not produce its effects in the direct manner of
efficient causes. Its existence is only inferred from the effects that are
described by the morphological laws. "Legislating" and "directing" are
further removed from the physical facts than "executing" and "produc-
ing." And the expression "morphological law" directly suggests the
term "legislative" to characterize the vital force.
But it now also appears that the vital force has, in an important way,
primacy over the chemicophysical forces. Though the vital force is only
subjective and scientifically not quite acceptable, it represents the
framework within which these forces must act. In this sense it directs
them, and mechanism becomes subordinated to teleology in Bernard's
methodology. 30 This relation between mechanism and teleology corres.
ponds closely to Kant's idea about "the necessary subordination of the
mechanical principle under the teleological in the explanation of a thing
as a purpose of nature" (KU, p. 336). In both cases the teleological
principles are necessary parts of biology, but only on a subjective basis.
No complete description of organic structure is possible without them.
Teleology is an essential part of our concept of an organism, but this
30. Cf Schiller, ClaudeBernard,p. 88.
84
concept is incapable of full explanation in physicochemical terms. The

overall structure of the organism can only be explained teleologically,
while its components and the separate processes taking place within it
can be explained physically.
This subordination of mechanism to teleology is a consequence of the
pragmatic epistemology of Kant and Bernard, which makes human
action the basis of physical knowledge, together with their belief in
Certain absolute limits to human experimentation with living organisms.
These limits are linked to our immediate perception of living things as
basically different from nonliving things, which constitutes the factual
basis of the critical teleology of Kant and Bernard. It just seems com-
pletely inconceivable to them that man will ever become able to experi-
mentally change the "laws" of development. (And in the back of their
minds they may have added that this would be a dangerous thing any-
wa¢)
Kant gave the internal purposiveness of living organisms a special
status relative to other kinds of purposiveness in nature. His analysis of
the organism as a "Naturzweck" has a factual character. As far as our
human understanding goes, the organism is necessarily a "Naturzweck,"
though it cannot as such be integrated into physical science. This is the
factual basis of Kant's teleology.
Bernard also emphasized the internal teleology of living organisms as
the basis for claiming teleology to be necessary in biological science. He
described the organism of harmonically cooperating functions, "a small
world where each part is made for the others." This exemplifies "intra-
organic teology" or "particular finality" as opposed to "general
finality." The latter has to do with the external relationships between
an organism and its environment. "Only particular finality is absolute,"
claims Bernard. "Only in this case can one see an intention which is
e x e c u t e d . . , the laws of particular finality are necessary, the laws of
general finality are contingent" (PV, pp. 340 0.
The Evolution of Species
I have already suggested that Bernard's fundamental separation of

physiology and natural history is not easily compatible with a naturalis-
tic theory about the evolution of species, for example, Charles Darwin's
theory of the origin of species by natural selection. Darwin wanted to
explain the multitude of organic forms in nature as the result of the
same kind of efficient causes that we can observe operating today.
Bernard, as we have seen, stressed the fundamental difference between
85
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
the efficient causes of chemistry and physics and the causes of organic
f o r m - the latter being final or primary causes outside the reach of
experimental sciences and outside the power of man.
Darwin starts his exposition in The Origin o f Species with a discussion

of the domestic breeding of plants and animals. Domestic breeding
brings about the same kind of changes in organic forms as takes place in
purely natural evolution, and it is in fact an experimental analogy to
the natural evolution of species. In The Variation o f Animals and Plants
under Domestication (1868) Darwin asserted: "Man, therefore, may be
said to have been trying an experiment which nature during the long
lapse of time has incessantly° tried."as The causes of morphological forms
and of hereditary morphological changes through the generations seem,
for Darwin, to fall clearly within the scope of experimental science. His
idea of evolution through natural selection is based on the unification
of natural history and experimental natural science and not on their
separation, which is the pivot of Bernard's methodology.
Both Darwin and Bernard had very insufficient ideas about heredity.
But while Darwin through his speculations on panspermia attempted to
formulate the principles of a physicochemical theory of heredity,
Bernard considered the principles of heredity to lie outside the reach of
biology as an experimental science. Bernard admits that in breeding
employing crosses and selection heredity is made into an experimental
condition. But the changes brought about are superficial. They do not
affect the fundamentals of heredity, which remain obscure: "A la v6rit6
on peut consid6rer l'h6r6dit~ comme une condition exp6rimentale et
l'employer, comme on fait en zootechnie, par les croisements et la
s61ection. On substitue ainsi des atavismes fugaces ~t l'atavisme fonda-
mentale; mais on met en oeuvre, dans de telles exp6riences, une con-
dition qui n'en reste pas moins obscure" (PV, p. 342).
Darwin stressed the importance of physiological research in elucidat-
ing the mechanisms of evolution. Bernard on his side saw no impor-
tance for physiology in the ideas of evolution through natural selection.
From his physiological point of view, there was no difference between a
doctrine that each species is specially created, as Cuvier, for example,
maintained, and a Darwinian theory of the origin of species. According
to Bernard, these theories concern only the distant past and have
nothing to do with the possibility of influencing the future course of
31. CharlesDarwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication,

popular ed. (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 3.
86
nature: " . . . en l'6tat actuel des choses la morphologie est fix6e et cela
bien entendu quelle que soit l'id~e que nous formions de l'6volution qui
y a conduit. Que l'on soit Cuvieriste ou Darwiniste, cela importe peu: ce
sont deux faqons diff~rentes de comprendre l'histoire du pass6 et
l'~tablissement du r6gime present; cela ne peut fournir aucun moyen de
r~gler l'avenir" (PV, p. 332). This equivalence between Cuvier and
Darwin shows how much closer Bernard's conception of the system and
harmony of the living world is to Cuvier's than to Darwin's. Bernard,
like Cuvier, did not accept the origin of species as a scientific problem.
Bernard's views on the origin of species and organic evolution looked
back to the static natural systems of the eighteenth century rather than
forward to the integrated biochemical evolutionary biology of the
twentieth century - the so-called neo-Darwinian theory.
"Evolution" is a central term for Bernard, but it generally refers to
individual development, not the development of species. "Evolution,"
says Bernard, "is probably the most remarkable character of living
organisms and consequently of life." He then explains what he means by
the evolution of an organism: "The living being appears, grows, declines
and dies" (PV, p. 33). Bernard is clearly thinking of the life cycle of the
individual and not of the development of a species through successive
generations. In another place, he argues that the idea of evolution
achieved a clear meaning only through the work of contemporary
embryologists (PV, p. 384). Bernard also stated a "law of evolution"
that not only neglects the evolution of species, but apparently contra-
dicts it: "The principle of evolution consists precisely in this affirma-
tion that nothing is born, nothing is created, everything continues"
(PV, pp. 3840. In other words, individual development follows un-
changing morphological laws.
Bernard discarded the theory of embryological preformation, as Kant
had done before him. But Bernard's own epigenetic theory accepted
that "the complete being is contained in its point of departure." This
means that the complete form of the organism is not manifest in the
egg but only latent. It is manifestly given at the origin of the species in
the far past and repeats itself in each life cycle, but there is no efficient
cause of development present at each stage: "Ainsi, ce qui est essentiel,
fondamental et characteristique de l'activit6 vital, c'est cette facult6
d'~volution qui fait que l'6tre complet est contenue dans son point de
d6part" (PV, p. 385). "Evolution" to Bernard meant the development
of an individual according to a certain pattern determined by its
descent, and the law of evolution said that this pattern is repeated
without change.
87
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
Some historians of science writing about Bernard have not taken

sufficient care to distinguish between the development of the individual
and the evolution of species, for example, Schiller and Poupa. 32 It is
misleading when Schiller takes Bernard to be interested in the same
problems of "evolution" as Darwin. Bernard's "declarations in favor of
evolution are numerous and unequivocal," writes Schiller. a3 As I have
shown above, evolution to Bernard meant the development of the in-
dividual, and he did not even accept Darwin's problem as scientific.
Schiller's comparison of the roles of Darwin and Bernard in the
development of biology therefore rests on conceptual confusion:
La nature des problbmes, qu'ils se proposent de rrsoudre les oblige

regarder des modalitrs diff~rentes de l'rvolution: la phylog~nie par
Darwin, l'ontog~nie par Claude Bernard. L'un vise fi l'universel, l'autre
vise au particulier. Darwin a laiss6 une throrie explicative, Claude
Bernard a laiss~ une mrthode. Historiquement, run clrt une periode,
celle des naturalistes dont son oeuvre repr~sente une somme, l'autre
oeuvre une bre nouvelle, celle de la mrthode exp~rimentale qui se
continue de nos jours, a4
From Darwinian (or rather neo-Darwinian) point of view, evolution is

phylogeny, and ontogeny is only a part of phylogeny. The development
of each individual is just a small part of the comprehensive phylogenetic
process. It makes little sense to put phylogeny and ontogeny on a par as
two modalities of the same "evolution."
An Evaluation of Bernard's Methodology
In light of the preceding analysis, the praise often accorded to

Bernard for his contribution to the foundation of modern biology
through a lucid explication of its methodology appears exaggerated. His
direct contributions to the growth of physiology were important, and
through this work he undoubtedly gave great impetus to the formation
of a modern, chemically based biology. But from a modern point of
view, his explicit methodology is quite conservative in the strict limits it
sets to the possible future development of experimental biology.
Bernard argued that it was in principle impossible to investigate the
chemical basis of heredity and morphological development. His
32. Schiller, Claude Bernard; Poupa, "Le probl~me."
33. Schiller, Claude Bernard, p. 147.
34. Ibid., p. 140.
88
methodology turned out to be as incompatible with the concerns of

modern biology as that of Kant. Chemical explanation of development
and form in living organisms is at the center of current research in
biology. And great progress has been made in the field, starting in the
late nineteenth century - at about the same time as Bernard formulat-
ed his methodology. More specific knowledge about how morphological
information stored in the genetic substance comes into play in the
developing organism in interaction with the environment is still scarce.
But it is presently a field of very active research.
Through positivist methodological principles Bernard wanted to free
science from obscure metaphysical ideas that he thought would only
lead people astray and thereby impede the progress of knowledge. His
warning against rash and simplistic attempts to reduce organic pheno-
mena to physicochemical structures and processes was not untimely.
Really successful reductionist attacks on the morphological processes
only became possible with the development of microanatomy and
sophisticated biochemistry in the middle of the twentieth century.
Bernard had concrete experience with the premature reductionist con-
clusions reached by chemists on physiological questions because of
their lack of respect for the complexities of organic structure. But his
positivist rejection of the absolutism of metaphysical speculation was
combined with a positivist belief in absolute facts. And as it turned out
some of the facts that he found it impossible to deny contained their
own metaphysical prejudices. Heredity and development are not in-
accessible to experimental human science, and the "morphological
laws" do not have their basis in "primary causes." The fate of Bernard's
methodology of biology can teach us to beware of the prejudice that
what is obviously impossible today will remain so in the future.
Bernard's, and Kant's, solution to the conflict between reductionism
and teleology was a compromise based on the separation of science
from philosophy. Like all compromises, this one did not really solve the
problem, but simply buried it under a heap of theoretical arguments,
with the hope that in time it would dissolve by itself. As it turned out,
they had given too much to teleology and the extrascientific interests.
Today we can say that the particular form that they gave critical teleo-
logy, including the specific limits on experimental biology, was unten-
able, and clearly inferior to methodological reductionism. But this does
not necessarily imply that the central idea of a critical teleology - a
mechanist world with a purposeful and extrascientific origin and struc-
ture - is untenable. The idea can well be adapted to the present climate
of thought, where it is generally accepted that all things consist of the
89
NILS ROLL-HANSEN
same kind of physical matter, but also commonly assumed that living,
and especially thinking beings, still are very special.
It could be argued that Bernard's critical teleology was a tactically
useful compromise from the point of view of developing reductionist
research programs. Critical teleology allowed reductionism to expand
where this was possible at the time, and at the same time gave protec-
tion against externally based philosophical and theological attacks.
Bernard was fighting on two fronts, against vitalists as well as
mechanists. His limitation of the mechanist prospects for the future
could be seen as a tactical concession that freed him to fight the
vitalists more efficiently. Disengagement from more distant reductionist
aims may have saved him from a lot of fruitless discussions and from
attacking problems that were not yet ripe for solution. The compromise
of critical teleology may therefore have been the most efficient way of
furthering the reduction of biology at the time.
The value of such a tactical interpretation is doubtful, however. From
Bernard's writings it appears obvious that he sought a systematic theory
of biological method, a theory that would draw the limits once and for
all. Bernard lived in an epoch with much more faith in the final and
absolutely certain character of scientific knowledge than we have to-
day. One's impression is that he took the compromise seriously as the
only possible conception of a science of the living world.
Neither does the role of Bernard's methodology as a support for his
research policy strengthen this tactical interpretation of his critical
teleology. Apparently, Bernard had no special interests in furthering
reductionism. His tactical purposes were linked to the expansion of
physiology relative to chemistry on the one hand and natural history on
the other.
CRITICAL TELEOLOGY AND METHODOLOGICAL

REDUCTIONISM
Critical teleology and methodological reductionism appear to be the

most interesting theories about biological science at the present. Above
I have discussed two classical versions of critical teleology and pointed
out their weaknesses relative to methodological reductionism as a guide
to the development of science. In my opinion methodological reduc-
tionism has been and still is superior to critical teleology as a guide for
biological research. This kind of reductionism believes in the fruitful-
ness of applying physicochemical ideas and methods to biology, but
makes no absolute presuppositions about the validity of any specific
90
physical or chemical theory. Historically, the claim of the superiority of

reductionism can be argued by analysis of examples central to the
development of biology. To justify the claim in relation to present
science is more problematic. The justification must be based partly on a
reasoned extrapolation of past trends, partly on a careful analysis of
present possibilities- a task that demands thorough knowledge of
present-day biology. In this paper I have attempted only a small con-
tribution to the historical argument by analyzing the theoretical struc.
ture of critical teleology as conceived by Kant and Bernard. In par.
ticular I have tried to show how their negative view of certain fruitful
reducionist ideas is connected with their critical teleology.
The advantage of critical teleology lies in its broader perspective,
considering scientific research as just one part of the total activity of
man. There is truth in the accusation that reductionism, and also
methodological reductionism, has neglected the interaction of science
with the rest of the social system. Reductionism has been concerned
about effecting everything possible in terms of the experimental
manipulation of living things. But in guiding the growth of science, we
cannot depend only what it is possible to do with an object; we also
want to consider what it is desirable to do from the point of view of the
subject. The insight of critical teleology into the subjective side of
science is important, but it has too often been linked to a dogmatic
narrow-mindedness concerning the possibilities of the objects. To me it
appears easier to supplement methodological reductionism with a social
theory than to cure critical teleology of its subjectivist dogmatism. But
this may, of course, be internalist scientistic prejudice on my part.
Acknowledgements
My research has been supported by The Norwegian Research Council

for the Humanities and the Sciences and by the University of Oslo. In
working with the manuscript I have benefited from comments by many
people. I want in particular to thank Jon Elster and Diderik Roll-Hansen
of the University of Oslo and an unnamed referee of the Journal of the
History of Biology.
91

1976 - Roll-Hansen - Critical Teleology Immanuel Kant and Claude Bernard On The Limitations of Experimental Biology

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1976 - Roll-Hansen - Critical Teleology Immanuel Kant and Claude Bernard On The Limitations of Experimental Biology

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Critical Teleology: Immanuel Kant and Claude Bernard

on the Limitations of Experimental Biology

METHODOLOGY GUIDING THE GROWTH OF SCIENCE

Applying our knowledge to the future is an essential part of science.

1. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery. (New York: Free Press,

ed external support. Since we cannot change the events of the past -

5. Claude Bernard, Rapport sur le progrks et la marche de la physiologie g~nd-

To be complete, such an evaluation of a methodological theory

KANT'S CRITICAL TELEOLOGY

Accounts of Kant's theory of natural science usually stress his ideal of

6. See Joseph Schiller, Claude Bernard et les probl~mes scientifique de son

They depend essentially on empirical concepts and laws and cannot be

The Living Organism as a Natural Purpose9 ("Naturzweck")

8. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Berlin: Philosophische Biblio-

It is a principle of internal teleology that we are discussing here. The

gave up his critical teleology, this view represents an important stage in

Experimental Method and the Antinomy of Judgment

As I mentioned above, both the full scientific (that is, mechanistic)

Dieses geschiet, um das Studium der Natur nach ihrem Mechanismus

This pragmatic interpretation of scientific knowledge also explains

Kant interprets the controversy between mechanism and teleology

The first rule is reductionist: Biological phenomena must be ex-

The Principle of the Purposiveness of Nature

Since the a priori laws of human understanding are insufficient for

13. Kant's resolution of the antinomy between mechanism and teleology

coherent entity. Reason therefore presupposes a principle that can

Allein es sind so mannigfaltige Formen der Natur, gleichsam so viele

This principle for the unity of nature can be no other, according to

antinomy is not solved simply by classifying teleology as a regulative

Kant's Resolution of the Antinomy

As already indicated, it is througl~ a limitation of the determinate

But internal teleology in biology is an absolute necessity only for the

A Retrospective Evaluation of Kant's Biological Methodology

It is easy to ridicule Kant's transcendental analysis of biology in the

philosophical analysis the factual existence of "Naturzwecke" is raised

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM OF CLAUDE BERNARD

Besides being one of the founders of modern physiology, Claude

14. Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine

However, Bernard's methodological influence was greater outside

15. Elie von Cyon, "Bernard," in Biographische Lexicon der Hervorragender

ment of Bernard's methodological ideas in the early period when he was

19. Grmek, Raissonnement experimental; Frederick Lawrence Holmes, Claude

integration of internal scientific and external social purpose leads to

Experiment as the Basis of Science

The pragmatic interpretation of scientific knowledge is central to

human action was central already to Kant's conception of scientific

Limits to Exact Experimen tal Methods

"Physiological determinism" is a basic idea in Bernard's methodology.

these phenomena cannot be subjected to determinist principles. They

La force vitale, la vie, appartiennent au monde m~taphysique; leur

En un mot, cette facult~ ~volutive, directrice, morphologique, par

When interpreted along these lines, the physiological determinism of

on teleology, on morphological "laws," and on the evolution of species.

Bernard was one of the "true friends of positivism," according

by facts but it develops ('marche et s'ddifie') with the aid of hypo-

"with these instruments the theories without which their readings

Physiology versus Natural History

Bernard makes a sharp methodological distinction between physio-

26. Ibid.,p. 183.

This characterization of the distinction is taken from the Rapport sur

27. Jean-Jacques-VictorCoste, "Note sur le rSle de l'observation et de l'exp6ri-

organic structures and processes. Their materialist prejudices would not

Bernard supported the autonomy of physiology by elaborating the