Title: Knowing where we stand and looking beyond it: A way out of the Quandary in African

“Quest after Knowledge”

Thesis: African “quest after knowledge” should starts from its culture and the perspective the
culture creates; realizing cultures unique, dynamic, and united aspects, it should remain open to
interact with other cultures.

By: YisehakWegene
Abstract

The debate in African philosophy, which emerged as a counter-hegemonic project, not surprisingly,
accentuates on the nature of African philosophy. As Naugbauer says, the debate strings between, on
one hand, defying the westerns accusation that Africans have no philosophy and are primitive,
illogical/prelogical; and, on the other hand, the wish to be part of a universal philosophical
enterprise. So the particularists (such as Mbity, Nkrumah, Senghor, ) engage on showing a
peculiarly African way of doing philosophy, while the universalists (such as Hountondji and
Oruka ) try to subsume African philosophy under the western strict definition of philosophy.
Nonetheless, restating the strict definition of what the European called “philosophia”, but as a one
among multiple divergent and particular paths of answering the fundamental questions of human
beings; I instead shall argue against both the superiority and sole-ness of this way (called
philosophy), and also against the arrogance over an exclusive possession of reason (in this case
philosophy itself too) by any race. And, based on these assumptions, I will try to show how culture
(understood in a wider sense, as it involves language and environment) shapes our perspective as
what, why, and how we get “closer to knowledge or the truth”; yet how culture and its perspective
can also be shaped. I explicate the nature of culture in its tripartite aspects; as Idiosyncratic,
dynamic, and universal.

Thus, I try to point a way out of the dilemma Naugbauer mentioned, by emphasizing on the
consciousness of where exactly we stand (our cultural perspective,) which is in fact in turmoil. Yet,
I suggest looking beyond the cultural horizon in order to garner what we think is important for and
from our perspective in order to shape our “quest after truth” in whatsoever ways we want to. This
is a universal inter/intra-cultural discourse which does not necessarily aim at some sort of
“universalism.”

Key terms: “Ways of accessing knowledge and truth”, philosophy, idiosyncrasy, dynamism, Universality,
perspective/s

Introduction

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It was when I was listening to Oum Tagraglte’s song “the soul of Morocco,” that the idea as to which

direction I think African should head in the quest for truth and knowledge, came to my mind. It is may be the

same experience Bell had attending Salif Keita’s concert. 1 It shows me three things how culture is always

peculiar, yet dynamic, and how it could be open to unity without erasing its idiosyncrasy. With its

peculiarities it gives us a perspective/s as to what we want to answer as the fundamental questions of our

existence, and why and how we do so 2: And with its unity with other cultures and its dynamic nature, culture

gives us the possibility of extending the horizon of our perspective via inter and intra cultural discourse, both

as individuals and as a society. Accordingly, the different ways of knowing, though might be cultivated by a

certain perspective, aren’t, and can’t be superior and also exclusively the property of a certain culture. So

philosophy, as a way of answering the aforesaid basic questions, has been and has to be delineated as a

rational and critical enterprise. And I think the bid to broaden its definition is redundant as the attempt to

employ philosophy and reason as criteria for regarding a culture as superior or inferior is off beam. It is

redundant because it is an attempt to subsume alternative ways under a name of a way. What is the need of

translating and dubbing Indians way of knowing (primarily based on intuition, and is called “Darshana”) as

philosophy? However, this does not mean that reason and criticality are genetically the property of

European, nor intuition is Indian. Instead it means that different factors lead a culture to employ a certain

method, and not the other. But to have and to use are different, for one may not use what he has. This is the

difference between what is genetically coded and culturally coded. And, what the Europeans missed was

both that there are other ways than philosophy; and that philosophy, just because mainly they use it, is not

their exclusive property. Besides, its superiority as a way of getting closer to the truth is questionable. Hence

in the following, based on these assumptions I shall argue that we African should start from being conscious

of our diverse cultures and the perspective they renders us, and has to be open to expand its horizon.

1
(Bell ,1997 :215)
2
And it is this Endeavour to answer the most fundamental questions of our life, throughout the paper, I dub it with
phrases such as “the quest for knowledge and truth” “…accessing the truth,” “the march toward truth”, and so on.

2
 1. The Problem of Defining Philosophy

Western philosophy emerged against its poetic background. And, the defining characteristic of
Greek philosophy was molded out of the fact that it breaks away from the Homeric way of
answering the most fundamental questions of human existence (such as the origin and nature of the
universe). Homer employed inspiration; and Thales (who might never hear the word “philosophy”)
used reason, and Anaximander added criticism to it. And Pythagoras’ word “philosophy,” though
too broad to achieve its purpose, refers specifically to a way of knowing defined in relation to
poetry, a way of knowing via reason and criticality. So, we can say the Greeks defined philosophy
as a rational and critical enterprise that deals with the most fundamental questions. And this is a
definition that often is used to characterize western philosophy (of course, with a number of
exceptions and critiques). This definition is too narrow that it is both precise and exclusive.

It is precise, for it helps to delineate philosophy from other “keys of accessing the truth” 3 such as
poetry, science, and religion. It tells us what philosophy is not. It is not science, because it raises
questions that are more fundamental that sciences: It is not religion, because it uses reason and
criticality. And the definition is too exclusive, because it is closed to accept other ways of
“accessing the truth” in to its arena. So Homer, no matter how deeply he understood human nature
and eloquently expressed it, could not be called a philosopher. Hence, the Greeks used this method
and they called it philosophy; and it has been used as a characteristic of the western world’s “march
toward truth”.

The two characters of philosophy as defined in the west, I think, are essential characters; and
essential because otherwise the word “philosophy” cannot stand at all. If, for instance, it is not
necessarily rational and critical, since the questions it raises are mostly alike with religion and art, it
would be sufficient to call it religion or art. Coining the word philosophy would be superfluous. So,
to criticize the status reason has in philosophy (just as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer did), is to
criticize philosophy itself. Since, reason is the essential component of philosophy (as it is defined
by those who defined it the first time, by the westerns mainstream thinkers), deprecating reason
tantamount to relinquishing philosophy.

3
Henceforth expressions such as “ways of accessing the truth,” “the quest for knowledge and truth,” “ways of the
march toward truth,” and “ways of getting colder to the truth” are used to denote the broader spectrum of ways to
truth in addition and as alternatives to philosophy (as rational and critical enterprise).

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Nonetheless, this should not be seen as problematic for it is redundant whether we call Mozart’s
compositions philosophy or art, or whether we call Indians way of “accessing the truth” philosophy
or “Darshana.” This is because what the critiques try to show us is that reason is not the only and
also the best way of getting closer to the truth. So, criticizing the project that centers on reason
(hence, criticizing what the coiners of the word called it philosophy), is just criticizing a way, not
the way, of “accessing the truth.” Consequently, the problem is not in defining the arena of
philosophy in a very narrow way, and the solution is not broadening the arena; instead the problem
lies in positing it as solely the property of a certain owner, and regarding it as the only and the best
path in “the quest after truth.” And the solution is surmounting these problems.

1. The Rationality Debate

About the first problem, that is ascertaining reason and philosophy as the exclusively, to use
Hountondji’s expression, “western patrimony;” 4I reckon it emanates from their deliberate
anthropological error or misinterpretation, done to set up the ground for colonialism as a
“civilizing” mission. This is primerly premised on the assumption that African’s answers to the
fundamental questions are not based on reason. And from this they arrive at the generalization that
Black people are incapable of reasoning, since they have produced none to demonstrate it. On this
regard, I deem, even if they don’t, not using reason to answer the fundamental questions does not
imply that they don’t have or cannot reason. First, the people the European were talking about were
people, who farm, and form family, society, religion, and politics of their own. And this can’t be
done without reason. Though he never knew a white man, not to mention Aristotle, it is easy to
assume that an African farmer reasons syllogistically about simple things such as the weather.
Moreover, the fact, if it is a fact, that African culture is dominated, as Bruhl says, by mysticism,
(Kebede, Messay, 2004: 4-5), does not imply Africans cannot reason. It could be that they find it
more appealing to use something other than reason as the primary way (as the Indian did.) On this
regard, in exposing various ways of answering the so called fundamental questions of existence, I
think, ethino-philosophy could be important.

And, Secondly, the problem in regarding European denial of Africans’ rationality emanates from
their scientific ignorance (deliberate?) this is what is called scientific racism. This results in the
conclusion that non-westerners are in general inherently and genetically incapable of reasoning.
4
Hountondji quoted in (Graness, A. and K, Kresse. Eds,1997: 105)

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This indeed, as Messay tells us, is coherent with slavery but contradictory with “civilizing
mission.”After all how one could “civilizes” what is genetically “uncivilizable?” (Ibid: 3) And,
Ramose wrote, the conclusion of scientific racism,

…was not based up on a thoroughgoing research. For this reason research was instituted to
justify and legitimize a conclusion which was supposedly already proven. Thus focus was
placed upon craniology and the study of the brain as physical substances….In other word
the assumption of scientific racism was that the brain was reason itself inhabiting the
cranium. But reason was nowhere to be found in the cranium or anywhere else in human
body. The basic flaw of scientific racism was to search for reason at the wrong place.
(Ramose, 2002: 12)

Hence, I cogitate that scientific racism has been disavowed by science itself. To deem Africans are
bereft of philosophy, reason, criticality, reflectivity and science, is simply unphilosophical,
unhistorical, and unscientific (Graness,A. and K. Kresse.Eds, 1997:105). And, I reckon, science
would be sufficient in undermining such blind racism, and in repudiating the counter-hegemonic
projects of thinkers such as Senghor and Mbity which harbingers the same assumption of difference
with its European counterpart. In fact the basic problem with Ethino-philosophy in general and the
negritude movement in particular is the fact that it is built on the ground of erroneous assumptions
made by the Europeans. What these projects added was just the claim of egalitarianism in
difference. As a result, since their claim of difference appeals to nature, the counter-hegemonic
projects are rebuffed by science itself together with their hegemonic counterpart. Thus, the question
on the non-western’s ability to reason is now merely a ramification of ignorance or deliberate
negligence of what science has to say. The only ground racism stands now is stupidity. But, is the
status of reason as a sole and superior way of accessing knowledge and truth unquestionable?

2. Is philosophy (as rational and critical enterprise) the only and “proper” way?

As I have tried to show, the central problem is not western definition of philosophy which
recurrently regarded to be too narrow; instead it is the view that it is an exclusively western
property and that it is the only proper way. As to the former I have shown that is not the case. And
as to the later, first, we can see how various western thinkers themselves have tried to repudiate the
status of reason. Besides, secondly, the availability of multiple paths toward truth and the

5
incommensurability of the paths cast doubt, if not rule it out, the status of philosophy I mentioned
above.

Thinkers such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer deny even the status of reason as the essence of man.
Schopenhauer, for instance, sees “will” as the essence of man. He reckons that,

“The intellect may seem at time to lead the will, but only as a guide lead a master; the will is
‘… the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see.’ We do not
want a thing because we have found a reason for it; we find reason for it because we want it.”
(Durant, 1961:236)

Besides, regarding the praise that reason, particularly instrumental reasoning, has brought progress
in science, technology and even human freedom, doubts have been casted by various western
thinkers. Among others Rousseau wrote, “…our soul has become corrupted in proportion as our
science and our arts have advanced toward perfection” (Rousseau quoted in Kebede, Messay, 2004:
12.) So “Modern civilization merely multiplies and expands the vices of greed, luxury and
inequality. Consequently the modern man is unhappy.” (Ibid: 12)

Rousseau, I ponder, would have much to say if he sees the long lasting subsequent and adverse
sequels of Enlightenment. Though, it would be a rash and wrong to attribute the problems of the
modern world to reason and Enlightenment, it is possible to see how the basic structure of reason
makes it liable to justify multiple claims of hegemony. And this structure of reason can be
manifested in the fact that reason functions in duality (the subject-object duality) that results, among
others in “I-Others,” man-nature, and “center-periphery” dichotomies. In reason knowledge is
characterized in the distance between the knower and the known. And in this, we can see how
reason is structurally susceptible to degenerating into hegemonic. Furthermore, there is also the
existentialists critique on reason that it cannot tell us the fundamental questions in relation to the
meaning of life (Ibid :14.) Accordingly, we can say that these critiques, though they might not be
able to cut off reason, exposed that it is not as it had supposed an unquestionably “proper” and sole
way of “searching the truth”.

Moreover, the fact that there are multiple ways of answering the most fundamental question of
human existence (such as the meaning of life and the purpose of the universe.) clearly argues
against the status of philosophy and reason as the sole way. Indian’s “Darshana”, for instance,

6
suggests intuition and meditation as a way of grasping the ultimate reality. Some find answers in
music, others in the colors and still others in mysticism. Still, I think, it is wrong to evaluate one
way with the standard of the other. This is the other basic fault of western mainstream thinkers such
as Brhul. They weight everything with their yardstick; what fit their standard passed and what did
not, failed. That failed, they dubbed it primitive, uncivilized, and pre-logical. This is their persistent
claim of what is particular and local as universal. But what is local is local. Their idea of
civilization is a particular idea of civilization premised on particular assumptions about human
nature and goal. And, an appeal to universalism is nothing but a blatant alleger for hegemony.
Mozart cannot, and should not be, measured by the standards of Aristotelian logic.

Consequently, in addition to denying non-westerns rationality, this is principally what the western
missed. That is, reason is problematic and by no means the only way. The move from “they do not
use primarily reason” to “they are primitive, irrational, and savages” is unjustified.” Mozart is not
“irrational” and Picasso is not a “savage”, just because they opt for a different path, a path different
from reason, in their quest for answers to the fundamental questions of human life.

3. Culture: Idiosyncrasy, Dynamism, and Unity.

So far, I have tried to show that there are different ways of the quest for answer to the basic
questions of human life, and they are not bequests of a single “race” or culture. Yet, Culture
(understood in a broader sense, i.e. consisting of language, customs, values, the environment, and
so on) has a power to shape, if not to determine, what we use or opt as “a path of knowledge” in
particular and our perspective in general. Culture, though it has overlapping elements with other
cultures, gives us a peculiar perspective. It molds our perspective by influencing what we think as a
fundamental question of life, and how (the method) and why (the motive) we try to answer it. For
most Indian thinkers, for instance, the fundamental question is the disquiet in life, the motive to
heal it, and the way right understanding by intuition and meditation. In addition, the perspective
could be either communal or personal: a communal perspective could shadow the individual, or the
individual could outshine the communal. The communal perspective refers to a perspective that is
hold as community, while the personal is what is shaped out of both the communal and the person’s
subjective personal experience. Yet, hence, there is no uncultured perspective.

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Language, for instance, is not just a means of communication, not just a container wherein we store
whatever we want without limit. It also influences our thought, for we think with our language and
the conceptual framework it provides us. After all the container’s size and shape molds the content.
The same goes with environment. It also contributes in creating a unique perspective. Egyptian
fetish for water and Thales’ view on water are simple showcases. Indeed there is no single factor in
curving a perspective; instead a perspective is the workshop of different factors. I roughly called
this factors culture. But am I appealing to cultural relativism? Hence am I saying that a cross
cultural understanding is impossible?

Talking about the idiosyncrasy of culture and the peculiarity of the perspectives it shape, I am not
entailing the pureness of culture. To say a culture is unique and to say it is pure are different.
Peculiarity entails only difference, while purity refers to the fact the something has never get mixed
with other thing. All cultures are unique, but most cultures are not pure. They are unique, for even
the mixture with other cultures bears another unique culture. Yet, Culture is always encircled by the
possibility (a possibility, because a culture may stay for a fairly long time without change owing to
its geographical seclusion. Yet, that does not mean it could not be changed) of dynamism initiated
either internally (“as time passes…”) or externally (with exposure to other cultures; think of, for
instance, colonialism and the ancient Greeks exposure to the Mediterranean world via trade). And
this dynamic nature of culture makes also perspectives dynamic. This shows the possibility of an
inter-cultural and inter-perspective discourse.

The discourse should not necessarily be to arrive at a single perspective or a universal culture;
instead it is to see if there is a thing one can garner from the other, hence shape and reshape each
other’s perspective in a way that helps all of us reach our respective goals which could be different.
Yet I am not referring also to postmodernism, though it appears to be. When I have recurrently
mentioned the phrase “accessing the truth,” I am not thinking of a relative truth. That is why the
concept of perspective is important. The perspectives are different ways of looking at a single truth,
not truths. They are like different points on the earth for looking at different parts of the sun. The
sun might appear very hot from one point, while gentle from another point: but it is the same sun.
Indeed we find more things that unite Picasso and Aristotle, than what divides them. Aristotle’s
logic might not be used as a yardstick for Picasso’s painting. But both can experience and learn
each other works with awe. Their endeavors are deeply interconnected. So, do all human endeavors.

8
Bell asks, “…are not the notions of love, poverty, and power common to all humanity…?”(Bell,
1997: 214). Then he tells us, as a non- African, the deep connection he felt attending Salif Keita’s
concert. And he answers his own question, focusing on common features of humanity, going
beyond our “small world” and interconnecting in various ways, allows us,

…to see the basis of our mutual understanding, and to show that, with all our pluralism and
differences in points of view, there is more in common that unites human being than divide
them…we can see what ties us to one another and what gives rise to mutual surprise and
wonder in life. (Ibid : 216)

So cultures and perspectives are idiosyncratic, yet dynamic and deeply inter-connected. Then what
about African cultures and the perspectives they shape? And how should African quest after truth
and knowledge (Both pragmatically speaking, and in the sense of knowledge for its own sake)
proceeds going beyond the particularists-universalists dilemma?

4. Obi Okonkwo and His People: African Culture In Turmoil

In his novel “No Longer at ease,” Achebe tells us a story about an African youth named Okonkwo
who just returned from England, completing his study for which he had been sent years ago by his
community’s scholarship program. In this book Achebe shows us the cultural turmoil the African’s
has got in to following the arrival of the “white men.” It is not only that there are multiplicities of
cultures across Africa, but also cultural discrepancy has ensued colonialism, and is still
accompanied by the neocolonialism, in Africa. Now it is difficult to speak of an African culture, for
there are many. It is Many, not because diverse, as it must also be the case before “meeting the
white men,” instead it is because it has been segregated. Between Obi and his people, here England
stands. So he dares to go against their culture, to merry “a girl of doubtful ancestry,” an osu,5 and to
criticize the culture that planted him. (Achebe, Chinua, 1960:82-83,133)

Now in Africa (1) we have the pure indigenous culture, which I suppose is almost non-existent, (2)
the culture that is propounded by the Obi’s people in Lagos which is in struggle with the white
man’s culture, and (3) we also have Obi whose culture tilts toward England and who represents the
professional intellectuals of African. And the cultural turmoil Achebe illustrated is the result of the

5
A girl, whose ancestors have been dedicated to serve a god, hence cannot get married.

9
segregation of perspectives and cultures created by the arrival of colonialism, and now by neo
colonialism. So now we have multiples of, and even contradictory, perspectives. But is this bad?

What is evil, I think, is not the fact that multiplicity of perspectives have emerged, instead it is the
way they have been created (i.e. by forceful and systematic segregation) and the condition that a
certain perspective, viz. that comes from the “educated professionals,” is making a superiority and
directive claim. First, the problem is not with what the “white men” brought to Africa, but with how
they brought it. If it were, let’s say, via trade and a two-way cross cultural discourse, in a way that
each culture can share what it has and learn each other, it would have been natural. Second, for the
reason I have discussed on cultural idiosyncrasy, the superiority and directive claim the “modern
African intellectuals” are making is baseless. Again the interaction has to be two-way, and must
start by recognizing the politics behind the western’s invention of hierarchy of culture and
perspectives.

5. African “Quest For Knowledge and Truth” Beyond the Particularists-

universalists Dilemma

The post-colonial debate in African philosophy centers on the nature of African philosophy. It has
been engaged in an attempt to answer the question, “…do the Africans as Africans (in their culture)
have an activity that deserves the label ‘philosophy,’ and is this philosophy unique or does it indeed
overlap or identify with what is properly termed ‘philosophy’ in other civilizations?” (Graness, A.
and K, Kresse. Eds, 1997:103.) The particularists (such as Senghor and Mbiti) accentuate the
peculiarity of African philosophy which can be found deep in the culture and psychology of black
people. And the universalists start with the strict definition of philosophy as rational, individualistic,
discursive and critical enterprise, either to look for it in African culture (as Oruka does) or to
commence it anew (as Hountondji does.) However, both have been criticized for being the
handmaiden of the west; the particularists, for denying African ability to reason and criticality and
for taking the peoples world view as philosophy; and the universalists, for applying western method
of philosophy and for “failing to demonstrate African’s identity”. (Ibid: 101,105,114)And this
appears to be a dead end.

And the way out of this dead end, I reckon, is realizing, on one hand, the peculiarity, dynamism and
unity of cultures, and, on the other hand, the possibility and availability of equal alternative ways of

10
“the quest after knowledge and truth” other than philosophy. As I have shown above, accepting the
strict definition is not problematic. But, with it we have to accept also the fact that it is a way, not
the way. In light of this the question “Is there African philosophy?” would be narrowed to the
question “Is there a rational, discursive, and critical, individual activity in the “quest after truth and
knowledge” in African?” And, even if the answer to this question is negative, it cannot serve as a
premise for the accusation of inferiority. This is because, as I have shown, science has solved the
rationality debate, and philosophy (reason and criticality) is just a way.

Accordingly, ethno-philosophy and even philosophical sagacity as counter-hegemonic projects (as

a way of refuting western hegemonic discourse) are redundant, for the reason I have mentioned
above. The ground for epistemic racism is none but silliness, and one can’t fight silliness with
argument. On the other hand, the professional thinkers attempt to glorify philosophy, reason, logic,
science has to be questioned. Ethno-philosophy, if it abandons its aspiration to exclusiveness, might
helps us to see the “quest after truth and knowledge” as it is done in different cultures and from
multiple perspectives. And Universalism, if it forsakes its boast of superiority, might help us to look
ourselves from “others” perspective.

So, now we African should start from the consciousness of the cultural praxis we are in and how the
praxis has and is being shaping our perspective. We should, and of course cannot, seek for a single
perspective. But from this consciousness we can understand each other as Africans. As I have said
recurrently, culture shapes perspectives, but culture itself could be shaped by other cultures as it is
dynamic. And this stresses the possibility and even reality of not just intra-cultural but also inter-
cultural understandings. The understanding must not necessarily be a complete one, but it must be
from our perspective and aim to the advancement of our perspective with its own standards (with its
“whats, hows, and whys”). As Bruce Janz wrote African the “quest for knowledge and truth” 6 must
not be about ignoring outside influences, instead it should be about rooting them in its own soil.
(Bruce Janz, 1997: 235) So does every cultures and perspectives. Picasso could draw what Mozart
sung.

6
Bruce calls it philosophy.

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 Conclusion

Abandoning our obsession on the term “philosophy” with which we have been trying to fit with,
and going beyond philosophy is, I think, the way out of the dilemma we are in. I have tried to show
that philosophy as rational and critical enterprise is neither exclusive (to peoples with a certain
color), nor superior to any other ways of “questing after truth.” I have also attempted to show that
this ways are sculpted by our perspective and fashioned by culture which is unique, dynamic and
deeply united with other cultures. Thus, I pointed, as a direction we have to head, consciousness of
where we stand (our cultures and perspectives) and still looking beyond it (an intra and inter
cultural discourse)

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Kebede, Messay.(2004) African Quest for a Philosophy of Decolonization. Amsterdam/New York:

Rodopi.

Ramose, B.M.(2002) African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harere: Mond Books Publisher.

Graness, A. and K, Kresse. Eds(1997) Sagacious Reasoning. Henery Odera Oruka in Memoriam.
Peter Lang.

Durant, Will.(1961) The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers of
the Western World. New York: Simon and Schuster publishers.

Bell, R. H.(1997) “African Philosophy from Non-African Point of View,” in Post Colonial African
Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Eze, E.Chukwudi,(Ed.) Oxford: Blackwell.

Janz, Bruce.(1997) “Alterity, Dialogue, and African Philosophy,” in Post Colonial African
Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Eze, E.Chukwudi,(Ed.) Oxford: Blackwell.

Achebe, Chinua.(1960) No Longer at Ease. London/Nairobi: Hienemann Educational Book Ltd.

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