The Instinct of Workmanship and The Incidence of Bullshit Jobs

Journal of Economic Issues
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The Instinct of Workmanship and the Incidence of

Bullshit Jobs
Erik Dean, Richard B. Dadzie & Xuan Pham
To cite this article: Erik Dean, Richard B. Dadzie & Xuan Pham (2022) The Instinct of
Workmanship and the Incidence of Bullshit Jobs, Journal of Economic Issues, 56:3, 673-698, DOI:
10.1080/00213624.2022.2079929
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JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
Volume LVI No. 3 September 2022
DOI 10.1080/00213624.2022.2079929
The Instinct of Workmanship and the Incidence of Bullshit Jobs

Erik Dean,
Richard B. Dadzie, and
Xuan Pham
Abstract: Throughout his work, Thorstein Veblen argued that humans are guided
instinctively by a desire for purposeful, useful effort. Yet anthropologist David Graeber's
recent volume, Bullshit Jobs, has revealed that many workers find themselves in jobs that
do not contribute anything of value to society. This article first synthesizes the ideas of
Veblen and institutional economists with Graeber’s to indicate how the co-evolution of
the institutions of modern capitalism and technology has encouraged the proliferation
of socially useless (or “bullshit”) jobs. We then formulate a series of hypotheses from
this theoretical synthesis to be tested with data from the National Survey of College
Graduates. A preliminary exploration and analysis of this data set is executed, followed by
evaluation of the hypotheses through a series of logistic models. Results provide support
for the arguments of Graeber and institutional theory as they concern the phenomenon
of bullshit jobs.
Keywords: bullshit jobs, instinct of workmanship, managerialism, bureaucracy, white-

collar occupations
JEL Classification Codes: B52, J3, J4, J5, L2
“In the intervals of sober reflection,” Thorstein Veblen wrote, “common sense speaks
unequivocally under the guidance of the instinct of workmanship.” People “like to see others
spend their life to some purpose, and they like to reflect that their own life is of some use”
(1898, 189). Recognition of this constitutional orientation of humanity forms, in part, the
basis of Marc Tool’s social value criterion, “the continuity and instrumental effectiveness
of recreating community non-invidiously” (1977, 841). Similarly, Michael Sheehan and
Rick Tilman argue that the instinct of workmanship, as well as the parental bent and
idle curiosity, should be taken as fundamental values of a “properly developing (meaning
generically human) community” (1992, 204).
Yet, despite the profound technological and organizational progress to which these
elements of human nature might be credited, ours remains a pecuniary society above all.
Erik Dean is an instructor at Portland Community College. Richard B. Dadzie is an assistant professor at Seattle
Pacific University. Xuan Pham is an independent researcher; opinions expressed are her own and do not express
the views or opinions of her employer. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 2020 meetings of the
Association for Institutional Thought. We are grateful to Michael Delucchi and two anonymous referees for their
comments on subsequent drafts. We wish to dedicate this work to our professor, John Henry, and to the inspiration
for the piece, David Graeber. The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in Scientists and
Engineers Statistical Data System at https://ncsesdata.nsf.gov/datadownload/.
673
© 2022, Journal of Economic Issues /Association for Evolutionary Economics
674 Erik Dean, Richard B. Dadzie, and Xuan Pham
Workmanship is “rated in terms of salesmanship” (Veblen 1914, 216–217); efforts are judged
not in terms of serviceability to the human life process, but in terms of financial advantage.
It does not surprise, then, that some significant number of workers secretly believe that their
jobs are “bullshit.”
Such was the essence of the argument put forth by anthropologist David Graeber in a
2013 piece in STRIKE! Magazine. That article was followed by a series of YouGov polls as well
as interviews conducted by Graeber, forming the empirical basis of his 2018 book, Bullshit
Jobs: A Theory. In that volume, Graeber defines a bullshit job as “so completely pointless,
unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its existence even though,
as part of the conditions of employment, the employee feels obliged to pretend that this is
not the case” (2018, 19).
Graeber is not merely executing an audacious turn of phrase here. Although a
colloquialism, “bullshit” carries a definite and perhaps even visceral meaning, including
the connotation of deception in Graeber’s definition. For this reason, the term might be
particularly suitable to eliciting reflection from workers about whether or not their work
expresses the instinct of workmanship. This is not, of course, to deny that instincts, as
Veblen used the term, are mediated—expressed and contaminated—through socially formed
habits.1 It is, however, to suggest that careful study, utilizing an evolutionary theoretical lens,
can reveal the instrumental and ceremonial nature of work by recourse to the appraisal of
the workers themselves.
While Graeber’s observations are not strictly limited to any particular segment of
the occupational structure, his work focuses especially on the myriad types of white-collar
positions that now make up a majority of American jobs. The aim of our study is to examine
this class of employments, to suggest how it has changed with technology and the evolution
of the corporate form of business enterprise, and to describe the extent to which white-collar
occupations have been fashioned from pecuniary principles; which is to say, we are looking,
in these employments, for the incidence of bullshit jobs.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section will review
Graeber’s five types of bullshit jobs: (i) goons, (ii) taskmasters, (iii) flunkies, (iv) box tickers,
and (v) duct tapers. A cursory history of technological and organizational changes relevant to
the issue will be incorporated into Graeber’s own observations, demonstrating the plausibility
of the existence of these jobs through an institutionalist understanding of twentieth and
twenty-first century capitalism. Following this, a series of hypotheses will be developed and
the literature relevant to these will be reviewed. We will then define and explore the data set
on which we base our own subsequent empirical analysis of the incidence of bullshit jobs.
The conclusion will summarize our findings and suggest avenues of future research.
The Industrial and Managerial Employments
While vested interests certainly remain, the captains of industry and finance that populated
Veblen’s analysis are, for the most part, dead. The then-fledgling megacorps of over a century
ago have since become dominant and ubiquitous, as have their managerial hierarchies.
1
Dewey used the term “impulse,” rather than “instinct,” but equally emphasized the preeminence of habit and
intelligence in the determination of actual human behavior (Jensen 1987). The use of an instinct-habit psychological
framework has a long and contested history in institutional economics (see Asso and Fiorito 2004) that continues in
the present (e.g., Cordes 2005; Ranson 2005). These historical and methodological issues are, however, largely set
aside in the present article, though we will periodically address issues concerning the measurement of instrumental
and ceremonial values through survey responses.
The Instinct of Workmanship and the Incidence of Bullshit Jobs 675
The managers, in turn, have summoned an army of office workers and salespeople—more
recently, coders and social media administrators. In 1899, there was one administrator for
every ten production workers in the United States. By 1947 that ratio was 2.2 to 10, and by
1977, 4.3 to 10 (Melman 1983, 71). While not using precisely the same methodology, figure
1 indicates that this brisk upward trend continued until the early 1980s, at which point long-
term advances slowed, but never ultimately reversed.
Figure 1. Annual Percentage of Nonproduction Employees in Goods-Producing
Industries
29
28
27
26
25
Percent
24
23
22
21
20
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See David Gordon (1996) for more
in-depth discussion of these data, including an argument for interpreting them as conservative estimates of the
extent of the managerial expansion (1996, 39).
These white-collar empires, teeming with millions of workers (and nearly as many distinct
job titles) now cover a majority of U.S. employment.2
In Alfred Chandler’s (2002) account, the visible hand of corporate management can
be traced to the organizational exigencies of the railroads, then the manufacturers, retailers,
and so on, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In order to make effective use
of the technologies of the first and second industrial revolutions, a dispersed hierarchy
of managers, engineers, and laborers was required; and it was through these deliberately
structured systems that the economies of speed intrinsic to mass production and mass
distribution were realized (cf. Mayhew 2008). Veblen similarly recognized the importance
of managing the interstitial adjustments of the “machine process”; yet, he was also lucid
with regard to the role of businessmen in that management: “all business sagacity reduces
itself in the last analysis to a judicious use of sabotage . . . of authoritative permission and of
authoritative limitation or stoppage” (1919, 168).
The occupational structures of business enterprises have continued to evolve over the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first. These changes can be understood, in part, as
2
The AFL-CIO’s Department of Professional Employees estimates that 59.8% of the workforce is comprised
of professionals (AFL-CIO 2021). As of January 2020, production employees in goods-producing industries (not
including those primarily involved in management, sales, accounting, and the like) accounted for only 11.7% of
total private nonfarm payrolls, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
responses to technological developments. The advent of mass media, for instance, made
possible what C. Wright Mills calls “absentee selling,” the use of which has been “studied,
probably more carefully than any other activity in modern society” (1951, 179). Thereafter,
digital computing radically altered the nature of work, from machining to high finance.
To what extent, then, was the occupational evolution in question driven by principles
of industrial expediency, and to what extent was it driven by business principles? The
remainder of this section will address this question, and in the process connect institutional
economics to Graeber’s taxonomy of bullshit jobs. The aim here is not to provide a robust
theoretical and historical account for the prevalence of bullshit jobs. Instead we endeavor
more modestly to show affinities between the work of Graeber and others, and to develop a
useful framework with which to conduct the subsequent empirical analyses.
Five Varieties of Bullshit
As it relates to corporate managerial hierarchies in the United States, the contemporary
occupational structure can be understood, following Seymour Melman, in terms of: (i) a
division of labor between those with decision-making authority and those without, driven
by (ii) the American ethos in which “occupational status and self-esteem vary directly with
distance from physical work and the workplace,” and in which (iii) “the main concern of the
managerial occupations is the enlargement of control of their decision-making power” (1983,
70–73). From this perspective, the managerial hierarchy is principally pecuniary in nature;
the “prime mover . . . appears to be invidious self-aggrandisement . . . and its goal appears
to be the conspicuous waste of goods and services” (Veblen 1914, 194). This makes the
structural source of Graeber’s (2018) taskmaster category of bullshit jobs clear. Taskmasters
can be of two types: (i) the unnecessary superior, where workers would be doing the work
even without the taskmaster there to assign it; and (ii) those whose jobs are to “create bullshit
tasks for others to do, to supervise bullshit, or even to create entirely new bullshit jobs”
(49). The presence of these taskmasters is one of several observable manifestations of the
ceremonial properties of the corporate managerial hierarchy.
Beside the taskmasters stand the goons, bullshit jobs that “have an aggressive element,
but, crucially, exist only because other people employ them” (Graeber 2018, 39). Graeber
includes in this category armies, lobbyists, corporate lawyers, public relations specialists,
advertisers, and telemarketers, all largely the product of inter-organizational rivalry (cf.
Eichner 1976, 283–284). But more than that, those in many of these occupations report
a degree of coercion or manipulation in their work that suggests not only a lack or
serviceability, but a negative contribution to society. As Veblen (1914, 184) distinguishes
the upper class as “disserviceable and gainful” in contrast to the simply gainful bourgeois
middle class, goons indicate a partial movement of the new middle class toward the former.
As with bullshit jobs more generally, there is clear divergence here from that lower class of
serviceable workmanship.
Intermingled throughout the corporate structure are the flunkies and box tickers. The
former represent the feudal retainers of the corporate bureaucracy, whose chief purpose is to
“make someone else look or feel important” (Graeber 2018, 34; cf. Gordon 1996, 76–77);
whereas the latter exist “to allow an organization to be able to claim it is doing something
that, in fact, it is not doing” (Graeber 2018, 45). These tasks may themselves be serviceable
to one degree or another but, especially in the corporate world, their primary function is
typically of an invidious character. Graeber (2018, 47–48) gives as an example preparation of
the boss’ presentations and reports.
The meetings in which such emblems are displayed might be considered
high rituals of the corporate world. And just as the retinues of the feudal
lord might include servants whose only role was to polish his horses’
armor or tweeze his mustache before tournaments or pageants, so may
present-day executives keep employees whose sole purpose is to prepare
their PowerPoint presentations or craft the maps, cartoons, photographs,
or illustrations that accompany their reports.
Graeber’s fifth and last category of bullshit jobs, the duct tapers, concerns the
relationship between managerial imperatives and technological competence. As Melman
(1983, 41) notes, a focus on short-term profits will drive management to outsource and
subcontract production where possible, and where such is not possible managers will often
prefer troubleshooting breakdowns over more prudent investments in equipment upgrades
and research and development. This tendency is exacerbated by the absence of upward wage
pressures to make such investments advantageous (Gordon 1996, 156, 161). Hence, duct
tapers, “whose jobs exist only because of a glitch or fault in the organization; who are there to
solve a problem that ought not to exist” (Graeber 2018, 42), constitute perhaps the sharpest
example of pecuniary employments that are yet of an industrial nature, borne of the sabotage
inherent to corporate hierarchies.
Graeber developed this last category of bullshit job largely from interviews with
employees in the software industry. While many of the service sector employees Graeber
interviewed considered their products overpriced, or disliked their affluent clientele, few
believed their industries should be done away with altogether. However, information
technology (IT) workers, along with telemarketers and sex workers, constituted the exception
here. “Many of the first category, and pretty much all of the second,” Graeber (2018, 28)
notes, “were convinced they were basically engaged in scams.” And, “a majority of those
classed as information workers do feel that if their jobs were to vanish, it would make very
little difference to the world” (108). We will incorporate this interesting finding into our
account below.
A Brief Evolutionary Explanation
An evolutionary account of the proliferation of these bullshit jobs must necessarily
consider both the technological and the institutional dynamics as a whole. Chief among the
latter are the myriad changes in corporate governance over the past century, including the
inexorable concentration of industry, the conglomeration movement beginning in the mid-
twentieth century, the rise to dominance of financial strategists within the top managerial
ranks, and the movement toward more combative labor relations by the corporate-managerial
community (Dean 2018; Melman 1983, xiii, 20; Gordon 1996). But, naturally, these coevolved
with technology as well. For instance, as Mills notes, a rationalized structure of clerks,
bookkeepers, and the like was already under development by the early twentieth century,
prior to the introduction of extensive office machinery (typewriters, adding machines, and
so on). This fundamentally social, as opposed to technological, reorganization of business,
in fact, cleared the ground for the introduction of these technologies beginning in the 1920s
(1951, 192–193). Hence, the interplay of technological, organizational, and occupational
change must be considered carefully.
On the organizational front, there is the mutual reinforcement between the growth of
managerial hierarchies and the aggressive treatment of workers. As David Gordon (1996)
argues, top-heavy corporate structures will tend to expand through the extraction of financial
resources from front-line workers’ pay and productivity gains. Yet, denying workers a share
of the returns from increased productivity creates a mandate for constant vigilance against
shirking, and hence an expanded system of surveillance and punishment. In essence,
Gordon’s argument suggests a subdivision of the first type of Graeber’s taskmaster. The first
subtype would cover those bosses who are essentially unnecessary because the work would
get done in the absence of their supervision, as above; whereas the second would cover those
bosses who are only necessary because corporate policy excludes workers from sharing in the
fruits of their labor.
This typology aligns well with the history of office work and the advent of the digital
computer. This technology could have been expected to produce the same effect as is
commonly associated with the automation of manual labor—that is, making administrative
jobs obsolete—but such was not to be. Under the guidance of the managerial imperative to
expand the breadth, depth, and granularity of decision power, the introduction of computers
instead facilitated a multiplication of systems of control over employees as well as customers.
And, as a matter of course, this process then “calls for larger administrative staffs, organized
into more departments, and justifies promotions for the managers who preside over the
increased body of work” (Melman 1983, 76–77; Gordon 1996, 76; cf. Mills 1951, 196–197).
Hence, substantially for reasons of invidious self-aggrandizement and control, the
proliferating offices of the modern economy represent what Mills calls “the enormous file”:
a part of the symbol factory that produces the billion slips of paper that
gear modern society into its daily shape. From the executive’s suite to the
factory yard, the paper webwork is spun; a thousand rules you never made
and don’t know about are applied to you by a thousand people you have
not met and never will. The office is the Unseen Hand become visible
as a row of clerks and a set of IBM equipment, a pool of Dictaphone
transcribers, and sixty receptionists. (1951, 189)
Far from a source of technological unemployment, the mechanization of office work merely
creates an internal division between those with the authority to make decisions and those
whose work is basically routinized and rationalized (Mills 1951, 205–212), yet still distinct
from the non-supervisory labor—a microcosm of the corporation itself vis-à-vis the wider
community.
This possibility for new technologies to create, rather than eliminate, waste is by
no means new, though it still usually goes unnoticed. The typewriter, Veblen observed,
dramatically increased the volume and cost of mail necessary to do business. Yet, “the
expedition of correspondence by stenographer and typewriter has at the same time become
obligatory on all business firms, on pain of losing caste and so of losing the confidence
of their correspondents” (1914, 315–316). Such criticism applied equally to telephones,
perhaps confirming Mark Twain’s quip, “If Bell had invented a muffler or a gag, he would
have done a real service” (in Bird 2008, 78). All the same, “invention is the mother of
necessity, and within the scope of these contrivances for facilitating and abridging labour
there is no alternative, and life is not offered on any other terms” (Veblen 1914, 316).
Given this, it becomes clearer why IT workers generally identified themselves as
working bullshit jobs in Graeber’s interviews. While Graeber himself can proffer only a
limited explanation for this finding (2018, 110; but see Graeber 2015), Veblen’s and Mills’
observations point the way. That the burden of business correspondence that attended the
introduction of the typewriter was exacerbated by orders of magnitude with the advent of
electronic mail is surely a truism by now. Similarly, it must be obvious that Mills’ “enormous
file,” with its thousand rules once applied by a thousand strangers, has since become a
ubiquitous network of apps and algorithms, created and constantly updated by teams of
unseen software engineers, mathematicians, and marketers.
Thus, there is certainly truth in Gerard Hanlon’s (2016, 33) argument that information
technology is, in essence, “a bureaucratic form—a new non-paper way of compiling Weber’s
‘files.’” Or, as Graeber (2015, 140) argues, “all the software designed to save us from
administrative responsibilities in recent decades ultimately turned us all into part or full-
time administrators.” If, in a general sense, much of this relatively new occupational category
is dealing in the intangible extensions of managerial control—surveillance, direction of
workflow, marketing, paperwork, and so on—then it would not be surprising to find that so
many of the employees in this field see their work as scams, making scant real contribution
to the world.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
There is little empirical work on the prevalence of bullshit jobs as Graeber (2018) defines
them. Only Robert Dur and Max van Lent (2019) have sought explicitly to find evidence for or
against Graeber’s arguments through a quantitative analysis. However, there does exist some
scholarship concerned more generally with the relationship between occupations, pay, and
so forth on the one hand, and the work’s contribution to society on the other. For instance,
Benjamin Lockwood, Charles Nathanson, and E. Glen Weyl (2017) attempt to associate
negative and positive externalities with different occupations through a review of the extant
literature. Others have studied the meaningfulness of work, which, while not coterminous
with our framework, nonetheless often includes an element of social contribution (see, e.g.,
Steger, Dik, and Duffy 2012). Notable in this regard, Milena Nikolova and Femke Cnossen
(2020, 5) define work meaningfulness by an index of responses that relate to “a feeling of
doing useful work” and “the feeling of work well done.”
Before reviewing this literature and our own hypotheses, it must be reemphasized that
Veblen’s instincts are always mediated through habits, and hence any survey response is
potentially reflective of institutional values which include those pecuniary principles our
framework holds to be in conflict with the instinct of workmanship. Because of this, the
potential is ever-present that a respondent’s beliefs concerning the social contribution of her
work reflect a contamination, as Veblen (1914, 216–217) put it, rather than an expression
of the instinct of workmanship. While there is always more to be done in unraveling the
interconnections between human nature and the instrumental and ceremonial habits of
thought that guide our present behavior, the hypotheses below reflect our best knowledge of
those interconnections and are mindful of the potential for contamination. We do, however,
assume that, except where there are theoretical and evidentiary reasons to believe otherwise,
responses to questions of a job’s contribution to society are meaningfully reflective of actual
contribution; negative responses to such questions are taken, then, as reasonably indicative
of bullshit jobs.
Bearing the above in mind, we turn now to a review and comparison of the extant
literature as it concerns the prevalence and nature of these jobs. We begin with a summary of
the research reporting the extent to which workers believe their jobs make (or do not make)
a contribution to society. After this, we generate hypotheses to be explored with our own
quantitative analysis.
Graeber’s initial STRIKE! Magazine piece (2013) led British data analytics firm YouGov
to conduct polls asking respondents, “do you think that your job is or is not making a
meaningful contribution to the world?” The surveys, conducted in August 2015, revealed
that only 50% of Britons believe their jobs are making a meaningful contribution, with 37%
believing they are not, and the remaining 13% unsure (Dahlgreen 2015). The same question
posed to Americans revealed 59% believing their jobs make a meaningful contribution, 24%
believing they do not, and 17% unsure (Moore 2015).
Other surveys have demonstrated similarly high percentages of the phenomenon of
bullshit jobs in the United States. From a survey of 196 non-faculty employees at a major
state university and a small liberal arts college, Amy Wrzesniewski et al. (1997) report 38%
of respondents answering “false” to the statement “My work makes the world a better
place.” Likewise, during the early months of the coronavirus pandemic, a survey conducted
for the Wall Street Journal found 26.7% of respondents agreeing with the statement “I’m
not considered essential or don’t think I am, but I’m still working. My work doesn’t feel
particularly important or meaningful” (Weber 2020).
In contrast, Dur and Van Lent (2019) found much lower rates of workers across 37
countries reporting bullshit jobs, with nearly three quarters of respondents agreeing or
strongly agreeing with “My job is useful to society.” Only 8% indicated “disagree” or “strongly
disagree” with this statement, with the remaining 17% doubtful about their job’s usefulness,
indicating neither agree nor disagree (5).
Variability in these findings may reflect a number of factors, including populations
sampled, survey design, and wording of the specific question at issue. It is, however,
worth noting that even low rates of reported job uselessness, or “bullshit jobs,” should be
of significant concern. One could think of such work as comparable to unemployment,
both in the sense of output lost as well as a failure to provide an opportunity to contribute
meaningfully to society. In this respect, even the most conservative estimates of the incidence
of bullshit jobs suggest a doubling or even tripling of the problem as reflected in standard
unemployment figures.
However, our analysis is concerned less with the absolute proportion of jobs which
the workers themselves consider bullshit, and more with the underlying characteristics that
differentiate bullshit jobs from others (cf. Gordon 1996, 111). To that end, the hypotheses
below are derived from the account given in the previous section. The first four hypotheses
concern the nature of pay and work understood in terms of the pecuniary principles of
modern capitalism and the managerial prerogative. The last two hypotheses concern
occupational categories of the managerial hierarchy and information technology specifically.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H-1), Pay for Bullshit. There is an inverse relationship between the
contribution one’s job makes to society and compensation for that job. While this hypothesis
is contrary to textbook neoclassical economics, Graeber (2018, 147) suggests that the
sentiment, at least, is common among employees.3 Moreover, the observation is consistent
3
The point need not detain the present analysis, but is worth noting nonetheless: while standard neoclassical
theory concludes that workers in competitive markets are paid according to their marginal productivities, there
are arguments—for instance, Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer (2008)—to the contrary. These typically indicate
motives for employees beyond compensation, which can act as substitutes for pay (cf. Frey and Kucher 1999). In
with the institutional understanding of status and remuneration as reflecting, at least in part,
predation, waste, and leisure, rather than serviceability (Peach 1987, 1499–1500).
The existing evidence is mixed. Contrary to our hypothesis, both YouGov polls
indicated a positive relationship between social contribution and income (Dahlgreen 2015;
Moore 2015). Jing Hu and Jacob Hirsch (2017) likewise find that jobs most often listed as
“meaningful” by survey respondents are associated with higher average salaries than those
most often listed as “meaningless,” yet their work also suggests most people are willing to
accept lower salaries for more meaningful work. In contrast, Lockwood, Nathanson, and
Weyl (2017) find that higher-paying professions typically generate negative externalities, while
lower-paying professions generate positive externalities. This is consistent with Graeber’s
(2018, 147) observations. Nikolova and Cnossen’s (2020) analysis, using data covering
thirty European countries, does not produce statistically significant correlations between the
logarithm of income and job meaningfulness, defined in terms of usefulness and a feeling
of work well done.
Hypothesis 2 (H-2), Managerial Empires. All else equal, social contribution declines
with the size of the employer. This hypothesis is consistent with the observation that both
managerial prestige and control stem from the maintenance of a retinue of middle managers,
marketing specialists, personal assistants, and so forth. The size of an enterprise is likely, in
part, to reflect this and, indeed, the proliferation of all categories of Graeber’s bullshit jobs.
While some work has been published on the relationship between employer size and job
satisfaction (e.g., Benz and Frey 2008), little has been done on employer size and the social
contribution of the work done. Nikolova and Cnosson (2020) find a negative relationship
between their index of job meaningfulness and employer size. Relatedly, Marcus Wolfe and
Pankaj Patel (2019), working in part with the same base data sets as Nikolova and Cnosson
(2020) and Dur and Van Lent (2019), find a positive relationship between self-employment
and reports of not doubting the importance of one’s work.
Hypothesis 3 (H-3), Taylorism and Make-work. There is a positive relationship between
the intellectual challenge of a job and its social contribution. This reflects two prongs of
the managerial program. Traditional Taylorist efforts can make the work that needs to be
done rote and mind-numbing, leaving the worker unclear as to what she is contributing. Yet,
the tendency for managers to amass flunkies, regardless of need, can fill offices with bored
workers with nothing to do but tend to the sundries and detritus of their screens and their
desks. Ironically, modern efficiency consultants commonly grapple with managers when it
comes to retaining these workers (Graeber 2018, 38–39).
Hypothesis 4 (H-4), Private Bureaucracy. Employees in the private sector are more likely
to indicate low levels of social contribution than those in the public and non-profit sectors.
Here, we go further than Graeber, who suggests only that “nowadays, useless bureaucrats seem
just as rife in the private sector as in the public sector” (2018, 24). While we acknowledge
the ever-increasing entanglement of private and public sector bureaucracies (Graeber 2018,
24 and 2015), our analysis above suggests that the genesis of bullshit jobs has deep roots
in pecuniary principles; and, as such, we expect that these jobs are in fact more—not just
this manner, arguments can be made within the neoclassical framework for the existence of the inverse relationship
Graeber observes. It may be most expedient to dismiss these extensions of utility theory, along with the standard
conclusions of neoclassical economics, as tautologies; though it may be more productive to note their fundamental
misspecification of the matter in terms of supply and demand (see Dugger 1981; Peach 1987, Gordon 1996, 201-
203).
as—prevalent within business enterprises. Just the same, we have in mind essentially what
Graeber (2015, 18) refers to as the “age of ‘predatory bureaucratization.’”
Dur and Van Lent (2019) found a significantly higher prevalence of workers believing
their jobs were “socially useless” in the private sector: 11%, versus 3% in the public sector
(see also Olsen, Kalleberg, and Nesheim 2010; Andrade and Westover 2020). Anne Colby,
Lorrie Sippola, and Erin Phelps (2001) used long form interviews of approximately ninety
people distinguishing between reasons for a job’s meaningfulness that have to do with
social responsibility versus those that have to do with personal themes. Their work found
a significantly higher rate of social responsibility themes from those working in the public
sector.
Hypothesis 5 (H-5), The IT Scam. Occupations in information technology are associated
with lower levels of contribution than others. This follows directly from the analysis provided
in the previous section. Outside of Graeber’s own (2018) findings, there is very little
previous work to support or contradict this position. In Nikolova and Cnosson’s analysis
(2020), professionals, technicians, and associate professionals show modestly greater levels
of meaningfulness as compared to managers, but lower levels compared to craft workers
and machine and plant operators. However, these categories include a number of other
occupations in addition to IT workers, and cannot be taken as speaking directly or strongly
to our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 (H-6), Benefactors of the Community. Top managers (e.g., the C-suite) will
report higher levels of social contribution than other employees, middle managers included,
within the administrative hierarchies. As indicated above, our empirical analysis assumes,
generally, that respondents report the social contribution of their work reasonably accurately.
This is the premise of Graeber’s method and is consistent with Veblen’s observation that, at
least in “periods of sober reflection,” people can and will acknowledge the degree to which
their work expresses or suppresses their instinct of workmanship. However, there is reason
to believe that this is substantially less so the case with upper managers.
Graeber (2018, 49) indicates managers were particularly unforthcoming with
testimonies of their jobs’ uselessness. For managers closer to the non-supervisory work of
the organization this may reflect a responsibility for keeping up morale and discipline, and
hence rationalizing what might seem futile work to the rank and file. However, Graeber
(2018, 57) finds that “there was really only one class of people that not only denied their jobs
were pointless but expressed outright hostility to the very idea that our economy is rife with
bullshit jobs:” the “business owners, and anyone else in charge of hiring and firing.” Hence,
a distinction must be made between middle- and upper-level managers. Whereas the essence
of the former is the taskmaster, combined perhaps with the “box ticking” involved in feeding
reports up the chain of command (Graeber 2018, 50), the higher one goes up the hierarchy,
the more oblivious one is likely to find the managers there (2018, 95).
The implication for our framework is that the division of labor between employees
with and without decision-making authority carries with it different values in the appraisal
of the work done, and ceremonial status increases with distance from the shop floor. Of
course, this is to be expected: the “pecuniary strategist—‘captain of industry’—who manages
to engross appreciably more than an even share of the community’s wealth is . . . likely to
be rated as a benefactor of the community at large and an exemplar of the social virtues”
(Veblen 1914, 216–217). It should come as no surprise if the modern pecuniary strategist par
excellence, perched high in his executive suite, is inclined to see himself as such a benefactor,
evidence to the contrary be damned.
Nikolova and Cnosson (2020) find that management is associated with the lowest levels
of job meaningfulness, although elementary occupations, which include laborers, cleaners,
and food preparation workers, among others, show very little difference in this regard. This
is contrary to Graeber’s observation that managers are less likely to report having bullshit
jobs, but it does not address the specific issue of top managers as compared to the rest of the
office hierarchy. Nikolova and Cnosson (2020) include as well the logarithm of the number
of subordinates, which does not produce statistically significant results. Similarly, Dur and
Van Lent (2019) find no evidence of a higher prevalence of socially useless jobs among either
middle or top managers.
Measuring Bullshit
Data
We used the 2017 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) data in this study for two
reasons. First, the NSCG provides a large sample of college educated individuals across the
working life span—from graduation to 75 years of age. Respondents to the 2017 NSCG are
composed of four panel cohorts selected from the 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 American
Community Survey (ACS). Second, participants were asked to rank their perceived
importance and satisfaction of principal jobs held during the week of February 1, 2017 on
a four-point Likert scale. The sample consists of 83,672 individuals surveyed on various
job characteristics4 including the characteristic of interest to us (our outcome variable),
perception of their job’s contribution to society. Respondents were asked the following: (i)
when thinking about a job, how important is the job’s contribution to society to you?; and (ii)
when thinking about your principal job held during the week of February 1, please rate your
satisfaction with that job’s contribution to society.
To identify a usable sample to test our hypotheses, we made the following adjustments
to the data. First, we excluded individuals who were not working for pay or profit during
the survey week, or had an annualized salary of zero dollars. This resulted in a sample of
69,344 observations. There were 34,970 (50.43%) respondents who were very satisfied with
their primary job’s social contribution, 25,237 (36.39%) who were somewhat satisfied, 6,754
(9.74%) who were somewhat dissatisfied, and 2,383 (3.44%) who were very dissatisfied.
Furthermore, we re-categorized the Likert Scale of our outcome variable from a four to two-
point scale with the following categories: (i) very important (very satisfied); and (ii) otherwise.
Nikolova and Cnessen (2020) also perform a re-categorization using principal components
analysis. They find that only 5% of respondents in their data indicated disagree or strongly
disagree with respect to the usefulness of their work and feeling of work well done (5).
Our data set has the following limitations. First, it oversamples workers in science and
engineering fields. Second, it samples only college graduates, who account for only about a
third of the adult population in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). We believe the
NSCG underrepresents people employed in productive, low wage, and ceremonially lower
status jobs that do not require a bachelor’s degree. However, given the primary subject of this
study, white-collar occupations, this restriction in the sampling is only a minor limitation. In
4
Other job characteristics in the NSCG focus on advancement, benefits, intellectual challenge, independence,
location, responsibility, salary, and job security.
spite of these limitations, the lack of publicly accessible data on workers’ perceptions of their
jobs makes the NSCG and our sample the most appropriate for this study.
Exploratory Data-Analysis: Cluster Analysis
We employed a k-modes cluster analysis following Zhexue Huang (1997). Clustering
allows researchers to identify patterns in the data set prior to using econometric or statistical
models to test hypotheses (Gordon 1999). Simply put, cluster analysis provides a deeper
description of the data, beyond standard summary statistics and correlation matrix tables,
by revealing groupings in the data (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990). Brian Everitt et al.
(2011) note that, “many cluster-analysis techniques have taken their place alongside other
exploratory data-analysis techniques as tools of the applied statistician. The term exploratory
is important here because it explains the largely absent ‘p-value,’ ubiquitous in many other
areas of statistics” (10).
K-modes cluster analysis uses a matching approach to partition categorical data.
Assuming two individuals, Xi and Xj, and their individual responses to job characteristics
questions, we begin by counting the number of mismatches in the individuals’ responses
such that (Huang 1997, sections 4 and 5):
d (X i, X j) = | m = 1 w (X i,m, X j,m)
k
Where w (X i,m, X j,m) = 0 if their responses are the same for attribute m;
w (X i,m, X j,m) = 1 if their responses are different.
A lower number of mismatches indicates that the two individuals are more alike in their
perceptions of job characteristics. We next define a vector of modes, M=[m1, m2, . . . , mk] for
a set of individuals X=[X1,X2, . . . , Xk]. Each set of individuals is called a cluster. The goal of
k-modes cluster analysis is then to find M that minimizes the function E for a chosen number
of clusters, c: E = | l = 1 | u = 1 d (X i, M l)
x n
While our primary job characteristic of interest is a job’s contribution to society, we

explored the data using all job characteristics in the NSCG sample. This was appropriate at the
exploratory phase of our analysis because it prevented us from making a priori assumptions
and allowed us to let the data speak broadly before turning to the specific investigation.
An important question in clustering is how many clusters are really in the data? Stated,
differently, when does the analyst “stop” clustering? We used an iterative approach of creating
two, three, and four clusters using all the job characteristics present in the NSCG data. We
examined the characteristics of the clusters for overlapping similarities, and selected two
clusters because they provided the most between-group distinctions (James et al. 2013, 27).
Respondents in Cluster 1 reported strong positive feelings about a job characteristic and
those in Cluster 2 did not.
Table 1 reports the results of the cluster analysis by highlighting the percentage
of individuals who responded Very Important (or Very Satisfied) on the surveyed job
characteristics by cluster.
Individuals in Cluster 1 report that all job characteristics are important to them when
thinking about a job. These individuals are also more satisfied with these characteristics
for the jobs they held at the time of survey. Individuals in Cluster 2 have the opposite
perceptions: they are less likely to believe these job characteristics are important and are less
satisfied. Our results raise the question: who are the people in these two clusters?
Table 1. Percentage of Individuals Reporting Very Important (or Very Satisfied) by Job
Characteristic and Cluster
Cluster 1 % Cluster 2 %
Variable
(Difference from Sample Mean) (Difference from Sample Mean)
N= 40,357 28,987
Importance of Contribution to Society Very Important: 69.8 (+18) Very Important: 26.8 (-25)
Satisfaction of Contribution to Society Very Satisfied: 72.2 (+21.8) Very Satisfied: 20.1 (-30.3)
Importance of Advancement Very Important: 58.7 (+11.3) Very Important: 31.8 (-15.6)
Satisfaction of Advancement Very Satisfied: 37.0 (+12.7) Very Satisfied: 6.5 (-17.8)
Importance of Benefits Very Important: 74.8 (+3.8) Very Important: 65.8 (-5.2)
Satisfaction of Benefits Very Satisfied: 53.4 (+14) Very Satisfied: 19.8 (-19.6)
Importance of Intellectual Challenge Very Important: 83.2 (+19.5) Very Important: 36.6 (-27.1)
Satisfaction of Intellectual Challenge Very Satisfied: 68.4 (+23) Very Satisfied: 13.3 (-32.1)
Importance of Independence Very Important: 80.8 (+18.6) Very Important: 36.4 (-25.8)
Satisfaction of Independence Very Satisfied: 81.5 (+20.6) Very Satisfied: 32.1 (-28.8)
Importance of Location Very Important: 67.5 (+7) Very Important: 50.7 (-9.8)
Satisfaction of Location Very Satisfied: 72.6 (+14.7) Very Satisfied: 37.5 (-20.4)
Importance of Responsibility Very Important: 65.6 (+19.8) Very Important: 18.2 (-27.6)
Satisfaction of Responsibility Very Satisfied: 72.7 (+23.8) Very Satisfied: 15.7 (-33.2)
Importance of Salary Very Important: 70.4 (+1.9) Very Important: 65.7 (-2.8)
Satisfaction of Salary Very Satisfied: 40.5 (+10.2) Very Satisfied: 16.2 (-14.1)
Importance of Job Security Very Important: 74.2 (+6) Very Important: 59.9 (-8.3)
Satisfaction of Job Security Very Satisfied: 65.0 (+16.8) Very Satisfied: 24.7 (-23.5)
Table 2 reports the demographic and employment characteristics of individuals

grouped in each cluster. A primary work activity is one that occupied at least 10% of the
respondent’s time during a typical workweek (NSCG 2017, Question A24). We find that
individuals in Cluster 1 are different from their counterparts in Cluster 2 in several ways.
They: (i) have a higher median annualized earnings ($79,000 versus $72,168); (ii) are more
likely to have a post-baccalaureate degree; (iii) are less likely to work in the private, for-profit
sector; (iv) are more likely to be female; and (v) are more likely to be white.
In contrast, the YouGov U.S. poll (Moore 2015) found males significantly more likely
to believe that their jobs make a meaningful contribution to the world, but the UK poll
(Dahlgreen 2015) found females slightly more likely to report the same perception. The UK
poll is complicated though, because females had a much lower response rate for “I don’t
know,” such that females were more likely than males to indicate “yes” to the meaningful
contribution question, but also more likely than males to indicate “no.” Dur and Van Lent
(2019) found no significant gender differences. The YouGov U.S. poll also found that Black
respondents were slightly more likely than whites and Hispanics to report that their jobs
make a meaningful contribution; however, they were also more likely to respond “I don’t
know” compared to the other groups.
The data allow for analysis of both the work activity the respondent engages in,
reported in table 2, as well as their occupational classification. Table 3 reports the
breakdown of occupations for the two clusters. In terms of primary work activity, Cluster 1
is disproportionately engaged in applied research, in professional services, and in supervision
of others. As to the first of these, it should be obvious that those explicitly engaged in research
“to meet recognized needs” would see their work as contributing positively. Interpreting the
prevalence in Cluster 1 of respondents whose primary work task falls under professional
services, however, is more nuanced. These include both healthcare services, which we might
expect to make a positive contribution, as well as financial services, which, following Graeber,
we would not expect to make a positive contribution (see also Lockwood, Nathanson, and
Weyl 2017).
Table 2. Demographic and Employment Characteristics by Cluster
(continued on facing page)
Variable
N= 40,357 28,987
Median
42 (+1) 41 (0)
Age
Median
Annualized 79,000 (+4,000) 72,168 (–2,832)
Salary
Bachelor’s: 44.6 (–3.8) Bachelor’s: 53.7 (+5.3)
Highest
Master’s: 39.7 (+1.4) Master’s: 36.3 (–2)
Degree
Professional: 5.4 (+0.9) Professional: 3.2 (–1.3)
Earned
Doctorate: 10.4 (+1.5) Doctorate: 6.9 (–2)
Private for profit: 37.7 (–5.8) Private for profit: 51.4 (+7.9)
Private nonprofit: 9.8 (+1.3) Private nonprofit: 6.7 (–1.8)
Self-employed; incorporated: 10.2 (+0.3) Self-employed; incorporated: 9.5 (–0.4)
Self-employed; not incorporated: 5.4 (+0.5) Self-employed; not incorporated: 4.1 (–0.8)
2-year college; technical institute: 1.6 (+0.2) 2-year college; technical institute: 1.1 (–0.3)
4-year college/university: 7.5 (+1) 4-year college/university: 5.1 (–1.4)
Medical school: 2.1 (+0.3) Medical school: 1.4 (+0.4)
Employer
University research institute: 2.1 (+0.3) University research institute: 1.3 (–0.5)
Type
Other educational institution: 0.1 (0) Other educational institution: 0.1 (0)
Elementary, middle, or secondary school: 10.0 Elementary, middle, or secondary school: 8.3
(+0.7) (–1)
Local government: 3.4 (+0.2) Local government: 2.9 (–0.3)
State government: 3.3 (+0.3) State government: 3.0 (–0.1)
U.S. government: 5.8 (+0.6) U.S. government: 4.3 (–0.9)
U.S. military: 0.7 (+0.1) U.S. military: 0.5 (–0.2)
10 or fewer employees: 12.0 (+1.3) 10 or fewer employees: 8.9 (–1.8)
11–24 employees: 4.5 (+0.1) 11–24 employees: 4.2 (–0.2)
25–99 employees: 8.3 (–0.2) 25–99 employees: 8.8 (+0.3)
Employer 100–499 employees: 12.3 (–0.5) 100–499 employees: 13.5 (0.7)
Size 500–999 employees: 6.0(–0.1) 500–999 employees: 6.2 (+0.1)
1,000–4,999 employees: 12.2 (–0.5) 1,000–4,999 employees: 13.5 (+0.8)
5,000–24,999 employees: 13.8 (–0.6) 5,000–24,999 employees: 15.2 (0.8)
25,000+ employees:30.9 (+0.5) 25,000+ employees: 29.7 (–0.7)
Female: 46.8 (+2.6) Female: 40.4 (–3.8)
Gender
Male: 53.2 (–2.6) Male: 59.6 (+3.8)
Never Married: 17.4 (–1.3) Never Married: 20.6 (+1.9)
Married: 69.5 (+1.1) Married: 66.8 (–1.6)
Marital Living in a Marriage-Like Relationship: 5.3 (0) Living in a Marriage-Like Relationship: 5.3 (0)
Status Separated: 0.8 (0) Separated: 0.8 (0)
Divorced: 5.9 (+0.1) Divorced: 5.7 (–0.1)
Widowed: 1.0 (+0.1) Widowed: 0.8 (–0.1)
White Only: 71.7 (+1.2) White Only: 68.8 (–1.7)
Black Only: 8.1 (+0.5) Black Only: 6.9 (–0.7)
Asian Only: 15.6 (+1.9) Asian Only: 20.0 (+2.5)
Race American Indian/Alaska Native Only: 0.7 (+0.1) American Indian/Alaska Native Only: 0.5 (–0.1)
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Only: Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander Only:
0.5 (+0.1) 0.4 (0)
Multiple Race: 3.4 (0) Multiple Race: 3.3 (–0.1)
Variable
Managing or supervising people or projects: Managing or supervising people or projects: 16.1
18.4 (+1) (–1.3)
Professional services (healthcare, financial Professional services (healthcare, financial
services, legal services, etc.): 18.1 (+2.2) services, legal services, etc.): 12.8 (–3.1)
Teaching: 13.6 (+1.3) Teaching: 10.6 (–1.7)
Computer applications, programming, systems Computer applications, programming, systems
development: 6.8 (–1.1) development: 9.5 (+1.6)
Sales, purchasing, marketing: 6.5 (–1.2) Sales, purchasing, marketing: 9.3 (+1.6)
Applied research-study to gain scientific Applied research-study to gain scientific
Primary
knowledge to meet recognized needs: 8.0 (+0.7) knowledge to meet recognized needs: 6.3 (–1)
Work
Design of equipment, processes, structures, and Design of equipment, processes, structures, and
Activity
models: 5.7 (–0.6) models: 7.2 (+0.9)
Accounting, finance, contracts: 4.3 (–0.5) Accounting, finance, contracts: 5.2 (+0.5)
Production, operations, maintenance: 3.1 (–1) Production, operations, maintenance: 5.4 (+1.3)
Basic research-study to gain scientific knowledge Basic research-study to gain scientific knowledge
primarily for own sake: 3.4 (+0.3) primarily for own sake: 2.7 (–0.4)
Quality or productivity management: 2.6 (–0.4) Quality or productivity management: 3.5 (+0.5)
Human Resources-including recruiting, Human Resources-including recruiting,
personnel development, training: 1.7 (+0.1) personnel development, training: 1.6 (0)
Other work activity: 3.2 (–0.4) Other work activity: 4.3 (+0.7)
Moreover, within professional services work activity, Cluster 1 is disproportionately
composed of lawyers, judges, and medical practitioners, whereas accountants are
overrepresented in Cluster 2. These results are consistent with our theoretical framework,
but it should be noted that we have not explicitly incorporated lawyers and judges into
that framework.5 Whether the relatively high reported satisfaction with social contribution
among people in these occupations reflects a genuine belief in the serviceability of their work
or a “contaminated” sense of workmanship as discussed in the previous section is beyond the
scope of the present article.
That managers are apt to see their jobs contributing positively to society is consistent
with Graeber’s findings. Moreover, the principal job codes reveal that Cluster 1 is particularly
heavy in C-suite managers—precisely those Graeber identified as most opposed to the very
notion of bullshit jobs—as well as education administrators.
In contrast, Cluster 2 is disproportionately engaged in sales, purchasing, and marketing.
This is consistent with Graeber’s goons category of bullshit jobs. Moreover, the division
we find here, between higher-level managers among Cluster 1 and salespeople in Cluster
2, suggests a refinement to the theoretical framework developed above. Veblen recognized
salesmanship and the fundamental prerogative of the businessperson, sabotage, as “the twin
pillars of the edifice of business-as-usual” (1923, 98). However, it appears that, as it concerns
the perceptions of those in these occupations, the decision-making authority of management
is more thoroughly contaminated with pecuniary principles than is the salesmanship
manifested explicitly in the job structure.
As expected, secretaries, clerks, and other lower-ranked office workers are overrepresented
in Cluster 2. This is consistent with the notion, from Graeber and others, of a managerial
feudalism in the modern occupational structure. It may even be appropriate to group these
employments with the cooks, waitresses, and bartenders (also overrepresented in Cluster 2)
as a sort of servantry to the contemporary structure of invidious production and leisurely
consumption.
5
While Graeber includes corporate lawyers among his examples of the “goon” variety of bullshit jobs, he
notes that the people he spoke to in this field were not in the higher ranks (2018, 40).
Consistent with our theoretical framework, workers engaged in IT-related tasks are
significantly overrepresented in Cluster 2. However, engineers and technicians also had
higher representation, a curious result. Given the prominence of these occupations in
Veblen’s analysis, we might expect a strong expression of the instinct of workmanship here
by way of representation in the first cluster. Contrary evidence may indicate engineers’
frustration and inability to control industrial production due to the pecuniary interests of
managers (Veblen 1921). Something else may be responsible as well or in addition. Strictly
speaking, this problem falls outside of our hypotheses, though we do note its persistence as
a matter for further inquiry.
Finally, while our analysis suggests a small distinction between the clusters in
representation of teaching as the primary work activity, inspection of the occupational codes
reveals an important difference: whereas pre-kindergarten through secondary teachers are
evenly represented in the clusters, post-secondary educators are overrepresented in Cluster 1.
This finding is noteworthy and further exploration is needed, though it is beyond the scope
of this study.
The k-modes cluster analysis yields supporting insights for the instinct of workmanship
and bullshit jobs; however, they are not statistically robust nor intended to be. These results
highlight the relevance of our hypotheses. Thus, we used standard econometric techniques
to evaluate our outcome of interest—a job’s contribution to society—against regressors to
investigate our hypotheses.
Table 3. Percentages of Workers in Selected Occupations by Cluster
Cluster 1% (difference from sample mean) Cluster 2% (difference from sample mean)
Managers: Managers:
i. Top level managers, execs, admins (CEO/COO/ i. Top level managers, execs, admins (CEO/COO/
CFO, presidents, distribution/general managers, CFO, presidents, distribution/general managers,
provosts): 5.1 (+1.2) provosts): 2.3 (–1.6)
ii. Computer and information systems: 0.7 (0) ii. Computer and information systems: 0.7 (0)
iii. Engineering: 1.8 (+0.1) iii. Engineering: 1.7 (0)
iv. Education administrators (e.g., registrars, deans, iv. Education administrators (e.g., registrars, deans,
principals): 0.7 principals): 0.3
v. Medical and health services: 0.8 (+0.4) v. Medical and health services: 0.4 (–0.2)
vi. Natural sciences managers: 0.4 (0) vi. Natural sciences managers: 0.3 (–0.1)
vii. Other mid-level managers: 2.7 (0.1) vii. Other mid-level managers: 2.3 (–0.3)
Legal and Finance Related: Legal and Finance Related:
i. Accountants, auditors, and other financial i. Accountants, auditors, and other financial
specialists: 2.8 (–0.2) specialists: 3.3 (+0.3)
ii. Accounting clerks and bookkeepers: 0.4 (–0.2) ii. Accounting clerks and bookkeepers: 0.8 (+0.4)
iii. Lawyers and judges: 2.0 (+0.3) iii. Lawyers and judges: 1.4 (–0.3)
Medical practitioners: Medical practitioners:
i. Diagnosing/treating practitioners (dentists, i. Diagnosing/treating practitioners (dentists,
optometrists, physicians, psychiatrists, podiatrists, optometrists, physicians, psychiatrists, podiatrists,
surgeons, veterinarians): 2.1 (+0.5) surgeons, veterinarians): 0.9 (+0.7)
ii. RNs, pharmacists, dieticians, therapists, ii. RNs, pharmacists, dieticians, therapists,
physician assistants, nurse practitioners: 5.3 (+0.6) physician assistants, nurse practitioners: 3.8 (–0.9)
iii. Psychologists, including clinical: 1.7 (+0.4) iii. Psychologists, including clinical: 0.7 (–0.6)
Cluster 1% (difference from sample mean) Cluster 2% (difference from sample mean)
Engineers: Engineers:
i. Mechanical engineers: 2.6 (–0.5) i. Mechanical engineers: 3.9 (+0.8)
ii. Electrical and electronic engineers: 2.4 (–0.4) ii. Electrical and electronic engineers: 3.3 (+0.5)
iii. Computer engineers-software: 2.3 (–0.3) iii. Computer engineers-software: 3.1 (+0.5)
iv. Civil, including architectural/sanitary engineers: iv. Civil, including architectural/sanitary engineers:
1.9 (0) 2.0 (+0.1)
v. Chemical engineers: 0.8 (–0.2) v. Chemical engineers: 1.2 (+0.2)
vi. All other engineers: 4.4 (–0.9) vi. All other engineers: 6.4 (+1.1)
Scientists (excluding social science): Scientists (excluding social science):
i. Biological scientists: 1 (0) i. Biological scientists: 0.8 (–0.2)
ii. Medical scientists, excluding practitioners: 1 ii. Medical scientists, excluding practitioners: 0.8
(+0.1) (–0.1)
iii. All other scientists: 2.9 (0) iii. All other scientists: 2.6 (–0.3)
Information Technology: Information Technology:
i. Computer network architect: 0.1 (0) i. Computer network architect: 0.2 (–0.1)
ii. Computer programmers (business, scientific, ii. Computer programmers (business, scientific,
process control): 0.4 (–0.1) process control): 0.6 (+0.1)
iii. Computer support specialists: 0.4 (–0.3) iii. Computer support specialists: 0.9 (+0.2)
iv. Computer system analysts: 1.0 (–0.2) iv. Computer system analysts: 1.5 (+0.3)
v. Information security analysts: 0.3 (0) v. Information security analysts: 0.3 (0)
vi. Network and computer systems administrators: vi. Network and computer systems administrators:
0.4 (–0.1) 0.7 (+0.3)
Technicians: Technicians:
i. Electrical, electronic, industrial, mechanical, and i. Electrical, electronic, industrial, mechanical, and
other engineering: 1.4 (–0.3) other engineering: 2.3 (+0.6)
ii. Health technologists and technicians (dental ii. Health technologists and technicians (dental
hygienists, health record tech, LPN, lab/radiology hygienists, health record tech, LPN, lab/radiology
technicians): 0.9 (–0.1) technicians): 1.0 (+0.1)
iii. Surveying and mapping technicians: 0.1 (0) iii. Surveying and mapping technicians: 0.1 (0)
iv. Technologists and technicians in the biological/ iv. Technologists and technicians in the biological/
life, mathematical, and physical sciences: 0.6 (–0.2) life sciences, mathematical, and physical sciences: 1.0
(+0.2)
Teaching: Teaching:
i. Pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, and elementary: i. Pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, and elementary:
1.7 (0) 1.7 (0)
ii. Secondary, precollegiate, and special education: ii. Secondary, precollegiate, and special education: 5
5.7 (+0.3) (+0.4)
iii. Post-Secondary: 6.5 (+1.1) iii. Post-Secondary: 3.7 (–1.7)
iv. All other teachers and instructors: 0.9 (+0.1) iv. All other teachers and instructors: 0.7 (–0.1)
Counselors (educational, vocational, mental health, Counselors (educational, vocational, mental health,
and substance abuse) and Social Workers: 3.5 (+0.4) and substance abuse) and Social Workers: 2.5 (–0.6)
Secretaries, receptionists, typists, and other Secretaries, receptionists, typists, and other
administrative (e.g., record clerks, telephone operators): administrative (e.g., record clerks, telephone operators):
2.4 (–0.5) 3.8 (+0.9)
Food preparation and service (e.g., cooks, waitresses, Food preparation and service (e.g., cooks, waitresses,
bartenders): 0.2 (–0.2) bartenders): 0.8 (+0.4)
Logistic Regression
Given that our outcome variable is binary, we evaluated our hypotheses using a logistic
model, taking the general form:
p i / Pr ^ y ii = 1 ; x i h =
e xl b
^ 1 + e xl b h
where yi=1, is the probability that a respondent is very satisfied with their job’s social
contribution;
xl is a vector of explanatory variables including controls for individual characteristics
of age, gender, race, and marital status; and
b are the parameter estimates associated with the explanatory variables.
Following our estimation, we generated odds ratios to interpret the likelihood of a
respondent to be very satisfied (i.e., yi=1) with their job’s social contribution. The odds ratio
represents the increase (or decrease) in the odds of being in category 1 of the dependent
variable when the independent variable increases by a unit. Consequently, an odds ratio of
1 implies equal odds of being in either the 1 or 0 category and an odds ratio greater (or less)
than 1 implies higher (lower) odds of being in category 1 (Cameron and Trivedi 2010).
Results and Discussion
We evaluated H-1 through H-6 in an additive manner. Table 4 presents the results of H-1,
H-2, and H-3. With respect to H-1, concerning the relationship between social contribution
and pay, controlling for individual and educational characteristics,6 the probability of a
unit increase in wages resulting in a respondent being very satisfied is –0.036. This result
corresponds to an odds ratio of 0.964, indicating that pay is inversely correlated with social
contribution, as predicted by our theory.
With respect to H-2, as hypothesized, the coefficients and associated probabilities for
employer size are negative, implying that the probability of not being very satisfied with a
job’s social contribution is higher at larger employers. Using organizations of 10 or fewer
employees as the reference group, the employer size odds ratios are consistently less than one
(though not statistically significant at the next smallest employer size). The lowest odds ratio
is for respondents who work in organizations with 5,000–24,999 employees.
As suggested by our third hypothesis, H-3, individuals who find their jobs intellectually
challenging are 6.35 times more likely to believe that their jobs contribute to society than
those who do not. This result is not surprising as one would expect the correlation to
be strong between these two variables when individual, educational, and employer size
characteristics are controlled.
Table 4. Results: Hypotheses 1–3
H-3, Taylorism and Make-
H-1, Pay for Bullshit H-2, Managerial Empires
Variable work
b Odds Ratio b Odds Ratio b Odds Ratio
0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Age 1.011 1.011 1.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
–0.036*** –0.027** –0.132***
Wages 0.964 0.973 0.876
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
–0.466*** –0.466*** –0.503***
Male 0.627 0.628 0.604
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
0.091*** 0.089*** 0.035
Married 1.095 1.094 1.035
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
0.230*** 0.228*** 0.075***
White 1.259 1.256 1.078
(0.002) (0.022) (0.020)
0.609*** 0.606*** 0.382***
PhD 1.839 1.834 1.466
(0.053) (0.053) (0.047)
0.336*** 0.333*** 0.289***
Masters 1.399 1.394 1.335
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
6
Individual characteristics include age, gender, marital status, and race, and bachelor’s degree is used as the
reference group for the highest level of education attained.
H-3, Taylorism and Make-

H-1, Pay for Bullshit H-2, Managerial Empires
Variable work
b Odds Ratio b Odds Ratio b Odds Ratio
0.742*** 0.721*** 0.488***
Professional 2.101 2.057 1.629
(0.084) (0.083) (0.071)
Employer Size:
–0.058 0.084
11–24 Employees 0.943 1.088
(0.042) (0.052)
–0.168*** 0.004
25–99 Employees 0.845 1.004
(0.030) (0.040)
–0.131*** 0.094***
100–499 Employees 0.877 1.099
(0.028) (0.039)
–0.155*** 0.017
500–999 Employees 0.857 1.017
(0.034) (0.044)
1,000–4,999 –0.217*** –0.049
0.805 0.952
Employees (0.026) (0.034)
5,000–24,999 –0.246*** –0.091**
0.782 0.913
Employees (0.025) (0.032)
–0.083*** 0.106***
25,000 Employees + 0.921 1.112
(0.026) (0.034)
Intellectual Challenge:
1.848***
Very Important 6.350
(0.111)
–0.518*** –0.385*** –0.812***
Constant 0.596 0.681 0.444
(0.026) (0.033) (0.024)
n 69,344
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 5 presents the results of H-4 and H-5. With respect to H-4, we estimated the
impact of employer type on satisfaction with social contribution, using private, for-profit
employers as the reference group. We controlled for individual, educational, and employer
size characteristics and found that employment in K-12 provides the highest likelihood of
satisfaction with social contribution with an odds ratio of 5.155. The odds ratio for self-
employed, incorporated is lowest relative to private, for-profit organizations at 1.326. This
finding is not surprising as one would expect the pecuniary motive to be strongest in this
category of employments relative to others.
With respect to H-5, we controlled for individual and educational characteristics,
employer size, and employer type, and evaluated the likelihood of respondent satisfaction
with their job’s social contribution based on their primary work activity. Our hypothesis
concerns specifically IT work, though we report all others as well, using human resources as
the reference group. Primary work activities in teaching, applied research, and professional
services all have higher probabilities of being very satisfied with the social contribution
of their work, with odds ratios of 1.642, 1.198, and 1.876, respectively. Employees in
accounting, finance, and contracting, in computer programming, in production operations
and maintenance, and in sales, purchasing, and marketing are all likely to respond that their
job’s social contribution is low relative to human resources. Stated differently, respondents
with these primary work activities are more likely to conclude that their jobs are bullshit.
These results are consistent with H-5, taking computer programming, which had the lowest
odds ratio of the group, as the relevant primary work activity.
Table 5. Results: Hypotheses 4 and 5
H-4, Private Bureaucracy H-5, The IT Scam
Variable
b Odds Ratio b Odds Ratio
Age 0.006*** (0.001) 1.006 0.006*** (0.001) 1.006
Wages 0.089*** (0.012) 1.093 0.072*** (0.013) 1.075
Male –0.220*** (0.014) 0.803 –0.141*** (0.015) 0.869
Married 0.134*** (0.021) 1.144 0.141*** (0.021) 1.152
White 0.184*** (0.022) 1.202 0.127*** (0.021) 1.135
PhD 0.341*** (0.045) 1.406 0.021*** (0.041) 1.233
Masters 0.189*** (0.022) 1.208 0.133*** (0.021) 1.142
Professional 0.547*** (0.071) 1.728 0.113*** (0.049) 1.120
Employer Size:
11–24 Employees –0.124*** (0.042) 0.884 –0.115* (0.042) 0.891
25–99 Employees –0.324*** (0.030) 0.723 –0.314*** (0.030) 0.731
100–499 Employees –0.386*** (0.026) 0.680 –0.385*** (0.027) 0.680
500–999 Employees –0.445*** (0.029) 0.641 –0.448*** (0.030) 0.639
1,000–4,999 Employees –0.486*** (0.024) 0.615 –0.487*** (0.024) 0.615
5,000–24,999 Employees –0.430*** (0.025) 0.651 –0.411*** (0.026) 0.663
25,000 Employees –0.480*** (0.023) 0.619 –0.453*** (0.023) 0.636
Employer Type:
2-year College 1.561*** (0.367) 4.765 1.220*** (0.275) 3.388
4-year College 0.995*** (0.096) 2.704 1.029*** (0.089) 2.267
K-12 1.640*** (0.169) 5.155 1.228*** (0.143) 3.416
Local Government 1.089*** (0.137) 2.971 1.029*** (0.132) 2.799
Other 0.571*** (0.287) 1.769 0.565*** (0.295) 1.759
State Government 0.946*** (0.119) 2.574 0.867*** (0.113) 2.379
Federal Government 0.996*** (0.107) 2.707 0.959*** (0.105) 2.608
Military 1.282*** (0.385) 3.603 1.172*** (0.352) 3.229
Medical School 1.260*** (0.225) 3.524 1.123*** (0.198) 3.074
Other Educational Institution 0.859*** (0.537) 2.360 0.620*** (0.432) 1.859
Private Non-Profit 1.355*** (0.123) 3.877 1.193*** (0.107) 3.296
Self-Employed Incorporated 0.282*** (0.038) 1.326 0.289*** (0.039) 1.325
Self-Employed Non-Incorporated 0.372*** (0.065) 1.451 0.289*** (0.061) 1.335
Research Institute 0.967*** (0.161) 2.630 0.879*** (0.151) 2.409
Primary Work Activity:
Accounting, Finance, and Contracting –0.460*** (0.046) 0.631
Applied Research 0.181*** (0.083) 1.198
Basic Research –0.054 (0.074) 0.948
Computer Programmers –0.038*** (0.047) 0.686
Equipment Designers –0.039 (0.068) 0.962
Product Developers –0.188 (0.070) 0.981
Managers (People and Projects) 0.045 (0.067) 1.046
Other –0.155* (0.064) 0.856
Production Operations and Maintenance –0.146* (0.064) 0.864
(e.g., chip production)
Professional Services (e.g., health, 0.629*** (0.123) 1.876
financial, and legal services)
Quality or Productivity Management –0.047 (0.074) 0.955
Sales, Purchasing, and Marketing –0.396*** (0.046) 0.673
Teaching 0.496*** (0.115) 1.642
Constant –0.955*** (0.021) 0.385 –0.884*** (0.034) 0.413
n 69,344
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
It is notable here that primary work activities that could reasonably be associated
with engineering—namely, equipment designers and product developers—failed to produce
statistically significant results, while those engaged in production and maintenance were
associated with an odds ratio less than one. Though these results were hinted at by our
preliminary analysis above, clustering engineers with other occupations associated with
low social contribution, they could be interpreted as implicitly contrary to our theoretical
framework. That is, we might expect that employees with these presumably more-instrumental
primary work activities would report greater levels of satisfaction with their jobs’ social
contribution. Basic research would also rightfully fall in this group as an unexpected result.
However, though our findings with regard to these work activities are interesting in their
own right, they are beyond the scope of the current analysis. Our theoretical framework is
not sufficiently developed to allow us to interpret these results with confidence.7
The results for the managerial primary work activities—being not significantly
different from human resources—prompted further investigation. Consequently, we created
a subsample of managers and other administrative occupations such as accountants and
receptionists to evaluate H-6, predicting a high rate of reported social contribution among
upper managers. The subsample includes 16,246 observations. Consistent with H-6, we used
mid-level managers as our reference group in addition to our control variables used in the
previous models. Additionally, we included a control for the number of people supervised.
H-6 is supported by the results in table 6. Upper managers are 1.406 times more likely to be
satisfied that their jobs contribute to society compared to mid-level managers. Additionally,
health care and education managers have a higher likelihood to be satisfied that their jobs
contribute to society with odds ratios of 2.881 and 1.489, respectively. Secretaries and other
support and administrative staff are, predictably, likely to be dissatisfied with their job’s social
contribution; that is to say, they think of their jobs as bullshit.
Before concluding, it is worth returning to the matter of what is being measured by
responses to the question of a job’s social contribution. As noted previously, we interpret
these survey responses as indicative of habits of thought which may express the instinct
of workmanship or its contamination. Because of this, positive responses to the social
contribution question could reflect the actual instrumental value of the work, or they could
potentially be expressions of ceremonial values such as prestige or pecuniary gainfulness.
Our working assumption has been that, at least for the purposes of the comparisons in
which we are interested, reported social contribution is reasonably accurate to the work’s
instrumentality, except where theory and prior empirical research suggest otherwise. The
implication is that, whereas pecuniary principles may permeate the modern occupational
structure, some (e.g., upper managers) are likely to internalize those values, whereas others
(e.g., salespeople) merely abide them in pursuit of a livelihood. That our results broadly
support our hypotheses suggests that this is an appropriate interpretation of these responses.
7
We indicate that these primary work activities, typically associated with industrial, rather than pecuniary,
employments, have an implied expectation of instrumentality; however, there is reason to suspect otherwise as well.
In addition to the duct-tapers discussed above, Graeber (2018, 15) relays the story of a Spanish engineer who, having
been deprived of any responsibilities on the job, opted simply to stop showing up—collecting a paycheck for six years
before anyone noticed. Graeber also relays the experience of an Egyptian man who, after studying at a renowned
engineering school, secured a job as a control and HVAC engineer “only to discover immediately that I hadn’t been
hired as an engineer at all but really as some kind of a technical bureaucrat. All we do here is paperwork, filling out
checklists and forms, and no one actually cares about anything but whether the paperwork is filed properly” (2018,
78). Hence, further development of the analysis in the second section of this article would be required to fully
understand the actual work experiences of, as well as the institutional conditioning of responses from, engineers,
researchers, and production and maintenance workers.
If, for instance, respondents’ reports of the social contribution of their work were dominated
by pecuniary values over the expression of the instinct of workmanship, then we would
expect to see a positive correlation between income and social contribution. We might
similarly expect to see lower rates of bullshit jobs, so-measured, among private, for-profit
employers. We find instead the opposite.8
Hence, while our findings should not be interpreted as a rejection of institutional
values presenting through survey responses, they do suggest that, with important exceptions,
pecuniary values are not so broadly dominant as to completely obscure respondents’
assessment of the actual contribution of their work. To be sure, more research is needed
to uncover the intricate ways in which both ceremonial and instrumental values shape
individuals’ perceptions of their work. The support we find above for our hypotheses can
only suggest that we are not, to our current knowledge, on the wrong path.
Table 6. Results: Hypothesis 6

H-6, Benefactors of the Community
Variable
b Odds Ratio
Age 0.009*** (0.002) 1.009
Wages 0.040 (0.027) 1.040
Male –0.079* (0.035) 0.924
Married 0.193*** (0.048) 1.213
White 0.115*** (0.041) 1.122
Ph.D. 0.313*** (0.113) 1.367
Masters 0.068 (0.039) 1.070
Professional 0.260* (0.150) 1.297
Employer Size:
11–24 Employees –0.007 (0.084) 0.993
25–99 Employees –0.322*** (0.055) 0.725
100–499 Employees –0.358*** (0.052) 0.699
500–999 Employees –0.540*** (0.053) 0.583
1,000–4,999 Employees –0.509*** (0.046) 0.601
5,000–24,999 Employees –0.467*** (0.047) 0.627
25,000 Employees –0.571*** (0.041) 0.565
Employer Type:
2-year College 1.191*** (0.680) 3.291
4-year College 0.890*** (0.237) 2.436
K-12 1.467*** (0.534) 4.338
Local Government 1.106*** (0.251) 3.022
Other 0.655* (0.617) 1.925
State Government 1.131*** (0.306) 3.098
Federal Government 1.291*** (0.296) 3.638
Military 1.292*** (0.584) 3.642
Medical School 1.044*** (0.430) 2.841
Other Educational Institution 0.971 (1.798) 2.639
Private Non-Profit 1.352*** (0.251) 3.866
Self-Employed Incorporated 0.249*** (0.069) 1.283
8
It could have also been the case that, lacking the same suggestion of tacit deception found in Graeber’s
term, the survey’s question of satisfaction with the job’s social contribution simply did not elicit the same “sober
reflection” from respondents. As a result, one could argue, responses in our data are more colored by contaminating
social values than Graeber’s interviews. If this were the case, however, we would expect to see results contradicting
Graeber’s own findings concerning, for example, IT workers. Again, this was not the case, specifically with regard
to H-5, but more generally as well.
H-6, Benefactors of the Community

Variable
b Odds Ratio
Self-Employed Non-Incorporated 0.291*** (0.124) 1.337
Research Institute 0.783*** (0.397) 2.188
Number of People Supervised:
Supervisor 0.015*** (0.003) 1.015
Principal Job Code:
Accountants, Auditors, and Other Financial Specialists –0.339*** (0.051) 0.712
Accounting Clerks and Book Keepers –0.578*** (0.071) 0.561
Computer and Information Systems Managers –0.327*** (0.083) 0.721
Education Administrators (e.g., deans, registrar) 0.398** (0.239) 1.489
Engineering Managers 0.195** (0.096) 1.216
Medical and Health Service Managers 1.058*** (0.375) 2.881
Natural Science Managers 0.286* (0.194) 1.331
Other Administrative (e.g., record clerks, telephone operators) –0.363*** (0.055) 0.696
Other Management Related Occupations –0.100 (0.056) 0.905
Personnel, Training, and Labor Relations Specialists –0.028 (0.090) 0.973
Secretaries, Receptionists, and Typists –0.592***(0.067) 0.553
Top Level Managers, Executives, and Admins (e.g., CEO, COO, and 0.341*** (0.094) 1.406
CFO etc.)
Constant –1.243 0.325
n 16,246
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Conclusion
The development of a managerial feudalism, as Graeber terms it (2018; see also Gordon
1996, 76–77), exemplifies the non-teleological nature of institutional evolution. That
occupational structures, especially in the corporate sector, have taken on such atavistic
traits—notably, from a period over which the advent of capitalism is widely held to be an
improvement—should give one pause. From a Veblenian perspective, however, the changes
are not incomprehensible. The feudal and the capitalist periods are, in his account, merely
variants of “pecuniary culture,” with the former being indirectly pecuniary through predatory
exploit rather than directly through commerce. And, any “aristocratic (or servile) scheme of
life must necessarily run in invidious terms,” with “the corollary that wealth and exemption
from work (otium cum dignitate) is honourable and that poverty and work is dishonourable”
(Veblen 1914, 183, italics in original).
From our synthesis of Graeber’s work and institutional theory, the existence of bullshit
jobs is not at all surprising. Differential privileges increasingly derive not from (or perhaps
in addition to) heredity, but from position within pecuniary bureaucracies. Hence, as the
above has demonstrated in terms of the white-collar work that pervades so much of U.S.
employment, the contemporary occupational structure can be coherently explained with a
recognition of the inefficiencies, the waste, and the invidious motives involved in much of
its construction and recreation through time.
However, while the preceding analysis generally supports Graeber’s arguments, both
theoretically and empirically, there remains considerable work to be done. First, a host
of demographic characteristics—race, gender, age, and others—as they pertain to the self-
reported social contribution of one’s work has yet to be fully explored. Second, while our
quantitative analysis has been concerned only with a snapshot of the workforce at a point
in time, there are several avenues of potential research on bullshit jobs through time. These
include secular trends as well as the relationship between the prevalence of such jobs and the
business cycle (see Dur and van Lent 2019).
Third, while our analysis makes a first pass at the particular nature and structure of
administrative professions and those in information technology, a great deal of work on these
and all of the other occupations is still to be done. The same could be said for the different
industries within and between the private and public sectors. For instance, our regression
analysis found only two types of managers—in education and in healthcare—more likely than
top managers to report high satisfaction with their work’s social contribution. While the
socially beneficial nature of these fields may make these results unsurprising, the nature and
structure of their administrative hierarchies remains an interesting topic for further research.
Similarly, our analysis produced curiously weak results with regard to the social contribution
of those in engineering fields. Further analysis of these workers is certainly in order.
In each of these examples, a look to whether those actually working the jobs in question
believe their work contributes to society has the potential to be illuminating. We suggest
that future research along these lines build from the approach we have taken: constructing
an evolutionary theoretical lens, in conjunction with previous empirical research, through
which to view the self-reported instrumental and ceremonial nature of these employees’
work. Without the theoretical component, reliable interpretation would not be possible as
responses could reflect either instrumental or ceremonial habits of thought in their own
right. But, of course, without empirical content, theory risks slipping into a quagmire of
speculation. We hope future work will expand beyond the boundaries of our analysis—
namely, white-collar occupations and a dataset of only college graduates—by making use of
this approach.
The existence and, indeed, prevalence of bullshit jobs represents an important social
concern. As argued above, most economists would acknowledge double-digit rates of
unemployment not only as problematic, but as pressingly so. The prevalence of bullshit
jobs at such rates ought to be treated similarly, representing unfulfilled desires to contribute
as well as lost output (though not lost income). Seen in this light, the need for further
study is clear, as one part of the institutionalist project of giving guidance toward the non-
invidious, instrumental recreation of community. Inherently, such an enterprise requires a
reconciliation of our institutional potential and the generic ends of life, chief among them
the instinct of workmanship.
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Journal of Economic Issues

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mjei20

The Instinct of Workmanship and the Incidence of

Erik Dean, Richard B. Dadzie & Xuan Pham

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2022.2079929

Published online: 30 Sep 2022.

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The Instinct of Workmanship and the Incidence of Bullshit Jobs

Keywords: bullshit jobs, instinct of workmanship, managerialism, bureaucracy, white-

JEL Classification Codes: B52, J3, J4, J5, L2

The Industrial and Managerial Employments

While our primary job characteristic of interest is a job’s contribution to society, we

Table 2 reports the demographic and employment characteristics of individuals

Results and Discussion

H-3, Taylorism and Make-

Table 6. Results: Hypothesis 6

H-6, Benefactors of the Community

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