B.
Weiner: The History
Reflections on the History of
Attribution Theory and Research
People, Personalities, Publications, Problems
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Abstract. Fifty years after the publication of The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (Heider, 1958), attribution inquiry remains
strong, but no longer dominant. This article examines some of the people (particularly, Fritz Heider, Edward Jones, and Harold Kelley),
publications, and conceptual issues that contributed to the duration of this line of work. Personal anecdotes are included.
Keywords: attribution, social psychology, history of psychology
In the 1950s, and particularly in the latter half of that de-
cade, there was much theoretical ferment and excitement
in the related psychological subdisciplines of personality,
social psychology, and human motivation. Among the con-
tributions at that time were Rotter’s (1954) conception of
social learning theory; Festinger’s (1957) beliefs about
cognitive dissonance; Atkinson’s (1957) theory of achieve-
ment striving; a variety of versions of cognitive consistency
(e.g., Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958), including Heider’s
(1958) notions about balance; extensions of Hullian drive
theory to human learning and anxiety (Spence, 1958);
White’s (1959) ideas about competence motivation; the
elaboration of ego-psychology by Rapaport (1959) and oth-
ers; and many additional contributions of perhaps equal im-
portance. Also during this time, Heider (1958) published
his book, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations,
which is being celebrated in this volume.
Fifty years later, it is useful to compare the longevity of
these seminal conceptions and determine which of them are
alive and well, as well as asking why the theories initially
took hold. This search is consistent with the findings of
attribution research – we seek the cause(s) of an important
outcome. The conclusions to these questions will be argu-
able, but it certainly is the case that attribution theory has
not died and has (perhaps) outlived all (or most of) the
conceptual advances listed above (e.g., how many current
graduate students in psychology can explain or even have
heard of the contributions of Hull-Spence to drive theory,
the advances of ego psychology put forth by Rapaport, and
so on). However, it also is fair to state that attribution no
longer is the dominant field of inquiry it once was, say in
the 1970–1985 era.
What gave rise to the growth and maintenance of this
theory? Why is it that 50 years after the publication of Hei-
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
Socialof Attribution
Psychology
© Theory
2008 Hogrefe
2008; Vol. and
& Huber Research
39(3):151–156
Publishers
Bernard Weiner
University of California, Los Angeles, USA
der’s book, attribution theory still has some prominence?
One answer to these questions relates to the places and the
personalities of the initial contributors. Atkinson, Festin-
ger, and Hull, for example, taught at major universities;
they had research groups, research assistants, and graduate
students, as well as faculty collaborators. These theorists
could be considered tribal leaders, being the kings and
dominant members of their tribes. They laid down the laws;
their wishes were abided; they were feared and admired.
One was an accepted member of the in-group or (at best)
a misguided member of the out-group. Hull, who was
trained as a robotic engineer, refused Heider’s request to
attend his research meetings (at that time, Heider was at
Smith College in Massachusetts, not too distant from Yale
University in Connecticut). In a similar manner, Spence
would not allow his students to take Lewin’s classes when
both were at the University of Iowa, and they clashed over
the addition of philosopher Gustav Bergmann to advance
their theoretical systems.
How this contrasts with Heider, at the rather unknown
University of Kansas, working on his own without research
assistants or funding. At the time prior to the publication
of his book, Heider’s “experimental” work did not require
lab assistants. One morning when I was at his house in
Lawrence, Kansas, he excused himself, saying he was go-
ing upstairs to his study to conduct some experiments.
There his analysis of Romeo and Juliet fostered the growth
of balance theory (the situation between the lovers and the
parents created an imbalanced state), as did his “experi-
mental” insights regarding the latent imbalance portrayed
in Ibsen’s Wild Duck (the devoted husband is unaware of
the financial disasters undertaken by his beloved wife).
Furthermore, Heider’s book was published when he was 62
years old. This was not the setting or conditions for the
Social Psychology 2008; Vol. 39(3):151–156
DOI 10.1027/1864-9335.39.3.151
 152 B. Weiner: The History of Attribution Theory and Research
establishment of tribal leadership, which he would not have
desired or accepted in any case.
In 1978, at a conference on attribution held in Biele-
feld, Germany, Heider started his talk as follows: “First
I want to say, do not attribute attribution theory to me.
Many here have contributed.” This statement is indeed
true, but its truth does not decrease Heider’s modesty. It
rather conveys his openness and receptivity to alternative
concepts, ideas, methods, and so on. This, in part, paved
the way for the richness of attribution theory, its applica-
tion to so many areas of psychology, and its lengthy
shelf-life. The complement to this conclusion is that the
rigidity or dogmatism of Atkinson, Festinger, and Hull-
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Spence and/or their theories, in part, lead to the decline
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of these conceptions.
Of course, the fate of a theory, both its initial accep-
tance and final duration, depends on more than people
and places. Hopefully, the intrinsic merits of the concep-
tion will determine its longevity. Yet one cannot dismiss
the context and the Zeitgeist. Attribution theory took hold
after cognitive dissonance had ruled social psychology
during the 1960s and had run its course. At the very core
of dissonance theory was Festinger’s Weltanschauung,
that theory should contradict common-sense (this held
even in his later work as an evolutionary psychologist).
Heider, to the contrary, embraced common-sense and
was believed to capture the views of the “naïve” person, or
the person “on the street.” Social psychologists had much
more simpatico for the position of Festinger than Heider,
often portraying naïve psychology with the Yiddish label
of “bubba” (grandma) psychology, a pejorative term indi-
cating it was nothing new. I confess that I initially shared
the abhorrence of common-sense psychology. I first be-
came involved in attribution research when Harold Kelley,
my colleague at UCLA, went on sabbatical leave and asked
me to mentor one of his students, Linda Beckman. When
we first met I asked Linda about her interests. She stated:
“I want to know why students think they succeeded or
failed.” “Oh no,” I replied, “the common-sense Heider stuff
that I dislike.” I was merely repeating a sentiment ex-
pressed a few years earlier by my mentor, John Atkinson,
when I was a student and his research group discussed the
Heider (1958) book (and quickly set it aside).
There are many reasons for the aversion of social psy-
chologists to common-sense, ranging from irrational
(fear of not being regarded as scientific) to rational (the
belief that science must develop its own language sys-
tems). Suffice it to say that there are many causes of sci-
entific growth and decline, and surely the common-sense
label played an important role in the history of attribution
thinking. Indeed, the waning of attribution theory toward
the end of the 1980s coincided with (was caused by?) a
refocus on unconscious determinants of behavior, as il-
lustrated in the priming literature. Later in this paper I
return to the issue of theoretical longevity and suggest
other factors that may have contributed to its duration and
decline.
Social Psychology 2008; Vol. 39(3):151–156
The Role of Harold Kelley and Edward
Jones in the History of Attribution
Research
If Heider wrote the principle source for attribution inquiry
(although he certainly was not the first to write on this top-
ic; see, for example, Ichheiser, 1933; Michotte, 1946), then
Kelley (1967) authored the chapter, published in the Ne-
braska Symposium of Motivation, that brought some core
attribution ideas into mainstream social psychology. He
also was the initial mailman, delivering both his and Hei-
der’s thoughts to the scientific field. Kelley’s (1960) review
of Heider’s book in Contemporary Psychology was widely
read and, for many, was their first introduction to attribu-
tion-related ideas. Prior to the publication of Heider’s book,
chapters had been mimeographed and distributed (you re-
member, before e-mail and even Xerox), but not to a wide
audience. The book awaited the help and subsequent col-
laboration of Beatrice Wright, who imposed order and sys-
tematic construction.
In his chapter, Kelley (1967) introduced the so-called Kel-
ley cube, which systematically analyzed the covariation an-
tecedents of causal beliefs, specifying the role of social norms
and past history in causal decision-making. While social psy-
chologists universally acclaimed the Kelley chapter, Heider
had misgivings. In a well-attended conference presentation,
while discussing the Kelley cube, Heider gently pulled his
two ears and followed this by sticking out his tongue. After a
few repetitions, he asked the audience if they thought the ear
tugging caused the tongue extension. Although rarely a user
of statistics in his own research, Heider certainly distin-
guished correlation from causation. Kelley was in the audi-
ence and on occasion repeated the Heider facial gestures and
criticisms when discussing causal inferences.
Although Kelley is perhaps best known for his contribu-
tions to attribution theory, he never viewed himself as an
attribution theorist. He confided to me that attribution was
merely a hobby. Kelley perceived himself as a theorist of
interpersonal relations and most envied Heider for using
the exact book title that he coveted.
As stated thus far, Heider supplied the seminal attribu-
tion ideas and Hal Kelley (along with Ned Jones, yet to be
discussed) made them known to social psychologists.
However, it may have been the book, Attribution: Perceiv-
ing the Causes of Behavior, coauthored or coedited by six
of us (Jones et al., 1972) that lifted attribution to its place
as a dominant conception within social psychology. A
number of ideas that were introduced or elaborated in that
book, including actor/observer attribution disparities, dis-
positional attribution biases, verb causality, causal dimen-
sions, causal schemata, attribution of arousal, and on and
on, became part of mainstream social psychology. The sto-
ry of that book publication, in which I was fortunate to have
played a role, has some interesting twists and turns. Here
is some of that history from a self-focused perspective.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 B. Weiner: The History of Attribution Theory and Research
The Publication History of Attribution:
Perceiving the Causes of Behavior
In 1968, Kelley approached me and proposed to establish
a working group on attribution theory. I was quite new to
the area and was flattered by his invitation. He had already
planned the meeting and soon obtained federal funding.
Four others were invited, the main person being Edward
(Ned) Jones. Prior to the covariation analyses provided by
Kelley, a well-known chapter on correspondent inferences
and the perceived determinants of choice and decision
making had been published by Jones and Davis (1965).
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This provided the background for subsequent thinking
about dispositional biases and proposed actor/observer at-
tribution disparities. At that time, Kelley and Jones were
among the most prominent social psychologists. The other
four conference participants, including myself, were young
assistant professors. Two, Richard Nisbett and Stuart Va-
lins, were students of Stanley Schachter and had published
on attributions for internal arousal, while the other, David
Kanouse, also at UCLA, had expertise in linguistics. He
was examining causal inferences elicited by disparate verb
types. At that time I was primarily working on achievement
motivation.
In the summer of l969, we met daily for 3 weeks at
UCLA. The mornings were intense discussions, or I should
say arguments or controversies between Jones and Kelley.
I was not sure what all the fuss was about and to the best
of my memory, the four assistant professors said relatively
little. The afternoons were devoted to reading or other
planned activities. At the conclusion of this initial meeting,
we were to write papers, either individually or with coau-
thors, and send these to designated others in our group for
comments. Then we agreed to meet for another 3 weeks the
following year, at Yale University, to finalize these papers
and address remaining issues.
The group decided who would be the best reviewers for
each of the papers. To my horror, Jones and Kelley agreed
to serve as my critics. I regarded them with fear: They were
extremely bright, verbal, highly critical, and were quite
likely to play key roles in my later tenure decision. After I
had completed my writing, with five students as coauthors,
I sent the manuscript to Jones and Kelley. Within a week I
received a reply from Jones. I still remember the dreaded
first sentence, and will paraphrase the rest:
“ Bernie, this paper needs a lot of work. It is far too theoretical
and too long. You must add further experiments, get additional
data, include some other key conditions and controls, and so
on . . .” It concluded: “Do not send this to Kelley until you
make changes. He will kill you. All the best. Ned”
My worst fears had been realized. I marshaled my resourc-
es and began to make changes to satisfy the empirically-
minded Jones. I knew there was time because Kelley would
be slow in responding. I did not want to tell him not to read
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
153
the first draft, so took my chances that I would beat him to
the punch with an updated version.
I worked extremely hard, overseeing new research stud-
ies, shortening the chapter, being more constrained theoret-
ically, and incorporating many other suggestions from
Jones the smart and famous and rigorous. Alas, just as I
was nearing completion of this revision, a large envelope
appeared in my mailbox. Kelley had responded. I read the
opening lines and my eyes began to water:
“Bernie,” the first line said, “this paper needs a lot of work.”
I knew I had seen that somewhere before. I continued to
read:
“It has far too much data and not enough theory. Give yourself
more space. Don’t be in such a rush and shortchange the con-
ceptual part. I suggest you condense the empirical section, get
out some of the experimental conditions and controls and ex-
pand the theory. By the way, if it is not too late, do not send
this to Ned. He will kill you. All the best: Hal”
I thought this over, returned to the first draft, made some
minimal changes, and re-sent it to Jones and Kelley. They
answered quickly, concluding that the revision was much
improved. I assume they did not read the new paper and/or
could not remember the old.
Our Yale meeting was in the last days when we began
to discuss where to publish our chapters. At these waning
moments the mention of a book was made. This goal was
not our original intent. There was agreement to combine
our chapters into a book, to be published by a new press,
General Learning. General Learning Press published the
chapters individually, as well as combining them into a
complete book. After the book had been out about a year,
I received a call from a potential reader asking why it was
no longer available. I was rather shocked to learn the book
was not in print and immediately contacted the publisher.
The representative explained that the appropriate paper
was not available. I subsequently learned that just prior to
our publication their paper warehouse flooded and special
paper had to be imported. When the first printing sold out,
publication stopped while there was a search for more of
this exclusive paper, which the publisher assumed had been
ordered for our book. That problem was clarified and ordi-
nary paper was used for the subsequent printings.
As indicated earlier, this book had a major impact on the
growth of attribution visibility and research. The book,
along with the individual chapters, has been cited several
thousand times and created, or helped to create, the tide for
attribution inquiry.
There also was a sad consequence of our meetings.
Many years later I was having dinner with Ned Jones and
he confessed that the meetings elicited a deep depression.
He felt the young assistant professors had “taken over” and
he was no longer up to the mental tasks of his position. Of
course, this was a totally unwarranted conclusion and quite
the opposite of our beliefs – we greatly admired and envied
Ned. He labeled his occasional drinking a “self-handicap-
Social Psychology 2008; Vol. 39(3):151–156
 154 B. Weiner: The History of Attribution Theory and Research
ping strategy,” that is, a dysfunctional behavior to ensure
that failure, if it occurred, would not be ascribed by him or
others to low ability. So that is how the idea of self-handi-
capping became part of social psychology and attribution
theory. I have always wondered if it had applicability to
anyone else.
The Next Milestones
There were numerous subsequent key events in the history
of attribution inquiry, although there certainly would be de-
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bate on which were the most important. I include among
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these milestones the three-volume publication edited by
Harvey, Ickes, and Kidd (1976, 1978, 1980), which con-
tained nearly 50 chapters written by many well-known fig-
ures as well as an informative interview with Heider. A
number of single-authored texts also followed that I will
not enumerate (with apologies to the authors). In addition,
there were research extensions beyond the confines of so-
cial psychology. I like to think that my work on success and
failure (Weiner, 1979, 1985) introduced attribution theory
to motivation and education. In addition, the extensions of
learned helpless by Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale
(1978) to clinical psychology and depression greatly ex-
panded the attribution audience.
Unfortunately, Heider, Jones, and Kelley are no longer
physically with us, although their influence remains. Hei-
der died in 1988 at the age of 92, Jones 5 years later in 1993
at the age of 67, and Kelley a decade later in 2003 at the
age of 82. They formed the initial great troika for the study
of causal attributions. Each had long marriages, large fam-
ilies, many admirers and friends, countless awards, rich and
productive lives.
Persisting Problems
There are various descriptions (metaphors) that give rise to
disparate portraits of the attribution field. The most preva-
lent view is that Heider provided the initial spark, Jones
and Kelley brought the kindling wood, and that started the
fire. Others threw on logs and branches and soon there was
a forest fire. Over time, like all fires, it began to burn out,
although there remained some occasional flares and a lot
of smoldering that left cause for concern. Also, like most
fires, it enriched the soil and left a positive residue for the
evolution of the forest. This metaphor suggests a unified
attribution theory, with all research guided by a shared the-
oretical perspective. This characterizes, to a great extent,
the literature driven by Atkinson’s theory of achievement
motivation, Festinger’s conception of cognitive disso-
nance, and the Hull-Spence presentation of drive theory.
I subscribe to a different, albeit related metaphor, when
characterizing the attribution domain. In this view, the
Social Psychology 2008; Vol. 39(3):151–156
sources of the spark and the initial kindling remain the
same. But rather than a central forest fire on which many
heap wood and brush, the wind scattered the fire to various
locations, giving rise to numerous smaller pockets of flame.
There were indeed paths between these various bonfires,
but nonetheless the fires remained separate, extinguished
at different rates, and left separate legacies. Hence, there is
no over-riding attribution theory and the use of this term is
misleading. Rather, there are many attribution-based theo-
ries and attribution is better characterized as a field of study
rather than a theory. Paradoxically, the lack of theoretical
unity gave rise to hybrid vigor and contributed to the dura-
tion of attribution-related activity.
Acceptance of this metaphor calls attention to some dis-
agreements or contrasts between areas within attribution
research, even though they did emanate from the same
sources. These distinctions are subtle and often have gone
unrecognized by those adding to the flames. I want to call
attention to three pertinent, interrelated issues that remain
unsolved, as well as rarely discussed. These conceptual
problems concern attributions for events versus outcomes,
the contrast between reason and cause, and the specifica-
tion of attributions as pre- versus postevent perceptions.
Attributions for Events Versus Outcomes
Heider, in part, traced the origin of his thinking about caus-
al attributions to the discovery of sand on an office desk.
This raised questions such as: “Why is there sand here?
Where did it come from?” The answers to these questions
soon were revealed when it was noticed that the roof was
leaking. This resulted in some needed repairs that, if not
undertaken, would have resulted in the collapse of the ceil-
ing. Attributions, he concluded, were essential for adaptive
behavior, and the field of attribution grew as one subset of
the study of cognitive functionalism.
For Heider, any event, action, or occurrence, including
sand on a desk, can give rise to the search for causes. The
honking of a horn, a person calling another for a date, a
delay in the arrival of a bus, the purchase of a house, and
on and on, might stimulate a desire for understanding. The
postulation of actor/observer discrepancies and the hypoth-
esis of dispositional biases stem from a consideration of
explanations for virtually any event.
On the other hand, in my work and those of others in the
achievement domain, as well as for individuals who study,
for example, attributional style, attributions are elicited for
achievement outcomes. That is, in achievement settings
there is a desire to find the causes of success and failure.
Thus, I do not address beliefs regarding why individuals
undertake achievement activities, i.e., why one plays base-
ball, or goes to school, or accepts a particular job. However,
I do examine perceptions regarding why one struck out at
baseball, dropped out of school, or was fired from a job,
from the perspective of either the actor or an observer. No-
tice that these are negative end results, which elicit more
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
 B. Weiner: The History of Attribution Theory and Research
search and attribution-related activity than do positive out-
comes. The hedonic bias, or the tendency to take more
credit for positive than for negative outcomes, concerns
outcome-related attributions rather than ascriptions for
events not associated with any valence. Linkage to out-
comes rather than to events also characterizes the identifi-
cation of optimistic versus pessimistic attributional styles,
which grew from the learned-helplessness literature, as
well as applying to literatures related to attributions for
stigmas, which are perceived as negative outcomes. Heider
regarded my definition of attributions as too narrow and
questioned my restricted vision of causal beliefs.
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Reasons Versus Causes
If a person is asked why he or she went to Movie X, the
likely answers will be what are called reasons, such as: “I
heard it was good”; “I was given free tickets”; “I love mys-
teries”; and so on. These explanations or justifications
make the choice understandable and intelligible. In ex-
plaining everyday actions, people focus on reasons, which
are associated with desires, incentives (costs and benefits),
volitional choice (intentions), and free will (see Malle,
2004). Heider included reasons as examples of causal as-
criptions.
Attribution theory has either confounded the distinction
between causes and reasons or else has neglected it. As
again displayed in my work and other writings related to
achievement strivings, outcomes are associated with causes
rather than with reasons. For example, failure ascribed to
lack of ability reveals a perceived cause of that outcome.
Neither lack of ability nor failure is associated with free
choice, or with any incentive. Furthermore, neither the
cause nor the result generally is “intended.”
The distinction between cause and reason is at times
murky. For example, although failure is not desired, suc-
cess is, and although lack of ability is not “intentional,”
putting forth the needed effort is intended. Nonetheless, it
is reasonable to maintain a cause/reason distinction and
link these, respectively, to attributions for outcomes versus
events. Attributions (causes) for outcomes may be less sub-
ject to the pejorative “naïve psychology” label than are as-
criptions (reasons) for events, which are more closely re-
lated to everyday explanations (see Malle, 2004). In addi-
tion, a causal analysis can be considered mechanical
(pushing the organism) as opposed to a reason analysis,
which has the flavor of teleology (action “in order to”).
Teleology has a relatively lower rung in what is regarded
as scientific explanation. This distinction, in part, leads me
to question the characterization of attribution theory as
“naïve” psychology. In addition, the predictions derived
from attribution theory are often not available to the lay-
person and certainly attribution theories strive for general-
ity and parsimony, attributes not associated with naïve psy-
chology.
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers
155
Explaining the Past Versus Predicting the
Future
Beliefs about control have played a central role in attribu-
tional inquiry. This influence traces back to the distinction
articulated by Rotter (1966) between internal versus exter-
nal locus of control, although Heider (1958) also contrasted
two sources or loci of “can,” ability (internal to the person)
and task difficulty (a characteristic of the environment).
The locus construct (independent of control beliefs) was
central in the research bias pursuits that characterized a
great deal of attribution work: hedonic biasing, actor/ob-
server disparities, and the preference for dispositional in-
ferences. In addition, the notion of personal control became
incorporated into research on stress, health, and coping. It
was contended that if an individual perceives personal con-
trol over his or her environment, then stress is reduced and
adaptive functioning is more likely. This has positive im-
plications for physical and mental health. Individual differ-
ence measures, with persons labeled as internal versus ex-
ternal in locus of control, are part of this research tradition,
generating hypotheses that individuals with an internal lo-
cus of control are likely to be “better” in virtually every-
thing (including dealing with health-related problems) than
are persons classified as external in control locus.
Although Heider did not discuss Rotter’s locus of con-
trol construct, he embraced a closely related distinction of-
fered by Richard deCharms (1968) between “origin” and
“pawn.” Heider used the label “self-starter” in addressing
some attribution-related issues and believed this character-
ization had adaptive significance.
Should beliefs about the future (e.g., “if I try hard then
I will succeed”; “I can control my weight, and, thus, will
improve my health”; “I have the strength to take charge of
my life and, thus, will be accepted in the program I want”)
be considered under the rubric of attribution theory? Or
rather, does attribution theory instead look backward: “I
succeeded; it is because I tried hard”; “I improved my
health; it was caused by losing weight”; “I was accepted
for the program of my choice; it was because I took charge
of my life.” The former hypotheses embrace the future, te-
leology, and reasons; the latter relations concern the past
outcomes, mechanism, and causes. Heider did not disen-
tangle the two groupings, embracing them both within the
large framework of causal thinking. I suspect this has left
the field with some enduring problems and confounds, but
also many possibilities and avenues for study.
A Summary and Concluding Note
Fritz Heider is one of the giants of the social sciences in
the last century. In his 1958 book, he proposes two related
conceptions: Attribution theory and balance theory, each of
which had a major impact not only within social psychol-
Social Psychology 2008; Vol. 39(3):151–156
 156 B. Weiner: The History of Attribution Theory and Research
ogy, but across fields of psychology and to other academic
disciplines as well. Although the dominance of both con-
ceptions has waned, they remain influential ways of think-
ing about ourselves and others. They have left permanent
legacies, both empirical and theoretical, for the evolution
of psychological thought.
The formulation of attribution theory was aided by many
others, particularly Ned Jones and Hal Kelley, although
there also was a large cast of additional contributors. This
resulted in many research directions and a variety of off-
shoots from the original conception(s). The fragmentation
of research efforts blurred some of the boundaries of attri-
bution theory, which had never been clearly formalized or
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demarcated. Some vagueness relates to lack of distinctions
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between events and actions versus valenced outcomes, rea-
sons versus causes, and future versus past events. Without
intention, these typically unnoticed disparities contributed
to the hybrid vigor of attributional thinking and, in part,
caused its resistance to extinction. In addition, Heider must
be given credit for being open to the many variants of at-
tributional thought, never passing public judgments that
others were “wrong.” Fritz would never do that!
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Bernard Weiner
Department of Psychology
Franz Hall, UCLA
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1563
USA
E-mail weiner@psych.ucla.edu
© 2008 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers