2. Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter), (2021) 1 SCC 745.

Issue-

The main issue, in this case, was whether Contemnors scandalises or lowers the authority of the
Supreme Court as defined in section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.

The Supreme Court, upon the complaint filed by the Mahek Maheshwari, took Suo motu cognizance of
the tweets posted by activist and advocate Prashant Bhushan on his twitter handle and held him guilty
of contempt of court for lowering the authority of the court, through his tweets.

Rules-

Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 defines contempt of Court as the civil or the criminal
contempt which is punishable under section 12 of the same Act.

It hits upon two important fundamental rights of the citizens, namely, the Right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression and the Right to Personal liberty defined in Article 19 & Article 21 of Indian
Constitution respectively.

The quantum of punishment for the offence of contempt of court is very less as compared to the
punishment for defamation (defined in section 500 of IPC 1860), even though both offences are similar
in nature.

Contempt powers of Supreme Court and High Courts under Article 129 of Indian Constitution confer
power on the Supreme Court and Article 215 confers power on the High Courts to punish the contempt
of itself.

Analysis-

Arbitrariness in Contempt powers of Supreme Courts and High Courts – In England, the offence of
Scandalising the court was applicable through the Crime and Courts Act. However, on the
recommendation of the Law Commission, it was abolished in 2013. The justification given by the Law
Commission behind abolition is that the said offence is an infringement of Freedom of Expression that
should not be retained without strong principled or practical justification. Further, it was also a violation
of the human rights principle.

In India also the term “Scandalise” used in section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Court Act is not defined and
contempt powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts are unlimited. This causes arbitrariness and
increases the probability of its misuse. Hence, its high time that the Supreme Court should either abolish
this offence or define the term “Scandalizing the court” and issue certain guidelines regarding its aim to
prevent its misuse by the courts.
Violation of Article 14 – Section 19 of Contempt of Court Act, 1971 provides the right to appeal against
the orders or decisions given by the High Court in the matters of its contempt. It provides provisions for
both intra-court appeal and inter-court appeal.

Intra-court appeal – In case the order is passed by a single judge of the High Court, its appeal shall lie to
a bench of not less than two judges of that High Court.

Freedom of Speech & Expression – Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees freedom and speech and
expression to its citizens is the ultimate guardian of all the values that the constitution holds sacred:
Rule of Law, Separation of Powers, Free and Fair elections etc. On the other hand, the constitution also
provides eight grounds for restricting freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2), out of
which contempt of court is one of them. Since “reasonable restrictions” is the operative word of Article
19(2), courts can utilize their powers of contempt only to aid the administration of justice and not to
shut the voices of people that seek accountability from the court for its errors or legal omissions.

Right to Appeal – Every citizen has a right to appeal, which is a substantive right enshrined under Article
21 of the Indian Constitution, but in the present situation, where the Supreme Court itself initiates a
contempt proceeding against the contemnors, there is no provision to appeal against its judgement.
Though there is a provision of review in such cases, the petition lies before the same bench and thus,
there is less probability of it being considered without any prejudice.

Since Right to Appeal is an absolute right under the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 and it’s also the basis of the
principle of natural justice, at least one opportunity should be provided to the aggrieved person to
appeal against the conviction. Thus, on 12th September, 2020 Contemnor No.1 filed the writ petition
before the Supreme Court and prayed for giving directions to declare that when Supreme Court is
hearing and deciding the matter at the first instance and is not acting as an appellate court, then the
person convicted by the Supreme Court, has a right to an intra-Court appeal to be heard by a larger and
different bench. He supported his viewpoint by quoting the maxim “Nemo potestesse simul actor et
judex” which means- No one can be a suitor and a judge at the same time. Thereby he meant that there
is a need for an intra-court appeal as it is provided by section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971
against the orders and decisions of the High Court.

Conclusion

The contempt power in a democracy is only to enable the court to function effectively, and not to
protect the self-esteem of an individual judge. The foundation of the judiciary is based on the trust and
the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. The Constitutional
bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of contempt against former Madras High Judge C.S.Karnan
also said that “Law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to the
winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.”

3. Dr.D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216, 220.

Issue-

Whether the above-stated conduct of the petitioner amounts to contempt of Court?

Are the Provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act,1971 ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?

Is it relevant in a contempt proceeding that the petitioner did not seek any personal gains for himself
and that he had made the averments for the public good with np intention to scandalize the court?

Whether defense under Sections 4&5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is available to the
contemnor?

Rules-

The Constitution of India, 1950- Article 19(1)(g)

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Sections 4 and 5.

Analysis-

The conduct of the petitioner was held to be amounting to Contempt of Court.

The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was not held to be ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution.

In this regard, the Court held that it is true that in an indictable offense, generally mens rea is an
essential ingredient and requires to be proved for convicting the offender but for criminal contempt as
defined in Section2 (c) any act which tends to create disaffection, disbelief in the efficacy of judicial
dispensation or tendency to obstruct the administration of justice or tendency to lower the authority or
majesty of law constitutes criminal contempt. Thereby, it excludes the proof of mens rea. What is
relevant is that the offending or affront act produces interference with or tendency to interfere with the
course of justice. The Court, therefore, is required to consider whether the imputations made by a
contemnor are calculated to bring to have the effect of bringing the court into contempt or casting
aspersions on the administration of justice or tends to impede justice, etc. The Court has to consider the
nature of the imputations, the occasion of making the imputations, and whether the contemnor
foresees the possibility of his act.
The Court held that the said provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are inapplicable to the present
case as they would apply only to the publication of a report of the judicial proceedings fairly and with
accuracy to outside the world. Further, it was held that there is a distinction between expression in
pleading and publication of a report of the judicial proceeding or order without malice as fair and
constructive criticism to the readers. What he has written in the second writ petition is neither a fair and
accurate report of the proceedings of the earlier writ petition nor a fair criticism thereof.

Conclusion-

PRINCIPLES OF LAW LAID DOWN IN THE CASE

1. Liberty of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) brings within its ambit, the
corresponding duty and responsibility, and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty.

2. Any citizen is entitled to express his honest opinion about the correctness of a judgment, order,
sentence with moderate language pointing out the error or defect or illegality in the judgment, order, or
sentence.

3. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into
disrespect and disregard and tantamount to contempt. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt.

4. It is not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to interfere with the
administration of justice. Making reckless allegations or vilification of the conduct of the court or the
judge would be contempt.

4.Prahlad Saran Gupta v. Bar Council of India, AIR 1997 SC 1338.

Issue-

Whether the appellant is guilty of gross professional misconduct?

Rules-

Advocates Act, 1961

35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct: In this section, [section 37 and section 38], the expressions
Advocate-General and Advocate-General of the State shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi,
mean the Additional Solicitor General of India.

36B. Disposal of disciplinary proceedings.

S.38 - Appeal to the Supreme Court.

Analysis-

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that the error has been made by the disciplinary committee of
Bar Council of India in rejecting the request made by the appellant. The court relied upon the judgement
given in the case of State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram[1], stating that it is not advisable for the
judge to make the comparison of hand writing and it is better to take expert opinion and assistance
regarding the comparison of the hand writing.

Therefore the court held that the appellant was not guilty of serious professional misconduct just
because he drafted the notice under Section. 80 of CPC, 1908 this was served to the railways. This
offence is considered as quasi criminal in nature and hence it has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. If the opinion of an expert is considered to compare the handwriting then it might be proved
beyond the reasonable doubt.

The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India also passed an order stating that the appellant is
guilty of professional misconduct for the letter sent to the Shri V.K.Gupta. The Supreme Court held that
there was no evidence that Shri Ram (judgement debtor) handed over the letter to V.K. Gupta and
advocate at Allahabad.

The Supreme Court has held that the anticipated settlement between the parties for Rs.1500/- was
deposited with the appellant, but he did not return the amount either to the decree holder nor the
judgement debtor and retained the amount for himself until he deposited the said amount in the court
which is against the professional ethics and conduct especially being a senior counsel this kind of
conduct is not expected.

Therefore the Supreme Court held that for this ground the appellant was held guilty for gross
professional misconduct and is punished for the same. The punishment of reprimand is imposed on the
appellant for this part of his misconduct to meet the ends of justice.

Conclusion-

In my opinion, the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is just and in consistent with the law.
The Supreme Court has examined the laws of professional misconduct which is ultimately related to the
professional ethics. Professional ethics are very important for a person to follow his professional rules
and conduct or duties. In the present case the appellant was found guilty of wrongfully retaining the
amount to himself and not returning the said amount to the decree holder.

This implies that there has been breach of trust by the appellant that his client has trusted upon him. In
the latter case of Harish Chandra Tiwari v. Baiju[2] stated that there are different types of misconducts
envisaged for a legal practitioner but the gravest professional misconduct is misappropriation of the
client's money. Hence, the Court has rightly held that for this ground the appellant was held guilty for
gross professional misconduct and is punished for the same.
5.Shambhu Ram Yadav v. Hanuman Das Khatry, AIR 2001 SC 2509.

Issue-

Whether the disciplinary committee, in exercise of its review powers, could alter the initial order of
suspension?

Rules-

Professional misconduct under section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.

Section 44 of the Advocates Act against the order

Analysis-

This case under Advocate Act, 1961 is concerned with professional misconduct of an advocate. In this
case, a complaint was filed by the appellant against the respondents-Advocate before the Bar council of
Rajasthan, which was referred to the Disciplinary Committee by the State Bar Council. The complaint
against advocate was that he had written a letter to his client Mahant Rajagiri stating that his another
client had informed him that the concerned judge accepts bribe to give favorable orders, and so he
should send an amount of Rs. 10,000 /- to get decision in his fever, and in case he can influence the
judge himself, there is no need to send Rs. 10,000 /- to be given to the judge. The content of the letter
was admitted by the respondent Advocate. However, in reply to the complaint letter, he pleaded that
the services of the presiding judge were terminated due to taking illegal gratification, and that he had
followed by norms of professional ethics and brought this fact to the knowledge of the client to protect
the interest of his client, and that the money was not sent by the client to him. Under such
circumstances, he had not committed in professional misconduct . The State Bar Council came to the
conclusion that the respondent Advocate was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him
from practice for a period of 2 years.

The respondent advocate challenged this decision before the Bar Council of India. The disciplinary
committee of Bar Council of India enhanced the punishment and directed that the name of respondent
be struck off from the roll of Advocate and thus he be debarred permanently from the practice of
advocacy. The respondent Advocate filed a review petition before it against this decision under Section
44 of the Advocate Act, 1961. The Bar Council of India accepted the review petition and held that the
Advocate is a man of 80 years old and is continuing practice since 1951. During such a long period of
practice, he has never committed any professional ethics with any ill motive. This is his first mistake. So,
the review-petition was allowed and the earlier order was modified by substituting the punishment of
permanently debarring him from practice with that of remanding him.
 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the earlier order of Bar Council of India had taken into
consideration all the relevant factors for arriving at the conclusion that the Advocate was totally unfit to
be a lawyer having the written such a letter and so the punishment lesser then permanently debarring
him cannot be imposed on guilty respondent. The Court further the held that the power of review does
not have empower the Disciplinary Committee for taking a different view on the same facts of the case.
The penalty of permanent debarment of practice was imposed on the respondent in view of the nature
of misconduct committed by the Advocate respondent, which has been modified in exercise of review
power. It is the duty of Bar Council to adhere to the required standards and on its failure to take
appropriate action against the erring Advocates.

Finally the Court set aside the review order of the Bar Council of India and restored its original order.

Conclusion-

The duties of an Advocate are prescribed under Part VI of the BCI Rules and one of the foremost duty is
to conduct the functions and plead or act in a dignifies manner, to respect & maintain dignity of the
court and uphold client’s interests. The legal profession is based on honesty and integrity of an Advocate
and the Advocates Act 1961 has cast a responsibility on the authorities to take action wherever it seems
that the credibility & reputation of the profession is eroded by certain persons or members of the Bar
Associations.The advocate had spent more than 50 years in legal profession and he is expected to have
high moral standards instead of dishonouring the profession. The Supreme Court held that the earlier
decision of the BCI was based on cogent evidences and relevant considerations. Also, in review petition
the BCI cannot take a different view upon the same facts as done by it in this case. Hence, original order
of the BCI was restored by the Apex Court and he was permanently restrained from practicing.

6. A.S. Mohd. Rafi v. State of Tamil Nadu [AIR 2011 SC 308]

Issues-

In this particular case, the bone of contention is the resolution that was passed by the Bar Association of
Coimbatore stating that none of its members would defend the accused policemen during the trial,
which was the result of a criminal complaint filed against the policemen as they had assaulted the
lawyers. As a result of this, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the policemen, in the Supreme Court of
India against that very resolution claiming that it violated the Constitution of India, precisely Article
22(1); the Rule 11, Chapter 2, Part 6 of the rules framed by the Bar Council of India, titled as the
‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquettes’; and the Professional ethics.
Rules-

Article 14 of Indian Constitution

Article 21 of Indian Constitution

Article 22(1); the Rule 11, Chapter 2, Part 6 of the rules framed by the Bar Council of India

Rule 11 of Section II of Part VI of Bar Council Rules framed under Section 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act,
1961

Analysis-

In the words of Judge Markandey Katju who presided over A. S. Mohammed V. State of Tamil Nadu case
in the Supreme Court, “Several Bar Association all over India, whether High Court Bar Associations or
District Court Bar Associations have passed resolutions that they will not defend a particular person or
persons in a particular criminal case. Sometimes there are clashes between policemen and lawyers, and
the Bar Association passes a resolution that no one will defend the policemen in the criminal case in
Court. Similarly, sometimes the Bar Association passes a resolution that they will not defend a person
who is alleged to be a terrorist or a person accused of a brutal or heinous crime or involved in a rape
case.”
In the opinion held by the bench, such resolutions are wholly illegal, against all traditions of the bar, and
against professional ethics. Accused policemen had “Right to be defended”. “When Bar Association of
Coimbatore had passed a resolution to not to defend the accused policemen in the criminal case against
them, such resolution was wholly illegal, against all the traditions of the bar and against professional
ethics. Hence, the action of the Bar Association of Coimbatore in passing resolutions that its members
would not appear for accused policeman was not justified, being against all norms of the Constitution of
India, the respective statutes and Professional Ethics.” On the same lines, it was held in this case that
“such resolutions were wholly illegal, against all tradition of the Bar, and against professional Ethics.
Every person, however wicked, depraved, vile, degenerate, loathsome, exerable, vicious, or repulsive, or
as may be regarded by the society; had a right to be defended in a Court of Law and correspondingly it
was the duty of the lawyer to defend him. Hence, action of the Bar Association of Coimbatore in passing
resolutions that its members would not appear for particular accused on the ground that he was a
policeman or suspected terrorist or mass murderer was not justified, being against all norms of the
Constitution of India, the respective statutes and professional ethics.” This judgement essentially
indicates the importance of the ‘Right to Representation’.

Conclusion-

Professional ethics needs an attorney not to deny a brief, unless a client is not able to pay his fee and
the attorney is not otherwise involved i.e. there is a possibility of conflict of interest. Consequently, the
action taken by any bar association to pass such a resolution that none of its members would appear on
the ground for a specific accused whether on the ground of being a police officer or on the ground of
being a convicted terrorist, a rapist, a mass killer, etc., is contradictory to all the standards of the
Constitution, the Legislation and professional ethics. It is against the Bar's great values which have
always stood up to defend people accused of a crime. Indeed such a resolution is a mockery to the legal
community.
In the words of Markandey Katju, “all such resolutions of Bar Associations in India are null and void and
the right minded lawyers should ignore and defy such resolutions if they want democracy and rule of
law to be upheld in this country. It is the duty of a lawyer to defend no matter what the consequences,
and a lawyer who refuses to do so is not following the message of the Gita.

7. Central Bureau of Hyderabad v. K Narayan Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512

Issue-

1. whether the respondent failed to discharge his duty by giving false legal opinion?

2. Whether A-6 failed to point out the ownership of the property?

3. Whether the A-6 failed to point out forgery in the construction permission issued by the municipal
authoritauthorities by means of their legal authority?

4. Whether respondent conspired against the bank, which resulted considerable loss to the bank?

5. Whether there was any agreement among the parties looting the bank?

Rules-

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468 471 read with Section 109 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’) and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988.

Section 482 of the Code before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad for quashing of the
criminal proceedings

Analysis-

(a) According to the prosecution, basing on an information, on 30.11.2005, the CBI, Hyderabad
registered an FIR being RC 32(A)/2005 against Shri P. Radha Gopal Reddy (A-1) and Shri Udaya Sankar (A-
2), the then Branch Manager and the Assistant Manager, respectively of the Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda
Branch, Hyderabad, for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468
471 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the IPC and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for abusing their official position as public
servants and for having conspired with private individuals, Shri P.Y. Kondala Rao the builder (A-3) and
Shri N.S. Sanjeeva Rao (A-4) and other unknown persons for defrauding the bank by sanctioning and
disbursement of housing loans to 22 borrowers in violation of the Bank, rules and guidelines and
thereby caused wrongful loss of Rs. 1.27 crores to the Bank and corresponding gain for themselves.In
furtherance of the said conspiracy, A-2 conducted the pre-sanction inspection in respect of 22 housing
loans and A-1 sanctioned the same.

(b) After completion of the investigation, the CBI filed charge sheet along with the list of witnesses and
the list of documents against all the accused persons. In the said charge sheet, Shri K. Narayana Rao, the
respondent herein, who is a legal practitioner and a panel advocate for the Vijaya Bank, was also arrayed
as A-6. The duty of the respondent herein as a panel advocate was to verify the documents and to give
legal opinion.

The allegation against him is that he gave false legal opinion in respect of 10 housing loans. It has been
specifically alleged in the charge sheet that the respondent herein (A-6) and Mr. K.C. Ramdas (A-7)-the
valuer have failed to point out the actual ownership of the properties and to bring out the ownership
details and name of the apartments in their reports and also the falsity in the permissions for
construction issued by the Municipal Authorities.

(c) Being aggrieved, the respondent herein (A-6) filed a petition being Criminal Petition No. 2347 of 2008
under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad for quashing of
the criminal proceedings in CC No. 44 of 2007 on the file of the Special Judge for CBI Cases, Hyderabad.
By impugned judgment and order dated 09.07.2010, the High Court quashed the proceedings insofar as
the respondent herein (A-6) is concerned.

(d) Being aggrieved, the CBI, Hyderabad filed this appeal by way of special leave.

We have already extracted the relevant allegations and the role of the respondent herein (A-6). The only
allegation against the respondent is that he submitted false legal opinion to the Bank in respect of the
housing loans in the capacity of a panel advocate and did not point out actual ownership of the
properties. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel for the respondent, the
respondent was not named in the FIR. The allegations in the FIR are that A-1 to A-4 conspired together
and cheated Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda, Hyderabad to the tune of Rs. 1.27 crores. It is further seen that
the offences alleged against A-1 to A-4 are the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467,
468 and 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988. It is not in dispute that the respondent is a practicing advocate and according to Mr.
Venkataramani, he has experience in giving legal opinion and has conducted several cases for the banks
including Vijaya Bank. As stated earlier, the only allegation against him is that he submitted false legal
opinion about the genuineness of the properties in question. It is the definite stand of the respondent
herein that he has rendered Legal Scrutiny Reports in all the cases after perusing the documents
submitted by the Bank. It is also his claim that rendition of legal opinion cannot be construed as an
offence. He further pointed out that it is not possible for the panel advocate to investigate the
genuineness of the documents and in the present case, he only perused the contents and concluded
whether the title was conveyed through a document or not. It is also brought to our notice that LW-5
(Listed Witness), who is the Law Officer of Vijaya Bank, has given a statement regarding flaw in respect
of title of several properties. It is the claim of the respondent that in his statement, LW-5 has not even
made a single comment as to the veracity of the legal opinion rendered by the respondent herein. In
other words, it is the claim of the respondent that none of the witnesses have spoken to any overt act
on his part or his involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Learned senior counsel for the respondent has
also pointed out that out of 78 witnesses no one has made any relevant comment or statement about
the alleged involvement of the respondent herein in the matter in question.

Conclusion-

In order to appreciate the claim and the stand of the respondent herein as a panel advocate, we have
perused the legal opinion rendered by the respondent herein in the form of Legal Scrutiny Report dated
10.09.2003 as to the title relating to Sri B.A.V.K. Mohan Rao, S/o late Shri Someshwar Rao which is as
under.

“Legal Scrutiny Report Dated 10.09.2003.

To The Branch Manager, Vijaya Bank, Narayanaguda Hyderabad Sir, Sub:- Title Opinion Shri BAVK Mohan
Rao S/o Late Shri Someswar Rao.

8. In Re: Arundhati Roy vs Unknown, AIR 2002 SC 1375

Issue-

The Court’s earlier decision on developing a dam, Arundhati Roy criticized the Court for muzzling dissent
and subsequently staged a protest in front of the Court. This case concerns a suo-moto contempt
petition (that is, a petition initiated by the Court on its own motion) against the Respondent, Arundhati
Roy, a Booker-prize winning author.

Rules-

Constitution of India , Art.129, Art.215— Contempt of Courts Act (70 of 1971) , S.2(a)— Judiciary –
Attempt to tarnish, diminish or wipe out confidence of the people in judiciary

Art.19(1)(a), S.2(a)— Contempt – freedom of speech, S.14, S.15— Contempt proceedings

Analysis-
The Court firstly stated that freedoms of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution are
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law, one of these being the Contempt of Courts Act which,
amongst other objectives, is directed at maintaining the dignity and the integrity of the courts and the
judiciary.

It dismissed as irrelevant the Respondent’s argument that the issue of whether truth could be pleaded
as a defense to contempt proceedings had to be determined. “Contempt proceedings have been
initiated against the

respondent on the basis of the offending and contemptuous part of the reply affidavit making wild
allegations against the court and thereby scandalised its authority. There is no point or fact in those
proceedings which requires to be defended by pleading the truth”, it said.

The Court went on to say that the affidavit as a whole was not being considered for contempt but that
part which made allegations questioning the integrity of the Court. It stated that the purpose of
contempt proceedings was not to preserve an individual judge’s reputation but to maintain public
confidence in the judicial system. Judicial criticism must not be based on a gross misstatement and must
not be directed at lowering the reputation of the judiciary. In order to be considered fair criticism, the
Court said that the statement “must be made in good faith and in the public interest, which is to be
gauged by the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for the comments, his
knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made and the intended purpose sought to be
achieved.” The Court considered that the Respondent’s statement was not based on any understanding
of the law or the judicial system. It said that her statements alleging the judiciary’s willingness to issue
notice on “an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition” whilst exhibiting a lack of
willingness to entertain a case concerning “national security and corruption in the highest places” and its
intention to silence criticism along with her lack of remorse, made it difficult “to shrug off or to hold the
[unsubstantiated] accusations made as comments of [an] outspoken ordinary man”.

Accordingly, the Court found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to
“symbolic” imprisonment of one day and imposed a fine of Rs. 2000 with the proviso that if she failed to
pay the fine she would be imprisoned for three months.

Conclusion-

This decision will go down in the Constitutional History of India as a landmark decision for many reasons,
some of them wrong reasons. It arises some poignant questions, which will matter seriously to the
society, which claims to be governed by the Rule of Law. It would be a truism to emphasise the
importance of the right of speech and expression, a right each one of us values very highly. It is a right
taken for granted by every citizen. It is not someone’s gift. It is a part of meaningful existence of citizens
This is the right which ensures that all literature, drmatics, films, journalism, painting, sculpture, music
grows and enriches our civilization without restraints from either the State or from other quarters of the
society. Each one of the citizens of post independence India has, as of right, lived with this
9. Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India 8 AIR 2003 SC 73 9.

Issue-

The issue analyzed by the court - Whether lawyers have a right to strike?

Rules-

incorporate Clauses (1), (2) and (3) and (4) in the Bar Council of India (Conduct & Disciplinary) Rules

Analysis-

The petitioner, in the present case, was an ex-army officer. In 1972, the petitioner was posted in
Bangladesh, where some accusation which was related to embezzlement was put on him and he was
brought to the military court in India. Charges against him were outlined and he was court-martialed
from his post and titles alongside imprisonment for 2 years. He filed a pre-affirmation application in a
civil Court to audit the matter and he got a reply from the court after an extensive stretch of 11 years
when the limitation period of the survey has been expired. It was subsequently discovered that
documents along with the application got misplaced during a vicious strike by advocates. A special
petition was filed by the petitioner to announce strikes by advocates illicit.

The petitioners submitted that strike as a mean for collective bargaining is recognised only in industrial
disputes. He submitted that lawyers who are officers of the Court cannot use strikes as a means to
blackmail the Courts or the clients. He submitted that the Courts must take action against the
Committee members for giving such calls on the basis that they have committed contempt of court. • He
submitted that the law is that a lawyer who has accepted a Vakalat on behalf of a client must attend
Court and if he does not attend Court it would amount to professional misconduct and also contempt of
court. He submitted that Court should now frame rules whereby the Courts regulate theright of lawyers
to appear before the Court. • He submitted that Courts should frame rules whereby any lawyer who
mis-conducts himself and commits contempt of court by going on strike or boycotting a Court will not be
allowed to practice in that Court. He further submitted that abstention from work for the redressal of a
grievance should never be resorted to where other remedies for seeking redressal areavailable.

He submitted that all attempts should be made to seek redressal from the concerned authorities. He
submitted that where such redressal is not available or not forthcoming, the direction of the protest can
be against that authority and should not be misdirected, e.g., in cases of alleged police brutalities Courts
and litigants should not be targeted in respect of actions for which they are in no way responsible. He
agreed that no force or coercion should be employed against lawyers who are not in agreement with the
“strike call” and want to discharge their professional duties.
Respondent submitted that lawyers had a right to go on strike or give a call for boycott. He further
submitted that there are many occasions when lawyers require to go, on strike or gave a call for boycott.
He submitted that this Court laying down that going on strike amounts to misconduct is of no
consequence as the Bar Councils have been vested with the power to decide whether or not an
Advocate has committed misconduct. He submitted that this Court cannot penalise any Advocate for
misconduct as the power to discipline is now exclusively with the Bar Councils. He submitted that it is for
the Bar Councils to decide whether strike should be resorted to or not.

Conclusion-

It was held that lawyers reserve no right to strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a symbolic strike.
They can protest, if required, must be only by giving press articulations, TV interviews, completing of
Court premises standards and additionally notices, wearing black or white or any shading armbands,
peaceful protest outside and away from Court premises, going on dharnas and so forth.