Essay 1 - Tran Thi Ha Linh - CYCWE8

CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST
FIRST ESSAY
Topic (1): Read the Melian dialogue and apply it to a 21st century
territorial annexation. Find the principles of realism in the Melian
Dialogue and apply them to the foreign policy of your chosen states.
Student’s name: Tran Thi Ha Linh
Neptun code: CYCWE8
Professor’s name: Szűcs Anita
Course: Introduction to International Relations
Date of submission: March 14th, 2022
Word count: 2,909 words

Thucydides, a famous ancient writer and thinker, is often regarded as one of the
founding fathers of realism. It is no exaggeration to say that his work, "History of the
Peloponnesian War", is a timeless work of influence, and "the only acknowledged classic text
in international relations"1. The "Melian Dialogue" is a passage in the book in which the
characteristics of realism are clearly portrayed. Though it happened more than 2000 years
ago, the points made by the Athenians and Melos about strong and weak states, war and
peace, allies and enemies, are still compatible with today's international political reality. On
top of that, it is worth noting that the situation in the dialogue bears a lot of similarities to a
territorial annexation that took place in the early 21st century—Russia’s annexation of
Crimea in 2014. This essay will discover the principles of realism in the Melian Dialogue and
apply them to Russian foreign policy.
The theoretical frameworks used in this paper are those of realism, a school of
thought whose spotlight is on the competitive and conflictual side of international relations 2.
It should be emphasised that the principal actors in the international arena are states whose
priorities containing their security, national interests, and possession of power 3. Besides,
international relations realists stress the constraints imposed on politics by the egoistic nature
of human beings, together with the absence of a supreme authority overarching all states
(international anarchy)4. All these elements, which constitute constant unrest in international
relations, can be found in Thucydides' work.
The "History of the Peloponnesian War" by Thucydides describes the conflict that
lasted from 431 until 404 BC between Athens and Sparta, involving most of the Greek city-
states5. To remain independent and neutral, Melos, a small island off the south-eastern coast
of Greece, resisted Athens' attempts to make it a vassal state 6. Athens then sent an
expeditionary army to conquer the island, or at least force it into the alliance against Sparta 7.
The Melian Dialogue took place under these circumstances. In the dialogue, the Athenians
insisted that the Melians’ neutrality, which might threaten Athenian hegemony, was
unacceptable and that they should be annihilated. Thucydides succeeded in bringing to the
audience first-hand experiences of the Peloponnesian War, as well as some insights into the
1 Simpson, A. (2018). Realism, Small States and Neutrality. In D. Orsi, J. Avgustin & M. Nurnus, Realism in Practice: An
Appraisal (1st ed., pp. 119-130). Bristol, England: E-International Relations. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Realism-in-Practice-E-IR.pdf
2 Cook, S. (2015). The Crimean Crisis and International Law: A Realist Perspective, 10(1). Retrieved from
https://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ustjlpp
causes of the war and the complex power politics behind the battle. Above all, remarks of the
Athenians are strongly backed by a realist viewpoint. The Athenians’ political motivations
were rooted in three keywords: fear, honour, and self-interest 8. A great degree of
correspondence can be found between those keywords and the basic concepts of realism,
namely anthropological pessimism, statism, power maximisation, and security dilemma
stemming from the state of international anarchy.
Since the Melian Dialogue is a typical example of any situation in which two parties
in a conflict have different levels of power, it is easy to detect some correlation between it
and Russia's confrontation with Ukraine in modern times, with its peak marked by Russia
annexing Crimea on March 18, 2014. The event should be put into the wider Russo-
Ukrainian conflict, along with the collision between Russia and the eastward-moving
Western powers. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation has been said to reflect
innumerable fundamental features of realism with its focus on a state’s interests, power-
seeking motivations, and the self-help nature of the state’s foreign policy in a context of
international anarchy, especially since the Munich Security Conference of 2007, when Putin
insisted that he was prepared to pursue an assertive and confrontational line if necessary 9.
Thucydides’ ancient claim that "the powerful do what they can'' offers a useful way to
explain the Russian realist approach in Ukraine, as their mentality resembles that of
Thucydides’ Athenians10. In this regard, Russia is behaving as a regional hegemon, trying to
subdue its neighbouring states, and to grip its enemies for the sake of its interests.
First, the concept of "anthropological pessimism" was strongly manifested in the

Melian Dialogue with the Athenian statement: "... of men we know, that by a necessary law of
their nature they rule wherever they can"11. In realism, human beings are viewed as self-
interested and power-seeking. Consequently, the traits of the individuals who constitute the
states are mirrored in the states’ behaviour as self-interested egoists, creating a realm of
constant struggles for power and dominance over others 12. They are subjected to "a perpetual
and restless desire for power after power, that ceases only in death", as per Thomas Hobbes'
belief13. Furthermore, as a study of human and state behaviour, Thucydides’ work reflects an
enduring historical worldview, stemming from permanent characteristics of human affairs
and repetitive patterns of international politics, since he highlighted that wars and turmoil
"will always happen as long as human nature remains the same"14. Thus, it is not surprising
8 Korab-Karpowicz, W. (2006). How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by Reading Thucydides. The
Foundations Of International Order, 89(2), 232-244. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903977
9 Maitra, S. (2014). Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimean Case [Ebook]. CLAWS Journal. Retrieved from
https://archive.claws.in/images/journals_doc/267144158_SumantraMaitra.pdf
10 Feinstein, S., & Pirro, E. (2021). Testing the world order: strategic realism in Russian foreign affairs. International
Politics, 58(6), 817-834. doi: 10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5
11 Thucydides, & Smith, C. (2014). History of the Peloponnesian war. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press.
12 Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2019). The globalization of world politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
13 Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-
relations/>.
14 Korab-Karpowicz, W. (2006). How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by Reading Thucydides. The
Foundations Of International Order, 89(2), 232-244. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903977
that the claims regarding this negative side of human nature withdrawn from the Melian
Dialogue can be applied to Russia’s aggressive behaviour in a modern world conflict.
Besides anthropological pessimism, "statism" is also an important concept of realism.

Sovereign nation-states, the primary actors on the global stage, possess similar pessimistic
traits to those of human beings. States are rational egoists whose most prominent interest is
survival, which is a prerequisite to achieving all other potential state interests 15. In Hans J.
Morgenthau’s opinion, states possess an inherent desire to rule over others, and this natural
characteristic will ultimately cause conflicts and wars16. Moreover, all states are unitary
actors, since they all pursue their national interests in terms of power—"... knowing that you
and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do"17.
Applying the above concept of "statism" to Russia's foreign policy towards Crimea, it
is not difficult to depict Russia as a perfect illustration of the anarchy in international
relations and the priority of the state’s interests. In an anarchic world, states have an innate
desire to pursue national interests and dominate others, and Russia is not an exception. In
January 1996, Yevgeny Primakov (the Prime Minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999)
expressed this viewpoint with his claim: "Russia doesn’t have permanent enemies, but it does
have permanent interests"18. The Russian Federation’s prioritisation of its national interests is
in fact absolute, which is clearly demonstrated in all important official state documents, and
many formal and informal claims that Russia is not interested in any international
cooperation that does not satisfy its interests19. Russia has not ceased its efforts to consolidate
its own influence in the post-Soviet areas, considered by Moscow as the zone of its
"privileged interests". In this case, the pursuit of Russia’s interests would be to the detriment
of its peripheral states. Crimea might be a small sliver of territory, but its geopolitical and
strategic importance to Russia should not be undermined. The base of Sevastopol in Crimea
gives the Russian fleet direct access to the Black Sea, allowing their navy to maintain its
presence in Eurasia20. Gripping Crimea under their wing is an attempt to increase their
territorial power in the region, thus assuring their weight in the East-West power balance.
Some have reckoned that “Russia’s annexation of Crimea was not because the West moved
too far east, but because it did not move far enough east to prevent Russian territorial
expansion”21.
16 Sigurdsson, A. (2015). Lost in Annexation? The Causes of Russia’s Foreign Policy Choices in Crimea Anno 2014
(Master). University of Iceland.
Press.
18 Maitra, S. (2014). Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimean Case [Ebook]. CLAWS Journal. Retrieved from
19 Jacek, W. (2011). Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. International Journal Of
Business And Social Science, 2(1). Retrieved from http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._1%3B_January_2011/16.pdf
21 Kuzio, T., & D'Anieri, P. (2018). The Causes and Consequences of Russia's Actions towards Ukraine. The Sources of
Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order (pp. 1-24). Bristol: E-International
Relations. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/74471
The importance of power is also a remarkable standpoint in the Melian Dialogue, as
stated by the Athenian envoys: "As the world goes, it is only a question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must"22. Since an
authority above states does not exist, meaning the parties are not "under equal compulsion",
considerations of justice would be excluded from foreign affairs, and the weaker being
suppressed by the stronger is transparent 23. Where there is an obvious imbalance of power,
the dominant side has an incentive to take advantage of it. Every chance to maintain and
optimise power should be utilised to prevent them from being dominated by other states. The
Melians believed in gods, but to the Athenians, the way of the gods is the way of power, or
power is the law of nature. In the Athenians’ words, any concession in terms of accepting
Melos’ neutrality would be considered "a sign of weakness", not only making them
vulnerable in their enemies’ eyes, but also setting a dangerous precedent that threatens
Athenian hegemony, when other subordinators, like a domino effect, would begin to detach
from the rule of the Athenians24. The Athenians thus laid down a declaration which affirmed
that the Melians were weak, so they had to surrender to the stronger: "If any maintain their
independence, it is because they are strong... the fact that you are islanders and weaker than
others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters
of the sea"25. Perhaps that is why the Chinese say "xiǎoguó wú wáijiāo"—Small countries
have no foreign policy, because they cannot shape events, but can only follow what was
predetermined. International politics is about the interests of the “great powers”, and the
interests of non-great powers should only be secondary to those of great powers26.
In any analysis of Russia’s foreign policy, it is essential to consider how Russia sees
itself. Russia has always had the mentality of a great power, which is perhaps a legacy
bequeathed by the Soviet Union. In Putin’s opinion, only by becoming strong can Russia be
respected and have its interests considered by the outside world27. More recently, Sergey
Lavrov, the Foreign Minister of Russia since 2004, said: "I am convinced that Russia simply
cannot exist as a subordinate country"28. For John Mearsheimer, in an anarchic environment,
states behave rationally, as the best way to warrant their survival is to be the most powerful
state in the system and to maximise their share of world power29. Obviously, the great power
status involves dominance in its neighbourhood and further controlling territories that are
Press.
relations/>.
Press.
Press.
26 Kuzio, T., & D'Anieri, P. (2018). The Causes and Consequences of Russia's Actions towards Ukraine. The Sources of
Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the Challenge to the European Order (pp. 1-24). Bristol: E-International
Relations. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/74471
29 Feinstein, S., & Pirro, E. (2021). Testing the world order: strategic realism in Russian foreign affairs. International
Politics, 58(6), 817-834. doi: 10.1057/s41311-021-00285-5
connected to that great power’s region. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its foreign policy
choices regarding Ukraine in 2014 give the impression of Russia as not being easily
threatened or subdued, thereby creating a commensurate balance of power with the West,
which is historically considered "the Other". Reinstating the Soviet Union’s sphere of
influence in Eurasia could be the initial step of the Russian President’s imperialist grand
strategy that serves the purposes of gaining the position of a global power and acquiring the
ability to shape the current world order, thus satisfying his further interests30.
As claimed by Mearsheimer, power disparities due to differences in capabilities can

exist in every regional system, leaving some states in a dominant position vis-à-vis others 31.
When states possess greater capabilities in their region, they must utilise their advantageous
position to impose their rules over other subjects32. This characteristic can partly explain why
the Kremlin always attempts to take part in the global decision-making mechanisms. Looking
at the correlation of the power levels between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, it is not
difficult to see that Russia is playing the role of the Athenians, and Ukraine is playing as the
Melians. Given the context of international anarchy, since Russia holds greater power in
comparison to Ukraine, it acts upon its power without restriction. Russia, acting in its own
state interest, took the opportunity to take out the disputed protests in Crimea by sending
tanks into the city33. The superiority of Russian power over the inferior power of Ukraine
blurs the issues of morality, which is proven by Russia's choices and disregard for Ukraine’s
concerns34. Undeniably, power has a significant role since states can only maintain their
independence and power if they are strong enough to defend against their adversaries.
Another prominent concept of realism indicated in the dialogue is the "security

dilemma", which happens in the state of international anarchy. The international arena is
essentially a self-help system, in which the anarchic state of nature will entail a state of war,
when states’ behaviours are not subjected to any constraint 35. Given a pessimistic view of
human nature, every state is a potential aggressor willing to invade each other for gain 36. Such
an inherent insecurity ultimately leads to a "security dilemma” when states are always in
doubt as to other nations’ true intentions. Regarding security as a central issue, power thus
30 Nitoiu, C. (2016). Aspirations to Great Power Status: Russia’s Path to Assertiveness in the International Arena under
Putin. Political Studies Review, 15(1), 39-48. doi: 10.1177/1478929915623967
31 ALIM, E. (2019). A Comparative Analysis of the Ukraine Crisis Through the Prisms of Offensive Realist and Liberal
Internationalist Theories. Yönetim Ekonomi Edebiyat İslami Ve Politik Bilimler Dergisi, 75-99. doi:
10.24013/jomelips.559158
32 Jacek, W. (2011). Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. International Journal Of
Business And Social Science, 2(1). Retrieved from http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._1%3B_January_2011/16.pdf
33 Tandilashvili, D. (2015). Classical Realist and Norm-Based Constructivist Analysis of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and
Annexation of Crimea [Ebook]. Retrieved from https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/
SPRING16FALL15ISSUEpt2-1jhiif4.pdf
relations/>.
has a greater role in shaping interstate relations as states "endeavour to destroy or subdue one
another" to guarantee their own safety37. The same logic applied to the Peloponnesian War,
when the growth of Athenian power made the Spartans afraid for their security. Vice versa,
for Athens, the slightest possibility that Melos might ally with Sparta, thus adding to Spartan
power, is an alarming scenario that cannot be ignored. Therefore, accepting Melos as a
neutral state is a strategic vulnerability that may set a dangerous precedent and threaten
Athenian hegemony: "... it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, who would
be the most likely to take a rash step and lead us into obvious danger"38.
The same logic can be applied to the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Russia’s
actions during the crisis were driven by security concerns, given the conditions of anarchy
and the lack of an international authority that make fear a sustained issue in international
politics, even for great powers. These attitudes fit the rational conception of international
politics, in which the self-help system is essential due to the constant threat of war. Because
of geopolitical sensitivities, great powers behave rationally by endeavouring to maximise
power in their zone of strategic interest and striving to keep extra-regional powers away from
their regions39. For Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) eastward
expansion may damage the existing balance of power, triggering the Russian government’s
sense of insecurity and vulnerability. Consequently, Russia’s growing insecurity motivates it
to increasingly exercise its power over Ukraine, a key country in Russia’s security
paradigm40. A zero-sum game in this situation can be described as follows: If Russia did not
annex Crimea to expand the Russian border, an expansion of the Western "border" would
happen in case Ukraine was accepted into NATO or the EU. In this scenario, the more
geopolitical gains the Western countries achieve eastward, the less Russia’s power and
interests. In the worst scenario, Russia would witness "a Western stronghold on Russia’s
doorstep", losing its military advantages and access to the Black Sea in its antagonist's hand,
hence degrading Russia's great-power status41. In short, Ukraine is indispensable to Russia's
geopolitical calculations now and in the future, so the tasks should be hindering the potential
"changing distribution of power" and preserving all the strategic benefits of having Crimea
under its wing. When the threat reached its highest point with the ouster of the pro-Russian
Ukrainian leader Yanukovych and the Euromaidan protest, the Kremlin decided to resort to
strong measures against Ukraine by occupying Crimea to diminish its security dilemma42.
relations/>.
Press.
10.24013/jomelips.559158
10.24013/jomelips.559158
41 Jensen, D. The Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine: A Theoretical Discussion on the Ukrainian Crisis. Aalborg
University.
42 Lavrynovskyi, O. (2020). WHY DID THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ANNEX THE CRIMEAN PENINSULA AND
INVADE THE DONBAS IN EASTERN UKRAINE IN 2014? (Master). Naval Postgraduate School.
It can be said that Russia's concerns are not unreasonable since the processes for
Ukraine to join NATO were seemingly activated with the trio package of Western policies:
NATO and EU enlargement, and the spread of democratic values and beliefs to former Soviet
states43. In 2004, the accession of the three Baltic states into NATO cut down the safety
distance between Saint Petersburg and NATO during the Cold War from twelve hundred
miles to just one hundred44. Moreover, the missile defence shield in Russia’s backyard,
NATO's growing intervention in regional conflicts, and the joint NATO-Ukraine military
exercises in Crimea have rung the alarm that provokes Russia’s resolve not to tolerate its
zone of interest being torn away from its orbit 45. Furthermore, Russia used to face fierce
invasions from south-eastern Europe throughout its history, namely the invasions by
Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany 46. Therefore, in Russian
strategic considerations, these menaces cannot be disregarded.
There is a large degree of consistency between the Melian Dialogue and the Russo-
Ukrainian situation. Facing the worst scenario of a Western-backed Ukrainian leader coming
to power, the Russian general leads the Russian invasion force confronting the renegade
Ukrainian leader and explains his reason for the invasion as follows: "If any maintain their
independence, it is because they are strong, and if we do not molest them, it is because we
are afraid; so that besides extending our empire, we should gain in security by your
subjection; the fact that you are a peripheral state and weaker than others rendering it all
the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the Eurasian
continent"47. An exact passage said by the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue is put in the
context of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, with the phrase "islanders" replaced by "a peripheral
state", and "sea" substituted by "Eurasian continent", showing a coincidence between the two
narratives.
Thanks to their sharp political realism, Thucydides' works have a timeless impact on
the way theorists from Hobbes to contemporary scholars perceive international relations. The
Melian Dialogue's timeless impact is evident in its application to Russian foreign policy
toward Crimea and Ukraine, in general. The principles of the state’s interests, power-seeking
motivations, and great powers' competition in realism have been proven useful in the process
of analysis. However, due to the complex and changeable nature of the state’s power and the
fact that the theoretical scope of realism has some limitations, the analysis of Russian foreign
activity should not be based exclusively on the perspective of realism, but should be
combined with other schools of thought, along with actor-specific expertise48.
43 Tahir, S. (2015). Dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy in 2014 Crimean Crisis: Assessing the Empirical and Theoretical
Complexities (Master). Central European University.
44 Thalis, A. (2018). Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion. Retrieved 5 March
2022, from https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-expansion/
46 Thalis, A. (2018). Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion. Retrieved 5 March
2022, from https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-expansion/
Press.
48 Rostoks, T. (2021). Teaching International Relations after Russia’s Annexation of Crimea. Lecture, University of
Latvia.
References:
● ALIM, E. (2019). A Comparative Analysis of the Ukraine Crisis Through the Prisms
of Offensive Realist and Liberal Internationalist Theories. Yönetim Ekonomi Edebiyat
İslami Ve Politik Bilimler Dergisi, 75-99. doi: 10.24013/jomelips.559158
● Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2019). The globalization of world politics. New
York: Oxford University Press.
● Cook, S. (2015). The Crimean Crisis and International Law: A Realist Perspective,
10(1). Retrieved from https://ir.stthomas.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1000&context=ustjlpp
● Feinstein, S., & Pirro, E. (2021). Testing the world order: strategic realism in Russian
foreign affairs. International Politics, 58(6), 817-834. doi: 10.1057/s41311-021-
00285-5
● Jacek, W. (2011). Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation. International Journal Of Business And Social Science, 2(1). Retrieved
from http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._1%3B_January_2011/16.pdf
● Jensen, D. The Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine: A Theoretical Discussion on
the Ukrainian Crisis. Aalborg University.
● Korab-Karpowicz, W. (2006). How International Relations Theorists Can Benefit by
Reading Thucydides. The Foundations Of International Order, 89(2), 232-244.
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/27903977
● Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.
● Kuzio, T., & D'Anieri, P. (2018). The Causes and Consequences of Russia's Actions
towards Ukraine. The Sources of Russia’s Great Power Politics: Ukraine and the
Challenge to the European Order (pp. 1-24). Bristol: E-International Relations.
Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/74471
● Lavrynovskyi, O. (2020). WHY DID THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ANNEX THE
CRIMEAN PENINSULA AND INVADE THE DONBAS IN EASTERN UKRAINE IN
2014? (Master). Naval Postgraduate School.
● Maitra, S. (2014). Realism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Crimean Case [Ebook].
CLAWS Journal. Retrieved from
● Nitoiu, C. (2016). Aspirations to Great Power Status: Russia’s Path to Assertiveness
in the International Arena under Putin. Political Studies Review, 15(1), 39-48. doi:
10.1177/1478929915623967
● Rostoks, T. (2021). Teaching International Relations after Russia’s Annexation of
Crimea. Lecture, University of Latvia.
● Sigurdsson, A. (2015). Lost in Annexation? The Causes of Russia’s Foreign Policy
Choices in Crimea Anno 2014 (Master). University of Iceland.
● Simpson, A. (2018). Realism, Small States and Neutrality. In D. Orsi, J. Avgustin &
M. Nurnus, Realism in Practice: An Appraisal (1st ed., pp. 119-130). Bristol,
England: E-International Relations. Retrieved from
http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Realism-in-Practice-E-IR.pdf
● Tahir, S. (2015). Dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy in 2014 Crimean Crisis:
Assessing the Empirical and Theoretical Complexities (Master). Central European
University.
● Tandilashvili, D. (2015). Classical Realist and Norm-Based Constructivist Analysis of
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Annexation of Crimea [Ebook]. Retrieved from
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/wp.towson.edu/dist/b/55/files/2016/06/
● Thalis, A. (2018). Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO
Expansion. Retrieved 5 March 2022, from
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-
the-era-of-nato-expansion/
● Thucydides, & Smith, C. (2014). History of the Peloponnesian war. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

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CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST

Student’s name: Tran Thi Ha Linh

Neptun code: CYCWE8

Professor’s name: Szűcs Anita

Course: Introduction to International Relations

Date of submission: March 14th, 2022

Word count: 2,909 words

First, the concept of "anthropological pessimism" was strongly manifested in the

Besides anthropological pessimism, "statism" is also an important concept of realism.

As claimed by Mearsheimer, power disparities due to differences in capabilities can

Another prominent concept of realism indicated in the dialogue is the "security

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