Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?

Quo Vadis
Common
Fisheries Policy?

Ernesto Penas Lado

Brussels, Belgium
This edition first published 2020
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Contents

Preface xiii Norway 31

Acknowledgments xv The case for full exploitation of
Disclaimer xvii fishery resources 32
Preventing overfishing or fully
1 The common fisheries policy: stability exploiting? 32
or change? 1 Is under-exploitation positive? 32
Introduction: fisheries, a conservative Is under-exploitation a realistic
world 1 scenario in the CFP? 33
A distributional policy 1 The example of the US 33
Policy change vs. policy stability 2 Under-exploitation in the EU? 34
Why do policies change? 4 Under-exploitation vs.
Legal change vs. policy change 4 over-exploitation 36
Does the CFP change too much or too The consequences of
little? 6 under-exploitation 37
Policy rigidity vs. policy flexibility: why The effects on other marine areas 37
is the CFP so rigid? 7 The effects on land: is livestock
Policy implementation and policy production better than fishing? 37
change: the challenge of The public debate 38
implementing the 2013 reform 8 Are the fishery objectives of the new
The challenges of implementation 9 CFP too rigid? 39
The CFP’s legendary bad press 9 The lessons from the US system 39
The reformed CFP: success or failure? 10 Socio-economic objectives vs. biological
The notion of “policy success” in delivery: should the policy
fisheries management 10 establish specific socio-economic
Policy results: how good are they? 13 targets? 40
Improving reporting of policy References 41
performance 18
3 Implementing maximum sustainable
If the CFP is not so bad, why
yield 43
advocating policy change? 22
What is maximum sustainable yield? 43
References 23
Defining MSY 43
2 The objectives of the CFP 25 MSY in the reformed CFP 44
Introduction 25 MSY in international law 44
The common fisheries policy in the MSY and the Treaty 45
Treaty 26 Is maximum economic yield a better
Fisheries policy: a multi-objective policy 26 option? 45
The objectives in Article 39 of the Treaty 26 An area around MSY 46
Other legal principles applicable to MSY as biomass or as fishing
the CFP 27 mortality? 47
Policy objectives in other countries 28 Introduction 47
The United States 29 Bmsy as an “aspirational objective” 49
Australia 30 The interpretation by environmental
New Zealand 31 NGOs 50

v
vi Contents

Single stock objectives in the marine Pretty good yield 76

ecosystems: can all stocks be The Fcube model 77
“above Bmsy ” in mixed fisheries? 50 Multi-stock reference points 78
Bmsy , an elusive parameter 51 Managing stock aggregates? 78
The US system 51 How much can we sacrifice weak
Estimating Fmsy 52 stocks? 79
Single-stock Fmsy vs. ecosystem-based An ecological cap on TACs? 80
Fmsy 52 Trophic models 81
Proxies for data-poor fisheries 52 Multispecies models and trade-offs: is
Alternative approaches: escapement multispecies management
strategies 53 compatible with relative
Fmsy as a target or as a limit? 53 stability? 82
The notion of risk in fishery Is multispecies management compatible
management 54 with the objectives of the CFP? 83
The US case 55 Can associated species in mixed
Fmsy : a point value or a range? 55 fisheries be dissociated? 84
Background 55 The US experience in dissociating
The case for fishing mortality ranges 56 stocks 84
F ranges: handle with care. Are they How to dissociate stocks in mixed
precautionary? 58 fisheries in the EU? 85
The on-going experience: MSY in References 88
multiannual management plans 58 5 Achieving policy objectives in
F ranges and the choke species problem: Mediterranean fisheries 91
the Baltic precedent 58 MSY and Mediterranean fisheries 91
The consolidation of F ranges 59 Time to catch-up 91
The safeguards: biomass thresholds 60 The status of Mediterranean fisheries 92
Should all plans reproduce that Sustainable overfishing? 93
precedent? 60
Economic performance 94
Fmsy for all stocks: what does it mean? 61
The Mediterranean specificity 94
Data-poor and secondary stocks:
Global warming: a game-changer 95
manage them to MSY? 61
Can MSY be achieved by 2020 for all
Introduction 61 stocks in Mediterranean
Which stocks to manage? 62 fisheries? 96
Are the EU-managed stocks the right The point of departure 96
ones? 63 What stocks to manage in the
Problem stocks 66 Mediterranean? 97
References 67 A focus on EU stocks 98
4 The challenge of mixed fisheries 71 Avoiding “cut and paste” approaches 98
Mixed fisheries in the new CFP 71 A fishery approach? 99
Can MSY be achieved for all stocks in Streamlining scientific advice 100
mixed fisheries? 71 The need for a “client” for the scientific
Mixed fisheries and choke species 72 community 100
Choke species: some experience outside Data poor stocks and MSY proxies 101
the EU 72 Revising stock boundaries 102
Choke species under the new CFP 73 The CFP and GFCM 103
Alternative management approaches What instruments to use in
for mixed fisheries 75 Mediterranean fisheries? 103
Multispecies approaches 75 Fishing effort plans 104
What potential for multispecies models? 75 TACs 104
 Contents vii

The multispecies approach: a better By-catch avoidance: mitigation 129

alternative for the Controlling the landing obligation 131
Mediterranean? 105 What to do with unwanted fish? 134
Closed areas 105 The need for monitoring 135
Mesh sizes 106 Is the landing obligation economically
The transition: a buy-out scheme for viable? 136
Mediterranean fisheries 107 References 137
References 108 7 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other
6 The landing obligation 111 instruments of the CFP 141
The CFP and the problem of Management by single-stock TACs 141
discarding 111 The advantages of TAC management 141
Discarding in the CFP: how much? The limits of TACs as an instrument 141
Why? 111 Other instruments available in the CFP 142
The 2013 policy on discards 112 Effort management 142
A critique of the landing obligation of Is effort a good management
2013 113 instrument? 143
Discards and direct human The Faroese system as an example 143
consumption 114 The experience of effort management in
What other countries do on discarding 115 the CFP 144
The US case 115 Effort management and technological
Norway 116 creep 147
Iceland 117 The potential for a (different) effort
The effects of a non-discard policy 117 management in the CFP 148
Biological effects 117 Technical conservation measures 149
Economic effects 118 The objectives of TCM 149
Choke species and the “perfect storm” The difficulty in increasing selectivity 150
of 2019 120 Technical measures in the new CFP 151
Relative stability as a contributor to Mesh sizes 152
choke species 120 Closed areas/seasons 152
Quota swaps as a possible solution 121 Minimum conservation reference sizes 155
How efficient is the quota swap system? 121 Technical measures and the landing
Are quota swaps increasing to facilitate obligation 157
the discard ban? 122 References 158
Can quota swaps be enhanced? 123 8 Fisheries and the environment 161
The flexibility mechanisms 124 The CFP and environmental policy 161
The de minimis allowance 124 Introduction 161
The survival exemption 124 Incorporating environmental concerns
The cross-reporting of catches 125 into the CFP 162
Ex-ante and ex-post quota adjustments: Overlapping legislation 163
banking and borrowing 125 The dichotomy between fisheries
Other possible elements of flexibility 126 management and environmental
TAC uplifts 126 protection: the case of sharks 168
Reducing minimum conservation Sharks: protect or manage? 168
reference sizes? 127 Shark finning 169
Working on the fringes of relative Some ideas on management 170
stability? 127 The effects of fishing on the
Other possible mechanisms 128 environment 171
Implementing the landing obligation Fishing: the evil of the seas? 171
in practice 129 Fishing down the food web? 173
viii Contents

Does sustainable fishing increase A note on consensus: is this the best

productivity? 173 method? 200
Preserving marine biodiversity 174 Are the ACs worth the investment? 200
How to measure biodiversity: existing The role of Producer Organizations 201
indicators 174 Environmental NGOs and the CFP 202
Protecting biodiversity on land as a NGOs and legitimacy: funding 203
comparison 175 NGOs and their influence 204
Marine Protected Areas: the ultimate NGOs and Advisory Councils 205
instrument? 177 Is cooperation between industry and
How to evaluate the preservation of NGOs possible? 206
biodiversity: the notion of The role of science 206
ecosystem services 178 The new CFP and fisheries science 206
The ecosystem approach 179 Improving scientific advice 207
The ecosystem approach and the CFP 180 Data and science 208
Ecosystem-based fisheries management 181 Streamlining the evaluation process:
A test case: managing forage fish 182 stock prioritization 209
What future for ecosystem-based Science and the management system 210
management in the CFP? 183 Economic advice 213
A provocative idea: balanced harvest 184 Science in the information age 214
Is selective fishing always a good The role of consumers: certification
idea? 184 systems 215
The notion of “balanced harvest” 185 The case of MSC 215
Is balanced harvest applicable in The dolphin safe certification 216
practice? 186 Other certification systems 216
References 186 Public or private labels? 217
9 Fisheries governance and the CFP 191 What to certify in the future? 218
The evolution of governance under Governance in the reformed CFP: the
the CFP 191 example of multiannual plans 218
Introduction 191 Background 219
The balance between discipline and Multiannual plans and the role of the
flexibility 192 institutions 219
Policy flexibility: the example of the How has co-decision fared for the CFP? 220
United States 193 Addressing variability and uncertainty 222
Can the CFP be more flexible? The Communicating the uncertainty 224
notion of “level playing field” in Spatial dynamics 224
the CFP 193 A governance system that quickly
The new paradigm of the CFP: incorporates variability 225
regionalization 194 How to make the CFP more adaptive to
The example of the US: a regionalized variability and uncertainty? 226
fisheries policy 194 Policy monitoring: from description to
Regionalization of the CFP: the causality 227
experience of discard plans 195 Policy complexity: can the CFP be
The role of stakeholder bodies 196 simplified? 228
The example of the US: what can we Is policy complexity inevitable? 228
learn from the US Regional The complex political/geographical/
Councils? 196 jurisdictional context 229
The EU’s Advisory Councils’ structure The evolution of the decision-making
and composition: are they workflow in the CFP 229
equipped to do their job? 199 The example of the US 230
 Contents ix

Can regionalization reduce complexity? 231 What future for the fight against IUU
Can guidelines replace regulations in fishing? 254
the CFP? 231 The improvement of RFMOs 255
Changing the paradigm: from Why RFMOs are so important 255
prescriptive to collaborative The necessary improvements 255
governance 232 NEAFC and the “coastal states
Results-based management 232 arrangement” 259
Does the CFP have the structures for The changes in the traditional status
collaborative management? 232 quo of the oceans 259
Creating trust 233 The increasing privatization of the
References 234 world’s oceans 260
The emergent fishing nations 260
10 The CFP and international fisheries 237
References 261
The external dimension as an
essential part of the CFP 237 11 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy

Introduction 237 reform 265

The EU as the crucial actor in What the 2013 CFP reform missed 265
international fisheries The issues beyond the “big four” 265
governance 238 Rights-based management 265
The external dimension of the CFP and Is rights-based management good or
international governance 239 bad? 266
Marine Protected Areas: the miracle Why did TFCs fail in the 2013 reform? 267
instrument? 240 The experience of third countries 268
MPAs: what objectives? 241 The experience of some EU Member
The Aichi targets 242 States 271
Rights-based management and discards 272
The notion of “ocean grabbing” 243
Is there a market of fishing rights in the
The ultimate MPA: a ban on high seas
EU? 272
fishing? 244
Small-scale fisheries: no specific policy 273
High seas fishing: economic nonsense? 245
Defining small-scale fishing: more
A ban on high seas trawling? 245
difficult than it seems 274
International governance and
What small-scale and large-scale can
developing countries 246
provide 275
International fisheries governance: a
The comparative impacts of small-scale
rich country’s agenda? 246
vs. large-scale fishing 275
Capacity building 247
What can we learn from aboriginal
Fight against poverty 247 fishing rights? 276
Access to fishing rights 248 The fisheries control system 277
Large-scale MPAs and developing The dichotomy between EU policy and
countries 249 national control 277
Global fleet capacity 250 Harmonization of sanctions? 278
A problem of global governance 250 Enhanced powers for EFCA? 279
The Kobe process 250 The control of the landing obligation: a
A key factor: the allocation of fishing test case 279
rights 251 The management system: is
Fisheries enforcement at global level: cost-recovery possible in the
fighting against illegal fishing 252 CFP? 280
Introduction 252 Is self-control an option? 281
The success of the EU IUU policy 253 Fleet policy: does it still have any
A multilateral IUU policy 253 sense today? 282
x Contents

Background 282 How to address the problem: the case of

Fleet policy in the 2013 reform 282 Alaska 309
The US case 283 Marine pollution: the example of
Are capacity ceilings limiting anything? 283 micro-plastics and marine
Is there a case for fleet policy? 284 resources 310
The EMFF: an instrument to Distribution and incorporation to the
accompany the reform? 285 food chain 310
Some positives . . . 285 The effects of micro-plastics on
. . . and some negatives 285 consumers 311
The structural measures of the US as a What to do? 311
point for reflection 286 Fisheries in the information age 312
References 287 The influence of the information society
on policy making 312
12 The global context: emerging
The bad image of industrial fishing 313
challenges 289
References 314
The status of the world’s fishery
resources 289 13 Adapting the CFP to emerging
The Pauly/Hilborn controversy 289 challenges 317
So, who is right and who is wrong? 291 Adapting the CFP beyond reform 317
The case of the EU 293 Emerging challenges and the value of
Does fisheries management work? 294 long-term strategic thinking 317
The “perfect protein”: can the world Adapting the CFP to climate change 318
afford to under-exploit its fishing The evidence of climate change in EU
opportunities? 295 fisheries 318
Hunger and poverty: fish consumption A case study: Atlantic cod 320
and the global demand for fish 295 The consequences of climate change in
Are the land-based alternatives better? the CFP 320
Protein from livestock 295 The US example 321
A question of equity: the notion of A strategic plan to adapt the CFP to
“leakage” 296 climate change 321
Fisheries: a key component of future More food from the sea 323
diets 297 Seafood vs. land-based food 324
Aquaculture: the seafood of the Is the EU producing enough food from
future? 298 the oceans? 324
Aquaculture and capture fisheries: are Some background 324
they compatible? 298 Are there untapped fish resources? 326
Is aquaculture ecologically sustainable? 299 Exploiting the lower trophic levels 327
Fisheries and employment 302 Improving quota consumption 327
Employment at sea 302 Changing the policy paradigm: a policy
The property of the means of based on exploiting the surplus
production: who owns the fishing of the marine ecosystem, not
rights? Does it matter? 304 individual stocks 327
Why the structure of property matters 304 Developing new aquaculture
What possible effects on management? 305 practice 328
Climate change and fisheries The integration of fisheries policy into
management 305 a wider policy context 328
Global warming and the oceans 306 The wider notion of fisheries
Global warming and food production 307 management 328
The effects of climate change on fisheries The relationship between fisheries and
and aquaculture 308 other economic sectors 329
 Contents xi

The challenge of science vs. social Evolution through adjustment 347

influence 329 A revamping of relative stability: from
Bridging the chasm: a “new deal” single-stock shares to combined
between the fishing industry and shares 350
environmental NGOs? 330 The Mediterranean: a new
Recreational fisheries in Europe 331 management paradigm 351
The US case 332 Should the CFP manage recreational
References 333 fishing? 351
What future for the fishery structural
14 Some ideas for the next CFP reform 335 funds? 352
A vision of the future CFP 335 An instrument to promote policy
The 2009 vision: is it still valid today? 335 change, not to maintain the
New elements of a vision of the future status quo 353
CFP 335 What structural funds for the future
New policy objectives 336 CFP? 353
An improved governance system 337 Introducing market mechanisms in
A more flexible, adaptive CFP 337 the CFP? 356
A new legislative culture: concentrating An alternative approach: RBM partial
on political objectives, not on and optional 357
micro-management 338 A specific policy for small-scale
A new decision support framework 339 fishing? 357
The future of regionalization 339 A reformulated discard policy 358
The notion of co-creation and the New objectives 358
“irrational” part of Accepting (while discouraging)
decision-making 340 over-quota landings 359
Creating breathing space for the ACs 340 Do we need to change the basic
A new structure for an enhanced role regulation? 359
for the Advisory Councils 341 Policy changes not requiring legislative
Relative stability: why it should change 359
evolve 342 Policy changes requiring clarification or
Why question the CFP’s cornerstone? 342 interpretation 360
Are individual annual quotas under Policy changes requiring legislative
relative stability biologically and change 360
economically rational? 343 References 360
An enhanced market of fishing rights Glossary 363
among Member States 344
Abbreviations 365
A European market of fishing rights?
The case of milk quotas 345 Index 367
Preface
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) established
in 1983, is one of the most integrated policies of
the European Union (EU), and its core purpose,
the management of the biological fish stocks, is
part of the five exclusive competences of the
Union, according to Article 3 of the Treaty of
Lisbon. In an earlier book (Penas Lado 2016) I
explained the importance of this fact over and
beyond the relatively minor weight of the fish-
ing sector in the overall economy of the EU.
The policy has been reformed roughly every
10 years. The last reform in 2013 represented
the most substantial policy change in the his-
tory of the CFP, notably due to the introduction
of three new important policy elements: the
regionalization of the policy, the introduction
of a ban on discards, and the establishment of a
clear-cut objective for the management of fish
stocks: fishing at maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) levels by 2020.
Now the policy is at a crossroads: the cumu-
lative effects of the implementation of the
reformed CFP, with its very ambitious policy
objectives together with policy strands that are
difficult to conciliate, the new challenges in
world fisheries (including for example climate
change) and the effects of the withdrawal of
the United Kingdom from the European Union,
all together result in a huge challenge for the
policy that calls into question old certainties
and will require a considerable re-thinking of
many old practices.
The purpose of this work is to complete my
own account of the historical development of
the CFP with an analysis of how the policy
can meet the challenges of the future, using
examples of other comparable fisheries policies
and taking a step forward to envision further
developments for the CFP of the future. On a
personal basis, and upon retirement from the
European Commission, this could be my last
contribution to the CFP, after close to 30 years
of work in different parts of its engine room.
At the time these pages are being written, the
negotiation for the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom from the EU has barely started on the
fishery side, and it is obvious that the outcome
of such negotiation cannot be anticipated.
Given the central position of the UK and the
waters under its jurisdiction in the CFP, it seems
safe to assume that such withdrawal, whatever
the conditions agreed, will have significant
consequences for the CFP. The book does not
address these questions, but the ideas presented
can be of relevance for the future of the CFP
whatever the terms and conditions finally
agreed on the departure of the United Kingdom
from the EU.
The evolution of policy making, in the EU
and elsewhere, is characterized by an increasing
flood of information and the growing influence
of social media, which tend to result in quick,
immediate snapshots of superficial informa-
tion, to the detriment of calm, in-depth analysis
of objective data. The modest aspiration of
this book is to provide some elements for
an in-depth discussion of many of the main
challenges of the policy. Of course, without
any pretension of being objective: the book
expresses my subjective views, and I can only
invite those who will disagree to write about it
and counter my arguments.
The challenges of the CFP are mainly of
two sorts: one is the implementation of the
2013 reform which will combine certain new
elements (landing obligation) without chang-
ing existing ones (individual catch limitations
under relative stability) and is likely to produce
a quagmire when all the new rules become fully
applicable in the coming years. The other chal-
lenge is the adaptation of the CFP to the new
challenges of the management of fish stocks
xiii
xiv Preface
around the world, and to do so in a way that will
not aggravate the complexity and unwieldiness
for which the policy has long been known.
A substantial element of this analysis is based
on my experience in the United States, where
the implementation of the fisheries policy
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act provided
a privileged opportunity to compare policies,
and this comparison allowed me to look into
the CFP under a different light. The US policy
has been considered in a recent comparison as
“decidedly more successful at meeting its con-
servation goals than has fisheries management
in the EU, as governed by the CFP” (Battista
et al. 2019). The debates about the CFP have
always tended to be too Eurocentric and, given
the very particular nature of this policy (a
unique mixture between national and inter-
national policy) the experience from abroad is
often dismissed as “not applicable to the EU.”
However, although “cut and paste” approaches
are obviously out of question, the experience of
the US in particular sheds extremely interesting
light into the way the CFP is trying to achieve
its goals. This vision of the CFP from outside
by a CFP insider is unprecedented, and this is
probably the most interesting part of this book.
This book contains a number of critical views
about the CFP as it stands today, and suggests
some ideas that many readers may probably
consider unrealistic, premature, unacceptable
or even outrageous. This only shows that
“thinking outside the box” is not necessarily an
exercise reserved for the young and inexperi-
enced. In any case, the critical views are written
from an unashamedly pro-European stance.
I bring a critical view of the CFP because I care
about it and want it to be the policy the Euro-
pean project deserves. The criticism is therefore
my personal view on the areas where the CFP
needs improvement, and the ideas proposed are
intended to be food for thought for those who
will implement the policy in the years to come.
The book does not necessarily advocate rad-
ical change in the policy. Popular wisdom tells
us: “if it is not broken, don’t fix it.” But the
problem is that perhaps certain things in the
CFP may be broken or about to break, and
we don’t even want to know about it because
we don’t want to “open Pandora’s box.” More-
over, things that are not clearly broken today
may start breaking in the future, and good
policies are those that try to anticipate change,
rather than respond to crisis. This book raises
questions that must be discussed. If, at the end,
the policy does not change, at least it should be
because the current policy is really better than
the possible alternatives, and not just because
of policy inertia and intellectual laziness.
Finally, some may criticize my bid for the
introduction of elements of flexibility in estab-
lishing objectives and evaluating results. This
may be seen as an attempt to “water down” the
policy. But that would miss the point: the ongo-
ing evidence shows that a policy with over-
ambitious or overly rigid objectives can only
provide the perfect alibi for poor implementa-
tion and enforcement. I believe that it would
be in the policy’s best interest to have more
flexible and realistic goals and then concentrate
on achieving them effectively.
Ernesto Penas Lado
Brussels, December 2018
References
Battista, E.W., Kelly, R.P., Erickson, A., and Fujita, R.
(2019). Fisheries governance affecting conservation
outcomes in the United States and the European
Union. Coastal Management https://doi.org/10.1080/
08920753.2018.1498711.
Penas Lado, E. (2016). The Common Fisheries Policy. The
Quest for Sustainability, 392. Wiley-Blackwell.
Acknowledgments
This work has largely been prepared during my
stay at the University of Washington, in Seattle,
USA, my alma mater for nine months under a
European Commission fellowship. The Univer-
sity of Washington’s academic excellence, open
mindedness and sense of intellectual freedom
provided me with the ideal conditions to learn,
teach, read, discuss and write about fisheries
management. In that context, the comparison
between the CFP and the US fishery manage-
ment system under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act was particularly illustrative. Although that
system cannot necessarily be applied in the EU
in many respects, the comparison between the
two management regimes allowed an analysis
of the CFP, with its strengths and weaknesses,
under a new light.
In particular, I am indebted to a number of
people who contributed to prepare these pages,
or to inspire them.
Ray Hilborn was a fundamental source of
help, information and inspiration. His generous
support to the organization of a course-seminar
on mixed fisheries in the University of Washing-
ton, and my participation in his various activi-
ties was extremely enriching. In that course, the
lectures by Clara Ulrich, Bill Karp, Kevin Stokes,
Dan Holland, Bruce Turris and Jim Armstrong
were of the highest interest. He also made very
useful comments on key sections of the book.
Dave Fluharty informed me about US fish-
eries management in his excellent dedicated
course and in numerous exchanges. In this
course, the contribution from Penny Dalton on
the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, Andre Punt on the stock management
parameters, or Anne Hollowed on the US pro-
gram to address climate change, among others,
were of particular value. His comments on the
final manuscript were extremely valuable.
Very special thanks to Bill Karp, who con-
tributed very substantially to this work by
providing me with his experience and insight
into the US management system through var-
ious presentations and exchanges. He also
provided extremely useful comments both on
substance and style to an earlier version and to
key chapters of the final draft.
Andrea Brocato and Tess Ames organized my
fellowship at the University of Washington and
facilitated all the contacts and activities. Nadine
Marcos contributed in finding documents and
references on EU fisheries policy, in particular
during my stay in Seattle.
Many colleagues provided me with their help
and collaboration during my long years as an
official in the European Commission. I learned
so much from many of them that they also must
be considered as contributors to this book, much
more than they can probably imagine.
xv
Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this book are those of the author and not those of the European
Commission.

xvii
CHAPTER 1
The common fisheries policy: stability or
change?
Introduction: fisheries, a
conservative world
In Europe, as elsewhere in the world, fisheries
are a traditional activity with a tendency to con-
servatism, and this is reflected in the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP). Traditionally, fisheries
communities tend to be rather resistant to
change of policy. While much of this industry
is quick to adapt to better technologies that
would improve their performance, they tend
to be rather reticent to introduce changes in
management. This in turn implies that many
traditional fisheries administrations, with a
deeply-rooted tradition of paternalism, become
equally resistant to change. Yet, the fishing
activity is subject to an increasing number of
challenges that call for policy change, or at least
policy adaptation.
An observer from outside would probably
think that the strong and frequent criticism of
the policy by its own stakeholders would imply
a strong appetite for change. Yet, for many
years the criticism in the EU has not necessarily
resulted in a strong drive for policy change. This
author has named this apparent contradiction
the “don’t like it but don’t change it” syndrome,
whereby those who criticize the policy every
day hesitate to change it or even consider it
exaggerated when the criticism comes from
others (Penas Lado 2016). The best proof is the
reaction of much of the European fishing indus-
try to the Green Paper on CFP reform published
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
in 2009, where the European Commission
made an unprecedented self-criticism of the
policy (EU 2009a): a number of voices, notably
from the industry itself, considered that the
Commission presented a too negative view of
the policy which, in their view, was not justified.
This example illustrates the weight of tradi-
tion in the evolution of the policy. In fisheries
management in general, and in the CFP in
particular, it is impossible to consider policy
improvements by starting with a blank page.
Any discussion on policy reform must always
take account of the complex maze of vested
interests to keep the status quo or part thereof,
and the limited capacity of the system (the
industry as well as administrations) to change
course. Any policy change should always be
partial and gradual, or it will simply not take
place. And, in most cases, change is not nec-
essarily self-induced, but the result of driving
forces from outside the industry/administration
complex.
A distributional policy
A fundamental part of the difficulty to reform
the CFP is its distributive nature. A number
of authors have alluded to the origins of the
policy that were dominated by considerations
of national interest by the Council of Ministers
when allocating fishing rights, rather than by
the search for a rational system to manage
fisheries (Schweiger 2010). Symes and Crean
(1995) underlined the fact that when the
1
2 Chapter 1
CFP was established, ministers were simply
expected to defend national interest in obtain-
ing a share of the resources, regardless of the
consequences for the common good. This cre-
ated a deeply-rooted tradition of looking into
maximizing the biggest possible piece of the pie
in the short term, and that culture has largely
survived to this day. Such culture, in addition,
has for a long time prevented management
from “growing the size of the pie.”
This tradition is also related to the paternal-
ism that has prevailed in fisheries management
in most Member State administrations. This led
part of the most competitive industry in 1983
to consider that the prevalence of the national
interest was not related with free markets, but
rather with social welfare (cited in Schweiger,
2010). In other words, national interests were
often defined in social welfare terms as opposed
to free markets and sustainable harvests.
Although considerable progress has been
made to redress these issues since 1983, the
difficulty to re-consider the distributional part
of the policy still constitutes a major factor
opposing policy change and adaptation. Any
change that could be construed as a question-
ing of the initial distribution of fishing rights
(relative stability) finds automatic opposition
by a still large majority of Member States and
significant parts of the industry.
It has been underlined that over time the
distributional part of the policy, the allocation
among Member States of single stocks through
relative stability, has been inevitably distorted
because species have tended to decline or
recover at different rates responding to variable
changes in stock abundance (Symes 1997).
However, this fact has never led Member States
to question the status quo, in a demonstration of
the extreme conservatism derived from the ini-
tial distribution: it is better not to touch it even
if in some cases it may be working against the
interest of a Member State. This state of mind is
also largely shared in the European institutions,
where allegations that something may question
relative stability immediately translate into
stopping the discussion: suggesting that idea is
simply a self-explanatory non-starter.
In addition, it has been demonstrated in a
number of cases that the agreement on allo-
cation of a fish stock is a pre-condition for the
adoption of management measures at EU level.
This has two consequences: that the distribu-
tional aspects of the policy are a barrier against
policy change, but also that effective policy
change can only take place if the distributional
question is addressed. The latter is probably
the biggest challenge to any attempt at future
policy change in the CFP.
Policy change vs. policy stability
The CFP, since its inception in 1983, has been
subject to a process of reform three times,
roughly every 10 years. Reforms have been
adopted in 1992, 2002, and 2013 (Penas Lado
2016). The traditional wisdom associated to
these reforms has been that there needs to be
a balance between (a) the necessary adapta-
tion of the policy as new evidence appears or
new challenges are to be faced, and (b) the
necessary time of stability to concentrate on
implementation.
During the inter-reform periods, however,
a number of policy changes can still be intro-
duced, but these generally do not require a
change of the legal basis of the policy, and cor-
respond to practical implementation of new or
different approaches that are already foreseen
in that legal basis.
The tradition of reform every 10 years contin-
ues, and the current basic regulation 1380/2013
foresees in its Article 49 the presentation of a
report by the Commission to the European
Council and to the Parliament on the function-
ing of the CFP by 31 December 2022. Although
this clause does not imply necessarily another
major reform as of 2023, it would seem reason-
able to think that the evolution of the policy
is such that is difficult to see how it would
just stay unchanged for another 10 years for
the first time ever, in particular taking account
of the influence of important factors such as
Brexit or climate change. In the meantime,
the next years to come will be fundamentally
implementation time.
Indeed, some of the most substantial changes
of the policy have been introduced during this
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
inter-reform period and without changing the
previous legal basis. For example, the idea of
considering the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) as the long-term objective of the man-
agement of fish stocks (before being enshrined
in the 2013 reform) was gradually introduced
after the 2002 reform through a Commission
Communication (EU 2006a) and gradually
applied de facto in some long-term plans long
before the idea was consolidated in legislation
in 2013.
This fact is extremely important, because it
shows that policy change should not be seen just
as a legislative change every 10 years, but rather
as an open-ended process where adaptation can
take place through practice when and where it
is relevant and necessary, even without a fun-
damental legislative change in the policy’s legal
basis. There is, however, a very strong current
against policy change notably from two actors:
fisheries administrations and major segments of
the fishing industry.
In the case of fisheries administrations, there
is a deeply-rooted reticence to policy change.
This is understandable: managing a fisheries
policy is complex; it requires a lot of work to
get familiar with the policy and to set up the
administrative and other instruments to run it
smoothly. The idea that once they have suc-
ceeded to do that the policy will be immediately
questioned makes them extremely nervous. As
an example, the in-depth consultation by the
Commission on the possible changes to intro-
duce in the control regulation of 2009 after the
2013 CFP reform showed all administrations
asking for limited technical challenges: “evolu-
tion, not revolution” was the position held by
practically all national administrations.
The fishing industry is a more complex case.
Always critical with the policy, they often try
to shy away from change when necessary: the
“don’t like it but don’t change it” referred to
above that much of the European industry
has practiced for so long. As an example, in
a recent debate on the matter a distinguished
representative of the European fishing industry,
after expressing strong criticism to the policy,
was asked what would be his top priority in the
3
event of a new reform of the CFP. He replied
loud and clear: “give us a break” in reference to
the need to have stability and not question the
policy so often.
Policy stability vs. policy inertia: are they
one and the same?
While it is very understandable to ask for “pol-
icy stability” both by administrations and the
industry, the problem of this notion is that
it often translates into something else: policy
inertia. While the first is desirable, in that
stability is necessary to ensure good implemen-
tation, and to provide the industry with a clear
framework where they can operate and plan
future investments, the second is a problem in
that it tends to dismiss necessary change and
improvement.
Policy stability and policy inertia are def-
initely not the same. The problem is that
distinguishing between the two is not nec-
essarily straightforward and, for sure, is seen
by different players from very different stand-
points. I would argue, however, that certain
cases are clear in distinguishing the two notions:
• The regime applicable to the 12 miles is prob-
ably a good example of good, positive policy
stability: it is not questioned by anyone, it has
never been identified as a problem and it pro-
vides security to fishermen and administra-
tions alike.
• The continuity of certain structural measures
like the funding of temporary laying-ups
outside cases of force majeure, after decades of
application without any positive evaluation,
is a clear case of policy inertia with more
than questionable effects.
In policy terms, it is generally expected that
policy changes introduced in a reform will
enjoy the standard 10-year period for imple-
mentation. This is more than sufficient time to
ensure the economic stability of the activity, the
need for changes in the management system by
national administrations and so on. But when
certain policy features remain unquestioned
after one or even several inter-reform periods,
despite evidence for the need for change, this
4 Chapter 1
is not stability, it is policy inertia, which only
means the inability of the policy to face its
challenges. Making a clear distinction between
the two things can be a very enlightening
exercise for future discussions on the need and
opportunity for policy reform.
Why do policies change?
The balance between policy stability and policy
change has been described as a function of the
interplay between epistemic communities that
traditionally dominate the policy debates which
tend to lean toward stability, so that policy
change takes place when new advocacy coali-
tions can bring a new policy image and impose
it, taking advantage of shifts in political lead-
ership (Meijerink 2005). On their side, Dudley
and Richardson (1996) consider that although
one of the adversarial communities may hold
an advantage over the other at a particular
time, the scope for action in a number of dif-
ferent policy-making arenas makes it unlikely
that it will retain supremacy over time. Radical
change is most likely to be brought about by
factors exogenous to policy communities.
How does this relate to CFP reform? Indeed,
the CFP has long been dominated by the fishing
industry as the clear epistemic community.
One can wonder whether this role actually
corresponded to the scientific fisheries commu-
nity, but if we follow the above definition, the
scientific community has long been the only
source of “objective” basis for the policy, but
the tradition of largely ignoring its advice by
decision-makers clearly points to the fishing
industry, and the national administrations that
largely reflected its views as the real epistemic
communities that have dominated roughly the
first two decades of the policy.
In the same context, the main “advocacy
coalition” has been that of a public opinion
influenced by environmental NGOs, which
have been the main drivers of policy change,
using to their advantage certain changes in
political leadership.
These changes in leadership have indeed con-
tributed to policy change quite substantially.
The two last policy reforms (2002 and 2013)
have been facilitated by the political leader-
ship in the European Commission, who have
been increasingly open to the new advocacy
coalitions, albeit in a very variable manner: the
2002 CFP reform was influenced by a Fisheries
Commissioner who was sensitive for the first
time to views outside the mainstream epis-
temic community. Still, some of the highlights
of that reform (the introduction of Regional
Advisory Councils) was clearly a demand of
the fishing industry itself, while other reforms
(the suppression of aid to new construction
of vessels) was clearly not, except for a few
cases. This tendency was exacerbated in the
2013 reform, where two of the three main new
elements (the landing obligation and the MSY
objective by 2020) were adopted contrary to
the industry’s will, and the third one (regional-
ization) was supported only by a fraction of the
industry.
Another important reason for policy change
is the tendency toward clarification of policy
objectives and enlargement of policy scope.
The tendency over the years clearly goes in the
direction of adding more and more layers to the
policy, as shown in Figure 1.1. This is explained
in particular by the need to enlarge the scope,
to include new policy objectives and principles,
as well as the need to further clarify questions
that the previous policy basis left undefined.
And this trend is clearly additive: it adds new
policy layers but rarely removes the previous
ones, resulting in a policy that accumulates
new provisions over time.
This tendency has positive aspects, for
example that it includes new provisions that are
necessary for the policy to address new chal-
lenges, but it also has downsides: in particular
it adds complexity and increases the likelihood
of the different policy layers being conflicting.
Legal change vs. policy change
The tradition of a legislative reform every
10 years together with implementation changes
during the inter-reform periods has tradition-
ally implied a philosophy that all the important
changes in the policy must follow a new
legislative basis.

Number of words in basic regulation
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0 Figure 1.1 Number of words in the basic
1983 1992 2002
However, it is important to underline that
the different legal basis of the policy, starting
with the two basic regulations of the policy
(EU 1970a,b) actually had certain elements
that could have been developed into policy, but
never were, or in a very limited way. Among
many possible examples, the possibility of using
fishing effort as an instrument was part of the
initial palette of management instruments in
the CFP, but it was not until the first recov-
ery plans for depleted stocks in 2004 that the
instrument was incorporated as an additional
instrument to the total allowable catches (TACs)
and quotas.
This reveals another tradition of the CFP:
while it is clear that new management
approaches do necessitate a legal basis, very
often this legal basis has been there for a long
time, but has not been used because the policy
never put into place the elements needed to
make it happen. In other words: having a legal
basis is a necessary, but not sufficient condition
for policy change.
There are many examples of this dichotomy
between the legal basis and the implementation
in practice. A case in hand is that of the “real
time closures,” a type of measure to adapt fish-
ing practice quickly once there is evidence, for
example, that a certain area is full of juvenile
fish and should be avoided. Traditionally recom-
mended by many fishermen’s associations and
a number of national administrations, a legal
basis for its application was indeed included in
the new control regulation of 2009 (EU 2009b).
However, it was never applied in practice. The
reason is simple: the practical implementation
The common fisheries policy: stability or change? 5
2013 regulation of the CFP over the years.
of that provision requires inter alia a system of
real-time transmission of information by a reli-
able source; something that was never put into
place. In fact, the only experience of this kind
was applied by the Scottish fleet alone.1
The elements for policy change can be varied
but always go far beyond the existence of a legal
basis:
• Sometimes, policy change is brought about
simply by applying the policy’s own rules
with determination and conviction, in cases
where the rules had been ignored without
consequence.
• In certain cases, the legal principle exists,
but the mechanisms to make it really appli-
cable in practice are not implemented.
The above-mentioned case of the real-time
closures is a good example.
• In other cases, the change takes place in cer-
tain areas and/or fisheries, where Member
States and the industry concerned take such
changes more seriously, while in other areas
this is not the case.
Overall, the CFP has always had a very wide
range of possibilities in its basic legal texts,
but these possibilities have not always been
implemented in practice, either because the
policy preferred other options, or else because
the non-legislative conditions necessary for
their implementation simply were not there.
This, in turn, means that before thinking about
introducing changes on a legal basis, it is
important to try to exploit all the possibilities
1 www.fishingforthetruth.co.uk/sustainability/
conservation-credits/
6 Chapter 1
offered by the existing legal framework, and
this represents a certain change of “culture” in
the policy.
Does the CFP change too much or too
little?
The CFP has evolved through the three reforms
and through the gradual evolution within the
successive frameworks. Whether the changes
introduced in the policy are too slow and
limited, or too quick and substantial, that is
of course a matter of different opinions. This
author will contend that fisheries policy in
general, and the CFP in particular have been
very slow to change.
There can be a number of reasons for this:
• The high level of uncertainty associated to the
activity, which creates a culture very unfa-
vorable to innovations whose consequences
are unclear.
• The relatively slow pace of technical inno-
vation, which makes regulatory change less
necessary to accommodate such innovation
as compared to other economic sectors.
• The image of fisheries as a highly conflict-
ual sector, where the difficulties associated
to policy change offset the benefits of the
change itself, at least from the viewpoint of
many politicians and managers. This often
makes the interest to keep social peace a
higher priority than adopting necessary (but
conflicting) changes in the policy.
• The relatively small size of the fishing indus-
try when compared with other economic
sectors in the EU, which generally puts
fisheries under the radar of other important
policy changes affecting larger economic
sectors.
Ultimately, the political drive for reform of
the CFP is a result of the imbalance between
the low overall economic weight of the fishing
activity in the EU as a whole and the (real or
perceived) unrest of the sector, that often dis-
courages managers from undertaking difficult
and contentious change, because the political
price to pay is comparatively high and the
rewards low.
That is of course the situation where countries
can afford to fail in their fisheries management,
and then compensate this failure with a certain
level of public funding. On the contrary, coun-
tries such as Iceland where the fishing indus-
try is the country’s bread and butter (at least
until the touristic boom in recent years), simply
cannot afford to fail in their fisheries manage-
ment, and that implies a much greater open-
ness to keep the policy under constant scrutiny
and permanent adjustment and improvement.
Within the EU, this is also reflected by the posi-
tion of the regions where fisheries represent a
high percentage of income, that are traditionally
much more open to policy change.
Because of these elements, what is a slow
pace of change for some can actually look like
a very speedy and confusing policy evolution
to others. The speed of change depends on
subjective perceptions, and it is not possible to
assess such speed in pure objective terms. The
question, however, can be approached from
the point of view of the degree of adaptation of
the policy to certain challenges or to traditional
shortcomings. There, a certain number of expe-
riences can shed some light in that discussion:
in a number of substantial issues of the CFP,
progress has been extremely slow, or inexistent,
for example:
• The management areas for the establishment
of TACs have been basically unchanged for
more than 30 years, despite clear evidence of
changes in the areas of distribution of a num-
ber of stocks.
• The change from the downward trend to the
upward trend in stock abundance took more
than 20 years (from 1983 to roughly 2000)
after the birth of the conservation policy.
• In certain areas, such as the Mediterranean
Sea, the conservation pillar of the policy is
still in its infancy, after the first attempts in
1994 (see Chapter 5).
• Some ideas (the reduction in discarding)
mentioned already in 1992 were only intro-
duced in the policy in 2013, that is, 21 years
later!
• Similarly, the establishment of MSY as a pol-
icy objective, established by international law
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
(The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea; UNCLOS) as a binding objective in
1994, was only enshrined in the legal basis of
the CFP in 2013, 19 years later.
These few examples illustrate that, at least
in a number of important policy areas, policy
progress in the CFP has been extremely slow. In
any case, perceptions about the pace of change
in the CFP are naturally variable. Some Mem-
ber States, with dynamic, industrial fishery
sectors want a quicker pace of policy change
and innovation. Others, with more traditional
sectors prioritize the preservation of the status
quo by all possible means. For the latter, any
change tends to be too much.
Ultimately, this division also reflects ideolog-
ical divisions about the way to handle fisheries:
while those favoring an economically-liberal
approach tend to favor policy change, those
favoring a more paternalistic, State-driven eco-
nomic sector tend to be more adverse to policy
change. Interestingly, this division does not
depend so much on the color of the govern-
ment in each Member State: these ideological
divisions are remarkably stable within every
Member State despite changes of government,
and tend to reflect deeply-rooted and politically
transversal traditions of liberal vs. paternalistic
management models of their fishing industry.
Changes in policy reform or in inter-reform
periods
It would be simplistic to think that the most
substantial changes are necessarily those of
the 10-year policy revisions. Sometimes, the
most substantial changes have been introduced
in the inter-reform periods. This is illustrated
by the experience of implementing the 2002
reform (EU 2002):
• This reform failed to incorporate MSY as
the objective of the management of stocks,
since the political drive from the World
Summit on Sustainable Development took
place the same year, thus with little time
to incorporate that political objective into
EU law. However, this did not prevent the
Commission promoting this objective years
before the following reform, notably through
7
a Communication (EU 2006a) followed by
specific MSY objectives in certain long-term
recovery plans.
• The experience of the use of effort man-
agement as a duplicate instrument to catch
limitations, established by the 2002 reform,
was considered a negative one and gradually
eliminated from subsequent proposals. In
some cases, provisions on effort manage-
ment were simply ignored by Council in
practice, despite the requirements of the
2002 legal basis.
The above experience shows that in the
period within two reforms there may be very
substantial changes to the policy in practice,
without necessarily requiring any change in
the legal basis. This is very positive, because it
shows that the policy needs, and can in practice,
be adapted through learning from experience
outside the reform periods.
Policy rigidity vs. policy flexibility:
why is the CFP so rigid?
This is another fundamental question when it
comes to policy change: if the policy is flexi-
ble enough, it does not need to be modified so
often. If it is rigid, then it needs to be adjusted
every time there is an unforeseen circumstance.
In this particular case, it seems clear that the CFP
is characterized by a high level of rigidity. Some
examples cited by Penas Lado (2016) illustrate
this point, such as the case of the Baltic ice cover
and the cod summer ban, or that of the adapta-
tion of the European Fisheries Fund to address
the effects of the 2008 oil crisis.
There is little doubt that the CFP is a very rigid
policy: all the rules, up to a remarkably tech-
nical and detailed level, are laid down as legis-
lation that is neither easy nor quick to modify.
In addition, the room for maneuver to “inter-
pret” the legislation is limited by the fact that
this is a role that corresponds exclusively to the
European Court of Justice, which implies that
the policy is “interpreted” only when the Court
establishes case law through its rulings.
Is this rigidity inevitable or a conscious polit-
ical choice? This author will contend that this
policy rigidity is mainly a tradition established at
8 Chapter 1
its inception and subsequently consolidated and
even reinforced ever since. There is a good his-
torical reason for this: the difficulty of the long
period (1977–1983) of gestation of the policy
made it necessary to agree on all details to over-
come the lack of trust among the players con-
cerned. This lack of trust has continued or even
been exacerbated in successive enlargements of
the Union, and thus the need to fix all the details
has continued.
This has resulted in a policy that is not only
rigid, but also complex, since most if not all the
actors have traditionally put emphasis on secur-
ing their vested interests and actually prefer a
bespoke policy, no matter how complex, to a
simple one that could be open to flexible inter-
pretation by different players.
Co-decision and policy rigidity
Since 2010 co-decision between the Council
and Ministers and the European Parliament
is the ordinary legislative procedure for the
CFP. In this context, it is opportune to ask
if it has contributed to make the CFP more
flexible or more rigid. The answer is not always
straightforward, but I will contend that, overall,
co-decision has rendered the CFP even more
rigid than before. The reasons are varied:
• The process of decision-making has become
so complicated that once a decision is taken
the system has little capacity or willingness to
introduce amendments to cater for new cir-
cumstances.
• The sheer amount of regulations of the CFP is
difficult to handle by a system with a limited
capacity to look at too many projects at the
same time; this considerably limits the oppor-
tunity for the Commission to make too many
proposals in parallel, let alone modify those
adopted after very long and complex negoti-
ations.
• The balance of power between the two
co-legislators often results in regulations
becoming too detailed and rigid, as a
result of institutional mistrust: Council and
Parliament mistrust each other and often also
mistrust the Commission having too much
room for maneuver to decide. The result of
this mistrust is regulations that establish too
many details through co-decision.
In fact, co-decision is an ideal procedure for a
policy where the legislative production is scarce
and is made up of a few legal acts, such as direc-
tives, that are adopted every so often. But the
procedure is ill-adapted to a policy with a tradi-
tion of abundant and detailed legislation. In this
case, co-decision can barely cope with the speed
at which the legislation needs to be produced
and adopted.
Obviously, any discussion on the future CFP
is not going to change the Treaty. But, as we
will see in Chapter 14, there is a way out: using
co-decision to adopt much less detailed and pre-
scriptive legislation, and re-centering the work
of co-legislators on fewer but politically impor-
tant questions.
This requires a reflection on the role of
Parliament in the CFP: while Council is used
to decide on all matters pertaining to the CFP,
the role of Parliament as a co-legislator is
still relatively recent (2010) and still needs
some adjustment, particularly in the way of
concentrating its activity on the important
political points, not so much on the technical
detail. In every political system, Parliaments
adopt laws, not regulations. Yet, in the current
co-decision process of the CFP the European
Parliament (and the Council) still have the
tendency to adopt too many technical details.
This requires a fundamental cultural change.
We will refer to this in Chapters 9 and 14 in
particular.
Policy implementation
and policy change: the challenge
of implementing the 2013
reform
As these pages are being written, the CFP is in
the middle of the inter-reform period. If we fol-
low the scheme described under “Legal change
vs. policy change” above, this is not the time for
policy reform, but just for implementation. It is
true that any indication, at this juncture, that
policy change may be necessary could seriously
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
undermine the efforts to implement the 2013
objectives effectively. The difficulties around
the full implementation of the landing obliga-
tion are the best example: if a policy change
was considered, it would probably follow that
all the actors concerned would concentrate
on what changes to introduce, not on how to
implement the policy adopted already.
The challenges of implementation
However, a number of reasons clearly indi-
cate that the policy implementation cannot
necessarily be business as usual until the
above-referred report of 2022. These reasons
are the following:
• The implementation of the two new CFP
objectives: the MSY by 2020 for all stocks,
combined with the full implementation
of the landing obligation by 2019, and all
under the rigid, unchanged quota allocation
keys under relative stability will produce
an important choke species effect in many
fisheries in EU waters, thus affecting the
ability of the fishery to deliver the objectives
of the policy as according to Article 39, Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) (see Chapter 6).
• The growing evidence of climate change
and its expected effects on fish stocks will
change the status quo of the policy, notably
as a result of the displacement of the area
of distribution of a number of key species in
European waters. These changes will inter
alia make current management areas obso-
lete and will aggravate the problem of choke
species (see Chapters 12 and 13).
• The achievement of the policy objectives in
the Mediterranean lags far behind other EU
waters and will require a special effort and
special instruments if such objectives are to
be achieved at all (see Chapter 5).
• The CFP is closely linked to the evolution of
the international management of fisheries,
and this is subject to increasing pressure
that the policy has to adapt to, in particular
if and when this evolution leads to new
international obligations for the EU (see
Chapter 12).
9
• The effects of the growing influence of public
opinion (largely through social networks) on
policy decisions, the coming into play of new
economic players in the maritime space, and
thus the challenge to handle an increasingly
complex policy context (see Chapter 12).
• Last but certainly not least, the effects of the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the
EU, whatever the specific conditions agreed,
will fundamentally change the CFP. These
changes will require new policy decisions
and approaches that may wait until the next
policy reform after 2022.
All the above points will make it necessary to
adapt the policy sooner rather than later, so the
idea that the current inter-reform period should
be business as usual is not granted.
The CFP’s legendary bad press
That the CFP has always had a bad press is
beyond any doubt. The causes are mixed, but
perhaps the very nature of fisheries man-
agement (imposing restrictions to preserve
tomorrow’s fishing is not necessarily popular)
and the character of the policy as one of the few
exclusive competence policies of the EU makes
the CFP or “Brussels” an easy scapegoat. This
bad press is particularly acute in the case of the
UK, to the point that in the Brexit referendum
(see below) the British fishing communities
voted massively for Brexit, despite the recent
reform (2013) that was very well-received by
the British government of the time.
In addition to the policy’s own failings, that
are not in short supply, the CFP is also criticized
for decisions taken by Member States them-
selves. A very interesting example is, as recently
as 2016, that provided by the British tabloid
Daily Mail, which stated in large headlines
that the English fishing industry was “sunk by
EU quotacrats” based on the fact that 23% of
English fish quotas were allocated to a single
Dutch-owned vessel, to the detriment of small
operators.2 What the article ignored is that
the allocation of the British fish quotas among
2 Mail Online. Thursday, 7 July 2016.
10 Chapter 1
operators is decided by the British government,
without interference from “Brussels.”
Though policy change does not necessarily
follow critical views from the media, it would
be naive just to ignore the weight of public
(or published) opinion in shaping up political
positions about the CFP.
The reformed CFP: success or
failure?
Ultimately, the case for CFP reform will be
determined by the consideration of the policy
as a success or a failure. This consideration,
over and beyond superficial evaluations, is
more complex than it seems. It is largely a
question of expectations, as well as the way in
which we report about its results:
• The same policy results can be viewed as
success or failure depending on expectations,
on the interpretation of policy objectives or
on the different weight given to the pol-
icy’s different objectives. There is no single
way to consider policy results as success or
failure.
• To evaluate the degree of success of a policy it
is also essential to ensure that the evaluation
is done on all the relevant data. Reporting
on policy results is crucial because depend-
ing upon what aspects of the policy, and what
objectives we look at, we may have a very dif-
ferent view of the policy’s degree of success.
Let’s look at these questions.
The notion of “policy success”
in fisheries management
The notion of policy success is not univocal. Dif-
ferent actors would have a very different view of
what this “policy success” is all about. This is the
case in all fisheries around the world because
the objectives of fisheries policy are various and
often conflicting, and what certain stakeholders
may consider a failure is perhaps a success for
other stakeholders (Hilborn 2007).
In the CFP, the different objectives of Article
39 TFEU point in the direction of a multi-faceted
notion of success. This is so because the different
objectives of the policy may in fact be conflicting
among them. The importance of recognizing the
conflict between policy objectives is increasingly
stressed (Hilborn 2007; Dichmont et al. 2010;
Pereau et al. 2012; Zimmermann and Yamazaki
2017). This means that the management system
should incorporate ways to assess these conflicts
and incorporate the relative importance of the
objectives of different stakeholder groups in the
institutional framework (Pascoe et al. 2017).
The notion of policy success is extremely
important because fisheries management fun-
damentally consists of applying restrictions to
ensure the sustainability of the resources that
the fishery depends on. Asking people to make
sacrifices is better understood when the people
concerned can see the future rewards of such
sacrifices. However, if and when the results
of these sacrifices are an improvement of the
biological status of the resources, but not a
long-term improvement in the socio-economic
condition of the industry, the sacrifices will
be seriously questioned as being unjustified,
inequitable, or simply unfair.
As we will see in subsequent chapters, the
management of fish stocks in certain areas of
the United States has improved the biological
status of the stocks, but has not increased yields.
There are more fish at sea, but the proportion
of the fish caught is lower. Any sacrifice made
to rebuild resources has benefited the resources
but not necessarily the fishermen. Whether this
was intended from the beginning, and whether
all fishermen concerned knew this from the
start, that is an interesting question. In any
case, the nature of fisheries management is
such that it requires clarity and transparency to
the industry as to what is the ultimate objective
of the policy, that is, what is its real measure of
“success”.
In these pages, and in connection with Article
39 TFEU (see Chapter 2), this author will argue
that the real measure of the “success” of the
CFP is not simply to have more abundant fish
resources, or fewer overexploited ones, but
also, or primarily, to ensure high sustainable
yields and ensure the maximum sustainable
level of production of seafood.
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
The different meanings of policy success
Policy success can have a very different mean-
ing in different places, or for different societal
interests and governments. There are plenty of
examples, but one that easily comes to mind is
the difference between management in a coun-
try like Iceland, where fisheries is the main
industry, and other countries where fishing is a
small, secondary industry in the context of the
country’s economy. In the first case, the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of the fleets is essential
for the whole country. Thus, the objectives for
management must privilege competitiveness
and economic output; the sector (and the whole
country!) simply can’t survive without them.
Here, the notion of policy success is necessarily
related to an industry that can generate wealth
for the country.
In contrast, many countries in the EU have
small fishing industries, representing much less
than 1% of the country’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). In such cases, management can focus
more on social objectives such as preserving the
employment or the social fabric of coastal com-
munities, even at the cost of lower profitability
and competitiveness. In such cases, the country
can even afford to subsidize the industry to buy
social peace. Here, the notion of policy success
can be more related to the preservation of the
social fabric of coastal communities, even at the
cost of a very low contribution to the country’s
overall wealth.
In the CFP, the establishment of a specific
objective of reaching Fmsy levels by 2020 has
been an important step to provide a clear
long-term operational objective to the manage-
ment of fish stocks, so as to end up with a long
tradition of short-term decision-making.
However, this operational objective does not
mean that all the CFP is to be judged only by
this indicator. In fact, the Fmsy is a situation
around which one may expect that the other
objectives of the policy (as stated in Article 39
TFEU) are more likely to be achieved. But this
is just an expectation: MSY is a compromise
that provides maximum biological production,
but does not maximize employment, ecosys-
tem preservation or economic profitability.
11
In other words, Fmsy is an operational objective
that is expected to contribute to achieve the
broader Article 39 objectives, but that does not
replace them. Policy success is therefore a much
broader notion than having all stocks at Fmsy .
Policy success and realistic policy objectives
Policy success is also strongly dependent upon
the degree of realism of the policy objectives.
Before the 2013 reform, the CFP suffered from
lack of clear objectives for the management of
fish stocks. This problem was (at least partially)
resolved in this reform. The question now is
whether the new objectives are realistic.
The problem is not so much whether we
have all the answers at this point in time.
As this author has explained, the European
law-makers were very conscious that when
adopting new policy objectives nobody had
all the answers to the numerous questions on
practical implementation, and that this was
seen as the only way to prevent these ques-
tions standing in the way of establishing the
objectives (Penas Lado 2016, chapter 16).
But the question is different: are these objec-
tives really all fully attainable, and if so, by
2020? The reply to this question is certainly not
simple and, for sure, is highly variable for dif-
ferent fisheries and areas. But it is necessary to
bear in mind the relative “attainability” of these
objectives, at least in certain circumstances, to
better evaluate the policy results as a reasonable
success, or as a complete failure.
For example, the discard ban established
under Article 15 of regulation 1380/2013 is
basically the same for all areas, and the degree
of flexibility to achieve it (notably the de min-
imis tolerance) is limited to 5% in all areas.
Obviously, if in certain EU fisheries after 2019
we have discard levels of around 7% or 8%,
down from current levels of around 40%, that
can be viewed as a failure because the target
is not attained, but such a dramatic reduc-
tion of discards would be an extraordinary
accomplishment in reality.
If we look at other places, for example the
US, we see very different levels of discards and
also a different level of ambition in the policy
12 Chapter 1
for different fisheries; the results are evaluated
in terms of the realized reductions in discarding
levels as compared to the initial levels, but with-
out trying to obtain exactly the same results in
all fisheries (NOAA 2016).
In comparison, in the new CFP even rea-
sonably good success in reducing discard levels
more than in the US would be considered a
failure, when comparing such results with a
very rigidly defined objective.
The same applies to the MSY objective, partic-
ularly to the “aspirational” objective of having
all stocks at levels of biomass “above Bmsy .” As
we will see below, scientists agree in saying that
having all stocks in a marine ecosystem at Bmsy is
probably not attainable, because of inter-species
considerations. In addition, we have also seen
that having all stocks at Fmsy cannot be done
without serious foregone yields, which can be
considered as not corresponding to some of
the objectives of Article 39 TFEU. This is of
particular relevance when we deal with mixed
fisheries, where individual stock parameters
are difficult to combine meaningfully. In these
cases, Gaichas et al. (2017) conclude:
There is no single combination of fishing mor-
talities that provides for MSY for all species
simultaneously, so accounting for stock produc-
tivity and ecosystem trade-offs is key to providing
reliable advice and to avoid unrealistic expectations.
(Emphasis added)
If, as a result of the implementation of the
CFP, we have a majority of stocks within Fmsy
values, and many of them with increased trends
in biomass, even if they are not all above Bmsy
that would be a historical success for the policy.
Yet, when comparing such results with the
policy objectives as defined legally in Article 2
of Regulation 1380/2013, they will certainly
appear as a failure.
This illustrates how policy objectives, when
defined in a very rigid manner, can make rea-
sonably good results look like policy failure.
This is extremely important and deserves a
careful discussion on how to interpret, evaluate
and present the delivery of the policy objectives
of the CFP.
Is 100% biological success possible?
The way Article 2 of Regulation 1380/2013 is
formulated seems to leave little doubt about
the new objective of the policy: having all reg-
ulated stocks at Fmsy by 2020. Over and beyond
the above considerations about the nature of
the policy objectives, the question can also be
asked in strict biological terms: can all biological
objectives be achieved at 100%? And if so, at
what cost?
Species interactions take place at biological
(predator–prey relationships) and technological
level (species caught by the same gear). The
level of fishing mortality potentially applicable
to a prey species, for example, depends on the
fishing mortality applied to its predators, and
its competitors for the same food (Jacobsen
et al. 2014). Conversely, the productivity of
predators also depends on the abundance of
their prey, as well as that of their competitors
(Cury et al. 2011).
All this has consequences when it comes to
the management of mixed fisheries through
single-species TACs. Mike Sissenwine, Pamela
Mace, and Hans Lassen have summarized this
in a very important paper (Sissenwine et al.
2014):
In light of scientific uncertainty, natural variability
in fish stock productivity (e.g. recruitment variabil-
ity), ecosystem dynamics (species interactions that
prevent all stocks from achieving MSY simultane-
ously), and the technological constraints in mixed
fisheries that prevent optimal management of
individual stocks, it seems unlikely that the amount
of overfishing will ever be zero. What research and
management costs and cumulative foregone yields are
necessary to approach perfection (zero cases of over-
fishing and overfished stocks)? (Emphasis added)
The implications of this fact are very clear:
the only way to achieve the objective enunci-
ated in Article 2.2 of Regulation 1380/2013 is to
accept “cumulative foregone yields” for a num-
ber of stocks. In other words, the only way to
achieve MSY in all stocks is in fact to fish at
less than MSY for a number, perhaps many of
the stocks concerned, and thus failing to achieve
the objective of Article 39 TFEU to maximize the
production of sustainable seafood.
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
Rindorf et al. (2017) make the case for policy
objectives that are more broadly defined with
fisheries and ecological considerations:
Management is more likely to meet policy objec-
tives if it incorporates fishery and ecological inter-
actions than would be the case if advice is just given
from a single species perspective.
This clearly points to a more flexible way in
evaluating the success or failure of the policy.
In other words, the simple statistics on the
percentages of individual stocks being overex-
ploited or not is too a simplistic way to report
and evaluate policy progress. A more flexible
and multi-faceted reporting is necessary.
Different Member States’ expectations
It is also important to bear in mind that, over
and beyond such Article 39 objectives, the real-
ity of fisheries management in Europe is that
different Member States have different expec-
tations and objectives. While certain Member
States want their industry to be self-sufficient
economically and manage it like any other
economic sector, including free market mecha-
nisms, other Member States have self-declared
social objectives that are best achieved through
social engineering management, away from
market mechanisms.
The latter is typical of Member States where
the fisheries sector is a frequent source of
political contestation. In this case, the idea of
MSW (“minimum sustainable whinge”) has
been described as the way many governments
handle fisheries management: to achieve a min-
imum level of complaining by the stakeholders
(Pope 1983).
Clearly, the notion of policy success or failure
is viewed very differently in different Member
States, and even among different regions within
Member States. That only underscores the need
to have a definition of “policy success” that goes
far beyond the achievement of the operational
objectives of Fmsy in 2020.
Policy results: how good are they?
On the basis of the above, how can we judge
the results of the CFP in recent years? These
13
results are evaluated by the Commission in at
least two ways:
• Since 2006, the annual “policy statement”
(more recently called “Communication on
fishing opportunities”) has summarized
the status of fish stocks in Europe. Initially
restricted to stock status, the annual docu-
ment has been gradually extended to other
policy questions, and in recent years has
gradually become a more integrated eval-
uation of policy results in an increasingly
wide range of policy outcomes. This report is
traditionally based on independent scientific
evaluations and this provides it with an
important credibility. The 2018 Communi-
cation on fishing opportunities (EU 2018a)
represents the best example of this trend.
• Every 10 years, the policy is also evaluated
in the documents presented by the Commis-
sion as justification for the next round of pol-
icy reform. This kind of evaluation is more
a political one, and is entirely done by the
Commission itself.
I will base the evaluation of the policy on
the above communication on fishing oppor-
tunities and, in particular, its technical annex
(EU 2018b), because this is the most recent and
updated analysis of policy delivery. In doing
so, I will refer to the different objectives of the
policy in Article 39 TFEU to discuss how much
such objectives are being met in practice.
Status of stocks
Though not spelled out in Article 39 TFEU, it is
obvious that the status of fish stocks is an essen-
tial measure of the success of the policy, notably
because the objectives of Article 39 can only be
reached if fish stocks are healthy and highly pro-
ductive.
Since the objectives of the policy are
expressed in fishing mortality, the best indicator
of stock status is the ration between the fishing
mortality exerted on the stocks and the target
fishing mortality established by the policy: Fmsy .
Figure 1.2 shows these ratios for different areas
where EU fisheries take place.
Are these good results? In the Mediterranean,
clearly not, in particular because there is not
14 Chapter 1
2
F/FMSY
Indicator
1
MED&BS: EU waters
NEA: EU waters
NEA: outside EU waters
2003 2006
Figure 1.2 Ratio between current fishing mortality and target fishing mortality in EU fisheries. Source:
Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2018) 329. Brussels, 11.6.2018.
even a positive trend. It is not just a matter of
getting there on time, or completely: in this
basin, the trend is not even positive. There is no
possible way around it: the conservation policy
in the Mediterranean is a complete failure.
However, the results in the Atlantic are posi-
tive: the trend goes clearly in the direction of
achieving fisheries at Fmsy on average. One can
discuss if the trend is too slow, if the objective to
have all stocks at Fmsy by 2020 will be achieved.
We have seen above the difficulties in achiev-
ing perfection. In this context, the conservation
policy in the Atlantic and outside can certainly
be seen more as a success than a failure.
Concerning the attainment of the expectation
of biomass rebuilding “above Bmsy ” Figure 1.3
shows the evolution over time of total biomass
of EU stocks.
Again, the Atlantic shows a positive trend
whereas such a trend cannot be observed on
Mediterranean stocks. Given that achieving
biomass objectives is much more elusive than
achieving fishing mortality objectives (as we
will see in Chapter 3) the policy in the Atlantic
can be considered a reasonable success. In
the Mediterranean, again, we must talk about
policy failure.
The scientific world has also looked at
this question. A large study conducted by
2012 2016
Marchal (2016), comparing the CFP with
the fisheries policy of Iceland, Australia and
New Zealand, widely considered to be among
the most advanced in the world of fisheries
management, concluded that:
The situation of EU fisheries has substantially
improved over the period 2004-2013 in the North
East Atlantic, with fishery status getting close to
that of other jurisdictions, but the lack of recov-
ery for the Mediterranean fish stocks remains a
concern.
With the obvious exception of Mediterranean
fisheries, the results of the CFP particularly over
the last two decades, is in this sense a reasonable
success.
Fisheries productivity
The above figures show a first result: fish abun-
dance is increasing – in the Atlantic. However,
if we talk about productivity in the sense of
Article 39 TFEU we must refer not only to the
amount of fish at sea, but rather at how much
fish is actually being landed, sustainably. An
increase in fish abundance at sea accompanied
by a lower rate of exploitation of that fish is not
an increase in productivity in that context.
We will see in Chapter 13 that the CFP
is not increasing the production of seafood.
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
2.0
1.5
B/B2003
1.0
Indicator
0.5 Biomass in MED&BS
Biomass in NEA
0.0
2003 2006
Figure 1.3 Evolution over time of total biomass of exploited fish stocks in EU waters, comparing the
Mediterranean and Black Sea (MED&BS) with the North East Atlantic (NEA). Source: Commission Staff
Working Document SWD (2018) 329. Brussels, 11.6.2018.
Figure 13.2 in Chapter 13 shows that the total
landings from EU capture fisheries does not
show a very clear upward trend despite the
general increase in stock abundance since 2006
as shown in Figure 1.3. Only as of 2012 there
seems to be a certain tendency to an increased
in overall yields. This has to be looked at
in connection with the rate of consumption
of available quotas which, as we will see in
Chapter 2, varies around 75%, which means
that the policy results in roughly a quarter of all
fishing possibilities not being used, something
that cannot be considered satisfactory in a
policy that is meant to promote food security.
As for aquaculture, total EU production
remains stagnant since the turn of the century
(see Figure 13.2 in Chapter 13), despite many
initiatives and important investment of public
funds. Overall, the objective of increasing pro-
ductivity is not (yet) achieved. This constitutes
an important challenge that is discussed in
Chapter 13.
Optimum utilization of the factors
of production, in particular labor
The number of jobs on board European ves-
sels has been diminishing since the inception
15
2012 2016
in the policy. Even in recent years, despite
improvements in stock status, the total number
of employed fishermen has fallen from 140 000
in 2008 to 125 000 in 2017 (Figure 1.4). This is
often referred to as a failure of the CFP (even
though the socio-economic model to fish EU
resources remains a national decision) and the
EU itself is often criticized (and blamed) for it.
But is this fair? Let’s look at this from another
angle, beyond numbers.
Actually, the fishing industry suffers the
same phenomenon than any other established
industry: the increases in productivity due to
the introduction of new technologies inevitably
reduces the labor necessary to produce a given
product. As technical improvement takes place,
the same amount of fish can be caught with
fewer vessels and these vessels can be crewed by
fewer workers. The reduction of employment
in the fisheries sector, from that perspective,
is the inevitable result of technical progress,
like in any other established industry, and not
necessarily an indication of failure.
In addition, the reduction of employment
is also an imperative of the improvement of
habitability and working conditions on board
fishing vessels. This author is familiar with
16 Chapter 1
160
140
employment (thousand)
120
100
80
60
40
20
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Total employed
Figure 1.4 Evolution of number of jobs at sea and average wages in the EU fishing fleet. Source: The 2017
Annual Economic Report on the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 17-12). European Commission. JRC Science for Policy
Report. Edited by Natacha Carvalho, Michael Keatinge and Jordi Guillen.
fishing vessels of around 400 GT accommo-
dating, in the 1970s, 15 or 16 crewmen, all
crammed in tiny cabins and without a shower.
When one considers the reduction of jobs at sea
as a “policy failure” one must look instead at
what this reduction also represents: a substan-
tial improvement in habitability and working
conditions for European fishermen.
The reduction of employment in the fishing
sector is strongly resented in many fishing areas
of the EU, and often blamed on the failure of
the CFP to preserve employment. However, the
most successful countries in the world in terms
of management (often presented as the model
the EU should follow) have been losing jobs
at sea in recent decades, as a result of greater
automation and increased fishing power of
modern vessels.
In Iceland, the official Government’s website3
indicates that:
The highest number of people working in the fish-
ing industry was in the 1980s about 16 thousand
employees. After that the number of people has
declined constantly to the current level of about
eight thousand.
This reduction, however, corresponds also to
an increase in the average levels of salaries by
3 www.government.is/fisheries/
30
average wage (EUR per FTE)
25
20
15
10
5
FTE Average wage per FTE
fishermen. This shows the trends toward fewer
but better jobs.
In Norway, the number of jobs has been
steadily decreasing for many years. According
to FAO, full-time employment in the catching
sector decreased from 17 087 in 1996 to 13 260
in 2003 (FAO 2016).
These two examples, coming from countries
generally acknowledged as successful examples
of preserving a thriving and competitive catch-
ing sector, illustrate the point that the reduction
of jobs at sea is not necessarily a sign of pol-
icy failure, but rather an inevitable tendency in
modernizing fisheries.
In this context, the data of Figure 1.4 show a
very gradual reduction of employment, accom-
panied by a certain increase in average wages,
an evolution that can be considered generally
positive. This picture is variable regionally, with
positive trends in the Atlantic and more stable in
the Mediterranean, but its shows that in terms
of employment, the CFP can claim reasonably
good results, particularly in recent years, coin-
ciding with the positive trend in the status of
(Atlantic) stocks.
Standard of living of producers
In recent years, the profitability levels of EU
fisheries have improved substantially. This has
translated in some cases in improved wage
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
Revenue and profits
2 193%
1.8
1.6
1.4 129%
124% 123%
1.2 107%
100%
1 110%
104% 105% 104%
0.8
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Revenue Gross Value Added
Figure 1.5 Evolution of the level of revenue and profits in EU fishing fleets. Source: Commission Staff Working
Document SWD (2018) 329. Brussels, 11.6.2018.
levels; In some cases, however, there is a
trend toward higher profitability but not better
salaries: the substantial increase in foreign
crews in many EU Member States (in some
cases with very low salary levels) indicates
a reverse trend: that of higher profitability
through lower wages. As a result, there is a
trend toward higher wage levels (Figure 1.4)
but this is much less clear than the increase in
profitability levels (Figure 1.5).
By region, the Atlantic is doing better than
the Mediterranean. Not surprisingly, the pos-
itive trend in the status of fish stocks in
the Atlantic area results in generally higher
profits and better wages, while in the Mediter-
ranean, the lack of progress on stock status
(see Chapter 5) translates in profitability and
wage levels that are also generally stagnant
(EU 2018c).
In fact, these profitability levels have been
achieved at a constant level of revenue, which
implies the improvement corresponds to gains
in productivity, and this in some cases may be
based on lower wage levels in certain fleet seg-
ments. This shows a picture that raises mixed
feelings. Profitability levels are on the rise, but
these do not always translate into better wages.
Another element that must be also evalu-
ated as part of the standard of living is the
17
179% 176%
151% 152%
142%
134% 136%
125%
123%
120%
107%
113% 110% 112%
106% 106%
101%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Gross profit
question of working conditions and safety on
board. Although these are rather elusive to
report quantitatively, anyone involved with
the fishing sector will agree with the dramatic
improvement that has taken place in safety lev-
els and working conditions on board European
fishing vessels, at least in those fleets that have
been renovated (up until 2004, with EU public
aid). These improvements, difficult though it
may be in quantitative terms, is without doubt
one of the biggest successes of the CFP.
Stability of markets and availability
of supplies at reasonable prices
The CFP is not able to supply the consumption
levels of fisheries and aquaculture products
in the EU. While fish production in the EU
amounts to 5.88 million tonnes, 1.9 million
tonnes are exported, while 8.68 million tonnes
have to be imported to account for a total
supply of 14.56 million tonnes, corresponding
to an apparent consumption of 12.77 million
tonnes (EU 2017). That means that the CFP
supplies only 46% of the total consumption of
fisheries and aquaculture products by European
consumers. And this self-sufficiency is not only
low: it is also decreasing.
This hardly looks as a policy success.
However, considering the size of the European
18 Chapter 1
fishing grounds as compared with Europe’s
population, even the most successful CFP could
not, in all likelihood, cover 100% of the con-
sumption of these products. So in any case it is
a mitigated failure: even with increased produc-
tivity of the wild stocks and higher aquaculture
production, it is difficult to see how the EU
could one day become entirely self-sufficient.
The 46% figure represents a partial failure, not
a complete one. And it can be attributed to
several factors:
• The inability on obtaining the maximum
sustainable production from the wild fish
resources, for a number of reasons that will
be examined in Chapter 2.
• The sluggish development of aquaculture
production, practically stagnant from the
beginning of the century.
• The consumption patterns of European con-
sumers, who tend to dismiss low value fish
and demand high-end quality products that
the EU waters have in limited supply.
The two first questions are an indication of
relative policy failure.
Other questions: integration
of environmental concerns
As we will see in the next chapter, the inte-
gration of environmental concerns is also an
objective of the policy, according to Article 11
TFEU. In general terms, this integration has
gone a long way, and includes the EC Natura
2000 areas in European seas, the prohibition
to catch a number of protected species, rules
for the protection of marine mammals and
seabirds and so on. Although this is and will
always be a matter for discussion, one can
safely assume that Article 11 TFEU is being
reasonably well-implemented in the CFP. We
will look at this in more detail in Chapter 8.
Is this good enough?
With all the above caveats, the CFP can be con-
sidered as a policy that at least in the Atlantic
and Baltic area, is slowly achieving its main
objectives and gradually delivering most of the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU. Though certainly
not a resounding success, it is certainly not
the kind of failed policy that is presented by
a number of stakeholders, and even scholars
(Khalilan et al. 2010).
Overall, the results of the policy are moder-
ately positive. And even the poor results (in
biological and economic terms) of the Mediter-
ranean fisheries do not seem to trigger a strong
appetite for change: the preservation of the
social fabric of coastal areas, even at the cost of
low productivity and low profitability, seems to
be stronger than the drive for change.
Overall, the results of the CFP are moderately
positive, particularly in recent years. For this
reason, there is no justification for dramatic
evaluations of the CFP as a complete failure.
Even if not all objectives are achieved, and their
achievement may not be complete and still
take time, the policy is on the right track. And
where it is not (the Mediterranean) this can
be clearly related to the relative absence until
recent times of a real policy to manage fishery
resources. The CFP is actually better than it has
traditionally been given credit for.
Improving reporting of policy
performance
As indicated above, the evaluation of the CFP as
a success or as a failure also depends largely on
what we look at, and this in turn is a result of
what we report about. It is important to under-
line that in most fisheries policies around the
world, while the objectives are socio-economic
as well as biological, the reporting on policy
performance has been almost exclusively bio-
logical. The CFP has also suffered from this for
a long time. This is why it is so important that
the reporting on policy performance actually
includes all the relevant questions that consti-
tute the various policy objectives, and not just
the status of fish stocks.
The current reporting
Policy progress toward MSY must be reported
regularly by the Commission, as required by
Article 50 of Regulation 1380/2013:
The Commission shall report annually to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on the progress
on achieving maximum sustainable yields and on
the situation of fish stocks . . .
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
In addition, reporting is also due on the
implementation of the landing obligation. So
far, the Commission has reported on policy
progress by showing statistics of the num-
ber of stocks that are fished at Fmsy level, as
this is the operational objective of the new
CFP (EU 2018a,b). Indeed, the new reporting
requirement of the reformed CFP continues
the tendency of the dichotomy between “socio-
economic objectives but biological delivery.”
This makes the exercise very simple and
objective (under the condition that the eval-
uation be done by independent scientists).
However, it carries a risk: as the objective
applies to all stocks, a pure statistical analy-
sis can present a reasonably good result as a
policy failure. For example, if by 2020 all the
important stocks are within Fmsy but a few sec-
ondary ones are not, this could be considered,
particularly in historical terms, as an important
achievement. Yet, the pure statistical analysis
showing that the proportion of stocks at Fmsy
is not 100% would appear as a failure, and
calls for more dramatic management measures.
In addition, the current reporting referring
only to MSY achievement would ignore some
of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU, notably
those on providing European consumers with
abundant affordable fish, or that of ensuring a
high standard of living to the producers.
A more complex question is that related to
the aspiration of achieving Bmsy levels as a result
of the Fmsy -based policy objectives. Mixing Fmsy
levels and Bmsy levels may be confusing, giv-
ing the impression that whenever Fmsy levels
have been achieved but Bmsy levels are still not
reached, then the policy may be inadequate.
The solution devised by the Commission is to
ask ICES to report on general levels of biomass,
as a result of the management of the stock con-
cerned, but also as a result of any other eco-
logical factor influencing biomass levels. In this
way, the evaluation of biomass would not be
a duplicate reporting on how individual stocks
respond to management, but rather a more gen-
eral evaluation of how the ecosystem is reacting
to management, together with other relevant
factors. This approach should show, in the years
19
to come, a picture of the ecosystem response to
the management of the individual stocks, and
cast more light as to whether the maximum lev-
els in biomass for all the stocks can be reached
all at once.
A positive evolution: the 2018 policy
statement
The Commission has identified the above
problem and, in recent years, the annual
communication on fishing opportunities is
gradually including a wider scope of policy
outcomes, beyond the simple delivery of MSY
by individual stocks. The last of these reports
(EU 2018a,b) includes, in addition to reporting
on stock status, the results of the policy in
socio-economic terms, thus making reporting
increasingly corresponding to the wide scope of
objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
Although this is just a preliminary step, it
is a very important one in that it is a turning
point in the traditional reporting about the
CFP: it introduces reporting on the evolution of
socio-economic and ecological parameters that
match much better the multi-objective nature
of the policy.
The US example: The Fish Stock
Sustainability Index
In the US, the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) measures the
performance of U.S. federal fisheries through
the Fish Stock Sustainability Index (FSSI). First
implemented in 2005, the FSSI is a quarterly
index that currently includes 199 fish stocks
selected because of their importance to com-
mercial and recreational fisheries. The FSSI
measures the performance of these important
fish stocks, which represent 85% of total catch.
The FSSI increases when NOAA Fisheries
determines the status of a stock and when a
stock’s status improves (either no longer subject
to overfishing, no longer overfished, biomass
increases to at least 80% of target, or is rebuilt).
The number of stocks in the index may be
revised as new fisheries develop and stocks are
assessed.
The US system is equivalent to the one estab-
lished in the EU since 2006 as explained above,
20 Chapter 1

in that it puts together regularly the statistics
corresponding to the status of the stocks regu-
lated according to their biological status.
However, the index does not refer to any of
the other objectives or considerations included
in the objectives of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act. In particular, under the US 10 national stan-
dards (see Chapter 2 “Policy objectives in other
countries; The United States”), the first one
being to “Achieve optimum yield and prevent
overfishing” the index is clear in expressing
the level of overfishing, but does not indicate
if the stocks concerned are exploited at their
“optimum yield”. In fact, as we will see below,
the extremely positive picture shown by this
index (see Figure 1.6) must be compounded
with the significant level of under-exploitation
of a number of these stocks (see Chapter 2 “the
US case”), for which it is debatable whether
they are exploited at “optimum yield” levels.
A final comment on this index: it reflects net
results, not the process leading up to them. The
difference between “over-exploiting” (F > Fmsy )
and “over-exploited” (B > 0.5Bmsy ) would allow
the establishment of a difference between the
stocks that are no longer overexploited and
those that are on the right track (at fishing
mortality levels) but that are not yet at the
biomass level. This differentiation is perhaps
secondary in the US because of the absence of a
clear-cut time limit for reaching the objectives,
but the idea could be useful for Europe, as we
will see below.
Possible future improvements in reporting
on the CFP
The reporting under Article 50 of Regulation
1380/2013 must be done seriously and carefully
every year. This reporting is currently being
done by STECF. This is a guarantee of objectiv-
ity and independence. Although the reporting
is done under a Commission Communication,
therefore a document under its own respon-
sibility, its credibility requires that the data on
MSY and discard levels be prepared by inde-
pendent scientists without political meddling.
While it is obvious that the reporting required
under Article 50 of Regulation 1380/2013
should continue, the question is whether, in
the light of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU, it
would not also be important to report on the
achievement of the other objectives of such
article of the Treaty. The idea could be to refer
to the biological status of the stocks, as ever
before, but to add considerations on the level
of achievements of the different objectives of
Article 39 TFEU, to underline that the ultimate
objective of the management of fish stocks is to
achieve all such goals.

800 758
750 1,000 (Total Possible Score)
700
650
FSSI Score

600
550
500
450
400
350 382.5
300
20

20

20

20

20

20
00

03

06

09

12

15

Year
Figure 1.6 Evolution over time of the United States’ Fish Stock Sustainability Index (FSSI) between 2000 and
2015. Source: NOAA (www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/fisheries_eco/status_of_fisheries/fssi.html).
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
In any case, the policy changes introduced by
Brexit will also inevitably change the reporting
about CFP performance: since many more
decisions will have to be taken in the con-
text of bilateral or trilateral (with Norway)
negotiations, it will become more difficult to
attribute credit or blame to any particular party
in explaining policy outcomes.
Hilborn (2018) provides an example of how
reporting on stock status can be made more
complete by referring not only to the num-
ber of stocks fished at or beyond Fmsy levels,
but also on how much yield is being lost as
a consequence of suboptimal abundance and
fishing pressure. Thus conveying more useful
information on the management system is
maximizing long-term sustainable yield, and
not just eliminating overfished stocks. In the
CFP, some ideas for improved reporting are
presented below.
A more meaningful reporting on stock
status
Current reporting on stock status is basically
a statistical exercise on the number and per-
centage of stocks that are on target. Yet, this
statistical exercise may have relatively little
meaning, both ecologically and economi-
cally. For example, if from one year to the
next two very small stocks with low eco-
nomic value reach their Fmsy objective, but
one very large (and economically valuable)
stock is fished at higher than Fmsy , the annual
statistics would look good: one more stock
at Fmsy level!
Yet, economically this can be negative, even
ecologically negative if the large stock has a cru-
cial role in the marine ecosystem concerned. It
is therefore important to find more meaning-
ful ways of reporting on the state of the stocks.
Some ideas can be:
• To report on the total biomass of the stocks
fished at Fmsy as compared to the rest.
• To report on the total market price of stocks
fished at Fmsy as compared to the rest.
With these two relatively simple indicators,
the state of the stocks can be at an ecologically
and economically more meaningful way.
21
The traditional reporting on biological objec-
tives could be more nuanced with the following
ideas:
• Overall evolution of the biomass of the
species under management, as a better
ecological indicator of the evolution of the
ecosystem. The evolution to the biomass
of individual stocks “above Bmsy ” would be
better understood in that context.
• The evolution of the F levels. Even if certain
stocks do not achieve the Fmsy target by 2020
in some cases, the evolution of F values
would show whether the F values are at
least being reduced, in other words if, for
the stocks where the target is not reached, at
least the F reduction is on track.
• In the Mediterranean, the choice of fewer,
more representative stocks should be made
to ensure that annual reporting really reflects
an evolution in comparable terms that would
allow progress to be detected.
In any case, strong emphasis should be made
on the trends. Beyond annual ups and downs,
it is the trends toward achieving the objectives
which matter most.
Socio-economic results
As we saw, Article 39 TFEU establishes clear
socio-economic objectives, however, the report-
ing on policy progress never included these.
This new reporting could include:
• A summary of the value of all the landings
of all species confounded, as an indicator of
the total revenue generated by the sustain-
able exploitation of the stocks and a summary
of average income of fishermen in different
fleet segments across Europe, as an indication
of the evolution of the standard of living of
the producers.
• A description of the trends in the average
prices of fish, to evaluate whether the CFP
is providing for affordable fish for European
consumers, taking account as much as possi-
ble the effects of imports, to the extent that
such effects can be evaluated.
• A description of the trends observed in salary
levels and other indications of working con-
ditions, to complement the data on number
22 Chapter 1
of workers with the evaluation of the quality
of the employment of these workers.
• An overall reporting on the total amount of
seafood produced by the CFP, not only in cap-
ture fisheries, but perhaps also through aqua-
culture, as a result of the EU policy to favor
this development since the beginning of the
structural policy.
This kind of reporting would indicate to what
extent the CFP is making progress to deliver one
of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
Environmental results
Beyond Article 39, the CFP must also contribute
to larger environmental objectives. These could
also be subject to regular reporting. This report-
ing would include:
• A summary of all fish abundance in the fish-
ing grounds, as an indicator of the potential
biomass, for all stocks confounded, that can
be extracted by fishing. This would com-
plement the information corresponding to
individual stocks with an evaluation of the
status of the marine ecosystem and its carry-
ing capacity. In this context, the reporting on
the achievement of levels of stock abundance
at levels “above Bmsy ” would be much better
understood.
• A summary of a simple indicator of marine
biodiversity. Such an indicator (see Chapter 8,
in the section “The effects of fishing on the
environment”) would illustrate how the
fishing activity is affecting biodiversity levels
in EU waters. To the extent possible, this
reporting should put the evolution of bio-
diversity into perspective, evaluating the
different causes for biodiversity loss (or gain)
including other human activity. This could
also include an evaluation of the evolu-
tion of the “mean trophic level” that has
been proposed to measure the alteration of
marine food webs by fishing (see Chapter 8,
under “Preserving marine biodiversity”).
This would make it transparent if the CFP
is really producing a “fishing down the food
web” effect.
• In that vein, progress in protecting areas of
high biodiversity in European waters could
be added. This would be important to judge
overall progress on biodiversity: in theory
there could be a certain loss of biodiversity
in heavily fished areas but that could be
compensated by a higher proportion of areas
protected from fishing as part of the Natura
2000 network.
This reporting would shed objective light on
the question of the real contribution of fishing
activity in relation to biodiversity conservation.
Results on the achievement of high,
sustainable supply of food
Since Article 39 TFEU is basically an article
about food security and, whatever the chang-
ing circumstances, the article has never been
changed by the European lawmakers, the
reporting could also refer to the way in which
the CFP contributes to food security in Europe.
This would include, for example:
• A summary of all catches taken from the
stocks, as a general indicator of the amount
of protein being produced; and an indication
of the percentage that such catches represent
as compared with the total biomass. In other
words, what percentage of the biomass are
we exploiting?
• A description of the sources of any mismatch
between the maximum potential yield and
the realized yield; the relative contribution
of over-exploitation and under-exploitation
of resources as a source of inefficiency in
fully exploiting the biological potential of the
European fish resources.
The above ideas would provide the reporting
on the status of European fisheries with a much
wider scope of considerations and elements of
analysis to evaluate the extent at which the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU are being achieved
by the CFP.
If the CFP is not so bad, why
advocating policy change?
This would seem to be contradictory: the strong
advocacy of policy change in these pages does
not seem to correspond to an evaluation of
policy performance that we can summarize
at least as “not so bad” and certainly better
 The common fisheries policy: stability or change?
than is usually given credit for. Why should we
introduce further changes in the policy then?
The reasons for change are three-fold:
• Even if “not so bad”, the policy has the
potential to be much better in many regards,
and the policy should aspire to be much bet-
ter than just “not so bad.” There is plenty of
opportunity for improvement in many areas
so there is no reason for self-complacency
with the moderate achievements.
• The new policy targets established in the
2013 reform will in some cases be very
difficult to achieve. Even if the best efforts
are made to that effect, the results are likely
to be disappointing, and this requires these
policy objectives to be revised in the light of
the ongoing experience to evaluate whether
they are achievable in the first place, and at
what cost.
• The policy has to face a number of challenges
that may seriously question the positive
trends observed in recent years. Even policy
strands that work relatively well today will
be under pressure from other factors, such
as climate change and other global trends.
The policy can never assume that what has
worked in recent years will necessarily con-
tinue to do so under the new context that is
unfolding.
It is essential that the relatively positive
view of policy performance does not lead to
self-indulgence: there is absolutely no reason
to relax; recent trends can be reversed and
new challenges may seriously question the
achievement of policy objectives. It is for these
reasons that a policy that is, arguably, not so
bad, should never rest on its moderate laurels,
and always be ready for improvement.
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CHAPTER 2
The objectives of the CFP
Introduction
The first fundamental element for a success-
ful fisheries policy is to have clear objectives.
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has for a
long time lacked clear operational and fishery-
specific objectives. The general policy objectives
enunciated in the treaties are an extension
those of the Common Agricultural Policy and
are not sufficiently specific for fisheries man-
agement, resulting in decisions that all too often
have been the result of short-term considera-
tions or pure political negotiations, rather than
the outcome of an objective pursuit of clearly
defined goals.
The 2002 reform introduced the objective
of achieving “ecological, economic, and social
sustainability” (EU 2002), as a way to translate
the objectives of the Common Agricultural Pol-
icy in the Treaty into the management of wild,
exhaustible resources. This was an improve-
ment, but still did not provide a clear target for
the management of fish stocks, and did not
establish a deadline to achieve such a tar-
get either.
Thus, the problem largely remained, and
after 2002 many management decisions were
still taken on short-term, political considera-
tions. This was referred to by the Commission
itself as one of the five structural deficiencies of
the policy in the context of its diagnostic prior
to the last reform (EU 2009a).
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The 2013 reform adopted for the first time
a clear objective for fisheries management:
achieving maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
for all regulated stocks by 2020. This was a
breakthrough, in that it provided for the first
time a measurable objective as well as a time
limit to achieve it.
However, this breakthrough does not resolve
all the problems. The scientific literature is
already referring to this: the principles are
promising, but the specific implementation is
not necessarily always conducive to smooth
implementation. For example, certain authors
indicate that although the mentioned reform
elements are in general very promising, their
concrete design does not always meet existing
expectations (Salomon et al. 2014).
In particular, the notion of MSY is one that
can be implemented in many different ways:
expressed in biomass or fishing mortality, used
as a limit or a target and so on. Some of these
questions were addressed in the trilogue to adopt
the new regulation, but others were not. So
even under the much clearer policy objectives
there is still ample room for interpretation, and
this has implications also on the consideration
of policy implementation as a success or a
failure.
Such discussion can have very far-reaching
consequences on the way the new CFP is
implemented, with implications on the amount
of fishing possibilities and their conditions
25
26 Chapter 2
for exploitation that can affect fishermen’s
livelihoods. In the context of these discussions,
many different interpretations could be taken
and they could indeed be all legitimate.
Some of these interpretations find inspiration
in the experience of other countries having
encountered similar issues before. There has
been a recent trend to compare the performance
of the CFP with that of the fisheries policy of
countries such as the US, Norway, or New
Zealand. These comparisons have underlined
the greater success of these policies to reduce
overfishing as compared to the CFP. On that
basis, certain stakeholders such as environmen-
tal Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
often suggest that the CFP should seek inspi-
ration in the policies of these third countries.
However, while recognizing the value of these
experiences, Europe has to find its own way
to interpret and implement these provisions,
and in that sense, there is no better source
of inspiration than Article 39 Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
The common fisheries policy
in the Treaty
Fisheries policy: a multi-objective
policy
As we will see below, fisheries management is
in general a multi-objective policy around the
world, and the CFP is no exception. Although
most fisheries management systems across the
world often focus on delivering pre-determined
biological targets, these are practically never the
only declared objective of the policy.
This implies that fisheries management must
evaluate the trade-offs across different and
often conflicting ways in which people value
and use the marine resources (Halpern et al.
2012; Longo et al. 2015). Different models of
fishery management provide different solutions
to this problem.
The objectives in Article 39 of the
Treaty
The objectives of the CFP in the Treaty are the
same established for the Common Agricultural
Policy originally in the Treaty of Rome. These
objectives apply mutatis mutandis to the CFP, as
laid down in Article 39 TFEU.
Article 39 TFEU reads as follows:
1 The objectives of the common agricultural policy
shall be:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by pro-
moting technical progress and by ensuring
the rational development of agricultural pro-
duction and the optimum utilization of the
factors of production, in particular labor;
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for
the agricultural community, in particular by
increasing the individual earnings of persons
engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilize markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies;
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at
reasonable prices.
2 In working out the common agricultural policy
and the special methods for its application,
account shall be taken of:
(a) the particular nature of agricultural activity,
which results from the social structure of
agriculture and from structural and natural
disparities between the various agricultural
regions;
(b) the need to effect the appropriate adjust-
ments by degrees;
(c) the fact that in the Member States agricul-
ture constitutes a sector closely linked with
the economy as a whole.
These objectives reflect the need in 1958 to
ensure that EU policy would provide for food
security in Europe. The fact that the Treaty of
Lisbon in 2009 did not change these objectives
at all can only be interpreted as meaning that
agriculture (and by extension fisheries) con-
tinue to be policies to ensure Europe’s food
security. In subsequent Treaties after 1958
other horizontal considerations were added,
such as the need to ensure compatibility with
environmental policy, but the main thrust of
the agricultural/fisheries policy has remained
unchanged and clearly focused on ensur-
ing the provision of a steady supply of food
for Europeans as well as adequate economic
standards for producers.
If the objectives of the new CFP as defined
in Regulation 1380/2013 need to be considered
against the background of Article 39 TFEU,

the question is then to determine what of
the different interpretations of that regulation
contributes better to the achievement of the
objectives in the Treaty.
The different objectives of Article 39 can be
best achieved in a situation characterized by
an abundant, steady supply of fish and by a
well-functioning market:
• The increase in productivity requires that
resources be brought to the level where they
can produce high yields on a stable basis.
• The high standard of living for producers
require that there is a good balance between
the number of fishermen and their means of
production and the natural resources they
exploit.
• The stability of markets requires profes-
sional organizations that control supply and
demand.
• To assure the availability of supplies (these
being highly fluctuating natural resources)
requires managing these resources at a point
at which their biological variability is reduced
as much as possible.
• To ensure reasonable prices it is necessary to
have a well-functioning open market avoid-
ing monopolies.
From the above one can suggest that bringing
resources to levels around maximum sustain-
able yield and exploiting them through efficient
market conditions are the best way to imple-
ment the objectives of Article 39.
It is also worth noting that paragraph 2(b)
states that the policy should establish its adjust-
ments by degrees. This is a very important
element for the CFP. Indeed, the new CFP has
incorporated this principle by enshrining the
long-term management plans as the centerpiece
of fisheries management, and also by establish-
ing phasing-in periods for the new objectives,
such as the landing obligation. But beyond
these cases this principle must be considered
also as a basis to try to avoid too dramatic
changes in fishing possibilities where possible:
although fishery resources are fluctuating by
nature, so that very stable catch quotas are an
illusion, the policy should try to develop all
possible mechanisms to ensure that the natural
The objectives of the CFP 27
fluctuations in fishery resources are smoothed
out as much as practicable.
It is important to bear this in mind because
the CFP of 2013, when it defined clear opera-
tional objectives and specific deadlines for the
first time, still left ample room for interpretation
on how these objectives should be implemented
in practice. This requires further guidance on
policy implementation.
When looking for such guidance as to how
the objectives must be implemented, it seems
clear that it is the text of Article 39 TFEU
that should be at the source. However, it is
frequent in the public debate to hear that the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU for fisheries are
old-fashioned, food security objectives for the
post-war European agriculture, and that they
are out of tune with today’s principles on the
management of fishery resources, with other
countries having much better fishery objectives.
Is this the case? We will examine below the
fundamental principles that inspire the fisheries
legislation of third countries often cited as a
possible model for the EU.
Other legal principles applicable
to the CFP
Although Article 39 TFEU constitutes the legal
basis for the CFP, this basis is not isolated: many
other principles apply.
Integration of environmental concerns
An obvious example is that of the applica-
tion of environmental objectives, laid down in
Article 11 TFEU:
Environmental protection requirements must be
integrated into the definition and implementation
of Community policies, in particular with a view
to promoting sustainable development.
It is to be noted the emphasis of this provision
is on the “promotion of sustainable develop-
ment,” showing that the intention of the
legislator was not to view environmental pro-
tection as a good in itself, but rather to promote
development in a way that will ensure sus-
tainability. The nuance is important, because it
means that when environmental protection will
28 Chapter 2
conflict with other policy areas, the objective of
the Treaty is certainly not to prevent develop-
ment, but rather to ensure it is sustainable.
The EU’s four freedoms and the internal
market
Beyond this most obvious case (because of
the frequent overlap between fisheries and
environmental policy) it is also important to
underline that all other principles applicable to
EU policies also apply to fisheries policy: there is
no exception to this. Principles such as the “four
freedoms” of the internal market are also of full
application to the fisheries policy. These free-
doms (free movement of people, goods, capital,
and services) constitute the backbone of the EU
internal market and, although their seamless
implementation is still not fully achieved, it
remains a key objective of EU policy, with a
potential overall gain of three trillion Euros,
according to a recent report (EU 2017).
The objective of the single market, in turn,
is to be conducive to increased competition,
increased specialization, larger economies of
scale, allowing factors of production to move
to the area where they are the most valued,
thus improving the efficiency of the allocation
of resources.1 This clearly points to economic
dynamism, not to the preservation of the status
quo that so often has characterized the CFP.
All this means that, when looking at the
performance of the CFP as an EU policy, one
must, for sure, look at the way in which the
biological resources are preserved, at how
the marine ecosystem is protected, but also
whether the four freedoms of the single market
are fully achieved, even more so in a policy
which is among the few exclusive competences
of the EU. This is, however, a question that is
rarely looked at in the context of mainstream
discussion and debates on fisheries policy.
The principle of proportionality
It is also relevant to refer to the principle of pro-
portionality. Under this principle, the action of
the EU must be limited to what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Treaties. In other
1 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en/
words, the content and form of the action must
be in keeping with the aim pursued. The princi-
ple of proportionality is laid down in Article 5 of
the Treaty on European Union. The criteria for
applying it are set out in the Protocol (No 2) on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality annexed to the Treaties.
This principle has implications for the CFP
too, in particular when dealing with very
marginal and secondary species, which may
have on occasion a disproportionate influence
on the policy despite their minor importance.
The example that comes to mind is that of some
“choke species” under the landing obligation
(see Chapter 6), that could stop a fishery with
plentiful quota thus producing disproportion-
ate effects on the overall delivery of policy
objectives.
The precautionary principle
The precautionary principle, enshrined in
Article 191 TFEU allows the EU to take precau-
tionary measures in cases of significant human
or environmental risks even if the scientific
basis available is uncertain. This principle is of
high relevance for the CFP, because the nature
of the scientific advice for fisheries management
is, by its own nature, highly uncertain.
The CFP has long suffered from what has
been called a “reverse precautionary princi-
ple”: many measures were not adopted because
the scientific evidence was not certain enough
(Penas Lado 2016). It is important to bear in
mind that the CFP is a policy that concerns
highly variable natural resources for which
the scientific evidence is and will always be
uncertain: the CFP must work on the basis
of uncertain science, and for this reason the
precautionary principle should always inspire
decision-making. Otherwise there is a clear
risk of decisions not being taken. This clearly
translates into the principle of basing decisions
on the best scientific advice available.
Policy objectives in other
countries
It is interesting to compare the objectives of
fisheries policy of the EU with those of certain

countries around the world. While the notion
of sustainability is a fundamental element of
all legislation, it is also true that this notion
is always accompanied by references to the
socio-economic benefits related to the full
exploitation of the resources available. Let’s
look at some examples.
The United States
The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) was first
adopted in 1976, just in advance of the decla-
ration of a 200-mi exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) in order to eliminate foreign fishing
and develop a sustainable US fishing industry.
Re-authorized twice (1996 and 2006) it consti-
tutes the basis for the entire US fishery man-
agement system. By the time these pages are
written, a third re-authorization is under way.2
The broad goal of sustainability is imple-
mented through the 10 national standards of
the MSA which provide direction for achieving
specific goals to:
1 Achieve optimum yield and prevent over-
fishing.
2 Require the use of the best available scien-
tific information.
3 Manage stocks as a unit.
4 Ensure that allocations are fair and equi-
table, promote conservation, and prevent
excessive shares.
5 Consider efficiency in utilization; not have
economic allocation as sole purpose.
6 Allow for variations and contingencies.
7 Minimize costs, avoid duplication.
8 Consider fishing communities to provide
for their sustained participation and to
minimize adverse economic impacts.
9 Minimize by-catch, and by-catch mortality.
10 Promote safety of human life at sea.
It should thus be noted that the policy has
multiple objectives, not only biological but also
social. It is also true that the way these objec-
tives are defined does not establish a hierarchy
among them, which means that, like in the CFP,
the management should seek a reasonable bal-
ance among them.
2 https://naturalresources.house.gov/
magnusonstevens/
The objectives of the CFP 29
These standards are further detailed through
guidelines. These provide a way to interpret
the standards, but in a very flexible way: these
guidelines constitute a basis on which the
proposals from the stakeholder bodies, the
Regional Fishery Management Councils, are
evaluated. At the same time, these guidelines
are updated from time to time to incorporate
the on-going experience and lessons learnt
from implementation and changes in policy
and priority.
This flexibility contrasts with the new CFP’s
rigidity in some of its objectives. While very
detailed and legally-binding provisions are use-
ful in certain contexts, excess rigidity can prove
poorly adapted to changing circumstances,
varied situations and emerging evidence on
implementation. The overall balance between
rigidity and flexibility is a crucial question to
ensure the success of a policy.
The MSA includes, in its Section 2 on “Find-
ings, purposes, and policy”:
to encourage the development by the United
States fishing industry of fisheries which are
currently underutilized or not utilized by United
States fishermen, including bottom fish off Alaska,
and to that end, to ensure that optimum yield
determinations promote such development in a
non-wasteful manner.
The emphasis on developing the industry to
fully utilize the resources available is notewor-
thy. As we will see below, the consequences of a
policy based on catch limitations on individual
stocks, combined with a discard policy, con-
tribute to a considerable extent to significant
under-exploitation of a number of US stocks.
However, the policy in general is considered a
success because it reduces overfishing. This is
an apparent contradiction, which shows that
even if the legal basis established long ago
indicates certain principles related to indus-
try development and social and economic
use of the resources, this has not prevented
the evolution of the policy toward a de facto
conservation-driven implementation.
In terms of level of ambition, the US policy
in 1996 required the recovery of fish stocks
30 Chapter 2
within 10 years with certain exceptions, while
the CFP, when it established its MSY objective,
considered a shorter period of six years, and no
exceptions. The US experience shows a positive
relationship between the implementation of
rebuilding plans and the recovery of biomass
for 44 stocks (Oremus et al. 2014). However,
as we will see below, this positive trend in
biomass was not necessarily accompanied by
higher yields. It is also true that some of these
stocks “recovered” as a result of updated and
improved information rather than changes
required in rebuilding plans.
On-going changes
At the time of writing, there is an on-going
re-authorization of the MSA. Interestingly, this
includes the challenge to balance conservation
and utilization of fish populations. In effect,
Bill H.R. 200, adopted by the US Congress on
July 11 2018, is named “Strengthening Fish-
ing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in
Fisheries Management Act.”3 Among other pro-
posals, the bill proposes the following changes:
• When specifying a time period for rebuilding
stocks, H.R. 200 would amend the current
section from “as short as possible” to “as
short as practicable.” H.R. 200 would replace
the 10-year rebuilding requirement with a
time frame that “may not exceed the time
the stock would be rebuilt without fishing
occurring plus one mean generation.”
• Bill H.R. 200 would add exceptions to stock
rebuilding requirements such as:
✓ the cause of stock depletion is outside the
jurisdiction of the Council or the rebuild-
ing program cannot be effective only by
limiting fishing activities;
✓ one or more components of a mixed-stock
fishery is depleted but cannot be rebuilt
within the specified time without signif-
icant economic harm to the fishery or
without causing another component to
approach a depleted status;
✓ management activities by another coun-
try under informal trans-boundary
3 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10267.pdf/
agreements hinder conservation and
management efforts by US fishermen; and
✓ the stock is affected by unusual events that
make rebuilding within the specified time
improbable without significant economic
harm to fishing communities.
• The bill also would replace the term over-
fished with depleted and would define
depleted as a decline in stock biomass,
regardless of its cause.
The above points are of extraordinary inter-
est, and show that the US policy is trying to
learn from the experience, while trying to
reduce the burden to the industry. The flexi-
bility in the recovery time of depleted stocks,
the introduction of elements of third country
influence in management and the increased
attention to mixed-fisheries aspects are a clear
indication that a policy focused so prominently
on eliminating overfishing in all individual
stocks may produce undesirable effects that
now must be corrected. A very important
lesson for the CFP.
Australia
The Fisheries Management Act of 1991 also sets
out our responsibilities in relation to the pursuit
of ecologically sustainable development. This
objective is a requirement to manage the long-
term sustainability of fisheries resources for the
benefit of all users and interest groups both now
and in the future. The objectives, as enunciated
in Article 3 of the Act4 are as follows:
The following objectives must be pursued by the
Minister in the administration of this Act and by
the Australian Fisheries Management Authority
(AFMA) in the performance of its functions:
a implementing efficient and cost-effective
fisheries management on behalf of the Com-
monwealth; and
b ensuring that the exploitation of fisheries
resources and the carrying on of any related
activities are conducted in a manner consistent
with the principles of ecologically sustainable
development (which include the exercise of the
precautionary principle), in particular the need
to have regard to the impact of fishing activities
4 www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00363/

on non-target species and the long-term sustain-
ability of the marine environment; and
c maximizing the net economic returns to the
Australian community from the management of
Australian fisheries;
d ensuring accountability to the fishing industry
and to the Australian community in AFMA’s
management of fisheries resources; and
e achieving government targets in relation to the
recovery of the costs of AFMA.
In addition to the objectives mentioned in
subsection (1), or in Section 78 of this Act, the
Minister, AFMA, and Joint Authorities are to have
regard to the objectives of:
a ensuring, through proper conservation and
management measures, that the living resources
of the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) are not
endangered by over-exploitation; and
b achieving the optimum utilization of the living
resources of the AFZ.
Once again, we see a multi-purpose policy
where the biological requirements are com-
bined with the notion of “cost effectiveness,”
high economic return and full utilization of the
resources.
New Zealand
The fisheries policy of New Zealand is often
cited as a success story in terms of the ecological
and economic sustainability it has achieved.
But what is the objective of this policy? In
effect, according to the 1996 Fisheries Act, the
purpose of the fisheries policy is:
to provide for the utilization of fisheries resources
while ensuring sustainability.
The term “utilization” meaning:
conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fish-
eries resources to enable people to provide for their
social, economic, and cultural well-being.
The policy objective is clearly one that puts
emphasis not only on sustainability, but just as
much on utilization and social benefit. Interest-
ingly, like in the US, these objectives are made
more precise through standards. In respect
of harvest strategy these standards are three
(Anon. 2008):
1 A specified target about which a fishery or
stock should fluctuate;
The objectives of the CFP 31
2 A soft limit that triggers a requirement for a
formal, time-constrained rebuilding plan; and
3 A hard limit below which fisheries should be
considered for closure.
These standards have certain characteristics
that made them extremely interesting as an
example:
• They consider a target not a limit as the basis
for management, and recognize the natural
fluctuation of fish stocks, so the system is not
based on a fixed point but one around which
there is room for fluctuation.
• A limit to trigger special action, which is set
at 0.5 Bmsy and a hard limit to establish a fish-
ery closure. But there is no requirement for
stocks to be all “above Bmsy .”
New Zealand has, reputedly, one of the best
fisheries management systems in the world,
despite the flexibility of its objectives in the
law. Its example shows that making the basic
legal texts or the standards very ambitious and
demanding is not necessarily a condition for
policy success.
Norway
In Norway, another example frequently cited as
an example for the CFP, the objective of the fish-
eries policy is:5
The Fisheries policy shall contribute to establish
a sound basis for an economically viable devel-
opment of the fisheries industry. A sustainable
management of the living marine resources is
pre-conditional. Through market orientation
and increased value adding, the fisheries sector
shall contribute to good employment and living
opportunities in the coastal communities.
Again, beyond the very general notion
of “sustainability” as a pre-condition, socio-
economic considerations are at the core of the
declared objectives of the policy.
Rigid vs. flexible objectives
One important lesson that can be drawn from
the above comparative analysis is that the most
successful fisheries policies in the world do
5 www.imr.no/filarkiv/2010/06/norwegian_
fisheries_and_aquaculture_fkd.pdf/nb-no/
32 Chapter 2
not necessarily have very ambitious and rigid
objectives in law. These best examples show
how, even with built-in flexibility in the legal
text, it is serious implementation that can lead
to success, rather than very rigid, ambitious
objectives on paper that may be unrealistic or
very difficult to implement.
The case for full exploitation
of fishery resources
Preventing overfishing or fully
exploiting?
It is obvious that keeping stocks at unsustain-
able levels, and even at levels that will not pro-
duce MSY is not compatible with the objectives
of the CFP and does not contribute to achieve
the objectives of Article 39 TFEU. As fish stocks
have traditionally been markedly below sus-
tainable levels it is logical that the CFP, for many
years, has focused on ensuring such sustainabil-
ity. Not surprisingly, the fish stock management
policy has been traditionally called “con-
servation” policy, a term that indicates the
philosophy behind it and is arguably responsible
for its bad image among EU fishermen.
This author has named his own account of the
development of the CFP as “the quest for sus-
tainability” (Penas Lado 2016). This quest is by
no means finished and, despite positive trends
in recent years, self-indulgence is absolutely to
be avoided.
However, as the status of stocks in Europe
gradually reach more sustainable levels (in the
Atlantic and Baltic), and as the CFP clearly
establishes the MSY objective by 2020, the
issue will gradually be raised of the possible
under-exploitation of the resources, either as
a result of the management system or because
of market failures. Indeed, this is the case in
the US, as we will see below. This opens a
new debate: if Article 39 TFEU undoubtedly
requires sustainable fish stocks, it can also be
argued that this article also requires full and
complete exploitation of the resources available
sustainably. And there are at least three reasons
why the exploitation of the EU’s sustainable
fishery resources may not be complete even if
sustainability is achieved:
• the effects of the policy in mixed fisheries;
• inefficiencies in the sharing of fishing rights;
and
• inefficient markets.
These are explained in subsequent pages. It
is important to understand that low, inefficient
exploitation levels of available – sustainable –
resources may hinder the achievement of some
of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
Is under-exploitation positive?
As we will see below, certain combination of
policy provisions, particularly when applied
to mixed fisheries, can lead to significant
under-exploitation of stocks that could be
exploited sustainably at higher harvest lev-
els. In the context of a policy where the only
operational targets established are biological,
this under-exploitation is often not seen as a
problem. But, is it?
If the management of mixed fisheries leads to
under-exploitation of certain stocks, then it is
true that this can have certain positive conse-
quences:
• Creating a “safety net” for the stocks con-
cerned that would ensure they are farther
away from possible over-exploitation. In
other words, under-exploitation could be
seen as the practical establishment of a lower
risk of over-exploitation of fishery resources.
• Reducing the overall pressure on the marine
environment, with positive consequences for
the ecosystem.
For the above reasons, a policy leading to
under-exploitation of sustainable levels of fish-
ing is generally seen, by environmentalists, as a
positive development.
In contrast, the under-exploitation can cer-
tainly be seen as a problem in economic and
social terms, in that it represents significant
loss of sustainable revenue and negative effects
on employment. However, if we look into this
question from a wider perspective, the negative
effects of under-exploitation of resources go
much beyond that:
• The objectives of Article 39 TFEU would
be more difficult to achieve: the abundant,
steady supply of fish would not be assured;
including consequences on European con-
sumers.

• The dependence of Europe on imported
seafood would increase. As we will see
below, the under-exploitation may increase
pressure on resources in third countries
where management is weak.
• It would put additional pressure on land
ecosystems. The unexploited fish would
need to be replaced by alternative animal
protein. If this is chicken, for example, what
would be the implication in terms of addi-
tional production of maize or soya to feed
that poultry? How much forest would need
to be chopped down to provide for the extra
farmland? And if this is farmed fish, the
effects of this sector on the conservation of
wild forage fish are also very controversial.
• Relative stability (the cornerstone of the CFP)
may not be, de facto, fully respected, in par-
ticular if the under-exploitation would affect
some Member States more than others.
• To sum up: the objectives of Article 39 TFEU
may not be fully achieved.
Ultimately, the question is: what is the best
way of implementing the objectives of Article
39 TFEU? Again, over-exploitation of resources
cannot guarantee any of these objectives, cer-
tainly not in the long term. But what about
under-exploitation? Is the under-exploitation
of fishery resources conducive to the objectives
of Article 39? I will try to demonstrate that
the answer is no; that the best way to achieve
these objectives is to ensure sustainable but full
exploitation of these resources.
We will see below that certain combination of
circumstances, in particular the achievement of
MSY objectives for individual stocks, combined
with the landing obligation and all under rela-
tive stability could lead mixed fisheries to a situ-
ation of considerable partial under-exploitation.
This risk could be avoided by providing
for a wider interpretation of the mandate of
Article 2.2 of Regulation 1380/2013, which
establishes specific objectives for all regulated
stocks individually. The idea that will be devel-
oped in these pages is to interpret this objective
as one that delivers a beneficial overall outcome
along the lines of what the economists call a
“central tendency” that holds for the most part
but not always.
The objectives of the CFP 33
The risk of under-exploitation, in any case,
must be compounded with the possibility
of a backlash in the tendency toward better
management of resources in recent years. The
danger to avoid is to use the full exploitation
argument as an excuse to undermine all efforts
to ensure sustainability. This idea should there-
fore be understood as an attempt to strike the
right balance, not to jettison all the efforts made
in recent years to advance toward sustainability.
Is under-exploitation a realistic
scenario in the CFP?
The obvious problem with the over-exploitation
of so many fishery resources around the
world (FAO 2016) may give the impression
that under-exploitation is not an issue, or
one that is far less important than that of
over-exploitation. The long history of over-
exploitation of European fishery resources and
the slow progress accomplished may give the
impression that this question is not worthy of
attention. Some may even argue that it would
be counter-productive to raise it, when the full
sustainability of resources in Europe is still not
achieved.
This is true, and nothing in this book should
be understood as a reason to undermine the
continuous struggle to phase out overfishing
from European fisheries. However, as that
objective is gradually approached, and as the
new combination of CFP measures (individual
[Total Allowable Catch] TAC + landing obliga-
tion + relative stability) kick in fully in 2019,
the possible under-exploitation of EU fishery
resources becomes a potential problem. It is in
this light that the question should be examined.
The example of the US
The experience of other countries shows that
the theoretically “successful” fisheries man-
agement can lead to a substantial under-
exploitation of the resources. The US rightly
claims that, because of fisheries management,
overfishing has largely been eliminated in US
waters (Anon. 2014).
The Magnuson-Stevens Act has led to a high
degree of sustainability of the main fishery
34 Chapter 2
resources . . . and to a considerable under-
exploitation of these resources. The US situation
can be roughly characterized by a considerable
reduction of the fishing pressure, but without
an increase in yields as a result. In other words,
the success of the US system consists of fishery
resources being more abundant, but exploited
less heavily. This conservative management
approach takes into account as well the diffi-
culty of estimating yield and it provides a de
facto “insurance” policy or hedge that avoids
inadvertent over-exploitation.
In the case of the New England groundfish
fishery, under the 2005–2009 management
plan the annual catch limits increased substan-
tially, while the total landing remained roughly
constant. Between 2005 and 2011, the under-
fishing of the sustainable catch limits was esti-
mated at more than 550 000 tonnes, worth
US$ 1.8 billion. In 2010, the catch of all
managed groundfish species was under the
prescribed catch limits; in fact, only 37% of the
aggregate catch limit was caught (Rothschild
et al. 2014). In the west coast of the US, the
total consumption of TACs has been lower than
40% and the trend has been downwards for
years (Ray Hilborn, personal communication).
If we look at other examples in North America,
we see a similar trend: in the groundfish fishery
of western Canada, the rate of consumption of
quotas varies around 50% only (Bruce Turris,
personal communication).
The above results must be interpreted with
care. In particular, the low percentages are
not ascribed to whether they are due to choke
species effects, market considerations, or other
factors. The figures show a level of under-
exploitation of available fishing opportunities
that raises many questions as to whether the US
system is effectively delivering all its declared
economic objectives.
We will see below how that table compares
with the percentages of quota consumption in
Europe under the CFP.
Under-exploitation in the EU?
In the CFP, there is also a certain level of
under-exploitation of the resources, although
Table 2.1 Data on the level of consumption of EU
TACs in recent years according to the official
catch-reporting system.
2014 2015 2016 2017
70.43% 77.81% 75.66% 73.85%
Source: Data elaborated by the author.
the level is of a completely different dimension
than that of the US. As shown in Table 2.1, the
overall level of quota consumption in the EU is
considerably higher than in the US, with quota
consumption levels between 70 and 80%,
and an apparent downward trend since 2015,
the first year in which the landing obligation
kicked in. A more detailed analysis by species
(see Figure 2.1) shows a very wide variation
in the percentage of quota consumption for
different species and different geographical
areas, so there are indeed certain levels of
under-utilization of quotas under the EU. And
this is all before the full implementation of
the discard ban and the full impact of choke
species. Why? Current under-exploitation of
certain resources can be the result of several
factors:
• Theoretically, the effects of the management
system in mixed fisheries, where the combi-
nation of individual fish stock objectives and
the ban on discarding can lead to fisheries
being stopped before all quotas are con-
sumed (the “choke species” effect). However,
given the low level of implementation of
the landing obligation during these years,
it is unlikely that choke species have been
responsible for this decrease.
• The “paper fish” effect, that is, in some cases
the quotas established may be higher than
the real abundance of the fish. Although this
is a phenomenon that has been considerably
reduced over time, there can still be cases
where quotas are set artificially high.
• In a number of cases certain quotas may not
be fished because of market inefficiencies.
These can be of very different nature:
(a) In some cases, the species concerned has
just a low market value so that its full
exploitation is not economical;
 The objectives of the CFP 35

100,00
90,00
80,00
70,00
60,00
50,00
40,00
30,00
20,00
10,00
0,00
An iting

t
le

ac e

l
rim

k.

H e
H ing

ck

od

g
re
ra
fis

ak

tin
So

ac

do
ai
ke

C
Sp

r
eg
er

hi
er
h

Pl

ad
W

w
gl

M
se
M

ue
or

Bl
H
Figure 2.1 Consumption of TACs by some key species in EU waters. Average for years 2014–2016.
Source: Data elaborated by the author.

(b) In some other cases, the quotas avail-
able may not be fished because they are
allocated to Member States that have no
economic interest while other Member
States may be more than willing to catch
them. This is an undesirable effect of the
rigidity of relative stability that will be
dealt with in subsequent chapters.
While the effect of choke species is still to be
evaluated, since the combination of individual
TACs under the landing obligation is still in the
phase-in period, there is no doubt about the
effects of the market inefficiencies.
These percentages are variable geograph-
ically. For 2015 the overall consumption of
TACs was 77.8%, but percentages were higher
in certain areas such as the Baltic or North
East Atlantic Fishery Commission (NEAFC)
but significantly lower in the main area, the
western waters, that accounts for 3/4 of all
TACs. As indicated above, there can be several
reasons to explain that. What is remarkable is
that this question has actually never been fully
investigated institutionally. In other words,
why is this not seen as a problem, or even as
a question to ask? Perhaps it’s about time that
this question be seriously investigated.
TAC consumption is also variable for different
stocks, as shown in Figure 2.1: while sole, sprat,
or herring have consumption levels over 80%
other species such as plaice have barely a utiliza-
tion over 50% and a very valuable stock such
as hake has less than 80% consumption. If sec-
ondary species are considered, utilization levels
are lower, for example tusk TACs are fished at
around only 30%.
These results, however, must be considered
carefully. In particular, they correspond to
official catches, that is, they do not take into
account unaccounted catches, or “black land-
ings.” If such unaccounted landings are taken
into account (whatever their real magnitude
may be), the figure of under-exploitation would
be smaller, though it would probably still be
significant. On the other hand, however, the
table has been made not from the original TACs
but from the “adjusted TACs” that is, after the
quota swaps among Member States (around
2000 per year, involving around 13–14% of
total catch possibilities). This implies that even
after the adjustments through quota swaps,
the level of quota consumption is far from
complete.
The trend in Table 2.1 is not straightforward
to interpret. Although the reduction coincides
with the gradual implementation of the landing
obligation, it would be premature to explain
the reduction on account of choke species
36 Chapter 2
effects (see Chapter 6). There may be some
cause/effect relationship with first sale fish
prizes which, according to European Market
Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture
Products (EUMOFA),6 have been declining in
certain years for certain groups of species:
• Prices of groundfish increased until 2011, but
have declined since, from an average of over
€2/Kg in 2011 to less than €1.5/Kg in 2015.
• Prices of small pelagic fish show an identi-
cal trend, with a reduction from €0.75/Kg in
2011 to less than €0.60/Kg in 2015.
• On the contrary, flatfish prices have remained
stable, at around €4.5/Kg from 2011 to 2015.
The objective of the above data is not to
play down the threat of overfishing. In fact,
the figures correspond to landings, not total
catches. If discards are added to these figures,
the effects on the resources are obviously sig-
nificantly higher. Last but not least, the referred
TACs are, in a number of cases, higher than
those necessary to ensure sustainability.
The real objective of the above table is to
demonstrate that in the CFP there is also a
problem of under-exploitation of a number
of TACs, and that the problem seems to be
getting worse, even if there is little evidence of
choke species effect so far. If this was evident
even before full implementation of the landing
obligation, what can we expect as the policy
becomes fully effective?
Under-exploitation vs.
over-exploitation
It is also true that the under-exploitation of
certain quotas may also be considered as a
minor problem if we compare it with the
over-exploitation of many other quotas due
to poor enforcement of catch limits, which is
still very significant in many European fish-
eries, as regularly reported by the European
Fishery Control Agency (EFCA). Indeed, the
main problem of the CFP for many years has
been that of quota over-exploitation. In that
context, talking about under-exploitation may
sound like comparing a real problem with a
6 www.eumofa.eu/
theoretical one, or like establishing the wrong
priorities.
There is no doubt that the over-exploitation
of quotas in the CFP has been and continues to
be a serious concern. But it is a well-known con-
cern that has been subject to many initiatives
in terms of recognizing the problem (EU 2007),
taking offenders to the Court of Justice, reshuf-
fling the control legislation (EU 2009b) or
improving compliance by Member States
through the coordinated approach of EFCA.
In contrast, the question of under-exploitation
of certain stocks in European waters has not
been subject to any initiative, or indeed been
considered an issue at all.
Recent studies suggest that there is still a
potential for an increase in global fish pro-
duction, to be achieved both by improving
management of currently over-exploited fish-
eries but also by expanding catches in certain
well-managed stocks (Costello et al. 2016).
In turn, Hilborn and Costello (2018) after a
complete analysis of world fisheries through
meta-analysis, concluded that:
There is considerable room for increased profit in
most of these fisheries from better management.
Increased yield will come from rebuilding overex-
ploited stocks, reducing fishing mortality on stocks
that are still fished at high rates, and surprisingly
from fishing some stocks harder. Indeed, in Europe
and North America the primary potential for
increased yield comes from fully exploiting stocks
that are now lightly exploited.
As we saw above, many stocks in EU waters
are not fully exploited. It is noteworthy that,
unlike EU waters, in third countries, where
EU fleets fish under bilateral agreements, there
have been initiatives designed to ensuring that
the fishing opportunities paid with European
tax-payers’ money, are fully used.
In EU waters, on the contrary, the fact that
fishing opportunities are not paid by tax-payers
money has led to a tradition where such under-
exploitation, whenever it happens, is not seen
as a problem. However, if we look again at the
terms of Article 39 TFEU, this will have to be
addressed one day.

The consequences
of under-exploitation
As we saw above, there is an obvious conse-
quence of the under-exploitation of fishery
resources: it does not contribute to achieve the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU. However, for
many societal interests this may not be unde-
sirable: under-exploiting fishery stocks has
positive ecological effects in reducing pressure
on the marine ecosystems. But is this really
so simple?
It is simple if we look at the European marine
environment alone. It is not simple at all if we
look at the globe as a whole and particularly
at the world’s food-producing systems. The rea-
son is simple: all the animal protein that does
not come from sustainable exploitation of Euro-
pean fisheries will have to be replaced by ani-
mal protein coming from other fisheries in the
world (some of them poorly managed), or from
the already over-stretched land-based agricul-
ture and livestock systems.
The effects on other marine areas
The EU fish market is not self-sufficient:
according to Eurostat, in 2014 the EU exported
2 145 169 t of fish (worth EUR 4.3 billion) but
imported 5 947 708 t (worth EUR 21 billion), so
the EU market runs a deficit of nearly 4 million
tons of fish a year. While much of the imported
production comes from well-managed cap-
ture fisheries, from countries with sustainable
fisheries policies such as Norway or Iceland, a
significant part of the EU’s seafood imports also
corresponds to catches from countries where
such production is not always sustainable, or
where it takes place under socially-unsound
conditions. In other cases, seafood imports
come from countries known to have pro-
duced such seafood at the cost of considerable
degradation of their coastal habitats.
The effect of the possible under-exploitation
of EU resources may also be looked at from this
viewpoint: what are the ecological effects in the
exporting countries of any increase in produc-
tion to replace the resources that Europe itself
will not be able to exploit sustainably?
The objectives of the CFP 37
The three main world’s markets for fish (the
EU, Japan, and the US) consume 30% of the
world’s fish supply, although they represent
only 12% of the population (Swartz et al. 2010).
The three importing blocs have very clear
spheres of influence. It is obvious then that
if these three importers do not fully use their
sustainable resources, this will result in consid-
erable pressure on the exporting countries,
many of which are developing countries
with little means to ensure good manage-
ment. This means that under-exploitation of
resources protects the marine environment in
the importing countries, but aggravates it in
the exporting ones; a new form of environ-
mental neo-colonialism, that certain authors
call “leakage” (Helvey et al. 2017). Indeed,
importing countries should have an interest to
preserve the exporting countries’ ecosystems,
on which they also depend. An adequate level
of exploitation of the importing countries’ own
resources may also contribute to that.
It is also pertinent to ask the question of how
much fish originated in illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fisheries is being imported
to fill the gap of Europe’s inability to extract
the maximum possible sustainable yield from
its marine resources?
The above points only reflect one basic fact:
in the world everything is interconnected, and
what Europe (the world’s first consumer of
seafood) does with its own fish resources will
have a bearing in the rest of the world; it is in
this light that the debate on over-exploitation/
under-exploitation must be looked at.
The effects on land: is livestock
production better than fishing?
Land ecosystems are already under tremendous
pressure from farming, urbanization, and many
other uses (Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011). Many
initiatives are taking place to find solutions to
increase food production while, at the same
time, reducing deforestation. Some of these ini-
tiatives involve proposals to reduce the average
dependence of human populations on animal
protein. Among all land uses, it is important
to underline in the present context the use
38 Chapter 2
of land for the production of livestock, which
competes with seafood as the main source of
animal protein for human consumption.
FAO produced in 2006 a complete review of
the effects of livestock production (FAO 2006):
• Worldwide, the production of livestock
accounts for 70% of total agricultural land
and 30% of the land surface of the planet.
The expansion of livestock production is a
key factor in deforestation, in particular in
Latin America, where 70% of the former sur-
face of the Amazon is occupied by pastures
and feed crops.
• The livestock sector is responsible for 18%
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. The largest
share of this comes from land use change
due to expansion of pastures and arable land
for feed crops. The sector also emits 37% of
anthropogenic methane (with 23 times the
global warming potential of CO2 ).
• The sector also represents a major source of
biodiversity loss, due to massive deforesta-
tion. Last but not least, the sector represents
8% of global human water use, mostly for
the irrigation of feed crops.
This was the picture in 2006. All the above
effects must have been aggravated in recent
years.
Even in the most efficient transformer of
vegetable crops into animal protein among
terrestrial livestock (poultry) it is estimated
that an average of 3 800 m3 of water are nec-
essary to produce 1 tonne of chicken. FAO
summarized that:
Over the past decades, the poultry sector’s growth
and trends toward intensification and concentra-
tion have given rise to a number of environmental
concerns. A direct consequence of these structural
changes (industrialization, geographical concen-
tration and intensification) in poultry production is
that far more waste than can be managed by land
disposal is produced, resulting in environmental
problems.
Other important works have estimated
the effects on livestock production and have
made projections of estimated surplus and
deficits (Steinfeld et al. 2006). But perhaps
the most meaningful information about the
effects of livestock production is the estimation
of its contribution to the global production
of greenhouse gases: according to the World
Watch organization, livestock production is
responsible for 51% of the total production
of greenhouse gases, more than any other
sector of the human economy. In addition,
livestock production is the single largest driver
of habitat loss (Machovina et al. 2015) due
to the cutting down of forest land to produce
feed crops.
As we will see in Chapter 13, fish protein
is healthy; its consumption is highly recom-
mended by doctors and nutritionists, and the
world’s appetite for fish is on the rise. The
fish not exploited sustainably will have to be
replaced by other animal proteins. Even if such
proteins are mainly from poultry (with much
lower impact than swine or dairy livestock)
its production will only contribute to increase
the ecological impact on land, notably due
to the necessary increase in feed crops, with all
the effects on global warming, fresh water and
pesticide use and loss of biodiversity that we
have seen above.
It is really in this light, by considering the
world ecosystem as a whole, that we must
examine the problem of the potential under-
utilization of fishery resources: as an extra
pressure on the world’s already overstretched
land ecosystems.
The public debate
The above data clearly shows that in terms of
influence in the world’s ecosystems and climate
balance, livestock is far more important, and has
a much greater effect than fisheries. Yet, while
there is abundant public debate about the neg-
ative effects of overfishing, little is said about
the negative effects of excessive livestock pro-
duction. Why?
One of the causes may be the different degree
of interest shown by environmental NGOs. In
Europe, the most dynamic NGO in recent years
has been the Pew Charitable Trust, which has
launched impressive campaigns and which
has been in recent years extremely active in
the fight against overfishing. Yet, the website

of this important NGO7 includes no mention
of the problem of livestock in the world’s
environment.
This author has no evidence to explain this,
but this fact casts a certain doubt as to the legit-
imacy of the strong focus to fight against the
interests of the fishing industry, whose negative
effects on the world’s ecosystem clearly falls
behind those of other human activities, and
which produces a high quality, relatively low
impact food for humankind.
Fisheries management is at present subject
to a high level of public scrutiny, and this must
be welcomed as a good development, since the
issues related to fisheries management are of
interest for society at large. But such societal
scrutiny should also take account the larger
impact on the world’s ecosystem of the other
human, food-producing activities, and how
they compare with the fishing activity itself in
terms of benefits and impacts in the world’s
ecosystems.
Are the fishery objectives of the
new CFP too rigid?
All the above considerations lead to a substan-
tial question: the objectives for the management
of stocks under the new CFP, are they too rigid?
Would more flexibility be necessary to ensure
a better balance between the necessary avoid-
ance of over-exploitation and the risk of under-
exploitation?
The answer is not straightforward and can
be a function of policy development. Typi-
cally, fishery management systems have been
put into place to react to serious situations of
over-exploitation of fishery resources. In those
cases, the introduction of specific, more pre-
scriptive objectives is very useful because they
replace more flexible systems that were prone
to abuse, leading to over-fishing. However,
as these more prescriptive systems tend to be
based on biological parameters only, and as
7 www.pewtrusts.org/en/
The objectives of the CFP 39
the main situation of over-fishing are phased
out, there is a need to examine the trade-offs
between precaution and conservation and the
social and economic benefits that the fisheries
can provide (Sissenwine et al. 2014).
Another important consideration is whether
the prescriptive objectives established for indi-
vidual stocks are flexible enough to deal with
technical and biological interactions in multi-
species fisheries and ecosystems or in data-poor
situations where scientific certainty cannot be
quantified. This clearly calls for management
systems to evolve in response to changes in
fisheries, in the environment and in society at
large (Sissenwine et al. 2014).
Certainly, providing greater flexibility in
management objectives may lead again to abuse
leading to over-exploitation. However, overly
prescriptive rules may lead to large foregone
yields in mixed fisheries (see next chapter).
Where to strike the right balance is one of the
fundamental challenges for the implementation
of the CFP.
The failure of the CFP to ensure sustainable
fisheries over many years certainly supports
the idea of a policy with very rigid and specific
policy objectives with relatively little room for
interpretation, as the only way to create “self-
discipline” to go in the right direction (Penas
Lado 2016, chapter 4). However, if we look at
the future of the CFP, and especially if we look
at the new policy adopted in 2013, which com-
bines increased rigidity with the combination
of measures that can be difficult to conciliate
in mixed fisheries, one can question whether
there is a need to provide certain internal
flexibility in the policy while at the same time
keeping certain basic elements to ensure that
the main objective of ensuring sustainability be
preserved.
The lessons from the US system
The US system provides an excellent example
in terms of the balance between specificity
of policy objectives and the flexibility of the
means to achieve them. The US system has a
number of advantages to adapt policy outputs
through flexible combinations of solutions, and
40 Chapter 2
above all, to keep up with the evolution of
the industry and the conditions under which it
operates. Many of these elements of flexibility
are certainly a source of inspiration for the
CFP. However, the US system has also certain
rigidities that are preventing the achievement
of the overall balance above mentioned. In
particular, the US system is failing to ensure
that the exploitation of its resources is not only
sustainable, but also complete.
The most important element of flexibility
in the US, as compared with the EU, is that
the guidance on how to achieve the overall
objectives of the policy are specified by the 10
national standards, that can be implemented
under a considerable degree of flexibility,
including the consideration of different levels
of risk.
The EU does not have a similar instrument,
and the way in which the basic tenets of the
policy are specified in more specific rules always
takes the form of legally-binding regulations,
thus removing room for maneuver when imple-
menting the policy. The tendency in the CFP
has been to build ever more detailed regulations
to pin down all players to a – theoretical – strict
delivery of policy goals, showing a remarkable
lack of trust among the players concerned.
The US experience in providing for flexibility
would not be easy to replicate in the EU. The
main reason lies probably in the multinational
nature of the CFP that adds a fundamental
element of distrust among key players. In the
US, with all participants being from the same
country, there is a relatively high level of trust
among the actors, whose legitimacy is not fun-
damentally questioned by anyone, although
this is very variable and has exceptions. In the
EU, on the contrary, the traditional mistrust
among fleets from different Member States
places an extra pressure on the so-called “level
playing field” that ends up requiring hard
law solutions to problems that, in the US, are
resolved by providing for flexibility for different
fisheries, in different regions, taking different
solutions and even different levels of risk.
This author has repeatedly advocated the
need to establish trust as the basis for a more
flexible, and arguably simpler policy. Only with
more trust among Member States, industries
and EU institutions could the CFP establish
simpler rules, allowing for different solutions
in different areas, even if they are not perfectly
equivalent. The idea that any regional differ-
ence may constitute a “discrimination” is still so
deeply rooted in the EU system, and this makes
the kind of flexibility of the US system very
difficult to apply. Only if the CFP can develop
that sense of trust will the policy be able to
evolve from a detailed, prescriptive approach,
where all the rules are established as hard law
to one based on recommendations with an
ample room for maneuver for implementation
in different places and circumstances.
Socio-economic objectives vs.
biological delivery: should the policy
establish specific socio-economic
targets?
As we saw above, fishery legislations in general
establish objectives that are economic and social
as well as biological. The scientific literature
includes the development of the notion of
“Maximum Social Yield” which captures the
trade-offs between social, economic, and eco-
logical sustainability (Charles 1988). Yet, the
general tendency is also that the operational
parameters used for stock management tend to
be primarily, if not exclusively, biological. Why?
The reason for this has been very well-
explained by some authors, for the specific
case of Australia. In this country, the regional
authorities responsible have chosen a role lim-
ited to ensuring biological sustainability, with
the economic management being left to the
commercial industry (Emery et al. 2017). The
reasons for this are generally applicable to many
countries, and certainly to the EU as well:
• The industry tends to be resistant to change,
even sometimes to changes that would
increase their economic benefit, since change
requires modification of existing business
structures.
• There is lack of information on the reasons
for the proposed regulations, creating confu-
sion as to the real motives for the proposed
change.

• The industry is heterogeneous, and any mea-
sure is viewed differently by diverse business
structures.
• That heterogeneity also results in difficulties
for the industry to reach consensus or wide
agreement on management changes aligned
with overarching legislation objectives.
In the specific case of the EU, we must add the
very different culture of management among
Member States, some of which consider the
fishing industry as any other economic sector
that must stand on their own economically,
while others see it as a strategic sector where
State policies should pursue specific economic
and social objectives. Thus, it is impossible to
agree on a common definition of the “maximum
social yield” that is valid in all Member States.
For these reasons, it seems inevitable that the
CFP, even though Article 39 TFEU has a number
of socio-economic objectives, will always have
trouble in establishing its operational objectives
in specific socio-economic terms. But that also
means that the operational biological objectives
should facilitate and promote the achievement
of the larger socio-economic objectives loosely
defined in Article 39. In other words, the target
of having all stocks at the biological level of
maximum sustainable yield, should be con-
strued in a way that will allow the achievement
of a range of socio-economic objectives. This
calls for a flexible interpretation of MSY as an
area around which different socio-economic
objectives can be achieved.
This represents a challenge, because social
objectives seem quite far from being integrated
into the current fisheries management, despite
a wealth of research on the topic (Rindorf
et al. 2017). This is due to a lack of coupling of
knowledge gained with qualitative and quan-
titative methods (Rockmann et al. 2015) and
the lack of well-defined and broadly agreed
social objectives and associated indicators (Pas-
coe et al. 2017). In other words, the social
objectives of Article 39 TFEU have never been
incorporated into the mainstream scientific
advice for the CFP, until very recently. The
result is that “social” considerations have tra-
ditionally been included as part of political
The objectives of the CFP 41
negotiations, without transparency and often
mixing genuine social questions with oppor-
tunistic or partisan politics, which in turn has
traditionally undermined the credibility of the
“social” arguments in fisheries management
under the CFP.
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(2017). Quo vadimus. Inclusion of ecological, eco-
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CHAPTER 3
Implementing maximum sustainable
yield
What is maximum sustainable
yield?
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the basic
objective of fisheries management in interna-
tional law (United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, UNCLOS), in a number of coun-
tries around the world and, since 2013, in the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
Defining MSY
The most common definition of MSY is that
provided by the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD):1
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the largest
long-term average catch or yield that can be taken
from a stock or stock complex under prevailing
ecological and environmental conditions.
The notion of MSY as an objective for fish-
eries management has been applied in a wide
number of cases, including the World Summit
for Sustainable Development of 2002 in Johan-
nesburg (United Nations 2002). A number of
countries and organizations have also used this
concept as a fisheries management objective
(Mace 2001; Worm et al. 2009).
It has been argued that this notion has always
addressed the biological conservation of the fish
stocks, but does not consider that other possible
objectives such as maximizing economic or
1 https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1644/
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
social benefit do not necessarily occur at MSY
levels (Zabel et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2015;
Hilborn et al. 2015). However, the introduction
of the MSY objective can also be associated
with economic benefit. Guillén et al. (2016)
estimated that in NE Atlantic fish stocks were
to be exploited at MSY, the EU fishing sector
could get an additional €4.64 billion per year in
profits than they would if current exploitation
rates were maintained. This forecast seems to be
proving right, since the improvement of stock
status observed in recent years is producing a
net increase in the profitability levels of the EU
fleets (EU 2018a).
The concept of MSY is very old and has
always been hotly debated. Though consol-
idated in international and EU law, it has
important detractors. Some even wrote its
epitaph long ago, based on the view that MSY
“advocated yields too high” (Larkin 1977). MSY
has also been dismissed as the wrong objective
for fisheries management: a world’s renowned
scientist like Sidney Holt considered MSY “the
worst idea on fisheries management” based
on the argument that it “both enthrones and
institutionalizes greed” after recognizing his
earlier support to the idea as a better objective
than the existing over-exploitation of certain
stocks.2
2 https://breachingtheblue.com/2011/10/03/
maximum-sustainable-yield-the-worst-idea-in-
fisheries-management/
43
44 Chapter 3
MSY in the reformed CFP
Regulation 1380/2013 established, for the first
time in the history of the CFP, a long-term
objective for the management of fish stocks.
This objective, the MSY, was considered as the
best way to achieve the objectives of Article
39 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). At the same time, this objec-
tive was established for the first time under a
specific time frame: 2020.
This represented a breakthrough for the CFP,
in that it corrected one of the CFP’s most clearly
identified problems: the lack of a specific objec-
tive for the management of stocks (EU 2009),
leading to decision-making that for many
years favored short-term political considera-
tions rather than the long-term sustainability.
The effects of this decision are, inter alia, to
tie down the EU institutions to a very clear
agenda to achieve such an objective within the
required time frame and thus eliminate the
short-termism that has plagued the policy for
so many years.
Before being enshrined in the basic regula-
tion of the CFP in 2013, the notion of MSY
was first introduced at a time when the policy
was clearly failing to address overfishing and,
in that context, moving to MSY represented a
net improvement of the situation at that stage.
I would be wrong to blame the notion of MSY
for the earlier failure of the CFP to address
over-exploitation: the major danger of assign-
ing the notorious failure of the CFP to a wrong
culprit, MSY, is to distract research efforts away
from investigating the real causes that likely
lay in the institutional set-up (Mesnil 2012).
Indeed, policies based on MSY objectives have
been very successful in reducing overfishing to
very low levels in the US (Hilborn 2007).
However, the inclusion of MSY as the objec-
tive of fisheries management under the CFP
came at a cost: the MSY notion has many impli-
cations that are difficult to handle in a political
negotiation, particularly as this was the first
time EU legislators were confronted with this
concept in hard law. While certain aspects of it
were discussed explicitly (the implementation
of MSY through biomass or fishing mortality
objectives) other questions (MSY as a limit or as
an objective, MSY as point values or as a range)
were not discussed at all by the EU legislators.
For these reasons, it was not possible to dis-
cuss harvest strategies in relation to reference
points and the explicit acceptance of particular
levels or risk with reference to these points.
All these questions are essential to determin-
ing how the policy works. Several strategies can
be employed for implementing the notion of
MSY and the effects of each strategy will differ.
Thus, the basic regulation on MSY by 2020,
essential though it is, does not consider all
options for implementation. This necessitates a
discussion on each strategy and its likely effects.
This is not always happening, at least in a
structured, purposeful way, and the way the
basic objective of achieving MSY by 2020 is
being implemented is more the result of specific
regulations, notably the Baltic Sea management
plan (EU 2016a) and the subsequent North Sea
plan (EU 2018b) establishing a precedent and
thus paving the way for future cases, rather
than that of a deliberative consideration of
possible pros and cons of the different options.
This is the objective of this chapter.
MSY in international law
The idea of MSY as a flexible concept is reflected
in international law. Article 119 of UNCLOS3
requires States to:
maintain or restore populations of harvested
species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environ-
mental and economic factors.
This “as qualified” clearly indicates that other
considerations about economics and ecology
should be considered, so the implementation of
MSY may actually deviate from a single point
Fmsy value.
The EU is a signatory of UNCLOS, so the
achievement of that objective in EU fisheries has
been a legal obligation for the EU since UNCLOS
became effective in 1994. The fact that it has
3 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf/

taken so much time to become enshrined in
the CFP (only in 2013) is yet another demon-
stration of the slow pace of evolution and
adaptation of the CFP itself.
At the same time, the rather flexible def-
inition of MSY in UNCLOS is important to
bear in mind while considering the following
pages. While certain policy players (some envi-
ronmental Non-Governmental Organizations
[NGOs]) advocate the notion of MSY as a strict
limit that must be respected in all stocks, the
above definition in international law recognizes
that the notion of MSY must take into account
socio-economic considerations.
MSY and the Treaty
All the preceding sections can be summarized as
one: is MSY the best target to achieve the objec-
tives of Article 39 of the Treaty? And what inter-
pretation of MSY can best achieve that? This is
one, if not the most, quintessential question for
the management of fish stocks under the CFP.
The objectives laid down in Article 39 TFEU
are varied, and under some circumstances
incompatible. That means that a reasonable bal-
ance among such objectives should be achieved.
No single point can maximize the delivery of all
the different objectives. In fact, the Commission
presented its proposal for MSY as the opera-
tional objective of the CFP as the best way to
achieve the objectives of Article 39 TFEU based
on that idea. This author consistently presented
the notion of MSY in the CFP as: “an area
within which we can strike the best balance
among the different objectives of Article 39.”
This implies that MSY must not be seen as
a miracle point that will deliver all goals, but
rather that, the goals being varied, the MSY
should be a wider notion around which differ-
ent balanced combinations of these goals can be
considered. But then, what should be that area?
As we will see in Chapter 4, this is of par-
ticular importance in the context of mixed
fisheries, where the scientific literature clearly
indicates that setting Fmsy as a management
target without any flexibility for compromises
may lead to disappointment by some of the
stakeholders (Kempf et al. 2016).
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 45
The MSY objective established in regulation
1380/2013 is subject to considerably different
interpretations. For example, some environ-
mental NGOs present the notion of MSY as
a limit, implying that fishing mortality levels
should be at Fmsy levels or lower, and that these
F levels should be such that will ensure that
biomass levels of all stocks are above Bmsy .
These different interpretations are legiti-
mate, in the light of the not-so-clear legal text.
However, the point value interpretation that
environmental NGOs promote has a basic flaw:
it does not take account of a number of legal
elements in the Treaty:
• As we will see in Chapter 4, a strict interpre-
tation of Fmsy as a limit will lead, in mixed
fisheries, to very low levels of exploitation of
certain healthy stocks. This would not corre-
spond to Article 39’s objective of maximizing
production.
• In some cases, keeping a very strict interpre-
tation would imply dramatic cuts in fishing
opportunities, and this runs counter with
Article 39’s point about “the need to effect
the appropriate adjustments by degrees.”
• The choke species effect (see Chapter 4) may
lead to closures of important and healthy
fisheries because the Fmsy of a very secondary
species may be overshot. This may not cor-
respond to the principle of proportionality
established in the Treaty.
In any case, the question remains contro-
versial. MSY is not a straightforward question,
and different ways of implementing the notion
are possible – and legitimate. I would strongly
argue that the main reference to help us inter-
pret what we should mean by MSY, remains the
Treaty, notably its Article 39. This is so obvious
that is often forgotten.
Is maximum economic yield a better
option?
Part of the above debate has concerned the
possible alternative use, as a policy objective, of
the notion of maximum economic yield (MEY).
As shown in Figure 3.1 the costs of fishing
increase linearly with the increase in fishing
effort, but fisheries yield does not. The point
46 Chapter 3
...by increasing the to increase (agricultural)
Yield individual earnings productivity
Revenue of persons engaged
Benefit
Maximum Maximum
Economic Sustainable
Yield Yield
Figure 3.1 Different policy objectives in Article 39 TFEU around MSY.
that maximizes the difference between costs
and yields (that is, the point that maximizes
sustainable profits in the fishery) is generally
found at lower fishing levels than MSY. This
makes MEY an attractive alternative to MSY,
both from the point of view of economists
(maximizing economic yield) but also for envi-
ronmental NGOs, since MEY corresponds to
lower levels of fishing than MSY.
This author has already argued why the
objective of MEY did not make headway in the
recent reform of the CFP: because a number
of Member States do not consider maximizing
economic yield as their objective for fisheries
management, and they prefer more “social”
objectives instead, even at the cost of lower
profitability (Penas Lado 2016, chapter 16). In
addition, the experience of trying to manage
fisheries at MEY, for example, in Australia,
show that this leads to additional complex-
ity (Pascoe et al. 2017). So, if MSY is not
necessarily a fixed point, and MEY is not neces-
sarily a clearly better alternative, in what area
should fisheries management in the CFP be
situated?
An area around MSY
If we consider the objective: “to increase agri-
cultural productivity” and “to assure the avail-
ability of supplies” one should consider MSY
Costs
...optimum utilisation of the factors
of production, in particular labour
Maximum Fishing effort
Employment
as the ideal target for fish stock management.
However, if we consider the objective “to
ensure a fair standard of living for the agricul-
tural community,” in particular by “increasing
the individual earnings of persons engaged in
(agriculture)” one would tend to think that
management should move to the MEY target,
where higher profitability would allow better
income for the producers. These two elements
together would probably lead to the idea that
the objectives of the CFP should be best deliv-
ered when fish stocks are managed somewhere
between MEY and MSY. Indeed, this is what
happens in the US system.
However, in the CFP these objectives do not
exist today in a vacuum: they have to be deliv-
ered in a policy characterized by: (i) objectives
and catch limits for individual stocks; (ii) fixed
allocation keys under relative stability; and
(iii) the landing obligation. As we will see in
subsequent chapters, if we try to apply the idea
of management “somewhere between MEY
and MSY” we must address the factors which
contribute to under-exploitation, notably choke
species and market failures. As a consequence,
the theoretical advantage of the “between MEY
and MSY” approach is offset by the fact that in
the context of mixed fisheries, that approach
can result in a high level of under-exploitation
of many resources, which in turn means that

the MSY would not in fact be achieved, and
the increase in agricultural productivity or the
availability of supply of Article 39 TFEU would
not be delivered.
For this reason, and if the CFP is to ensure also
these objectives, in a sector where the EU is not
self-sufficient and must import a large amount
of the fish it consumes, it is necessary to look
beyond the “MEY to MSY” approach and look
for a wider concept of MSY as an area around
which we can strike the best balance among the
objectives of Article 39.
This is shown in Figure 3.1, where differ-
ent policy objectives of Article 39 TFEU are
placed against the central MSY point for a given
stock: if maximum biological yield is privileged,
the central MSY point will provide it. If more
economic efficiency is the priority, the MEY
notion will be the ideal reference. If maintain-
ing employment levels is preferred, this will be
achieved at fishing mortality levels (Fsoc ) higher
than MSY, even at the cost of a lower economic
profitability.
Since we saw in Chapter 2 that the CFP has
several objectives with different socio-economic
values, one cannot expect that the single MSY
central point will provide all the best perfor-
mance for all these objectives. Rather, the
delivery of a reasonable combination of policy
objectives does require that management is
kept within an “area” around the central MSY
point. Within this area, different options with
different trade-offs are possible.
This requires the implementation of the MSY
objective under two basic options:
• To aim higher than the “MEY to MSY” range
and trying to maximize sustainable food
production even at the cost of a higher risk
of over-exploitation of certain individual
stocks; or
• To allow some flexibility in determine the rel-
ative importance of individual Total Allow-
able Catch (TACs)/landing obligation/relative
stability so as to minimize the choke species
effect.
Both ideas are not mutually exclusive and
will be develop in subsequent pages of this
work.
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 47
MSY as biomass or as fishing
mortality?
Introduction
The notion of MSY can basically be expressed
through two different approaches: the biomass
corresponding to MSY, Bmsy , and the fishing
mortality corresponding to that objective, Fmsy .
In the first case, the approach consists of bring-
ing the abundance of the stock to the level
where it can produce a maximum yield on a
sustainable, stable basis. In the second case,
the approach is the ensure that, whatever the
abundance of the stock (influenced largely by
natural factors outside our control) we will
exploit only that part of the stock that will
allow a maximum yield on a sustainable, stable
basis. Both approaches are possible and can
somewhat be combined. They have pros and
cons that must be examined.
This question was hotly debated in the nego-
tiation leading up to the 2013 reform. The
position of the Commission (that management
should be based on fishing mortality, not on
biomass) finally made headway, for several
reasons:
• Fishing mortality reference points are more
robust to scientific uncertainty than biomass
reference points (Sissenwine et al. 2014).
Bmsy estimates are highly variable, and it
is not a good idea to have very fluctuating
long-term objectives: moving targets make
policy difficult to understand and implement.
• While Fmsy can be reasonably established
through management, Bmsy is partly the
result of natural factors outside our control.
• Experience shows that Bmsy can some-
times not be reached even if the fishery is
closed for several years. Cod in Flemish Cap
(Perez-Rodriguez et al. 2012), North Sea
herring (Diockey-Collas et al. 2010), Pacific
sardine off California;4 all these are examples
of fisheries that collapsed and were closed for
many years without biomass recovering until
many years later. This shows that the Bmsy
4 https://swfsc.noaa.gov/publications/CR/1990/9067
.PDF/
48 Chapter 3

objectives may be unachievable even under
the most restrictive management regime for
a relatively long period of time.
• It is not known if all estimates of Bmsy for
different associated stocks can all be achiev-
able at the same time. Sometimes Bmsy esti-
mates may correspond to abundance levels
of a certain species that may be incompati-
ble with maximum abundances for another
species. As the biomass of different species
increases, part of these increases may be dis-
sipated by ecosystem effects,
• It is not possible to set a time limit to reach
Bmsy . Experience shows that between the
reduction of F and the increase in B there is
always a time gap, roughly between 3 and
10 years. That means that if Fmsy is reached
within a given time frame, the achievement
of Bmsy cannot be assured in such a time-
frame, if at all. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
point: for the Northern Hake stock fishing
mortality started to be dramatically reduced
in 2005, but only in 2009 did the spawning
stock biomass start to increase as a result.
Other examples show how this time gap
between the reduction of fishing mortality
and the increase in biomass is extremely vari-
able, and in some stocks can reach around
10 years.
The implications of this discussion are clear:
if the policy objectives are implemented in
terms of biomass, then the management system
must take account of the natural factors that
can influence such biomass, and this implies
the establishment of catch limits that are much
more precautionary. By fixing objectives in

F
1.2
Flim
Fpa
1
FMSY

0.8
F(15–80 cm)

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014

SSB
350
Blim
300
Bpa
250 MSYBtrigger
SSB in 1000 t

200

150

100

50

0
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
Figure 3.2 Evolution of fishing mortality and spawning stock biomass for Northern Hake, showing how F started
to be reduced around 2005 but biomass levels only started to increase toward 2009. Source: www.ices.dk/sites/
pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/hke.27.3a46-8abd.pdf/

terms of biomass, the influence of fishing in the
overall stock abundance must be minimized to
reduce the chances of other ecological factors
affecting the target biomass. On the contrary,
approaches based on fishing mortality simply
discount from the management strategy the
effects we cannot control, assuming that stock
abundance can never be perfectly managed,
and simply ensuring that whatever nature
will provide us with, we will only exploit a
sustainable part of it.
Bmsy as an “aspirational objective”
The above discussion confronted two philoso-
phies in the CFP reform negotiation, and the
solution was very much a typical EU product,
where legislators try to avoid winners and
losers. It was accepted that fisheries under the
CFP would be managed based on the achieve-
ment of Fmsy objectives by 2020, as the basic
operational parameter, but that language was
introduced to the effect that the objective of
the CFP would have the aspiration of bringing
the biomass of the stocks to levels higher than
those producing MSY. The compromise was
in fact clear that the policy would be based on
Fmsy parameters, but that Bmsy would remain
an “aspirational” objective, to be expected from
a sound implementation of the former. Specific
wording was established to that effect, which
was believed by legislators to clearly reflect the
above conclusion (EU 2013, Article 2.2):
In order to reach the objective of progressively
restoring and maintaining populations of fish
stocks above biomass levels capable of producing
maximum sustainable yield, the maximum sus-
tainable yield exploitation rate shall be achieved
by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive,
incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all
stocks.
However, this phrase has created consider-
able confusion. Although nobody questions
that the operational parameters for stock man-
agement should be the fishing mortality levels,
it is argued (notably by NGOs) that the Fmsy
values to be used are those that will ensure that
the biomass (even without time limit) will be
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 49
above Bmsy . It is now necessary to determine
how the management based on Fmsy objectives
can meet the expectation of biomass levels
above MSY.
The confusion has also reached the scientific
world: certain authors claim that the objective
of the policy has two phases: reaching Fmsy
by 2020 and subsequently continue reducing
fishing mortality until all stocks are above Bmsy
levels (Froese et al. 2018). This interpretation
has absolutely no basis. The idea of a second
phase where fishing mortality levels would be
reduced further than Fmsy in order to achieve
biomass levels above Bmsy never crossed the
mind of the EU co-legislators. Yet, the inter-
pretation is there and has significant advocates.
Clearly this requires a clarification.
In this regard, it is important to underline that
this aspirational objective cannot have a specific
deadline. We have seen in Figure 3.2 above that
there is a time gap between the reduction of
fishing mortality and the increase in spawning
stock biomass. This time gap is in fact very
variable for different stocks. In some cases,
the biomass reacts quickly to the reduction
in fishing pressure: following the reduction of
fishing mortality on North Sea whiting, around
year 2000, the biomass reached a rapid peak in
2002. In other cases, however, this takes much
longer: the cod stock in the same area took
five to six years to show any sign of recovery
of biomass following the general reduction of
fishing mortality on gadoids around the year
2000. In certain other cases, such as west of
Scotland cod, the reduction of fishing mortality
(although with ups and downs) since approx-
imately 2005 has not yet produced any signif-
icant increase in spawning stock biomass.5 In
other cases, such as blue whiting, the relation-
ship between F and B is much less clear-cut, and
since 2011, for example, the biomass has been
increasing despite an increase in fishing mortal-
ity in parallel, due to increasing recruitments.6
5 www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/
Advice/2017/2017/cod.27.6a.pdf/
6 www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/
Advice/2015/2015/whb-comb.pdf/
50 Chapter 3
This simply illustrates the point that the rela-
tionship between fishing mortality and spawn-
ing stock biomass is not simple; it can take dif-
ferent forms for different stocks and is difficult
to predict. But, crucially, while fishing mortality
is a parameter that can be established through
fisheries management, biomass cannot, even
less so in relation with any specific time limit.
Ultimately, the very notion of a policy objec-
tive that is so difficult to achieve must also be
raised. Even if only aspirational, the idea that
policy success means having all stock above
Bmsy is misleading. Trying to project individual
Bmsy parameters to all species in the ecosystem
is just not straightforward. As International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
clearly states (ICES 2016):
As a population of fish increases one cannot expect
that growth and mortality for that species remains
constant as there will be increasing competition for
food and habitat within that population.
This implies that trying to pursue the objec-
tive of having all stocks above Bmsy simply
ignores ecosystem considerations, and does not
correspond to a credible ecosystem approach to
fisheries management.
Since such an objective may be unachievable
even if all fisheries were closed, given the
ecosystem effects mentioned above, taking it
too literally can give rise to frustration and a
false impression of policy failure. There is clearly
a need for a very flexible interpretation of that
aspirational objective, as the expectation that
bringing stocks within fishing mortality targets
is expected to produce overall good levels of
biomass of all stocks confounded, rather than
specific single-stock biomass reference points.
The interpretation by environmental
NGOs
Despite all the above, the debate lingers on,
particularly stirred up by some environmental
NGOs, who have a very different reading of the
basic regulation. Granted, the text of the basic
regulation as regards the above Bmsy objective
can be read and interpreted in different ways,
and these readings can of course be legitimate.
But it is important to underline the real
meaning of some of these interpretations by
some NGOs. These argue that the ultimate
objective, through the management of fishing
mortality, is to ensure that the management
bring all stocks above Bmsy levels. For example,
Pew states that:
To bring the stock back to BMSY or above, in a
defined timeframe, fishing pressure needs to be
reduced even further below FMSY. 7
This interpretation of the above Bmsy objec-
tive clearly implies that achieving Fmsy levels is
not enough. Furthermore, the scientific com-
munity agrees that it is practically impossible
to have all stocks above Bmsy levels at the
same time, at least in mixed fisheries (see next
chapter). This implies that this interpretation
of the law by NGOs would amount to setting
a policy objective that is practically impossible
to achieve. This was never the intention of the
legislators. And even if it was, it can certainly
not be expected that the policy will deliver it.
Given that achieving biomass objectives does
not only depend on fisheries management,
but also on ecological factors outside our con-
trol, any policy that purports to “ensure” that
certain biomass levels should be achieved sim-
ply does not make any sense. The legislators
simply cannot force nature to behave in any
particular way.
Single stock objectives in the marine
ecosystems: can all stocks be “above
Bmsy ” in mixed fisheries?
As we have explained, the “aspirational” objec-
tive of the new CFP is that the Fmsy policy by
2020 will be such that we should expect, as a
result, that biomass levels of all stocks will be
“above Bmsy .” The question is: even in the best
of scenarios, even if all stocks are effectively
fished at their Fmsy values, is it possible, and
likely, that all stocks will reach biomass values
“above Bmsy ”? And, if not, does this mean that
the policy is failing?
7 www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/03/
turning_the_tide_msy_explained.pdf/

Already at the level of a single species, it is
difficult to determine what is the real level of
Bmsy . This parameter is defined, for a num-
ber of stocks, with limited consideration of
multi-species effects. Bmsy estimates are gener-
ally based on single stock population dynamics,
and their estimation has a low robustness due
to climatic and other effects on the abundance
of the fish stocks.
If we add the ecological relationships among
different species, then the individual Bmsy esti-
mate becomes even more elusive. In fact, there
is little evidence that if we take all the estimates
of single-stock Bmsy , all these values could actu-
ally be reached at once. In some cases, perhaps
the Bmsy of a predator species may prevent that
of a prey species from being reached, or the Bmsy
of two competing species in the same trophic
level may not be possible because of competi-
tion between the two. In these circumstances,
it seems prudent not to take this aspirational
objective of having all stock biomass levels
beyond Bmsy as a very strict measure of policy
success, but simply as something to be moni-
tored and re-evaluated, to better know how the
biomass of the different stocks in the ecosystem
react to the policy of keeping all exploitation
rates at around Fmsy levels.
One way or another, this problem is recog-
nized in different management systems around
the world. For example, in the US and New
Zealand, a stock is considered “overfished”
when its biomass is lower than half Bmsy , which
is a recognition that having all stocks at the indi-
vidual Bmsy estimate is not realistic, although
it is not necessarily clear if the .5 Bmsy cut-off
recognizes ecosystem/multispecies factors.
Bmsy , an elusive parameter
In addition to the above, Bmsy is a very elusive
parameter to estimate. Largely dependent on
ecological conditions that can be highly fluc-
tuating, Bmsy is not a “stable” parameter. ICES
define Bmsy (ICES 2016) as:
The expected average biomass if the stock is
exploited at Fmsy for a long time.
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 51
This is extremely important: ICES define
Bmsy not as a fixed parameter, but rather as
an average of the level of biomass that can be
expected if the fishery is conducted at Fmsy level
on a stable basis. In this regard, the notion of
Bmsy as an aspirational objective rather than
as a legally-binding target, corresponds much
better to the scientific basis for the policy.
In the same document, ICES remind us that:
Fishing mortality is the only variable that can
be directly controlled by fisheries management.
A management strategy that harvests variable
yield in response to natural variability in stock size
will on average give yields closer to the long-term
MSY than a strategy operating with the maximum
constant yield that could be taken sustainably.
This is a clear indication that management
should be based on fishing mortality, not on
estimations of constant maximum stock abun-
dance or yields, at least from the point of view
of harvest levels. However, it must be recog-
nized that from an economic standpoint, the
industry may prefer in some cases a strategy
based on constant TACs, even at the cost of a
lower overall harvest levels.
The US system
As we saw in Chapter 2 under the headings
“Policy objectives in other countries; The United
States”, the first of the 10 national standards
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) estab-
lishes as an objective “optimum yield” and the
avoidance of “overfishing.” While the notion of
“optimum yield” is difficult to grasp, because it
cannot necessarily be equated to the biological
notion of MSY, the avoidance of overfishing
is a clearer objective. To achieve that, the US
system uses a combination of fishing mortality
and biomass. But the way they are applied is
interesting:
• A fishery is considered to be undergoing
“overfishing” when the fishing mortality is
higher than Fmsy (F > Fmsy ).
• A stock is considered “overfished” when
its biomass is lower than a certain thresh-
old called “minimum stock size threshold”
(MSST), which is established at half the value
of Bmsy (B < MSST = 0.5 Bmsy ).
52 Chapter 3
It is important to understand that the notion
of overfished does not necessarily mean unsus-
tainable. In fact, it is possible for a fishery to be
sustainable and stable at low levels of biomass.
It is also interesting to note that while the
criterion on fishing mortality is very strict
(any level of fishing mortality higher than Fmsy
corresponds to overfishing) the criterion on
biomass is far less demanding, considering that
a stock is not overfished even if its biomass
is considerably lower than Bmsy , just as long
as it higher than 50% of that value. In other
words, that while the US policy is very strict on
fishing mortality levels, it is much more flexible
on biomass levels. From this perspective, the
US and the EU system are very different, with
the US policy being much more flexible in its
aspirations for high levels of biomass for all
stocks as a result of sound management. This is
important to have the right expectations when
analyzing the performance of the CFP.
Estimating Fmsy
The notion of Fmsy can be implemented in
different ways according to the type of stock
managed, the type of fishery where it is caught,
and the type and quality of the scientific advice
available. It is not possible to use one single
definition and estimation method and extend
it automatically to all stocks and fisheries. This
implies that the notion of MSY as a magic figure
is neither realistic not possible in many cases.
Single-stock Fmsy vs.
ecosystem-based Fmsy
The traditional Fmsy estimates, such as those
regularly produced by ICES, are primarily based
on single-stock considerations that do not fully
incorporate aspects of the ecosystem func-
tioning, such as density-dependent population
dynamics, sexual maturity, and so on. The
consideration of these factors in the estima-
tion of Fmsy values results in higher levels of
mortality and thus higher sustainable yields. In
other words, ignoring ecosystem factors leads to
estimates of Fmsy that can cause foregone yields.
Certain authors have estimated these fore-
gone yields to be very substantial, in the order
of magnitude of 40% (Gislason 1999; Collie
et al. 2003; Sparholt and Cook 2009; Fernandes
and Cook 2013). ICES is also aware of this fact
(ICES 2013a).
This has very important implications for
management: single-stock Fmsy estimates that
ignoring ecosystem effects may produce in fact
a very ineffective way of exploiting fishery
resources sustainably. This is of high relevance
considering that the policy itself is meant to
promote the ecosystem approach. In the per-
spective of increasing the production of seafood
(see Chapter 13) the need to include ecosys-
tem elements in the estimation of Fmsy levels,
replacing the current single-stock approach,
must be put on the table.
Proxies for data-poor fisheries
Fmsy can be well-estimated in data rich stocks.
However, not all stocks are data-rich, and many
will, arguably, never be. What to do in those
cases? In these cases, a heuristic approach
is necessary, through the use of Fmsy proxies
that provide estimates of Fmsy -like objectives
that can be derived from the data available.
The scientific literature provides for a number
of proxies that can be adequate for different
cases.
ICES (2015) has summarized the approaches
on MSY proxies for data-poor stocks. This
report shows the wide range of methodologies
used by ICES to estimate MSY proxies depend-
ing upon stock characteristics and level of data
availability:
• Life history indicators
• A stochastic production model in continuous
time (SPiCT)
• A mean length mortality estimator
• The length-based spawning potential ratio
(SPR) method
• The catch-based MSY method
• The age-based methods
• ICES also indicate that for certain stocks, such
as silver smelt, the MSY remains difficult to
assess.

There are also very creative approaches where
data-poor stocks can be evaluated through anal-
ogy to similar, data-rich stocks. This is known
as the “Robin Hood approach” whereby val-
ues for parameters of selectivity functions
are provided to data-poor assessments in the
form of penalties on the estimated parameters,
which leads to stock assessments for the most
data-poor stocks being informed by those for
the data-rich stocks (Punt et al. 2011). New
approaches are also being developed based on
the life story parameters of the species: a data-
poor stock can “borrow” the evaluation of
data-poor stocks having a similar life story in
the same area.
The above consideration shows two impor-
tant things: (i) that MSY is not a magic figure
that can be obtained with similar methods in
all cases; and that (ii) the objective of MSY
by 2020 may have to rely on different man-
agement approaches for different stocks. A
standard, unified approach for all stocks is not
possible.
Alternative approaches: escapement
strategies
In some cases, the notion of Fmsy is poorly
adapted to the population structure. In par-
ticular, the abundance of short-lived stocks
(anchovy, sandeel, etc.) depends primarily on
annual recruitment. In these cases, rather than
an elusive Fmsy concept (which would be very
variable in different years), these stocks can
be better managed by the so-called escape-
ment strategies, which consist of evaluating the
strength of the annual year class as the main
component of the spawning stock biomass, and
then reserving a proportion of that biomass that
should “escape” fishing mortality to reproduce
the stock, the rest of the biomass being available
to fishing.
In some cases, managers establish not two,
but three components: one for reproduction,
another one as food for predators, and the third
one as quota for fishing. This is in fact a further
step in the implementation of the ecosystem
approach, by introducing a trophic element
into the evaluation of the amount of fish that
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 53
needs to remain in the sea, not just for stock
reproduction, but for the preservation of a prey
species. We will refer to this in Chapter 8.
ICES has recently reviewed the different
methodological options (ICES 2017). The real
question from the point of view of the policy
is: is an escapement strategy an equivalent
to MSY? The answer is yes: an escapement
strategy can establish, with different levels of
probability, the annual amount of fish that can
be removed while maintaining a high probabil-
ity of avoiding reproductive failure. From that
point, the MSY can be considered as the very
fluctuating yield that could be harvested every
year based on the natural fluctuations of the
stock.
Fmsy as a target or as a limit?
Fmsy can be applied either as a target or a limit.
If it is a target, this implies that the manage-
ment uncertainty can result in real F levels
that are either higher or lower than the Fmsy
established, so that such objective would be
reached only on average. On the contrary, if
Fmsy is considered a limit, then it would be
necessary to establish the probability of the real
fishing mortality to be lower than the limit.
This probability cannot be 100%: this would
imply closing down all fisheries. The question
is then: if Fmsy is a limit, what is the acceptable
probability of managing the fishery within the
limit in practice: 95%? 90%? 51%? Obviously,
depending upon the probability established the
management would give extremely different
results: if the probability is established at 95%,
very low catch limits would be established. The
lower the probability, the higher the catch lev-
els, and if the probability was 51% this would
be almost identical to Fmsy as a target.
This question may look technical but it has
considerable legal and political implications,
in terms of policy output and also in terms of
the evaluation of the success of the policy (see
Chapter 1). If we implement Fmsy as a target,
the good implementation of the policy would
still lead to a situation where in any year stocks
54 Chapter 3
would be equally likely to be above or below
Fmsy . This would not be a bad result at all, if
we look at the history of the CFP, but it would
“look” to some as not corresponding to the
policy objective of the 2013 reform.
If we implement Fmsy a limit, a new discussion
would be necessary to determine the probabil-
ity level that such limit would be overshot. And
in any case, even under the “limit” scenario,
there would still be a certain number of stocks
whose fishing mortality still may be higher
than the limit Fmsy , thus giving the impression
of policy failure if the number of stocks at Fmsy
is not 100% in 2020, even if we succeed in
having all stocks around the target. In any case,
considering Fmsy as a limit, the result would
be that on average the level of exploitation of
stocks would be lower than Fmsy .
The problem is that this issue was not dis-
cussed at all in the trilogue, so any definition
would be legitimate. In practice, the Com-
mission has implemented Fmsy as a target in
the first proposal for a multiannual plan, for
Baltic stocks, although the final decision by the
co-legislators was to apply this as a limit with
exceptions (EU 2016a). The same approach has
been adopted for the North Sea (EU 2018b).
This seems to establish this as the standard to
follow, but the discussion lingers on and it is far
from obvious that this will be consolidated in
the future.
The notion of risk in fishery
management
The above discussion on the use of Fmsy as
limit or target boils down to the discussion
of the notion of risk in fishery management.
As is always the case in the management of
natural resources, the management system has
to deal with a high level of uncertainty, that no
amount of science will ever be able to eliminate
completely.
The question of risk is also double-faced, in
the light of the above considerations on full
utilization of resources: the most obvious risk is
that the rate of exploitation of many stocks will
be higher than that corresponding to long-term
sustainability, but another risk would be to
establish a level of fishing that will be so low (at
least for a number of stocks) that the fishery will
fail to deliver its full potential. The consideration
of these two risks together changes substan-
tially the notion of risk which, traditionally,
only referred to the risk of overexploitation.
The level of risk acceptable is not a sim-
ple question. It depends on many factors and
ultimately, it depends on the weight given by
managers and stakeholders to different factors,
such as the economic and social consequences
of their choice of risk level. It is then logical
that in different cases, different fisheries and
different places the level of acceptable risk may
be different.
Traditionally, the notion of risk has been asso-
ciated only with the biological aspects: provided
that the risk of biological over-exploitation is
averted, all other risks tended to be ignored.
It is important that this risk continues to be
averted: the CFP’s job to ensure sustainable
stocks is not yet achieved, and all efforts should
continue to be done toward that objective.
However, as we move to a future where the
individual stock objectives will be combined
with the landing obligation and all under rela-
tive stability, the risk of under-exploitation will
have to start being looked at just as well, since
such under-exploitation is also contrary to the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
The level of risk will obviously determine the
relative success of the policy: a very low risk
management will ensure that most stocks will
not be overfished, but at a cost: a lower level
of exploitation of potential yields and potential
food production. A higher risk can lead to a cer-
tain number of stocks being overfished, but a
potentially higher overall level of exploitation
and food production.
To be sure, the biological health of the
resources is a pre-condition for the other
objectives of Article 39 TFEU to be achieved.
Biological sustainability must therefore be a
priority in terms of risk evaluation. But the
question is: when certain levels of sustainability
are achieved, at least for the main species, the
further pursuit of biological recovery may lead
to very significant foregone yields, which in

turn can be considered as not corresponding to
some of the objectives of Article 39.
The US case
In the case of the US, the first of the 10 national
standards talk about “optimum yield.” This opti-
mum yield is defined as:
Maximum Sustainable Yield as reduced by social,
economic or ecological factors (emphasis added).
The word “reduced” was introduced in the
2006 reauthorization of the MSA to replace
the term “modified,” as it was understood that
the MSY modified by social and economic fac-
tors gave rise often to TAC levels that did not
ensure the sustainability of the stocks.
The term “as reduced” clearly indicates that
the MSY notion is a limit, not a target. However,
there is no indication of what is the probability
level to overshoot MSY, as we indicated above.
This level of risk of overshooting the limit is
decided on a case-by-case basis, following the
advice of the Regional Councils, each of which
have a risk management policy. Many use a
P* (probability of overfishing) concept.8 This
implies that, in some cases, the TACs are estab-
lished at F values considerably lower than Fmsy ,
that is, at a very low level of risk, while in other
cases the TACs corresponds to F values much
closer to Fmsy (higher levels of risk). In those
cases, there is little difference between the F as
a limit and the F as a target.
In any case, the US system has an obvious
effect: it leads to lower levels of fishing than
those corresponding to a full exploitation of
resources at MSY levels. This has been described
as a system of “conscious under-exploitation
of natural marine resources so that marine
ecosystems are preserved in perpetuity while
contributing to food production” (Mace 1999).
This is, however, an objective that reflects
what one can qualify as a US perspective that
is, the philosophy that under-exploiting fish-
ery resources is not a problem, because the
8 http://archive.nefmc.org/tech/cte_mtg_docs/
101102-03/abc_control_rules/5_Fisheries%20Forum
%20-%20Regl%20Risk%20Policy%20Report.pdf/
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 55
country has very extensive and fertile farmland
to ensure food security. While this is under-
standable for countries like the US or Canada,
the idea of a policy of “conscious under-
exploitation” of fishery resources is less obvious
for countries with limited capacity to produce
food, or even for countries relying on imported
fish (as we will see in Chapter 12).
Fmsy : a point value or a range?
Background
Regulation 1380/2013 does not define how to
express Fmsy . While it is true that in the absence
of such definition it is generally understood that
Fmsy is a point value of fishing mortality, it is also
true that other interpretations are also possible,
such as considering Fmsy as a range of F levels
that would tend to deliver MSY.
The question is important for a very simple
reason: it is not clear that in mixed fisheries all
stocks can be fished exactly at their individual
Fmsy levels. That means that if some stocks in
the mix are fished at their individual Fmsy value,
other stocks may be fished at higher or lower
values of fishing mortality. And the only option
to ensure that no individual stock is fished at
levels higher than Fmsy is probably to fish some
of the stocks in the mix at F levels lower than
Fmsy : it is clear that all stocks cannot be fished at
Fmsy simultaneously.
The Commission, in the framework of long-
term plans, has proposed to express Fmsy values
for individual stocks as F ranges, not point val-
ues. There are two reasons:
• The need to find a solution to the institutional
deadlock on the relationship between Coun-
cil and Parliament on the interpretation of
Articles 43§2 and 43§3 TFEU; and
• The need to find a solution to the possible
effects of the combination of three policy
elements: MSY for individual stocks, discard
ban and relative stability in mixed fisheries,
possibly leading to the need to close fish-
eries when the quota of the weakest stock
is exhausted while plentiful quotas for other
associated stocks remain uncaught (see the
56 Chapter 3
“choke species” issue in Chapter 4); a sce-
nario that could be considered as contrary to
Article 39 TFEU.
In the first long-term plan adopted (for the
Baltic Sea) the co-legislators accepted this
approach but including a considerable number
of conditions on the use of the upper and lower
part of the F ranges. In any case, the issue
remains controversial, and NGOs in particular
consider that Fmsy values in the upper part of
the range are higher than Fmsy , that means,
they consider that Fmsy can only be a point
value.
The case for fishing mortality ranges
The idea that the Fmsy notion is necessarily a
point value is not warranted. Selecting a target
fishing mortality rate within a range allows
optimization of sustainable yields while allow-
ing consideration of other aspects to be included
in decision-making (Hilborn 2010). In addi-
tion, the flatness of the yield curves of many
stocks (Pope 1983) allows for a large space to
operate in that regard. In economic terms, it
is obvious that in mixed fisheries, achieving
overall economic benefits may require certain
low-productivity stocks to be fished at fishing
mortality rates higher than those correspond-
ing to their individual Fmsy (Pascoe and Mardle
2001).
This suggested the consideration by the Com-
mission of fishing mortality ranges as a possible
solution. This was also aided by the need to
resolve a long-standing inter-institutional irri-
tant that had blocked the adoption of new
management plans and even the amendment
of existing ones since the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon in 2010.
F ranges and the inter-institutional problem
It is important to leave a written record of
the institutional reasons why the Commission
proposed, and the legislators finally accepted,
to implement the fishing mortality objectives
as F ranges in the Baltic Sea multispecies
management plan (EU 2016a), establishing a
precedent for subsequent plans.
The first recovery and management plans,
adopted under the previous basic regulation
(EU 2002) were prior to co-decision in fish-
eries. That means that both the multiannual
plans and the corresponding annual TACs were
adopted by the Council of Ministers alone. This
allowed the plans to establish “harvest control
rules” that would turn the annual decisions
on TACs into an exercise of implementation
of a multiannual strategy. This was institu-
tionally acceptable, although not exempt of
implementation problems, because it meant
annual self-discipline, imposed by Council onto
itself.
But everything changed with the Treaty
of Lisbon, which established that co-decision
(under Article 43§2 TFEU) would be the ordi-
nary legislative procedure for the CFP, while
certain annual regulations, such as annual
TACs and fish guide prices would remain as
an exclusive competence of Council (under
Article 43§3 TFEU). As a consequence, the
multiannual management plans would have
to be adopted by co-decision (Art. 43§2) while
annual TACs would still be adopted only by
Council (Art. 43§3). This introduced a new
problem: if the multiannual plans continued to
include detailed “harvest control rules” estab-
lishing the “formula” to calculate annual TACs
for the stocks concerned, then the decisions on
annual TACs would be just “rubber-stamping”
of the multiannual plans, and therefore the
Council under Art. 43§3 would have no room
for maneuver (TACs would be automatically
established by the harvest control rule, and
Art. 43§3 would then be devoid of content,
at least for the stocks under these plans).
This was politically unacceptable for Council
that saw the establishment of annual TACs
as a prerogative that it was not ready to
give up.
The alternative proposed by Council (that
multiannual plans would not include a harvest
control rule) was not acceptable for the Parlia-
ment, or indeed for the Commission:
• For the Parliament, because excluding the
harvest control rule from multiannual plans
would remove from co-decision some of the

most important decisions in the CFP: those
concerning the basic balance between the
biological need to recover the resources,
and the consideration of gradual approaches
to take economic and social factors into
account. This balance is best expressed in
the harvest control rule of the plans. For the
European Parliament, the position of Council
meant leaving Art. 43§2 empty of content as
regards fundamental decisions on resource
management.
• For the Commission, because a multian-
nual plan without a long-term strategy on
how to establish annual TACs would be
worthless, and also because a plan with-
out self-discipline by Council would be a
step backwards: without any rules on TAC
setting, the annual TAC setting process
would revert to past practice as stand-alone
decision-making procedure based on short-
term considerations.
In this context, the lack of agreement
between the two co-legislators resulted in a
period of more than five years (from the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in January
2010 to the adoption of the Baltic multiannual
plan in early 2016) in which no single plan
was adopted or even amended. This situation
clearly had to be resolved. And the solution
was so difficult that the Commission proposed
and the co-legislators agreed to avoid the
question in the context of the negotiations
for the reform of the CFP concluded in 2013.
In fact, article 10.1 of regulation 1380/2013
reads:
As appropriate, and without prejudice to the
respective competences under the Treaty, multian-
nual plans shall include . . .
This language was crafted to ensure that the
institutional impediment did not stand in the
way of an agreement on the reform package, so
the question would have to be resolved at a later
stage.
Once the CFP reform was adopted the
co-legislators established a Task Force to find
a solution to the problem. This Task force was
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 57
structured as a trilogue, and worked on the basis
of Commission non-papers proposing compro-
mise solutions. After a number of meetings of
the Task Force, a final text was agreed, provid-
ing for a satisfactory and balanced solution to
the problem.
The key to the agreement was the Commis-
sion’s idea to implement the Fmsy objectives as
ranges instead of point values. This means that
the multiannual plans would not determine an
exact formula to calculate annual TACs, but
only a framework within which different TACs
would be possible. This provided a win–win
situation:
• For Parliament, it ensured that they had a
say in determining the basic balance between
biology and socio-economics in the manage-
ment of EU fisheries, by fixing the fishing
mortality limits and timetable (as well as
the safeguards, see below) of stock recov-
ery and management within multiannual
plans;
• For Council, it ensured that annual TACs
would not be entirely constrained by co-
decision: within the established frame-
work, annual TACs could still vary to
some extent, depending on Council-alone
decisions.
The conclusions of the Task Force were
a breakthrough, in terms of how to find a
solution to the problem and how to move
forward. Meaningfully, the Task Force was
composed, in the three institutions (Council,
Parliament, and Commission) by the same
people who had negotiated the reform, which
clearly indicates that the Task Force was ideally
placed to interpret the intentions of the legis-
lators in 2013 when finding a solution to this
problem.
The conclusions of the Task Force were not
formally adopted by the co-legislators, so their
value is more political than legal. They were
instrumental in agreeing on the Baltic plan and
subsequent ones, which demonstrates their
considerable policy value.
58 Chapter 3
F ranges: handle with care. Are they
precautionary?
The main problem associated to the use of F
ranges is the allegation that the upper part of the
F ranges may not be precautionary. As we saw
above, the Baltic plan established limitations
on the use of the upper part of the F ranges. In
fact, scientists have warned that sustained fish-
ing in the upper part of the ranges may lead to
unacceptable risks when technical interactions
occur (Ulrich et al. 2017).
The reply to this question is not straight-
forward. In a meta-analysis carried out by
European scientists, to assess if “pretty good
yield” F ranges can be used without impairing
recruitment, it is demonstrated that the reply to
this question is different in different cases. By
analyzing a limited number of cases, they found
that fishing at Fmsy is generally precautionary
with respect to impairing recruitment for highly
exploited teleost species in Northern waters,
whereas the upper part of the range providing
95% of MSY is not necessarily precautionary
for small and medium-size teleost fish. The
study further concludes that these results do
not apply to non-teleost fish, such as sharks
and rays, with lower reproductive potential
(Rindorf et al. 2016). This points to the consid-
eration of an asymmetrical range around the
Fmsy point value, with more flexibility for the
lower than the upper part of the range.
This implies that the use of F ranges must
be subject to the evaluation of the precaution-
ary character of the upper part of the range,
and this has to be assessed case-by-case. In
other words, F ranges must not be a right but
just a possibility to address the mixed fishery
problems described above, and always within
a framework of achieving sustainability. The
solution to this is already available: scientists
can calculate ranges that correspond to “pre-
cautionary” levels, understood as 95% chance
of spawning stock biomass staying above Blim .
In the case of the North Sea multiannual plan,
the higher number of species involved, and the
secondary nature of some species, introduced a
new element: the possible choke species effects.
Such effects would be especially unwelcome if
caused by minor species of minimal value in the
overall economic performance of the fleet. This
introduced a new element in the picture: the
definition of two categories of stocks: those with
specific F objectives (target stocks) and the sec-
ondary stocks (by-catch stocks) for which other
measures would be established.
The comparison between the two cases shows
a positive evolution, demonstrating that some
of the lessons of the Baltic case were learnt.
In addition to the distinction among target
and by-catch species, particularly necessary
because of the much higher number of stocks
managed in the North Sea as compared with
the Baltic, the North Sea plan included a much
more flexible approach for the provision of sci-
entific information and deriving management
advice.
The on-going experience: MSY
in multiannual management
plans
Whatever the theoretical considerations, the
notion of MSY, both related to fishing mortal-
ity and to spawning stock biomass is already
subject to practical implementation, notably in
the context of multiannual management plans
(MAPs). At the time of writing this volume,
two of such plans have been adopted under the
new CFP, and others are in the pipeline. MAPs
already in place are those for the Baltic Sea (EU
2016a) and for demersal stocks in the North Sea
(EU 2018b). Moving forward, the tendency of
the CFP to “cut and paste” precedents to ensure
a level playing field is very likely to establish
these two MAPs as the “gold standard” in terms
of how the MSY approach is implemented.
F ranges and the choke species
problem: the Baltic precedent
The negotiation of the Baltic multiannual plan
was a first opportunity to apply the guidelines
adopted to resolve the institutional deadlock,
but also to recognize that individual Fmsy values
in mixed fisheries could result in certain sus-
tainable quotas not being fully exploited, due

to choke species effects. This discussion was
made difficult by the lack of experience: the
arguments were theoretical, and it was not easy
for the co-legislators to grasp the problem in
practice.
On the other hand, the insistence from cer-
tain groups in the European parliament, who
were reluctant to accept the idea of Fmsy being
represented by a range, led to the adoption of
a solution that would minimize the use of the
upper part of the range and would establish
safeguards in case stock abundance would fall
under certain levels. For example, according to
Article 4.4 of the regulation, the upper part of
the F range could be used only in the following
cases:
(a) if, on the basis of scientific advice or evi-
dence, it is necessary for the achievement
of the objectives laid down in Article 3 in
the case of mixed fisheries;
(b) if, on the basis of scientific advice or evi-
dence, it is necessary to avoid serious harm
to a stock caused by intra- or inter-species
stock dynamics; or
(c) in order to limit variations in fishing oppor-
tunities between consecutive years to not
more than 20%.
In addition, legislators also adopted certain
safeguards, laid down in Article 5 of the reg-
ulation to the effect that, if the biomass of
the stocks regulated would fall under a cer-
tain threshold level, this would trigger special
action.
Overall, this was a compromise that preserved
the basis of the inter-institutional agreement
and provided for some flexibility in the imple-
mentation of fishing mortality targets, but
with limits and guarantees to prevent possible
negative effects of an excessive flexibility. The
difficulty in adopting this regulation was jus-
tified not only on the differences of approach
allowed under Regulation 1380/2013, but
also based on the value of this proposal as a
precedent for others, in yet another example
of the tendency of the CFP to ensure a level
playing field that stifles the necessary flexibility
of approach in different circumstances.
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 59
The consolidation of F ranges
The Fmsy ranges were consolidated in the first
two multiannual plans referred to above. The
plans established an F range divided in two
parts, upper and lower, separated by the Fmsy
point value, with associated conditions for the
use of both parts. In fact, these plans introduced
the idea of F levels in the lower part of the range
(that is, using Fmsy as a limit) as the normal
criterion, leaving the use of the upper part of
the range to very special conditions:
• When the stocks concerned have a spawn-
ing stock biomass higher than an estimated
threshold level (MSY Btrigger ); and
• When it was necessary for the purpose of
avoiding choke species effects and preventing
too high inter-annual variations of the TACs
(up to 20%).
This implies that Fmsy should be considered to
be a limit in normal circumstances, and only in
case of healthy stocks, and on additional consid-
erations of choke species or inter-annual stock
variation, can the upper part of the range be
used. In other words: Fmsy is used as a limit, and
in special circumstances as a target.
The question of how frequently will the plan
actually allow for the use of the upper part of the
range will depend on how the scientific advice
interprets the notion of MSY Btrigger . In fact, the
Baltic multiannual plan defines MSY Btrigger as:
MSY Btrigger means the MSY trigger reference
point, expressed as spawning stock biomass, below
which specific and appropriate management action
is to be taken to ensure that the exploitation rates,
in combination with natural variations, rebuild the
stocks above levels capable of producing maxi-
mum sustainable yield in the long term (emphasis
added).
This definition is different than the one pro-
vided by ICES, and this only introduces an
undesirable confusion. In effect, ICES define
MSY Btrigger simply as “the value of spawning stock
biomass (SSB) that triggers specific management
action” 9 .
9 www.ices.dk/community/Documents/Advice/
Acronyms_and_terminology.pdf/
60 Chapter 3
In addition, the idea that MSY Btrigger should
“ensure” anything when combined with natural
variations is an example of trying to legislate the
behavior of nature, something obviously hope-
less. The idea of ensuring a given result in terms
of biomass for a highly fluctuating fish stock is
alien to the management of natural resources.
Finally, it is difficult to interpret what is meant
by “in combination with natural variations.”
If this definition is treated literally by sci-
entists, it may result in fisheries being closed
when the biomass is lower than MSY Btrigger ,
and even so this would never “ensure” that
biomass rebuilds to any given level. In fact,
this definition tries in practice to recover the
proposal by the Greens during the 2013 reform
process, who wanted the objective of the policy
to be expressed in biomass. In a way, this lan-
guage implies that the fishing mortality should
be determined by the obligation to reach a
certain biomass level, rather than considering
the biomass level as an expectation if and when
the right fishing mortality is applied.
Finally, having a definition of MSY Btrigger
in EU law that does not correspond to the
ICES definition is a perfect formula to create
confusion. The alignment of the EU defini-
tion to the one used by ICES would be the
best solution to avoid any confusion or wrong
expectations.
The safeguards: biomass thresholds
The two MAPs also established a system of safe-
guards. Although the co-legislators understood
that the intention of the basic regulation as
regards the MSY objective was to use fishing
mortality, and not biomass as the operational
parameter, the aspiration on Bmsy strongly
influenced the outcome of the trilogue on the
two MAPs. In particular, under strong pres-
sure by the Greens the two MAPs included
biomass-related safeguards. They imply that if
the estimated spawning stock biomass of the
stocks concerned were below certain thresh-
old levels, then exceptional measures would
apply.
This implies that one of the declared objec-
tives of the F ranges, as mentioned above, the
avoidance of “choke species” problems, can only
take place in certain cases, when biomass lev-
els are in excess of threshold levels. This limits
considerably the value of F ranges.
Should all plans reproduce that
precedent?
Under the CFP, there is a strong tendency to
follow precedent. The question is, then: should
other areas, where circumstances are different,
follow the same model? This is of particular
relevance for the establishment of MAPs in the
Mediterranean.
If precedent is followed, once a strategy
for implementing MSY has been established
for one MAP, the same strategy should be
employed in subsequent plans to ensure a level
playing field. However, there is a fundamental
problem with this approach: it corresponds to
the deeply-rooted tradition of the CFP that
maintaining a level playing field implies leg-
islative harmonization, something that the US
system (see Chapter 2) proves wrong: the same
standards can be reached with very different
solutions. A “cut and paste” strategy based on
the Baltic precedent may be politically easier,
but has important downsides:
• It ignores the capacity of the system to learn
from experience.
• It ignores the different characteristics of
the different fisheries in question, which
can have, inter alia, very different needs to
address choke species problems.
• It ignores the differences in the management
instruments used. While these safeguards can
work for a TAC-based system, they may be
inadequate for the effort-based system used
in the Mediterranean.
Overall, the development of multiannual
management plans, the centerpiece of EU fish-
eries management under the new CFP, should
respond to the philosophy that inspired the
regionalization of the policy: to achieve the
same standards while adapting to the charac-
teristics of different fisheries and sea basins.
This implies an important change in current
practice, as we will see in Chapter 9.

Fmsy for all stocks: what does it
mean?
Article 2.2 of the basic CFP regulation estab-
lishes MSY objectives for all stocks. But is it
obvious what that means in practice?
Although the standard interpretation in the
Atlantic and the Baltic is that “all stocks” means
those with a TAC, a number of doubts have been
raised regarding the exact interpretation, partic-
ularly in the context of multiannual manage-
ment plans:
• For some stocks there is no standard estimate
of MSY, so they can hardly be treated as those
having such estimates.
• Some stocks are small and marginal, and the
value of their management at Fmsy is almost
nil, as the fishery is conducted on the basis
of the main stocks. Some of these stocks can
also be important choke species. This poses a
serious question of proportionality.
• In the Mediterranean, where TAC manage-
ment does not exist, the whole notion of “all
stocks” is open and subject to different possi-
ble approaches.
• Finally, the regulation itself has an alterna-
tive to Fmsy objectives, as laid down in Article
9.5 of Regulation 1380/2013 for cases where
increases in selectivity in mixed fisheries may
not be possible. In this case, specific alterna-
tive measures shall be taken.
The term “all stocks” has to be defined on a
case-by-case basis in the context of the multi-
annual plan. In fact, an important precedent
has already been set in the North Sea man-
agement plan for demersal stocks (EU 2018b):
the distinction between target stocks for which
specific Fmsy ranges are established as objectives,
and the by-catch stocks for which an alternative
approach is set.
In the case of the Mediterranean, the ques-
tion is even more complex. The recent proposal
for a multiannual plan for the management of
demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean
(EU 2018c) establishes F ranges as objectives for
a relatively wide range of stocks. This approach,
largely influenced by the aforementioned Baltic
and North Sea MAP development approaches,
poses a new problem: since the management
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 61
instrument proposed is primarily an effort
regime: how can the effort level ensure that
the fishing mortality of all these stocks is kept
within the range? This is a question where
only the ongoing discussion and the future
experience of implementation will tell.
Data-poor and secondary stocks:
manage them to MSY?
Introduction
All fishery management systems in the world
have to cope with stocks for which there is too
little scientific information to ensure proper sci-
entific evaluation. As fisheries research tends to
concentrate on the most commercially impor-
tant species, data-poor stocks tend to be those
of minor economic importance, although there
are exceptions to this general rule.
All management systems, to a different
degree, handle this question on the basis of two
different kinds of solution:
• Trying to regulate all stocks, even at the cost
of many of them being subject to very sim-
plistic and unsophisticated advice and man-
agement, as data-poor stocks.
• Trying to regulate only the main stocks (gen-
erally the most important commercially, but
this can also vary) and leaving secondary
stocks outside the evaluation/management
cycle, and assuming that the management of
the main stocks can provide sufficient assur-
ance that secondary stocks will be reasonably
healthy.
Different management systems have a dif-
ferent combination of these two solutions,
although some, like the US or the New Zealand
systems, tend to solve the problem by enlarging
the evaluation to the widest possible range
of stocks. This implies that while the main
species are fully evaluated, the less important
ones must have simplified evaluation. In New
Zealand, for example, more than 600 stocks
have been defined (most of them in inshore
waters) but only around 24 have a “state of
the art” evaluation. For the rest, simplified
methods are used (Kevin Stokes, personal
62 Chapter 3
communication). In the US west coast, 2/3 of
the 90+ managed stocks are without traditional
assessments to help define stock status in rela-
tion to management targets. For those cases,
stock complexes are often employed for man-
agement purposes. Productivity–susceptibility
analysis (PSA) is used to assess the vulnerabili-
ties of these stocks (Cope et al. 2011).
The evaluation and management of data-poor
stocks have been subject to different approaches,
in the US (Cope et al. 2015), Australia (Dowling
et al. 2015) and other countries. Interestingly,
some of the US regional councils have encour-
aged the preparation of guidelines on the
assessment of data-poor stocks (Anon. 2011).
Progress in the evaluation of data-poor sin-
gle stocks has been important in recent years
(Thorson et al. 2013; Rosenberg et al. 2014), so
there are fewer and fewer excuses for failing to
address the management of these stocks.
In the case of the CFP, the approach is mixed.
The evaluation/management system applies
to the main but not all stocks occurring in EU
waters, but among them many are data-poor
and subject to a different evaluation method-
ology. In fact, a number of EU-regulated stocks
have always been data-poor and have long
suffered from almost total absence of scientific
advice. An important improvement was intro-
duced in 2012 through the data-limited stocks
(DLS) approach, which provides precautionary
quantitative advice on data-deficient stocks
(ICES 2012). This new approach has in fact
established a new scenario, where the number
of stocks without advice has been dramatically
reduced. The issue has also received attention
from the European Parliament, which commis-
sioned a very useful study on the subject in
2013 (O’Brien and Le Quesne 2013).
Which stocks to manage?
We referred above to the question of what
stocks should be considered subject to the
MSY objective as the basic regulation refers
to all stocks. But the question of the stocks to
manage is wider: over and beyond the specific
management of all regulated stocks under a
specific MSY objective, the question of whether
certain secondary stocks should be managed at
all must also be discussed.
The debate is complex. In principle, it would
seem as though the largest the number of stocks
evaluated and managed, the better, from the
point of view of ensuring sustainability and
ecosystem stability. However, the question is
not so simple, and the extension of the num-
ber of species evaluated and management ad
infinitum would also have downsides:
• Evaluation and management are costly. In
the US it is estimated that relatively sim-
ple assessment can cost between $30 000
and $50 000 (excluding the cost of basic
research), while a more complex evaluation
can cost $250 000–$300 000 (Lapointe et al.
2012). And this cost does not include data
collection or peer review. This is higher than
the annual revenue generated by certain
secondary stocks. There is, therefore, an
important consideration of cost effectiveness
of the management system.
• The increase in the number of regulated
stocks makes management more complex
(including more complicated rules on quota
management, technical measures, choke
species effects, etc.) with less than obvi-
ous benefits in terms of the overall fishing
pressure on the main species.
• Some of the secondary species represent a
very low percentage of the catches, and even
a low percentage of the biomass in the ecosys-
tem. It is estimated that, in the North Sea,
the main seven species regulated account
for 90% of the catches, while the remaining
10% accounted for 15–20 species. A num-
ber of these secondary species are indeed
part of the TAC and quota system, repre-
senting increased complexity and cost and
little, if any, benefit in terms of the overall
management of the North Sea fishery.
The CFP, like most fisheries management
systems around the world, does not manage
all the species of the ecosystem. In general
terms, only the main commercial species are
regulated, while species of minor economic
importance are generally left out of the man-
agement system. This has been justified, for

example in the case of Norway, by at least two
reasons (Gullestad et al. 2014):
• The management of minor species is not
cost-effective.
• Many of these species are coastal and largely
exploited by an unknown number of recre-
ational fishermen.
By and large, these reasons can also be
applied to the management of stocks in the
Atlantic and Baltic under the CFP. Certain
stocks represent such a low economic inter-
est that the cost of their management could
actually be greater than the economic value of
the landings. In some other cases, very local,
coastal fish are only exploited by very artisanal
or recreational fishermen, and do not lend
themselves to management at European level.
Are the EU-managed stocks the right
ones?
As the policy applies to the regulated stocks,
it is pertinent to ask the question whether the
stocks currently regulated under the CFP are
the right ones. Does the CFP need to include
more stocks? Or perhaps certain secondary
stocks should not necessarily be managed?
The achievement of the Fmsy objectives for
stocks of secondary importance poses several
kinds of problem:
• A number of them are data-poor, and do not
have estimates of Fmsy . It is necessary to use
proxies.
• Some of them do not have any real influence
on the decisions made by the skippers. The
question is then whether it is worth to invest
in their research and management. Should
these stocks be kept under the TAC and quota
system?
• Some secondary stocks must be subject to
the discard ban from 2019 onward because
they have a TAC. This aggravates the “choke
species” problem (see Chapter 6).
Actually, the list of regulated stocks in Euro-
pean waters is not necessarily the result of an
objective analysis of the cost/effectiveness of
their inclusion in the management system, but
rather the result of many years of develop-
ment of the policy, very often responding to
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 63
political considerations, over and beyond pure
cost/effective management.
Stocks that perhaps should be managed
by the CFP
Some stocks of considerable importance are not
managed under the CFP. There can be several
reasons to explain this:
• Certain stocks were not present, or sought
after by fishermen at the time of establishing
the list of regulated stocks (1983 for the
initial ones, with more stocks added as a
result of successive enlargements). In recent
times, however, either their presence has
increased (due to global warming?) or new
commercial interest has been developed. This
case is exemplified by stripped red mullet
(Mullus surmulentus) in the North Sea, now
abundant and commercially exploited in
this area but not yet subject to management
under the CFP. The reason is that the man-
agement would require an allocation key
among Member States, a question for which
there is no appetite in any administration.
• In other cases, the difficulty of solving
allocation problems among Member States
concerned prevented the EU from taking
measures to manage stocks that were always
considered commercially and biologically
very important. There is no better example
of this than Iberian sardine, shared by Spain
and Portugal and essential for both Member
States, but traditionally not subject to EU
management under the CFP because no
agreement on allocation could be reached.
Only in recent years has the EU agreed to
delegate the management of this stock to the
two Member States concerned.
• Finally, in other cases the key importance of
recreational fishing in the management of
the stock represents a major obstacle for tra-
ditional EU management, which as we saw
generally excludes recreational fishing. This
is the case of sea bass (Dycentrarchus labrax)
where the already difficult question of allo-
cation among Member States only adds to
the difficulty of regulating the massive level
of recreational catches. Recent measures
64 Chapter 3
adopted for this stock demonstrate the dif-
ficulty of addressing that combination of
problems in a stock that should benefit from
high priority for management on account of
its economic and ecological importance in
EU waters.
The solution to this problem is not straight-
forward. Bringing these stocks under CFP man-
agement would in effect require an agreement
on allocation. This has proven difficult enough
but in the context of the implementation of the
new CFP of 2013, bringing more species into
the TAC and quota system would only aggravate
the choke species problem. In addition, these
species are not unregulated; either they have
some kind of provisional management, or man-
agement by Member States through delegation,
with results that must be carefully evaluated.
For these reasons, the balance of pros and cons
of such an initiative must be carefully balanced.
Beyond that, there is also a question of need
and priority. Put it another way, a question of
cost/efficiency. If we take the three cases above,
there is a different degree of need to bring these
stocks in the CFP.
• For stripped red mullet in the North Sea and
adjacent areas, ICES have produced advice.
Nothing therefore prevents its management.
However, the question must be evaluated
in the light of several questions: how does
a fishery for this stock interact with other
stocks subject to EU TACs and relative stabil-
ity? What would be the added value for the
overall management of North Sea stocks?
How much of a choke species effect would
this produce? The fact that there seems to be
no particular demand to manage this stock
tend to give a certain indication that the
possible management of this stock may be
seen more as a problem than a solution to
anything.
• For Iberian sardine, the stock is regularly
evaluated (ICES 2013b), so the scientific
basis is available (and better than that for
other stocks under EU TACs). The question is
whether the bilateral management between
Spain and Portugal, now enshrined in EU
law, is equivalent to that under direct EU
management.
• For sea bass, the status of the stock, with
increasing fishing mortality and plummeting
biomass, together with its widely-distributed
nature and the complex mix of gears and
Member States involved, should make it a
real priority to bring this stock under the
mainstream EU management system. Recent
arrangements (EU 2017) in the absence of
such management, can only be considered
an exceptional, transitional situation. In
addition, it is perhaps the best example of
how an efficient management regime for a
stock cannot take place if recreational fishing
is not included in management.
Overall, the question of which stocks should
be managed under the EU regime is not only
about reducing the number of stocks, but also
about the need and opportunity to include a
few, key ones. Furthermore, it is important for
the future of the CFP that the discussion on
which stocks to include under the EU man-
agement system should take the form of a
science-based analysis of advantages and dis-
advantages, and not consideration on political
opportunity.
Stocks that perhaps should not be managed
by the CFP
The CFP has brought into the TAC and quota
system a certain number of species of secondary
importance. The reasons are varied, but in gen-
eral they originated from the idea of ensuring
that no fishery can develop outside the TAC
and quota system itself or, in some cases, to use
the management (and the associated relative
stability) to consolidate fishing rights. While
these are legitimate considerations for Member
States and their industries, the result is a system
where the need and opportunity to regulate
certain species can be questioned.
In effect, certain species are secondary in
economic terms; there are almost no directed
fisheries for them, and their catches do not
determine fisheries behavior: what happens
with them is more likely to be the result of man-
agement and business decisions that are taken

based on the main target species in the fishery.
There is very limited scientific knowledge about
some of these, and given their relatively low
overall value, it is doubtful whether the sci-
entific community should invest their limited
research resources to investigate them.
These species, generally included in the data-
poor category, have been managed on the basis
of very simple considerations and often pro-
duced “paper fish.” Overall, these species were
not considered a problem, since they never
drew too much attention or efforts to manage
them. Under the current regulatory scenario,
however, their inclusion in the list of species to
be subject to the landing obligation as of 2019,
introduces a new factor: they can contribute to
aggravate the choke species effect without their
management being necessary to manage the
target species in fishery.
In this context, it is opportune to ask the
question of what is the added value of having
such species in the management system. Should
they continue being managed by the CFP? Two
cases are worth looking at: dab and flounder in
the North Sea and boarfish in western waters.
Dab and flounder in the North Sea
These are secondary species in the beam-trawl
flatfish fishery. The reason why they were
included in the TAC and quota system was to
prevent the development of a fishery by Span-
ish vessels in the North Sea, upon the Spanish
accession in 1986. Upon accession, Spain did
not obtain quotas of regulated species in this
area, where it had no track record of fishing.
But theoretically Spain could have developed a
fishery entirely based on non-regulated species
in these waters. For this reason, certain sec-
ondary stocks, hitherto non-regulated, were
subject to TACs since 1985. It is to be noted
that the likelihood of Spain developing such
a fishery for non-regulated species alone was
extremely low.
The annual TACs for these species is practi-
cally meaningless because there is no evaluation
of these stocks, and the fishery where they are
caught is governed by the sole and plaice. How-
ever, when it comes to the landing obligation,
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 65
the two species will have to be retained on
board, and could become choke species.
In fact, the Commission has already taken
the initiative of asking ICES what would be
the effect of removing these stocks from the
management system under the CFP. The ICES
report concluded that:
ICES advises that the risk of having no catch
limits for the dab and flounder stocks is currently
considered to be low and not inconsistent with the
objectives of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
The advice is valid as long as dab and flounder
remain largely by-catch species, with the main
fleets catching dab and flounder continuing to
fish the target species (plaice and sole) sustainably
within the FMSY ranges provided by ICES.
The message is very clear: the inclusion of
dab and flounder in the annual TAC and quota
regulation is not really necessary. This certainly
constitutes a precedent of a type of analysis
that could well be extended to other stocks and
areas.
Boarfish
The boarfish represents a very different case.
This small fish (Capros aper) started to be
exploited by Irish fishermen at the beginning of
the 2000s, and by 2006 had reached significant
levels (Stange 2016). As the fishery (used for
fish meal) expanded, a TAC was established for
the first time in 2011 (EU 2011). At the time,
the idea was to ensure adequate management
of the fishery – and to “fix” relative stability on
it by the initiators of the fishery. However, the
by-catches of this species in fisheries targeting
other stocks were not considered. Following
the adoption of the landing obligation, concerns
that this species would “choke” for other fish-
eries arose, and a number of fishing interests in
Europe have questioned the wisdom of having
a TAC on this stock.
This case is much less clear-cut than the pre-
vious one, at least for two reasons:
• This stock is subject to a directed fishery
by some Member States, it is not simply a
bycatch. Thus, the need for management, as
the stock is not indirectly managed through
the management of the main target species
66 Chapter 3
in the fishery, as in the case of dab and
flounder.
• The relative stability for this stock is very
unbalanced, so the removal of the TAC would
have a very different meaning for different
Member States.
Other stocks?
The discard ban provides a good opportunity to
revise the list of species subject to TACs and quo-
tas, for the purpose of ensuring that those reg-
ulated are those that determine the behavior of
the fleets, while ensuring that no unnecessary
complexity or burden is imposed on either the
industry, the scientific community or fisheries
managers.
A recent ICES report (ICES 2018), requested
by the European Commission, has concluded
that removing the EU TACs for the following
stocks would generate a low risk of stocks
being exploited unsustainably. This report does
not refer to the landing obligation, but only
to the cost/efficiency of continuing adopting
single-stock TACs for them:
• Plaice in ICES Division VII.a
• Plaice in ICES divisions VII.f and VII.g
• Tusk (Brosme brosme) in ICES Division III.a
and Subarea IV
• Plaice in ICES Subdivision III.a.21
• Lemon sole (Microstomus kitt) in ICES Division
III.a, Subarea IV, and Division VII.d
• Cod in ICES Division V.b
• Haddock in ICES Division V.b.
This exercise, however, cannot be done sim-
ply on the basis of an evaluation of the added
value of the TAC from the point of view of man-
agement: it also has to take account of whether
the possible removal of the TAC would have
an effect in altering relative stability. This is
yet another example of how the distributional
questions in the CFP often stand in the way of
a possible rationalization of the management,
and shows the increasing contradiction of a
very integrated EU policy that still relies on a
fixed, rigid distribution of rights among Mem-
ber States, something that has been addressed
in other policies, but that has always been taboo
in the CFP.
The case of deep-sea stocks
The above considerations have already resulted
in the elimination of several TACs in the spe-
cific case of the deep-sea stocks, regulated
since 2004 through biannual TACs. The last
regulation on these stocks (EU 2018d) elim-
inated certain TACs existing in the previous
one (EU 2016b): for example no TAC for black
scabbardfish in ICES subareas 1–4 (North Sea
and Skagerrak) was set due to the low quota
uptake and due to the fact that no targeted
fisheries were taking place, and no TACs for
roundnose grenadier in ICES subareas 1, 2 and
4 (North Sea) and greater forkbeard in ICES
subareas 1–10, 12, and 14 were set, on the basis
of scientific advice. ICES advice establishes that
removing the TACs would generate no or a low
risk of unsustainable exploitation.
These examples clearly show that the list of
stocks should not be considered fixed forever,
but revised regularly on the basis of relevance
of such management and its cost effectiveness.
Problem stocks
The management system also has to handle the
case of the so-called problem stocks. In effect,
while a number of stocks respond positively to
management (though with variable response
times) there are certain stocks that do not
seem to respond to management efforts, or
respond only in a limited way. In these cases,
the lack of response to management (notably
to a reduction of fishing mortality) casts doubts
on the efficiency of the policy itself, and often
justifies the call for more dramatic action, that
in turn poses a serious problem for the industry
concerned. How to handle these cases?
Steadman et al. (2014) have studied 10 stocks
in EU waters that, after numerous attempts to
improve management, are still considered out-
side safe biological limits. Among other consid-
erations, the difficulty in bringing these stocks
to Fmsy by 2020 without unacceptable economic
hardship or without seriously affecting fisheries
for healthier stocks illustrates why these can be
considered problem stocks.
These stocks raise fundamental issues of fish-
ery management: why are they so difficult to

rebuild? Are there ecological reasons, outside
our control, that prevent rebuilding? What
sacrifices would be necessary to recover them
if possible? Are such sacrifices acceptable and
compatible with other policy objectives? Many
more questions than answers, but another
fundamental challenge for management.
Some of the difficulties in rebuilding these
stocks may come from the mixed species nature
of the fisheries where they are caught, thus
preventing the intended reduction of fishing
mortality required on a single-stock basis. But
part of the problem too may come from ecolog-
ical factors: in some cases, positive recoveries
have been associated to favorable climatic con-
ditions and subsequent strong recruitments
while in other cases such conditions are not
present and recruitments have remained low
(Zimmermann and Yamazaki 2017). In the
case of North Atlantic cod, it appears that the
depletion of one stock can trigger trophic shifts
that may prevent rebuilding through increased
predation and competition (Frank et al. 2005).
These factors raise an uncomfortable ques-
tion: in a policy defined by the need to reach the
same objective for all individual stocks, what is
the price of introducing strong measures and
sacrifices to recover a stock to pre-determined
levels against ecological factors in a complex
ecosystem and a mixed fishery? Is this price
worth paying in economic, social and even
ecological terms?
This is a difficult question because it is always
difficult to determine the ultimate cause of
the depletion of a stock. But the number of
cases in which a stock has collapsed at least
partially for natural causes raises the issue of
how far do we need to go in sacrificing other
fisheries to recover one that, whatever our
efforts, simply may not come back for a long
time, at least at the levels traditionally known.
There is no straightforward answer to this, since
the chances of recovery of such species may be
extremely elusive, but this kind of scenario calls
for a policy that can handle uncertainty with
much more flexibility than is the case under
the current CFP. We will refer to this question
in Chapters 9 and 14.
Implementing maximum sustainable yield 67
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CHAPTER 4
The challenge of mixed fisheries
Mixed fisheries in the new CFP
The special challenges posed by the manage-
ment of mixed fisheries are well-recognized
in the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
(see below) as well as in important interna-
tional instruments of fisheries managements,
such as FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries (FAO 1995).
The difficulties associated with mixed fish-
eries were identified very early in the process
of development of fishery assessment methods.
As early as the late 1950s, Ricker (1958) already
indicated that when two or more populations
of a species, characterized by different repro-
duction potentials, are fished in common, total
potential catch is less than when each can be
fished separately at its optimum level. Paulik
et al. (1967) already presented solutions to the
problem of finding the common rate of exploita-
tion that maximizes total sustained yield from
a mixture of stocks, and Hilborn (1976) offered
in the 1970s a new methodology to calculate
optimal harvest rates for mixed stocks.
There has always been some scientific basis
for the idea that mixed stocks cannot simply
be managed through the sum of management
systems for individual stocks. Yet, fisheries
management, in the EU and elsewhere, has
continued to this day fundamentally based
on single-stock considerations. This leaves the
question open as to whether the new CFP that
is still based on the achievement of single-stock
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
management objectives, can really deliver such
objectives, and at what cost.
Can MSY be achieved for all stocks
in mixed fisheries?
The notion of maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) was based on the productivity of individ-
ual species, ignoring interactions within the
fishing process, and aiming to maximize the
weight or value of landings under assumptions
of constant vital rates (Rindorf et al. 2017). Over
time, it has become obvious that assumptions on
constancy and independence in vital processes
are rarely fulfilled, so a dynamic approach is
necessary if interactions among species and with
their environment are to be considered (Fog-
arty 2014). If the linkages in fisheries systems
are ignored, unintended and perverse conse-
quences may occur (Degnbol and MacCay 2006).
As we saw in Chapter 2 individual MSY
objectives are very difficult to achieve for all
stocks in mixed fisheries, at least without a high
management cost and considerable foregone
yields (Sissenwine et al. 2014). In a multi-
species context, there is no single combination
of fishing mortalities that provides for MSY for
all species simultaneously (Gaichas et al. 2017).
Other authors have indicated that single-species
total allowable catch (TACs) are not consistent
with each other when the stocks are caught by
the same fleets (Baudron et al. 2010). Zimmer-
mann and Yamazaki (2017) point to the need
to consider inter-stock relationships:
71
72 Chapter 4
Not accounting for such inter-stock dependence
hinders or even reverses the conservation and eco-
nomic benefits of stock rebuilding and increases
the risks that rebuilding strategies fail to achieve
their management objectives. . . . this underlines
that constant, single-species management targets
such as precautionary spawning biomass or MSY
biomass may be unattainable for all stocks in the
ecosystem.
This strongly contrasts with the very strict
interpretation of the basic regulation of the CFP
as regards the possibility of having all stocks
above Bmsy levels.
Mixed fisheries and choke species
The term “choke species” has been defined by
International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea (ICES) as follows:1
A choke species is a term used to describe a species
with a low quota that can cause a vessel to stop fish-
ing even if they still have quota for other species.
The problem of choke species exists, one way
or another, in all fisheries managed through
single-stock catch limitations combined with a
policy or restrictions on discarding. But even
without them, choke species effects may also
occur on economic grounds: even if certain
fisheries for secondary species can be con-
ducted when the quotas for the main ones
are exhausted, the economic interest of such
practice may not be obvious.
The scale and extent of this phenomenon
depends on a number of factors, including quota
availability, the spatial overlap of target and
by-catch species, and the ability of businesses to
avoid catch-limiting species while maintaining
economic viability (through temporal or spatial
avoidance, gear selectivity, etc.). The effects
of choke species can be direct (early closures of
a fishery even when quotas of certain species
are still available), or indirect economic ones,
when the spatial overlap of fish stocks with
respect to target and by-catch species may
determine where effort is displaced and hence
1 www.ices.dk/news-and-events/Blogs/
Inotherwords/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=13/
whether steaming costs may increase and catch
rates decrease (Simons et al. 2015).
The choke species effect has been reported for
a number of fisheries around the world (Kraak
et al. 2015), associated with single-stock TACs
with no-discard policies. In the specific case of
the CFP, the choke species phenomenon is the
result of two combined factors:
• Different TAC levels. The application of
individual objectives for individual stocks
combined with a ban on discards. In these
cases, when the TAC of the weakest stock is
reached, it is no longer possible to continue
fishing for other (healthier) stocks without
discarding the former. The fishery must then
stop.
• The allocation of TACs in national quotas.
The fact that, in the CFP, the TACs are allo-
cated among Member States in national
quotas, and these allocations are extremely
different for different stocks. As a result, it
is possible that two species with no choke
effect between them in terms of total TAC,
may be choke for individual Member States
if their quota allocation is very unbalanced:
one stock may be choke for one Member
State and a different stock may be choke for
another Member State.
In this chapter we will examine the question
from the point of view of the TAC levels: What
can be the effect of different TAC levels com-
bined with the discard ban in mixed fisheries?
The other source of choke species, the fixed
allocation of the different stocks among Mem-
ber States under relative stability is looked at in
Chapter 6.
The consequences of the choke species effect
can be that healthy stocks are substantially
under-exploited. This may be acceptable in
certain political systems, but not in others. The
evidence of this emerging problem has alerted
the European fishing industry that is deploying
its best efforts to find practical solutions.
Choke species: some experience
outside the EU
The experience of the US on choke species
is very illustrative, as we saw in Chapter 2.

True, this phenomenon may not be due only to
choke species effects. Other factors such as low
economic interest of many of the stocks under
the management policy may be at the origin of
this phenomenon. And so far, relatively little
is known about the different causes of the low
quota consumption. However, expert advice
points at the management of weak stocks to
avoid by-catch as a strong reason why fish
are left in the sea (Dave Fluharty, personal
communication).
In the US, where the policy establishes clear
objectives by individual stocks, like in the CFP,
there is on-going debate on the need to intro-
duce, through the next reauthorization of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, special provisions for
mixed fisheries, since “it is a rare fisheries scientist
who would contend that all stocks in a multispecies
complex are able to be demonstrably abundant
simultaneously” (Frulla and Hawkins 2017).
This evidence has led the US Congress
in its on-going proposal to reauthorize the
Magnuson-Stevens Act (Bill H.R. 200, July
2018) to introduce changes that would add
exceptions to stock rebuilding requirements
when “one or more components of a mixed-stock
fishery is depleted but cannot be rebuilt within the
specified time without significant economic harm to
the fishery or without causing another component to
approach a depleted status.”2
What this means in catch share fisheries or in
fisheries with prohibited species by-catch (e.g.,
Pacific halibut and herring) the by-catch is
limiting on the quota fisheries. There are estab-
lished constituencies to whom these by-catch
species are allocated. Further, if one species in a
fishing complex is determined to be overfished
the rebuilding plan limits by-catch by others.
See under “How much can we sacrifice to weak
stocks?” below.
This is a clear example of the recognition that
mixed fisheries pose serious problems in the
way of the rebuilding of individual stocks in the
mix, and how policy has to introduce flexibility
to deal with these cases.
2 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF10267.pdf/
The challenge of mixed fisheries 73
Choke species under the new CFP
The importance of the problem of choke species
was anticipated by the co-legislators in the CFP
reform of 2013. Although the regulation fore-
sees the increase in selectivity as the primary
solution, it also recognizes that there will be a
need to provide advice on the appropriate fish-
ing mortality levels (EU 2013, recital 8):
Management decisions relating to maximum sus-
tainable yield in mixed fisheries should take into
account the difficulty of fishing all stocks in a mixed
fishery at maximum sustainable yield at the same
time, in particular where scientific advice indicates
that it is very difficult to avoid the phenomenon
of “choke species” by increasing the selectivity of
the fishing gears used. Appropriate scientific bod-
ies should be requested to provide advice on the
appropriate fishing mortality levels in such circumstances
(emphasis added).
The problem is that such requirements must
be applied in the legal context of Article 2.2,
which lays down MSY as an objective “for all
stocks.” If we take these elements literally, then
it would in principle seem that the “appropriate
fishing mortality levels” would in many cases
have to be lower than Fmsy , so the policy may
lead to the kind of under-exploitation observed
in some mixed fisheries in the US.
Although it is still relatively early to fully
understand the effects of choke species (since
the landing obligation is still in its phase-in
period) the scientific community is already
evaluating the potential effects. For example, it
has been predicted that in the North Sea demer-
sal mixed fishery, the full implementation of the
discard ban would result in the closure of the
fishery when approximately half the available
quotas are still uncaught, producing a propor-
tional reduction in revenue as compared to the
situation prior to the landing obligation (ICES
2016a). This is shown in Figure 4.1, drawn
from Ulrich et al. (2017) concerning the mixed
fishery for demersal stocks in the North Sea.
The left-hand side box represents the sce-
nario of full consumption of the haddock TAC:
all other TACs are overshot, leading to signif-
icant discards (stripped part of the columns)
in the other species. Upon implementation of
74 Chapter 4
250
Max Min sq_E
200
Predicted catches 2016
150
100
50
Under-shoot
0 0
–50
12345 12345 12345
Figure 4.1 North Sea mixed-fisheries projections for 2016 following standard display as in ICES (2015). Source:
Ulrich et al. (2017).
the landing obligation, this is no longer pos-
sible. The second box from the left represents
the scenario under which none of the TACs
are exceeded and no discards take place. This
would correspond to the full, effective imple-
mentation of the new policy. It is apparent that
only the TAC for sole would be fully harvested,
while the remaining TACs would be signif-
icantly under harvested. This illustrates the
problem very well: combining MSY-based TACs
for individual stocks under the landing obliga-
tion in mixed fisheries can lead to significant
under-exploitation of a number of stocks in the
fishery.
The choke species problem, in addition, can
actually be aggravated by the improvement
of certain stocks. Such is the case for hake in
the North Sea, where higher abundances of
this stock contrast with low quota shares, thus
contributing to turn the healthy hake stock
into a problematic choke species. This calls for
a more holistic and responsive approach to the
management of the multispecies fishery.
This assumes a full implementation of the
landing obligation, without the effects of the
flexibility mechanisms foreseen in Article 15 of
Regulation 1380/2013. That means that only
250
Max Min sq_E
200
3 150
3
100
4
2
4 2
1
1 50
5 5
1:Cod
2:Haddock
3:Plaice
4:Saithe
5:Sole
–50
12345 12345 12345
the future practice, including the possible partial
or full application of these flexibility mecha-
nisms, and the possible perverse incentives to
discard illegally will determine the real extent
of the problem of choke species.
The European fishing industry has frequently
drawn attention to the negative effects of
the choke species effect.3,4 Its potential con-
sequences are clear: failure to resolve the
problem would result in lower profitability
levels for the industry, even serious economic
difficulties, and it would potentially contribute
to under-exploitation of healthy resources, thus
failing to deliver on some of the objectives of
Article 39 TFEU.
The economic effects of choke species are
potentially considerable. In a study conducted
on two stocks (saithe and cod) caught by bot-
tom trawling in the North Sea, Mortensen et al.
(2018) found that cod would choke the fishery
3 www.seafish.org/about-seafish/blog/2014/1/20/
addressing-the-issue-of-choke-species-in-a-mixed-
fishery/
4 www.webmeets.com/files/papers/EAERE/2016/
904/Choke%20species%20and%20quota%20prices
.pdf/

early in the absence of quota balancing options,
resulting in an 87% reduction in revenue, while
saithe could choke the fishery later, resulting in
a 43% reduction in revenue.
Alternative management
approaches for mixed fisheries
The “choke species” problem is a consequence
of the single-stock management policy. The dif-
ficulty in resolving the problem favors the con-
cept of “multispecies” management, where in
theory the management would focus more on
the relationship among different stocks, their
effects on single-stock objectives and eventually
on fishery-related objectives rather than stock-
related objectives.
Multispecies approaches
Multispecies approaches to manage mixed fish-
eries would imply lower emphasis on single
stock objectives and more focus on the overall
maximum yield of a group of species taken in
the same fishery. By changing the focus from
individual stocks to groups of associated stocks
the management gets closer to the manage-
ment of the surplus of the ecosystem, and from
that perspective it can be considered as a step
toward the ecosystem approach to fisheries.
Of course, the interactions among species also
have a significant economic dimension, as dif-
ferent species have different market prices and
levels of interest for fishermen. This implies that
multispecies approaches require the considera-
tion of trade-offs between biological yields and
economic benefits.
The importance of incorporating multispecies
effects in the management of fish stocks has
been recognized by many authors (Kempf et al.
2016; Zimmermann and Yamazaki 2017). In
fact, Anderson (1975) or Wilson (1982) among
others have recognized the problem in earlier
contributions. In recent times, the importance
of these inter-stock relationships is considered
a key aspect of the ecosystem approach to
fisheries (Garcia and Cochrane 2005; Mor-
ishita 2008). However, these relationships are
The challenge of mixed fisheries 75
complex, difficult to model and always data-
hungry. Thus, Skern-Mauritzen et al. (2016)
estimate that only 2% of the world’s fish stocks
are managed including these multispecies inter-
actions.
The idea of multispecies management is
indeed recognized as an objective in the context
of Regulation 1380/2013. However, it is proving
very difficult to implement in practice. There
are a number of reasons for this, and the first
one is the absence of a sound, reliable scientific
basis for it.
The term “multispecies management” can
have more than one interpretation. Fur-
thermore, scientists have proposed several
approaches for managing fisheries taking into
account multispecies considerations. Follow-
ing Zimmermann and Yamazaki (2017), two
modeling approaches can be identified:
• Analytical, multi-stock models and
• Models that encompass entire food web
effects, such as competition and predator-prey
relationships.
Many authors have proposed different mod-
els for multispecies fisheries, some of them
a long time ago (May et al. 1979) and more
recently, attempts to model species interactions
include Hollowed et al. (2000) and Plagányi
et al. (2014) among others. Some of these mod-
els also include consideration of socio-economic
factors (Ratz and Lloret 2016). The question
is then: can this type of modeling approach
inform the CFP in the near future, or is it better
to try to advance individual stock objectives
based on traditional approaches?
What potential for multispecies
models?
In the early 1990s the public concern that
industrial fisheries were “robbing the food” of
the target species in the North Sea was a major
motivator behind the development of multi-
species models, beginning in the 1970s with the
seminal work by Andersen and Ursin (1977).
At present, ICES run multispecies virtual popu-
lation analysis (VPA) from time to time and the
results are used to update the natural mortality
values used in the single-species assessments
76 Chapter 4
used for the routine ICES advice. That means
that even the single-species advice from ICES
is to some extent informed by multispecies
considerations.
The new CFP will require a new type of scien-
tific basis, focused on multispecies approaches.
In some cases, this advice is already emerging.
For example, multispecies considerations are
already taken into account by ICES in the con-
text of the best-evaluated European sea basin:
the North Sea. Already in 2013, ICES5 con-
cluded, inter alia that:
• There is no single MSY solution in a multi-
species context, and policy choices will have
to be made.
• Yield of virtually all species is strongly
affected by the abundance of cod and saithe,
which are the main predator fish species.
Changing management target fishing mor-
tality (target F) for cod and saithe therefore
influences the yield of other stocks more
than the management targets for these other
stocks.
• Due to predation, it is unlikely that all
stocks can be maintained above precaution-
ary single-species biomass reference points
simultaneously.
• Target fishing mortalities leading to close-to-
maximum average yield (Fmsy ) in a multi-
species context are in general higher than
the agreed single-species Fmsy values.
• Due to a successful reduction in fishing mor-
tality for many stocks, natural mortality is
becoming the dominant source of mortality
in the North Sea. This means that the stock
dynamics are increasingly more influenced
by natural processes than by fisheries.
The implications of the above report are
extraordinary: a policy based on single-stock
parameters and objectives in a multispecies
context clearly leads to unreasonable expecta-
tions, derived from the difficulties of achieving
these individual objectives all at once. And, as
F levels are reduced, the fisheries become more
5 www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/
Advice/2013/2013/mult-NS.pdf/
dependent upon natural effects that are not
possible to manage.
Pretty good yield
Introduction
As we saw above, the incorporation of MSY tar-
gets in the CFP has been a very important step
forward in providing for clear objectives for the
management of fisheries in Europe. However, it
can be argued that the optimum biological yield
may not be the only legitimate objective of fish-
eries management. We have argued above that
the objectives of Article 39 TFEU can be best met
in “an area around the notion of MSY.” That
means that MSY may not necessarily be seen
as a single figure but rather as an area within
which other elements may also legitimately be
taken into consideration.
This idea has given rise to the introduction of
the notion of pretty good yield (PGY) by Alec
McCall of the US National Marine Fisheries ser-
vice, defined as the 80% of the optimum yield
(Hilborn 2010). This notion reflects the fact that
most fisheries management systems have mul-
tiple objectives, so that rather than a point, a
broad range of harvest policies can provide good
yield while also producing other desired out-
puts, be they biological and/or economic.
Pretty good multispecies yield
More recently, the notion of PGY has evolved in
connection with mixed fisheries in Europe, as
pretty good multispecies yield (PGMY) also as
a possible solution to the “choke species” prob-
lem. The obvious use of the notion of pretty
good yield is its use in a scenario of mixed
fisheries where individual stock objectives are
difficult to achieve all at once. Then the notion
is called pretty good multispecies yield (Rindorf
et al. 2016). In this context, the notion of
PGMY could be considered as a proxy of MSY
that also contributes to fully implement the
landing obligation by reducing substantially
the “choke species” effect. PGMY is defined by
Rindorf et al. (2017) as:
achieving at least a specified percentage of the
MSY while allowing scope for achieving additional
objectives.

Other authors (Kempf et al. 2016) indicate,
for the North Sea, that the current approach
of treating each stock separately and ignoring
trade-offs may result in unacceptable ecosys-
tem, economic or social effects, leading to
disappointment by stakeholders, and that to
treat Fmsy no longer as a point estimate but
rather as a pretty good yield within sustainable
ranges was seen as a promising way forward to
avoid unacceptable outcomes when trying to
fish all stocks simultaneously at Fmsy levels.
Although the notion is not specifically
referred to, the Commission has already adopted
this approach in the context of the Baltic and
the North Sea management plans, with the
introduction of fishing mortality ranges. These
correspond to an implementation of the PGMY,
in the sense that some stocks can, under very
specific circumstances, be fished at mortalities
higher than the individual Fmsy , but always
within a limit that is considered precautionary.
This notion is extremely useful in that it
provides managers with flexibility to manage
trade-offs in multispecies mixed fisheries. It
is clear that high long-term yields and lower
risks of stock collapse are achieved when all
individual stocks are managed at fishing mor-
talities lower than Fmsy , that is, when they are
managed within the lower part of the fishing
mortality ranges (Thorpe et al. 2017).
The notion of pretty good yield makes envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) nervous, notably in the sense that it
opens the door to the management of certain
stocks at levels higher than the individual
Fmsy value. One possible way to ensure that
the flexibility provided for by the pretty good
yield concept applied to individual stocks is to
combine it with some safeguards, as we will
see below.
How would PGMY solve the choke species
problem?
PGY would not resolve in itself the problem of
choke species in all fisheries, but in a number of
them it would certainly reduce the effects of the
phenomenon. In particular, it would contribute
to solve the choke species effect at TAC level.
The challenge of mixed fisheries 77
By providing for a range of fishing mortality
options for individual stocks in mixed fisheries,
managers can establish TAC levels correspond-
ing to the fishing mortalities per stock that
will maximize overall yields, or minimize the
amount of foregone yields due to the exhaus-
tion at an early stage of the TACs for the less
productive stock in the mixed fishery.
Figure 4.2 shows the fishing mortality ranges
for the main demersal species in the North Sea,
as presented by Ulrich et al. (2017). The figure
shows the central Fmsy point, the ranges and the
optimum F levels to maximize MSY in the con-
text of the mixed fishery. It can be observed that
the optimum F corresponds to different parts of
the F range for different stocks.
The different combinations of F values within
the ranges can be modeled in terms of avoidance
of choke species effects, but can also be eval-
uated in terms of economic yield. This allows
for annual decisions on TAC levels that, while
respecting the overall objective of MSY, provide
for flexibility to deliver other policy objectives
just as well.
The Fcube model
Another interesting development is that of the
so-called Fcube model. Fcube stands for the 3
Fs: “Fleet and Fisheries Forecast.” This model is
based on the idea, as we explained above, that
applying single-species assessment and quotas
in multispecies fisheries can lead to overfishing
or quota underutilization, because advice can
be conflicting when different stocks are caught
within the same fishery. The Fcube model offers
different scenarios of fishing effort and calcu-
lates the level of overfishing and underfishing
of each stock in a mixed fishery as compared
with the catch levels of the stocks based on
single-stock comparisons.
Scenarios of different levels of effort and
corresponding multispecies catches have been
developed for the North Sea by Ulrich et al.
(2011) and for the Iberian Peninsula (Iriondo
et al. 2010). As we will see in Chapter 5, this
type of model also has considerable potential
for multispecies management in the Mediter-
ranean Sea.
78 Chapter 4
0.6
0.5
0.4
F2016
0.3
0.2
0.1
COD HAD PLE POK
The notion of Fcube is also relatively adapt-
able to bio-economic modeling: the FcubEcon
management framework for effort allocation
between fleets and fisheries is based on the
economic optimization of a fishery’s earn-
ings while complying with stock-preservation
criteria (Hoff et al. 2010).
The Fcube model is very useful for mixed
fisheries where multispecies objectives would
be allowed. On the contrary, in a context where
the individual Fmsy objectives have to be applied
to all stocks, the effort levels would those nec-
essary to ensure that no single stock is exploited
at an F > Fmsy , thus producing foregone yields.
Multi-stock reference points
This kind of approach is based on developing
an algorithm that characterizes bio-economic
reference points that optimize economic and
biological benefits. When tested in the mixed
fishery for hake in northern waters, includ-
ing the interaction with two other associated
species (anglerfish and megrim), the model
predicts that when TAC levels are established
under this scheme, management performs bet-
ter in economic and biological terms than that
corresponding to single-stock reference points
for the three species separately (Da Rocha et al.
2012).
FMSY range
FMSY
Foptim
F2014
Figure 4.2 Fishing mortality ranges for
the main demersal stocks in the North
SOL Sea. Source: Ulrich et al. (2017).
This concept has also been explored also in
the Iberian fisheries by Garcia et al. (2017),
where TAC advice was generated under the
traditional single stock approach and compared
with such advice based on multi-stock refer-
ence points using a bio-economic optimization
model. The multi-stock scenarios in principle
allow for a better utilization of combined TACs.
The model allows for reference points to be all
considered precautionary in the sense of ICES:
that the probability of being below Blim was
less than 5%. The authors also indicate that the
model can be adapted to be used within the
limits imposed by the fishing mortality ranges
that have been introduced in the Baltic plan
and are likely to be used in subsequent ones.
This type of model can allow the develop-
ment of reference points for stocks associated
in a given fishery that will be more consis-
tent among them, that will correspond to a
more efficient use of available fishing oppor-
tunities (thus reducing choke species effects),
and where the condition that all TACs be
precautionary can be imposed.
Managing stock aggregates?
Another possible approach to handle mixed
fisheries is to define the notion of MSY not
for an individual stock, but for an assembly of

closely related stocks. This would allow the
establishment of objectives and measures for
the management of the aggregate as a whole,
allowing for changes in the result of individual
stocks within the aggregate.
Edwards et al. (2004) describe this approach
as “portfolio management” whereby man-
agement combines fish stocks that are joined
by ecology (e.g. predation, competition) and
unspecialized fishing techniques (e.g. mixed
species trawls) into a portfolio which balances
expected aggregate returns against the risks
associated with single-stock uncertainties.
Managing stocks under this approach can sig-
nificantly increase benefits for society relative
to single-species approaches.
A very interesting article (Fogarty et al. 2012)
describes the development of surplus produc-
tion models for 12 demersal fish species in the
Gulf of Maine (NE USA) at both single-species
and aggregate levels, as a possible way to
manage species assemblages rather than indi-
vidual stocks. Interestingly, the equilibrium
yield (MSY) and biomass at MSY (Bmsy ) levels
for the summed-up single-species production
model reference points exceeded the aggregate
model results by 28.0 and 27.5% respectively.
Biological interactions such as competition and
predation are potential reasons for the differ-
ence. Not accounting for biological interactions
may result in overly optimistic predictions of
long-term yields and unrealistically high esti-
mates of Bmsy . This begs the question about
flexibility associated with fishing some individ-
ual stocks at >Fmsy .
These results are extremely interesting, in
various aspects:
• They confirm that setting reference points
for single stocks without ecological consider-
ations may produce overestimations of Bmsy ,
which in turn implies that the aspirational
objective of having all stocks at biomass levels
“above Bmsy ” may simply not be achievable
at all.
• Managing aggregates actually produces lower
estimates of sustainable yield. This is not
surprising but raises serious management
implications.
The challenge of mixed fisheries 79
That means that concerns that not focusing
on the weakest stock may lead to its overex-
ploitation in the mix, are to be compounded
with a substantially lower level of overall fish-
ing effort corresponding to the total level of
catches of the aggregate.
This kind of approach, however, is not easy
to implement, notably due to the difficulty of
putting together all the scientific information
necessary to develop such complex ecological
models (Hilborn 2011). But this underscores
the interest on relatively simple models where
species relationships are implicit rather than
explicit. The advantages of these models, even
if simplified, are that system-level proper-
ties (including total biomass, total catches,
aggregate size composition) tend to be much
more stable for the species aggregate than
for any of its individual species (Fogarty and
Murawski 1998; Auster and Link 2009). These
characteristics appear to reflect compensatory
processes related to a sequence of species
replacements under the constraint of overall
energy limitations of the ecosystem (Fogarty
et al. 2012).
How much can we sacrifice weak
stocks?
All the above options have an obvious down-
side: if they provide some kind of “averaging
out” of fishing mortality among associated
stocks as a solution to the choke species prob-
lems, that implies that certain stocks would
be exploited at higher F levels than those cor-
responding to the individual Fmsy values. Put
it another way: this would mean accepting a
certain level of over-exploitation of a certain
number of stocks. The question would then be:
how far can we go with this? How much can we
over-exploit certain individual stocks in order
to minimize choke species effects and maximize
the sustainable production of seafood?
The answer is not straightforward, particu-
larly from an ecological point of view. While
the idea of fishing down a weak stock can
have little economic effect, if and when such
stock has a low economic value, the question
of the evaluation of the ecological value of the
80 Chapter 4
over-exploitation of an individual stock is much
less clear.
Actually, if we move toward the concept of
ecosystem-based management, the emphasis
on weak stocks could be compounded by the
overall status of the ecosystem. Marine ecosys-
tems can be very stable even if their individual
species fluctuate to a substantial degree. This
is shown in Figure 4.3, drawn from the ICES
ecosystem overview of the greater North Sea
ecoregion (ICES 2016a): the ratios F/Fmsy and
spawning stock biomass (SSB)/MSY Btrigger for
different groups of stocks fluctuate consider-
ably over time. Yet, the averages for all stocks
together are much more stable.
This simple image suggests that, rather than
focusing on individual stocks, whose abundance
is in any case naturally fluctuating, fisheries
management could focus more on the overall
surplus that the ecosystem can produce, which
is in fact remarkably stable.
An ecological cap on TACs?
The idea of the multispecies pretty good yield
could be combined with a safety net applicable
to the whole fishery: a limitation of the overall
catch of all stocks combined. This would corre-
spond to a kind of ecological cap to the catches
Greater North Sea
5
4
F/FMSY
3
2
1
4
SSB/MSY Btrigger
0
1960
benthic crustacean
Figure 4.3 Evolution over time of fishing mortality relative to Fmsy and biomass relative to MSY Btrigger for
different groups of stocks in the greater North Sea ecoregion. Source: Updated from ICES (2016a). Reproduced
by courtesy of ICES.
of all stocks combined in a mixed fishery, to
compensate the higher risk taken for some
individual stocks. This measure can indeed be
complementary to the individual TACs, and in a
longer perspective could be considered a funda-
mental element in a new kind of management
system for mixed fisheries.
In the Bering Sea/Aleutian groundfish fishery
in Alaska, management established an ecosys-
tem cap for the annual TACs of groundfish
for this region by requiring that the optimum
yield range must fall between 1.4 and 2 mil-
lion tonnes. This has limited the sum of TACs
for all species concerned to 2 million tons, a
lower figure than would result from adding
the individual TACs of the same species when
considering single-stock considerations, which
some years amounted to 2.8 million tons
(Witherell et al. 2000). This implies that certain
stocks, particularly flatfish, have been exploited
well below sustainable levels (Witherell 1995).
Interestingly, the origin of the measure was ini-
tially not related to ecosystem considerations,
but to limit foreign fishing at a time when the
US fishing capacity was lower than it is today.
This long-term experience is very illustrative
of what can be an alternative approach to
the low-risk strategies for individual stocks: to
1980 2000 2020
Year
demersal pelagic

consider a wide range of options for individual
stocks (with higher risk for some of them) but
in the framework of an overall low-risk strategy
for the whole fishery and its ecosystem.
This TAC cap concept has been further
developed by other authors into a step-by-step
multispecies approach based also on the idea of
an overall cap on all catches combined. This
approach consists of four steps (Gaichas et al.
2017):
• Limit total removals from the ecosystem
• Allocate the total removals limit across
among aggregate species groups
• Maintain individual species above minimum
stock size thresholds
• Optimize the species mix (within aggregates)
based on bio-economic portfolio analysis.
The above proposal (that the authors them-
selves present as very preliminary) deserves
attention in that it provides internal flexibility
(among stocks) within an overall limit estab-
lished as an ecological cap. This would allow
taking a higher risk for some individual stocks
but in the context of an overall low ecological
risk. It is placing the evaluation of risk at the
level of aggregate species more than at the level
of individual stocks. Although the concept of
higher risk is not part of the current thinking
in Alaska, the theoretical possibility is there to
consider in other contexts.
Of course, such a strategy would need to be
developed in much more in detail, particularly
its second step, which may not necessarily be
neutral under relative stability in the EU con-
text. In addition, the level of risk of the overall
level of the total removals would need to be
carefully compounded with step 3 on the level
of protection of individual stocks. In addition,
the above kind of management requires a very
sophisticated level of discussion with stake-
holders and a very adaptive system to address
the numerous, different and changing scenarios
and their respective trade-offs (Jennings et al.
2016).
This also includes the treatment of the indi-
vidual target for stock management (MSY) as a
limit rather than as a target, in what has been
described as a “conscious under-exploitation
The challenge of mixed fisheries 81
of marine resources” (Mace 1999). Can this
experience be translated to the CFP?
Trophic models
Trophic models are a consequence of the appli-
cation of the ecosystem approach to fisheries
management, and we will refer to this in
Chapter 8. However, it is important also to refer
to this type of model here.
In recent decades, studies on how fisheries
and marine food webs interact have been
developed. However, by and large fisheries
management continues to be based on single-
species considerations. Trophic models have
been demonstrated to be difficult and costly to
develop. They are data hungry and require a
substantial level of knowledge regarding inter-
actions among different species in the fishery
(and their ecosystem). This makes progress
slow and difficult.
The Commission tried to use the opportunity
of the new CFP to produce the first multispecies
model for the Baltic Sea, including trophic rela-
tionships. The (theoretically) simple food chains
of this sea were considered an ideal place to start
such models. But the task proved too complex
and in the end the current management plan
for the Baltic Sea (EU 2016a) is still based on
individual stock parameters.
An ultimate use of trophic models, such as
those developed by Gascuel et al. (2011) is to
provide a theoretical basis to explain complex
patterns, such as cascading effects, maximum
sustainable ecosystem yield and fishing down
the food web. The value of these models in the
CFP has to be put in context. While it is difficult
to see such models entirely replacing the cur-
rent single-stock management, they can provide
as a complementary tool that may be extremely
useful to management:
• They can help understand the effects of fish-
eries management on the ecosystem, and to
better understand the role of fisheries man-
agement in achieving the “good environmen-
tal status” of the Marine strategy Framework
Directive (see Chapter 8).
• They can serve to establish a general cap
on the overall use of the ecosystem, thus
82 Chapter 4
allowing greater flexibility among individ-
ual species targets, provided such cap is
respected.
• They can allow better understanding of the
achievability of the aspirational objective of
maintaining all stocks above Bmsy .
Tropho-dynamic models have been devel-
oped in recent years and can in many cases
already provide a sound basis for management.
However, fisheries management still relies
largely on individual stock decisions, with little
regard to species interactions. Among the rea-
sons to explain this, the increased complexity
of such models, the need to bring in more
expertise and stakeholder input, is in most
cases at odds with the management system’s
strong inertia (Longo et al. 2015).
An associated explanation is that the benefits
of this kind of approach are generally only
visible over relatively long periods, and the
management system tends to favor quick solu-
tions where the results of management become
apparent as soon as possible (Daily et al. 2009).
Overall, despite the growing scientific basis
available for trophic models, their utilization is
still extremely restricted. Many authors have
analyzed the reasons for this and, according to
Longo et al. (2015) the main ones are:
• The lack of decision-support tools helping
with the integration of ecological and social
assessments of fisheries (see also Koen et al.
2013).
• The need for a more effective institutional
process to translate this interdisciplinary
knowledge into action.
In the specific case of the EU, the first
problem should actually be resolved: the Sci-
entific, Technical and Economics Committee
for Fisheries (STECF) does have the capacity
to integrate the different contributions from
biological, economic, and social science. On the
contrary, the institutional framework and rel-
ative stability (see below), does not favor such
approach. The implementation of this approach
would necessitate a change in paradigm in the
way the CFP adopts its policy, as we will see in
Chapter 9.
Multispecies models and trade-offs:
is multispecies management
compatible with relative stability?
In addition to the many implications and
trade-offs associated with application of multi-
species models, issues associated with specific
concerns arise in the EU because different levels
of exploitation or under-exploitation, and their
associated economic performances, would not
necessarily be neutral under relative stability.
Thus, different scenarios would affect Member
States differently, so that any discussion on
the overall merits of any given scenario would
likely be hampered by allegations that such
scenarios undermine relative stability.
This could even be more delicate in the case
of trophic models. If these models are devel-
oped, this would lead inevitably to decisions on
whether the management should “manipulate”
the trophic levels: would it be advisable, for
example, to under-exploit prey species in the
expectation that this would imply more food
for predators and higher yields for these? Or
the other way around?
During the bilateral negotiation between the
EU and the Russian Federation to establish
the new bilateral arrangement in the Baltic
Sea following the EU enlargement of 2004,
Russia insisted in the inclusion of Western
Baltic cod in the list of stocks to be managed
jointly, even though this stock occurs entirely
in EU waters. The reason? Cod feeds on sprat,
the main interest for Russia. By having a say
on the management of cod, they could favor
higher exploitation rates of this stock, resulting
theoretically in lower cod abundance, lower
predation on sprat and higher abundance of
the latter (Penas Lado 2016).
Within the EU, a case in hand can be the
balance between cod and one of its principal
prey items, sandeel, in the North Sea. If trophic
considerations are included, one could for
example, favor a higher rate of exploitation of
the cod (predator) and a relatively lower one
for sandeel (prey), on the basis of the higher
economic value of the former. However, while
the fishing rights for cod in this area are mainly
in the hands of the UK (47% of the quota) the

TAC for sandeel is mainly allocated to Denmark
(over 90%). That implies that any strategy to
favor economic factors would benefit the UK
more than Denmark, something that the latter
would no doubt consider a de facto breach of
relative stability.
All these difficulties are associated with the
traditional definition, entirely dependent upon
quotas for individual stocks. These difficulties
could be overcome if relative stability were to
be defined as a more general notion of allocating
Member States a fixed amount of the total bio-
logical and economic production from the Euro-
pean seas. This could remove the difficulty that
single stock-based relative stability represents.
In Chapter 14 we develop some ideas as to how
this could be done.
Is multispecies management
compatible with the objectives
of the CFP?
In principle, one may think that the different
multispecies approaches referred to above are
not compatible with the specific policy objec-
tives of the CFP as laid down in Article 2.2
the new basic regulation 1380/2013 since
these objectives clearly state that MSY must be
reached for all stocks. That seems to indicate
that there is little or no room for any solution
that would depart from the achievement of Fmsy
levels for each one of the individual stocks man-
aged under the CFP. For example, the notion
of PGMY referred to above, would seem in
principle incompatible with the notion of MSY
applicable to all stocks, enshrined in the basic
regulation. Yet, as we have seen, different mul-
tispecies or ecological models are based on some
degree of “averaging out” fishing mortality lev-
els for the stocks associated in mixed fisheries.
The question, however, is less clear-cut
than it appears to be. In fact, the differences
between the two notions are due to the con-
sideration of MSY as a point value of fishing
mortality without any flexibility. But the text of
Article 2.2 does not say anywhere that MSY
should be considered necessarily as a point
value, as we explained above. If, for a number
of reasons, the notion of MSY is to be considered
The challenge of mixed fisheries 83
as associated to some level of flexibility, the
difference between MSY and PGMY blurs
considerably. What are, then, the elements of
flexibility that can justify the interpretation of
MSY not as a point value, but an “area around a
point value”? Let’s look at some considerations:
• In some cases, the yield curve of certain
stocks is flat-top that is, the maximum yield
does not correspond to a fixed F point but
rather a range around it.
• Importantly, the consideration of Fmsy as a
range of F levels rather than a point value, as
established by the Baltic Management Plan
(EU 2016a) and the North Sea Management
Plan (EU 2018) provides a precedent of
interpreting MSY as a kind of PGMY. It is
important to underline that this provision is
not a derogation to the policy objectives set in
Article 2.2 of the basic regulation 1380/2013;
it is a proportionate way to implement them.
• The need to ensure that the two main new
objectives in the new CFP (MSY and the
landing obligation) can be achieved simul-
taneously. We saw above (Figure 4.2) that
in mixed fisheries the implementation of the
MSY objective can lead to very significant
levels of under-exploitation of TACs. If a very
extreme implementation of MSY can pre-
vent practical implementation of the landing
obligation, then the implementation of the
policy is not balanced. Both objectives must
be achieved in parallel, and neither objective
should become an obstacle to the other.
• All the earlier considerations on Article 39
TFEU (see Chapter 2).
Furthermore, Regulation 1380/2013 recog-
nizes explicitly the problem of mixed fisheries,
and allows for special considerations in this
regard, in the context of multiannual man-
agement plans. Article 9(5) of this regulation
reads:
Multiannual plans may contain specific conser-
vation objectives and measures based on the
ecosystem approach in order to address the spe-
cific problems of mixed fisheries in relation to
the achievement of the objectives set out in
Article 2(2) for the mixture of stocks covered by
the plan in cases where scientific advice indicates
84 Chapter 4
that increases in selectivity cannot be achieved.
Where necessary, the multiannual plan shall
include specific alternative conservation measures,
based on the ecosystem approach, for some of the
stocks that it covers.
For these reasons, at least, it is not far-fetched
to consider that Regulation 1380/2013 could
indeed allow implementation of the PGMY
or other multispecies approaches in mixed
fisheries, as a way of ensuring that the notion
of MSY contains the necessary flexibility to be
what it was always conceived to achieve: the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
Can associated species in mixed
fisheries be dissociated?
As we have seen, mixed fisheries are a problem
because different species are associated together
in the catch. But is this association permanent?
Is it inevitable? Another solution to the problem
of choke species is the possibility of dissociating
species that normally appear associated in the
catch.
It is true that the notion of associated species
is not an absolute one. On the contrary, stocks
that appear “associated” can show very different
degrees of association when we look at a more
detailed breakdown of this association in terms
of areas, gear, and time of the year:
• Some stocks are associated in certain areas
but not in others. A case in hand is plaice and
sole in the North Sea. Plaice cannot be fished
without catching sole in its southern part. But
in the northern part where sole is less abun-
dant, it is possible to conduct a plaice fishery
with much lower catches of sole.
• The gear is also an essential factor. Gadoids
are strongly associated with Norway lob-
ster (Nephrops norvegicus) in certain trawl
fisheries, but not at all in long-line or pot
fisheries.
• As seasonal abundances of different stocks
vary, so does their degree of association in
the catch.
From the above it follows that a management
based on a gear/area/time breakdown of fish-
ing activities could indeed contribute to dissoci-
ate different stocks in the catch. However, the
extent to which this can be done without major
economic disruption to the industry is much less
clear. Furthermore, some of the differences in
the degree of association among stocks are not
permanent; they fluctuate with time and are not
necessarily amenable to a management through
fixed technical measures.
The US experience in dissociating
stocks
In the US system, technical measures are used
alongside catch limitations as management
instruments. The Northeast coast of the US has
been subject to numerous efforts in establish-
ing technical measures to dissociate associated
species in the catch as a way to avoid choke
species effects and other undesirable outcomes.
These experiences tend to show that the best
way to achieve that objective is the use of
dynamic measures, that is, to use real-time
information on the presence of the target and
bycatch species to inform skippers in real time
about the areas where species discrimination
may be high. For example, Dunn et al. (2014)
found that the use of empirical move-on rules
could reduce catch of juvenile and choke stocks
between 27 and 33%, and depredation events
between 41 and 54%. Dunn et al. (2016)
further found that dynamic closures (which
typically involve setting relatively small por-
tions of the ocean off-limits for shorter periods,
based on fine-scale, real-time assessments of
changing conditions) are up to three times
more efficient at reducing by-catch with lower
costs to fishermen than static measures that
close large areas and remain in force longer.
These real-time closures were not initially
acceptable to the industry, because their target
and by-catch species were different in vari-
ous fisheries, and because the basis for such
real-time decisions has to be objective. In this
regard, the partnership between the fishing
industry and governmental agencies seems
to be the crucial factor. For example, in the

Gulf of Maine, through support from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) Fisheries Northeast Cooperative
Research Program, the Gulf of Maine Research
Institute has developed a near real-time spa-
tial/temporal fishing area selectivity tool (FAST)
in partnership with the groundfish industry,
which skippers trust to make their decisions on
avoidance of choke species and by-catch (Peros
et al. 2014).
Other experiencers suggest that wide-ranging
studies of species’ life histories, potential
changes in fleet behavior and individual incen-
tives are important for developing and imple-
menting mitigation programs (O’Keefe et al.
2014).
How to dissociate stocks in mixed
fisheries in the EU?
For the above purpose there can be two types of
solution: either through technical conservation
measures, or through the individual behavior of
skippers. They are largely complementary, and a
combination of the two may in fact allow a cer-
tain level of dissociation of species that, under
current circumstances, are strongly associated
in mixed fisheries.
Special measures for weak stocks: spatial
management
One obvious possibility to dissociate stocks
would be to adopt area-based restrictions, when
and where the weak stocks would be well-
localized. To protect the weak stocks in question
would need to show either a particular geo-
graphical distribution (so as to allow for specific
area limitations) or certain characteristics that
would allow for technical measures to increase
selectivity against such stock. These charac-
teristics are not necessarily there in all cases.
That means that the use of that provision (that
the co-legislators introduced largely in order
to address the choke species problem) depends
on the existence of practical solutions allowing
dissociation of species in the catch in fisheries
where they are traditionally caught together.
The case of demersal elasmobranchs (for
example, skates and rays) is illustrative. In
The challenge of mixed fisheries 85
general data-limited, TACs for these species
tend to have little value. Instead, scientists
have suggested spatial proxies to MSY as the
best option (ICES 2012). These tools have been
recently developed further (Dedman et al.
2015). More recently, Dedman et al. (2017)
developed a tool to allow for different scenarios
for the management of these stocks based on
closed areas of different dimensions, to inform
stakeholders and managers on the options
available and their effects.
These tools are extremely promising for
managing weak stocks, at least for stocks with a
clear (and relatively stable) spatial distribution.
However, the above methods must be com-
pounded with their economic effects, which
must always be evaluated. In particular, the
potential risk of spatial approaches is that they
determine a displacement of the fishing effort
to different areas than those initially intended
by the fishers. This may have negative eco-
nomic effects. In addition, the displacement
may also generate negative biological effects: in
a study conducted on the cod/saithe fishery in
the North Sea, the spatial displacements of the
fleets to avoid catching cod (choke species in
this fishery) would increase effort in the area
where juvenile saithe is most abundant, thus
provoking a reduction of the saithe spawning
stock biomass in the long run (Simons et al.
2015). Clearly, these measures are promising
but their effects, both biological and economic
must be evaluated on a case by case basis.
The role of technical conservation measures
Many of these measures may allow a cer-
tain dissociation of species. The association of
species is never identical in different areas, so
area-based approaches to catching available
TACs can play only a limited role in the dissoci-
ation. Similarly, gear structure and rigging may
also reduce catches of the associated species.
There are many examples of gear that select
different species differently: grids, square mesh
panels, etc.
For this type of solution to be workable, tech-
nical measures have to be flexible and adaptive,
something that the traditional approach of
86 Chapter 4
Regulation 850/98 for example does not allow.
In that regard, the recent proposal by the
Commission for a new framework on technical
measures (EU 2016b) is intended to provide
such possibility. In addition, in the EU system
such measures should be, to the extent possible,
neutral under relative stability, to ensure that
the limitations adopted for the protection of the
weak stock do not affect different individual
Member States very differently.
If we look at the US experience, the solu-
tion of the dynamic move-on measures seems
more promising. This can be done as private
schemes by the industry. This is very flexible
and must be applied through a real-time system
largely based on trust. So far, attempts to use
this real-time instrument have been limited,
and the Scottish example of the “conservation
credits” despite its presumed success, has been
rather limited and its effect, rather uncertain
(Anon. 2010). A different model is when the
avoidance measures initiated by the indus-
try are subsequently enshrined in law. For
example, in the US, when fishing under the
specific management regime for Bering Sea
pollock, fishery cooperatives are empowered to
hold operators accountable for moving on. This
is no longer a voluntary scheme and the trust
concern is much less (Karp et al. 2001).
In fact, real time closures have been already
regulated, in the context of the control regula-
tion: Articles 51 to 54 of Regulation 1224/2009
lay down conditions for the establishment
of real time closures within the CFP, includ-
ing closures by Member States and by the
Commission (EU 2009). However, these pro-
visions have practically never been applied.
Beyond the question of the wrong place of
these provisions (they are technical rather
than control measures) the reason behind this
failure is probably the absence of a practical
mechanism to make them work, requiring
the two crucial factors that allow its success-
ful use in the US: in particular the system of
real-time information gathering and dissemi-
nation, and the trust by operators. If real time
closures are to be implemented in practice in
the CFP, those are the questions to look at in
particular, rather than a legal basis without
implementation.
The role of new technologies
Fisheries technology is constantly improving
since the development of industrial fishing
more than a century ago (Walsh et al. 2002).
Not surprisingly this evolution continues today.
In fact, the policy-driven evolution toward ever
more selective fishing is leading to the develop-
ment of new gear technologies that allow for a
much better discrimination among species (and
even sizes) in the catch. The question is: how
much can these new technologies facilitate the
dissociation of species within mixed fisheries?
A report by ICES documents the wide range
of improvements in gear technology that
are taking place throughout the world (ICES
2016b). These include improvements in trawl
door design, underwater imaging and many
other technologies that improve the skipper’s
ability to discriminate species. The idea that,
in particular trawl fishing is basically a blind
operation where one cannot control which fish
is caught by the gear is gradually being replaced
by one where the skipper has an increasing
number of options on what to catch and what
to avoid.
It is gradually becoming possible to some
degree to increase the species selectivity of
fishing gear so as to better dissociate different
species in the catch in mixed fisheries. How-
ever, these technologies will reduce mixed
species effects, but it is difficult to see how this
dissociation will ever be perfect and complete.
In addition, with better selectivity may come
an economic problem: improved avoidance of
unwanted species and/or sizes may also reduce
efficiency (and increase cost) for harvesting
target species. Better selectivity does not nec-
essarily translate into better profits since these
will depend on the basket of fishing rights avail-
able to fishermen. The real use of these new
technologies can only come through their com-
bination with management: only by ensuring
that fishermen have real economic incentives
to use these new technologies will they pro-
vide a substantial contribution to dissociate

species and reduce choke species effects in
mixed fisheries.
Can skipper behavior do the job?
Beyond the role of technical conservation mea-
sures, it is also true that individual skippers
can do a lot in terms of dissociating species in
their catch, through a combination of factors
such as depth, area, speed, haul duration, etc.
as well as gear-rigging based on experience and
in-depth knowledge of the fishing grounds.
Modern technologies allow for an increasingly
selective fishing,6 thus opening the door for
more avoidance of unwanted catches through
the behavior of skippers. This kind of behavior
is not amenable to legislative approaches, so
its application probably depends entirely on
the existence of the right incentives. What can
those incentives be?
The experience of Scottish skippers as part of
the conservation credits scheme has been stud-
ied by O’Neill et al. (2014). The introduction of
more selective gear that would help dissociate
certain species in the catch was fundamentally
dependent upon the incentives available to
ensure that no loss of daily income took place
in the short term. In addition, the authors illus-
trate how larger mesh sizes can also provide
indirect benefits such as a reduction in fuel
consumption. Overall, they found that more
selective fishing is possible, even on a voluntary
basis, provided that the right incentives are on
offer. These take notably the form of increased
quotas or increased days at sea when and where
these are limited.
This experience shows that there is a poten-
tial for a more selective fishing, that skippers
themselves may be able to opt for voluntarily,
on the basic condition that the adequate incen-
tives (notably in terms of better access to the
resource) be provided for, and that these incen-
tives should guarantee short-term incomes, not
just long-term benefits.
6 For example, the use of cameras attached to trawl
gear allow for better discrimination of the species to
be caught.
The challenge of mixed fisheries 87
Here again the US experience is useful: one
of the most sophisticated systems of bycatch
avoidance is that of the fishery for Alaskan
pollock, whose stakeholders don’t have a right
to catch salmon in principle, and have put
together a system of salmon avoidance. These
rules are known as “rolling hotspots” where
the areas with a relatively high density of
salmon are identified and reported in real time
(Jim Armstrong, personal communication).
The system is entirely run by the fishermen’s
cooperatives, who agree by contract to coop-
erate in running the system and abide by
its rules, without direct intervention by the
Federal Government (Dave Fluharty, personal
communication). But a key to the success of
this type of scheme is that the cooperatives are
allowed by law to penalize vessels that fail to
apply the move-on directions. So in the end
it is a mandatory program, with management
delegated to cooperatives.
This example, among others, illustrates that
industry-run systems have a considerable
potential to allow for by-catch avoidance. The
questions here are two-fold: (i) what kind of
incentive is necessary to make this work and
(ii) can this kind of system work in the EU?
In terms of incentives, a lot could be done at
national level in terms of quota allocation, since
the allocation of national quotas to the fishing
industry remains a national competence that
all Member States defend fiercely. At EU level,
the precedent of the quota top-ups allowed to
Member States using CCTV cameras, agreed
by Council for a few stocks means that the
idea is not necessarily far-fetched. The main
difficulty, however, would be to allow this kind
of system as a scheme run by the industry itself.
Although not necessarily incompatible with
EU law, the difficulty could be to broker an
agreement among all industry interests (or at
least the main ones, fishing beyond territorial
waters) that they would all agree to implement.
This would require a new paradigm in terms of
governance, where a collaborative, rather than
a prescriptive approach would be developed.
We will look into this question in Chapter 9.
88 Chapter 4
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CHAPTER 5
Achieving policy objectives in
Mediterranean fisheries
MSY and Mediterranean
fisheries
The policy objective of maximum sustainable
yield (MSY) by 2020 in the 2013 reform applies
to all European Union (EU) stocks, including
obviously the Mediterranean stocks. This is
the first time in the history of the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) that the policy objectives
are specifically applicable to Mediterranean
fisheries. Given that such fisheries have been
subject to a different management regime this
represents a major challenge for the CFP. The
status of resources, and the lack of tradition and
“culture” of fisheries management at EU level
make it necessary to catch up with the Atlantic
and Baltic, both technically and politically, and
all that in a very limited period of time: before
2020. This is just one fundamental challenge
for Mediterranean fisheries within the CFP,
but there are others, as well as interesting
opportunities.1
Time to catch-up
When looking at Mediterranean fisheries, it is
essential to bear in mind the very different tim-
ing of the development of a stock management
policy as compared with the Atlantic. In the
latter, the total allowable catch (TAC) and quota
1 https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/inseparable/sites/
inseparable/files/ogs_italy_research_topic_eu_cfp
.pdf/
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
policy has worked since 1983, and in fact only
started to produce results in terms of reduction
of fishing mortality at the turn of the century.
This means that the CFP only managed to get
its act together in starting to reduce overfishing
after 17 years of its inception! In contrast, the
conservation policy was not applied to the
Mediterranean in 1983 and the first attempt to
look at the management of stocks took place
only in 1994, with the first technical measures
regulation (EU 1994). Even this first attempt
was limited to consolidating existing national
measures on mesh sizes in EU law, but there
was no attempt to address the question of the
management of Mediterranean stocks.
A real management policy only started
(somewhat modestly) in 2006 with the new
regulation (EU 2006) which established effort-
based management plans as the basis for stock
management. Only the multilateral manage-
ment of an iconic stock (bluefin tuna) took
place in the 1990s, but that was a result of
the work of ICCAT (International Commis-
sion for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas),2
not a CFP initiative. The first attempts to
manage Mediterranean fisheries in a more
systematic manner are very recent: some man-
agement plans were adopted by the General
Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean
(GFCM) in recent years (Food and Agriculture
2 International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, see chapter 10.
91
92 Chapter 5
Organization [FAO] 2018) and, at EU level, two
proposals were made for long-term manage-
ment plans, for small pelagic fish in the Adriatic
Sea (EU 2017) and that for demersal stocks in
the western Mediterranean (EU 2018a). These
are still not adopted by the EU co-legislators at
the time of writing.
This clearly implies that the management
of stocks in the Mediterranean is more than
two decades behind that of the Atlantic. This is
important to remember when evaluating the
slow progress observed since 2006.
The status of Mediterranean fisheries
Figure 5.1 shows the magnitude of the prob-
lem: not only fishing mortality levels are very
far from the Fmsy objective. Even worse, they are
not even being significantly reduced.
The general status of Mediterranean stocks
is bad, and certainly much worse than in the
Atlantic (EU 2016a). This has always been
the impression in the scientific community,
but only in recent years this has been made
clear through more complete and systematic
scientific advice. According to the Scientific,
Technical, and Economics Committee for
Fisheries (STECF), more than 95% of the
Mediterranean assessed stocks are exploited
at levels larger or much larger than Fmsy (EU
2015; Osio et al. 2015). Other authors consider
that 85% of the assessed stocks are overfished
2
F/FMSY
0
2003
2005
2007
2009
Figure 5.1 Evolution if the ratio current F/Fmsy for Mediterranean stocks. Source: Commission Staff Working
Document SWD (2018) 329. Brussels, 11.6.2018.
compared to sustainable yield reference values
of MSY (Collocca et al. 2013).
These differences may appear surprising, but
they are probably the consequence of the fact
that the “assessed stocks” have traditionally not
been the same from one year to the next, so
overall evaluations carried out in different years
(on a different set of stocks) can provide differ-
ent results. In any case, all possible combina-
tions of reporting on stock status coincide with
the high level of overfishing of most Mediter-
ranean stocks.
In terms of fishing mortality, other authors
show that, up to 2014, the average exploitation
rate for the main demersal and small pelagic
stocks of the Mediterranean Sea is around three
times the estimated level of Fmsy (Cardinale et al.
2017). In addition, the exploitation pattern of
most Mediterranean fisheries is extremely inad-
equate, with most fisheries having a very low
selectivity, resulting in extremely high levels of
mortality of juvenile fish (Collocca et al. 2013).
These high levels of over-exploitation
also seem to have significant effects on the
Mediterranean ecosystems, where the over-
exploitation of the fish has altered and sim-
plified the food webs over time, especially by
reducing the proportions of top predators and
increasing the presence of non-commercial
species at lower trophic levels (Coll et al. 2010;
Lotze et al. 2011).
2011
2013
2015
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
Sustainable overfishing?
One can certainly wonder why, if the resources
are so over-exploited, there are relatively few
cases of fishery collapse in this area, or even
why this situation is not necessarily seen as a
complete disaster by the fishing industry, and
why the calls for urgent action to remedy this
situation have always been received with a mix-
ture of disbelief and resistance.
The prevailing view has always been that
Mediterranean fisheries are somehow “protect-
ed” by a number of factors, such as the high
diversity (and high resilience to change), the
existence of safe havens for a number of stocks
(adult fish situated in deep waters, outside the
reach of trawling, that can ensure relatively
stable recruitments) or the relatively high price
of fish (all for direct human consumption)
that make low yields relatively profitable.
This situation has led to an extended belief
that Mediterranean fisheries are in a state of
“sustainable overfishing”. Is this true? Theo-
retically, a fishery can be over-exploited (in
terms of yield per recruit) and be sustainable, in
the sense that the reproductive capacity is not
impaired. Indeed, Figure 5.2 shows the evolu-
tion of biomass in Mediterranean stocks and,
1.5
B/B2003
1.0
0.5
0.0
2003
2005
2007
Figure 5.2 Evolution of total biomass of Mediterranean stocks since 2003. Source: Commission Staff Working
Document SWD (2018) 329. Brussels, 11.6.2018.
93
somehow surprisingly, shows a rather stable
situation. This looks like a contradiction: with
the very high fishing mortality levels shown
in Figure 5.1, how is it that biomass levels are
stable instead of collapsing?
This sustainable overfishing would be charac-
terized by a low yield per recruit, but a relatively
stable one for most stocks. This would be easy
to test if there were, as in the Atlantic, long time
series of stock abundance. Yet, as we saw above,
the information on time series is patchy, and this
makes a systematic and complete evaluation
of this question difficult. However, for smaller
groups of stocks certain time series exist that can
shed some light on this question: in areas where
relatively long time series exist, a decreasing
trend in the abundance of commercial species
has been observed (Coll et al. 2009). More
specific cases, such as small pelagic fish (GFCM
2015) and common sole in the Adriatic Sea (EU
2016b) show the old and significant decline in
biomass levels of the stocks concerned.
Other recent studies also cast serious doubts
about the sustainable overfishing theory.
A meta-analysis of 42 Mediterranean stocks
of nine species in 1999–2010 showed that the
exploitation rate has been steadily increasing,
2009
2011
2013
2015
94 Chapter 5

selectivity has been deteriorating and the The Mediterranean specificity

abundance of the stocks has been shrinking The Mediterranean fisheries show certain dif-
(Vasilakopoulos et al. 2014). ferences as compared with the Atlantic. These
Overall, however, beyond more specific cases, differences (traditionally grouped under the
Figure 5.2 seems to confirm that the Mediter- heading of “Mediterranean specificity”) are
ranean is characterized by a strong growth frequently mentioned:
overfishing, but not so clearly a recruitment • The high diversity of the ecosystem and the
overfishing. high number of species in the catch, with
sometimes no clear target species identified.
Economic performance For example, in a bottom trawl fishery off the
We have noted the generally positive trend in Turkish coast, 135 different species belonging
the economic indicators of EU fishing fleets in to 10 classes, 26 orders, and 71 families were
recent years. These trends, however, are due identified (Gökçe et al. 2016). This makes
to significant progress in the Atlantic basin, but it difficult sometimes to distinguish a clear
Mediterranean fisheries do not follow the trend. target species.
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the gross • The very bad conservation of most stocks, in
value added and average wages for Mediter- particular in terms of growth overfishing (EU
ranean fisheries in recent years, broken down 2016b and 2016c).
between small-scale and large-scale fleets. • The poor tradition of systematic and coordi-
Contrary to the very positive trend shown nated scientific advice, lacking the tradition
in Figure 1.5 in Chapter 1 for the whole EU of TAC-related advice by International Coun-
fleet, Mediterranean fleets hardly show signifi- cil for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and
cant improvements in recent years, and this is partially duplicated between STECF and
particularly the case for the small-scale sector. GFCM.
A superficial analysis reveals how this can be • The tradition of local or at best regional man-
associated with the status of the stocks: in both agement due to the coastal nature of many
areas, the economic improvement follows quite fisheries.
closely that of the overall abundance of the bio- • The traditional weakness of the multilateral
logical stocks, in a very clear demonstration of management in the sea basin under GFCM,
the case for the improvement of stock status as although this is changing for good: in recent
the fundamental precondition to any improve- times, GFCM has been responsible for impor-
ment in the socio-economic status of Mediter- tant initiatives regarding scientific advice and
ranean fisheries. management (FAO 2018).

Mediterranean Sea Mediterranean Sea

35 25
Average wage (thousand Є)
GVA per FTE (thousand Є)

30
20
25
20 15

15 10
10
5
5
0 0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
SCF LSF SCF LSF
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3 Evolution of: (a) Gross value added (GVA) and (b) average wages for small-scale (SCF) and large-scale
(LSF) fishing vessels in the Mediterranean. Source: EU (2018c).
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
• Last but not least, the narrowness of the
Mediterranean continental shelf, which
determines a fundamental difference with
the Atlantic (see Figure 5.4): the coastal
nature of most fisheries, the absence of
large common fishing grounds for fleets
of different nationalities, and the different
jurisdictional regime of these waters. This
is in stark contrast with the width of the
continental shelf in the waters of the EU-10
where the CFP originated. This chart alone
explains probably more than anything else
the real Mediterranean specificity.
Another important difference that has a
considerable bearing on the management of
Mediterranean fisheries is the fact that the EU
is not alone in the basin: A key factor is that
only nine out of the 23 country-members of
the GFCM are members of the EU. Thus, in
many cases, the EU has to call upon other inter-
national legislative agreements in an attempt
to protect fish stocks. These non-EU GFCM
members are known as the Mediterranean
Partner Countries and in 2006 they accounted
for 54% of fish caught in the area whereas the
EU Member States accounted for the rest.
The importance of catches by non-EU coun-
tries in the Mediterranean is not only high: it
is also growing over time: between 1990 and
2006, the total catches by Partner Countries
in the Mediterranean increased by 47%, with
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria showing the greatest
relative increase of 105%, 148%, and 113%,
respectively (Hadjimichael et al. 2010). This
is extremely important because it creates an
understandable fear in EU Member states
and their industries that any effort to reduce
catches to recover overfished stocks will only
result in an increase by their competitors, with
no benefit for the resources.
The above differences are both the cause
and the consequence of very different pol-
icy approaches under the CFP between the
Atlantic/Baltic and the Mediterranean. And
these differences are not only quantitative
(“a sea of difference” for Symes 1999) but
also quantitative: Mediterranean fishermen are
subject to considerable fewer EU regulations
95
(Hadjimichael et al. 2010), corresponding to a
very late and incomplete incorporation to the
acquis of the conservation pillar of the CFP.
In any case, these differences should not be
considered as an excuse for the obvious failure
of the policy in this basin. These differences
have been known for a long time. Sometimes,
Mediterranean Member States have, to differ-
ent degrees, hidden behind this specificity to
avoid taking specific measures to address the
situation. If anything, the specificity means that
the conservation policy should have specific
instruments and probably a specific timing
to achieve objectives, but it cannot be taken
as an excuse for the long-standing lack of
will by many players to address the problem
seriously.
Global warming: a game-changer
In Chapter 12 we will look at the effects of
climate change on the world’s fisheries and the
challenge that this represents. In the Mediter-
ranean these effects are particularly acute: the
warming of the waters together with the easy
access of warmer water species from the Red
Sea are producing an extraordinary invasion of
alien species in the basin. More than 900 alien
species have been identified in the Mediter-
ranean in recent decades.3 The Eastern part is
particularly affected, and the effects of these
species has been known for a number of years
(Galil 2000; Streftaris and Zenetos 2006), as are
the increasingly complex interactions between
incoming and native species (Mills et al. 2004).
The effects are different from those in the
Atlantic. As we will see, in the open Atlantic
waters global warming produces a northward
displacement of the area of distribution of
many stocks. In the Mediterranean this is not
possible: species that would normally migrate
northwards are “squeezed” by newcomers to
the northern part of the basin, where they are
increasingly overlapping with the alien species,
producing new types of interactions that are
still not entirely known.
3 www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/05/
110523171111.htm/
96 Chapter 5

Bathymetry
>200 m
<200 m
Union Waters boundary
EU Member State
Other Country
Cartography: D G MARE - Unit C4 - 14/07/2017
Projection: Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area
Scale 1:22 000 000
Map Reference: EU_shelf_170714tl

Figure 5.4 Chart of the continental shelf in different areas of European seas, showing the narrowness of the
Mediterranean shelf. The EEZ lines are indicative, not authoritative.

This is an important game-changer. In addi-
tion to the well-known effects of the geograph-
ical drift of many species, in the Mediterranean
the mix of stocks, and the replacement of tra-
ditional species by new ones is advancing fast,
and this has obvious consequences on ecosys-
tem structure, as well as on the scientific advice.
Among other factors, this phenomenon implies
that certain changes in abundance of stocks may
actually not be due at all to increased fishing
mortality, but rather to increased competition
from the new, alien stocks. This represents a
huge challenge to the science base of the policy
in this basin, already in need of catching up
with other EU areas.
As I will explain in Chapter 13, the relative
successful management system of the Atlantic
has a fundamental flaw in this particular con-
text: its high level of structure and rigidity is
ill-adapted to the kind of dynamic processes
derived from climate change. For this reason,
it is important that the Mediterranean tries to
develop its own approach where the challenges
of climate change can be met with more
appropriate and more flexible mechanisms.
Can MSY be achieved by 2020
for all stocks in Mediterranean
fisheries?
Now under the new CFP the MSY objective
must be achieved at the same time, and that
means the Mediterranean must catch up with
the rest of EU waters in just a few years. This
implies reductions of fishing mortality from
now to 2020 at levels much higher than those
necessary in the Atlantic or the Baltic. Can this
be done at all? How?
The point of departure
The fact that the new CFP in 2013 established
exactly the same time limit for the achievement
of the MSY objective, despite the huge differ-
ence in stock status between the Atlantic/Baltic
and the Mediterranean is a tribute to the
importance that European legislators give to
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
the notion of level playing field. However, the
evidence of a stock status indicating that a vast
majority of Mediterranean stocks are very far
away from Fmsy objectives makes the achieve-
ment of the new CFP objective extremely
difficult in this basin.
In Chapter 2 we saw the relative success of
the US system to remove overfishing. This has
implied recovery times of 10 years for the most
over-exploited stocks. This sharply contrasts
with the six-year (2014–2020) timeline to
bring all Mediterranean stocks to Fmsy levels.
The question of proportionality is obvious.
These difficulties must be also seen in the light
of the achievements of the current conservation
framework, based on technical measures effort
management plans. A very recent work clearly
indicates that this management system is not
providing a solution to the problem of Mediter-
ranean fisheries (Cardinale et al. 2017).
This fact, of course, has not prevented the
Commission to make its utmost to make this
objective possible. A recent initiative through a
meeting in Malta (the MedFish4ever4 ) involv-
ing EU Mediterranean Member States and
seven non-EU States has boosted political com-
mitment to redress the situation. In any case,
however, the two main agreements of this
meeting clearly fall short of what would be
necessary to achieve the goals established in
the reform of 2013:
• By 2020, ensure that all key Mediterranean
stocks are subject to adequate data collec-
tion and scientifically assessed on a regular
basis. In particular small-scale fishermen are
to acquire an increased role in collecting
the necessary data to reinforce scientific
knowledge.
• Establish multi-annual management plans
for all key fisheries. On its part, the Commis-
sion has already initiated this process with its
proposal for a multi-annual fisheries plan for
small pelagic stocks in the Adriatic.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/
newsroom/image/document/2017-17/ec-
medfish4ever_declaration_127EBE71-C8F2-262C-
D21E41DF99099E65_44383.pdf/
97
Important though they are, it is also clear that
the EU cannot entirely depend on multilateral
cooperation in the sea basin if the objective of
MSY is to be delivered by 2020.
What stocks to manage in the
Mediterranean?
Article 2 of Regulation 1380/2013 requires that
the objective of bringing stocks to MSY levels
by 2020 shall apply to all stocks. In the Atlantic
this is interpreted as referring to all stocks regu-
lated under TACs and quotas. But the question
is much less clear for the Mediterranean. While
the stocks to be subjected to the discard ban
are those under a minimum landing size, it is
not obvious that the list of “all stocks” for the
purpose of Article 2 of Regulation 1380/2013
should be the same. It is to be noted that the list
of species under minimum size includes species
of fish, crustaceans, and molluscs that are
coastal, and where it is questionable whether
they should be managed at EU level.
Most fisheries management systems in the
world are based on single stock considera-
tions. With different approaches, only the
main commercial species are managed, and
the management of species of minor economic
significance is often disregarded. It is essential
that the managers choose those stocks that are
to be evaluated continuously in order to focus
management on them. Having full analytical
assessments for more than 100 species in all the
Geographical Statistical Areas of the Mediter-
ranean is clearly not possible, due to insufficient
data and manpower (Osio et al. 2015).
On the other hand, the idea of manag-
ing all the combinations of species/statistical
areas making up more than 300 “stocks” in
the Mediterranean basin is not realistic. The
management system cannot absorb all those
stocks, either in terms of scientific assessment
or in terms of management. Besides, it is
even questionable whether there is an added
value in trying to manage all these stocks. The
example of the Atlantic is again relevant: in the
Atlantic/Baltic area, not all the known stocks
are managed; only the main ones are, and even
so ICES has recently advised that eliminating
98 Chapter 5
certain stocks from the list of managed ones
under the CFP would have little effect on the
overall conservation of EU fisheries in this
area (ICES 2018). In the Mediterranean case it
would make sense to make an interpretation of
“all stocks” as meaning only the main stocks,
those that determine the behavior of fishermen.
There are methodologies to base the pri-
oritization of unassessed stocks, such as the
productivity-susceptibility analysis (PSA) which
correlates well with the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list scores.
These scores can be combined with landings
and average prices, to derive a list of the pri-
ority stocks that respond to a combination of
biological vulnerability and commercial impor-
tance. When applying such methodology, Osio
et al. (2015) found that eight of the 15 highest
ranked stocks are currently not assessed. This
clearly underscores the problem of scientific
advice and the need to streamline for a group
of priority stocks.
In GFCM, an important attempt has already
been made by establishing a list of priority
stocks based on: (i) economic importance
and (ii) level of risk. The list includes pelagic
(sardine, anchovy, and horse mackerel) and
demersal stocks (notably hake, red mullet, and
red shrimp) as well as species of particular con-
servation concern (eels, red coral) and invasive
species.5 The list is rather short, but it is an
important step. One can certainly expect that in
a context of patchy scientific advice, the advice
for these priority species will be assured on a
regular basis. It is important to bear in mind
that such lists are likely to evolve over time, as
species abundances shift under climate change.
Whatever the list of stocks or fisheries to be
subject to priority management, the point is
that this is a decision that has to be made by
fisheries managers on a systematic basis. The
current approach, represented by the man-
agement plans of the 2006 regulation has a
major flaw: the system is largely “bottom up”
so the stocks/fisheries under such plans are
5 www.fao.org/gfcm/activities/fisheries/stock-
assessment/priority-species/en/
those proposed by Member States, with little
or no overall planning on priorities. This does
not ensure a systematic approach based on
clearly-defined priority stocks, and only con-
tribute to perpetuate the patchy framework still
largely existing today. In addition, as we will see
below, the scientific community needs to focus
its work on these priority stocks on a systematic
basis. For these reasons, it is essential that man-
agers take decisions on the definition of priority
stocks/fisheries so that everybody’s work can
focus on these, as the best way to build a man-
agement system that will deliver the CFP goals.
A focus on EU stocks
As we saw above, progress in the multilat-
eral management of shared Mediterranean
stocks is necessarily slow, because some North
African countries are still trying to expand
their fisheries, but also given the enormous
political and financial difficulties of a number
of Mediterranean coastal states to undertake
serious fisheries management.
However, a number of stocks are distributed
exclusively, or primarily in EU waters, partic-
ularly in areas such as the Gulf of Lyons, the
Northern Adriatic and the Northern Tyrrhenian
Seas. In these cases, progress can be made
without cooperation from non-EU countries,
and without fear that these will benefit from
the EU’s sacrifices.
This is already on-going: the first two propos-
als for management plans in the Mediterranean
are those for small pelagic fish (sardine and
anchovy) in the Adriatic Sea (EU 2017) and
that for the demersal stocks in the western
Mediterranean (EU 2018a). In both proposals
the stocks concerned are primarily distributed
and exploited at EU level, so there is little
excuse about lack of cooperation by third coun-
tries. At the time of writing, the two proposals
are being discussed by the EU co-legislators and
the final outcome cannot be anticipated.
Avoiding “cut and paste” approaches
Since the long-term management plans were
developed in the Atlantic and Baltic, there
can be a tendency to use these models and
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
apply them mutatis mutandis to Mediterranean
fisheries. In fact, the initial proposal for a
multiannual plan for small pelagic fish in the
Adriatic Sea was based on the same instruments
(F ranges) than the reference case, the Baltic
Sea multiannual management plan (MAP) (EU
2016d). The use of instruments developed for
fisheries managed by single-stock TACs was,
however, poorly adapted to this area.
A similar trend is observed in the proposal
for a plan for western Mediterranean demer-
sal stocks (EU 2018a). Despite a genuine effort
to establish a tailor-made approach to Mediter-
ranean fisheries, the proposal bears still a con-
siderable resemblance to those of the Baltic and
North Sea plans, something that may not neces-
sarily contribute to an easy passage through the
decision-making process.
It is very important to ensure that the devel-
opment of a conservation policy be done based
on tailor-made approaches, even if that implies
that the notion of harmonization and level plain
field is less visible. This is really a test case for
the CFP to be able to adapt to local conditions
and to regional differences. A number of factors
make “cut and paste” approaches inadequate in
a Mediterranean context:
• The point of departure is different, and the
instruments to be considered as part of the
MAP must reflect that. A clear example
is the idea of incorporating specific struc-
tural measures to the plan (scrapping and
temporary laying ups) as suggested by the
Mediterranean Advisory Council in prepara-
tion of the Western Mediterranean demersal
plan. Without exceptional measures of this
kind, it is very difficult to see how the
dramatic reductions in fishing mortality nec-
essary to get anywhere close to a Fmsy level
could be achieved.
• The scientific advice available is different and
this implies that the approaches proposed in
the North Sea for example may not be prac-
ticable in the Mediterranean.
• The Baltic and North Sea plans are tailor-
made for fisheries managed by single-stock
99
TACs, and are poorly adapted to the tradition
and preference for effort-based management
in the Mediterranean.
• For demersal fisheries, the important prob-
lem is selectivity, which requires special
measures to address. While it plays a sec-
ondary role in the Baltic and North Sea
MAPs, it should play a key role in any MAP
on demersal stocks in the Mediterranean.
Above and beyond these technical argu-
ments there is also an important political
one. Mediterranean stakeholders have always
resented (rightly or wrongly) that Mediter-
ranean policy has been somehow a second
priority after the Atlantic, and that the whole
of the policy has been designed for the latter
and thus poorly adapted to the specificities
of the Mediterranean sea basin. Now that an
active Med AC exists and makes meaningful
proposals, any impression of “cut and paste”
policy development will undoubtedly meet
serious opposition in this area.
As we argue in other parts of this book,
the level playing field does not mean policy
harmonization, but an equivalent level of
ambition and standards. This case illustrates
better than any other the need to develop a
bespoke Mediterranean conservation policy
that will combine the incorporation of the
special features of the fisheries in this area, the
need to include stakeholders’ “buy in” and all
under common CFP standards.
A fishery approach?
The considerations of the previous chapter
about the acceptability of a “pretty good
multispecies yield” and other multispecies
approaches as proxies to the MSY objective
of Article 2.2 of Regulation 1380/2013 can be
repeated here, although for different reasons.
If in the previous case the avoidance of choke
species was the main reason, in the Mediter-
ranean one can arrive at a similar conclusion
even in the absence of TACs and, hence, choke
species.
Perhaps it is here in this context that the
notion of “aggregate MSY” (Fogarty et al. 2012)
could be developed and applied, at least for the
100 Chapter 5
most complex bottom trawl fisheries for a wide
range of stocks. In this vein, the idea could be
developed to accompany this aggregate MSY
so that a total cap on catches from the ecosys-
tem, to provide a general safety net that the
lesser attention to individual over-exploited
stocks would be compensated by an overall
safety net for the species aggregate. As we saw
in Chapter 3, this approach may in fact turn
out to be more conservative than the sum of
individual stock objectives.
Despite all available principles and method-
ologies to assess and manage stocks through
single-stock measures, the mixed nature of
many Mediterranean fisheries lends itself to
this kind of approach. The idea could be, at
least for certain fisheries, particularly those by
bottom trawl, to develop a management based
on species aggregates rather than individual
stocks. This could actually solve a number
of the difficulties associated with the above
approaches based on individual stock param-
eters. The question would at least deserve a
serious discussion.
Streamlining scientific advice
The traditional wisdom is that the scientific
basis for Mediterranean management is clearly
insufficient, and that this is a significant factor
contributing to the poor state of stocks in this
area. While this is true and certainly has to
be addressed, it is also important to underline
that this relatively poor level of scientific advice
cannot be used as an excuse to avoid measures
that are clearly necessary in the light of the
available information (EU 2015). The scientific
advice needs to be streamlined and adapted to
the policy priorities established by the 2013 CFP
reform. This is beyond doubt, but it is proving
extremely difficult to do in practice.
The need for a “client” for the
scientific community
There is abundant and good fisheries science in
the Mediterranean. And, contrary to extended
belief, there are plenty of data too. Yet, for many
years, it proved extremely difficult to provide a
systematic picture of the status of the stocks in
the area, as was done in the Atlantic and Baltic.
Indeed, the annual “Policy Statement” pub-
lished by the Commission since 2006 including
a description of the evolution of stock status
in recent years only contained such analysis
for the Atlantic and Baltic, but was silent on
the Mediterranean, for lack of a systematized
approach. Only since 2014, thanks to the work
of STECF, it was possible to start providing this
kind of analysis of the overall status of the
stocks. Even so, the percentage of stocks con-
sidered “evaluated” is insufficient (EU 2016a).
Even these first attempts to evaluate Mediter-
ranean stocks systematically were undermined
by a number of problems:
• A high level of uncertainty of the evaluations.
• The very high number of stocks but the rel-
atively low number of them subject to some
kind of evaluation.
• The fact that the stocks evaluated were dif-
ferent every year (!) thus preventing the
establishment of comparable time series to
describe the evolution of stock status.
This is all the consequence of the traditional
lack of a “client” asking for systematic advice to
run a well-established management system. The
TAC and quota system in the Atlantic and Baltic
have provided ICES with a client asking specific
questions every year, thus forcing the scientific
community to gear up to provide such advice
annually. In the Mediterranean this client has
traditionally been missing and it is necessary to
create it if fisheries science in this area is to pro-
duce consistent and systematic advice.
There are two main conditions to ensure that
the CFP constitutes the client that is so essen-
tial to bring together the best coordinated efforts
by the scientific community: clarity of objectives
and stability.
• Clarity is essential in defining what stocks
must to be evaluated regularly, and what
are the management areas concerned by
the evaluations. So far, the evaluation
of Mediterranean stocks has been based
on a selection of stocks evaluated that
changed every year! That makes evaluation
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
discontinuous and, specially, makes mean-
ingful time series impossible, since the stocks
evaluated every year are different.
• Ensuring the stability in the choice of the
key stocks and ensuring that such key stocks
are evaluated every year, thus allowing for
a complete time series of evaluations, is a
fundamental component of any successful
strategy to address the problem.
This clarity and stability is the responsibility
of fisheries managers, not scientists. Managers
should establish a clear list of priority stocks
where the evaluation work should concentrate
(thus avoiding annual variations in the list of
stocks evaluated) and ensure the stability of
such evaluations over time.
Once managers have established the man-
agement structure and have thus clarified
what the “client” wants, it is also essential that
the different scientific bodies also clarify their
respective roles and avoid duplications. Here
again, the experience of the Atlantic between
ICES and STECF is worth mentioning: while
these bodies duplicated their work to some
extent for a number of years, recent efforts
have considerably streamlined their functions
and today ICES carry out the basic evaluation
work while STECF concentrates on all the
elements that ICES does not deliver, either
because of their economic nature or because of
their EU-only interest.
This scheme could well be reproduced in
the Mediterranean, with GFCM’s Scientific
Advisory Committee (SAC) playing the role of
ICES and with STECF doing the economic and
the EU-only tasks. This distribution of labor is
important to avoid possible duplications, but
also to provide a much-needed trust in the
system of provision of scientific advice to all
relevant players in the basin, something that an
EU body like STECF cannot ensure.
Data poor stocks and MSY proxies
We addressed the question of data poor stocks
in Chapter 3, but the question is of particular
relevance in the Mediterranean: there are few
stocks where the Fmsy has been estimated. In
addition to the difficulties, the estimation of
101
Fmsy values is also dependent on the variability
of the fishing mortality at age, that is, is very
dependent on the exploitation pattern that,
as we have seen, is extremely unselective in
Mediterranean fisheries (Collocca et al. 2013).
The difficulties of evaluating data-poor stocks
in the Mediterranean has long been a common-
place . . . and an excuse. This evaluation should
start from a clear standpoint: it is not possible to
replicate the kind of evaluation available for the
best assessed stocks in the Atlantic and Baltic
stocks; a new approach is absolutely necessary.
The scientific literature describes abundantly
different methods to evaluate stocks in data
poor situations. In the Mediterranean, the sit-
uation is in many cases not strictly a data-poor
one, but one where many data are not used
as according to a clear, stable, and systematic
methodology.
Methods to handle this kind of case are not
in short supply: good reviews have been done,
inter alia, by Cope et al. (2011), Costello et al.
(2012), Jardim et al. (2014), Rosenberg et al.
(2014), and Thorson and Cope (2015). Some
methods allow the estimation of management
reference points concerning yield and biomass
for fisheries where approximate catches are
known from the beginning of the exploitation
(Dick and McCall, 2011).
Other methods borrow information for eval-
uation from data-rich stocks. This method,
the so-called “Robin Hood” approach, is based
on the notion that stocks found and caught
together exhibit similar, but not identical,
trends in exploitation rates. This allows assess-
ments for data-poor stocks to “borrow strength”
from data-rich stocks and can lead to more sta-
bility and precision for data-poor stocks (Punt
et al. 2011). The possible use of this methodol-
ogy, however, may be limited by the availability
of data-rich stocks from which other stock
can borrow. This abundant methodology also
removes any excuse about the difficulty to
manage Mediterranean stocks on account of
alleged “poor data”.
The improvement of scientific advice is nec-
essary but not sufficient. The long tradition
of the CFP of fixing TACs at levels higher
102 Chapter 5
than those recommended by scientific advice
is well-illustrated. However, the problem is
certainly not restricted to the Atlantic around
TACs: the reductions of fishing efforts adopted
by GFCM for bottom trawling have been much
lower than those recommended by scientists
(Carpenter et al. 2016).
For a long time, the scientific advice in the
Mediterranean has been discredited. This fact,
combined with the inevitable harshness of the
reductions proposed by scientists to address the
acute overfishing problem, make it even more
necessary than in other areas to build trust in
the scientific advice. This is not an easy process,
but the experience of the Atlantic, where both
ICES and STECF have opened their doors to the
participation of the fishing industry, and the
increased use of science/industry partnerships,
have contributed to increase dramatically the
credibility of the scientific advice in the Euro-
pean industry. This is another pending question
in the Mediterranean basin.
Revising stock boundaries
The problem of stock boundaries in the Mediter-
ranean is very old. Out of the over 300 stocks
identified, a number of them are not clearly
biological unit stocks, but rather the defini-
tion of a species in one of the statistical areas
defined by FAO. This is not a very unusual case.
In British Columbia, Canada, the management
of the demersal fishery deals with as many as
40 different stocks (actually, 40 combinations of
45°N
40°N
35°N
30°N
10°W 0° 10°E
Figure 5.5 Location of GSA 7, area for which evaluations of sardine and anchovy by STECF. Source: EU (2016e).
species/zones, just like in the Mediterranean)
of rockfish! And in New Zealand, the number
of stocks managed is around 300, including
many small stocks of coastal species. However,
doing this requires time and investment that
are not necessarily available, and certainly not
enough to deliver results by 2020, so another
more realistic approach is necessary.
The above exercise of identification of the
main stocks must be complemented with the
further study of the boundaries of such stocks,
since it would be most desirable that these stock
boundaries will coincide, as much as possible,
with the areas for their management. In the
Mediterranean, most stock boundaries are still
based on a combination of species and FAO
statistical areas, with relatively little knowledge
on population structure and distribution. For
certain important species, a number of different
stocks are identified: 15 for red mullet, 12 for
hake, 11 for anchovy or 5 for sardine (Cardinale
et al. 2017).
It is obvious that the management system
cannot cope with so many stocks, and this
implies the need to work on at least two
important questions:
• Better identifying stocks with boundaries
based on stock distribution and not on
statistical divisions; and
• Prioritizing the research and management on
the most important stocks.
Figure 5.5 shows the problem of stock
boundaries. According to the last evaluation
20°E 30°E 40°E 50°E
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
of the sardine and anchovy stocks by STECF
(EU 2016b) the stocks are evaluated for by FAO
area. The question is: is a FAO Statistical Area
the area of distribution of a discrete stock? If we
take the example of the natural distribution of
sardine and anchovy in the Atlantic, with their
very wide (and fluctuating) areas of distribu-
tion, it is difficult to see how such a small area
can represent a biological stock.
The MAREA project,6 financed by the Euro-
pean Commission, has started revising stock
boundaries and, although the difficulties are
considerable, progress has been achieved in
better defining the stock structure of data-rich
stocks, such as Mediterranean hake (Merluc-
cius), while other stocks have proven much
more elusive, such as white octopus (Eledone
moscata). This important work has to continue
and be consolidated.
The CFP and GFCM
The GFCM is responsible for the multilateral
management of fish stocks in the area. One
essential factor in the development of stock
management in this area is the degree of
progress achieved by the regional organization,
GFCM. For many years, progress on fisheries
management in the framework of GFCM has
been extremely slow, although it is fair to say
that things are changing, and GFCM in recent
years has been able to accomplish unprece-
dented progress.
This slow progress has an important bear-
ing on the position of EU Member States and
industry: it is very difficult to convince either
of the two to make sacrifices to recover shared
fish stocks if countries of Northern Africa do
not do the same. As a result, slow progress in
GFCM favors slow progress in the EU. This is a
vicious circle that has to be broken, if progress
is to be made to achieve MSY levels by 2020.
The role of GFCM, however, must be put
into the right perspective: if GFCM was respon-
sible for the sluggish progress toward stock
recovery in the Mediterranean, one would
6 https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/
studies/stockmed_en/
103
normally expect that the state of the stocks in
European waters of the Mediterranean would
be somehow better than that of stocks shared
with non-EU States. However, the Commission
demonstrated that this is not the case: stocks
distributed in EU waters are in no better shape
than those distributed partially or totally in
third countries’ waters (EU 2016a). This implies
that, while progress in GFCM is certainly impor-
tant, this organization and the other countries
of the basin cannot be blamed any more than
the EU for the poor state of the stocks.
This has led the EU to prioritize the devel-
opment of management plans applicable to
fisheries distributed primarily in EU waters.
Such is the case of the proposal for a manage-
ment plan for small pelagic fish in the Adriatic
(EU 2017) and that for demersal fish in the
western Mediterranean (EU 2018a).
Unfortunately, the decision-making process
of the two above plans is proving extremely
slow and difficult, and this creates a new sce-
nario: namely where EU internal management
measures can actually become slower to adopt
than measures at the level of GFCM. This, cou-
pled with recent important progress in GFCM’s
ability to work out management plans casts a
very interesting new light on the relationship
of the CFP and GFCM. The latter being long
considered as holding back progress in the man-
agement of Mediterranean fisheries, current
experience may actually prove otherwise, and
progress in the GFCM seems to be advancing
more quickly now than internal EU manage-
ment; something to be taken into consideration
in future initiatives.
What instruments to use
in Mediterranean fisheries?
According to the current Mediterranean regu-
lation (Regulation 1967/2006) the main instru-
ment to manage fisheries in the area is the
national or EU management plan through the
use of fishing effort. Since the entry into force
of this regulation, a relatively low number of
these plans have been actually implemented: by
104 Chapter 5
February 2016, 28 national plans were adopted
and 13 in advanced preparation. Many of these
plans concern small fisheries and correspond
largely to a “bottom up” approach as mentioned
above, which does not guarantee a systematic
management system of the main fisheries in
the basin. In addition, their implementation
has not necessarily constituted a success: in
a number of cases, the nominal reduction in
fishing effort has not resulted in a reduction of
fishing mortality of the key stocks (Cardinale
et al. 2017).
The results of the management instrument
established in the 2006 regulation are therefore
very unimpressive. This does not mean nec-
essarily that the instrument is inappropriate,
but it means that the traditional view that
fisheries should only be managed by effort as
a self-evident truth must be revised. It seems
therefore opportune to discuss what would be
the appropriate instruments to use in these
fisheries.
Fishing effort plans
This is the instrument favored in Regulation
1967/2006. The reasons for this are clear,
although it has been argued that in reality the
main reason to justify an effort-based approach
instead of a catch limitation approach has been
the weight of tradition and the lack of appetite
to negotiate allocation keys (Penas Lado 2016).
It is useful, in this context, to draw from the
experience of the US in using effort manage-
ment. Up until 2010, the groundfish fishery off
New England was managed using “days at sea”.
The system had to be changed to a catch-limit
system based on different stocks because, in the
words of Rothschild et al. 2014:
Problems arose because attempts to control over-
fishing resulted in a continuous ratcheting down of
the number of days a boat could fish. The days at
sea system was widely criticised not only because it
not only created days at sea limits that were eco-
nomically infeasible (e.g. 25 days boat-1 year-1)
but it also did not prevent overfishing.
Although the circumstances are different,
the New England case shows what can hap-
pen if a real reduction of effort is applied to
a fishery requiring important reductions in
fishing mortality, as indeed is the case of most
Mediterranean fisheries.
However, experience shows that changes
in policy are slow and, given the urgency of
achieving the MSY 2020 objective, the use of
effort is not going to disappear overnight. By
and large, and despite the possibility to intro-
duce TACs in certain Mediterranean fisheries,
one can expect that most fisheries, and par-
ticularly coastal demersal fisheries, will still be
managed through effort plans. The Fleet and
Fisheries Forecast method (Fcube) estimates
potential effort by fleet in mixed fisheries sit-
uations to achieve specific targets of fishing
mortality (Maravelias et al. 2012).
TACs
It has been explained elsewhere that there
is no objective basis to exclude the use of
catch limitations from certain fisheries in the
Mediterranean. In addition to bluefin tuna,
already subject to TACs in the context of
ICCAT, and the recent case of swordfish, also
subject to catch limitations in the same context
since 2016, science has already recommended
the use of this kind of instrument, for example
in the case of directed fisheries for sardine
and anchovy in the Adriatic Sea, giving rise
to a proposal from the Commission in that
regard (EU 2017). Other authors consider that,
if Mediterranean fisheries are to achieve the
objective of MSY in 2020, a TAC-based system
would be necessary (Cardinale et al. 2017).
As we have seen the Commission has already
proposed applying TACs for small pelagic fish in
the Adriatic (EU 2017). This proposal is based
on the STECF advice that “controlling catches is the
most appropriate means of adapting fishing mortality
and it would be a more effective management tool for
small pelagics” (EU 2014).
However, TACs in this basin will probably be
of limited use. Only in those fisheries with a rel-
atively clear target species, caught in relatively
clean fisheries will the TACs be useful. The
Mediterranean represents a good opportunity
to learn from the shortcomings of the policy
based on individual TACs in mixed fisheries in
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
a context of individual objectives and combined
with relative stability.
The recent proposal for a multiannual plan for
demersal stocks in the Western Mediterranean
(EU 2018a) actually proposes a TAC only for
one stock: hake, in recognition that the main
instrument proposed (effort applicable to spe-
cific fisheries) may not be enough to achieve the
MSY objectives for a stock considered the main
target species for trawlers.
As we have argued above, the Mediterranean
lends itself very well to some intermediate
approaches. Over and beyond effort man-
agement, the idea of using “aggregate MSY”
and catch limitations for species aggregates may
have interesting potential, in that it would be an
instrument to control total output, presumably
resolving the problems associated with effort
management, not for individual species but for
aggregates that may represent a management
of the “carrying capacity” of the fishery. This
idea would at least deserve some discussion to
better evaluate its potential.
The multispecies approach: a better
alternative for the Mediterranean?
The Atlantic management approach, based
on single-stock TACs under a fixed scheme
of management areas and allocation keys will
be under considerable pressure in the near
future for a number of reasons, but primarily
by climate change. The Mediterranean is barely
starting now to establish a systematic stock
management system. Without the weight of
the past, the management of fisheries could be
based on a new paradigm, trying to avoid the
problems that the rigid nature of the Atlantic
system will cause under the emerging dynamic
scenario created by climate change.
In particular, management in the Mediter-
ranean, especially for demersal fisheries, has
an opportunity to develop a management sys-
tem that would not place so much emphasis
on individual stocks but rather on multi-
species approaches. Such approaches would
respond better to the high level of diversity
of the fisheries (that is dramatically increasing
under climate change) as well as to the quick
105
changes in fish communities. Furthermore,
multispecies approaches are better adapted to
the use of fishing effort as the primary manage-
ment instrument, a choice determined by the
deeply-rooted tradition of controlling fishing
time in many Mediterranean ports.
Multispecies approaches have downsides too,
and one of the main ones is the relative disre-
gard for the problems of particularly vulnerable
stocks, which may be partially “sacrificed” for
the purpose of achieving multispecies goals. But
this has possible solutions too. One can be the
adoption of specific area/time closures appli-
cable when and where the most vulnerable
species are found. Another one is to accept that
the management system will inevitably lead to
a level of overfishing of certain stocks, but that
can be compensated by the limitation of the
total impact of the fishery on the ecosystem,
through the establishment of an ecological cap
such as a limit to the overall removals from the
ecosystem, as I refer to in Chapter 4. This would
be fully consistent with the whole approach
of focusing management on the surplus of
the ecosystem and not to its individual stocks
which, under any circumstance, will be very
variable as a result of climate change.
Closed areas
Scientific evidence on the positive effects of
closed areas, notably through the “spill-over
effect”7 is abundant: see for example Goñi et al.
(2008), Forcada et al. (2009) among others.
Interestingly, evidence also shows that the
benefits of this kind of instrument are higher
in the case of very poorly managed fisheries,
whereas for relatively well-managed ones the
closed areas do not provide a very important
benefit (Buxton et al. 2014). This implies that
in the particular case of the Mediterranean,
where management has been largely absent,
the potential for this instrument appears
significant.
7 The protection of fish inside the protected area
results in an increase in the abundance of the fish not
only within the area, but also in the surrounding areas
where the fish can be exploited.
106 Chapter 5
This kind of instrument was also part of
Regulation 1967/2006 (EU 2006), which
established two types of protected area, some
of the “Community fishing protected areas”
(Article 6) to cover areas shared by more
than one Member State, and “National fish-
ing protected areas” in their territorial waters
(Article 7). In both cases, Council and Member
States, respectively, should declare a network of
these areas within two years of entry into force
of the regulation, and further areas should sub-
sequently be established. These two provisions
clearly indicated that the protected fishing areas
were considered at the time as a fundamental
instrument for fisheries management, and this
was intended by Council as a way of avoid
having to apply TACs.
The results are less than impressive. The
extension of marine protected areas (MPAs)
is still rather limited, and estimated at 9.5%
of the waters within the exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) of coastal States of in the Western
Mediterranean. With this level of coverage, it is
estimated that MPAs will contribute relatively
little to the achievement of the MSY 2020
objective (Cardinale et al. 2017). Other estima-
tions are that, by mid-2015, there were 1077
MPAs covering 6.45% of the sea basin area.
Coverage is variable, with only the Western
Mediterranean exceeding the 10% coverage
target (Rodriguez-Rodriguez et al. 2016).
Part of the problem for the low level of
implementation of these provisions may lie in
the expectation that the protected areas would
be associated with a system of payments to
compensate for the foregone activity. Indeed,
as has been explained by this author, on the
discussion of the new structural instrument
of the CFP for the period 2014–2020, certain
Members of the European Parliament strongly
advocated the establishment of a scheme of
payments to Mediterranean fishermen to stop
fishing in protected fishery areas (Penas Lado
2016, chapter 16). Failure in obtaining guaran-
tees of such funding resulted in a total loss of
interest in the instrument itself. This raises the
issue of whether the protected fishery areas are
a viable instrument in the absence of public aid.
The above example encapsulates the diffi-
culty of using closed areas as a mainstream
instrument for fisheries management:
• If they do not reduce the overall fishing mor-
tality, their value for conservation is limited.
• If they do, they will require the use of pub-
lic money on a permanent basis to compen-
sate for the loss of fishing activity, something
highly questionable from different points of
view.
Overall, closed areas can be useful to address
specific, well-localized problems and can there-
fore constitute significant contributions to effec-
tive management, particularly for very local
management systems or as complementary
measures in the case of multispecies approaches
requiring protection for specific species with a
stable and well-known geographical or bathy-
metric distribution. However, insofar as these
areas cannot address the fundamental problem
of excess fishing capacity and effort, it is diffi-
cult to see such instruments as constituting, on
their own, the main management instrument
for these fisheries.
Mesh sizes
As we saw above, the very unselective nature
of most Mediterranean fisheries results in an
extremely low yield per recruit. Scientists rec-
ommend that the achievement of the MSY
objective by 2020 will not happen on the basis
of reductions of fishing mortality alone, but
that a significant improvement in the exploita-
tion pattern is paramount. For example, in the
hake stock, an improvement of the exploitation
pattern to exploit the stock to its optimum level
(Lopt ) would allow the MSY fishing mortality
in that scenario (FLopt ) to be up to four times
higher than at current levels (Fcurr ) or MSY
with the current exploitation pattern (Fmsy )
(Collocca et al. 2013).
Theoretically, Regulation 1967/2006 set out
to improve selectivity in Mediterranean fish-
eries, by moving the basic bottom trawl mesh
size from 40 mm diamond to 40 mm square
mesh or 50 mm diamond mesh. However, the
rather unambitious change that this represents
(and even so it was extremely difficult to adopt,
 Achieving policy objectives in Mediterranean fisheries
in the face of strong opposition from much of
the industry) does not fundamentally change
the catch composition for the most important
demersal stocks, even if stock yield should
tend to increase in the future (Guijarro and
Massutí 2006).
It is clear on that basis that the current tech-
nical measures as represented in Regulation
1967/2006 fall short of what is necessary to
stand a chance of achieving the MSY 2020
objective. In this context, a new approach
seems necessary. The traditional one of legally-
binding, detailed rules on mesh sizes, that has
characterized the CFP since its inception in
1983 must evolve. In line with the idea of
the new framework on technical measures
(that we will refer to in Chapter 7) we need
a much more flexible approach, based on a
results-based management where it will be for
the industry and Member States to find the
right combination of measures (including mesh
sizes) that would best contribute to achieve the
goals established in the policy, provided the
right incentives are applied.
In Chapters 6 and 7 we touch upon the ques-
tion of how technical measures, and particularly
mesh sizes, can contribute to increase selec-
tivity. The general understanding is that top–
down, prescriptive measures have a scope for
improvement that is seriously limited by their
direct effect on catch rates and fishermen’s
revenues.
Perhaps the difficulty is to find the right
incentives; in the Atlantic/Baltic such incen-
tives can take the form of higher quotas, for
example, but this option is not available in
the Mediterranean if TACs are not applied.
Perhaps a possibility to explore may be to have
incentives in terms of fishing effort (if and
when this will remain the main management
instrument) for fishermen that would engage
in significant increases of selectivity through
their own device.
The local or sub-regional nature of some
fisheries, together with the strong tradition of
local self-regulation in many Mediterranean
ports could actually facilitate that. The idea of
the national management plans introduced in
107
Regulation 1967/2006 responded to the idea of
capitalizing on the local culture. Here again, the
Mediterranean culture of fisheries management
is that of little or weak multilateral manage-
ment but strong local management. Perhaps
this could make these fisheries a textbook case
of how local collaborative approaches could
contribute to resolve the much-needed increase
in selectivity that is an essential condition for
the sustainability of resources in this area.
The transition: a buy-out scheme
for Mediterranean fisheries
The transition to the 2020 goal of all regulated
stocks at Fmsy is so much more difficult than in
the Atlantic that it makes sense to consider it
as a specific project with specific means. Other-
wise, it is an illusion to think that the same tran-
sition as in the Atlantic and Baltic Seas could
take place in this context.
The level of socio-economic sacrifice associ-
ated with the very strong reductions in fishing
mortality and selectivity in the fisheries con-
cerned that will be necessary to achieve the
MSY 2020 goal bears no comparison with that
of the Atlantic. Once co-legislators established
the same time limit to achieve MSY than in
other EU waters, there seems to be little doubt
that the transition will require special measures
for the Mediterranean. This is one of the ques-
tions where the new structural instrument of
the CFP, the European Maritime and Fisheries
Fund (EMFF) of 2014 falls short of what would
be necessary to provide the necessary support to
achieve the fundamental goal of the new CFP.
This new instrument purposely tried to
become a fundamental aid to the achievement
of the general objectives of the CFP. However,
perhaps under the pressure to ensure a “level
playing field” and avoid any impression of
discrimination, the new EMFF failed to estab-
lish the necessary instruments and priority to
focus the main problem for Mediterranean
fisheries: the much more difficult transition to
the MSY 2020 objective adopted a year before,
and thus the need to provide for an exceptional
108 Chapter 5
set of instruments to accompany the economic
and social hardships of this transition.
Reprogramming national programs under
EMFF is always possible, although it is not easy
to do in political terms, since the allocation of
EMFF funds to different sectors is often a deli-
cate and politically sensitive exercise. However,
there is no political excuse: if the achievement
of the MSY 2020 objective (even for a limited
number of key stocks) is understandably hard,
at least there should be no excuse from the
financial point of view: the EMFF was theoreti-
cally designed as an instrument to accompany
the reform. There is hardly a more important
objective in the reformed CFP than achieving
MSY by 2020. Arguments to justify that this
objective cannot be made easier through EMFF
because the funds are committed for something
else is difficult to understand, and is contrary
to the very philosophy under which the EMFF
2014–2020 was adopted: to be an instrument to
accompany and facilitate the implementation
of the 2013 CFGP reform.
If the total effort to be exerted on these
resources or the total catches allowed are those
necessary to end overfishing, it follows that the
allocation of days or catches is most unlikely
to be economically sustainable for the fleets
concerned. This probably only means that these
reductions are economically, socially, and thus
politically impossible to implement unless there
is an adjustment of the fishing capacity that
can be compatible with rebuilt, sustainable
fisheries. This calls for an ambitious program
of scrapping of excess capacity, probably in
particular for trawling sectors, as a necessary
evil to make real progress in this basin.
This is an uphill battle, at a time when the
fleet policy was somehow downgraded by the
CFP reform of 2013 and particularly in the con-
text of the phasing out of scrapping aid after
2017 in the structural policy (EU 2014). Clearly,
and no matter how unpopular this may be, this
question will have to be revised.
The proposal for a new fisheries structural
fund to cover the period 2021–2027 represents
probably the last opportunity. The problems
referred to above concerning the use of the
current EMFF to address the problem of
Mediterranean fisheries should be corrected. In
this regard, the proposal (EU 2018b) includes
the possibility for specific fleet adaptation
programs. The proposal clarifies that the sup-
pression of scrapping aid after 2017 in the
current EMFF was due to lack of sufficient
targeting. This proposal admits the possibility
of a program for the adjustment of capacity in
certain fleet segments and sea basins.
It is important that this possibility be main-
tained during the co-decision process, and
that enough money can be allocated for this
purpose. Unless fleet adjustment takes place, it
is difficult to see how Mediterranean fisheries
could get anywhere close to the MSY objective
even long after 2020.
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CHAPTER 6
The landing obligation
The CFP and the problem
of discarding
Beyond doubt, the introduction of the landing
obligation in the 2013 Common Fisheries Pol-
icy (CFP) reform represents the most prominent
(and challenging) question of the implementa-
tion of the policy; one that will contribute to
shape up, like no other change ever made, the
fishing policy of the future.
Discards have always existed in European
Union (EU) fisheries. Although data have
always been incomplete, the levels of discarding
in some fisheries have been known for a long
time (EU 1992). They have long been consid-
ered a problem but, for a long time, other issues
took priority and the CFP did not address this
question directly. In recent years, however, the
introduction of policies to eliminate or reduce
discards in a number of countries around the
world, and the growing influence of a public
opinion that cannot understand why the fish-
ing activity wastes so much fish, have resulted
in this issue taking center stage in policy deci-
sions. The evolution of the EU policy as regards
discarding has been reviewed by Borges (2015),
Borges (2018), and Borges and Penas (2019).
Discarding is a phenomenon that exists in
all fisheries in the world and is clearly not an
exclusive European problem (Kelleher 2004).
Worldwide, fish discards increased from the
1950s to reach a peak in 1989 at 18.8 mil-
lion tonnes (between 10% and 20% of total
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
catches). After 2000 discards represent slightly
less than 10% of total annual catches (Zeller
et al. 2017), although this estimation is highly
controversial. A very good summary of the
problem of discarding from different angles is
provided by Uhlmann et al. (2019).
Discarding in the CFP: how much?
Why?
The levels of discarding in European fisheries
have always been controversial because data on
discarding have always been patchy. However,
they are significant in a number of fisheries.
The discards in European fisheries have been
estimated as being around a million tons a year
(Holmyard 2015); that is about 20% of the
total landings, estimated as 5.12 million tonnes
in 2015.1 According to the Impact assessment
carried out by the Commission in 2011 (EU
2011), beam trawlers have the highest discard
rates, whatever their target species.
Bottom trawling for mixed fisheries have
generally very high but very variable discard
rates, ranging between 18% and 70%, with
little differentiation by gear or geographical
area. In the area with the best data, the North
Sea, discard levels vary between practically zero
in pelagic fisheries to nearly 50% in demersal
ones (ICES 2017). Discard rates also change
1 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Fishery_statistics_in_detail/
111
112 Chapter 6
over time. For example, in the North Sea,
in 2012–2015, discard rates of demersal and
crustacean species remained constant (7–10%
and 15–20%, respectively, of the total catch of
these species), while discards of benthic species
declined sharply between 2014 and 2015
(40–25%). Discard rates of pelagic species were
close to zero during 2012–2015 (ICES 2017).
These discards often represent an unac-
counted source of fishing mortality, which has
for a long time undermined the reliability of a
number of stock evaluations. This constitutes
another important motivation for a no-discard
policy: improving our knowledge of everything
that is actually caught, thus contributing to
improve the quality of the scientific advice. But
over and beyond these considerations, there is a
societal motivation: discards have been consid-
ered morally reprehensible for a significant part
of the European society and have contributed
to stock over-exploitation (Rochet et al. 2014).
While discarding can occur for a number
of reasons, these investigations indicate that
discarding in the past was mostly driven by
market demand, but recent legal and reg-
ulatory constraints have led to changes in
fishing strategies and became a significant rea-
son for discards (Damalas et al. 2015). These
regulatory constraints are fundamentally the
improvement in the implementation of the
minimum landing sizes, which has traditionally
obliged fishermen to discard the undersized
fish. However, there are also reported cases of
discarding due to high-grading by small-scale
fishing in the Mediterranean (Fabi and Grati
2005).
Discarding in the Atlantic is primarily due to
implementation of rules of the CFP and eco-
nomic decisions taken by the skippers and vessel
owners, although the relative contribution of
different elements is difficult to ascertain:
• Minimum landing sizes. In Atlantic waters,
catches of undersized fish seem to have been
the primary cause of most discarding (EU
2006). This has changed after the reform,
and today the fish under the minimum con-
servation reference sizes must be landed and
counted against their quotas (EU 2015a).
• Lack of quota. This is the most obvious con-
sequence of the management system based
on individual stocks, combined with a rigid
scheme of allocation of the total allowable
catches (TACs) among Member States under
relative stability. But beyond this problem at
EU level, discards are also produced by the
allocation systems of national quotas estab-
lished by Member States, which sometimes
result in specific fleet segments, or individual
vessels, lacking quotas of certain stocks even
if their Member State still has such quotas
available.
• Rules on catch composition. The rules on
catch composition associated to the use of
certain mesh sizes, as laid down in Regulation
850/98 (EU 1998), forced discarding under
certain circumstances. These rules have
already been modified to avoid conflict with
the new landing obligation, through the
so-called “omnibus regulation” (EU 2015a)
that aligned existing technical measures with
the requirements of the new discard policy
of the reformed CFP.
• High-grading. This is the so-called “economic
discarding” that is, the discarding of lower
value fish of a given species to maximize de
value of the quota available by landing only
the larger, higher price fish. Although theo-
retically banned since 2009, little has been
done to enforce it.
• In the Mediterranean, high species diversity
and high percentage of non-commercial
species. Despite the general impression that
in these fisheries everything is landed, a
European Commission study2 indicated that
out of ca. 100 species caught in a bottom
trawl, only c. 40 were retained.
The 2013 policy on discards
The landing obligation of 2013 was certainly
not the first attempt to address the question of
discarding in the CFP. As far back as 1994, the
problem was already identified by scientists,
2 https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/
docs/body/report_en.pdf/
 The landing obligation 113

and an approach to solving it was outlined EU co-legislators in 2013, particularly from the
(Crean and Symes 1994): European fishing industry.

A reduction in discards can only be achieved

through the realignment of policy instruments, A critique of the landing obligation
greater collaboration between regulators and of 2013
resource users, and closer integration of policy and The criticism to the discard ban does not come
market behaviour. only from the industry: meaningfully, the sci-
entific community has also been critical. All the
However, this recommendation never mate-
above considerations do not prevent different
rialized. The process leading up to the decision
scientific voices in Europe from advocating a
to ban discards in EU fisheries has been
different approach, based on a stepwise devel-
explained by this author (Penas Lado 2016,
opment (Veiga et al. 2016). But perhaps the
chapter 16). To cut it short: the bottom–up,
best critique on the whole historical approach
collaborative approach initially proposed by the
leading up to the adoption of the new discard
Commission in 2007 (EC 2007a) did not work;
policy is that of Borges (2015), who argues
it was simply not taken seriously, perhaps for
that an increase in public awareness, due to
lack of incentives to do so. In this context,
public campaigns against fisheries discards, has
imposing in EU legislation a relatively detailed
focused managers’ attention onto a symptom
discard ban with a specific delivery date with
of fisheries mismanagement, rather than on its
a relatively short phase-in period was done on
underlying causes of over-exploitation and lack
purpose: the experience of other countries such
of fisheries control. This has distorted the dis-
as Norway, which developed this policy on a
cussion of the reform of the CFP and potentially
very gradual basis, incorporating new species
undermined its provisions relating to discards.
in the discard ban along a very long period, was
The recent publication of a comprehensive
considered short of the political expectations of
analysis of the discard problem (Uhlmann
the time in the EU.
et al. 2019) allows a very complete basis for
It was feared that a very long and gradual
discussion. It would have been very useful to
phasing-in period to implement a non-discard
have such an analysis at the time when the
policy would go down politically as a failure to
decisions were taken by the co-legislators in
act on an issue that required a quick solution.
2013.
This called for a more dramatic solution, where
The critical views on this policy decision come
the ban would take place as quickly as pos-
from different angles:
sible even before the practical solutions were
• Many in the fishing industry (even from
identified.
Member States that institutionally supported
It was believed that once the legislation was
the landing obligation) believe that compli-
in place, the obligation to abide by it would
ance with the discard ban would make many
mobilize everybody to find the practical solu-
fisheries unprofitable, since vessels should
tions the make the policy workable. This was
either fill their holds with low-value fish, or
the reason why the EU co-legislators opted for
stop fishing very early in the year due to lack
a top–down approach despite the evidence of
of quota for choke species. The European
better results through bottom–up approaches
industry tends to see the landing obligation as
(Penas Lado 2016; Catchpole and Gray 2010).
an opportunistic political move.3 Academia
The political decision was very high-profile,
has started to study the likely economic
and this means that sticking to it will have a
high political value. However, this does not
prevent strong criticism to the decision, and not
so much to the idea of reducing discards, but 3 http://europa-azul.es/la-federacion-pesca-escocia-

rather to the specific provisions adopted by the pide-la-despolitizacion-la-gestion-pesquera/

114 Chapter 6
effects of the implementation of this measure
(Anderson 2014; Hatcher 2014).
• Sardà et al. (2015) also consider that it is
doubtful that this discard ban will result in an
effective reduction of discards, and that the
policy as adopted may actually negatively
affect ecosystems at all hierarchy levels, for
ignoring the ecosystem-based approach.
• Some scientists criticize the way in which
the EU laid down the obligation, with a very
short learning period of four years, instead of
the gradual, learn-by-doing approach used in
Nordic countries (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011).
• The small-scale fishing sector, already suffer-
ing from limited levels of profitability due to
low capitalization (Villasante et al. 2015) may
suffer disproportionately from this measure
(Veiga et al. 2016).
• The approach by fishery instead of by species
(initially proposed by the Commission) is
unwieldy in practical terms, given the diff-
iculty of defining such fisheries (EU 2015b).
These arguments have a clear political risk:
that of a backlash in the enthusiastic support
that the no-discard policy received from most
political players at the time. After the enthusi-
asm of 2013, one can certainly perceive a riptide
in such enthusiasm, when the implementation
in the real world increasingly shows the difficul-
ties of turning a much-appreciated policy into
a reality in the fishing grounds. In hindsight,
some of the promoters of this ambitious pol-
icy (on paper) now increasingly question their
unwavering support in 2013.
The discard ban and the “level playing
field”
In addition to the above criticism, this author
has a particular one, related to the way in
which the co-legislators decided on this funda-
mental part of the policy. As briefly presented
above, the level of discards is extremely vari-
able for different cases, particularly different
gear. This could have justified a different level
of ambition in eliminating discards, or at least
a different application of the flexibilities of
Article 15 of Regulation 1380/2013. However,
this was not the case, and the maximum level
of the de minimis tolerance (Article 15.5(c)), the
cross-species flexibility (Article 15.8) and the
inter-annual flexibility (Article 15.10) is fixed
in the law for all fisheries across the board.
This represents typically a “one-size-fits-all”
kind of solution that the CFP has been so often
criticized for. An example is the comparison
between the Baltic and the North Sea: while
discards in the Baltic rarely exceed 5–10%, in
the North Sea they can reach 50%. Yet, the
maximum allowance is identical in both cases.
True, it can be argued that these are ceilings
and that in every fishery the use of these flex-
ibility mechanisms may not reach such ceiling,
which normally should be reserved for the most
difficult cases. However, the co-legislators did
not consider a different degree of flexibility for
different cases, since they preferred to give pri-
ority to the “level playing field” and, specially,
because some of them wanted to ensure that
the policy would “look” strict, so that too much
flexibility for some cases would be seen as too
lenient a policy.
As a result, and even if the flexibility is indeed
applied at different levels in different cases (for
example, the Mediterranean Member States
asked for the maximum application of the de
minimis rule for the first year of application of
the landing obligation) the net result is that
in certain cases the ceilings may be reached
without a clear need to do so, thus resulting
in a fishing practice that does not change sub-
stantially current practice, while in other cases
it may not be sufficient to cater for all the
practical difficulties to reduce discards.
As we will see below, there are other
approaches for this kind of policy where the
objectives are modulated for different types
of policy without such modulation being seen
as “discrimination”. There is a very important
lesson to be learned from this for the future of
law-making in the CFP.
Discards and direct human
consumption
One of the questions that still causes confusion
in the implementation of the discard ban is the

text of Article 15.11 of Regulation 1380/2013,
which reads:
. . . the use of catches of species below the mini-
mum conservation reference size shall be restricted
to purposes other than direct human consumption,
including fish meal, fish oil, pet food, food addi-
tives, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics.
This provision has given rise to a surprising
level of confusion, which is still seen in on-going
scientific publications. The confusion comes
from the fact that certain – overzealous – admin-
istrations interpret the ban on direct human
consumption as a human health question,
and believe such undersized catches should be
treated as Category 3 material according to the
EU animal by-product legislation (EU 2009a).
This implies, inter alia, that such fish cannot
be used for indirect human consumption and
that vessels should be equipped with storage
facilities to ensure that no contact takes place
between these fish and the fish that will be sold
for direct human consumption. If that inter-
pretation made headway, this would impose
a disproportionate (as well as unnecessary)
burden on European fleets.
Actually, the above interpretation makes
no sense at all. The reason why co-legislators
decided to ban the direct human consumption
of undersized fish had absolutely nothing to
do with human health and the protection of
consumers: it was simply intended to prevent
the development of a market for undersized
fish, once such fish would be landed as per
the landing obligation. The idea was to prevent
the establishment of a high market price for
undersized fish (that is highly appreciated by
consumers in certain European markets) but at
the same time to allow for some limited bene-
fits for fishermen landing a certain amount of
inevitable catches of these small fish.
It is obvious that undersized fish pose a
problem of fishery conservation, and it should
be handled on that basis. But obviously there
is no question of the undersized fish being
unhealthy for humans, so there is absolutely no
point in classifying that fish as part of the animal
by-products legislation which, it is important
The landing obligation 115
to bear in mind, caters for problems of human
health such as the mad cow disease.
This also means that there should be no
problem at all in the small fish being processed
as part of products for human consumption.
The real motivation for the co-legislators was to
avoid that, as a result of the landing obligation,
European consumers could see juvenile fish
being legally sold in markets or served in restau-
rants, something that the public opinion would
never be able to understand. But the provision
of Article 15.11 was certainly never intended to
create artificial and unnecessary difficulties to
an industry that has already enough challenges
with the implementation of this new policy.
What other countries do
on discarding
Since the non-discard policy of the EU arrived
relatively late in time, at least as compared with
other countries, it is important to draw on the
experience of these countries. Karp et al. (2019)
have made a very good analysis of the different
approaches applicable in different countries. Let
us look at some of the most significant.
The US case
In Chapter 2 we referred to the 10 national
standards for fisheries management under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act. Standard no. 9 says:
To the extent practicable:
(1) Minimize by-catch.
(2) To the extent by-catch cannot be avoided, mini-
mize the mortality of such by-catch.
By-catch is defined as “fish” that are har-
vested but not sold or kept. These provisions
do not include seabirds or mammals (which
enjoy special protection) or legally-retained
non-target species, but include economic and
regulatory discards and unobserved mortalities.
The above standard provides for ample flex-
ibility to determine specific objectives and
measures that are established on a fishery-
by-fishery basis, taking into account the sci-
entific advice but also the fishery-specific
116 Chapter 6
considerations discussed by the Regional
Management Council. The degree of com-
pliance with this guidance is quite variable and
limited monitoring often impedes verification.
It is important to underline that the flexibil-
ity provided by this national standard does not
necessarily translate into a very lenient policy.
The experience of implementation shows that
this flexibility is used to determine a non-
discard policy that in some cases brings down
discards significantly, and in all cases encour-
ages appropriate improvement.
One fundamental difference in the US is that
the establishment of level of discards is specific
for different fisheries and largely responding
to the evaluation of feasibility by the industry
itself. Although implementation is very vari-
able, in the best cases once the discard objectives
are established, the implementation is highly
enforced, notably with the generalized use of
observers on board. This contrasts with the EU
policy, characterized by a legislative approach
establishing in hard law the same tolerance
levels and flexibility mechanisms across the
board and leaving enforcement to usual con-
trol mechanisms, poorly adapted to the new
obligation.
The results of this policy is that US fisheries
have reduced discarding substantially, but dif-
ferent fisheries still have extremely different
levels of discarding in practice, as shown in
Table 6.1, drawn from US national by-catch
report Benaka et al. (2016).
As it can be seen, while the overall discard
rate is around 11% overall, the percentages
are extremely variable by region: in Alaska the
percentage is 6% and in the West Coast, 2%,
while in the greater Atlantic reaches 19% and
in the Southeast (largely influenced by shrimp
fisheries) it jumps to 156%.
These data clearly show the result of a pol-
icy that tries to “minimize by-catch” (National
Standard 9): the results reflect striking differ-
ences between the West Coast, where discard
levels are extremely low, to the southeast where
they continue to be huge. This is not necessar-
ily a sign of policy success in some regions and
policy failure in others, at least not exclusively:
it also reflects the very different conditions of
Table 6.1 Fish by-catch and fish landings by
geographical area in the US (data for 2013).
Fish by-catch Fish landings
Region (lbs.) (lbs.)
Greater Atlantic 140 219 256 738 953 648
Southeast 243 558 458 156 063 630
Alaska 279 161 533 4 545 327 715
West Coast 15 562 500 643 331 523
Pacific islands 10 628 968 33 277 790
Totals 689 130 985 6 116 954 306
Source: National Marine Fisheries Service (2016). U.S.
National By-catch Report, First Edition, Update 2. L.R.
Benaka, D. Bullock, J. Davis, E.E. Seney and H. Winarsoo
(eds). U.S. Department of Commerce, 90 pp.
fisheries in different regions and the different
levels of difficulty to address the problem.
In any case, the level of reduction of discards
is always variable for different fisheries in every
region: For example, in Alaska, the pollock
fishery has very low discard and constitutes
a very high proportion of the overall catch.
However, discard in some other fisheries can be
quite high. Similarly, most of the discard from
the Southeast occurs in the directed shrimp
fisheries.
Norway
A starting point is that most fisheries in Nor-
wegian waters are of relatively low diversity.
The problems of high discard levels associated
notably with mixed fisheries were, in Norway,
much less serious than in many fisheries in
the EU. That means that the task was, initially,
easier than in the EU.
The Norwegian discard ban policy has very
often been mentioned as a model in the EU
debate on the problem of discarding. It is worth
describing the system to see the differences
with the EU policy.
Gullestad et al. (2015) have described this
system. It is much wider and complete than
just a ban on discarding. The use of real-time
closures is an important element to mini-
mize the amount of small fish that has to be
discarded. These are applied through a collab-
orative scheme that ensures acceptance by the
industry. The very gradual introduction was
another key factor: new species were included

in the ban along a very long period of time, thus
allowing for a slow and effective learning pro-
cess whose results were gradually incorporated
into the policy. In addition, different accom-
panying measures were introduced, including
compensation to fishermen for landing illegal
catches, obligation to change fishing grounds,
tailoring of quota regulations, development of
selective gear and so on.
The main difference with the EU system is
that the Norwegian system is based on species,
not fisheries, and that its implementation fol-
lowed a very slow process along many years,
gradually including more species while at the
same time learning from the implementation to
introduce the necessary changes.
The Norwegian system has been much
praised. However, to this day it remains difficult
to obtain data on real levels of discarding in
Norwegian fisheries. Unlike the US case above,
where very transparent reporting allows an
evaluation of the effects of the policy, in Nor-
way the information on the real level of discards
under their non-discard policy remains elusive:
since Norway does not employ observers or use
electronic monitoring, it is basically impossible
to monitor and evaluate effectiveness.
Iceland
Iceland has a complete system to ensure the
most efficient rate of exploitation of available
resources, and this includes inter alia a very
efficient system of exchange of quotas among
operators as well as specific measures to deal
with unwanted catches upon landing. The
results are quite impressive: discards were low
in 2012 in all gears, or 0–0.71% of landed catch.
Total cod discards were 0.41% of landed catch
and total haddock discards 0.08% (Pálsson et al.
2013), although the reliability of these impres-
sive figures has been questioned (Uhlmann
et al. 2019).
Key features to the success of the discard
ban include: improved selectivity; real-time
closures; monitoring, control and surveil-
lance (MCS); mechanisms that include discard
monitoring (although of limited in scope);
regulatory incentives to land undersized catch
with partial or zero deduction from quota.
The landing obligation 117
Also, voluntary move-on measures are used
to collect and share information on where and
when to avoid unwanted catch (Uhlmann et al.
2019). The system also includes provisions on
the landings in excess of quotas.
The effects of a non-discard
policy
The discard ban policies have often been pre-
sented as a contribution to good management.
However, the ultimate political motivation
for such measures in the EU has been the
consideration of discarding either as a sign of
policy failure (Euro-skeptics) or as an unethical
practice: a waste of good, healthy protein in
a world riddled with malnutrition. But the
idea that eliminating discards can contribute to
more healthy fisheries and a healthier ecosys-
tem has also been voiced very frequently as a
self-evident fact. However, the evidence does
not always point in that direction. This leaves
open the question of the real effect of this
policy on such questions as the management of
stocks and the effects on biodiversity. Discard
estimates are notoriously unreliable, especially
when regulations encourage covert discarding
behavior. It follows that full retention will result
in more accurate fishing mortality estimates if
everything is estimated at the point of delivery.
The discard ban policy seems to have no way
back in political terms, but its specific terms
and conditions can and should be subject to
scrutiny and evaluation. Beyond the ques-
tion of the practicality of its implementation,
there is also a question of what is the effect
of a non-discard policy over the exploited fish
stocks and over the marine environment in
general.
Biological effects
In terms of the effects of a reduction of discard-
ing on fish stocks, some authors believe that
the emphasis on avoiding the catch of small fish
(typically subject to discard ban) and the drive
to conduct more size-selective fisheries has led
to significant improvements in the exploitation
118 Chapter 6
pattern of targeted species (Gullestad et al.
2015). This is a very positive result of this type
of policy. Other studies however show how the
discard ban can be positive for certain species
but negative for others (Hall and Mainprize
2005; Simons et al. 2015). The latter show
that it is not self-evident that the discard ban,
by definition, will have positive effects for
conservation, at least for all species.
Very often, the idea of the discard ban was
considered by many of its promoters as being
positive for the fisheries and for the marine
environment. The affirmation that “preventing
discards is good for conservation” is still often
cited as a self-evident mantra. However, the
scientific evidence does not necessarily confirm
that; rather the contrary. In a study conducted
in the North Sea, where 30–40% of trawled
fish was discarded before the ban, it was shown
that landing the entire catch while fishing as
usual would have conservation penalties for
seabirds, marine mammals and seabed fauna,
and no benefit to fish stocks. The study further
recommended considering the broader ecosys-
tem consequences of fishery management
policy, since species interactions may dissipate
or negate intended benefits (Heath et al. 2014).
In the case of the effects on seabirds, the
likely effects are mixed: A discard ban may
have negative consequences by creating a food
shortage for scavenging birds. Some species may
offset this by feeding more on other birds, with
potentially negative population-level impacts,
or by moving into novel environments. In
general terms, however, it is considered that
the effects of discards on scavengers are limited,
so the implementation of the landing obligation
is not likely to have a very strong impact on
scavenging biota (Depestele et al. 2019).
On the other hand, benefits of a discard ban
may be a reduction in seabird by-catch in fish-
ing gear, as well as a reduction in populations
of large generalist species that currently domi-
nate some seabird communities (Bicknell et al.
2013). So there seems to be no obvious overall
ecological benefit from that point of view.
However, the above cases do not delegitimize
the discard ban. This policy can still be justified
on much larger societal considerations than the
mere effect on fisheries and ecosystems, includ-
ing notably the avoidance of wastage of healthy
food. Ultimately, what is important is that a
discard ban policy should be clear as to what
the objectives are, and therefore what are its
intended effects and expectations. Overplaying
the expectations of this policy can only lead to
frustration and possible backlash at a later stage.
Economic effects
The exact economic effects of the discard ban
in the EU are difficult to anticipate, since they
depend on whether the existing mechanisms to
resolve choke species effects are used, and with
what effects. It also depends on whether the
new obligation is seen only as a problem, or also
as an opportunity to be embraced through a
change of culture in the way the industry fishes.
In any event, much of the European fishing
industry has voiced strong concerns about
this, while recognizing the need to address the
problem (Fitzpatrick et al. 2019).
Landing obligation as a problem
Existing literature provides some elements to
evaluate this question. A recent study (Hoff
et al. 2019) considers that, despite the potential
to reduce the impact through mitigation, the
overall picture shows that the industry will be
worse off with the landing obligation than it
would be without such policy.
In more specific terms, a study in the cod
/saithe fishery in the North Sea, where cod can
be a choke species, it was found that failing to
apply a mechanism of inter-species quota flexi-
bility would result in a significant reduction of
profits in the long term (Simons et al. 2015).
In a different context, Lart et al. (2002) found
that discarding practices were most closely
related to economic influences than to fishery
regulations, and concluded that in most of their
studied cases, efforts to reduce discarding that
failed to take account of economic influences
were unlikely to be successful in effectively
reducing discarding. The question is, then, is
the discard ban as spelled out in Article 15 of
Regulation 1380/2013 applicable in practice

without significant disruption in the economy
of the European fisheries?
This is very important and has wider implica-
tions: if the economic effects are not well-taken
into account, the incentive for fishers to ensure
compliance disappears altogether, which in
turn requires extremely expensive control and
enforcement systems to guarantee compliance
(Graham et al. 2007). This makes it particularly
important to ensure that the implementation
of the discard ban can be done with sufficient
degree of flexibility to ensure that the necessary
adaptations can be assumed by the industry
without undue economic cost.
The problem of choke species, as described
above, is very clear-cut: if there are no quotas
available, fisheries have to close. However, the
problem can be more complex if we consider
the economics of the fishery. In theory, if avoid-
ance measures are applied (see Chapter 3 and
under “TAC uplifts” below) one could consider,
for example, conducting a fishery for whiting
only when quotas for cod and/or haddock are
exhausted. Even if such a case was technically
possible, thanks to avoidance measures, the
question is: would that fishery be profitable?
Indeed, this problem has nothing to do with
the discard ban. Even before the discard ban is
fully applied, the question of differential quota
availability is one that has existed since the
inception of the CFP as a result of the focus on
individual stock catch limits. One can certainly
assume that, if this has not forced the early
closure of fisheries, as the discard ban will, it
may have created an inefficiency in the way
quotas are used. The figures shown in Chapter 2
are higher than those corresponding to other
systems, such as the US, but are still short of a
very efficient utilization of all catch possibilities.
Little has been studied about this, which
implies that only the future conduct of the
fisheries will tell. It is important to underline
that the effect of choke species goes beyond
the practical possibility to continue fishing for
the remaining stocks when choke species are
exhausted. The real question is: can the fishery
be profitable when fishing for other stocks
The landing obligation 119
(if avoidance measures make it possible) once
the choke species quotas are exhausted?
There is probably no clear answer to this
question, although it is easy to assume that this
kind of “economic choke species effect” can
actually happen despite improved avoidance.
This only underscores the need to keep the
development of the discard ban well-monitored
for its economic effects, in order to detect such
kind of problem and try to find possible and
practicable solutions sooner rather than later.
As the experience of other countries shows,
the discard ban only work if the industry finds
economic solutions for its side effects.
The landing obligation as an opportunity
Over and beyond the economic downsides
related to conducting more selective fisheries
(lower CPUE, increased operating costs, cost of
gear modifications, etc.) there can be also some
positive effects. The main one is the incentive
for the industry to use, or to increase market
value of species hitherto neglected.
One clear effect is the opportunity to develop
a better market value for species of low interest
today. Many examples illustrate this, such as the
recent initiatives taken by the Spanish industry
to find a market value to species such as the
“marujito” (Gadiculus argenteus), a fish of low
value, relatively abundant in European waters
and not subject to management. Discarded or
used as bait, the species has been subject to
campaigns to introduce it in the markets and
increase its value.
Beyond that, the discard ban policy provides
incentives to develop markets for other species
traditionally discarded, such as invertebrates.
Although not considered part of the discard
ban policy per se, innovation is necessary and
the policy does encourage “cultural” change
to compensate for possible losses by finding
new markets for species hitherto not fully
utilized or, in some cases, not utilized at all.
A number of interesting projects have been
developed in different parts of Europe in recent
years with the purpose of developing markets,
with certain processing, of almost everything
coming out of the sea, from low-value fish,
120 Chapter 6
to fish trimmings (skin, guts, etc.) to inver-
tebrates to make aquaculture feeds and even
pharmaceutical products.
These are potentially positive economic
consequences of the discard ban policy; they
create a new opportunity, for those interested
in developing it, to use for profit an increasing
number of species and products that are part of
the ocean’s bounty but have never been given
before an economic value.
Choke species and the “perfect
storm” of 2019
Since the landing obligation is subject to a
phase-in period from 2015 to 2019, this year
will the one where the LO will apply to all reg-
ulated species. This means that in 2019 there
will be, for the first time, a combination of:
• LO applicable to all regulated stocks;
• Fishing mortality reductions in a number of
stocks to achieve the Fmsy target by 2020; and
• Relative stability keys.
The three factors, separately, contribute to
choke species effects particularly in mixed fish-
eries. But it is the combination of the three,
and their cumulative effects that will produce
what the fishing industry has come to call “the
perfect storm”.
And that is not all: to these combined factors
we must add two potentially important ones:
(i) the displacement of certain stocks from the
areas where they traditionally have their quo-
tas, as a result of climate change; and (ii) the
possible future effects of Brexit.
In addition, it is to be borne in mind that
when co-legislators adopted the landing obli-
gation, they knew (the Commission insisted
on this point) that the practical implemen-
tation of this measure would pose many
questions whose answer we did not know. The
co-legislators (and the Commission) under-
took to ensure that, once the legislation was
adopted, all the relevant actors should “put
their heads together” to find those answers
in a cooperative manner. Failure to do so will
produce a backlash against the very idea of the
landing obligation.
Relative stability as a contributor
to choke species
As we indicated in earlier chapters, the prob-
lem of choke species, expressed in TAC levels,
is considerably aggravated in some cases by
the allocation of these TACs among Member
States under relative stability. There are cases
where two TACs of associated species can be
well-aligned, without any choke-species effect,
while the allocation of such TACs among Mem-
ber States is very different, so in fact one species
can be “choke” for a Member State and the
other can be “choke” for another one.
A case in hand can be that of the relation-
ship between two species that are often asso-
ciated, such as hake and cod. In ICES areas VI
and VII combined the TAC for hake for 2018 is
62 536 tonnes and the combined TAC for cod is
5578 tonnes (EU 2018a). That means that cod
catches must represent 9% of hake catches. But
this is at TAC level. If we look at national quota
level, the ratio is extremely variable for differ-
ent Member States: around 35% for Belgium
and Ireland, around 12–13% for France and the
Netherlands, but it goes down to 5% for the UK
and 0% for Spain. See Figure 6.1.
This implies that while certain Member States
have a ratio between the two species that cor-
responds to the TAC levels, other Member
States have a very different ratio between
their national quotas for the two stocks. In the
extreme case of Spain, the ratio is zero: Spain
has a substantial quota for hake, but a zero
quota for cod. Where the imbalance is highest,
one of the two species will be a choke in the
fisheries in ICES areas VI and VII.
In any case, the real problem remains con-
troversial because its magnitude may depend
to a certain extent on the full implementation
of existing flexibility mechanisms. Not surpris-
ingly, different views can come from different
quarters: while for example the North Sea Advi-
sory Council has made a detailed analysis of the
fisheries where choke species effects are highly
 The landing obligation 121

0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
C

d
m

K
n
n

nd
nc
TA

U
ai
iu

Figure 6.1 Ratio between the cod and

la

Sp
lg

rla
Ire
Fr
al

Be

he
hake quotas in ICES areas VI and VII per
t
To

et Member State.
N

likely,4 other analysis, done for environmental
NGOs, consider these claims not well-justified.5
By way of comparison, in the case of Alaska,
for example, by-catch quotas are established for
allocative reasons, rather than to address other
concerns (Witherell et al. 2000). This means
that once the main allocation of target species
has been set, by-catch quotas are allocated to
avoid having to close the fishery due to the pres-
ence of a “choke species”. This of course does
not entirely eliminate choke species effects,
but reduces them considerably. In the US, the
general tendency is that the choke species effect
is mainly provoked by the shortage of certain
target species (sablefish, salmon, halibut, etc.)
that can be by-catch to other fisheries and
where operators may not have a quota. But
the choke species effects are more rarely the
result of secondary species, where different
mechanisms allow for flexibility to obtain the
necessary quotas to avoid closing the fishery.
Quota swaps as a possible
solution
All the above elements were of course well-
known for the co-legislators when the 2013
reform was adopted. Why then didn’t they
foresee a mechanism to solve the problem?
4 www.nwwac.org/_fileupload/Opinions%20and
%20Advice/Year%2011/NWW%20MS%20LO
%20docs/FINAL_Advice_MS-Group_Landing
%20Obligation.pdf/
5 http://cfooduw.org/the-2016-discard-ban-choking-
or-crying-wolf/
The reason is simple: they considered that such
mechanism was already existing: quota swaps.
The ca. 2000 quota exchanges per year are the
tool for Member States, on a strictly voluntary
basis, to compensate for the frequent mismatch
between their basket of fishing opportunities
and the needs and interests of their fleets.
However, as we will see below, this mech-
anism, at least the way it has traditionally
applied, does not seem to provide an effective
solution to the many allocation-related chokes.
How efficient is the quota swap
system?
The efficient use of resources requires an effi-
cient “market” for the exchange of fishing
rights. Yet, this market does not exist among
Member States over and beyond the system of
quota swaps among Member States.
The system of quota swaps has existed since
the inception of the TAC and quota policy in
1983, and has worked every year since then.
Today, around 2000 swaps are effected by
Member States each year. This system certainly
smoothens the rigidity of the allocation keys
under relative stability.
A study on swaps (Hoefnagel et al. 2015)
indicates that in 2013, Member States swapped
approximately 17% of their quotas for all
species. These exchanges take place under
different formulas, depending upon need and
opportunity, and the authors mention cases of
1 : 1 exchange rate between stocks having a 5 : 1
market price ratio. Swapping traditions are also
influenced by the national systems to allocate
fishing rights.
122 Chapter 6
The above study identifies several types of
swaps:
• Swaps at producer organization or group
level;
• Swaps at individual fishermen level;
• Swaps at government level;
• Intra-company swaps. In some cases, these
swaps are proposed by owners having vessels
in more than one Member State.
Despite its significant merits to provide rela-
tive stability with some much-needed flexibility,
the system of quota swaps has a rather limited
capacity to resolve the problem of choke species,
for a number of reasons:
• It generally works as exchanges quota-for-
quota. This means that Member States can
generally use this system to get more quotas
of their stocks, of interest only if they have
“currency” that is, unused quotas of interest
for the Member States they want to exchange
with. This is often not the case.
• The tradition is to use this to exchange quotas
of target species. Many national fleets count
on these exchanges as an integral part of
fishing opportunities for such target species,
so they are not easy to change for others
for the purpose of getting choke species.
A very good example is the traditional swap
between Spain and France: Spain gives
anchovy to France and France gives hake to
Spain in return. Both Member States benefit
because both consider their national quotas
of hake (Spain) and anchovy (France) too
low. But if Spain needs cod and haddock
(clear choke species in western waters), it is
not clear at all whether it could get a quota of
these stocks from France, and at what price.
• The lack of transparency of the system. The
“deals” among Member States are done by
national administrations and their results
are communicated to the Commission ser-
vices so that they can be integrated into the
quota management system. However, the
information is not made openly public, so
the industry has no opportunity to have a
complete picture of who and where may
have unused quotas to exchange.
• Allegedly, certain quota exchanges between
Member States are originated by deals
between their respective industries, some-
times involving a real quota purchase, where
the financial transfer takes place at industry
level, but where the formal quota transfer
takes the form of a quota exchange between
States. Given the lack of transparency of
this system, it is impossible at this stage
to evaluate the dimension of this practice
that national administrations tend to be
very discreet with. But to the extent that
this mechanism exists and is used, it is a
proof that the rigidity of the relative stability
requires in practice mechanisms to provide
flexibility to improve quota utilization. In
other words, even if a market of quotas
does not officially exist, it seems to develop
somehow behind the scenes, in a completely
non-transparent way.
• As described by the above study, swaps can
also be restricted by governments in order to
avoid too many fishing rights being accumu-
lated in a few (particularly foreign) hands
(Hoefnagel et al. 2015).
• In some cases too, swaps may be restricted by
certain Member States, even if “currency” to
buy them is available, with the intention of
limiting overall consumption of the TAC to
keep prices high.
During the negotiations leading up to the
2013 reform, the Commission advanced the
idea of a “enhanced quota swap market” as a
mechanism to alleviate the problem of choke
species. However, the voluntary nature of the
exercise, and the exclusive competence of
Member States in running it do not allow for
the Commission to get actively involved in
promoting a more fluid market of exchanges
of quotas. The question is, however, whether
Member States, under the pressure of having
to find solutions to the choke species problem,
will take the necessary steps to develop these
exchanges more effectively.
Are quota swaps increasing
to facilitate the discard ban?
When the landing obligation was adopted, the
expectation of the co-legislators was that the
problem of choke species due to the rigidity
of relative stability could be at least partially

resolved through increased quota swapping.
Although it is still too early to evaluate the
trends in the levels of quota swapping in rela-
tion with the implementation of the discard
ban, the data available so far do not show any
consolidated tendency: swapping remained
limited after the enforcement of the landing
obligation, and only in the last year with data
available (2017) a certain increase in total
swapping was observed.
Table 6.2 shows the recent trends in the level
of swapping: while the level has been around
11–12% of total quotas swapped, in 2017 the
percentage went up to nearly 15% which may
be in principle a good sign, that as the full imple-
mentation of the landing obligation approaches,
Member States are stepping up their swapping
levels to avoid choke species effects. However,
it is remarkable that if we compare this table
with Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, we can see that the
increased level of swapping has not led to an
increase in the overall level of quota utilization.
It will be important to monitor the evolution
in the levels of swapping as of 2019 to assess
how much the quota swapping can constitute
an effective solution to choke species.
Can quota swaps be enhanced?
Since quota swaps are a voluntary mechanism,
the Commission can do nothing to force Mem-
ber States to increase the level of quota swaps
(or at least to change their nature) so as to
facilitate the resolution of the choke species
problem. However, the Commission can do
something to facilitate this, while preserving
the voluntary nature of the swaps: to provide
transparency on quota consumption. Indeed,
the little knowledge available by the industry
on quota exchange opportunities is a major
Table 6.2 Evolution of quota swaps, in absolute value
and percentage, in recent years.
Quotas
Year Quotas swapped Percentage(%)
2014 4 581 509.720 548 558.180 11.97
2015 4 259 138.905 528 721.654 12.41
2016 4 095 420.096 483 782.374 11.81
2017 5 003 375.775 744 402.974 14.88
Source: Data elaborated by the author.
The landing obligation 123
factor explaining the relatively low level of
quota exchanges through swapping (Andersen
et al. 2009).
Access to information is a prerequisite to
transparency, which is one of the principles of
good governance (Hoefnagel et al. 2015). If the
Commission’s quota management system was
made available publicly, the industry could see,
in real time, which Member States have unused
quotas of their choke species. This information
would prompt possible deals among industry
sectors of different Member States that could
then translate into real quota swaps if the
national administrations would agree with
their industry’s proposal.
In reality, this would only mean enhancing
a process that already takes place: the quota
swaps agreed by national governments are
originated in demands from their national
industries. The transparency of the system, as
suggested above, would not change anything
in substance, but by increasing the trans-
parency the opportunities for swaps would be
much better identified by the industry and the
swaps could eventually become more effective
in addressing the real needs of the industry
in the new scenario. This idea in fact has
been advanced by representatives of the EU
fishing industry and would deserve serious
consideration.
Such an idea, however, would require the
consent of Member States: Article 113(2) of the
control regulation (EU 2009a,b) states that:
The data exchanged between Member States and
the Commission shall not be transmitted to persons
other than those in Member States or Community
institutions whose functions require them to have
such access unless the Member States transmitting
the data give their express consent.
Whether these Member States not using their
quotas and refusing to swap them will agree that
such information is made public remains a chal-
lenge.
It is also important to underline that the mar-
ket of quota exchanges through swapping does
not have any policy orientation and is entirely
voluntary. Failure to use the fishing opportuni-
ties is not seen as a policy problem. This con-
trasts sharply with the provisions available in
124 Chapter 6
certain agreements with third countries, where
unused quotas allocated to Member States must
be made available to other Member States ready
to use them. This has been the case for example
in Greenland for the last 10 years (EU 2007b).
Another question, much more far-reaching,
is whether relative stability itself, or at least
some of its traditional allocation keys, could
and should be modified to better adapt the
management system to the new scenario of
the landing obligation. This extremely impor-
tant and delicate question is addressed in
Chapter 14.
The flexibility mechanisms
The CFP, like most management systems in
the world, has a number of flexibility mech-
anisms to allow a smooth implementation of
a non-discard policy. This, however, does not
mean that such mechanisms will be enough
to cater for all the possible cases of choke
species. While many fisheries may find ade-
quate solutions with these mechanisms, there
is no guarantee that all fisheries will.
At this juncture, it is important to bear in
mind that the philosophy of the legislator
in 2013 was that discards should be reduced
as much as possible through various means,
and notably by fishing more selectively and
that the flexibility mechanisms were neces-
sary only to address those cases where, after
such reductions, there would be a residual
level of inevitable discards. It is important
therefore to consider that these mechanisms
were intended only to deal with a “residual”
problem, not with the main one.
Beyond the quota swap system that can pro-
vide certain flexibility to address the problem
of relative stability and choke species, the basic
regulation includes several mechanisms of flexi-
bility, on the understanding that the discard ban
would be in some circumstances extremely dif-
ficult to apply at 100%.
The de minimis allowance
A case in hand is the discard plan for the
Mediterranean applicable for 2015. Here, and
despite the perceived low impact of discarding
in this area, the Mediterranean AC and the
Member States concerned proposed to apply
the maximum level of the de minimis tolerance:
7% for the application of the landing obliga-
tion to pelagic species (EU 2014a). In other
cases, the plans were much more limiting in
allowing for the application of the de minimis,
for example in the plan for pelagic fish in the
Atlantic (EU 2014b).
The real problem of the de minimis flexibility
is its use as “combined de minimis,” a practice
started by Member States that the Commission
has not found a legal basis to reject. In short, the
combined de minimis means that the percentage
of discarding is calculated against the combined
quota of a number of stocks. As a result, a per-
centage of discarding of 5%, when calculated
against several combined quotas, can result in
percentages of discarding for certain stocks very
much in excess of 5%. Theoretically (and per-
haps in practice?) the combined de minims can
allow, for certain stocks, an actual increase in
discarding.
This poses a fundamental question: if this
combined de minimis is questioned, and the
quota swap system is not improved, the imple-
mentation of the LO under relative stability
will be practically impossible in a number of
cases. If it is not questioned, a number of stocks
could still sustain high levels of discarding,
and the credibility of the policy would suffer
considerably as a result.
Overall, the combined de minimis, although
theoretically not excluded by the legal texts, is
incompatible with a serious implementation of
the LO. Its use by Member States only shows
the failure of the EU quota swap market and the
failure of relative stability to evolve. Only if the
latter are addressed will it be possible to rule out
the “combined de minimis” as what it really is: a
desperate, false solution.
The survival exemption
Article 15 of Regulation 1380/2013 allows an
exemption to the landing obligation for species
having a “high survival” when discarded. This
exemption has already been used in some of the

current discard plans. An example is Norway
lobster in south western waters (EU 2015c). The
problem with this exemption is that the rate of
survival to the catch and discard is very diffi-
cult to estimate, and certainly variable in dif-
ferent circumstances. Theoretically, many fish
species can survive discarding under certain cir-
cumstances, making these provisions a potential
excuse to undermine the principle of banning
discards. Recent studies however have signifi-
cantly constrained the extension of the problem
(Morfin et al. 2017).
The difficulties associated with this mech-
anism are those of a very loosely defined
principle (how high is “high survivability”?) to
be applied on very inconsistent scientific advice.
This provides a lot of room for maneuver, but
also a lot of room to question whatever the
decision made. Inevitably, decisions on high
survival have to be done on a case-by-case
basis (Rihan et al. 2019). The situation is made
further complicated by the very different results
obtained in similar fisheries, but also for the
different levels of discarding, which makes a
given percentage of survival to discarding very
different in terms of the overall amount of fish
that is caught and thrown back dead to the sea
(EU 2017).
Overall, a way forward to implement this pro-
vision is to combine the estimated percentage
of survival with the total proportion of discards:
a low survival rate in a fishery with low dis-
cards will produce a very limited amount of fish
discarded and dead and could be considered
more acceptable than a case of higher survival
but with a very high level of total discarding,
resulting in a more significant total amount of
fish being discarded and dying.
The cross-reporting of catches
Another mechanism of flexibility in Article 15
of Regulation 1380/2013 is the possibility for
Member States to count catches of a stock for
which they have no quota, against the quota of
another stock. This is subject to two conditions:
(i) that full transparency is provided to ensure
there is no confusion in real catches by stock;
The landing obligation 125
and (ii) that the stock with a quota shortage is
not outside safe biological limits.
This mechanism is potentially very useful
to provide much-needed flexibility in terms
of mitigating choke species effects. In fact, a
similar mechanism is used in Iceland, where
over-quota catches of all stocks (except cod)
can be counted against other quotas, according
to the “cod-equivalent” formula.
Scientific studies have indicated that a flex-
ible system like this can indeed have benefits,
notably in terms of the economic performance
of the fleets. In the cod/saithe fishery in the
North Sea, providing for this inter-species
flexibility is expected to provide a significant
improvement in economic performance. Fail-
ing to use such flexibility results in a reduction
of 29% in net profits, thus providing little
incentive for compliance (Simons et al. 2015).
In practice, this mechanism has been used
only once, according to the European Commis-
sion services.
Ex-ante and ex-post quota
adjustments: banking and borrowing
The mechanism for banking and borrowing
quotas from two consecutive years, up to a
maximum of 10% is actually not a new mech-
anism. This allows counting quota overshots
against the quota of the following year, as well
as saving unused quotas from one year to the
next one. In fact, the old regulation on inter-
annual quota flexibility has applied for many
years: Regulation 847/96 (EU 1996). The nov-
elty it provides is that the quotas which were
subject to penalization are now acceptable to
the level of 10%.
This mechanism also exists in other coun-
tries, and it is generally recognized as providing
useful flexibility in some cases. However, such
mechanisms cannot resolve certain questions:
in particular, when relative stability is very
unbalanced, the banking and borrowing will
not solve the problem, at best it will displace
it to the following year and, depending upon
the annual circumstances, it may in some cases
even aggravate the problem of choke species in
the mid and long term.
126 Chapter 6
Other possible elements
of flexibility
Beyond the elements of flexibility incorporated
into the basic regulation, other mechanisms of
the CFP can be used to reduce in some cases the
most undesirable choke species’ effects.
TAC uplifts
An immediate solution to this problem, that has
already been implemented, is the concept of
TAC top-ups or uplifts, that is, additional TACs
that account for fish that used to be caught
and discarded and that, on implementing the
landing obligation, would be landed without
increase in the total fishing mortality. The idea
of these is to increase the TACs as a propor-
tion of the estimated level of discards in the
fishery, so that the revised TACs would be the
sum of what is normally landed plus what is
normally discarded. These have been applied
in the first years of the phase-in. Theoretically,
this should result in “fishing mortality-neutral”
TACs. This solution is of course well-received
from the industry. It is probably premature to
evaluate the effects of its application. However,
a number of concerns have emerged:
• The top-ups are estimated by science on the
basis of existing data. But these data do not
anticipate future increases in selectivity, nor
do they take account of different discard
levels by different operators in the same
fishery. The quota top-ups may give higher
quotas even to those whose discards were
not so high.
• The fact of basing top-ups on estimated dis-
cards can act as a disincentive to reduce dis-
carding through technical means: the higher
the discards, the higher the quota top-ups.
• Ultimately, this may be a partial solution to
the question of TAC levels, but certainly not
to the choke species problems as related to
quota allocation; these top-ups are allocated
among Member States according to relative
stability, so for example when and where
a Member State does not have a quota of
a certain stock, any quota top-up to a zero
national quotum is still a zero quotum.
According to Borges (2018), of the 40, 64,
and 88 TACs under the LO between 2015
and 2017 respectively, around 30% (primarily
demersal stocks) were increased in 2016–2017
to account for the LO and, of these, 10 TACs
were set above landings advice before any
adjustments were made. The author concludes
that the LO is likely to have contributed to TAC
increases above the maximum advised catch in
2016 and, particularly, 2017.
Overall, these quota uplifts have the merit
of providing compensation that, presumably,
facilitates the implementation of the discard
ban, but in a context where the enforcement of
the ban is still in its infancy, the net effects are
less clear. If the ultimate goal of the discard ban
was, as the Commission originally intended,
to change the way our fishermen fish, toward
more selective fishing, and apply the landing
obligation to the remaining unwanted catches,
one can cast serious doubts as to whether the
quota top-ups really provide an incentive to
change fishing practice, but rather contribute
to make business as usual easier.
This instrument can provide a solution in
some cases where the target species, in par-
ticular, may be exhausted relatively soon in
the year while quotas of by-catch species are
still available. As such, it can certainly provide
much needed flexibility. Quota uplifts, on the
contrary, cannot solve the problem of choke
species due to relative stability. For Member
States with very low or even zero quotas of
some of their choke species, the quota uplifts
hardly make a difference, because an uplift of,
say, 10% makes little difference for those with
very low quotas, and makes no difference at all
for Member States with zero quotas.
In addition, while the first quota uplifts were
associated with certain measures, such as the
use of CCTV cameras (thus increasing the level
of information about real catches) some quota
uplifts in recent years have been adopted with-
out any compensation. They have meant a net
increase in fishing mortality without any advan-
tage in terms of better enforcement or better
information about what happens in the fishing
grounds.

It is also important to understand that these
quota uplifts are nowhere to be found in Reg-
ulation 1380/2013, and are applied by Council
alone in the context of the annual TAC and
quota exercise. This is politically significant
because it is an element of policy flexibility that
the European Parliament did not agree to, and
has no power to question. This certainly adds
to the lack of trust between the two institutions
when it comes to the management plans.
Reducing minimum conservation
reference sizes?
This is a tempting idea: in theory, by reducing
the minimum catch size, fishers can land and
sell for human consumption a higher per-
centage of the small fish that they inevitably
catch under current rules. This has been done
for example with cod in the Baltic, where a
reduction from 38 to 35 cm was adopted with
the purpose of allowing the marketing of cod
between 35 and 38 cm, in a context where
increases in selectivity were considered difficult
(EU 2014c).
This resulted in decreased selectivity by
incentivizing commercialization of smaller
size eastern cod, while there was no apparent
reduction in discard rates (ICES 2017). This
ran counter to the idea of the legislators about
the need for increasing selectivity in order to
facilitate the implementation of the landing
obligation.
Working on the fringes of relative
stability?
Relative stability is a well-consolidated princi-
ple, with ample political support and favorable
case law from the European Court of Jus-
tice. However, as we approach the “perfect
storm” referred to above, the case for a certain
adjustment to certain aspects starts to become
much more an issue than was the case ever
before.
A fully-fledged revamping of relative stability
would be a daunting, highly political task that
cannot be done in the short term and outside
a major framework of policy reform. We will
refer to this in Chapter 14. For this reason, the
The landing obligation 127
most realistic scenario in the short to mid-term
is to do what part of the European industry
has referred to as “working in the fringes of
relative stability” that is, to leave the basic allo-
cation keys unchanged, but to introduce some
marginal elements of flexibility around these
keys to provide for much-needed flexibility to
resolve the choke species effects generated by
the allocation of TACs into national quotas.
“Others” quota for by-catch only
In some cases, choke species effects may be
avoided by adding a relatively small number
of by-catch quotas. These would be based on
scientific estimates of inevitable by-catch levels
in certain areas, when and where at least some
Member States have no quota.
For example, Regulation 2016/2285 on bian-
nual TACs for deep sea stocks (EU 2016) estab-
lishes quotas for “others” only as by-catch, for
black scabbardfish in ICES areas V, VI, VII, and
XII. The same applies to roundnose grenadier in
ICES areas Vb, VI and VII and red seabream in
ICES areas VI, VII, and VIII.
In the general TAC regulation for 2017 (EU
2017) there are also other precedents:
• “Others” quotas (as by-catch) are set in tusk
(Union waters of ICES IV), blue ling in ICES
Vb, VI, and VII, as well as in international
waters of ICES XII, and in ICES areas II and
IV, ling in ICES I and II. In cod in areas I and
II, the quota table includes more specifically
a quota for “other Member States” and even
this quota is subject to an allowance for up to
14% by-catches of haddock.
• In the Northeast Atlantic Fishery Organisa-
tion (NAFO) area, the quota table for Amer-
ican plaice establishes a zero TAC for the
Union, corresponding to a “no directed fish-
ery” approach, but the quota table goes on
the allow for a “maximum of 1250 kg or 5%,
whichever is the greatest,” as by-catch. A
similar approach applies to yellowtail floun-
der under a zero quota for the Union (2500 kg
or 10% whichever is higher as by-catch) and
again a similar approach applies to capelin
and Northern prawn.
128 Chapter 6
In addition, in the general TAC regulation for
2018 (EU 2018a), both bluefin tuna and sword-
fish in the North Atlantic have an “other” quota
available, only as by-catch, to Member States
not having a quota of their own, and in the
bi-annual TAC regulation for deep sea stocks
(EU 2016), there are unallocated, “others” quo-
tas (only as by-catch) for black scabbardfish,
roundnose grenadier and red seabream.
These examples show how today’s relative
stability already has a number of “others”
quotas or by-catch quotas that constitute a
precedent showing that this kind of approach
could be considered in a number of cases to
take account of by-catches in a way that does
not undermine the principle.
Quota top-ups not allocated according
to relative stability
This is an idea initially considered in the frame-
work of the 2013 reform trilogue. The idea
would be to consider some top-ups that would
be allocated to those Member States not having
quotas of such stocks, in cases where such
by-catches were unavoidable. This was actually
not fundamentally different from the previous
solution, except in that there was a recognition
of the need to apply a different relative stability
for the top-ups. For this very reason, it was not
accepted.
These examples clearly show that the use of
by-catch quotas is a relatively common feature
within the current context, so there is no fun-
damental problem in suggesting that this kind
of solution could be extended to other stocks
where scientific data show a certain level of
inevitable by-catches.
Small adjustments to some relative
stability keys
This would be by far the most far-reaching
instrument, but it cannot be overruled alto-
gether. The author has explained already (Penas
Lado 2016) how the relative stability key for
blue whiting was re-negotiated in December
2005, as a result of an external factor: the
negotiation of a new TAC and allocation by the
coastal States of the North East Atlantic, forcing
the EU to reconsider its internal allocation key
to increase its efficient consumption. We will
look into this question in Chapter 14.
Other possible mechanisms
Eliminating TACs
We referred to this possibility already in
Chapter 4. Although eliminating a TAC for the
sole purpose of facilitating the landing obliga-
tion does not seem a very good idea, it is true
that the value of certain TACs for the overall
conservation policy is very limited, and the
elimination of a certain number of these TACs
may not have significant effects on the general
status of EU stocks. If and when decisions to
eliminate some TACs are taken for the purpose
of simplifying the policy, these will have as a
side effect the facilitation of the implementation
of the landing obligation.
A recent report by ICES6 has established that
the removal of a TAC for seven stocks in EU
waters would imply a “low risk of these stocks
being exploited unsustainably.” This is clearly
an open door to the possibility of revising the
list of species subject to TACs.
Prohibited species list
This possibility has also been floated: by con-
sidering a choke species as a protected one, its
retention on board would be banned and thus
would be discarded legally. Obviously, this kind
of measure would not be an incentive to avoid
catching the species concerned in the first place,
and would correspond to an undue use of a
mechanism intended to protect endangered
species such as marine mammals or certain
species of sharks. Using such a mechanism
for mainstream fish species would seriously
undermine the credibility of the policy and
will, again, run counter to the intention of the
policy to reduce unwanted catches as much as
possible through avoidance measures.
Managing fisheries by fishing effort
The use of fishing effort management as the
main management instrument would certainly
6 www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/
Advice/2018/Special_requests/eu.2018.24.pdf/

contribute to eliminate part of the choke species
problem. The question is analyzed in Chapter 7.
Implementing the landing
obligation in practice
The political drive to adopt the policy in
2013 was stronger than the knowledge and
experience necessary to ensure it could be
implemented smoothly in the real world (Penas
Lado 2016). That task was – on purpose – left
for implementation. This raises the question of
the practicality of the implementation of this
policy under the specific conditions imposed in
Article 15 of Regulation 1380/2013. An analysis
of this question has been done by Borges and
Penas (2019).
Despite the likely practical difficulties, it
seems clear that in political terms there seems
to be no way back on the development of a
no-discard policy as a central element of the
CFP. However, the specific rules may be subject
to continuous evaluation. Certain authors have
signaled that no-discard policies need a gradual
approach of learning by practice (Johnsen and
Eliasen 2011). In fact, it is extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to get a new policy right in
just one go. Learning from experience as imple-
mentation takes place remains an unavoidable
feature of good policy making. And for that,
ensuring adequate monitoring of what hap-
pens, and what is the effect of the different
measures taken, should remain a fundamental
priority for the years to come.
By-catch avoidance: mitigation
The philosophy of the discard ban was that the
thrust of the effort should be placed in avoid-
ing undesired catches in the first place. During
the discussions on the reform, phrases like: “to
avoid discarding, avoid catching the undesired
fish in the first place” became mantra. The ques-
tion is, then, how can the industry avoid catch-
ing the undesired fish in the first place? And to
what extent?
The Scientific, Technical and Economics
Committee for Fisheries (STECF) has made an
The landing obligation 129
extensive report on the improvement of selec-
tivity to contribute to this purpose. But the
question is just not about technical measures
(EU 2018b). A study commissioned by the
European Parliament (EU 2015d) based on the
case of plaice in the Baltic Sea (a well-known
choke species in the demersal fishery) con-
cluded that a series of different measures can
contribute to minimize choke species effects.
The measures include (not surprisingly): (i) a
national redistribution of quotas and (ii) inter-
national quota swaps to solve the choke effects
as a result of allocation; also (i) the improve-
ment of selectivity and (ii) spatial–temporal
avoidance to solve the problem at the level
of TACs. Meaningfully, the study recognized
that all potential solutions to the choke species
problem will have economic consequences,
primarily for the fisher, but also for the retailer,
consumer, and the society at large.
This implies that over and beyond the tech-
nical solutions (which we will review below)
there is a fundamental challenge to be met: that
of making solutions to the choke species prob-
lem economically acceptable for the economic
stakeholders at large. This will in fact require an
evolution of the governance culture in the CFP,
as we will discuss in Chapter 9.
Technical measures and the landing
obligation
In Chapter 4 we examined the question of how
associated species can be dissociated in practice.
We can draw on those elements here to discuss
how much the question of unintended catches
of undesired fish can be mitigated, if not com-
pletely eliminated. The very philosophy of the
discard ban, as expressed by the Commission,
was to reduce as much as possible the catching
of unwanted fish through increasingly selective
fishing, so that the real ban on discard would
apply to a much smaller fraction of total catches
as compared with today’s levels of discarding.
The scientific literature refers to many cases
where different technical measures have suc-
cessfully reduced levels of discarding, although
of course results are very variable (Graham
et al. 2007).
130 Chapter 6
A very good review of existing mitigation
methods was compiled by O’Keefe et al. (2014).
The authors conclude that although a num-
ber of schemes were successful in reducing
by-catch, most reported unanticipated results
related to shifts in fishing effort, changes in
catch of non-target species, reduced catch of
target species and socio-economic impacts to
fishing fleets. This was largely the result of lim-
ited knowledge of the effects of these schemes,
and the authors recommended more research
in this area. In any case, the study found that
a combination of mitigation measures would
be more effective than any single one, and
emphasized the value of cooperative solutions
among fishers, scientists, and managers as the
most effective way to reduce by-catches.
The analysis of the mitigation measures that
we have seen in Chapter 4 leads to the conclu-
sion that there seem to be two main approaches
for mitigating the undesired by-catches and thus
facilitate a no-discard policy: real time closures
and incentive-based increases in selectivity.
Both approaches have been successful in re-
ducing by-catch in other countries when imple-
mented in a flexible way that allows for full
industry collaboration. These two instruments,
however, have a problem in the CFP: they
require a kind of governance that departs signif-
icantly from the tradition for detailed and pre-
scriptive regulatory approaches of the CFP, that
apply even to the regionalized decision making.
Can the industry do it?
Implementation of these two approaches, how-
ever, is not necessarily incompatible with the
legal basis of the CFP. Rather, it represents a
kind of de-centralized governance, with full
involvement by the industry that will require
a new, bold, and creative approach. Whether
such an approach will ever be possible under
the CFP, this author will contend, it is not a
legal problem. It is one of political will and
courage to question our own approach, learn
from our own shortcomings and involve the
industry beyond national perspectives.
In this sense, the recent experience of the cod
avoidance plan in Kattegat is very important,
as a test of how a fleet information system,
providing the skipper with information about
hotspots of unwanted species can allow skip-
pers to make a better plan for the selective
fishery based on more qualified information
(Eliasen 2014). Hence the kind of collabora-
tive approach that clearly emerges is the most
effective one for the implementation of a new
policy objective, and also underlines the need
for testing of new approaches to make the CFP
adaptive to new challenges.
The big question, therefore, is how the above
scheme could be implemented in practice, and
whether it could be implemented under the
current governance system. The high contri-
bution foreseen for avoidance and selectivity
must be seen in this context: will the tradi-
tional approach on technical measures allow
for such a fundamental contribution? Or will
more innovative approaches, like the two men-
tioned above, involving fundamental changes
in governance be necessary?
The question is not even new, or a direct
result of the 2013 reform. It is important to
note that, already in 2011, the North Sea
Regional Advisory Council (NSRAC) examined
the regime applicable to the real-time closures
in the CFP, and found it confusing and devoid
of guarantees of success. Consequently, they re-
quested a dedicated research project to test such
a system and evaluate its effects (Anon. 2011).
This fact is very meaningful: the industry
examined the possibility of using an instrument
for which the CFP provided a legal basis, but
they hesitated to use it because of the lack of
evaluation of its practicality. This implies that
for the CFP to be able to adopt solutions to
the many challenges ahead, it needs to give
itself the means to test new policy and manage-
ment approaches, and to do so in cooperation
with the industry to ensure that these new
approaches can make headway if they demon-
strate their value at test level. We will look at
this question in Chapter 8.
In the current context, there has been one
main case where the industry has taken impor-
tant steps toward adapting their fishing prac-
tice to implement the LO: the Swedish demersal

fleet.7 However, it is important to understand
that this has been done largely as the result of
a very strong pressure by the Swedish govern-
ment on their own industry, a kind of pressure
that is difficult to see in other Member States.
The need for collaborative solutions
From the above elements there is perhaps one
conclusion that stands out: the problem of
discard has so many causes, so many different
manifestations and drivers in different circum-
stances, that it is very difficult to see how any
given set of measures can offer a universal solu-
tion. At the end, discard avoidance boils down
to individual skipper behavior, taking into
account all the regulatory, economic, and even
educational elements involved. This means
that ultimately the problem of discards requires
in practice very different and case-specific
approaches.
This does not mean that policy objectives in
hard law are not appropriate, but rather that
these policy objectives should allow for case-
specific flexibility, both in terms of the level of
ambition and, specially, in terms of the specific
means to implement them in practice. In other
words, the implementation of a successful
discard ban policy requires what Eliasen et al.
(2014) call a “selective behavior” in fishers.
Such behavior is impossible to regulate, so
instead of trying to legislate all the minutiae of
skipper’s behavior, it seems preferable to work
out collaborative approaches with the industry
where the right incentives may be identified
and used.
Other studies, already based on the emerg-
ing experience, point at the still high level
of discards in the Mediterranean, found that
the existing regulation has more weaknesses
and threats than strengths and opportunities,
and recommended that the governing system
should take into consideration the contex-
tualization of discard management according
to the specific characteristics of each métier;
7 http://blogs.edf.org/edfish/2016/12/09/working-
together-to-address-challenges-in-swedish-
fisheries/
The landing obligation 131
coordination between stakeholders; and cau-
tion about the ecological cost of landing discards
(Garcia-Rivera et al. 2015).
This is one of the main reasons why, as we
will see in subsequent chapters, the implemen-
tation of the CFP requires the further develop-
ment of collaborative approaches to implement
the main policy objectives in the real world.
Controlling the landing obligation
The control and enforcement of a non-discard
policy is not straightforward. This question,
however, received limited attention when the
discard ban was adopted: is it possible to control
it? And if so, at what cost? As Penas Lado (2016)
explained, during the 2013 reform process the
question of control was not addressed since a
major revamping of the EU fisheries control
regulation had taken place not long before (EU
2009b). This meant that the question of the
controllability of the LO provisions was not
addressed.
The discard ban will increase the need for ade-
quate control of the fishing activity in the EU. As
Condie et al. (2014) have summarized:
Catch quotas and a discard ban create strong
incentives for more selective fishing practices, but
also for non-compliance with full documenta-
tion of catches. A high level of monitoring and
enforcement will be required to ensure that fish-
ers improve profitability through more selective
fishing practices rather than illegal discarding.
Existing methods to control this policy are
generally expensive and labor intensive, and
cannot necessarily be applied to all vessels
concerned:
• Observers on board can be very effective,
but they are expensive and applicable only
to vessels beyond a certain size. It is diffi-
cult to see this solution applied to the EU’s
thousands of vessels.
• CCTV cameras can also be effective, but they
also require significant manpower (to revise
the footage produced by the cameras) and
are effective only in low-diversity fisheries.
In addition, the experience shows that this
technology is strongly opposed as a matter of
principle in a number of Member States.
132 Chapter 6
The EU control agency, European Fisheries
Control Agency (EFCA), has been developing
methodologies to control the landing obliga-
tion, notably on landing. Overall, the methods
exist, and the financing through the European
Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) too. In
principle there seems to be no excuse, and the
measure should be adequately enforced. But is
this going to be the case?
The experience of the first stages of the
implementation is not impressive. The attitude
of public administrations so far has been largely
one of “wait and see” the effects of the land-
ing obligation before taking enforcement too
seriously. Certain national administrations con-
sidered, at the beginning of the implementation
of this measure that they should be “controlling
but not enforcing.” That is, the implementation
was being monitored, but no sanctions were
being imposed on violators.
This may be a reasonable attitude at the first
stages of implementation of a new policy before
its real effects are fully grasped. However, this
cannot continue forever. At a certain stage, if
the landing obligation continues to be “con-
trolled but not enforced” the measure itself,
and by extension the reformed CFP would be
seriously undermined.
The experience of third countries
The experience of countries having applied this
type of policy is very varied:
• In Norway the control is assured by 15
inspection vessels conducting c. 2000 inspec-
tions per year. As a result, according to
Gullestad et al. (2015), half a dozen captains/
companies are fined every year. Beyond
these figures, the Norwegian enforcement
of the discard ban is generally perceived as
weak.
• In the US west coast, the main instrument
to control the discard objectives is the use of
observers on board. In Alaska, some fisheries
have a 100% observer coverage. While cov-
erage is different for different fisheries, these
observers have a clear mandate to monitor
and report discards. They are not scientific
observers: they actually have compliance
reporting responsibilities and are generally
believed to have a significant deterrent
effect on discarding. Their effect is primarily
deterrence. Their reports on compliance
are reviewed in regional headquarters and
that can lead to consequences for the vessel
captain and crew. Observers cannot stop
unpermitted processes or do other enforce-
ment except through reporting. In some
cases, observers are paid by the industry.
• In Canada, a number of fisheries are subject
to control through CCTV cameras. The case
of the Canadian Pacific groundfish fishery is
of particular interest: in some fleet segments,
on-board monitoring reaches 100% of the
operators. Importantly, observers are paid for
by the vessel owners.
It is noteworthy that in some of the above
countries the definition of the discard policy
objectives is much less strict than in the EU.
As we saw above, the case of the US is prag-
matic: “reducing by-catch as much as possible.”
This is a national guideline and regulations
are more specific and stricter for some fishery
management plans. Overall, the objectives
are seriously enforced at least for the most
important fisheries.
In contrast, the EU policy, at least in these
initial stages, seems to respond to the opposite
approach: very rigid and ambitious policy objec-
tive, but general inability to take enforcement
seriously. This is a fundamental point for reflec-
tion in the context of future policy discussions.
Controlling the LO in the EU
In the EU, the above solutions are not used yet.
This is related to a certain number of problems
for the time being:
• The idea of extensive use of observers (even
more so if paid for by the industry itself)
is very far from being acceptable. This may
largely be the result of the lack of “owner-
ship” by the industry of the discard policy,
and also due to the lack of “culture” of
cost-recovery in Europe, which makes this
notion extremely difficult to incorporate in
the short term. Importantly, there cannot be
a strong economic argument: EMFF provides

for abundant funds to finance control means,
and the level of financing is actually higher
than what Member States thought they could
spend, so there is no shortage of money.
• The use of CCTV cameras is strongly opposed
by some national administrations, some
of which argue they are against principles
enshrined in their national constitution. This,
however, tends to sound as an excuse more
than a reason and, if the right incentives
are there, one can wonder whether such
considerations would be put on the table.
Despite the above difficulties, observers
and cameras will sooner or later have to be
tested. The methodologies developed by the
EFCA are fundamentally a system to identify
potential offenders, and it is therefore more
useful as a tool for risk assessment than one for
effective enforcement. The discard policies are
extremely difficult to enforce effectively with-
out some kind of monitoring of what happens
on board the fishing vessel. If the CFP wants to
be credible in enforcing this policy, this question
will have to be addressed at some stage.
So far, the control of the discard ban has
been subject to much methodological study and
discussion led by the EFCA. And the legal pro-
visions to control this new policy are gradually
being introduced in the legal basis of EFCA’s
Joint Deployment Plans: the so-called SCIPs
(Specific Common Inspection Programmes).
However, the practical implementation is still
at a very early stage.
Serious enforcement of the discard ban, based
on intensive on-board monitoring, seems to be
the most effective option, but it is expensive
and in Europe today does not seem to have
the industry’s agreement, let alone enthusiasm.
Good enforcement will only be possible if and
when the policy itself is better tailored to the
real problems on the fishing grounds through a
more collaborative approach with the industry.
At this point in time, however, it is premature
to evaluate the level of control of the landing
obligation. The fact that it is a new policy that is
still in its phase-in period, does not make this a
top priority for the national inspection systems
of Member States. However, this should change
The landing obligation 133
over time. The credibility of the measure, and
even the 2013 CFP reform as a whole, will be
largely dependent upon the real application and
enforcement of this provision in practice.
The methodology exists, and even if the
control means it will continue being paid for by
taxpayers’ money, funds for control purposes
are certainly not in short supply. As I advocate
in different parts of this book, not all fisheries
have to be subject to the same level of coverage
simultaneously. Implementation can also be
subject to testing and to gradual introduction,
with well-known methodologies (observers
and CCTV cameras) in selected fisheries where
the industry can accept a high level of enforce-
ment in exchange for some kind of quota-based
incentive. Again, the CFP has to break the
deadlock of the “all or nothing” approach on
control too, with testing being developed for
the most willing, or for those with the highest
discard problem to resolve.
The recent proposal to update the 2009
control regulation (EU 2018c) provides for the
elements to control the landing obligation. In
doing so, it will remove the excuse that this
objective came after the last revamping of the
control measures, so the latter do not allow for
adequate enforcement of the LO. It is an open
question how many of these elements will be
incorporated into the final regulation which is
at present being discussed by the EU legislators.
In any case, the CFP should ensure that the
discard ban is credibly monitored and enforced.
But that also means that the discard ban must
be proportionate and reasonable, and will not
cause excessive economic disturbance to the
fleets concerned. The worst possible scenario,
to be avoided by all means, is one where the
policy “looks” strict but due to its undesirable
economic consequences for certain fleets it is
then not seriously enforced by national agen-
cies. Experience has shown many times that
when regulations are not well-designed, they
end up not being well enforced. This author
would argue that it will be much better for the
landing obligation and the CFP in general, to
ensure that its rules are flexible enough to be
applicable in practice, rather than keeping their
134 Chapter 6
strictness on paper and then failing to enforce
them in the fishing grounds.
What to do with unwanted fish?
One of the practical difficulties in implementing
the discard ban is the lack of alternatives, partic-
ularly in small ports, for any unwanted fish that
have to be landed against the initial interest of
the fishermen. While in large ports, particularly
those close to a fishmeal factory can find eas-
ily non-human consumption markets for their
unwanted fish, this kind of solution is not avail-
able in smaller ports and in ports of the Mediter-
ranean, where there are no fishmeal plants. It is
necessary to find practical solutions applicable
in these places.
What is “unwanted” fish?
The very notion of “unwanted” fish is very vari-
able geographically and even in a given place, it
also varies with time, as new species and prod-
ucts are gradually incorporated into the main-
stream consumption patterns.
Geographically, the differences are striking.
While in the Mediterranean Sea many species
can be sold for direct human consumption as
consumers accept a wide variety of species, in
other parts of the world (including Europe) the
diversity of species on offer is rather low despite
the thriving fisheries in their coast.
All this implies that in many areas there is a
considerable potential to enlarge the range of
species subject to consumption and therefore
having a market value.
New uses of low-value fish
This is an area where considerable progress
has been achieved, although this is not nec-
essarily obvious for the consumer. Here again,
geographical differences are striking: a fish like
blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), used for
fish meal or for surimi in some European coun-
tries, is highly appreciated for direct human
consumption after very simple treatment (gut-
ting and heading) in some southern European
markets. But it is perhaps the development of
“fish fingers,” surimi or similar products, where
consumers are not aware what species they
are eating, that offers the best opportunities to
introduce certain species in the human con-
sumption market. Europe consumes significant
amounts of hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae)
from New Zealand without ever knowing what
the fish looks like.
Interesting examples are being developed.
For example, the fishing company Nordic Wild-
fish has been assisting in the development of
a new technology that can make use of all
by-products from whitefish such as cod, pol-
lock, and haddock. Instead of discarding the
heads, guts, and the rest of the fish, they can all
be incorporated into a hydrolysis process that
separates the bones, leaving a kind of “soup” to
which enzymes can be added and valuable oils
and proteins extracted.
In the US Alaska region fisheries, some ves-
sels are being retrofitted to incorporate on-
board plants to produce fish meal and oil from
hitherto discarded fish. As fish oil and fish meal
prices rise, and in a context of a full-retention
no-discard policy, the idea of using all catches
to produce valuable products clearly gains
momentum. As an example, the vessel Star-
bound, built in 1989 to fish for Alaskan pollock,
was retrofitted by adding 20 m of additional
hull space for a fishmeal fish oil on-board pro-
cessing plant (Anon 2016). This was motivated
by regulation requiring improved retention and
utilization.
There are also very creative solutions. The
fishery for pollock in Alaska has a low level of
by-catch, but these include salmon and halibut,
highly-valued species that the fleet concerned
cannot catch because they are designated as
prohibited species for that fishery. The North
Pacific Fishery Management Council has initi-
ated a voluntary scheme whereby the pollock
fishermen concerned have a choice: the salmon
and halibut caught can be either discarded, or
kept and frozen on board and later delivered
to a food bank, free of charge. This implies that
they would freeze the fish on board but would
not obtain any benefit from it (Dave Fluharty,
personal communication).
FAO has looked into this question in its last
report on the state of the world fisheries and

aquaculture (FAO 2014) and has described
a wide range of possible uses of low-value,
unwanted fish or even fish trimmings:
• Salmon trimmings have been used for differ-
ent purposes, partially for human consump-
tion and the rest for animal feed ingredients.
• The tuna industry is successfully using fish
trimmings from canneries. The dark meat is
used for pet food, the oil is used in various
industries and other by-products are used
for the food industry to fortify of bread and
yogurt for example. The cooking juice of the
tuna is also used as a flavoring agent, sauce,
or condiment.
• In some Asian countries such as Thailand the
tilapia skin is popular as a snack for human
consumption.
• Different fishery by-products are used to
produce animal feed. In small ports, far away
from a processing plant, the production
of silage, in relatively simple facilities and
cheap storage conditions, allows the use of
fish by-products, to later be transported to
processing facilities when enough quantities
have been accumulated.
• Pharmaceuticals and bioactive ingredients
are also derived from fishery by-products,
such as omega-3 or gelatine.
Other authors have described numerous uses
for unwanted fish, including oils, enzymes,
flavors, pigments, and other ingredients to be
used in agriculture or pharmaceuticals (Archer
2011). Stewart (2014) recommends six cate-
gories of non-food uses: fish meal and oil, bait,
ensiling, composting, energy production and
rendering.
Europe runs a significant deficit of non-food
products derived from fish, so the opportunity
is there to develop such markets. There are
of course difficulties, notably related to the
less than obvious profitability of handling,
transporting, and storing products that would
otherwise have been discarded, particularly in
small ports, but the current structural instru-
ment (EMFF8 ) placed a strong emphasis on the
public support of these initiatives.
8 European Maritime and Fisheries Fund.
The landing obligation 135
All the above examples, and many others
developed in recent times (Iñarra et al. 2019)
show that there is no shortage of ideas on what
to do with fishery by-products. And, under the
EMFF, there is certainly no shortage of public
funds to help either.
The need for monitoring
At this point time it is difficult to foresee how
the discard issue will evolve in the CFP. It is
important to underline the crucial importance
of monitoring what is going on. As a policy,
the LO has suffered from the beginning from
the patchy and incomplete scientific basis to
ensure good decision making. Whatever the
future evolution of the policy, it should clearly
be based on better information. Now, with the
work of the EU research program DiscardLess
and the publication of an excellent book on
the matter (Uhlmann et al. 2019) we are in a
much better position than we were when the
LO was adopted. And the presumed effects of
the “perfect storm” referred to above should be
monitored to ensure a good basis for whatever
questioning will be made to the 2013 policy.
This monitoring is important for at least three
reasons:
• To have a better knowledge of the real discard
levels;
• To verify the implementation and effects of
whatever flexibility or allowance mechanism
is put in place, to evaluate their effect and the
case of their continuity; and
• To better understand changes that will occur
as the policy evolves. If the 2013 policy was
decided somehow blindly, without practical
knowledge of its effects, any future revision
should be based on better knowledge of what
happens in the real world.
This implies inevitably the use of instruments
such as cameras or observers. Over and beyond
the discussion on the role of such instru-
ments (whether they should also contribute to
enforcement) it is just unthinkable that a high-
profile policy objective like this would be imple-
mented without having the means and methods
to monitor its results. This deficiency is signif-
icant and must be remedied in the near future.
136 Chapter 6
Is the landing obligation
economically viable?
Beyond controllability, the real question is
whether certain EU fisheries, especially those
with a high level of discards and techni-
cal difficulty to improve selectivity, can survive
economically in the new context. As mentioned
above, a recent study (Hoff et al. 2019) casts a
rather pessimistic outlook about this question,
indicating that in general terms the industry
will be worse off applying the landing obligation
than they would be otherwise.
Perhaps there is no better example of this
than the North Sea flatfish fishery, conducted by
the Netherlands and Belgium, which encapsu-
lates the real problem with no-discard policies:
the net used by these vessels (in the North Sea
south of parallel 56 degrees N), of 80 mm in
the cod-end is necessary to catch sole, the main
commercial species, that has a streamlined
body that allows it to escape nets of larger sizes.
But this net also captures very large amounts
of plaice, species of lower commercial value
having a less streamlined body, and whose
small individuals are retained by the 80 mm
cod-end to a substantial degree. To conduct a
viable fishery for sole, these fleets inevitably
catch large amounts of small plaice that have
little or no market value and have traditionally
been discarded in large amounts. Both species
are technically difficult to dissociate in the
catch, so implementation of the discard ban on
this fleet would result in large catches of small,
low-value plaice which would accompany the
catches of sole. Consequently, the plaice quota
would quickly be used up with low value
fish, and the fishery would have to be closed
before the sole quota is used. This is clearly
uneconomical. Little wonder the Dutch fishing
industry concerned is among the most vocal of
those opposing the discard ban.
Not all the forecasts are negative, however. In
some cases, the discard ban is seen as an oppor-
tunity to increase the amount of fish landed and
to use the extra landings to open up new market
opportunities (Leitao and Baptista 2017). And
the experience of the Scottish fleet participating
in the “conservation credit” scheme shows that
possible economic downsides can be compen-
sated by appropriate incentives (O’Neill et al.
2014).
These discrepancies show that the economic
effects of the implementation of the discard ban
will be very variable, depending on a series of
factors that are associated to the characteristics
of the fishery as well as those of their markets:
• It is to be expected that bottom trawl fish-
eries will have the biggest economic problem.
Their unselective nature makes these fish-
eries particularly vulnerable to the effects of
choke species.
• Fisheries that take place far away from their
home ports are likely to suffer more. The
number of days of steaming to and back from
the fishing grounds (these days implying
high running costs and no income) require
that the vessels fill their holds only with
high-value fish. The obligation to keep on
board and fill the vessel holds with low-value
fish unintendedly caught can reduce the
profitability of the fishing trip.
• Fisheries in Member States with a very
imbalanced relative stability, that is, where
the fishing rights are very different from the
real catch composition of their vessels will
have difficulties. In addition, fleets segments
in Member States where there is no effec-
tive market mechanism to exchange quotas
among different fleets are likely to suffer
more.
• In fisheries conducted from small, isolated
ports it is more difficult to develop alter-
native markets for the unwanted and the
undersized fish.
In any case, in the European context it is
difficult to determine the level of economic
difficulty that the full implementation of the
landing obligation will imply. Perhaps the best
study on this is a very recent one by Seafish for
the specific case of the UK fleet (Russell et al.
2017). According to different bio-economic
models tested, it seems there will be relatively
little choke species effect until 2019. But that
year, when all regulated stocks will be subject to
the discard ban, the choke species effect will be

significant in a number of fisheries. In 2019, the
Scottish Nephrops fleet is expected to encounter
a choke point of 43% of the 2015 days at sea,
an average of 38 days per vessel, and the North-
ern Ireland Nephrops trawl fleet is expected to
encounter a choke point of 6% of the 2015 days
at sea. These are very precise estimates of the
number of days that vessels will have to stop
fishing as a result of choke species. The study,
however, does not consider the extent to which
these are the result of the implementation
of different measures. Solutions to the choke
species effect are largely lacking and further
work on this issue is necessary.
The above study focuses on the UK, but other
Member States will encounter similar or even
more acute problems. A case in hand is Spain in
Western waters, which has significant quotas of
Spain’s traditional target species (hake, megrim,
anglerfish) but zero quotas of gadoids (cod, had-
dock) that are associated in the catch. In the case
of zero quotas, the quota uplifts are not useful.
It is also important to underline that the eco-
nomic difficulties associated with the landing
obligation may be encountered in fleets that
in principle look similar. Years ago, Sweden
introduced a Nephrops grid that allows high
yields of Norway lobster (Nephrops norvegicus)
while avoiding associated fin fish in Kattegat.
The same technical solution was proposed for
the Scottish Nephrops fleet. However, for this
sector this type of grid was technically possible
but economically not viable because fin fish
represent 50% of the revenue of that sector.
The experience of other countries outside
the EU is not necessarily useful for the EU. In
particular, the system in the US is less strict than
the one in Europe, to the effect that discards
are eliminated as much as practicable, which
implies that if certain reductions make the fish-
ery uneconomical, the industry itself can argue
that such reductions are not “practicable.”
Ultimately, these real or potential difficulties
are the main challenge to the practical imple-
mentation of the discard ban. If the industry
sees its implementation as becoming uneco-
nomical, no amount of top–down control will
be able to ensure good compliance.
The landing obligation 137
However, if and when the practical imple-
mentation of the landing obligation, as specifi-
cally set out in Article 15 of Regulation
1380/2014 shows that many problems remain
unresolved, and that this results in significant,
negative economic impacts on the European
fishing industry, the CFP should have the capac-
ity to learn from the experience and introduce
the necessary flexibility to ensure that the main
policy core, the substantial reduction of waste
in European fisheries, is resolved in a way
that is fully compatible with the other policy
objectives and with the overall economic health
of the sector.
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CHAPTER 7
Beyond single-stock TACs: the other
instruments of the CFP
Management by single-stock
TACs
The total allowable catch (TAC) system based
on single stocks has been the cornerstone of the
Common Fisheries Policy since 1983 (except in
the Mediterranean as we saw in Chapter 5), as
is the case in most fisheries management sys-
tems around the world. Does this mean that it
is the best possible management system? And
are they the system that will be best adapted for
the future challenges of the policy? What are
the other possible instruments and would they
present advantages to today’s system?
The advantages of TAC management
The best proof of the merits of single-stock
TACs as the main management instrument in
fisheries is the fact that it is, by far, the most
commonly used instrument around the world.
In the CFP, single-stock TACs have a number of
advantages:
• They are an ideal instrument to work out
allocations of fishing rights, in a way that the
industry and national administrations can
easily identify and quantify with economic
interests.
• They allow a species-specific approach, par-
ticularly for weak stocks. This advantage,
however, is questionable in mixed fisheries,
as we saw in Chapter 4.
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
• TACs can be calculated as corresponding to
specific levels of fishing mortality, at least at
the level of single stocks. They are well-suited
to implement a conservation policy based on
fishing mortality objectives.
• They are based on the most traditionally
available scientific advice, that in most cases
correspond to single-stock dynamics.
• Ultimately, they are user-friendly in that they
establish a clear relationship between man-
agement and the expectations of fishermen.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the TACs
in the CFP were set in 1983 largely as a way to
allocate fishing rights. Ultimately, this is proba-
bly the main reason why this is, still today, the
prevailing management instrument. However,
these advantages do not imply that the TACs are
the one and only viable instrument for effective
management. In particular, the emphasis on
single-stock objectives, mixed with no discard
policies produces, in mixed fisheries, the choke
species effect that we saw in Chapters 4 and 5.
In this context, some downsides also become
apparent.
The limits of TACs as an instrument
Despite the above advantages, TACs are not
perfect and, in certain circumstances, may
arguably not be the best instruments to ensure
sound management. In scientific terms, many
contributions underline the caveats of TAC
systems (Kell et al. 2005; Schwach et al. 2007;
141
142 Chapter 7
Baudron et al. 2010). The latter summarize
these caveats as follows:
• the intrinsic uncertainty in fisheries advice
and the difficulty in providing precise point
stock/fishery estimates and reliable TAC
advice for most stocks;
• the political pressure when negotiating
annual TACs, which often results in TACs
not being consistent with scientific advice;
• the resistance of the fishing industry to TACs
varying significantly between years;
• the difficulty in achieving single-species
objectives in a mixed-fisheries context; and
• the weak linkage between output control
(TAC) and the levels of capacity and effort.
In addition, one can add the difficulties of
enforcement. After more than 30 years of CFP,
the EU institutions themselves still consider that
TACs are not well-respected, as indicated in var-
ious EU reports including from the European
Court of Auditors, including very recent ones
(EU 2017). If we add the effect of the landing
obligation, requiring the control of the amounts
of fish discarded under the different flexibility
mechanisms, the enforcement challenge of the
system is enormous.
The Commission itself has been critical with
the TAC system in the past, in particular in the
context of the preparation of the 2002 reform
(EU 2001). The context was, at the time, that of
a strong advocacy by the scientific community
to use effort management since TACs were not
effective in limiting the fishing mortality of the
cod stocks in EU waters.
In any case, the above caveats in the TAC
system should be analyzed now under a new
light: that of the new CFP characterized by its
three combined elements of individual TACs,
relative stability and landing obligation. It is in
this context that the possible use of alternative
instruments, at least in certain specific cases,
may actually provide the kind of flexibility
that the traditional TAC system cannot provide
under the CFP after 2013.
Other instruments available
in the CFP
TACs have never been the only management
instrument available in the CFP. And, in today’s
legal basis (Regulation 1380/2013) Article 7
provides for a very wide variety of management
instruments to be used in the CFP: multian-
nual plans, targets for fish conservation and
environmental impact, incentives (including
economic ones) to achieve different targets,
measures on TAC allocation, minimum con-
servation sizes, pilot projects on alternative
management systems, and a wide variety of
technical conservation measures.
Once again, it is not the legal basis that
establishes the pre-eminence of TACs, it is
traditional practice. All these other alternative
mechanisms are there, they can be applied. The
question is: should they? Would they provide
better management, at least in certain cases?
The alternative question is: if the CFP has so
far made very limited use of alternative instru-
ments, is this the result of the conviction that
the existing ones are better, or rather the result
of the attachment to the status quo and the high
level of policy inertia (see Chapter 1), given the
extreme complexity of introducing novelties?
Let us look at the experience and potential of
the other instruments of the CFP.
Effort management
Fisheries management by effort is an impor-
tant potential alternative to management by
catch quotas. The current legal basis of the CFP
considers effort management as an option and
it has always been the preferred option in the
Mediterranean. However, the effort manage-
ment systems established in parallel to catch
limitations in the context of several long-term
management plans adopted since 2004, such as
inter alia the cod recovery plan, the southern
hake and Nephrops plan or the Baltic cod plan
have been eliminated in recent years without
explanation. Why? This certainly deserves a
reflection.
This author has already argued that the main
difficulty encountered by the effort manage-
ment associated to management plans was that
it applied in parallel to TACs, so that if the
effort prevented Member States to fully exploit
its quotas, then it was perceived as a breach
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
of relative stability (Penas Lado 2016). This is
confirmed in a study by Kraak et al. (2013): the
main problem is that the landing quotas taken
in a mixed fishery did not limit catches because
fishers were incentivized to continue fishing
and discard over-quota catch while quota for
other species was available. The effort limita-
tions intended to reduce this effect were insuf-
ficient to adequately limit fishing mortality in
targeted fisheries, because fishers experienced
them as prohibiting the full uptake of other
quotas.
Is effort a good management
instrument?
In fact, effort is not generally used as the
main management instrument. Catch limita-
tions by species are, by and large, the most
widely used method. Does this mean that effort
management is not a good instrument to man-
age fisheries? The answer is not necessarily
straightforward.
Effort management can theoretically have
certain advantages:
• Effort is very closely correlated with fishing
mortality (Sissenwine et al. 2014), and there
is a growing need to ensure that the manage-
ment system should be more robust to major
sources of uncertainty (Degnbol and McCay
2006).
• In ecological terms, TAC management tends
to have a low correlation with total fishing
effort, and generally fails to mitigate the
effect of fisheries management on non-target
species (Reiss et al. 2010).
• Effort management would eliminate the
problem of choke species under a discard ban,
since the problem of availability of single
quota species would disappear.
However, effort management also implies sig-
nificant disadvantages:
• Effort is difficult to define meaningfully. The
normal descriptors of effort are vessel size
(vessel tonnage and/or engine power) and
time of fishing (fishing days/hours) but these
are static parameters, that do not take into
account other factors which determine the
ability of a vessel to catch fish, such as gear
type and size or the fish-finding equipment.
143
• The consequence of the above is the possi-
bility of an “efficiency rush” that will allow
vessels to increase their real ability to catch
fish while not modifying their nominal effort
descriptors.
• Fishing efficiency is ever growing, ren-
dering effort indicators quickly obsolete,
although some authors have even consid-
ered that such an increase in efficiency can be
well-predicted (Pauly and Palomares 2010).
Any effort parameters should be revised
regularly.
• The fishing effort being limited, this can pro-
duce a tendency by fishermen to concentrate
such effort on the catching of the most valu-
able species, that can in some cases be those
in most need of protection. In other words,
effort limitation may not be sufficient to pro-
tect particularly vulnerable stocks.
The shortcomings of effort can certainly be
worked out. For example, it is possible to refine
the definition of effort by adding to the kw/days
some metrics relating to the size and geometry
of the gear deployed in routine monitoring of
fishing effort (Eigaard et al. 2011).
The Faroese system as an example
Effort management systems have been used in
different parts of the world. Perhaps the best
example of implementation of an effort sys-
tem is that of the Faroe Islands with its mixed
gadoid fishery, established in 1996. Hegland
and Hopkins (2014) have analyzed the Faroese
system, indicating that it has several interesting
advantages, notably:
• It curtails the discard problem in a very sim-
ple way;
• The system enjoys ample support by the fish-
ing industry concerned; and
• The system exhibits great ingenuity in using
targeted effort allocations and extensive use
of closed areas to both balance and steer
catches and cater for the needs of diverse
fleet segments.
However, its promoters are also aware of
the limitations of the system that is consid-
ered as not having achieved its objectives,
notably because it has long been insufficiently
144 Chapter 7
restrictive (Lokkegard et al. 2007) and have set
forth to address them:
• The system does not have a maximum
sustainable yield (MSY)-like objective, and
existing International Council for the Explo-
ration of the Sea (ICES) advice is poorly
adapted to this management system. The
Faroes are now undertaking to give the
system a clearer management objective
(Hegland and Hopkins 2014).
• The issue of “effort creep” must be better
assessed, to ensure a good correspondence
between days at sea and fishing mortality.
• The use of closed areas as a complementary
measure has to be better understood.
The Faroese experience is of particular rel-
evance (like the Icelandic experience) for one
reason: the economy of the Faroe Islands
depends almost entirely from its fishing indus-
try. Getting fisheries management right is abso-
lutely paramount: they just can’t afford to get
it wrong.
In that vein, the problems encountered have
not always been an inevitable consequence of
fishing effort management per se, but rather
of the inability to adapt to scientific recom-
mendations. The initial effort levels were too
high, and it then became politically difficult to
reduce them according to scientific advice. This
is an extremely useful lesson to learn from the
Faroese system.
Finally, the Faroese experience is now under-
going change. Early in 2018 the Faroese Parlia-
ment passed the Act on Management of Marine
Resources, which states that all living marine
resources in Faroese waters are property of the
people of the Faroe Islands, and as such, fishing
licenses may never become private property.1
The evolution of the Faroese policy in the future
is of the highest interest, in that it may indicate
whether one of the most prominent effort man-
agement systems in the world passes the test
of implementation over time, in a country that
simply can’t afford to get fisheries management
wrong.
1 www.faroeislands.fo/the-big-picture/news/the-
faroese-parliament-passes-fisheries-reform/
In general terms, when considering stocks in
isolation, effort management does not necessar-
ily perform better than TACs. However, when
stocks are considered in mixed fisheries, effort
management seems to be appropriate, and
inter-annual flexibility of the system appears
to be the best compromise between short and
long-term objectives, as well as between bio-
logical sustainability and economic return
(Baudron et al. 2010).
The experience of effort
management in the CFP
Actually, the CFP already has an important
experience in the use of effort as a management
instrument, both as a stand-alone instrument
as well as an additional one to TACs and quo-
tas. This implies that discussions on the merits
and shortcomings of this type of instrument
can indeed be based on experience, not just
prejudice.
Effort in management plans: a duplicated
instrument
The most prominent implementation of effort
management in the CFP has been that of the
multi-annual management plans that started
with the cod recovery plan in 2004 (EU 2004),
followed by several others that also incorpo-
rated effort management, such as for example
the southern hake recovery plan (EU 2005). The
incorporation of effort management, in addition
to TAC management in these stocks, followed
recommendations from ICES to the effect that
single-stock TACs in mixed fisheries were not
limiting fishing mortality in the depleted stocks.
However, effort management was eliminated
from these plans several years later, and the
new plans for the Atlantic and Baltic, after the
reform of 2013, do not include effort manage-
ment. It is important to understand why:
• In the old plans, effort management was
an instrument that duplicated, not replaced,
existing management by TACs. This increased
the complexity and workload for both the
industry and administrations.
• Even if effort had replaced TACs, it would
have been very difficult to translate relative
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
stability (expressed in catch quotas) to a new
one based on new effort quotas.
• The duplicity of instruments produced a
vicious circle: if effort levels limited the ability
of Member States to catch their quotas, then
they were not acceptable as a breach of rel-
ative stability. But if they didn’t limit quota
uptake, then they had no added value for
conservation.
Regrettably, the withdrawal of the effort
management systems has been done somewhat
“through the back door” that is, without an
explanation or justification of the reasons why
this was carried out. For example, while the
original Baltic cod recovery plan contained
an effort management scheme (EU 2007a),
the new Baltic plan (EU 2016a) completely
excludes such an instrument without even a
justification. This was already so in the corre-
sponding Commission proposal.
This clearly indicates that effort manage-
ment was eliminated because it was perceived
by Member States, stakeholders, and much
of the Commission services as too complex
and basically useless, even if certain scientific
evaluations did not necessarily underpin this
view (EU 2014). That the instrument was
removed was hardly a surprise. The real sur-
prise is the absolute lack of analysis behind
that decision and the lack of justification. This
reveals to what extent the need to eliminate
the effort schemes was simply taken for granted
politically.
Yet, the scientific literature offers some anal-
ysis of the use of effort management as an
instrument in European fisheries. Fernandes
and Cook (2013) underline the key role of an
overall effort reduction in European fisheries
in the subsequent positive trends toward stock
recovery. The benefits of effort reduction are
also important for the ecosystem. Engelhard
et al. (2015) studied the positive evolution of
the Large Fish Index (LFI) showing that this
indicator of good environmental status has been
on the rise in areas where the fishing effort by
bottom trawlers has been reduced. On this basis,
the authors considered that this provides strong
support that recent European effort reduction
145
schemes are now beginning to result in an
improved ecosystem state as indicated by the
regional-scale improvement in the LFI.
An interesting analysis of the cod recovery
plan was carried out by Kraak et al. (2013).
Although the analysis is limited to the imple-
mentation of the amended cod plan (EU 2008)
as of 2009 and does not refer to the initial cod
recovery plan (EU 2004), it is an interesting
summary of the positive and negative aspects of
the new instrument introduced by the EU. On
the positive side, they indicate that the buy-back
scheme of more fishing days for the adoption
of more selective gear has indeed increased the
use of these more selective fishing methods. On
the negative side, the landing quotas taken in a
mixed fishery did not limit catches because fish-
ers were incentivized to continue fishing and
discard over-quota catch while quotas for other
stocks were available. The effort limitations
intended to reduce this effect were insufficient
to adequately limit fishing mortality in tar-
geted fisheries, although fishers experienced
them as prohibiting the full uptake of other
quotas.
The Scientific, Technical and Economic Com-
mittee for Fisheries (STECF) has regularly
evaluated the results of the different effort
management schemes in the EU (for example,
EU 2014). The evaluation is difficult and often
inconclusive, largely due to the very imperfect
implementation of the effort regime in some
cases. This makes it difficult to assess the con-
tribution of the effort regime to the recovery
of the stocks. In certain cases, one can wonder
whether the effort regime has contributed
little simply because it has not been seriously
implemented. In other cases, there has been
a positive contribution. These results are of
considerable interest but, as stated above, they
have been largely ignored in recent manage-
ment decisions, where the elimination of effort
regimes has been decided without reference to
scientific reports or indeed without any justifi-
cation at all. A debate on this question, based
on scientific evidence, is long overdue.
146 Chapter 7
The experience of the “western waters”
regulation
Indeed, the CFP has experience in the manage-
ment of a stand-alone effort management sys-
tem: the so-called “western waters regulation”
(EU 2003). This regulation is a mix of different
elements related to the accession of Spain to the
EU in 1986, and its main instruments still reflect
the objective of limiting major displacements of
fishing effort among different areas of the west-
ern façade of EU waters. But, interestingly, it has
also provisions for management through effort
of certain fisheries such as crab and scallop fish-
eries not subject to TACs and quotas.
The effort ceilings established in this regula-
tion are not based on stock management objec-
tives; they represent the effort levels exerted in
the past, to ensure such levels are not increased
in the future, regardless of stock status. The sys-
tem acts as an area-based duplication of the
capacity ceilings of the fleet capacity policy and
its objective is (still today!) to prevent signif-
icant changes in the distribution of national
fleets in EU waters as related to the accession of
Spain to the EU in 1986.
The western waters regime was analyzed in
depth by the Commission in 2010 (EU 2010),
and some of the conclusions are very interesting
and worth discussing. Although the scheme is a
fixed one, applicable to large areas without clear
linkage with the management of specific stocks,
the Commission recognized that:
Due to its static nature, the 2003 effort regime can-
not be used for stock management or management
of multi-species fisheries; it was not conceived for
that purpose . . . However, a general effort regime
might have a potential to be linked to biological
parameters and thus to future management con-
siderations, provided that those parameters will be
able to reflect the status of a variety of stocks at the
same time.
This is very interesting. Already in 2010,
the Commission recognized the potential of
this general overall cap to effort as a potential
instrument to complement the single-stock
TAC-based management, although this idea has
never been developed ever since. It is also very
interesting to remember what the Commission
wrote in the above report about the use of effort
management as applied to non-TAC stocks:
The management by fishing effort could represent
an important tool in the scallop and crab fisheries,
as those are not limited by TACs. However, the
parameter currently used for management is not
precise enough, especially for crab fisheries, and
the regime should be able to react to management
initiatives of stakeholders, which is currently not
the case.
Again, the potential for this instrument for
non-TAC species, provided that it can be adap-
tive to management changes and learning pro-
cesses in cooperation with stakeholders, seems
an idea that, yet again, has not been developed
any further. With the regionalization of the
CFP in 2013, the idea of a system to manage
non-quota species through a system “able to
react to initiatives from stakeholders” acquires
an entirely new significance. This will be further
discussed in Chapter 9.
The – failed – Kattegat case
Since learning from failure is important, it is
worth mentioning the initiative by Denmark
and Sweden (joined somewhat reluctantly by
Germany) to establish a new experimental
management system in the Kattegat region,
based on effort limitation and eliminating TACs
and other measures as well as eliminating dis-
carding. This initiative, taken in the mid-2000s,
was an industry-led attempt to find simpler
alternatives to the TAC system, notably inca-
pable of addressing the question of discarding.
The experiment, however, never materialized.
It is important to understand why:
• On the Commission side, the level of effort
proposed was too high to ensure sustain-
ability of the Kattegat cod stock, at the time
subject to a recovery plan. When the Com-
mission, following scientific advice, indicated
what would be the effort levels that would
deliver the recovery of the Kattegat cod
stock, the industry concerned lost interest in
the project.
• On the Council side, the adoption of the
experimental scheme required a legal dero-
gation from certain CFP regulations. A
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
number of Member States in Council, even if
unaffected by the experiment, were not sym-
pathetic to it because they feared a precedent
of a system that would dismantle relative
stability.
• For some Member States, it was politically
difficult to admit that in the Kattegat fish-
ermen would not have to be constrained
by TACs, while their fishermen complained
about low TAC levels. The high priority given
to the level playing field, already referred to
in other sections, played a key role here.
The Kattegat case, if anything, clearly indi-
cates that any experience in developing alter-
native management systems must address the
above questions. First, they should be able to
provide the same level of achievement of the
policy goals, and not be seen (perhaps unfairly)
as a way to get “off the hook” on the sacrifices
necessary to achieve such policy goals. But
most importantly, they should not be seen as
a precedent for anything. It is this obsession
for precedents that stands in the way of devel-
oping innovative, potentially interesting policy
approaches. We will refer to this in the context
of the evolution of governance in Chapter 9.
The Mediterranean case
In the Mediterranean, there was no stock man-
agement policy for many years: up until 2006.
The TAC and quota system did not apply there
since 1983, and the first EU regulation on the
conservation of stocks was that on technical
conservation measures of 1994 (EU 1994),
which basically consolidated existing rules on
mesh sizes at national level, but did not estab-
lish measures for the management of the stocks.
It was only the regulation of 2006 (EU 2006)
that introduced the first system to address the
question of the reduction of fishing mortality
of Mediterranean stocks. And for that purpose,
the instrument chosen was the management
plan based on fishing effort. The reasons were
two:
• That the multi-species nature of most
Mediterranean fisheries did not lend itself
to management by catch limitations by
individual stock;
147
• That the long-standing tradition in this area
was that of regulating days of fishing and/or
times of fishing, and that building on exist-
ing practice was preferable to imposing a new
one.
Subsequently, the management plans imple-
mented on that basis have consisted in the
establishment of effort limitations. The results,
however, seem to have been limited, as we
pointed out in Chapter 5. A report of the STECF
indicated that in the effort management sys-
tems analyzed, there was indeed a reduction
of nominal effort; but this reduction did not
necessarily translate into a reduction of fishing
mortality (Cardinale et al. 2017). This implies
that either (i) the nominal effort measured
does not necessarily represent the real effort
deployed; or (ii) that vessels reacted to the limi-
tation of effort by further developing the ability
of the vessels to catch fish through technical
development or adaptations in fishing practice.
The implementation of these effort plans
is still relatively recent, and their evaluation
incomplete, so it is difficult to draw clear con-
clusions why they do not seem to have achieved
the objective expected. This also underlines the
importance of continued monitoring and eval-
uation of the policies under the CFP: unless we
learn more about the reasons for policy success
and failure, we cannot propose improvements
to the policy. This seems to be the situation we
are in today.
Effort management
and technological creep
Whatever the conditions, one fundamental
difficulty of effort management systems is
technological creep, that is, the increase in the
vessels’ ability to catch fish even if the param-
eters to measure effort (for example, engine
power or gross tonnage per day of fishing) stay
unchanged. Abundant bibliography exists on
this phenomenon. A very good summary is
provided by Marchal et al. (2007) who state,
meaningfully, that:
The results suggest that fishing effort descriptors
that are not traditionally measured (gear type,
148 Chapter 7
ground rope type, length of net used per day,
headline length, crew size, number of winch or
net drums) may have a substantial impact on catch
rates.
These factors increasing catch rates are
extremely difficult to legislate. Or if they are,
then the policy aggravates its tendency to
top–down micromanagement that has been so
often criticized. This leads effort management
systems to a crossroads:
• If these factors are not regulated, then the
total amount of nominal effort must be con-
tinuously reduced, to keep-up with techno-
logical creep.
• If this kind of development is prevented
through legislation then technical progress
is hampered and long-term viability of the
fleets concerned may be compromised.
Besides, preventing such development may
prove extremely difficult to enforce.
Overall, unlike in some fisheries where the
industry itself can guarantee that no technical
creep takes place, the management by effort
seems to require inevitably a regular ratcheting-
down of nominal effort levels, if only to com-
pensate for technological creep.
The potential for a (different) effort
management in the CFP
Overall, the potential for effort management
in the CFP as a stand-alone management sys-
tem has never been fully explored outside the
Mediterranean. However, in political terms,
it is certainly not possible to suggest at this
point in time the use of effort management
in the Atlantic and Baltic Seas, at least as a
duplicate instrument to TACs and quotas. Yet,
the evidence available suggests that under
certain circumstances effort management has
been positive, and that at least justifies that
the debate about its possible use should not be
avoided. It is also important to underline that
the new basic regulation of the CFP (EU 2013)
does include effort management as one of the
options for management.
Effort management as the only management
system (without quotas) could have consider-
able advantages in the new CFP:
• It would solve the problem of choke species
and facilitate the implementation of an ambi-
tious non-discard policy.
• It would be amenable to the implementation
of an ecosystem-based management through
shifting emphasis from individual stock yield
to ecosystem yield.
• It would provide for ample flexibility in
implementation through stakeholder initia-
tive.
• With modern technologies, a simple effort
system would be much easier to enforce
than the catch limitations and the landing
obligation as laid down today in the CFP.
As we have seen above, however, the main
difficulty in taking this route would be that a
new effort system should not duplicate the TACs
and quotas, but rather replace them, and would
require a new allocation of effort quotas. Many
Member States and stakeholders could see this
as a breach of relative stability. The key to allow-
ing for effort management may be in translating
the current allocation keys expressed in catch
quotas to new ones based on effort, but which
would be considered equivalent by all Member
States.
This would be a complex exercise, but per-
haps it may be tested on a few, clean and
non-contentious fisheries. As we will see in
Chapter 9, the instruments of the CFP should
not necessarily be “all or nothing,” blindly
applicable to all circumstances. In some cases,
what is not possible elsewhere could actually be
applied, starting on an experimental basis, with
specific fisheries, and fleet segments of various
Member States, when and where there is an
opportunity to develop new, more efficient
approaches to fisheries management.
This is yet another example where possible
policy improvement could be tested in a limited
scenario, among willing partners, allowing the
CFP to learn from the experience without pre-
judging future extension to other fisheries.
Translating relative stability to effort?
Shepherd (2003) had already proposed a system
to overcome the main problem of effort man-
agement (beyond the question of duplication
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
of instruments). This author considered that
the problem could be resolved by requiring
that all changes of effort (whether up or down)
should apply pro rata to all those affected, so
all entitlements to fish with a particular gear in
a particular area could and should be adjusted
up or down by the same proportion. This kills
two birds with one stone, because it imple-
ments the principle of relative stability, and at
the same time avoids the need to decide on
the equivalence between different vessels and
gears (i.e. to solve the long-standing problem
of determining fishing power).
Yet again, a test in a limited scenario could be
the way to go to test the potential interest of this
approach. In addition, possible new approaches
on the definition of relative stability (see
Chapter 14) could facilitate this.
An intermediate approach: effort
management and the ecosystem approach
A possible intermediate use of effort manage-
ment could be to be a complementary measure
in terms of capping the overall effort in a
given ecosystem. This would correspond to
the ecosystem approach by submitting all the
TACs and quotas to an overall ecological cap,
understood as a general limitation on the level
of interference with the marine ecosystem.
This idea could make sense in relation with
any policy of introducing flexibility among the
individual objectives for individual stock man-
agement (see Chapter 4) as a compensation for
allowing exploitation of certain stocks above
their individual MSY level. This ecological cap
would be an extra guarantee that going slightly
beyond ideal exploitation levels for certain
individual stocks would be done only under a
general cap on the overall exploitation of the
ecosystem.
As we saw in the case of Alaska (see
Chapter 4) this kind of cap can be established in
terms of overall catches. But nothing prevents
its application also as an overall effort cap to
ensure that whatever flexibility is established
in terms of different stocks, the overall fishing
pressure exerted on the ecosystem would not
go beyond a certain, precautionary threshold.
149
Technical conservation measures
The term technical conservation measures
(TCM) have always referred to a variety of
measures that determine the selectivity of the
fishing operations. This includes mesh sizes,
minimum landing sizes (MLS), closed areas, the
protection of endangered species and so on, but
they do not include any measures to limit the
amount of fishing.
The objectives of TCM
Technical measures have traditionally been
stand-alone measures, in that they applied
without a clear-cut objective (beyond a generic
increase in selectivity) and generally discon-
nected from the other conservation instru-
ments, in particular TACs and quotas. Even
under the new policy the contribution of tech-
nical measures to achieving the MSY objective
and to facilitate the landing obligation remains
unspecified.
This is somehow in contrast with the evidence
of the effects of age-selectivity on long-term
yields: it has been shown how relatively subtle
changes in selectivity can produce substantial
differences in MSY and Fmsy (Scott and Samp-
son 2011). And, as we saw in Chapter 5, the
very low selectivity of Mediterranean fisheries
makes it extremely difficult to achieve MSY
levels in these fisheries (EU 2016b). Despite
that, management instruments in the CFP still
focus exclusively on reaching Fmsy levels (esti-
mated as corresponding to current, not ideal
age-selectivity) while quantitative objectives
in terms of increased selectivity are fiercely
resisted, as demonstrated by the opposition
by Member States to the establishment of a
quantified target, in the context of the latest
proposal to revamp the technical measures of
1998 (EU 2016c).
Technical conservation measures have been
an associated, though secondary tool for fish-
eries management in the Atlantic and Baltic,
while for the Mediterranean they have long
been the main tool for fisheries management.
In any case, they cannot be seen as the only tool
for management, for at least two good reasons:
150 Chapter 7
• Technical conservation measures are not
stock-specific, but fishery-specific, so they
cannot address conservation problems of
specific stocks.
• They tend to be stable, and are generally not
responsive to changes in stock status.
Is increasing selectivity always required?
Perhaps the lack of specific objectives of the
traditional TCM policy is also related to the
fact that, in some circumstances, the need to
increase selectivity is not necessary or even pos-
itive. While the need to reduce catches of small
fish is generally accepted as an axiom (high
size-selectivity maximizes yield per recruit)
there may be cases where low selectivity can be
compatible with sustainable, profitable fisheries
if and when (i) smaller fish are more easily
accessible; and (ii) small fish may fetch higher
market prices.
These circumstances are not frequent, but
they do exist, thus perhaps justifying that cer-
tain fisheries may not seek to establish technical
measures that maximize size selectivity. It is a
question of trade-offs: a lower yield per recruit
may be compensated by more profitable fishing
(at a lower level of fishing mortality). Such
an approach could be acceptable under certain
circumstances. A case in hand is that of the sea-
sonal European fishery for Northern albacore,
regulated by the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
This fishery exploits the young albacore fish
that migrate northwards in the Atlantic during
the summer months, and become available to
mid-sized vessels from the continent which
can’t access this resource during the rest of the
year. Although it is a fishery for the young fish,
it has long been remarkably healthy,2 due to
the low overall level of exploitation.
In terms of market prices, species such as
sardine and horse mackerel are well-known
to have price structures that do not neces-
sarily favor large individuals. This indicates
that exploitation patterns based on juvenile
2 www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e/
2017-04-e.pdf/
fish may have a lower yield per recruit, but a
higher economic interest. Increasing selectivity
in these cases, provided the overall exploitation
remains sustainable, is questionable.
The difficulty in increasing selectivity
Technical measures can be extremely con-
tentious, because they have direct effects on
the vessels’ operation and profitability: unlike
quota management, where adequate allocation
and fleet adjustment can ensure fair quota lev-
els for the operators remaining in the fishery,
the implementation of certain technical mea-
sures can have very direct effects on individual
vessels’ catch rates, thus directly affecting
income. As Suuronen and Sardà (2007) put it:
The successful use of technical measures appears
to depend largely on their acceptance by industry.
Measures that increase costs or reduce earnings
are unattractive, so if short-term effects are not
accounted for, the potential long-term gains may
never materialize.
In this regard, it is worth comparing the
evolution of the two main pillars of the con-
servation policy in the last 20 years: while TAC
levels have changed quite dramatically during
this period for a number of stocks, the tech-
nical measures (particularly the mesh sizes)
have very seldom changed. As these pages
are written, the current rules are still those of
Regulation 850/98 (EU 1998) despite several
proposals to upgrade them. The reasons have
been explained as the result of the different
ways that the industry can adapt to changes
in these rules: lower TACs can be absorbed
by reducing fleets or finding alternative catch
opportunities, so individual catches per vessel
can be assured in many cases. In contrast, larger
mesh size will inevitably result in lower catch
rates (in the short term at least) by individual
vessels, even in the event of fleet reduction
(Penas Lado 2016).
The current positive trend in stock status (at
least in the Atlantic and Baltic) has taken place
mainly as a result of a reduction in fishing mor-
tality, but not as a consequence of a substantial
increase in selectivity, since technical measures
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
have remained almost unchanged since the turn
of the century. This is extraordinary: the mesh
sizes are probably the most long-lasting mea-
sures in the CFP. This illustrates the extreme dif-
ficulty in modifying them: because they have a
direct effect on catch rates of individual vessels.
In addition, the most important cases of
over-regulation in the CFP (as well as in other
fishery policies around the world) have gen-
erally been related to technical measures. For
these reasons, the new Commission proposal
for a new approach on technical measures (EU
2016c), proposes a substantially new way of
regulating these measures, based on regional-
ization and result-based approaches. However,
the reception of such a proposal by Member
States and the industry left no doubt: neither
wanted to establish any specific target for the
improvement of selectivity. This demonstrates
the above point: reducing fishing activity can
be acceptable in the end; it has been done since
2000, but reducing catch rates of individual
vessels remains by and large almost impossible
to accept.
Technical measures in the new CFP
In the new CFP after 2013, technical conserva-
tion measures acquired a special relevance for
several reasons. But one stands out: the philos-
ophy of the landing obligation proposed by the
Commission and adopted by the co-legislators
was that the policy objective obligation and its
flexibility mechanisms would actually apply
to the “remaining” problem of discarding that
would result from a major shift in the way
European fishermen fish, with much enhanced
selectivity. In this light, the landing obligation
was presented as the last component of a strat-
egy whose main aim would be to “change the
way we fish” in Europe. This change of fishing
practice toward much higher selectivity would
be achieved through a variety of instruments,
but these would be developed around a new
approach on technical conservation measures.
It is important to underline that the above
interpretation is clearly spelled out in the new
basic regulation which, in its recital 8, refers to
the “increase in the selectivity of the gears used”
151
as the primary instrument to resolve the prob-
lem of choke species (EU 2013).
In the Mediterranean, technical conservation
measures have a particular relevance: as we saw
in Chapter 4, the improvement of exploitation
patterns through increased selectivity is a fun-
damental element to achieve the objective of
MSY by 2020 (Collocca et al. 2013).
Furthermore, the growing importance of en-
vironmental concerns, and the need to progress
toward more ecosystem-based approaches,
underlines the contribution of technical mea-
sures to the CFP, notably if we consider that the
improvement in selectivity is an important fac-
tor to reach management objectives under an
ecosystem approach to fisheries management
(Fauconnet and Rochet 2016).
In the new CFP, the improvement of selec-
tivity is understood as a contribution to better
yields. In fact, MSY is also a function of selec-
tivity, which implies that a better exploitation
pattern could increase sustainable yields by
maximizing the yield per recruit of the stocks
concerned.
Things, however, can be more complex.
While an excess of catches of small fish may
be negative from the point of view of the yield
per recruit of the stock, and while large fish
generally fetches higher prices than small ones
(Zimmermann and Heino 2013) there can
be some exceptions, particularly in Southern
Europe where there is a tradition of eating small
fish. There may be occasions where stocks can
be well-exploited, sustainably and profitably, at
less than ideal exploitation patterns.
There are stocks where mid-sized fish have a
better market value than large fish, as we saw
above. As another example, the increase of large
cod in the Barents Sea fishery has not necessar-
ily been welcomed by all: very large fish don’t
fit into the filleting machines and thus have a
lower value!
In ecological terms, it has also been argued
that harvesting smaller fish, which have higher
productivity, allows a greater stable biomass
than harvesting larger fish, which have lower
productivity (Law et al. 2012).
152 Chapter 7
These questions indicate that the increase in
selectivity of fisheries is not always necessar-
ily a straight line leading to better yields, or
to higher profitability. In addition to specific
difficult issues such as the pulse trawl case,
the questions discussed above may lead to the
considerable difficulties in adopting the new
proposal on technical measures (EU 2016c),
still currently being discussed as these pages are
written. This is unfortunate, since the new pro-
posal represents a breach with the old tradition
of centralized, top–down technical measures.
It proposes regionalized, results-based man-
agement where the stakeholder bodies would
play a fundamental role in identifying specific
solutions to improve selectivity, which would
be adapted to different fisheries and different
areas.
Mesh sizes
Mesh sizes have always been the main instru-
ment to ensure selective fishing in the CFP
and, with whatever future scenario, they
will continue to be an important instrument.
However, the implementation of the landing
obligation brings the EU policy on mesh sizes
to a new dimension: that of improving selec-
tivity and reducing unwanted by-catch (in
particular undersized fish) so as to facilitate the
implementation of the landing obligation.
Indeed, as we have seen already, the message
of the Commission in relation to this measure
is that the landing obligation would apply to
the remaining undesired catches once all efforts
have been made to avoid catching them in the
first place, notably through improvements in
selectivity. The question is then, how much can
a new policy on mesh sizes reduce unwanted
catches so as to facilitate the implementation of
the new policy objective?
The contribution of larger mesh sizes in this
regard is well-documented (EU 2018). Techni-
cally speaking, there is relatively little problem
in increasing size selectivity through larger sizes.
The problem is economical instead.
More selective fishing simply reduces catches
of species that are more streamlined and are
not retained in the cod-end with larger meshes.
Some of these species are economically crucial
for the economic survival of certain sectors.
In this context, compulsory increases in mesh
sizes may be economically unacceptable for
certain fleets and may only result, at best, in
formal compliance with the new rules but with
new methods (gear riggings, net materials, etc.)
that nullify the effect of the larger mesh.
This opens up the possibility of a different
approach: one that would make such mesh size
increases more voluntary and dependent upon
the provision of incentives that would alleviate
any economic downside associated with the
loss of certain catches. As illustrated by O’Neill
et al. (2014) such incentives can allow the
adoption of more selective ways to fish if the
incentives are such that can ensure that there
is no short-term loss of daily income.
Such an alternative approach to technical
measures would not be easy to apply to the
whole of the CFP, since their very nature is
rather optional, not compulsory, and the CFP
even under regionalization is still dependent
upon hard law approaches. In addition, O’Neill
et al. (2014) also found that the incentives
may be very different for different fleet seg-
ments, which underscores that one-size-fits-all
approaches generally favored in legislation may
not work.
Experiences like the conservation credits
scheme have been possible in a relatively
reduced microcosm, e.g. the Scottish demersal
industry. Taking such an approach on a broader
scale would require fundamental changes in
the governance of the CFP that we will discuss
in Chapter 9, but it would also imply a serious
discussion about incentives. These should, if
possible, not be based on public money, but on
advantages in terms of quota availability and so
on, that could largely be done at national level,
not just at EU level.
Closed areas/seasons
Closed areas/seasons have many objectives:
protecting aggregations of immature fish,
protecting aggregations of spawning fish, pro-
tecting benthic communities of high diversity
(Natura 2000) and even protecting the forage
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
fish for a population of marine birds. In some
cases the objective of the oldest closures has
been blurred over time: of the ca. 40 closed
areas/seasons contained in Regulation 850/98,
many do not have an objective today, so sci-
entists have been largely unable to evaluate
their effectiveness (EU 2007b). Specially, the
relationship between these areas and the other
elements of the policy (notably long-term
plans) remains largely untrodden territory.
There are examples of how closed areas can
combine with other measures such as effort
management to achieve objectives. The case of
the Faroe Islands mentioned above, and that
of the New England groundfish fishery until
relatively recent times are good examples.
Closed areas and objectives
Apart from the closed areas under Natura 2000
to protect areas of high biodiversity, the CFP
has established a number of closed areas with
various objectives, but primarily with those
of protecting well-known and relatively stable
aggregations of juvenile fish (for example, the
plaice box in the North Sea, or the hake boxes
in NW Spain). However, in a number of cases,
certain closed areas do not seem to have a clear
objective. Some intended to protect spawning
cod (in the Celtic Sea) only lasted a few years
since they were demonstrably useless in reduc-
ing total effort. For others, adopted already at
the inception of the policy in the early 1980s,
the objectives were never clearly spelled out.
In any case, these closed areas have, at best,
a stand-alone objective: to improve selectivity.
However, in no case are they directly related to
other measures (such as catch limitations) with
a clear indication of the expected contribution
of the closed area to achieve overall objectives.
For the future the closed areas/seasons should
be much better combined with the other mea-
sures as an integral set of rules to deliver
the MSY objectives. The potential of closed
areas/seasons to complement the measures to
reduce fishing mortality toward Fmsy must be
explored further, in particular in connection
with multispecies fisheries. We would need to
evaluate better how closed areas (that displace
153
but do not reduce the fishing pressure) can
contribute to the overall policy objective. This
would be the key to their wider contribu-
tion: our ability to forecast and measure their
contribution to the overall fishing mortality.
An important potential use of closed areas/
seasons is to complement the multispecies
approaches proposed in Chapter 4 for mixed
fisheries. If and when that type of management
can imply a high level of risk for some of the
stock in the mix, the use of closed area/seasons
could be a way to ensure that the overall level
of effort is adapted to the multispecies objec-
tives while bringing special protection for the
stocks in need. Naturally, this is only possible
in certain cases, where the geographical distri-
bution of the species concerned is well-known
and stable.
Closed areas as mainstream fisheries
management instruments?
Much has been discussed about the use of
different types of closed areas/seasons as a
mainstream fishery management tool. In gen-
eral terms, closed areas/seasons can be useful,
but they are certainly no panacea. They can be
most useful when dealing with the manage-
ment of mixed fisheries on sedentary species,
but are much more limited when dealing with
pelagic species that move within large areas.
In any case, these areas need to be examined
on a case-by-case basis, and must have clear
objectives and be monitored, so as to be able
to evaluate their effects against such objectives
(Hilborn et al. 2004).
One particular question that is essential to
determine the usefulness of this type of mea-
sure for fisheries management is what can be
their effect on the total fishing effort exerted on
the stocks under consideration. If closed areas
only mean displacing the fishing effort outside
the areas concerned without overall reduction
of effort, their influence on management will be
small, even counter-productive in some cases.
Lauck et al. (1998) suggested that marine
reserves should be at least 20% of avail-
able habitat to be effective. This may be variable
depending upon the objective sought, but the
154 Chapter 7
experience in European waters clearly shows
that, unless the areas protected are very exten-
sive, they will have a very low impact. In
particular they will simply displace effort from
one place to another, with less than obvious
benefits.
Overall, the potential of closed areas as a
mainstream management instrument is rather
limited. It can be useful for certain small com-
munities where the “refuge effect” can spill
over to the surrounding areas, and where the
overall balance between the limitation of activ-
ity and the increase in yields in surrounding
areas is positive. However, this is not necessar-
ily always the case, particularly for large areas
and, especially, for moving resources. Closed
areas can serve complementary purposes such
as protecting biodiversity or even well-known
aggregations of juvenile or even spawning fish.
But such measures, alone, are not sufficient to
manage fisheries because this always requires
some kind of limitation on the overall outtake
of the species in question, across all its natural
area of distribution.
Real-time closures
In the EU, the idea of real-time closures has
been subject to many discussions; it has always
been considered a very promising instrument,
if only it could apply under the rules of the
CFP. Progress has been limited because the
nature of decision-making necessary to make
this instrument work is incompatible with EU
decision-making. An interesting study commis-
sioned by the European Parliament has looked
into this question (Anon 2010).
In particular, the study analyzes the most
developed system of real-time closures devel-
oped under the CFP: the Scottish “Conservation
credits” scheme, whereby closures of 56 square
miles (7.5 × 7.5 nautical miles) are established
normally for 21 days whenever high aggrega-
tions of small cod are documented. The report
finds it difficult to evaluate the net benefits
of this scheme because the system displaces
fishing effort but does not reduce it. The main
advantage of the system cited is the significant
buy-in by the industry.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the US experience
shows that this type of dynamic measure is
much more effective than static closures in
terms of avoiding by-catch or choke species
(Dunn et al. 2016). What can we learn from the
US system and to what extent is this experience
applicable in the CFP?
From the US experience, real-time closures
require the following elements:
• A clear, reliable source of the immedi-
ate information on the basis of which the
closures can be implemented.
• A non-legislative nature, since the law can
simply not keep up the pace of real time clo-
sures.
• The trust among the operators that all are fol-
lowing the same rules.
Real-time spatial management approaches
can create incentives for fishers to develop, use
and share information and technology to avoid
undesired catch. Compared to Europe, the US
has developed spatial management tools with
more truly real-time mechanisms and with
greater involvement of the fishing industry in
designing and operating the tools (Little et al.
2015).
The CFP has a legal basis to conduct real-time
closures – it is placed in the control regulation:
Articles 51–54 of Regulation 1224/2009 (EU
2009). However, these provisions have never
been used. Apart from the obvious fact that
the provisions are in the wrong regulation
(something that matters more than it seems in
principle, as the control regulation is normally
known and handled by officials different from
those responsible for management) there are
clear reasons why this happens: the problem
is not the legal basis. This is necessary but not
sufficient. The implementation of real-time
closures requires the three above conditions,
and these have one fundamental requirement
in common: trust. And trust is something that
traditionally has been in very short supply in
the CFP.
This is an important lesson to learn: the CFP
has a certain tendency to believe that the way
to do something is legislating on it, but the
legislation itself, necessary though it may be,
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
does not in itself provide the other elements
necessary for that legal basis to be applied in
the real world: incentives, trust, interest. It is in
this area that the Commission should work if
real-time closures are to become the promising
instrument that it has demonstrated to be in
other countries.
From the recent experience, perhaps the
only body that could create such a trust are
the Advisory Councils. If the industry and
other stakeholders could work out a system to
establish real-time closures that all would trust,
certainly the CFP could examine the formula to
give some legal backing to this type of measure.
It is important to address this question because
the CFP desperately needs to find ways of incor-
porating this type of bottom–up management,
which has proven so useful in other places, as
part of the acquis of the CFP.
Perhaps the only way forward may be to
include in the legal basis of the EU an empow-
erment for fishermen organizations to manage
these closures, with a contribution from the EU
in terms of facilitating the logistic aspects neces-
sary to ensure a quick and complete flow of the
information necessary to run it. As indicated
above, however, the main difficulty for this
would be the tendency to rely on “hard law” to
ensure a level playing field. As in other similar
circumstances, it may be useful to think about
a pilot project, where a relatively limited and
well-selected fishery would test a system of real
time closures, applicable only to them, and then
their catch composition could be compared to
that of a similar fleet. This would allow testing
of how this measure could bring about a change
in the size composition of catches of the main
target species. As we saw in Chapter 3, this kind
of system works well in the fishery for Alaskan
Pollock in the NE Pacific, based only on private
arrangements within the industry without
intervention of the Federal Government. Can
this ever be done in the EU?
Can skippers do the job? The use
of individual incentives
The idea of real-time incentives whereby indi-
vidual fishers would be allocated fishing-impact
155
credits to spend according to spatiotemporally
varying tariffs was explored though simulation.
According to this concept, fishing mortality
rates of multiple species and impacts on the
ecosystem are regulated through a “single cur-
rency.” This currency could be spent in using
their fishing-impact credits in limiting fishing
in sensitive areas, or fishing longer in less sen-
sitive areas. The authors found very promising
possibilities and suggested that the system be
tested (Kraak et al. 2014). This method, in the
authors’ view, would outperform traditional
management of mixed fisheries, and would be
better than broad-brush effort management
(Kraak et al. 2015).
These ideas could work well in the CFP, but
given that the allocation of national quotas to
individual operators is a competence of Member
States, it is they who can take the initiative.
Minimum conservation reference
sizes
MLS have been one of the most traditional
measures of the CFP since 1983. Arguably, they
are also one of the most easily understood but
one of the least enforced in certain EU areas. In
the context of the modified CFP, the traditional
minimum landing sizes were changed into min-
imum conservation reference sizes (MCRSs), to
express the fundamental change introduced in
the legislation on the landing obligation: small
individuals smaller than the MCRS should
no longer be discarded but must be landed
and sold for purposes other than human con-
sumption. This change was introduced in the
so-called “omnibus regulation” (EU 2015)
which intended to prevent legal contradictions
between the new basic regulation including the
landing obligation (Regulation 1380/2013) and
the existing technical measures regulations,
notably Regulations 850/98 and 1967/2006.
How important are minimum sizes
for management?
This question is less straightforward than it
seems in principle. True, in extreme cases,
the very high impact on juveniles constitutes
a major barrier to good management. The
156 Chapter 7
Mediterranean illustrates the absolute need to
improve the exploitation pattern to allow for
sustainable management (Collocca et al. 2013),
as we saw in Chapter 4. However, in other
cases the question is not so clear. As mentioned
above, the fishery for northern albacore (Germo
alalunga) by European fleets is fundamentally a
seasonal fishery for juvenile (ages 1 and 2) fish.
Yet, the stock is remarkably stable.3
Minimum sizes are important where the
exploitation pattern is key for conservation (as
in the Mediterranean), but in fisheries with
a low level of overall effort, the exploitation
pattern can be secondary and so can be the
measures to limit the capture of small fish.
On the other hand, minimum sizes have a
very attractive side: they are very intuitive:
everyone tends to agree that catching small
fish is bad, and that makes their protection an
objective that is socially acceptable and widely
understood. It is also a kind of measure that can
be straightforward to implement. Despite these
advantages, however, it would be a mistake
to believe that their implementation has been
a success: when and where the selectivity of
the fishing gear is very low and when and
where there is a good market for the small
fish, minimum sizes have not always been
well-implemented.
Overall, minimum sizes are important in
certain fisheries where the exploitation pattern
is bad and overall effort is high, and they are
measures that enjoy ample support in public
opinion. Changing such policy may make sense
in the context of the landing obligation (see
Chapter 6) but it would be counter-intuitive to
pursue an ambitious conservation policy and
in that context, question the use of minimum
sizes or relaxing their implementation.
However, changes in minimum sizes would
be very different for fishermen than changes in
mesh sizes: while the latter will affect catch rates
and thus fishermen’s incomes, certain changes
in minimum sizes could actually remove some
of the difficulties to be encountered with the
unavoidable retention on board of fish of
3 www.iccat.int/Documents/Recs/COMPENDIUM_
ACTIVE_ENG.pdf/
small size, notably by “legalizing” certain sizes
hitherto illegal, and thus could contribute to a
smoother implementation of the non-discard
policy.
Minimum sizes and regionalization
Minimum sizes have always been different for
different regions within the CFP. Most typically,
Mediterranean minimum sizes have been sig-
nificantly lower than those of the Atlantic for
the same species, on account of two factors:
(i) the lower growth rate and earlier sexual
maturity of certain species in this basin com-
pared with the same species in the Atlantic;
and (ii) the use of much smaller mesh sizes
in the Mediterranean and thus the need to
establish a certain proportionality between the
gear used and the acceptable sizes of the fish
caught by them.
It has been argued that the different min-
imum sizes in different European regions
make enforcement more difficult, including the
application of these sizes to imported fish. The
regionalization of the CFP is likely to produce
an even bigger dispersion of minimum sizes
in different European regions, thus rendering
control more difficult and, meaningfully, mak-
ing the policy more difficult to understand for
the European consumer. Is this dispersion of
minimum sizes a good development?
It is possible to have a policy with different
minimum sizes from different areas, and this
is already the case in particular between the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean. However, if
this dispersion of sizes is to be controllable,
there has to be very strict rules on traceability,
which in turn imply considerable administrative
burden and policy complexity.
In any case, the example of the US shows an
extremely diversified set of measures on fish
size, including notably the sizes applicable to
recreational fishing. This shows that this can
be done, although the difficulties to enforce
such regulations are a good demonstration that
the CFP should be careful not to disperse its
regulations, to the point of making them too
complex, difficult to understand and even more
so to enforce.
 Beyond single-stock TACs: the other instruments of the CFP
Technical measures and the landing
obligation
As we saw in Chapters 4 and 6, there is a
need to dissociate associated species in mixed
fisheries, and technical measures can play a
role here. Technical measures are not the only
way to mitigate by-catches, and evidence of
existing by-catch avoidance schemes shows
that generally the best solution is a combina-
tion of different measures identified through
collaborative approaches among the industry,
scientists, and managers (O’Keefe et al. 2014).
It was also clear that top–down fixed measures
were much less effective than flexible, real-time
measures with the cooperation of the industry
(O’Neill et al. 2014).
There is no doubt that improving selec-
tivity (including through mesh sizes) should
be an important contributor to facilitate the
implementation of the discard ban. A different
thing is whether the traditional approach of
top-down compulsory increases in mesh sizes
is the right one, as discussed previously.
Minimum sizes and the landing obligation
It can certainly be argued that the minimum fish
sizes represent an extra difficulty in implement-
ing the discard ban: the stricter the minimum
sizes, the more difficult to eliminate them from
the catch, and thus the more difficult it becomes
to have a really discard-free fishery. From that
perspective, it can be argued that relaxing the
policy on minimum sizes (at least for secondary
species) can indeed facilitate the implementa-
tion of the discard policy by making it easier to
conduct certain fisheries with fewer demands
on the landing of undersized fish.
The discussion leading up to the adoption of
Regulation 1380/2013 focused quite a lot on the
question of the policy to follow in relation to
undersized fish and the landing obligation. In
particular, once a certain amount of undersized
fish is inevitably caught, what would be the best
course of action? Throw them back to the sea
(and thus exclude them from the discard ban)?
Or keep them on board and sell them, but then
under what conditions?
157
This was technically and politically difficult
and is still today subject to controversy:
• Some proposed that the small fish inevitably
caught should be allowed to be sold in the
markets.
• Other (Mediterranean) countries thought
that undersized fish should be outside the
discard ban and should be thrown back to
the sea as before.
• Others wanted undersized fish to be given to
charity, with no benefit for the fishermen.
Finally, the idea adopted was to give fisher-
men a partial incentive to land the undersized
fish unintentionally caught. If there was no
economic benefit at all, it was feared that
fishermen would have no incentive to respect
the landing obligation. If, on the contrary,
the undersized fish could be sold for their full
value, it was feared that this could contribute
to develop a targeted fishery for the undersized
fish (which in certain European regions, can
indeed fetch high prices). The solution of allow-
ing the marketing of the undersized fish only
for uses outside direct human consumption was
a compromise to provide some economic incen-
tive, but not full economic incentive to land
these fish for the human consumption market.
Whether this is a good solution, only practi-
cal implementation will tell, and as suggested in
many areas, it would be good for the policy if the
lessons learned from this implementation could
be used to modify the policy and improve it if
necessary, rather than maintaining it regardless
of its results.
Beyond this, the question can also be asked
as to the need for a policy on. This policy
aggravates the consequences of the discard
ban (undersized fish cannot be sold for human
consumption) and complicates control and
traceability. Traditional wisdom makes it clear
that exploiting small fish reduces yield-per-
recruit. However, this does not mean that a
fishery exploiting small fish cannot be sustain-
able. In certain cases, the small fish can fetch
very good prices. The question is then: is it
conceivable and even desirable to have at least
certain fisheries without limiting catches of fish
under minimum size?
158 Chapter 7
Eliminating minimum sizes could be possible
only in the case of resources where the manage-
ment would ensure high, stable yields. Again,
testing this kind of approach in a specific case
could be interesting to evaluate its potential.
Once more, we come back to the question of
the need to allow for testing of new approaches
in limited, specific cases, as one of the ways
in which the CFP can learn better from the
experience and improve its results. Such test-
ing should be very well-explained; as we saw
above, minimum sizes enjoy ample support in
society at large, and their partial elimination
for the above purposes may well be difficult to
understand.
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CHAPTER 8
Fisheries and the environment
The CFP and environmental
policy
Introduction
The Treaty requires (Article 11, Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union [TFEU])
that environmental conservation be integrated
in all Community policies, but this integra-
tion should pursue, notably, the promotion of
sustainable development. This means that the
incumbent legislation should not be construed
as an obstacle to prevent the full exploitation of
sustainable resources, but rather to ensure that
such exploitation is environmentally sustain-
able. This is important, because it implies that
a policy that prevents sustainable development
on account of (over)protection of the marine
ecosystem is arguably not compatible with the
Treaty.
There has always been an overlap between
fisheries and environmental policy, and the
overlap is growing, creating frequent conflict.
The overlap is multi-faceted:
• Many questions in the management of
marine resources are overlapping between
fisheries management and the protection of
the environment. The protection of marine
mammals in fisheries, or the protection of
endangered shark species are good examples.
• Many environmental regulations have a very
important bearing on fisheries management.
Examples such as the Habitats Directive (EU
1992a) and the “Natura 2000 network”, or
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
the more recent Marine Strategy Framework
Directive (EU 2008a) illustrate this overlap.
• In general terms, the failures of the fisheries
management may turn what were initially
fisheries management issues into environ-
mental ones. This has happened a number
of times; a good example being the EU
ban on driftnets; initiated as a gear conflict
but resolved as a question of protection of
cetaceans (Penas Lado 2016).
• The implementation of the ecosystem
approach to fisheries management blurs the
boundaries between fisheries management
and environmental policy, by developing
more integrated management frameworks.
• Last but not least, the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) that used to intervene
in environmental questions, over the last
few years have increased their interest and
influence on mainstream fisheries manage-
ment issues and have become mainstream
stakeholders in the fisheries decision-making
process.
For these, and possibly other reasons, it is
impossible today to talk about fisheries man-
agement without referring to a wide range of
issues one way or another related to environ-
mental policy. By and large, environmental
policy is the single most important policy inter-
acting with fisheries policy. In the context of the
European Commission’s inter-service consul-
tations that precede the adoption of a proposal
under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the
161
162 Chapter 8
consultation with the services responsible for
environment policy is almost invariably the
most substantial and difficult.
It is important to underline that between
fisheries and environmental policy there is no
legal hierarchy. This means that none of the two
policies must prevail over the other. Instead,
they should be implemented in a way that
makes them as compatible as possible. This rep-
resents the main challenge: finding the balance
point where both policies are made compatible.
This is the case, in particular, as regards the
implementation of the marine strategy frame-
work directive and the CFP. But the challenges
are much wider, and go much beyond specific
EU legislative frameworks. The protection of
marine biodiversity from the effects of fishing,
the discrepancies between the two policies
when addressing a number of conservation
issues, and ultimately the development of the
ecosystem approach, a concept everyone agrees
with, but which has countless different inter-
pretations, are fundamental challenges for the
future CFP.
Incorporating environmental
concerns into the CFP
Some background: the 2008 communication
In 2008, the Commission published a commu-
nication (EU 2008b) laying down a strategy
to incorporate environmental concerns into
the CFP, as required by Article 11 TFEU. This
communication has resulted in a number of ini-
tiatives, at different degrees of implementation,
and in particular the reduction of the overall
fishing pressure and the measures to pre-
vent incidental catches of non-target species.
These measures have become mainstream
components of the CFP.
It has been argued by the Commission
itself that if the management of individual
stocks is done properly, then the ecosystem
approach would to some extent be achieved:
well-managed fisheries would minimize the
impact on ecosystems and by-catch species.
However, single stock management does
not consider impacts on no-target species,
trophic interactions among species and habitat-
destroying fishing practices. From that point of
view, the ecosystem approach would funda-
mentally consist of keeping fishing mortality
rates low enough to prevent ecosystem-wide
overfishing, reducing or eliminating by-catch
and avoiding habitat-destroying fishing meth-
ods (Hilborn 2011). That is indeed the main
thrust of the approaches proposed by the
Commission in its communication of 2008.
The CFP has, over the years, incorporated a
substantial amount of environmental concerns.
Probably many more than the CFP is given
credit for. A non-exhaustive list includes:
• The overall reduction in fishing pressure has
been ongoing since the turn of the century
and continues taking place in the Atlantic and
Baltic. However, it has still not been achieved
in the Mediterranean (EU 2017).
• Incorporation in the regulations of technical
measures of fishery closures or limitations to
protect Natura 2000 marine areas. All Natura
2000 areas proposed in the marine space
have been subject to protection from all or at
least certain types of fishing under the CFP.
In addition, a “fast track” procedure to adopt
fisheries measures for Natura 2000 areas has
been incorporated into the new CFP (Article
11 of Regulation 1380/2013).
• Limitation of fisheries in certain areas to pro-
tect fish that constitute the main food source
for endangered seabirds: the sandeel closure
in the North Sea (EU 1998).
• Legislation to reduce the incidental mortal-
ity of cetaceans in gillnets through the use of
pingers (EU 2004).
• The inclusion of a growing list of protected
species whose catch is completely forbidden.
Following the example of the iconic basking
shark, today the annual fishing opportunities
regulation (EU 2018) includes as many as 36
protected species.
• Action plans for the protection of sharks (EU
2009a) and seabirds (EU 2012) in EU fish-
eries.
• The practice of discarding has been banned
in Regulation 1380/2013 (EU 2013a) to enter
fully into force in 2019.

These are but examples of how the process of
incorporation of environmental concerns actu-
ally started long ago in the policy and continues
taking place today.
Overlapping legislation
Out of the many overlaps between the two
polices, two pieces of environmental legislation
appear as particularly relevant for the CFP in
terms of the number and importance of the
overlaps: the Natura 2000 network and the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Since
there is no hierarchy between fisheries and
environmental policy, the solution to the over-
lap is their alignment, not the prevalence of
one over the other.
The alignment between the CFP and the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD)
is not straightforward. As Van Hooff and
Kraus (2017) point out, both instruments
differ significantly in the governance set-up,
including the underlying advisory process. The
difference may actually contribute to making
uncoordinated requests for scientific advice
and uncoordinated proposals for policy imple-
mentation, including from Member States
themselves: very often, the services responsible
(Fisheries and Environment departments) do
not sufficiently coordinate initiatives, and this
contributes to frequent friction.
The CFP and Natura 2000: the value
of Article 11 of Regulation 1380/2013
The Natura 2000 network is part of the imple-
mentation of the EU directives on habitats (EU
1992a) and birds (EU 2009b).
The implementation of Natura 2000 by Mem-
ber States still has a number of issues to resolve
in terms of consultation with stakeholders,
resolving different national conservation strate-
gies or resolving the impact of fishing. It has
also been argued that the MSFD lacks a com-
prehensive approach to manage the protection
and integrate EU sectorial and national policies
(Salomon 2009). For these reasons, it has been
suggested that the CFP can play a pivotal and
integrative role in the standardization of all the
Fisheries and the environment 163
environmental procedures regarding fisheries
to avoid discriminatory measures (Fock 2011).
However, it is important to bear in mind the
place that the CFP has in the overall workflow of
the implementation of these directives; to avoid
creating false expectations as to how far reach-
ing the CFP and its instruments to implement
these directives can be.
Unlike the CFP, the two directives mentioned
above require the initiative of Member States
to designate areas to be protected. This desig-
nation, and the procedure associated to it (con-
sultation with stakeholders and other Member
States concerned) must be done before the CFP
is involved. It is only when the protection of
the zone concerned requires limitations of fish-
ing that the CFP comes into play, since Member
States cannot take measures on their own in the
context of a policy with exclusive EU compe-
tence.
For a number of years, the CFP did not have a
specific decision-making process to incorporate
the protection of marine Natura 2000 areas into
its legislative body. In some cases, proposals
from Member States for protection from fishing
of certain marine areas had to be handled by
the Council of Fisheries Ministers, without any
guarantee of being adopted. For this reason, the
new basic regulation of the CFP had to provide
for a specific mechanism to do this efficiently,
through regionalization (Article 11 of Regula-
tion 1380/2013). But it is important to realize
that this procedure is to be used only once the
procedure for designation of a site Natura 2000
is well under way following Member States’
initiatives and adequate consultation with all
the stakeholders. If such a previous step has not
been well-fulfilled, the CFP and its consultative
bodies cannot compensate for that since they
are designed to cater for fisheries issues only.
Often fisheries and the CFP are somehow
blamed for lack of progress in the designation
of certain marine Natura 2000 areas overlap-
ping waters of more than one Member State.
However, in such cases, experience shows that
the problem is not fisheries: it is the designation
that is blocked in the first place in Member
States for lack of agreement among them on
164 Chapter 8
issues such as protection from oil and gas
drilling, gravel extraction and so on, outside the
field of application of the CFP.
Some environmental stakeholders blame
Article 11 of Regulation 1380/2013 for delays
in adopting protection to Natura 2000 mar-
itime zones. This is completely misplaced. The
contrary is true: without this article, national
initiatives to protect marine areas would have
no guarantee of being adopted by the fisheries
co-legislators, as was the case before 2013. It is
this article, adopted in the CFP reform of 2013
to address this problem, that now ensures that
proposals from Member States for maritime
Natura 2000 areas are dealt with by the CFP
under a fast-track, efficient procedure.
It is therefore important to ensure that the
procedure of agreement of fisheries measures
for Natura 2000 areas is kept in the right place,
and with the right expectations, in the overall
context of the Natura 2000 workflow.
The CFP and the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive or
MSFD (EU 2008a) represents the ultimate
example of what we can consider an inte-
grated ecosystem approach. Such an approach
can be fundamentally distinguished from the
ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM,
see below).
The MSFD has a number of objectives that
clearly interact with the CFP: it sets out to
achieve “Good Environmental Status” (GES)
in all European seas by 2020. The Directive
establishes 11 “descriptors” of GES:
• Descriptor 1: Biodiversity is maintained.
• Descriptor 2: Non-indigenous species do not
adversely alter the ecosystem.
• Descriptor 3. The population of commercial
fish species is healthy.
• Descriptor 4: Elements of food webs ensure
long-term abundance and reproduction.
• Descriptor 5: Eutrophication is minimized.
• Descriptor 6: The sea floor integrity ensures
functioning of the ecosystem.
• Descriptor 7: Permanent alteration of hydro-
graphical conditions does not adversely affect
the ecosystem.
• Descriptor 8: Concentrations of contaminants
give no effects.
• Descriptor 9: Contaminants in seafood are
below safe levels.
• Descriptor 10: Marine litter does not cause
harm.
• Descriptor 11: Introduction of energy (includ-
ing underwater noise) does not adversely
affect the ecosystem.
Among these descriptors, at least five have
a bearing on the CFP. Ensuring that the MSFD
and the CFP are fully compatible and reinforce,
rather than conflict with each other, represents
an important challenge for the EU and its
Member States. We will see below what are
such interactions.
Descriptor 1: Maintaining biodiversity.
The CFP has always been concerned about
biodiversity issues, though without precise
objectives. The implementation of MSFD has
a clear bearing on the CFP as the objectives
of biodiversity protection mean significant
restrictions in fishing practice. It is obvious that
fishing activity alters the marine environment
and can reduce biodiversity. The question is
where and how to establish the balance
between continuing an activity necessary for
the production of food and the necessary
protection of marine biodiversity.
The effect of fishing on marine biodiversity
can be twofold:
• the destruction of rich ecosystems as a result
of destructive fishing practices (for example,
bottom trawling in cold water coral beds);
• the reduction of populations of certain
species caught incidentally (cetaceans, tur-
tles, etc.)
Both questions are already covered by cur-
rent environmental and fisheries policy. Natura
2000 already protects the high-biodiversity
marine areas in Europe. While more areas
could still be established under this frame-
work, there doesn’t seem to be a strong case
for a brand new approach on this. As for the

by-catch species, the CFP has an ample set of
measures to protect them, such as for example
the regulation on the protection of cetaceans
(EU 2004). Overall, the descriptor should be
well-covered by on-going initiatives. It is dif-
ficult to see what additional initiatives could
be taken under MSFD that would go beyond
these, and why, and how that could be justified
as compatible with the CFP.
The definition of this descriptor as “main-
taining” biodiversity seems to point at a future
where the GES will be characterized by preserv-
ing the biodiversity that exists, not necessarily
to rebuild the one that was lost. This would
be an equivalent, in land, to preserve areas
with high biodiversity, but not necessarily
to turn farmland back into forest. Similarly,
ideas of preserving as no-take zones very large
amounts of seafloor, including areas that have
been trawled for decades, would not seem
to correspond to the notion of “maintaining
biodiversity.”
Descriptor 2: Non-indigenous species.
This is also a very far-reaching objective.
Although the primary objective is to prevent
the introduction of non-native species, either
voluntarily (through aquaculture) or invol-
untarily (for example through vessels’ ballast
water) this objective may quickly become
obsolete due to global warming: whatever the
efforts to implement the directive, the species
composition of the European seas is changing,
with alien species becoming common in many
areas. This is particularly obvious in the Eastern
Mediterranean, which suffers from the invasion
of alien species from the Red Sea through the
Suez Canal.
For these reasons, this descriptor is one of
the most difficult to implement: the occurrence
of non-indigenous species in the European
seas is taking place largely as a result of phe-
nomena outside the remit of the CFP and the
EU’s environmental policy. In any case, if the
highest risk of the introduction of alien species
has been certain aquaculture practices, the CFP
has given itself an instrument to regulate and
prevent unintended negative effects of such
Fisheries and the environment 165
practices: the regulation on the use of alien
species in aquaculture (EU 2007). This aspect
is, at least, well-covered by the CFP, although
this of course cannot stop the undesired effects
of global warming in terms of the increased
presence of warm-water species in European
waters.
Descriptor 3: Commercial fish species.
This descriptor is not just to be harmonized
with the CFP: it should be the CFP. The com-
patibility between MSFD and the CFP requires
seamless coincidence between this descriptor
and the objectives of the CFP. However, there
has been a certain tension in this context.
The MSFD is environmental legislation and
this means that the national administrations
responsible for its implementation are those
responsible for environmental policy, and their
practice involves frequent consultations with
NGOs rather than with the fishing industry. As
a result, the coordination, at the level of Mem-
ber States, has not necessarily been perfect, and
a number of discrepancies in terms of how this
descriptor should apply have appeared, often
creating a certain confusion as to its objective:
is it coinciding fully with the CFP or going
beyond?
The answer is easy: Descriptor 3 must seam-
lessly correspond to the CFP. The CFP and
the MSFD have no hierarchical relationship
in legal or policy terms. None of the two
policies should prevail over the other one,
which means that their implementation should
look for as much harmonization as possi-
ble. And, while the other descriptors do not
have other clear-cut objectives in EU law, the
descriptor on commercial fisheries has the
now clearly-defined objectives of the CFP as in
regulation 1380/2013. If Descriptor 3 departs
from those objectives, this would be impos-
sible to justify in either legal or policy terms.
Meaningfully, the new objectives of the CFP
were established in 2013, after the adoption
of the MSFD, and were adopted with the clear
idea that achieving such objectives would auto-
matically correspond to the achievement of
Descriptor 3.
166 Chapter 8
This question is, however, far from being
resolved in practice, and it still surfaces in the
context of the relationship between the CFP
and the MSFD:
• Commission Decision 2017/848 (EU 2017)
on the implementation of MSFD includes a
criterion for Descriptor 3 which goes beyond
the CFP: the size structure of the stock. This
means that stocks that have reached the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) objec-
tives under the CFP could be considered
“unhealthy” under MSFD (!).
• In the Baltic Multi Annual Plan (EU 2016)
there is a provision allowing for lower
total allowable catch (TACs) than those
determined by the CFP objectives if this is
necessary to fulfill Descriptor 3 of the MSFD
on commercial stocks. As these go beyond
the MSY objective of the CFP, this provision
implies that some TACs may have to be set at
lower levels than those required by the CFP
in order to fulfill the extra criterion of the
MSFD!
• In addition, the requirement of achieving
Bmsy is included without a different time
perspective than the achievement of Fmsy .
Yet, as we saw in Chapter 3, there is always
a time gap between the achievement of Fmsy
levels and the recovery of the biomass to Bmsy
levels (if this happens at all). This implies
that even in the most successful cases (Fmsy in
2020) there is no reasonable expectation that
Bmsy levels will be reached at the same time.
This, again, can have the effect of turning a
successful policy result (Fmsy in 2020) into an
apparent failure.
MSFD should also evaluate its own achieve-
ment of the GES after 2020. It would be both
legally and politically difficult to explain how
environmental and fisheries policy would have
a different evaluation of the results achieved in
ensuring the sustainable management of fish-
ery resources. Achieving Fmsy is already difficult
enough. If, in addition, stocks for which this dif-
ficult objective is achieved can still be consid-
ered “unhealthy” by environmental policy then
the CFP will always appear as a failure under
MSFD. This was never the intention of the leg-
islators in 2013.
Descriptor 4: Food webs. To the extent that
fishing activity can alter the structure and func-
tion of marine ecosystems, the implementation
of this objective could theoretically have an
influence on the way certain fisheries activity
is conducted. If the notion of “fishing down
the food web” is taken into consideration,
the fulfillment of this descriptor could require
measures to reduce fishing pressure.
Indeed, the CFP has, for many years, aimed
at reducing the total level of fishing pressure,
through a variety of measures, from TACs
adapted to low fishing mortality rates, to direct
reduction of fishing effort and fleet capacity.
These measures have produced a net reduction
of the total level of fishing pressure since the
turn of the century, and the trend continues
at least in the Atlantic and Baltic (see Figure
1.2). In this regard, the MSFD cannot probably
contribute more than simply supporting the
efforts under the CFP to reduce the overall
fishing pressure to the fishing mortality levels
necessary to achieve the goals for 2020.
However, there are other implications. In this
chapter we explain how the idea that fishing
is seriously producing a “fishing down the
food web” effect is far from evident (Branch
et al. 2010). We also explain how it is less
than obvious that selective fishing can actually
contribute to preserve ecosystem structure and
function (Zhou et al. 2010). As we explain
below, the preservation of the current structure
of the food webs does not necessarily have to
correspond to the traditional wisdom of ensur-
ing selective fishing. Other approaches such as
balanced harvest may be possible that, despite
their doubts and potential downsides, certainly
need to be carefully considered.
Ultimately, fisheries alter the ecosystems,
although certainly much less than does agricul-
ture, in particular in the case of pelagic fisheries.
Here, MSFD has to recognize that a productive
ocean is not, and cannot be a pristine one. It
is not possible to maximize the production of
sustainable food from the ocean (as required

by Article 39 TFEU) based on pristine marine
ecosystems. For this reason, the preservation
of the food webs should be considered as the
preservation of the currently exploited food
webs, and should not be construed as an aspi-
ration to recover long-lost unexploited marine
food webs, that could only arguably be recov-
ered at the cost of losing most of the fishing
activity, something unwarranted either by the
Treaty or by common sense.
Descriptor 6: Seafloor integrity. Certain
fishing activities, such as bottom trawling,
affect seafloor integrity. The implementation
of this objective may therefore result in some
limitation on the use of bottom trawls. The
question here is whether this should require
the establishment of a quantified target in
terms of percentage of the floor protected
from bottom trawling. A number of envi-
ronmental NGOs promote this approach, and
some have even suggested the protection of
70% of the seafloor being banned for bottom
trawling.
This raises a very important issue: while the
areas that have benthic communities of high
diversity (such as those protected under Natura
2000) would effectively be destroyed by bottom
trawling, many other areas of the European sea
bottoms have been trawled for decades. These
areas could be compared to farmland that is
regularly plowed for the production of food, as
opposed to pristine forest where biodiversity is
conserved.
If the seafloor with high biodiversity is (or
should be) protected by Natura 2000, what else
should be done under MSFD? If the protection
of the seafloor goes much beyond Natura 2000,
one would be protecting areas that Natura 2000
itself did not consider worthy of protection on
the basis of the habitats directive. What would
then be the purpose of such protection? How
much do we know about the effects of protect-
ing sea bottom with relatively low diversity?
What would be the trade-offs of such protec-
tion against the possible limitation of fishing?
These questions must be addressed seriously to
implement that provision.
Fisheries and the environment 167
The scientific literature has already evaluated
the effects of bottom trawling on the seabed,
including considerations on management. The
vulnerability of the sea bottom to trawling is
very variable depending upon the trawling
technique, the depth (and the wave-induced
natural disturbance), the composition of the
sediment (mud, sand, gravel, etc.) and so
on. The “easy” solution of closing to trawling
certain currently trawled areas may have the
undesired effect of displacing trawling to areas
where vulnerability is higher, thus producing
more damage in the longer term (Kaiser et al.
2002).
A recent report (ICES 2017) has assessed the
status of the sea bottom, in terms of the impact
of bottom trawling, in the North Sea. Fishing
pressure was found to be highly aggregated. In
the Greater North Sea, a relatively high impact
occurred in deeper waters and in muddy
habitats. The trade-off analysis indicated that
landings in weight and value were also concen-
trated at the highly aggregated (core) fishing
grounds. The relatively high landings per unit
of impact at the core fishing grounds imply
that an overall reduction of fishing impact on
the seabed, achieved by reducing fishing at the
peripheral grounds, may result in a smaller
reduction in landings and a larger reduction in
pressure than if the reduction were at the core
fishing grounds.
This important report illustrates the current
situation, but it does not assess whether the
current level of impact is excessive or not.
ICES very clearly indicate that this is not for
scientists, but for fisheries managers to deter-
mine, as it is a question that depends on policy
objectives. In this regard, one can suggest that
the amount of trawling that corresponds to
GES should be that necessary (no more; but
no less) to fish North Sea stocks at Fmsy levels,
as established by the CFP. Restricting this more
than that would amount to impose, through
environmental legislation, stricter objectives
than those established by the CFP, something
that is not granted, either legally or politically,
since the two legislations must be aligned, but
one should not supersede the other.
168 Chapter 8
True, it could be argued that fisheries could be
exploited at Fmsy levels with less bottom trawl-
ing and less impact on the sea floor, through
reconversion of the bottom trawl fleet to other
gear. This would be an interesting perspective,
but it should, in any case, take account of two
factors: (i) that certain species (i.e. Norway
lobster) need bottom trawling to be caught
efficiently; and (ii) that fleet reconversion is
very costly and takes time, so any tendency
to reduce bottom trawling while maintaining
fishing at Fmsy level should in any case be partial
and very gradual; something not achievable by
2020.
When evaluating the effects of bottom trawl-
ing, for instance in the North Sea, one must bear
in mind that this area claims the world’s highest
number of oil and gas rigs,1 among other human
impacts, so bottom trawling should be put into
the correct perspective in terms of its relative
contribution in the overall preservation of the
seafloor integrity of the area.
The dichotomy between
fisheries management
and environmental protection:
the case of sharks
The above cases show how the two policies are
being combined. However, in a number of cases
the interaction between the two policies is not
easy, and a number of issues can be considered
differently, and managed under very different
instruments, depending upon their considera-
tion as fisheries or environmental issues. These
are the “areas of friction” between the two poli-
cies. There is perhaps no better example of this
than the question of the conservation or man-
agement of sharks.
Sharks: protect or manage?
It is important to raise the issue of sharks
because they represent, today, the most clear
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_and_gas_
fields_of_the_North_Sea#List_of_fields/
example of the dichotomy between two pol-
icy approaches: (i) the fisheries one, where
marine species are considered a resource to
be exploited sustainably; and (ii) the environ-
mental one, where species are considered as
an asset of mankind that need to be preserved,
over and beyond any consideration of possible
sustainable development.
Contrary to extended belief in many coun-
tries, sharks are not just by-catch species: they
are targeted, used and traded at very significant
levels around the world (Vannuccini 1999) so
beyond ecological or ethical considerations,
they are also fishery resources in their own
right.
The precedent of whaling
The best illustration of the above dichotomy
is the regime applicable to whale species under
the International Whaling Commission (IWC).
Here, following the establishment in 1986 of a
moratorium on whale hunting to protect the
many whale species close to extinction, the
majority policy of the organization (with an
important influence by the EU Member States)
has been to oppose any re-opening of whale
hunting, even for those species where scientific
advice clearly indicates that a certain level of
sustainable exploitation is possible. At EU level,
the IWC is followed by the Directorate General
of the Environment, not the Department of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, which indicates
that this is seen, policy-wise, as an environ-
mental question, not one of management of
marine resources.
Although certain countries of the world (led
by Japan) continue advocating the sustainable
exploitation of whales as a marine resource
like any other, it is difficult to see any possible
change in this policy by the EU any time soon.
The case for sustainable exploitation of at least
some whale species has been made clear by
the scientific advice available to the IWC who
is able to evaluate the abundance of different
whale species.2 If whales are not exploited,
2 https://iwc.int/status/

is not for lack of such scientific basis. Many
authors advance hypotheses on the possible
beneficial effects of certain levels of exploitation
of whales, notably in terms of competition with
man for forage species.
Over the years, the excellent scientific advice
available to the IWC has evolved toward
anti-whaling positions, not entirely based on
grounds of the sustainability of the whale
populations, but rather on the moral rejection
of whaling. In these circumstances, Morishita
and Goodman (2005) wonder whether such
scientific advice is relevant and necessary at all.
Despite all the evidence, the idea that whales
are to be entirely protected, even if certain
levels of exploitation are possible, is completely
consolidated in Europe, although with certain
exceptions, notably by Denmark on behalf of
the Faroe Islands. For whales, environmental
considerations have prevailed over those of
marine resource exploitation and management,
probably forever. Will sharks follow suit?
Should sharks be the new whales?
Sharks are iconic species that have drawn the
attention of both NGOs and the public at large.
Given their particular reproductive characteris-
tics (very few, well-developed eggs laid, instead
of millions of small eggs, and ovo-viviparism in
some cases, thus very few offspring per female)
they are closer to marine mammals than to
other fish in terms of reproductive strategy and
thus are very sensitive to over-exploitation.
They are, however, keenly-sought species for a
number of fisheries in the world, some of them
seeking the whole animal, others interested
only in their fins.
According to FAO, many vulnerable shark
species (a term that also includes skates and
rays) are declining. Global catches reported to
FAO tripled from 1950 to a historical maximum
of 893 000 tonnes in 2000, and have declined
ever since to 766 000 tonnes in 2011 (FAO
2014).
The CFP has taken a number of measures
to protect sharks, generally responding to the
protectionist approach. These amount to a com-
plete ban on a number of endangered species,
Fisheries and the environment 169
as the EU has already done for a number of
years. For example, the annual regulation on
TACs and quotas for 2018 (EU 2018) contains
more than 10 shark species whose catch is
prohibited.
However, there is abundant literature argu-
ing in favor of direct management of sharks as
a better alternative for conservation than tradi-
tional approaches based on their consideration
as protected wildlife (see below in “Some ideas
on management”).
Shark finning
The issue of the exploitation of sharks has been
made more difficult by the existing practice
of shark finning. By “finning” we understand
the practice of catching sharks to cut and
market their fins and discard the fish carcass.
This practice, is very common among Far-East
long-liners catching tuna. For these fleets,
sharks are not the target species; these fishers
are not interested in the whole shark carcass. In
the event of incidental catches of sharks, they
only cut and keep the fins and discard the rest.
This is really the practice that has caused outcry
in the international community. However, this
was not the practice in Europe. The few Mem-
ber States active in catching sharks actually
used the whole animal (the meat, the liver, the
skin, the bones) so they did not practice finning
as such.
Different initiatives have been taken by the
international community to stop this practice.
The whole idea of banning shark finning is
twofold:
• to stop a practice that is unacceptable from
the point of view of animal welfare; and
• indirectly, to reduce catches of sharks by
make economically non-viable the catch and
retention on board of the fins only.
As in many other issues, the EU has taken the
lead by passing legislation to the effect of ban-
ning this practice. An EU ban on shark finning
has been in operation since 2003 (EU 2003).
The 2003 finning ban has recently been
revamped with a new, stricter regulation
(EU 2013b) to ensure better enforcement of
170 Chapter 8
the former. This revamping, however, intro-
duced an extra cost in existing practice in
European fleets while vessels from the Far East
continue their finning practices unchecked, in
an example of how NGO-led policy can put
European fleets at a disadvantage without a
significant overall influence on finning levels
at global level. This has produced in European
fishermen a sense of unfairness: they have to
implement a policy that removes flexibility in
their fixing practices to solve a problem that
they did not cause.
While the practice is rejected in western
countries notably on grounds of animal wel-
fare, it has been argued that this practice can
actually be sustainable. An economic study
of trends in the Hong-Kong shark fin market
showed a clear preference for large fins. In
the specific case of blacktip shark, the fin sizes
preferred in the market are well in excess of
those corresponding to the age of maturity of
the shark, thus providing for a very good basis
for management measures based on shark size.
Such management would also be favored by
the use of size-selective gear such as hooks
and lines, allowing for release of the smaller
individuals (Fong 2002).
Banning shark finning does not constitute
in itself a policy to manage sharks, and cannot
replace proper management of the commer-
cial shark species. However, the public outcry
against this practice (related to animal welfare
as much as to biodiversity protection) has a
very strong bearing on the public perception
of any fishing activity involving sharks, and
this implies an additional difficulty, by making
the sustainable management of commercial
sharks stocks a highly sensitive issue, where
emotional arguments often prevail over ratio-
nal arguments about sustainable, science-based
management approaches.
Some ideas on management
On the above dichotomy between avoidance
and managed exploitation, FAO has long taken
the view that sharks can indeed be exploited
and managed. Shotton (1999) already reviewed
a number of cases of management of elasmo-
branchs. And FAO’s International Plan of Action
on Sharks established guidelines including the
“rational long-term economic use” of sharks
(FAO 2000). The EU adopted in 2009 an action
plan to implement FAO’s plan (EU 2009b).
FAO proposes a number of measures to man-
age shark species sustainably:
• Improving species identification and report-
ing. This is important because, unlike most
commercial fish, skippers cannot tell apart
most shark species, and can distinguish only
the main ones.
• Implementing shark conservation measures.
This represents a major challenge because
traditionally the Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Organizations (RFMOs) have failed
to consider sharks as part of their mandate,
or have prioritized other species for their
management.
• Combating the illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU). This responds to the evi-
dence that shark catches often overlap illegal
fishing.
• Improving regional cooperation.
• Improving labeling and certification.
• Addressing international trade.
All these above elements should allow, in
well-defined cases, that the catch of certain
species of sharks should be subject to manage-
ment as fish resources and not simply forbidden
as a threat to endangered species. But for that
it would be necessary that all stakeholders
admit that at least certain shark species are
amenable to exploitation and management,
and that the practice becomes as transparent
and rationally managed as any other fishing
practice, something still hard to achieve in most
cases.
Doomsday scenarios about the status of shark
populations are not necessarily all agreed by
science. For example, in a very complete study
of sharks in the Northwest Atlantic and Gulf
of Mexico, Burgess et al. (2005) conclude how
shark population declines are very variable,
and that in a number of cases the real status of
populations is actually healthier than asserted.
More recent studies (Dulvy et al. 2014) indicate

that, while alerting about the risks of collapse
of a number of shark populations, they advo-
cate improved fisheries management and trade
to avoid extinction and promote population
recovery. This clearly implies that sharks can
be and should be managed as fishery resources
and that such alternatives as banning all shark
catches are not necessarily the only option.
The management of sharks remains a rather
secondary issue in some of the regional fishery
organizations that could theoretically under-
take to do it. The fact that many of the shark
fisheries are not just targeting sharks but also
tuna and tuna-like species (mainly swordfish
in the case of the European fleets) does not
necessarily contribute to give shark manage-
ment the kind of priority that it would deserve.
For instance, the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) has
been successfully managing tuna fisheries in the
Atlantic since the 1960s, but has only recently
started taking some measures to manage certain
shark species.
As a result, failure to address shark manage-
ment properly as a legitimate fishery resource
results in NGOs “filling the void” by taking
initiatives against shark fisheries in interna-
tional environmental fora. This is the ultimate
example of how failing to address fisheries
management issues only allows environment
policy to take over instead. For this reason, the
idea of a dedicated Regional Fisheries Manage-
ment Organizatiion to manage shark fisheries,
and ensure their proper management, has been
proposed by certain authors (Herndon et al.
2010) and this idea would certainly deserve
careful consideration.
The effects of fishing on the
environment
Fishing: the evil of the seas?
In recent times the fishing activity has received
increasing attention in terms of its negative
effects on the marine environment. Sometimes,
the effects of fishing make more headlines
than other human activities that threaten the
Fisheries and the environment 171
marine environment, such as pollution, oil and
gas drilling, maritime transport and so on. And
aquaculture is not treated any better. Why?
There is abundant scientific literature on the
negative effects of fishing on the marine envi-
ronment. A recent example is the study on the
global footprint of fisheries by Kroodsma et al.
(2018). The study indicates that industrial fish-
ing occurs in more than 55% of ocean area and
has a spatial extent more than four times that of
agriculture. This dramatic conclusion has been
abundantly reported in the mass media, causing
considerable public concern about a catastrophe
in the making.
However, a recent comment on that study
(Amoroso et al. 2018) reveals that such a con-
clusion is an artifact of the spatial scale of the
analysis, and that the global (all vessels) and
regional (trawling) impact of fishing at a higher
resolution reduces the above estimates by a fac-
tor of 10 and 5 respectively, so the comparison
of the impacts of agriculture and fisheries of the
Kroodsma article is misleading. Yet, the latter
comment has received no media attention.
It is true that both fisheries and aquaculture
modify the natural environment, but so does
(even more) agriculture. In fact, while agricul-
ture dramatically modifies terrestrial ecosys-
tems by eliminating all biodiversity, marine
exploited ecosystems (particularly pelagic
ones) fundamentally keep their ecological
structure and most of its biodiversity while
being exploited. Yet, the need for agriculture
to feed the world’s growing population is not
questioned by anybody, while fisheries and
aquaculture are seriously criticized. In addition,
the effects of fisheries on the marine environ-
ment are almost never compared with those
of other human activities, such as oil and gas
drilling, maritime transport or seabed mining.
Let alone pollution coming from land sources:
from chemicals to plastics, and especially pes-
ticides and other pollutants that end up in the
oceans coming from agriculture and husbandry
run-off. If all these impacts are considered, fish-
eries and aquaculture tend to be at the receiving
end of negative environmental impacts, rather
than at their origin.
172 Chapter 8
The real effects of fishing on the marine envi-
ronment remain very difficult to evaluate sci-
entifically. Many attempts have been made to
express such effects through indicators (see for
example Fulton et al. 2004). These authors con-
clude that it is necessary to use a variety of indi-
cators simultaneously to detect the full range
of impacts from fishing. This complexity results
in a serious difficulty in telling apart the real
effects of fishing from the natural fluctuations of
marine ecosystems, or even the effects of other
human intervention on these ecosystems.
The main advocates of this negative image
of fishing activity are certain environmental
NGOs. Greenpeace describes the CFP as a “bro-
ken” policy open to abuse by industrial-scale
fleets, notably on the basis of some well-known
examples of illegal fishing.3 On the same side,
Sea Shepherd accused the CFP of “inten-
tional bad management,” in response to the
short-term interests of the fishing industry.4 In
such cases, a few negative examples are used
to generalize a bad image of a whole sector.
Few industries around the world, with a much
larger influence on the world’s ecosystems, suf-
fer this negative campaigning, which have an
enormous effect on public opinion and have an
increasingly crucial influence on policy making.
The campaigning against industrial fishing by
certain NGOs is often joined by other interests,
such as those of recreational fishermen. And
the results are not just a question of image:
they have a bearing on policy decisions, such
as the net increase in no-fishing zones for com-
mercial fishing that take place in a number of
countries around the world. This has led some
well-known scientists to suggest voluntary
self-transparency by the fishing industry as a
way to fend off unfair allegations about the real
effects of fishing (Hilborn 2018).
Over and beyond the real effects of fisheries
from an objective, scientifically-based perspec-
tive, there is at the start a cultural question.
3 www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/
reports-briefings/2011%20pubs/7/ocean_inquirer_
v10_low_res.pdf/
4 www.seashepherd.fr/news-and-media/edito-
20160204-fr-01.html/
And perhaps also another question of rapport de
force among different human economic sectors
and their capacity to influence public debate
in their favor. Culturally, much of the criticism
of fishing activity as destructive comes from
countries that never had to rely on fishing as a
source of food. In these cultures, fishing is not
an essential part of their diet, which depends
from rich and abundant farmland, so they can
afford to consider their seas as nature reserves
without any negative consequence in their food
supply. Interestingly, some of these countries
have obtained their extended farmland thanks
to extensive logging of primeval forests, with
an enormous loss of biodiversity. For these
reasons, one should not be over-impressed by
criticism from that origin.
Furthermore, as we will explain later in
these pages, fishing activity is, overall, very
small in global terms that cannot match the
economic and political influence of other eco-
nomic sectors, both food-producing sectors on
land, or other economic sectors in the world’s
oceans. This often makes the fishing industry
an easy scapegoat, which their overall effects
on the world’s environment would not justify
in comparative terms.
Fisheries, at the receiving end
of environmental degradation
Interestingly, much is said about the negative
effects of fishing on the environment, but
little on how fishing suffers from the degra-
dation of the marine environment due to
other economic activities. Yet, these effects
are well-demonstrated in a number of cases,
including the effects of numerous pollutants
carried by runoff waters from land (Bukola
et al. 2015).
The negative effects of pollution, in addition,
are not just immediate: pollutants such as heavy
metals, dioxins, and others are bio-accumulated
in fish, and although they do not cause signifi-
cant fish mortality, they compromise the value
of fish as a healthy source of food for humans
in the long term. From this point of view too,
fishing is at the receiving end of the negative
impacts of other human activities (often from

land) rather than the cause of environmental
degradation.
This is of course not a blanket defense of
whatever the fishing industry does. As in other
economic sectors, the world’s fishing industry
is also riddled with illegal activity, abusive
practice, short-term greed and so on, and these
activities must be energetically fought. But
overall there is no objective basis to say that
fisheries, including those on an industrial scale,
if and when practiced sustainably to produce
much-needed food for humankind, are in any
way the evil of the seas.
Fishing down the food web?
The over-exploitation of fishery resources is,
according to certain authors, not only a prob-
lem of inefficient use of sustainable resources,
it also has negative consequences in the marine
ecosystem. The expression “fishing down the
food web” has been coined as an alleged
negative effect of fishery over-exploitation.
According to this theory, overfishing would
produce: “a gradual transition in landings
from long-lived, high trophic-level piscivo-
rous bottom fish to short-lived, low trophic
level invertebrates and planktivorous fish”
(Anon 2005). This effect, first described in
a famous study in 1998, considered that the
mean trophic level (MTL) of the catches of
the world’s fisheries were declining by 0.1 per
decade. The effect would be more pronounced
in the northern hemisphere (Pauly et al. 1998).
This theory has given rise to doomsday sce-
narios where fishermen would end up finding
only jellyfish to catch. This powerful image has
been abundantly used by environmental NGOs
to raise awareness about the non-sustainability
of fishing activity in recent years. The question
is: is this kind of scenario realistic? Is this hap-
pening already?
The issue is one very hotly debated in the
scientific world. In fact, more recent studies
have questioned this theory, showing that the
MTL of fisheries catches frequently diverged
from the MTL of the ecosystem, given the
selective character of the fishing activity. They
also looked again at the MTL of catches and
Fisheries and the environment 173
found substantially different values than those
quoted in the 1998 paper. Catch MTL, a new
paper says, declined from the 1950s but has
increased since the mid-1980s (Branch et al.
2010).
Species richness has long been used as an
indicator of ecosystem functioning and health.
While global richness is declining, regional
trends may be very different. In a study con-
ducted in nine open marine areas of North
America, positive species richness trends were
found in eight out of these nine regions, thus
providing evidence that while global trends
may be negative, sub-global richness trends can
be stable or increasing (Batt et al. 2017).
The controversy lingers on. It is clear that
fishing alters the marine environment. But the
latest evidence suggests that the MTL of the
catch does not necessarily reflect the structure
of the food webs, since catches of different
species are largely driven by economic interest
and opportunity, not just by their relative abun-
dance in the ecosystem. Overall, the “fishing
down the food web” may be happening in
poorly-managed fisheries, but when and where
traditional fisheries management works, it does
not seem to take place. Any projection of global
trends will have to take that into account.
Does sustainable fishing increase
productivity?
The above idea of a substantial part of the
marine environment being dedicated to the
production of food must also be examined from
another angle: the sustainable exploitation of
fishery resources: does it increase, reduce or,
or maintain the productivity of the marine
ecosystem concerned?
On land, everyone is familiar with the idea
of farmland being more productive (in terms
of food) than wild environments. A lawn that
is mowed regularly produces more grass than
a wild grassland. Does this happen in marine
ecosystems too?
The question is complex and easy conclusions
are to be avoided. However, as mentioned in the
previous chapter, harvesting smaller fish, which
174 Chapter 8
have higher productivity, allows a greater sus-
tainable biomass yield than harvesting larger
fish, which have lower productivity (Law et al.
2012).
This may not necessarily make sense eco-
nomically (if larger fish fetch much better
prices and enjoy consumer preference over
small ones) but it simply shows that it is the-
oretically possible to manage fisheries in a
way that the production of sustainable fish
protein is maximized, and that this would not
correspond necessarily to the maximum biodi-
versity – just as in the case of agriculture. The
idea that keeping certain marine areas as areas
of high fish production with low biodiversity
is not an impossible concept, but one that
could possibly be examined and developed in
certain areas in exchange of protecting others,
with high biodiversity, from all kinds of fishing
(see below).
Preserving marine biodiversity
The protection of biodiversity features in
almost all maritime policies around the world.
However, its implementation poses a series of
questions that must be addressed to ensure
that the measures established for that pur-
pose achieve their objective and at the same
time allow for the continuation of legiti-
mate, sustainable exploitation of the ocean’s
resources.
Conserving marine biodiversity has been
an important objective for EU policy for quite
a long time. Perhaps the main instrument to
achieve that has been the “habitats directive,”
first adopted in 1992 (EU 1992a), including its
implementation through a series of protected
areas under the network Natura 2000.
At international level, the most prominent
initiative is that of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD). Signed by 150 government
leaders at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the
CBD is dedicated to promoting sustainable
development. Conceived as a practical tool for
translating the principles of Agenda 21 into
reality, the Convention recognizes that biologi-
cal diversity is about more than plants, animals
and microorganisms and their ecosystems – it
is about people and our need for food security,
medicines, fresh air and water, shelter, and
a clean and healthy environment in which
to live.
At international level, the CBD has adopted
the so-called Aichi targets: 10% of the ocean
surface covered by marine protected areas
(MPAs), an objective that the EU has signed up
to and is committed to reaching.
How to measure biodiversity:
existing indicators
The objectives of preserving biodiversity have
raised a problem: how to measure it. While
progress in fisheries management can be made
relatively simple (see Chapter on measuring
policy success) measuring biodiversity is much
more complex. Since the adoption of the CBD,
there has been a “boom” of indicators. Teixeira
et al. (2016) provide a very good evaluation of
existing indicators, underlining that there is still
a lack of practical ones, and that much more
research is needed on the topic.
In a different study, Butchart et al. (2010)
compiled as many as 31 indicators to measure
the evolution of biodiversity in respect of the
objectives set by the CBD. Again, the problem
with these indicators is that they provide a
rather complex picture of the evolution of
biodiversity. The above authors indicate that,
over time, some indicators increase and others
decrease, sending a rather complex, confusing
message as to whether the objectives are being
achieved. Indeed, this is not surprising, many
components of the ecosystem are fluctuating,
and cannot be expected to evolve as a straight
line over time: ups and downs are inevitable
and do not necessarily describe a clear-cut
overall trend.
In addition, there is a certain tendency to
measure biodiversity in large oceanic areas,
ignoring the fact that in the oceans there is
an increasing specialization of the space, with
certain areas being heavily fished or subject to
other economic activities and others protected
from them. Should biodiversity be measured
in the same way in both types of marine area?

There is a possibility to approach biodiver-
sity conservation as on land: by specializing
the territory. If we take a somehow similar
approach in the sea, the idea could be to mea-
sure the evolution of biodiversity in areas being
fished in a specific way, while the biodiversity
in MPAs could be measured differently. All this
points to a differential approach. How can we
measure marine biodiversity in marine areas
that are not protected for that very purpose?
A simplified approach?
Dulvy et al. (2006) have proposed an inter-
esting idea: to use as a biodiversity indicator
the relative abundance of 23 fish species in
the North Sea. The idea is to classify these fish
according to their level of threat of collapse,
according to a semi-quantitative scale of zero
(no risk) to three (highest risk of collapse), the
idea being to bring the ecosystem to zero (no
fish species being threatened).
This idea is of course preliminary, but it has
two very attractive characteristics:
• Its simplicity. Instead of more than 30 fluctu-
ating indicators sending confusing messages,
this indicator provides a simple, understand-
able time series on how things evolve.
• The fact that these fish can be proxies of
ecosystem structure and function. This is
often the case on land with the use of certain
species as indicators of ecosystem health.
Rather than monitoring dozens of elements,
it is much simpler to focus on a few indicator
species for which, in addition, we have the
luxury of disposing of very long time series
to detect trends much more reliably.
This approach is of course amenable to
improvement, but in view of the confusion
and complexity of current approaches on the
measurement of biodiversity through count-
less – and often contradictory – indicators, it
may actually be better to measure it through a
much simpler set of indicator species, like the
one referred to above.
Protecting biodiversity on land as a
comparison
On land, the dichotomy between protecting
biodiversity and producing food for a growing
Fisheries and the environment 175
population is resolved through two different
mechanisms:
• Through territorialization. National parks
are the best example: defined geographical
areas protected from any human activity
that would destroy the biodiversity they
contain, while allowing economic activity in
other areas where biodiversity simply does
not exist anymore. The contrast between
national parks and farmland is the best
example of this approach.
• Through protection of individual species,
such as the complete ban to hunt endan-
gered species wherever they occur, from
bears to eagles.
In any case, the establishment of these mea-
sures reflects the need to protect the remaining
biodiversity existing on land, but does not
question that the vast majority of the territory
will still be necessary for human activity such
as agriculture, industry or habitation. Further-
more, the territorial approach does not try
to protect biodiversity everywhere, rather, it
responds to the need to have areas protected
and areas dedicated to the production of food or
other goods, where biodiversity is secondary to
the main objective of producing goods. Indeed,
the establishment of national parks or reserves
where biodiversity is preserved is probably
only possible because the other land areas are
dedicated to the production of goods.
The question is: can this approach be applied
in the oceans? One side of the question is
already clear: the protection of high diversity
marine environments is on-going, and has a
number of good examples such as the marine
Nature 2000 areas, where biodiversity is basi-
cally untouched. The real question is: if these
areas are sufficiently large and representative,
could the rest of the oceanic areas be subject to a
kind of exploitation regime that maximizes the
production of food, as in the case of farmland?
The idea is still alien to the public debate on
biodiversity conservation. In a very interesting
article, Lubchenko and Grorurd-Colbert (2015)
consider that the Aichi targets are still very far
away from being achieved, and that only 1.6%
of the ocean is “strongly” or “fully” protected,
as compared with the corresponding figure on
176 Chapter 8
land of around 15%. Their suggestion is that
the protection of biodiversity in the ocean must
quickly catch up with that of land.
However, this comparison fails to refer to
the situation of the non-protected areas. In
fact, on land most of the remaining 85% of the
surface is not protected at all from biodiversity
loss. Farmland represents nearly 40% of the
world’s land surface and has a very low bio-
diversity, and this is accepted as an inevitable
fact: humankind needs to produce food, and
high food production through agriculture is
not compatible with high biodiversity. In the
ocean, no such equivalent exists, and the bio-
diversity objectives still try to protect, one way
or another, biodiversity in practically all marine
areas. The specialization of zones between food
production and biodiversity is very clear on
land, but it is still in its infancy as regards the
world’s oceans.
This idea would have far-reaching conse-
quences, because certain effects, such as the
loss of diversity or the environmental effects of
certain fishing techniques like bottom trawling
would be seen under a very different light if
they are considered as affecting biodiversity, or
rather as an efficient way to exploit certain sea
zones dedicated to maximize the production
of food.
Areas for fishing: a low-diversity,
high-productivity marine ecosystem?
As we saw above, the most widely accepted
definition of the ecosystem approach insists on
the need of ensuring exploitation of resources
while preserving ecosystem structure and func-
tion (FAO 2003). This deserves a reflection: it
means that the exploited marine ecosystems
must preserve their structure and, at the same
time be exploited. It is important to underline
that this is not at all the approach taken to
produce food and preserve biodiversity on land.
On land there is a clear-cut separation
between areas to produce food, where no con-
siderations on preserving ecosystem structure
and function apply (farmland) and areas where
pristine ecosystems are preserved (national
parks and the like). But this distinction does not
seem to apply to the sea: why? Is this justified?
Does it necessarily have to be like that?
The marine ecosystems supporting fisheries,
should they privilege output or biodiversity? By
comparison with terrestrial ecosystems, agricul-
tural land has completely sacrificed biodiversity
in order to maximize output. Should cer-
tain marine ecosystems exploited for fisheries
production do the same?
This is a complex question. Fishing is not
farming, so the terrestrial example should not
be taken literally. The question is that certain
marine ecosystems can be held at lower levels
of biodiversity but higher levels of commercial
output. In addition, such ecosystems could
even be held at relatively low trophic levels,
if this means higher yield of fish protein with
a high market value. We must bear in mind
that certain low-trophic level species, such as
the anchovy in the Bay of Biscay, fetch higher
market prices than a number of its predators
from higher trophic levels in their ecosystem.
The idea of that type of ecosystem could
also be seen in connection with a network
of MPAs to preserve the marine ecosystems
well-identified as having a particularly high
biodiversity. This would correspond to an
approach equivalent to that on land: large areas
are dedicated to agriculture while areas of high
biodiversity are preserved as national parks.
This resolves the dichotomy between preserva-
tion and production by doing both in different
parts of the territory. With all the caveats
due to the different nature of the ecosystems
concerned, and the differences between land
farming and sea fishing, a similar approach
could be a reasonable solution to this problem:
preserving meaningful ocean areas of high
biodiversity as MPAs and, in turn, exploit other
areas for fisheries under criteria of maximizing
sustainable production of fish.
Coastal areas dedicated to intensive aquacul-
ture already provide an example. Areas with
intensive production of oysters or mussels rep-
resent exactly the above idea: they are ecosys-
tems highly modified by man to maximize
the production of food from primary produc-
tion, and largely replacing the – much more

diverse – natural ecosystems by a very short and
effective food chain. These ecosystems are, if
and when well-managed, extremely productive
ecosystems with low diversity. Can this be done
in certain areas for capture fishing?
Marine Protected Areas: the ultimate
instrument?
The value of MPAs to preserve biodiversity has
been known for years. In recent times, how-
ever, the drive to establish large-scale MPAs as
a multi-purpose instrument for marine con-
servation has gained so much momentum that
is becoming almost an undisputed mantra for
environmental advocacy groups and significant
parts of society.
Lubchenko et al. (2003) among many other
authors have advocated this kind of “emerging”
instrument, which can allegedly provide mul-
tiple benefits: habitat protection, conservation
of biodiversity, enhancement of ecosystem ser-
vices, recuperation of depleted stocks and their
export to fished areas, and so on. However,
these authors recognize that MPAs cannot be a
solution against climate change, pollution, or
overfishing originated outside their boundaries,
so the instrument should in any case be com-
plemented by other approaches. Other studies
(for example, Roberts et al. 2001) underline
the positive effects on fisheries management,
claiming increased adjacent catches for arti-
sanal fisheries outside marine reserves between
46% and 90%. However, other authors under-
line that there are important gaps in scientific
knowledge about marine reserves that must be
filled if these are to be a useful management
instrument, but these tend to be ignored by
uncritical advocacy (Sale et al. 2005).
MPAs can indeed be very effective instru-
ments for the purpose of protecting biodiversity.
But for that to be the case, there are a number
of conditions for their application:
• Adequate definition of objectives. MPAs are rele-
vant insofar as they represent well-identified
areas of high biodiversity. The best, positive
example of this can be the deep-sea areas
with cold coral communities of Lophelia
pertusa, protected under the Natura 2000
Fisheries and the environment 177
network and implemented in the CFP. On
the contrary, some of the areas protected
under other initiatives, without a clear iden-
tification of the ecosystems to protect, remain
of dubious usefulness to protect biodiversity.
• Good geographical delimitation. Today’s research
and control technologies allow the accurate
determination of the areas that deserve pro-
tection. The tendency to protect very large
areas that encompass spots of high diversity
with other areas could be understandable
when the knowledge of the sea bottoms
was patchy. Today, however, the knowl-
edge in many areas of the world is detailed
enough to target the real high-diversity areas
much more precisely so that broad-brush
approaches are neither necessary nor justi-
fied.
• Evaluation of winners and losers. Beyond the
question of the biological effects, large MPAs
can have very different consequences in
terms of who is excluded from the exploita-
tion of resources in these areas and who is
not. Although extended wisdom implies that
MPAs can benefit small-scale, developing
countries’ interests, the experience tends to
show the contrary: large MPAs affect directly
those who fish in these areas without alter-
native, while industrial interests can afford
to find new places outside the MPAs.
• Social license. Large MPAs are also easier to
establish in remote areas, where the existing
number of economic activities is lower, and
so is the resistance to that instrument. The
result is that MPAs are established where it is
politically easier because pressure groups are
weaker, but not necessarily where the pro-
tection would make more sense in ecological
terms.
• The overall balance between protection
and – sustainable – exploitation. The propos-
als by certain groups to bring the protection
of biodiversity in the world’s oceans to 30%
of their surface should be compounded with
the effects of such a measure on the world’s
ability to take full advantage of marine
resources and produce more seafood (see
Chapter 2), or on who will benefit from that.
178 Chapter 8
• Adequate enforcement. One must bear in mind
that enforcement of fishing activities is led by
the existence of the fishing activity itself. If no
fishing is allowed in these areas, what incen-
tive is out there to invest in very expensive
enforcement? Who will enforce this kind of
measure?
These are just a few reflections on the use
of MPAs. The Natura 2000 network is a very
good, positive example of the points above: they
protect well-identified areas of a surface pro-
portionate with the ecosystem to protect, and
they are part of the control and enforcement
system of the CFP. When considering proposals
for very large-scale MPAs, the example of the
Natura 2000 in EU waters is an example to be
borne in mind.
How to evaluate the preservation
of biodiversity: the notion
of ecosystem services
Humankind benefits in a multitude of ways
from ecosystems. The exploitation of its
resources is an obvious benefit. But the notion
of ecosystem services conveys the philosophy
that, over and beyond the direct economic ben-
efits derived from the exploitation of resources,
the preservation of ecosystems also provides
humankind with a number of more intangi-
ble benefits, which are not necessarily easy
to measure in economic terms (the so-called
“externalities”). Collectively, these benefits are
becoming known as ecosystem services.
Already in the last century the ecosystem
goods and services provided by the biosphere
were estimated to be in the range of US$ 16–54
trillion per year, with an average of US$ trillion
per year, as a minimum estimate (Costanza
et al. 1997). Twenty years on, the notion and its
evaluation have been reviewed (Costanza et al.
2017). Most of this value would be outside the
market, that is, unaccounted for in economic
terms. The EU has proposed a long-term view of
how the ecosystem services should be protected,
valued and restored in EU policies (EU 2011).
The ecosystem services concept itself was
popularized by the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MA) in the early 2000s (Anon.
2005). This grouped ecosystem services into
four broad categories: provisioning, such as the
production of food and water; regulating, such
as the control of climate and disease; support-
ing, such as nutrient cycles and crop pollination;
and cultural, such as spiritual and recreational
benefits. To help inform decision-makers, many
ecosystem services are being assigned economic
values.
The notion of ecosystem services is easy to
formulate, but extremely elusive when it comes
to applying in practice, although the subject
has been explored by some authors (Bouma
and van Beukering 2015). The EU initiative
Mapping and Assessment of Ecosystems and
their Services5 distinguishes three broad types
of ecosystem services:
• Provisioning. Provision of tangible outputs.
Fisheries and aquaculture production would
be part of these ecosystem services.
• Regulating. Services to maintain the ecosys-
tems. In the oceans, the capacity to absorb
and recycle organic matter from sewage
would be a case of ecosystem service.
• Cultural. Symbolic, spiritual or intellectual
benefits. It has been argued that the abil-
ity to observe pristine, natural ecosystems
has even a positive influence on human
health, particularly for children (Ten Brink
et al. 2016), although these are much more
difficult to identify and evaluate.
The evaluation of ecosystem services is cen-
tral to a number of environmental questions,
notably to the discussion on the number of
extensions of the MPAs being proposed around
the world (see below). The development of
such methodologies would cast much-needed
objectiveness in evaluating the different mer-
its in generating wealth and jobs of different
activities (or protection from) taking place in
the marine environment.
This is methodologically difficult. While on
land there has been more progress on this
question, such as the study of “externalities”
5 1st
MAES Report (2013) drawing on Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005), TEEB (2010) and
CICES.

of economic activity, this remains more elusive
in the marine environment. For example, the
investments in air-cleaning technologies can be
compared with the savings in health systems
through the reduction of lung disease, as an
indirect way to attach an economic value to
clean air. In the oceans this is in principle less
clear-cut, so more studies are necessary. And
then, of course, there is the question of the
intangible benefits of conservation, probably
not amenable to economic evaluation but nev-
ertheless important at least for a significant
part of society. For example, over and beyond
the – easy to calculate – economic value of
whale watching, is there any way to calculate
the benefit to society of knowing that these
extraordinary creatures are not extinct?
The evaluation of ecosystem services can
make progress, but it will always be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to create a common
“currency” that will allow us to compare ben-
efits to society from fishery exploitation with
those associated to the social benefits of having
more plentiful fish and other biota at sea. But
the more this is investigated, the more it will
be to bring some objective elements into an
otherwise ideological discussion, likely to be
dominated by those with the greater capacity
to mobilize public opinion in their favor.
All these elements are extremely important,
but they have very different levels of objective
basis to incorporate them in decision-making.
While the provisioning tends to be clear to
identify and evaluate, the regulating service is
less clear-cut and, in the case of the oceans,
clearly inexistent: while seawater recycles
organic matter, it cannot recycle heavy metals
or plastics. As for the “cultural” ecosystem ser-
vices, these are very elusive to evaluate under
common standards, and are extremely different
for different cultures. Just an example: while
whaling is generally rejected on cultural/ethical
grounds in most countries, in certain coastal
communities of the Faroe Islands, there is a
strong cultural value attached to the annual
practice of culling pilot whales, and in certain
coastal communities in Japan, whaling is a
deeply-rooted tradition.
Fisheries and the environment 179
The ecosystem approach
The ultimate integration between the fisheries
and environmental policies is the implemen-
tation of the ecosystem approach to fisheries
management. The notion is enshrined in many
international agreements. Although different
definitions exist, FAO (2003) uses the following:
The ecosystem approach to fisheries explicitly
addresses the need to take account of the interde-
pendences of species and functioning of aquatic
ecosystems when managing fisheries. This means
recognizing that the range of measures chosen
should not only address a series of target species
concerns, but also preserve ecosystem function
and integrity.
However, other definitions available illustrate
the considerable differences in the way different
institutions and individuals look at the meaning
and practical implementation of the ecosystem
approach. Moreover, it has been argued that the
sound management of individual stocks consti-
tutes a positive contribution to ecosystem-based
management (Froese et al. 2008).
The concept is complex and cannot be
developed and fully applied overnight. In the
1990s different authors developed different
approaches to turn it into implementable poli-
cies. The work of Grumbine (1994), Mangel
et al. (1995) or Christensen et al. (1996) can be
emphasized in this regard.
Morishita (2008) categorizes four types of
ecosystem approach for fisheries management:
• By-catch mitigation in the managed fisheries;
• Multi-species management;
• Protection of vulnerable ecosystems; and
• Integrated approach.
These four types are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, and many countries around the
world are developing a combination of these
different approaches, sometimes in different
cases and different fisheries.
It is important to underline that the bound-
aries of what the ecosystem means can also be
subject to very different interpretations. While
a narrow interpretation of “ecosystem” leads
to the consideration of the biological aspects
180 Chapter 8
alone, many other authors consider that the
“ecosystem” also implies considering people as
part of the ecosystem (Helpern et al. 2012).
If we consider the notion of the ecosystem
approach in connection with the objectives of
Article 39 TFEU, it seems obvious that people
whose economic activity depends upon fishery
resources should be considered as an integral
part of the notion of marine ecosystem.
The ecosystem approach and the CFP
EU law requires that the CFP applies the
ecosystem approach. But beyond the CFP, this
notion is also applied on a larger scale in EU
policy, as an objective that embraces all EU
policy areas. From that starting point, one
can build this approach from two different
angles:
• The incremental approach. This means that the
ecosystem approach must be built through
a gradual process of incorporating, as the
scientific basis allows, additional layers of
considerations in the management of ocean
resources. In other words, the incremental
approach would start with existing man-
agement of fishery resources and gradually
integrate, like layers in an onion, addi-
tional considerations in terms of effects on
the environment, human activity, physical
oceanography and as many additional ele-
ments as the knowledge basis would allow.
Under this model, the ecosystem approach
would be a gradual process where additional
elements for consideration and for manage-
ment are gradually integrated as our ability
to combine all these factors into meaning-
ful management will allow. This process
should eventually lead to the development
of ecosystem-based fisheries management
(EBFM). This is the traditional approach
implemented under the CFP.
• The holistic approach. This is where the pol-
icy would start with a complete picture of all
the relevant factors for ocean management,
far beyond fisheries, to try to build models of
ocean management by putting all these ele-
ments together at the same time. In this con-
text, fisheries would be just one block of the
whole policy approach. This is the case of the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive.
This is equivalent to the two approaches pro-
posed by Hilborn (2011): one is more pragmatic,
building on existing single-species management
by adding, for example, predator requirements
for forage fish in a piecemeal fashion. Another
approach focuses on overall ecosystem structure
and functioning as represented by trophic rela-
tionships and ecosystem models.
As we will see below, the two approaches
have in fact been adopted at EU level and they
are somehow being developed in parallel.
The ecosystem approach in the CFP reform
The new CFP requires the application of the
ecosystem approach, defined as follows (EU
2013a,b):
The CFP shall implement the ecosystem-based
approach to fisheries management so as to ensure
that negative impacts of fishing activities on
the marine ecosystem are minimised, and shall
endeavour to ensure that aquaculture and fish-
eries activities avoid the degradation of the marine
environment.
This definition corresponds to a very tradi-
tional approach, of minimizing the effects of
fisheries on the environment, but does not
go as far as requiring a real ecosystem-based
management. From that angle, one could con-
sider that this traditional approach of pursuing
a traditional fisheries policy while including
policy measures to minimize the impact on
non-target species or certain marine habitats
would be a good-enough approach. However,
the development of very different approaches to
ecosystem management, the growing evidence
of interaction between fisheries and other
human activities on the marine environment,
as well as the growing level of overlap among
different EU legislations, all call for a much
wider considerations than those of Article 2.3.
In addition, the new CFP does not pro-
vide any particular guidance on how to apply
this approach. This view is shared by cer-
tain authors, who consider that the success
of the ecosystem-based management of EU

fisheries depends much more on the specific
implementation of the measures and on the
accompanying incentives, which in the end,
implies that the institutional and political set-
tings will determine its success (Prellezo and
Curtin 2015).
Ecosystem-based fisheries
management
EBFM would correspond to the incremental
approach described above, and can be, as we
saw in Chapter 4, a way to smooth out some
of the rigidities of management based on single
stock objectives, particularly when combined
with no discard policies. But it is also a way to
better address the obvious relationship between
individual stock dynamics and the dynamics of
the marine ecosystem where they live.
There are current developments that point
to the introduction of trophic relationships and
area-based management to further the imple-
mentation of the ecosystem approach. These,
however, introduce complexities that are still
today difficult to manage. The introduction of
trophic relationships for fisheries management
is scientifically complex.
In addition to their complexity, ecosystem-
based management poses difficult questions in
terms of trade-offs: for example: if the relation-
ship between a predator (cod) and a prey (sprat)
is well-established, what should management
favor? Maximizing cod catches because of their
higher value, thus manipulating the ecosystem
with unknown consequences? In addition to
the risk to the ecological balance, this would
also potentially affect relative stability because
different Member States have different levels
of cod/sprat quotas in their basket of fishing
rights, so that approach would favor the Mem-
ber States and the fleet segments having larger
cod quotas, thus opening up a very difficult
discussion on relative stability among Mem-
ber States and on social equity within these
Member States.
This would be just a simple example of the
reasons why the idea of expanding the notion of
EBFM to include trophic relationships must be
analyzed cautiously, compounding the efforts
Fisheries and the environment 181
necessary to develop its scientific basis with the
benefits it would provide or rather the problems
it would create.
The science base for EBFM is complex and
is considered in some cases as insufficient to
develop such an approach in practice. We have
referred to the case of the Baltic Sea in Chapter
3. Indeed, EBFM is still often viewed as an
over-ambitious goal, particularly in systems
lacking capacity and/or resources (Patrick and
Link 2015). In some cases, the expansion of
single-species reference points to take account
of the use of performance measures for a single
or a small selection of ecosystem metrics is not
possible at present, owing to the absence of
a clear understanding of their dynamics and
a lack of underlying theory to explain their
behavior (Hall and Mainprize 2004).
However, considerable progress has been
made in recent years, and certain authors
(Longo et al. 2015) argue that what stands in
the way of EBFM today is not the lack of under-
standing of the food web dynamics, but rather
two other elements:
• The lack of decision support tools helping
with the integration of ecological and social
assessments.
• The need for more effective institutional
framework to translate multidisciplinary
knowledge into action.
In other words, in addition to the question of
the scientific basis, there is a problem of gov-
ernance. In addition, increasing integration also
requires developing transdisciplinary expertise
(Ciannelli et al. 2014), something that must be
taken into account in the decision-making pro-
cess.
Overall, either approach outlined above is
complex, data-hungry, and requires complex
governance structures. The temptation is to
stick to the current system of management of
individual stocks. However, given the growing
interaction between fisheries management and
other policies, and economic activities, and
in a context of growing population density,
increasing use and potential conflict among
users of the marine environment, it is clear
that the case for the implementation of a true
182 Chapter 8
ecosystem approach is becoming more urgent
than ever (Longo et al. 2015).
This has important implications for the CFP,
because the implementation of such approaches
requires, as we will see in Chapter 9, an impor-
tant cultural shift toward a more integrated and
collaborative management of the policy.
A test case: managing forage fish
One of the most tangible applications of the
ecosystem approach is that of the management
of forage fish. As “forage fish” we understand
a series of species, of small size in adulthood,
very abundant, generally feeding on plankton,
that constitute a significant source of food for
the upper trophic levels of the marine ecosys-
tems. In certain fishery management systems,
the quota allowances for these fish take into
account the need to preserve an important part
of these resources as food for their predators,
so the commercial yields are in fact lower than
they could be on account of their role in the
marine ecosystem.
The ecological role of forage fish
The species that prey on forage fish are very
varied, including larger, carnivorous fish of
economic interest as well as non-target species
such as seabirds, seals, and other marine ani-
mals. The key role of these species in the marine
food chain has originated specific approaches
to protect this food source in order to preserve,
or manage sustainably, the predator species,
either commercial or not. Since these species
are commercially valuable (although many just
for reduction to fish meal or to produce surimi)
certain management systems in the world have
established measures to protect them over and
beyond their estimated sustainable catch levels
based on individual stock population dynamics.
This implies that the catch limits establish
for these species must be significantly lower
than those corresponding, for example, to their
estimated MSY levels, since a certain propor-
tion of the stock is reserved as food for its
natural predator (Smith et al. 2011). However,
the apparently obvious role of forage fish in
determining the abundance of the predator
fish is not necessarily always straightforward.
If all relevant factors are considered, there is
little evidence for a strong connection between
forage fish abundance and the rate of change
in the abundance of their predators (Hilborn
et al. 2017). Engelhard et al. (2014), analyzing
the North Sea, found that reducing fishing
mortality of forage fish may not lead to larger
stocks of piscivorous fish, especially if their early
stages compete with forage fish for zooplankton
resources. In complex ecosystems, changes in
the impact of fisheries on forage fish may have
potentially complex (and perhaps unantici-
pated) consequences on other commercially or
ecologically important species.
Despite these shortcomings, there are a cer-
tain number of examples of such an approach.
The case of capelin is well-known: this fishery
in the Barents Sea is managed through the joint
Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, and
multispecies interactions are explicitly taken
into consideration when setting quotas, in par-
ticular by setting aside part of the total biomass
of the capelin stock as food for the cod in the
area (FAO 2014).
Can the CFP protect forage fish? The
interaction with relative stability
The question of forage fish is certainly not alien
in the CFP. However, other than certain limited
cases, such as the closure of an area to fishing for
sandeel to protect it as food for a seabird once
considered endangered: the kittiwake gull (EU
1998) there are basically no measures of this
kind in the TAC and quota policy. Why?
In the early 1990s the public concern that
industrial fisheries were “robbing the food” of
the target species in the North Sea was a major
motivator behind the development of multi-
species models, beginning with one in 1977
(Andersen and Ursin 1977). At present, ICES
run multispecies virtual population analysis
(VPA) from time to time and the results are
used to update the natural mortality values
used in the single-species assessments used for
the routine ICES advice. This means that even
the single-species advice from ICES is to some
extent informed by multispecies considerations.

In 1992, a scientific meeting was arranged by
the Commission on the topic (EU 1992b). The
analysis took account of both mixed-fisheries
and predation and competition effects. The
results showed a relatively small impact of
the sandeel fishery on cod. Though reducing
the sandeel fishery could increase the abun-
dance of whiting, this was not thought to be
interesting or important. In 1998, the European
Parliament reported on the topic and concluded
that industrial fisheries, in moderation, are
justifiable in the North Sea.
However, in the CFP the application of this
type of management would face a fundamental
problem: relative stability. In fact, the TACs for
sandeel and Norway pout, main forage fish in
the North Sea, is largely dominated by Denmark
that has over 90% of the TAC of sandeel and
almost 100% of the TAC for Norway pout. In
contrast, Denmark’s share of the main predator
species of these forage fish is much lower: 20%
of the cod and 5% of the haddock in the North
Sea. This implies that if the EU established a
special protection regime for the forage fish,
this would affect Member States differently,
with Denmark possibly feeling that the system
“sacrificed” the Danish fishmeal fishery for the
sake of (unproven?) benefits for other stocks
of interest to other Member States. In other
words, this type of policy could be considered
as undermining relative stability by, at least, a
Member State.
This fact is recognized in the scientific litera-
ture. Beyond this particular case, management
plans in the CFP are limited by path dependency
by being subject to relative stability, which dic-
tates a stock by stock perspective, making
inclusion of biological interactions virtually
impossible (Ramírez-Monsalve et al. 2016).
What future for ecosystem-based
management in the CFP?
The two above approaches, incremental and
holistic, will be developed in parallel, since both
are enshrined in EU law. We have seen above
what are the points of overlap between the
CFP and the MSFD that will necessitate close
cooperation to ensure seamless implementation
Fisheries and the environment 183
of both. But what is more open to debate is how
much the CFP will be able to develop, within
the notion of the “incremental” approach, the
notion of EBFM.
Hilborn (2011) draws a very useful compari-
son between the two most common approaches:
• Continuing with the traditional single-species
approach but gradually reduce by-catches
and protecting sensitive habitats; and
• Building truly ecosystem-based harvest con-
trol rules, supported by ecosystem models
and ecosystem indicators.
The first type, relatively simple, is in fact
being applied already in the CFP. The foresee-
able evolution of this model will be to gradually
modify single-species strategies by ecosystem
knowledge, and this will eventually imply set-
ting fishing mortality levels below MSY levels,
particularly for forage fish species. In prac-
tice, ICES recommendations on single-species
parameters are already incorporating, to the
extent possible, inter-species relationships.
The second type of management is much
more difficult. As expressed by Longo et al.
(2015) its very nature makes it much more
complex, expensive, and data-demanding. And,
crucially, it requires more complex combination
of expertise and stakeholder involvement, thus
being more likely to be curtailed by gover-
nance inertia. In addition, as we saw above,
the different trade-offs offered by this type of
management would be sometimes difficult to
accept in a CFP dominated by the rigidity of
relative stability.
But this kind of EBFM also poses other ques-
tions: the understanding of marine food webs
carries the risk or opportunity of manipulating
the ecosystem in favor of certain policy objec-
tives. For example, as suggested by Hilborn
(2011), one obvious option would be the delib-
erate over-exploitation of low-value species
that prey upon or compete with high-value
species, just like on land humankind has histor-
ically killed lions, bears or wolves and plowed
up the native habitat to produce a much higher
return of food production from the land than
184 Chapter 8
would otherwise be obtained by collecting the
native species.
This clearly deserves a debate, which is linked
to the idea (see under “Preserving marine bio-
diversity” above) of specializing intensely fished
areas in the most efficient way of producing
food, even as modified ecosystems, just like
farmland on land. This debate is complex
because the different trade-offs in ecological
terms also have different consequences in eco-
nomic and social ones, so it is not possible to
handle these ecological trade-offs in a “neutral”
or “scientific” manner: the introduction of
socio-economic analysis of the effects of the
different ecological options would be absolutely
necessary for this type of EBFM. Without this
kind of debate, it is difficult to see how this
second type of EBFM will ever be able to make
headway within the CFP.
We referred above to the two broad approaches
to implementing the ecosystem approach.
While the MSFD is a well-defined legislative
framework with specific objectives and dead-
lines, the future of this approach is relatively
well-established in legislation. On the con-
trary, the incremental approach proposed in
the 2008 Commission communication (EU
2008b) is much more open-ended, and not
pre-determined at all in legislation. It is in this
context that the future development of the
ecosystem approach for fisheries management
can be best discussed.
Why do we need to further develop
the ecosystem approach?
Over and beyond the above achievements, one
can wonder if that is all that we can expect
from the implementation of the ecosystem
approach under the CFP. Clearly, the answer
is no. In strategic terms, there are a number of
areas where the CFP could continue to explore
a more advanced version of this concept:
• Development of multi-species models, to
develop further flexibility in a policy tradi-
tionally dominated by single-stock objectives.
• Development of trophic considerations in
management of stocks.
• Estimation of ecosystem “carrying capacity”
at different levels, so that further flexibility
on a single-stock basis can be compen-
sated with an overall ecological safety net
expressed in terms of total removals from
the ecosystem.
• A better estimation of the “ecosystem ser-
vices” to better compare fisheries with other
uses (or protection) of marine areas. This
will be important in a context of increasing
occupation of the marine environment and
growing implementation of maritime spatial
planning.
• A better estimation of the effects of measures
to preserve biodiversity, including spatial
approaches (like national parks on land) and
even a better evaluation of selective fishing
(see “balanced harvest” below).
• A better evaluation of the effects of “selective
fishing”: does it really contribute to preserve
ecosystem structure and function?
• In both a European and global content, how
can we maximize the sustainable production
of seafood? What species and trophic levels
can provide this? And what kind of ecosys-
tem structure and function can deliver this
objective better?
These ideas clearly indicate that the ecosys-
tem approach in the CFP, far from being already
applied, is an area of work where very substan-
tial progress can still be done.
A provocative idea: balanced
harvest
Is selective fishing always a good
idea?
In the debate about fisheries policy, there has
always been a traditional wisdom requiring the
fishing activity to be selective. This may have
different meanings:
• Species selectivity would be the fishing prac-
tice that tries to maximize the catches of
the target species while trying to minimize
the incidental catch of non-target species, in
particular endangered species such as marine
mammals or seabirds.

• Size selectivity, where the focus is in avoiding
the catch of juveniles of the targeted species,
to maximize yield per recruit of commercial
fisheries.
The need for “selective fisheries” has become
almost an undisputed mantra in all discussions
on fisheries management. Fisheries manage-
ment has always promoted selectivity: small
fish and iconic endangered species have always
been subject to policies to reduce or eliminate
entirely their catch (see “Technical conservation
measures” in Chapter 7). This trend has long
extended beyond the dimension of endangered
species to include species that are to be avoided
regardless of their biological status, as “icon-
ic” species deserving protection on their own
right. This new dimension is ever growing: the
species that are protected on moral grounds,
even though they could sustain sustainable lev-
els of exploitation. The case of certain whales
referred to above is the best example.
The number of species that fishermen cannot
catch is ever growing, turning fishing increas-
ingly selective. In addition to the growing list of
species whose catch is forbidden in the annual
TAC and quota regulation, the landing obliga-
tion is providing a step forward in this trend:
the species to be avoided are not only those that
need biological protection, or that are iconic,
but also those species for which fishermen have
no quota, nor the right to discard them under
the new policy. All this development introduces
a very selective fishing, where only a part of
the species of the ecosystems are exploited
while the rest must be spared. The question
is, then: does this increasingly selective fishing
contribute to preserve ecosystem structure and
function? In other words: is selective fishing
always a good idea?
A group of scientists have in recent years
started to question the wisdom of this com-
monplace that requires all fishing to be as
“selective” as possible. The motivation of this
group is to investigate the fascinating question
of whether selective fishing really has positive
effects on the marine environment.
From a scientific standpoint many have
considered the negative impact on marine
Fisheries and the environment 185
ecosystems of harvesting strategies that do not
consider trophic relationships (Anon. 1999;
Hollingworth 2000; Smith et al. 2011). This
raises an interesting scientific question: if we
exploit the ecosystem very selectively and, at
the same time, establish the objective of pre-
serving ecosystem structure and function, is the
former compatible with the latter? Indeed, the
idea that one can preserve ecosystem structure
and function by harvesting very selectively part
of such structure is counter-intuitive.
The notion of “balanced harvest”
This question has led a group of scientists to pro-
pose in 2010 the notion of “balanced harvest”
meaning that instead of exploiting the marine
ecosystem very selectively, it would be prefer-
able to do so unselectively, removing the differ-
ent species of the ecosystem according to their
level of productivity (Kolding et al. 2016).
FAO (2014) defines this notion as:
a management strategy that aims at distributing
fishing pressure across all trophic levels to ensure
the maintaining of trophic relationships across
species and sizes . . . showing how harvesting
should take place across the different trophic levels
in a way that is proportional to their respective
levels of productivity.
The notion of balanced harvest should be
looked at in the context of the emerging
paradigm of the EBFM. Extended wisdom is
that selective fishing (concentrating on target
species and avoiding by-catches) is a contribu-
tion to this approach. However, this belief is not
necessarily scientifically-based. In fact, if one of
the fundamental objectives of the EBFM is to
allow sustainable exploitation while preserving
ecosystem structure and function, it is far from
obvious that fishing certain species and sparing
others may contribute to that objective at all.
Zhou et al. (2010) summarize this as follows:
Selective fishing alters biodiversity, which in turn
changes ecosystem functioning and may affect
fisheries production, hindering rather than help-
ing achieve the goals of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries
Management.
186 Chapter 8
This concept has given rise to a very intense
controversy in the scientific community. A
number of well-known authors have consid-
ered that for the balanced harvest the empirical
evidence is scarce and questionable, and that
the development of such a notion would “hin-
der the policy changes needed for the rebuilding
of ecosystems, healthy fish populations and
sustainable fisheries” (Froese et al. 2015).
Interestingly, certain authors find that
although selective, balanced fishing is pre-
dicted to produce the highest total MSY and the
lowest impact on trophic structure, it is effec-
tively a fishery predominantly targeting small,
forage fish (Jacobsen et al. 2014). Whether that
would be economically interesting, that is a
different matter.
Another interesting development is that of
the relationship between the balanced harvest
and the no-discard policy implemented by
any western countries in recent years. One
can wonder if the notion of balanced harvest
would only make a non-discard policy more
difficult, since the thrust of the no-discard
policy is precisely to render fishing much
more selective and minimize the unwanted
part of the catch. Both concepts, however,
could be made compatible, notably in fisheries
with a very high level of compliance (Borges
et al. 2016).
Is balanced harvest applicable
in practice?
The notion of balanced harvest is a very appeal-
ing scientific concept, but beyond the on-going
controversy on the effects on the ecosystem and
on the fisheries management systems, it is diffi-
cult to see it applied in ocean management any
time soon. There are a number of reasons for
this:
• It would imply a breach with very long-
standing notions of resource conservation,
such as those related to the protection of
charismatic species or the protection of juve-
nile fish. The notion of balanced harvest
could even lead to the consideration to
exploit at least partially, some top preda-
tors such as whales. This is not easy to
imagine any time soon. Likewise, allowing
the catch of juvenile fish would be rather
counter-intuitive, difficult to understand and
to accept by consumers and the public at
large.
• The application of this notion may give rise
to a catch composition in many fisheries that
would not necessarily reflect economic inter-
est. As indicated above, fisheries based more
on low-value small forage fish would not
necessarily be more interesting economically.
• This would have implications on the question
raised in “8.0” above: should the man-
agement system propose the commercial
exploitation and the preservation of ecosys-
tem structure and function all at once in all
marine areas, or rather should it ensure the
preservation of pristine ecosystems (through
MPAs) while allowing for high fish produc-
tion (perhaps very selective) in the exploited
areas, very much like the division of land
uses between farming areas and national
parks?
It is important that research continues on this
topic. If not necessarily a notion to be applica-
ble to the full extent of its implications in the
short term, the idea of a balanced harvest can
contribute to finding a better solution to the
problem of combining a high sustainable rate
of exploitation of commercial species with the
maximum possible preservation of the marine
ecosystems structure and function.
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CHAPTER 9
Fisheries governance and the CFP
The evolution of governance
under the CFP
Introduction
The governance of the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy (CFP) has traditionally been a controversial
issue and, while it has considerably evolved
over time, the perception of governance as a
problem has always remained common place.
A very recent study, comparing fish-
eries management in the US under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act and the CFP (before
and after the 2013 reform) casts some inter-
esting light into the governance of the CFP
(Battista et al. 2019). The authors give the
pre-2013 reform CFP low scores across most of
the attributes, with consistently higher scores
for the US system. They recognize, however,
that many of these low scores are improved
following the most recent round of CFP reforms
in 2013, but many gaps remain: guidance on
goal prioritization in the face of trade-offs is
still lacking, as are clear directives concerning
whether maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
should be seen as a target or a limit, and how
to reconcile the MSY mandate with the new
discard ban in multi-species fisheries.
The governance of the CFP is dynamic and
has been evolving both as a result of reform
processes but also through gradual evolution
during the inter-reform periods. While some of
the changes introduced over time are institu-
tional, such as the introduction of co-decision
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
as the ordinary legislative procedure from 2010,
as a result of the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon, many other changes are the result
of new administrative requirements introduced
in recent years, such as the consultations with
stakeholders’ bodies or the requirement for
impact assessments prior to any new initiative.
We will refer to these in the sections below.
In addition, the governance of the CFP has
evolved also as a result of the different legal
requirements and objectives that have been set,
over the years, to try to improve the policy’s
capacity to deliver results. Finally, a number
of changes of practice have also taken place
within the existing framework.
The evolution of governance has been the
result of a permanent struggle between two
opposing motivations:
• The need to build self-discipline in the
system, so that the policy sticks to its own
objectives and does not deviate from them on
the basis of short-term considerations. This
requires inter alia clear objectives, particularly
for the mid and long term.
• The need to be flexible to be able to adapt
decisions to special circumstances and to
changing conditions, and the need to learn
from experience and adjust the policy as
a result, while at the same time respect-
ing deeply-rooted EU principles such as
non-discrimination. This in turn implies that
the long-term objectives must be flexible and
revisable.
191
192 Chapter 9
The first motivation tends to produce rigid,
complex, and stable policy frameworks, while
the second calls for flexibility, simplification,
and adaptability. The balance between these
two considerations is a permanent source
of tension in the policy and often results in
contradictory initiatives.
The question of complexity is also influenced
by the continuous growth in the number of
Member States, areas and fisheries to regulate
and issues to address, and this exacerbates the
difficulties to conciliate the two contradictory
needs.
In recent times, two developments have also
added a new dimension to the governance: in
2010 the introduction of co-decision by Council
and Parliament as the ordinary legislative proce-
dure for the CFP and the introduction of region-
alized decision-making in the policy reform of
2013. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 showed how the
number of words of the basic regulation of the
CFP continues to grow every time the policy is
reformed.
The balance between discipline
and flexibility
The long-standing failure of the CFP to address
overfishing (from 1983 to 2000 fishing mortal-
ity continued to increase in the most important
Atlantic stocks) fully justifies the long quest
for the establishment of self-discipline in the
system to be able to address this problem,
even at the cost of unintended rigidity. The
main element of self-discipline introduced in
the policy was the introduction of long-term
recovery and management plans, starting in
2004 with the cod recovery plan (EU 2004a).
As this author has explained, these plans were
introduced when the recovery of very depleted
stocks made it clear that annual decisions
were not sufficient, and that a self-disciplined
long-term strategy to take annual steps toward
a long-term objective was necessary (Penas
Lado 2016, Chapter 4). However, the estab-
lishment of very clear-cut long-term objectives
may bring to the policy too much rigidity,
in terms of the possible inability to adapt to
changing circumstances, so it is necessary to
strike a reasonable balance between the two.
The dividing line between discipline and
rigidity is not necessarily clear-cut, because this
requires a fine analysis of what are the fun-
damental policy elements that should remain
fixed and stable, thus establishing discipline in
the governance system, and those that are more
marginal, which may remain flexible and easy
to change and adapt. Somehow, the reform of
the CFP in 2013 addressed this question, but it
did so largely as an exercise on power grabbing
and therefore the above question is not fully
resolved in Regulation 1380/2013. The actual
dividing line is that everything considered fun-
damental was to be decided under co-decision,
while the less fundamental elements of the
policy can be delegated to regionalization. This,
however, does not mean that the secondary
policy elements are so simple to adopt: region-
alized decision-making is certainly lighter than
co-decision, but still relatively heavy as a legal
and administrative procedure.
In practice, this question is clarified only in
terms of the scope of policy elements that can
actually be regionalized (that is, made relatively
more flexible and easily modifiable). And such
scope is rather narrow: in fact, regionalization
is applicable only in the context of multian-
nual plans (Articles 9 and 10), measures to
incorporate environmental legislation (Article
11) and the landing obligation (Article 15).
In principle all other policy pillars fall out-
side this process. Meaningfully, this did not
include technical measures, arguably the most
amenable to regionalization of all instruments,
to the point that the recent proposal for new
technical measures had to include an amend-
ment of the basic regulation to make that
possible.
Overall, given the ever-increasing complex-
ity of governance, the balance is still too much
on the side of discipline and policy rigidity, so
the real challenge of the policy for the future is
to maintain clear principles and objectives but
to create sufficient flexibility to achieve them
through different, adaptive means.

Policy flexibility: the example of the
United States
The US system is a very good example of a flexi-
ble policy, where the main objectives and princi-
ples are established in hard law and are legally
binding, but where the more detailed rules on
how to implement the law and how to achieve
the objectives rely more on guidelines, which
can be applied with a fair degree of flexibility.
The best examples are the 10 national
standards for the implementation of fisheries
management, referred to in Chapter 2 under the
headings “Policy objectives in other countries;
The United States”, which are complemented by
guidelines on how to apply the legislation, reg-
ularly updated and adapted without necessarily
changing the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
This system allows for a good balance
between the fundamental principles and
objectives, enshrined in hard law, and the
implementation, where the system is open to
continuous evolution through learning from
practice. This flexibility also allows for a lot
of room for maneuver for the stakeholders to
adopt the kind of measure they see fit, and
results in a patchwork of management sys-
tems that tend to be the best adapted to every
circumstance.
Examples of this flexibility are:
• The very different levels of risk to implement
the MSY “as reduced by” when fixing total
allowable catch (TACs) in different fisheries,
largely as a result of input from the Regional
Councils.
• The use of industry-managed measures to
handle discards and quota exchanges, which
applies only in certain fisheries but not in
others.
• The use of rights-based management, which
applies only to certain fisheries, not univer-
sally to all.
• The different levels of discard allowances as a
result of fishery-specific considerations.
These are but a few examples of this policy
flexibility which implies two important lessons:
(i) that very different solutions are possible to
implement a common standard; and (ii) that the
use of an instrument in one fishery does not
Fisheries governance and the CFP 193
necessarily prejudge its use in other fisheries.
These two lessons are certainly worth bearing
in mind when thinking about the CFP.
Can the CFP be more flexible? The
notion of “level playing field”
in the CFP
The CFP has a limited capacity to develop a
flexible approach similar to that of the US, and
these limitations are not necessarily always
of a legal nature. Nothing in Article 39 TFEU
indicates that the CFP should govern through
regulations that should specify every technical
detail, and that there is no space for guide-
lines to implement the policy objectives with
a degree of flexibility. The question is: is that
inevitable?
This author will contend that the main reason
why it is so difficult to advance toward more
flexibility in the CFP’s rules is the high politi-
cal importance that most Member States attach
to the notion of a level playing field, that is,
the importance that all fishermen in Europe are
governed by the same or very equivalent rules,
since no single Member State is ready to accept
that their fishermen are seen as being discrim-
inated against in EU law. The problem is that a
level playing field is traditionally equated to pol-
icy harmonization. There is still relatively little
place in the system (even after regionalization)
to admit that different rules in different fish-
eries can really be trusted as being equivalent
in achieving the same policy goals.
In the above example of the US, it is impor-
tant to note that the notion of level playing field
also applies, but differently: the level playing
field in the US system is to have the same stan-
dards, but not to harmonize the instruments to
achieve such standards, something that is also
food for thought for the CFP. We will develop
the point that the implementation of the level
playing field without trust among the play-
ers leads inevitably to policy complexity and
rigidity, in other words, in very detailed and
prescriptive legislation. Any attempt to ques-
tion this traditional trend will require a great
deal of trust among the players concerned.
194 Chapter 9
The new paradigm of the CFP:
regionalization
The regionalization of the CFP introduced in
the 2013 reform carries important promises,
notably the establishment of a legal basis that
provides for a real say to the stakeholders,
and for a management that gets much closer
to the problems of the real world. Although
it was in principle also viewed by certain
Member States (the UK) as a way to take
decision-making powers “away from Brussels”
and to partially re-nationalize the policy, it is
clear that this interpretation must not prevail,
and it was not the original idea of the Euro-
pean Commission in any case. On the contrary,
regionalization must be clearly a way of making
decision-making, particularly on more tech-
nical questions, closer to the fishing grounds,
closer to the stakeholders, more sensitive to
regional differences and specificities and more
easily adaptable to changing circumstances and
new challenges.
In this context, it is important to compare
regionalization in the EU with the regional
structure of the US fisheries policy, where it
was never intended to remove power from the
Federal Government, but to ensure that the
policy is well-adapted, in such a huge country,
to regional differences and specificities.
However, like with any other instrument,
regionalization also has certain risks that must
be addressed:
• Measures in different sea basins may be very
different from each other, thus becoming an
extra complexity for those vessels that fish
in more than one area in the same trip. In
other words, regionalization may not always
be a contributor to policy simplification as it
is expected to be.
• The buy-in by the stakeholders is dependent
on the use that national administrations
will make of the input from the stakeholder
bodies. Contrary to extended belief, national
administrations are not necessarily more
open to stakeholder advice than the services
of the European Commission in Brussels.
If the stakeholders feel that their views are
not more seriously considered by national
administrations under regionalized policy
making than they were by the Commission
under the traditional system, regionalization
will fail to deliver its fundamental objective.
• Last, but not least, it is a process that lets
the European Parliament out of the picture
as regards the substance of the regionalized
decisions.1 If the Parliament feels that Mem-
ber States use this procedure to somewhat
undermine the general rules established by
co-decision, this may result in a considerable
shrinkage of the amount and significance of
the provisions left for regionalization in the
context of co-decision legal acts.
Overall, the success of this new decision-
making process depends on the way in which
these potential difficulties will be addressed.
The example of the US: a
regionalized fisheries policy
The case of the US is an extremely interest-
ing example of a policy that was regionalized
from its inception in 1977. In effect, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) adopted in 1976
already introduced a regionalized approach,
including the establishment of eight Regional
Fishery Management Councils. Their experi-
ence is valuable for analyzing with respect to
the potential of regionalized management, its
advantages and disadvantages.
The regionalized policy has been subject to
a series of changes over time, in particular to
adjust the shortcomings of the policy and, at the
same time, to adjust the level of autonomy that
the Regional Councils enjoyed from the begin-
ning of the policy. The main characteristics of
this regionalized policy are the following:
• The Regional Councils are advisory to the
National Marine Fishery Service regional
administrators who perform the adminis-
trative functions. The federal government
1 Regionalized decisions take the form of Commis-
sion’s Delegated Acts. These have a procedure allow-
ing Parliament (and Council) to oppose adoption, but
only if and when the Commission’s Act goes beyond
the mandate for such decision, and not on questions
of substance.

reviews the decisions and recommendations
made by the Councils and can only overrule
their recommendations if they are in vio-
lation of the MSA or other relevant laws.
This has happened in only a limited number
of cases. In other words, these Councils
have enjoyed a large room for maneuver
to establish their policy, within the legal
framework established by the Magnuson-
Stevens Act.
• These Councils enjoy the flexibility provided
by the Magnuson-Stevens Act to establish
regulatory measures that, de facto, apply dif-
ferent levels of risk in fisheries management.
Put it another way: they do not necessarily
produce a “level playing field” in terms of
the level of risk associated, for example,
to the establishment of catch limitations.
However, this flexibility is today lower than
it used to be, as explained in Chapter 3,
in connection with the way of introducing
qualifications to the basic MSY value. When
it was realized that the flexibility to “modify”
such a value gave rise to a certain number of
recommendations for non-sustainable levels
of fishing, the MSA had to be modified in
2006 to ensure that the MSY values could
only be reduced as a result of the flexibility.
• The Regional Councils make recommen-
dations on a very wide range of issues, far
beyond than the relatively narrow range
of measures that the new CFP consid-
ers under regionalization. Among many
examples, one can cite the role of Regional
Councils in recommending systems of allo-
cation of fishing rights, and methodologies
to do so: using transferable quotas or not,
etc.
The US Regional Fishery Management Coun-
cils have, as a result, a much wider room for
maneuver to shape up policy, because there are
many fewer policy strands established through
detailed hard law. A key for this is the rela-
tively low importance given to the level playing
field: the MSA acts by establishing minimum
standards on a few questions, and these stan-
dards are not formulated in detailed terms in
the legislation. That means that insofar as the
Fisheries governance and the CFP 195
standards are respected, there is ample freedom
to adopt the policy as recommended by the
different stakeholders’ preferences.
Regionalization of the CFP:
the experience of discard plans
The adoption of the discard plans to implement
the landing obligation has been the first practi-
cal example of how the regionalized CFP works.
This experience is illustrative of how the CFP is
responding to the challenges expressed above.
This experience allows us to draw some prelim-
inary conclusions:
• Member States did the job in general terms.
The procedure for the Commission to legis-
late in case of Member States’ failure to do so
was not used. But this has been the case in a
very pressing context: that of adopting flexi-
bility mechanisms for the implementation of
the landing obligation. The real challenge of
regionalization will come with other kinds of
measures without the pressure to deliver on
a specific time limit.
• Regional differences among plans were sub-
stantial. This can be considered positive on
one account: that the tradition of looking for
a “level playing field” did not prevent such
differences. However, these differences also
had a downside: that fleets which operate in
more than one area in the same fishing trip
have to fulfill different and conflicting rules
in that trip; in other words, that regionaliza-
tion makes the rules more complicated for
them, not simpler.
• The degree to which Member States followed
the advice of the corresponding Advisory
Councils (ACs) was very variable, including
the two extremes: while the first conditions
applicable to the discard ban for pelagic fish
in Atlantic waters, proposed by the Mem-
ber States concerned and adopted by the
Commission (EU 2014a) largely ignored the
recommendations of the Pelagic Advisory
Council, the rules applicable to the Mediter-
ranean (EU 2014b) for the first discard ban
in that area were a perfect reflection of the
advice provided by corresponding Advisory
Council.
196 Chapter 9
• The scrutiny by the Commission services
of the earlier versions of the draft pro-
posed by Member States worked remarkably
smoothly. As an informal procedure not
contemplated in the basic regulation, the
analysis of the proposals by Member States,
carried out based on the scientific scrutiny
by the Scientific, Technical, and Economic
Committee for Fisheries (STECF), proved an
informal but very effective method to remove
from Member States’ proposals those aspects
where the scientific justification was weak,
forcing Member States to base their final
proposals on a much better technical or
scientific basis. This is a very good example
of the way in which informal, cooperative
mechanisms between Member States, the
Commission and stakeholders can provide
flexible solutions.
• On a less positive note, the mechanism is
such, particularly when it is applied with a
specific and tight deadline, that for measures
difficult to evaluate but with less than obvi-
ous justification, the system gives Member
States the benefit of the doubt, in a way
that a Commission proposal would probably
might never do otherwise.
Overall, the experience is encouraging but,
as happened between the first Regional Advi-
sory Councils set up in 2004, there needs to
be a learning curve of several years to ensure
that the system works properly. In particular,
the discard plans worked out at the begin-
ning because national administrations invested
heavily in brokering agreements, but this kind
of investment is not easy to maintain in the
years to come. The real challenge is to replace
such investment by the work of the ACs, which
in fact should largely replace national admin-
istrations in designing measures and brokering
agreements.
This will not be simple, on either side.
National administrations will have to learn to
largely delegate these questions to the stake-
holders, something that has not happened yet,
at least in all areas. But it will also crucially
require the ability, the willingness and the
means by stakeholders to invest in the process.
This in turn will only happen if and when
they see that national administrations trust and
endorse their proposals, something that will
take time, effort, trust, and good will.
The role of stakeholder bodies
Stakeholder bodies are meant to play a key
role in the new CFP, notably in the context of
regionalization, where their proposals could
be the basis for the regional measures to be
proposed through agreement by the Mem-
ber States concerned. This is known to be
challenging, because of the complexity and
variety of legitimate stakeholder interests in
Europe. In general terms, regional, and other
differences make it very difficult to decide
on trade-offs that are acceptable to everyone.
No poll or focus group can be considered as
having the “correct” or “universal” set of opin-
ions and values (Levin et al. 2015; Pascoe
et al. 2017). In the specific case of the CFP,
the sheer complexity of the Union makes this
even more difficult than in small countries.
In New Zealand, for example, certain prob-
lems can be resolved simply by organizing
a few meetings among the –limited –actors
involved (Kevin Stokes, personal communica-
tion), something almost impossible to do at EU
level.
The example of the US: what can we
learn from the US Regional Councils?
The 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conser-
vation and Management Act, set up eight
regional fishery management councils to
manage marine fisheries within a 200-mile
wide zone contiguous to the United States.
These were set up to cater for the different
characteristics of US fisheries in different areas.
The experience of these councils is very rich
and illustrative. Largely considered a success,
their role underwent an evolution over time to
ensure that the ample room for maneuver they
enjoyed did not lead to bad decision-making.
This experience, however, is extremely vari-
able, with certain councils working significantly
better than others. In terms of lessons learned,

I will draw in particular from the Regional
Council that, arguably, works best of all:
the Northwest Pacific Fishery Management
Council.
Their functioning
This author attended the sessions of the North
Pacific Fisheries Management Council, respon-
sible for the management of fisheries in Alaska,
held in Seattle from 30 January to 2 February
2017. A number of observations can be made
about such meeting:
• The level of involvement of stakeholders,
and their investment in spending several
days away from home, was impressive.
This probably is the result of the Regional
Councils’ capacity to shape up the final deci-
sions, which makes attendance worth the
investment.
• The presence and activity of environmental
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
was relatively secondary. This may be due
to several reasons: (i) that the legal frame-
work established by the MSA is satisfactory
for them so their involvement in the daily
discussions is not seen as crucial; (ii) that
they prefer to exert their influence outside
the Councils, including litigation where
appropriate; or (iii) that fisheries in the area
concerned are no longer a top priority for
these NGOs, given notably the very positive
evolution of the resources, at least as regards
the clear reduction of overfishing in recent
years. Whatever the reasons, this is in stark
contrast with the European ACs, where the
relationship with environmental NGOs is still
seen as a major difficulty.
• The business-oriented debates, including an
apparently high level of knowledge by stake-
holders of the basic concepts of fisheries man-
agement. The program of training of Council
members, organized by the Federal Govern-
ment, may substantially contribute to this.
• The very close relationship between fisheries
science and the Councils. Some evaluations
of stocks are made at meetings back-to-back
to the Council meetings, with important
presence of the industry in these evaluations.
Fisheries governance and the CFP 197
At the Council meeting there is open review
of the scientific basis for management actions
by the Scientific and Statistical Committee.
• The remarkable transparency of the discus-
sions, including the reporting of activities
contrary to the law, such as catches of pro-
tected species or the comparison between
TACs and estimated catches. This allows the
Council to evaluate, in aggregated form,
the problems associated with the practical
implementation of the policy, its flexibility
or rigidity and so on, thus allowing for a pro-
cedure of constant re-evaluation of agreed
rules, and their adjustment as necessary.
• The constant scrutiny of policy results
included also for example reports on the
effects of rights-based management and
its effects on the levels of accumulation of
fishing rights in fewer hands.
Many of these ideas could well be tested and
tried in the EU’s ACs. However, one reflection
must be made: the workings of the US Regional
Councils imply a costly, time consuming invest-
ment that the industries concerned can only see
as worthwhile if they are sure that they recom-
mendations will, at the end of, the day, turn into
policy. This is perhaps the biggest challenge for
the role of the ACs in the new CFP.
Another important lesson drawn from the
US experience is the importance of training. In
effect, handling fisheries management issues
implies the ability to grasp a wide range of
issues, scientific, economic, and social. The
better the knowledge about these issues among
stakeholders, the better-informed the discus-
sion will be, and the better the management.
For this reason, the US National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS) has initiated a program of
training of stakeholders to make them familiar,
in particular, with the basic concepts of fisheries
science.
Finally, it is also useful to bear in mind
that the above examples from the US coun-
cils are actually some of the most positive,
notably taking place in the North Pacific Fish-
ery Management Council. One of the keys
for their success is the excellent organiza-
tion of the industry, largely constituted by
198 Chapter 9
business-oriented operators with the capacity
to think strategically and negotiate practical
solutions. In other US councils where the
industry is less structured, the results are cer-
tainly much less impressive. This is a point
to be kept in the back of one’s mind when
thinking about the pros and cons of industrial
vs. artisanal fishing, as we will see in Chapters
11 and 14.
The role of cooperatives
In the US, a large part of the industry has
been organized in cooperatives, which in turn
have played a major role in the management
of their fisheries. Between 1997 and 2011,
fishing cooperatives on the West Coast of the
US and Alaska grew to cover almost 60% of US
West Coast and Alaska commercial fisheries.
In these fisheries, cooperatives now manage
capacity reduction and harvest limit compli-
ance internally, transforming the way harvest
limits are met – but not how they are set.
These cooperatives have lengthened seasons
and have reduced un-harvested allocations
and by-catch; they have also contributed to
establishing no-fish areas. They remain ready
to enlarge their field of intervention, but that
would require an evolution of the regulatory
system (De Alessia et al. 2014).
US cooperatives have been favored through
policy: the American Fisheries Act (AFA). The
AFA was signed into law in October 1998.
The purpose of the AFA was to tighten US
ownership standards for US fishing vessels
under the Anti-reflagging Act, and to provide
the pollock fleet the opportunity to conduct
its fishery in a more rational manner while
protecting non-AFA participants in the other
fisheries.
The AFA eliminated the race for pollock
through the establishment of cooperatives with
specific provisions for their allocations, struc-
ture, and participation by catcher vessels and
processing plants, as well as annual reporting
requirements and excessive share limits. In
response to a directive in the AFA, the Coun-
cil added measures to protect other fisheries
from adverse effects arising from the exclusive
pollock allocation. Cooperative fishing began
under the AFA program in 1999. The effects of
AFA on the pollock industry were tremendous.
Capacity was reduced, efficiency was increased,
regulatory by-catch was reduced, a higher por-
tion of the fish was utilized, and higher valued
products were produced.2
Environmental NGOs and Advisory Councils
Another important question in the US Councils
is the participation of environmental NGOs.
While it is important, and often includes litiga-
tion, many of the discussions on management
measures are not followed or questioned by the
NGOs. This is remarkable, and compares posi-
tively with European ACs, where the difficult
discussions between industry and NGOs are
often cited as the main difficulty for their work.
Why does this happen?
It is difficult to find literature on this topic,
but the personal experience of the author and,
more importantly, that of US scientists with
ample experience in such meetings, is that
environmental NGOs, once they have secured
that the Magnuson-Stevens Act requires that
TACs will be established based on Fmsy as
“reduced” by other factors, are sufficiently
reassured of the basis for sound management
and then prefer not to interfere in the discus-
sions on how much the industry will want to
reduce their fishing mortality levels with regard
to Fmsy . Having a sufficiently reassuring legal
basis seems to be the best formula to avoid
interference between industry and NGOs. This
outcome followed long years of continuous lit-
igation of Federal decisions from certain NGOs,
which forced the system to adopt policy goals
in their direction.
Another reason, from expert advice, seems to
be the development of more positive, coopera-
tive approaches by certain NGOs, which prefer
to cooperate with the industry in the search
of satisfactory solutions for all, thus creating a
positive atmosphere of cooperation that reduces
litigation and facilitates agreement. NGOs such
2 www.npfmc.org/american-fisheries-act-afa-
pollock-cooperatives/

as the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF)
have taken this approach, and it is generally
felt that it has produced excellent results both
in terms of achieving objectives and creating
a positive atmosphere for cooperation among
stakeholders.
The EU’s Advisory Councils’ structure
and composition: are they equipped
to do their job?
The importance of a good participatory involve-
ment of stakeholders in the process of designing
policy orientation has been demonstrated (Long
et al. 2015; Sampedro et al. 2017). This good
participatory involvement is crucially influ-
enced by the composition of the stakeholders’
bodies. This implies that all the important actors
must be there, but also means that all actors
must actively and positively participate. For
this reason, the composition of the advisory
bodies is a key element in determining their
contribution to good governance.
Advisory Councils: from reactive
to proactive
The new CFP of 2013 introduced a change in
the composition of the original Advisory Coun-
cils of 2004: the increase in the participation
by non-industry interests from a third to 40%.
This was intended as a message to the effect
that the new policy actually meant business
in terms of taking conservation much more
seriously, and to send the message that fisheries
management was not an activity open to a
very wide scope of societal interests, and not
only to the more specific interests of the fishing
industry. It is also important to note that certain
stakeholders needed to be associated in the
process. A number of authors have underlined
the particular role that women can play as
stakeholders. In particular, experiences around
the world demonstrate that women’s voices
are essential to assess the crucial question of
the resilience of human communities to policy
change (Calhoun et al. 2016).
However, this change did not reflect the more
fundamental change in the role of these Coun-
cils under the new policy: while the Regional
Fisheries governance and the CFP 199
Advisory Councils of 2004 only had a “reactive”
role (commenting on Commission initiatives)
the new Advisory Councils of 2013 are also
expected to be proactive and take initiatives to
propose specific solutions under regionaliza-
tion. Yet, their structure remained unchanged
except for the composition above mentioned.
Even their funding was initially unchanged.
The new composition rules are often con-
sidered by the European fishing industry as
problematic: ACs often report serious diffi-
culties in striking agreed recommendations
between industry and NGOs. Industry com-
plains about rigidity in NGOs and NGOs
complain about industry’s ways of ignoring
their views altogether.
In other sections of this chapter I advocate
more collaborative approaches for managing
the CFP. This would inevitably mean that the
ACs should evaluate whether they have the
right structure, means and context to under-
take such role. Collaborative approaches can
hardly be implemented without a fundamental
rethinking of the ACs’ structure and function.
And, in this vein, the longer experience in
other countries would seem to indicate that the
catch composition is not necessarily the key: it
is the ability to establish effective collaborative
methods that allows stakeholder bodies to excel
in their role in policy making.
Advisory Councils and science
This question has been hotly debated for quite
some time. Certain old regional advisory coun-
cils (RACs) repeatedly asked the Commission to
use part of its annual grant to finance the oper-
ation of the RACs to hire their own scientists, to
help them prepare their own recommendations
on a scientifically sound basis. The Commission
(including this author) traditionally opposed
this idea, for fear that these scientists could be
used to try to produce alternative science and
try to question that produced by International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
and/or STECF and end up creating confusion.
This, however, has not prevented certain indus-
try segments from bringing their own scientists
200 Chapter 9
to RAC meetings, simply by paying them from
their own pocket.
The experience of the US Advisory Councils
is extremely useful here. In such councils the
industry is free to bring their own scientists if
they pay for them, but what is more important
is the intense collaboration between science
and stakeholders. In particular, many evalua-
tion exercises are done in combination with the
Council’s meetings in an overall collaborative
effort. This has succeeded in bringing scientific
advice to an extraordinary level of trust by the
industry.
In the CFP, even if the scientific process of
both ICES and STECF has long incorporated
observers from stakeholder interests, and this
has certainly contributed to improve the under-
standing and trust between the two, the process
of scientific advice is still physically separate
from the discussions of the ACs. The idea of
exploring a more collaborative approach, for
example organizing AC meetings back-to-back
with STECF working groups dealing with
the stocks of interest of that AC, could be
explored.
A note on consensus: is this the best
method?
Although the legislation does not prejudge
the way in which the ACs should adopt their
recommendations, it has been commonplace
that recommendations by consensus have more
added value and are more likely to be followed.
Indeed, this is the philosophy behind the 2013
decision to enlarge the participation of the
interests other than the fishing industry to
40%, up from 1/3 in the previous RACs.
The idea is that by asking the different
stakeholders to get together in relatively bal-
anced proportions and by giving a premium to
consensus recommendations, those recommen-
dations would be more balanced and would
be a better basis for decision-making than
would be the more extreme positions of specific
stakeholders.
The problem with this philosophy is twofold:
• Very often, the points of view of the catch-
ing sector and the environmental NGOs are
so difficult to conciliate that the ACs may fail
to arrive to a meaningful recommendation.
As a result, the ACs may fail to fulfill their
promise of delivering decision-making to the
fishing grounds, and end up being still dom-
inated by the administrations.
• The industry does not have as much as an
opportunity as they would wish to discuss
issues industry-to-industry, since the pres-
ence of other stakeholders can sometimes be
intimidating.
It is important to understand that for the ACs
to fully do their job and become an instrument
for co-management, the working environment
has to be one of trust and collaboration among
all the stakeholders. True, this is not a question
of percentage composition of different interests,
but rather a question for the governance sys-
tem to reassure everyone that their voices will
be heard. Somehow, with a certain dose of cyn-
icism, one could argue that the 60%/40% com-
position of the ACs in the reformed CFP is a way
for administrations to delegate to them the diffi-
cult task of balancing out the different interests
and positions of different stakeholders (typically
a fisheries manager’s job), and make the work
of the administrations easier.
For this reason, the author has always advo-
cated the idea that consensus is certainly of
value, but it should not be an obligation. It is
preferable to have strong and clear recommen-
dations by a majority and then reflect minority
views rather than struggling unsuccessfully
for consensus and failing to make a useful
recommendation.
Are the ACs worth the investment?
Everyone involved in the CFP would agree that
the ACs are there to play a fundamental role
in the current and future CFP. Yet, certain ele-
ments cast doubt on whether this expectation
can and will be met:
• As we saw above, the CFP reform gave the
ACs very substantial new tasks but did not
fundamentally change their structure, func-
tion and even, initially, funding.
• A number of observers talk about a deep crisis
in some of the ACs, and question their ability

to deliver what the new CFP is asking them
to do.
This kind of situation has to be put into per-
spective: in the US system, where the regional
Councils have been working for much longer
than their EU equivalents, the good example of
the North Western Regional Advisory Council
cannot hide the fact that other councils do not
work nearly as well. This demonstrates that
making these councils work is something that
takes many years and, in some cases, might
actually never entirely happen. This, at least,
should be enough to indicate that the current
problems encountered in some of the ACs is
a growth crisis, and pessimism is just not an
option.
There can be many factors undermining the
ability of the ACs to deliver what is expected
from them in the new CFP. Some have been
mentioned above: the difficulties in conciliating
the different points of view of industry and
NGOs, the lack of trust among some of the
actors, the limited means, arguably insufficient
to take up the new roles, etc. But above all,
there is a factor that appears as the crucial one:
for ACs to work, their participants have to be
convinced that their hard work in the ACs
is really worth the investment. This question
somehow summarizes all the other points:
stakeholders will make ACs work if they see
that what they do has a clear reflection in the
policy.
Participation in ACs is costly, sometimes tech-
nically difficult (for example, understanding the
science) and time-consuming. If we want Euro-
pean stakeholders to take up the heavy invest-
ments that this represents, we have to give them
the assurance that their investment is worth it.
This means that they should see much of what
they do reflected in the policy. Is this the case
today?
We have seen above how some national
administrations largely ignored the advice of
the ACs on some of the initial discard plans.
Of course, expectations cannot be dispro-
portionate either: no AC can expect that all
their recommendations will be automatically
rubber-stamped by national administrations in
Fisheries governance and the CFP 201
the process of regionalization. But a lot can be
done to ensure that they can do their work
with a relatively high expectation of seeing the
bulk of their work turned into policy.
Drawing from the experience observed in
some of the most successful US Regional Advi-
sory Councils, a number of elements seem to
be important in that respect:
• The structure and function of the ACs could
be revised to make them more adapted to the
entirely new tasks from the reformed CFP, in
particular the need to make proactive propos-
als in the framework of regionalization.
• As advocated in this chapter too, the range
of questions subject to decision by regional-
ization could be enlarged, so as to give the
ACs a say on issues of considerable impor-
tance to them that are currently still outside
their remit. This would allow stakeholders to
propose package approaches instead of more
isolated solutions.
• National administrations should rely more
on the ACs to make up the recommenda-
tions under regionalized decision-making.
The experience of discard plans shows that
in some cases national administrations drew
up these plans as a political process, largely
downplaying the role of the ACs.
Many other ideas could be examined for the
same purpose. In any circumstance, it seems
clear that the ACs established in the 2013
reform are at a crossroads: with almost the
same structure as the old RACs, they have to do
an entirely new work, much more demanding
and difficult. Nobody can expect that this will
happen overnight, and without a rethinking of
their structure and function.
The role of Producer Organizations
Producer Organizations (POs) are an old insti-
tution in the CFP. Established very early in the
policy as the main instrument for the industry
to organize itself, notably in relation with mar-
ket policy, their main role has been to balance
fish supply with demand, so as to make public
intervention in the markets just a last resort.
In that vein, as the market policy under the
new CFP has lost most of its old instruments,
202 Chapter 9
and as the public funding to the POs is being
phased out, the issue of the increased role to
be played by the industry in the future policy
may be a good opportunity to rethink POs,
not exclusively as an instrument for market
policy, but rather as an instrument to allow
the European fishing industry a more proactive
role in the governance of the future policy.
POs could be used as a way to allow the fish-
ing industry the level of involvement in policy
making that will be implied in a more coopera-
tive, bottom–up governance system as proposed
in these pages. While parts of the industry do
not need such an instrument, many sectors may
actually benefit from having a PO with capac-
ity and mandate to represent their interests in
the meetings of the Advisory Councils. We must
bear in mind that the bottom–up policy advo-
cated here will imply a heavier involvement of
the industry, and this represents a challenge for
those industry segments that already consider
to be overstretched by the current system.
This idea could be combined with provisions
in the future structural policy to provide for
funds to (at least the weaker) POs to have
financing so as to ensure their active partic-
ipation in the governance system. Failure to
provide such financing might actually result
in a new system where only the most pow-
erful sectors would actually be able to have a
constructive contribution. This would fail to
deliver the objective of the ACs to be a fair
representation of stakeholder’s views.
Environmental NGOs and the CFP
Although environmental NGOs are part of
the stakeholder consultation bodies discussed
above, their role is certainly not limited to such
participation. And their influence in policy
making has become so prominent that they
certainly deserve a section of their own.
This is certainly not just a fisheries issue.
Like in many other policy areas, the influence
of NGOs has been steadily growing in recent
decades. By one estimate, the number of
transnational NGOs increased more than
10-fold between 1960 and 1997 to roughly
16 000! (Bhagwati 2004).
The influence of environmental NGOs has
been steadily growing since the inception of the
CFP. Today, such influence is extremely high.
And, over time, their field of interest has been
enlarging: while they focused on the protection
of endangered species in the first years of the
CFP, today they take an interest in all issues
related to mainstream fisheries management.
NGOs were very influential in the process
of policy reform in 2013. In addition, NGOs
ensure a very close monitoring of the CFP,
including for example a frequent questioning
of whether the Commission makes its propos-
als on annual TACs as according to scientific
advice.3
In fisheries management, NGOs are there
to stay. They have been even recognized as
formal stakeholders in the CFP. But their role
goes beyond, and their activity as lobbies to the
governmental agencies is much more influen-
tial than their contribution to the work of the
stakeholders’ bodies. However, their legitimacy
remains a controversial question, particularly in
some cases related to their sources of funding.
The influence of NGOs in the CFP has been
very positive in a number of cases, when and
where they have contributed to raise aware-
ness in the society at large about the need
to address certain problems. In other cases,
they have provided vital input to implement
certain strands of EU policy, for example in
the fight against illegal fishing. In this context,
for example, the contribution of certain NGOs
such as the Environmental Justice Foundation,
among others, has been extraordinary by pro-
viding a crucial amount of evidence of illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) activity for
the EU to act upon.
However, their role in other aspects of the
policy, notably the conservation policy, remains
very controversial, notably on two grounds:
3 http://cfp-reformwatch.eu/2015/09/ngos-losing-
their-trust-in-the-commission-over-scientific-
advice/

• Large parts of the fishing industry still see
them as hostile to their legitimate interests,
and often question their real motivations for
such hostility.
• In recent times, their level of influence is
such that it has raised questions of legitimacy
as compared with other human activity
and other societal interests in the marine
environment.
NGOs are very numerous and also very
varied. While some privilege uncompromising
campaigning, sometimes very aggressively,
other favor cooperation with the admin-
istrations and the industry. In a different
context (that of anti-globalization NGOs), a
useful distinction has been drawn between
“stake-wielding” NGOs, those who are often
seen in the streets and heard often with a
strident voice, and “stake-asserting” NGOs who
prefer to participate and influence the system
(Bhagwati 2004).
NGOs and legitimacy: funding
Whatever their attitude, their role is in any
case controversial, and their sheer capac-
ity to influence political decisions inevitably
poses questions about their legitimacy and
their representativeness. They encapsulate
the debate between representative democracy
(that they use as lobbyists) and participative
democracy which they influence considerably
through campaigning. The recent trend toward
increased (but superficial) flow of information
through new technologies and social media
plays very well with NGOs.
One of the criticisms that can be addressed to
the NGOs is the way they establish their priori-
ties that are in many cases determined by their
sources of funding. This means that NGOs must
be judged not only on the basis of what they
raise and campaign on, but also on the basis of
what they do not raise.
A typical example is that of large transna-
tional NGOs fundamentally financed by
foundations originating in the US oil indus-
try that are legitimately active in many areas
of human activity, but tend to shy away from
activity against the oil and gas drilling and
Fisheries governance and the CFP 203
transport. In other cases, it has been underlined
that while the negative effects of fishing of
the marine environment have so often been
denounced by NGOs, the (much more sub-
stantial) effects of livestock production on land
ecosystems and on climate change receive
surprisingly little attention.
The case of Pew
The case of the Pew Trust deserves special
attention, given its considerable influence and
leadership among the environmental NGO
community in Europe in recent years, in par-
ticular on issues related to the CFP. According
to publicly available information4 the Trust, a
single entity, is the successor to, and sole ben-
eficiary of, seven charitable funds established
between 1948 and 1979 by the adult sons and
daughters of Sun Oil Company founder Joseph
N. Pew. According to the 2009 annual report, as
of 30 June 2008, the Trusts owned over US$ 5.8
billion in assets. For the 12 months ending on
that date, total revenues were about US$ 360
million and total expenses were about $250
million, of which about $14 million were for
operating costs and fund-raising expenses.
These impressive means are focused on
reducing the scope and severity of three
major global environmental problems, among
them the:
Destruction of the world’s oceans, with a particular
emphasis on marine fisheries (emphasis added).
That the huge funds coming from an oil com-
pany are dedicated to fight the world’s oceans
with a particular emphasis on fisheries raises
an obvious legitimacy issue: is this NGO equally
committed to fight the effects of the consump-
tion of fossil fuels on the world’s oceans? Or
about the effects of land-based activities on
ocean pollution and marine ecosystem health?
Is the fishing industry an easy scapegoat for
the world’s ocean problems when other human
activities have a much higher effect on these
oceans?
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Pew_Charitable_
Trusts/
204 Chapter 9
The amount of money originated from the oil
industry does not disqualify the activity of this
NGO, if and when it is based on well-justified
arguments. But it certainly casts a doubt as to
the fairness of their strong focus on the fishing
industry and, by comparison, the little attention
paid to other human activities that may have
a bearing on the “destruction of the world’s
oceans.”
NGOs and their influence
It is necessary to discuss the limits of the influ-
ence of NGOs in policy making. This author will
contend that their influence has been positive
in some cases where they have raised aware-
ness about issues that might otherwise have
gone almost unnoticed, and have put pressure
on the system to ensure that fisheries managers
do their job properly. Cases like the influence of
NGOs for the Commission to take initiatives to
save North Sea cod at the turn of the century,
or to save Bluefin tuna in more recent years,
illustrate these positive influences.
In other cases, their influence is more con-
troversial, such as for example the intensive
campaign of the French NGO Bloom against
the authorization of the so-called “pulse trawl,”
an electric gear authorized only experimentally
for a number of years under the CFP, and hotly
discussed in the context of the latest proposal
on technical conservation measures. Despite
a scientific report by ICES that evidenced the
limited negative effects of the gear (ICES 2018),
Bloom’s campaigning (largely using social
media very effectively)5 successfully influenced
institutional positions against this gear.
When NGOs are too intrusive and try to
micromanage policy making, their influence
is often negative, since they are often led by
ideology more than by evidence and generally
lack expertise in law making as well as political
sensitivity over social considerations. Overall,
NGOs are good at raising public awareness on
the need for managers to do the right thing, but
5 www.bloomassociation.org/nos-actions/nos-
themes/peche-electrique/
they are not good at doing the fisheries manage-
ment themselves: they are good as campaigners
and advocates, but not as legislators.
NGOs’ role in science has been on the rise in
recent times. One of the basic tenets of good
fisheries management is that scientists will be
given full freedom to adopt their recommenda-
tions without any pressure from governments
or interest groups. In this sense, the indepen-
dence of such bodies as ICES or STECF has
been crucial for the progress of the CFP. In
Europe, NGOs are not questioning scientific
advice. Rather, they often question the terms
of reference sent by managers to the scientific
community; and often disagree on whether
managers are asking scientists “the right ques-
tions.” This is healthy because it puts the pres-
sure where it belongs: fisheries managers, and
leaves scientists to their work without pressure.
This, however, is not necessarily the tendency
everywhere. In recent times, certain NGOs are
questioning the independence of famous fish-
eries scientists, based on the funding of their
research. This is the case for example, with
Greenpeace and other NGOs with Professor
Ray Hilborn (dubbed an “overfishing denier”
by Greenpeace), who withstands a public
campaign against his independence (including
complaints to the president of his University!)6
on the basis of the – limited and transparent –
funding of his research by fishing industry
interests. This is due to Professor Hilborn’s
disagreement with some of the NGO’s cam-
paigning messages. That influence is ironic: if
we observe the sources of financing of some
of the NGOs themselves, it is easy to see, as
above, the influence of big economic interests
in deflecting the public attention from their
own impact on the world’s oceans.
In some instance, a certain NGO interfered
in an internal procedure of the Commis-
sion leading to the adoption of a proposal on
annual TACs. The NGO used a Commission’s
internal consultation document (not yet even
6 www.greenpeace.org/usa/research/overfishing-
denier/

available to Member States!) to discredit the
position of the Fisheries Directorate General
in front of the institution’s Legal Service. This
unacceptable practice shows that there should
be a clear line between legitimate lobbying and
undue interference.
Good awareness raisers, bad legislators
The experience of this author clearly demon-
strates that environmental NGOs have been
very positive for the CFP in some cases when
they acted on what they do best: raising aware-
ness about the need for fisheries managers to
“do the right thing” and address certain prob-
lems, as in the above-mentioned cases of North
Sea cod and Bluefin tuna. Pressure on the
institutions and cooperation through the pro-
vision of information by certain NGOs has also
been, and continues to be, a key factor in the
impressive progress of the EU’s policy against
IUU fishing. This is perhaps the best example of
how a cooperative approach can be extremely
fruitful.
However, when NGOs try to micromanage
the policy, through proposals for specific legal
provisions, they clearly lack knowledge on
law-making and, crucially, lack the necessary
balance to combine environmental concerns
with other socio-economic, or simply practi-
cal elements (such as feasibility, controllability,
etc.) that are equally legitimate and are essential
to guarantee good law-making.
Perhaps the best example is the inclusion, in
Regulation 1380/2013, of the expectation to
have all stocks with biomass levels above Bmsy .
This was the result of very effective influence of
certain NGOs in the decision-making process.
Even as an aspirational objective only (and
the NGOs concerned wanted it to be legally
binding), we have seen in other sections that
having all stocks above Bmsy may not be eco-
logically possible. Including in the legal text
an aspiration that is unachievable is not good
legislation: it can only produce frustration
and a false sense of policy failure. If all the
main stocks are within Fmsy levels by 2020, it
would be a tremendous policy success, even if
Fisheries governance and the CFP 205
a number of them were not at biomass levels
above Bmsy .
For these reasons, the intervention of envi-
ronmental NGOs in the CFP, that clearly is
there to stay, needs to be put in the right con-
text: positive and useful to raise awareness
about important management issues (with the
above caveats), but not appropriate for detailed
law-making. Clearly, they should continue
to be heard, but they should not dictate the
policy.
NGOs and Advisory Councils
From the inception of the Regional Advisory
Councils following the 2002 CFP reform, NGOs
have been considered part of the stakeholders
that constitute such councils. In the reform of
2013, their role in the new Advisory Coun-
cils was actually increased, by requiring that
non-industry stakeholders constitute up to 40%
of the composition of their general assemblies,
as laid down in Regulation 1380/2013 (EU
2013). This was a clear signal that NGOs were
there to stay, and to increase their influence in
the new CFP.
However, it does not necessarily follow
that European NGOs are embracing this new
opportunity and using it to the full. In fact,
the attendance of NGO members to AC meet-
ings is often patchy and incomplete. This may
be due to several reasons that go from the
alleged hostility of the fishing industry to
economic problems to ensure attendance to
all meetings. However, there is a factor that
emerges as a more worrying: some NGOs
admit that if they have to maximize the use
of their limited resources, they find it more
useful to invest in lobbying decision-makers
rather than participating and seeking consensus
recommendations in the ACs.
If the ACs are to play an important role in
the CFP it is essential that their components do
not undermine them by outside lobbying. Obvi-
ously, this concerns the industry just as much.
Perhaps the way to get there is to increase the
trust by the regulators in the recommendations
of the ACs, so as to ensure them a high rate of
success of their recommendations, as a way to
206 Chapter 9
discourage, as useless, external lobbying against
the ACs’ recommendations.
Is cooperation between industry and
NGOs possible?
As mentioned above, certain NGOs, such as
for example the EDF in the US, and the World
Wildlife Fund in Europe are well-known for
their collaborative approach with the indus-
try, through a number of specific projects.
These examples alone demonstrate that such
cooperation is possible. Of course, other NGOs
prefer not to cooperate and choose instead to
campaign against certain fishing activities. And
certain parts of the industry resent so much
the NGO campaigning that they cannot come
to terms with the idea of cooperating with
them. However, some parts of the industry
have demonstrated that they are more than
ready to do so. This shows that cooperation
between industry and NGO is a possibility, but
only when and where there are two willing
partners, from both sides.
The Commission has indeed tried to favor
this kind of cooperation. Beyond the composi-
tion of the Advisory Councils that we discussed
above, other instruments have been estab-
lished. The fisheries structural fund (Regulation
508/2014, EU 2014abc) foresees the fund-
ing of such activities, though rather vaguely:
while its Article 28 establishes a clear basis
for partnerships between scientists and fish-
ermen, Article 29 considers funding for the
“Promotion of human capital, job creation
and social dialogue.” Within this overall title,
funding is possible for social dialogue at Union,
national, regional, and local level involving
fishermen, social partners and other relevant
stakeholders.
The text is intended to promote social dia-
logue with trade unions, but NGOs are certainly
other relevant stakeholders so that the indus-
try/NGO dialogue could indeed be supported
on that basis. The question is to what extent
this possibility (true, almost hidden in the text)
will in effect be promoted by national author-
ities when implementing the CFP. This has at
least two components: (i) if this cooperation
has proven so fruitful in a number of cases,
shouldn’t it be promoted further in the current
context? And (ii) for the future structural pol-
icy, shouldn’t this kind of partnership have a
higher level of priority and visibility?
In any case, this cooperation is not just a
matter of funding. Much more important is the
realization of its strategic need. In a context
where the oceans are increasingly occupied
by different human activities, most of which
have no regard for the health of the marine
ecosystem (energy, transport, etc.) the two
most significant stakeholders who need healthy
marine ecosystems (the fishing/aquaculture
industry) and who advocate them (environ-
mental NGOs) should have a strategic interest to
cooperate. Some of this cooperation is already
taking place, but a lot more is necessary in
the future, and this constitutes a fundamental
challenge for future ocean governance.
The role of science
The new CFP and fisheries science
The CFP is a science-based policy. Regulation
1380/2013 requires that all proposals from
the Commission be made taking into account
the best available scientific advice. Under the
reformed CFP, science will play an even higher
role than in the past, for a number of reasons:
A good, reliable, and respected scientific advice
is a fundamental element for good fisheries
governance. In the EU, we have come a long
way in terms of improving the advice and, in
particular, improving its understanding and
acceptance by the stakeholders. However, this
is a process that can never be considered final-
ized. More improvements are still necessary in
the current scientific basis for the CFP.
• There are new requirements (MSY, dis-
card ban, long-term plans, multi-species
approaches, ecosystem approach, etc.) that
require new advice while, at the same time,
the traditioinal advice (on annual TACs,
technical measures, etc.) will still be nec-
essary. This implies that there is a growing
demand for extra advice in the new CFP.

• The requirements on transparency and on
the diffusion of science are ever growing,
including new “clients” such as the Advisory
Councils, the media and so on. This implies
that scientists must spend more and more
time explaining to different audiences the
scientific results.
• The areas of scientific expertise are enlarging
(economic and social science, environmen-
tal science) and so is the need to develop
inter-disciplinary approaches.
• The scientific community is increasingly
required to look into new areas (wider
marine environmental questions, global
warming, etc.) without necessarily having
additional resources.
• Last but not least, the challenges are also
important for the administrations and stake-
holders, notably to ensure that they have
the minimum scientific literacy necessary to
understand the increasingly complex science.
This clear increase in the demands for advice
intervenes in a context where the human
resources for fisheries science in Europe are not
growing, and where the best scientists have to
use an increasing share of their precious time
in disseminating science and in handling the
administrative part of their bids for research
funds. The question then is: can the European
scientific community face up to the challenge?
Scientific advice, a cumulative process
in layers
The scientific advice for the CFP must develop
following policy development. This results in
the introduction of new needs for advice as new
policy layers are added. One can distinguish a
number of layers:
• Traditional advice that is necessary for annual
TACs, technical measures, etc.
• New advice from the CFP reform of 2013.
This includes MSY projections, fishing mor-
tality ranges for multiannual plans, the
effects of discarding and so on.
• Economic advice, gradually included as a
mainstream part of the advice system.
• Advice on environmental questions, includ-
ing for example the implementation of
Fisheries governance and the CFP 207
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive
(MSFD) and notably the determination of
the level of fishing that is compatible with
good environmental status.
• Future advice, which may include the devel-
opment of multispecies approaches, the
effects of climate change or the need to
produce more food from the sea.
What is important about these layers is that
the addition of new ones does not make the
old ones obsolete: the old scientific advice is
not replaced by the new one, and still needs
to be improved, resulting in an ever-growing
number of layers of advice necessary for the
policy. This represents a double challenge:
• For the scientific community, how to be able
to produce the new layers of advice while still
producing (and improving) the traditional
layers.
• For managers to be able to absorb all the
accumulating layers of advice. This implies
having a critical mass of officials with the
time to read and the expertise to understand
such advice.
• For stakeholders, to be able to follow the
advice and to establish all the necessary
cooperation mechanisms to keep up to these
developments.
In sum, the ever-growing number of layers
of the scientific advice is a challenge for all the
players of the system, and not just for scientists.
Improving scientific advice
A number of initiatives have been taken in
recent years to address the above problem:
• Streamlining the provision of advice by
avoiding duplications between different bod-
ies. Under the old CFP, all advice for the
Commission had to come from the STECF
even when the original advice had been
prepared by ICES. This produced an obvious
duplication of efforts that has now been
eliminated, thanks to the Commission’s
insistence in the context of the 2013 reform.
• Increasing the EU budget for data collec-
tion, in the context of the new structural
fisheries fund, as well as the percentage of
contribution from the EU. For the period
208 Chapter 9
2014–2020, the EU has assigned EUR 520
million to finance data collection with an
80% co-financing rate (EU 2014c, Articles
13 and 94).
• Continuing funding fisheries science in Hori-
zon 2020. The research project MyFish on the
management of mixed fisheries is an excel-
lent example.7
However, all these initiatives have not fully
resolved a fundamental problem: the stagna-
tion of Europe’s workforce on fisheries science.
This is a complex problem. It can be related to
the low attractiveness of such a research area
for young talented scientists, given the low
curricular value of fisheries science publications
in ICES for example. But it is also related to
the current trends in the funding of science. It
has been reported that the increase in funds for
fisheries research in the past has not resulted
in an increase in the amount of research done
or in the number of scientists, but rather in the
replacement of other sources of funding, with
no net increase in the amount of work done at
the end (Penas Lado 2016). Clearly, other ideas
must be developed.
Data and science
The crucial importance of good data for good
fisheries assessment has been abundantly
reported. In this regard, the importance of the
data collection regulation for the improvement
of scientific advice for the CFP must once more
be underscored. And the CFP of 2013 went
even further than even before by taking two
significant steps: (i) including the collection of
scientific data as a legal obligation for Member
States (Article 25 of Regulation 1380/2013);
and (ii) increasing the budget dedicated to this
objective in the new fisheries fund (Article 13
of regulation 508/2014).
Given the high demand for new scientific
advice for the new CFP, the implementation of
the new framework of data collection is of fun-
damental importance. Fisheries science cannot
work on annual snapshots (although certain
7 www.myfishproject.eu/
annual surveys are important to check trends).
Rather, fisheries science, both biological and
economic, require time series. Building now
the right time series is essential to ensure we
can respond to the scientific challenges of the
future.
However, as we will see below with the prior-
itization of the evaluation process, the financial
means and the human base for basic research
and data collection are limited. It is important to
ensure that the priorities are well-established.
In this regard, one must abandon the idea that
more data always means better assessment.
Figure 9.1 shows how the relationship between
more data and better assessment is not just
a simple one where more data automatically
results in better assessments.
Although the general trend is that the more
data available, the better the assessment, there
are cases where the data are so abundant that
the assessment would be equally good even
with fewer data. In other cases, the quality of
the assessment is low, but an increase in the
data will not necessarily result in an improve-
ment of the assessment, because the problem
is not in the amount of data but rather on the
type of data and the methods used.
This is of course a conceptual picture, but
it indicates something important: a good data
collection strategy is not just about collecting
more data: it is about prioritizing data collec-
tion where additional data will provide the
most important gains in the quality of the
assessment. This is important in a EU context
where the successive accumulation of layers
is producing a saturation in the provision of
scientific advice, where the main bottleneck for
the provision of good science may not be just
data, but time for scientists to process the data
and draw the best possible conclusions.
Furthermore, the data collection should be
stable: different levels of availability of data
over time distort time series and can induce bad
management. To a certain extent, data stability
is even more important than data richness. An
interesting study by Rudd and Branch (2017)
found through meta-analysis that constant
reporting (either over or under-reporting)

Good assessment
possible with same or
less data
Improved
Assessment
Data poor: too little
data to allow for good
assessment
Figure 9.1 Conceptual relationship between data availability and assessment quality. Source: Inspired in the
presentation by Francisco “Cisco” Werner. Bevan series of lectures, School of Aquatic and Fisheries Sciences,
University of Washington, Seattle, 12 January 2017.
results in recommended catches that are sus-
tainable. On the contrary, when there are
trends in the level of reporting over time,
the improvement of catch reporting produces
resource under-utilization, while the deterio-
ration of catch reporting produces overfishing.
They conclude that while quantifying total
catch is necessary for understanding the impact
of fisheries on businesses, communities, and
ecosystems, detecting trends in reporting rates
is more important for estimating fishery status
and setting sustainable catches in the future.
Streamlining the evaluation process:
stock prioritization
One of the reasons why the EU scientists are
over-saturated is that the scientific advice is
provided annually for all stocks, at least for the
Atlantic. This does not mean that all stocks are
fully evaluated scientifically, but the scientific
community produces annual advice on all
stocks. In fact, in most countries, the scientific
literature shows an accumulation of publica-
tions on a relatively low number of species,
while for a number of important commercial
species there is little research done or, at least,
published (Aksnes and Bowman 2016).
Fisheries governance and the CFP 209
Assessment will
improve with more
data
Data rich but poor
assessment: different
data or method?
Data
This should not have to be necessarily the
case. While certain short-lived stocks (i.e.
anchovy, sandeel, etc.) strongly fluctuate annu-
ally so they have to be evaluated every year,
many long-lived species could be evaluated
only every second or third year without a sig-
nificant loss in the quality of the management.
Indeed, in some Regional Fishery Organizations
dealing with long-lived species, such as Inter-
national Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the evaluation of the
main stocks is done every two or three years.
In the case of deep-sea stocks, subject to TACs
since 2004, these TACs were bi-annual because
the stocks were evaluated every second year.
This would have obvious consequences on
the annual character of TACs, something that
has never actually been seriously discussed.
The possibility of evaluating certain tradi-
tioinal stocks only every second or third year
could allow scientists a more efficient focus on
important issues every year .
Data vs. thinking time
For years, data deficiencies for the advice of the
CFP have justified a priority in providing for
such data. Today, the provisions on data collec-
tion of the CFP by and large ensure a very good
210 Chapter 9
coverage of data (including those necessary for
economic analysis) for the policy. But at the
same time the advisory system is becoming so
saturated with ever-increasing demands that
a different problem is emerging: that of the
automatic nature of the advisory process. The
availability of data combined with standardized
methodologies allow for a very effective and
automatic provision of advice. But that has a
fundamental downside: the risk that the advice
will become too automatic. European scientists
are already warning that in some cases the
application of models is too automatic due to
lack of time, so the system increasingly tends to
churn out stock evaluations based on standard
methods, but with very limited time for revi-
sion. As a result, some scientists argue that the
main limiting factor for good advice to the CFP
is no longer data, but thinking time to filter out
the model results with the basic knowledge of
the fisheries and the biology of the species.
This is clearly a very important reflection.
Given the impressive increase in scientific
advice that the policy has to produce, it is
important to ensure that the future provision of
scientific advice will not just pile up more data,
but that it will provide for time and capacity to
process the data and allow for in-depth discus-
sions over and beyond the results churned out
by the evaluation models.
The US case
In the US, the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) has a well-
developed strategy for the prioritization of the
scientific evaluation work for setting TACs. This
strategy distinguishes different types and levels
of scientific evaluation (Methot 2015):
• Full assessment level
• Baseline monitoring/data-limited assessment
level
• Ecosystem-linked assessment
• Benchmark/prototype assessment
• Full update
• Partial update.
The justification of this strategy is clear:
research and evaluation are expensive, and pri-
oritization is absolutely necessary to maximize
the cost/efficiency of the scientific evaluation
system. The system uses several criteria to
classify different stocks in different levels of
priority, such as:
• Fishery importance. The most important
stocks economically are given top priority.
This is evaluated using, when relevant,
the estimated importance of the recreational
fishery. Other sub-criteria, such as the stocks’
importance for subsistence fisheries are also
considered.
• Stock status. This criterion gives higher priority
for stocks that are in greater need for conser-
vation and management actions.
• Ecosystem importance. This gives priority to
stocks that are important as forage for one or
several of the main species. It also considers
their role as predator or competitor of the
main species.
• Assessment information. Relatively higher pri-
ority is given to stocks where there are unex-
pected changes in stock indicators that may
reveal substantial changes in stock status.
Overall, this strategy, which is always open
to refinement, provides an extremely objective
way to streamline the scientific work in a way
to maximize the output of an overstretched sci-
entific community.
Science and the management system
Scientific advice and trust
As we will see below, creating trust among the
actors is an essential condition to improve fish-
eries governance. And that trust must affect,
perhaps in particular, the scientific advice. This
requires a “culture” that ensures that fisheries
scientists can produce their best advice with-
out pressure. Scientists themselves observe
frequent meddling or pressure in their work,
for example when certain stakeholders are
disappointed with the outcome of the advice,
that they consider against their interests or
when the local industries expect local scientists
to back their socio-economic considerations
(Rindorf et al. 2017). Other examples are
NGOs’ expectations that scientists will support
their ecological sustainability concerns (Knigge
et al. cited in Rindorf et al. 2017).

It has been clear for some certain time that
the improvement in stakeholders’ trust in
the scientific advice would require a different
approach in the way the advice is produced,
presented, and explained. Schwach et al. (2007)
summarized it very clearly by indicating that
all major stakeholder groups are calling for a
more interactive system to produce a common
knowledge base. This would bring uncertainty
from its marginal role as the “leftovers of cer-
tainty” to the heart of the science process, and
would require stakeholders to help address
uncertainty and negotiate a more realistic
placement of the burden of proof.
This is of particular relevance in the context
of two fundamental governance questions: the
need to place the concept of “uncertainty” as a
central one in the management process, and the
need to develop more collaborative approaches
to management.
Science and the industry
The independence of science is a fundamental
tenet of a healthy fisheries management system.
Although a partial contribution from the fish-
ing industry to science (as part of “cost recov-
ery” schemes) can be a good idea (see Chapter
11, “The fisheries control system”) particularly
in terms of providing funds or other means to
ensure a better collection of data, it is essen-
tial that the process leading to the provision of
advice remains independent.
In recent times, some extreme positions have
been taken, from those who consider that a sci-
entist having received 10% of his research funds
from the fishing industry is no longer objective
(see under “Environmental NGOs and the CFP”
above), to others who consider that government
financing of research is a “subsidy” with nega-
tive connotations (Sharp and Sumaila 2009).
These extreme positions are to be avoided.
While the contribution of the industry to sci-
ence can, if properly handled, be a positive
development in the sense of increasing indus-
try’s responsibility on the management system,
it is clear that the final provision of the advice,
on the basis of available evidence, must be
done without any meddling by vested interests,
Fisheries governance and the CFP 211
and thus the cost of such a process should
not be considered a subsidy, but a service that
public authorities should be fundamentally
responsible for.
There is a clear need to ensure full under-
standing between industry and science. In the
EU, in addition to the transparency already
applied by ICES and STECF, and the funding by
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)
of industry/science partnerships, there is still
room for improvement. Certain ideas applied
in the US East coast could be applied in the
CFP, such as the parallel scientific/commercial
surveys, or the participation of industry mem-
bers in the survey campaigns, can contribute
further to improve the trust and understanding
between these two fundamental actors of the
policy.
Science and managers
The independence of scientists and managers
is also a point worth mentioning. As the soci-
etal pressure to manage fisheries “according
to scientific advice” mounts, there can be a
tendency by managers to rely more on bio-
logical scientific advice as the sole source of
decision-making. This sometimes allows man-
agers to “hide behind the scientific advice” and
not do their job, which is to combine that advice
with other legitimate considerations. Typically,
the demands from managers in this context
tend to downplay uncertainty by asking scien-
tists to provide clear advice that they can use
without having to take too difficult decisions.
This has often been referred to by this author
as the “give me a figure” syndrome.
Certain authors have illustrated this, notably
in relation with the emphasis on single-stock
TACs as the one and only instrument for man-
agement (Schwach et al. 2007):
The attempts by managers to use science as a
legitimate device for the institutionally strong but
technically flawed TAC system result in demoral-
ized scientists who do not believe in what they are
doing, in undue demands for flexible advice with
no room for interpretation, and in continuous
inflation of the science boundary.
212 Chapter 9
One example of this phenomenon, among
many others, is ICES’ reply to a request for
advice on the level of disturbance of the bottom
of the North Sea from trawling, in the context
of the implementation of Descriptor 6 (seafloor
integrity) of the Marine Strategy Framework
Directive (see Chapter 8). The report (ICES
2017), in addition to providing plentiful data
on the levels and impacts of bottom trawling in
this sea basin, repeatedly indicated that it was
not for scientists, but for managers, to decide
how much bottom trawling is acceptable: that
is a decision that depends on policy objec-
tives. That was a clear demonstration that the
managers had asked them not just to provide
advice, but also to give a policy judgement.
This is certainly not just a European problem.
In other parts of the world, sometimes, man-
agers short-circuit collaborative methods by
asking scientists directly to recommend the
most appropriate strategy (Punt 2017).
These considerations require that the bound-
ary between advice and management be clari-
fied further:
• The role of uncertainty of the advice has to be
accepted by managers and placed at the cen-
ter of the management system, so that man-
agers do not place unreasonable demands on
scientists in terms of eliminating such uncer-
tainty.
• The terms of reference by managers must be
clear in asking for options and their conse-
quences, but must not ask science to take a
position on decisions which only belong to
managers.
As we will see below, this requires a new
paradigm in the relationship between science
and all the actors in the management work-
flow. But it also requires the existence of a
critical mass of scientists and a high degree of
understanding of scientific matters within the
administrations responsible, and particularly
within the European Commission services.
The human base of fisheries science: a
“low-recruitment stock?”
A problem emerging in recent years in Europe
is the human base for fisheries research, which
is arguably shrinking for many observers, and
certainly not expanding for most. There seems
to be a problem of low attractiveness of the
research area among brilliant young European
students. The causes can be varied, but two
regularly mentioned are the bad image of the
fishing sectors as one in permanent crisis and
frequently criticized, or considered to be in
the verge of collapse, and the low curricular
value of some of the publications generated or
even the difficulty in publishing in scientific
journals the kind of scientific work required by
ICES and STECF. Some consulted also mention
the relative low priority accorded to fisheries
science by various governmental and private
sources of research funds.
The EU has tried to contribute to this, inter
alia, by ensuring that there is basic funding for
data collection, but the problem runs deeper.
Even if basic data collection is well-funded, in
Europe there is still a high number of stocks
with very little or no research and evalua-
tion. This contrasts with other cases, such as
those of the US and Canada, where fisheries
management extends even to a high number
of secondary species, all of them having basic
research and evaluation. For example, in the
Pacific groundfish fishery in Canada, there
are as many as 40 stocks of rockfish (different
coastal species of limited economic importance)
being managed and subject to research and
(simplified) evaluation.
There are no easy solutions to this question,
but this is worthy of a strategy to try to ensure
that the CFP does not run out of high-level sci-
entists. Just as an example, in the US NOAA
organizes conferences in universities to attract
young, brilliant people to fisheries and other sci-
ences. At EU level, similar or other initiatives
must be put into place to ensure that the “stock”
of EU fisheries scientists does not suffer from
“impaired recruitment” in the years to come.
Scientific literacy
The problem of the availability of science is also
a question outside the scientific community
itself. There is probably little point in increasing
the amount of science available if fisheries

managers don’t know how to use it. There
is an issue about the “scientific literacy” in
fisheries administrations. It has been argued,
for example, that the failure of the initial stages
of the CFP to address emerging overfishing was
the lack of scientific literacy in the European
Commission services in the late 1970s and early
1980s (Holden 1994).
Ensuring that the administrations concerned
(and not just the European Commission) dis-
pose of a critical mass of fisheries experts, and
ensuring a relatively high degree of scientific
literacy among non-experts becomes an essen-
tial element for good management, all the more
so since the increasing complexity of the issues
at stake and the associated scientific advice.
Crucially, this also applies to the stakeholders.
We referred above to the training programs
organized by the NMFS in the US. This seems
a very good idea to be promoted further. As
for the Commission services, ICES organize
excellent training courses on fisheries science
that have been followed by a number of EU
staff. But over and beyond these interesting
possibilities, it is very important that the staff
policy of the European Commission ensures a
critical mass of scientific literacy in its services,
as an essential condition for the institution to
be able to play its essential role in running this
policy in the very complex policy context of the
future.
Economic advice
Economic advice is very recent in the CFP and
still lags behind biological advice as a funda-
mental source of advice for the CFP. Although
the economic advice is catching up, it still
suffers from a certain reputation of not being
real scientific advice.8 Yet, the achievement
of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU, as well
as those of Regulation 1380/2016 do require
that the economic advice be available to guide
decision-making as well as to ensure adequate
reporting of policy progress.
8 A number of people consider economic advice as
“politics” or as an excuse for not applying biological
advice.
Fisheries governance and the CFP 213
Progress in recent years has been impres-
sive, particularly in transforming economic
analysis from a simple description of trends to
analysis of causes and effects. While the first
economic analyses presented by the Commis-
sion were mainly descriptive, the most recent
reports have started to analyze cause/effect
relationships, so they are now in a position, to
some extent, to explain the economic trends
observed as a result of policy development. For
example, recent reports clearly demonstrate
the positive economic effects associated with
the biological recovery of the stocks, something
that was previously a theoretical point; it is
now demonstrated with hard data.
The key to the recent development of the
economic advice has been the inclusion of
economic information into the support scheme
for data collection, which has allowed, roughly
as of 2007, the development of time series of
economic parameters that in turn have allowed
the study of trends in those parameters and
how they relate to other policy elements.
The next step in this evolution is the idea of
turning economic advice from an instrument
of policy analysis ex-post to a real instrument
for policy decision, and to do so in areas where
economic advice has so far been absent. Some
examples are outlined below.
Economic advice for TACs
In recent years the Commission has started
to provide economic advice to the decisions
on TACs, notably on questions related to the
degree of dependence and possible economic
effects of certain fleet segments affected by
recommendations for substantial reductions in
TAC levels. This kind of advice is very useful in
turning the classic “December negotiation” on
TACs into a much more objective, transparent,
rational, and ultimately legitimate negotiation
between science-based arguments on the bio-
logical and the economic consequences of the
TAC levels.
For example, the TAC reductions advised by
biological science can be compared with the
economic performance of the fleets depend-
ing and their degree of dependence on such
214 Chapter 9
stocks, so as to evaluate in objective economic
terms what is the real impact of a substantial
TAC reduction on specific, dependent fleet
segments, and their capacity to absorb a neg-
ative economic shock. This, alone, is turning
a political negotiation into an objective one
on how to combine biology and economics as
part of intelligent and well-informed fisheries
management.
Economic advice for other policy strands
Another important area where more economic
science would be necessary is the structural
policy. Many of the instruments that, with
certain variations, have been included in the
structural policy in the fisheries sector (some
measures have existed since 1970) have never
been seriously studied in terms of their effect
on the fishing industry and their contribution
in achieving the CFP objectives.
Theoretically, the structural policy should
not be permanent, but rather an instrument
to solve structural deficiencies that the free
market is unlikely to resolve. In other words,
the structural policy is there to solve market
failures. However, the lack of economic advice
on the effects of many of these measures has
traditionally produced a rather uncritical con-
tinuation of many of these measures without
a serious analysis of whether they resolve
a market failure, or simply continue as an
acquired right regardless of their need and
effects.
As we will explain in Chapter 14, the future
may question the continuity of today’s generous
structural policy. If that is ever the case, there
would be a need to prioritize funds much better,
to focus them to resolve the real market failures.
For example, what is the effect of tempo-
rary laying-ups or vessel modernization in the
overall balance between fleets and resources?
This has never been studied seriously, and dis-
cussions on the need and opportunity of such
instruments has traditionally taken the form of
political discussions dominated by pressure by
certain constituencies against opposition from
ideological opponents, none of them with solid
economic arguments to hand.
The opposite is also true, and certain
instruments have been suppressed (such as
joint ventures) without a serious economic
study of their real effects, but rather on sim-
plistic foregone conclusions (the EU “exports”
its overcapacity to third countries). In the case
of scrapping premiums (phased out after 2017)
the absence of serious economic analysis for
the whole of Europe on the economic effects
under different scenarios and modalities has
led to the suppression of an instrument that, if
well-designed and implemented, could still help
considerably the achievement of the objectives
of the CFP.
Hopefully, the next structural instrument
(after 2020) should be able to judge the need
and opportunity of certain instruments (or the
reintroduction of others) on the basis of a much
better-informed economic basis.
Science in the information age
This is an emerging challenge that will probably
only grow in the future. For many years, the tra-
ditional, peer-reviewed scientific advice was the
only source of information for decision-makers,
other than fishermen’s interests. Today, how-
ever, traditional advice has two new competi-
tors: (i) advocacy campaigns by NGOs, which
include an increasing amount of technical argu-
ments; and (ii) highly publicized science, often
not the best science, but the one that captures
headlines and influence public opinion.
The relative influence of these new players is
inversely proportional to the level of scientific
literacy of decision-makers, but also to the
time available to read the traditional science.
The choice between a long, complex, often
user-unfriendly scientific advice and a leaflet
with a few catchy arguments, or against catchy
headlines in the media is a very unfair one. If
managers lack scientific literacy and time to
read the science, the risk that more and more
management decisions will be based on the easy
arguments rather than on the complex ones
from the traditional advice significantly grows.
And as the weight of public opinion, which
can be captured by headlines but will never
read the complex advice, grows in influence
for decision-making, it is clear that the role of

scientific advice will be more and more under
pressure in the system.
This will require scientific literacy among
the players, as explained above, but it will
also require that the advice system itself will
make an extra effort to be more readily under-
standable by non-experts. This opens up the
need for scientists to invest more on explain-
ing the advice to a much larger public than
today.
The role of consumers:
certification systems
The consumers are playing an increasingly
important role in the development of con-
sumption patterns, although their influence is
still very varied among European countries. For
example, in the German market, consumers
are highly sensitive on sustainability issues and
are ready to pay a moderately higher price
for sustainable seafood. In such a market, the
fishing industry actively seeks the certification
of their products, not even to increase their
market share, but actually to prevent being
squeezed out of their own markets. In certain
European markets, supermarket chains are
gradually considering selling only certified
fish. In southern Europe the situation is differ-
ent, with consumers tending to favor quality
and freshness over sustainability, but one can
certainly argue that the trend will arrive in such
markets in the years to come.
The role of consumers as a driver for pol-
icy change was clearly shown in the last CFP
reform of the CFP, where the Commission’s
campaign to promote sustainable fish had a
considerable influence on the European public
opinion. Significantly, this campaign raised the
question of sustainability but it did not indicate
what specific fish was sustainable. This shows
that even in the absence of such guidance (that
was actually provided by different non-EU
initiatives) the appeal to consumers can play
a very important role in shaping up policy
through the influence of public opinion on
administrations.
Fisheries governance and the CFP 215
The case of MSC
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) has
become in recent years the most extended and
influential certification system of sustainable
fishery resources. MSC now claims that 9.9
million tonnes of fish (close to 12% of total
fish production in the world) as being certified
by them. They have certified 313 fisheries in
30 countries and 91 more are being evaluated
for possible certification.9 At the beginning
MSC-certified fish acquired market advantages,
including in some cases higher prices. In recent
years the MSC is becoming so influential that in
certain markets in Northern Europe fishermen
want their fish certified simply to preserve their
market share, and consider that non-certified
fish will eventually be squeezed out of their
own markets.
This influence will contribute to shape up
attitudes in the fishing industry by providing a
very strong incentive to adopt sustainable fish-
ing practices: losing an MSC certification carries
a risk of being excluded from certain markets,
and this may be in some cases a strong incentive
to accept unpalatable management measures.
This in principle goes in the same direction as
the new CFP, so one can consider that MSC can
indeed reinforce the Commission’s drive for
sustainable fishing. The question is, however,
whether the criteria for sustainability estab-
lished by MSC are the same as that established
in the rules of the CFP, and to what extend they
reinforce each other.
Although the MSC has certainly contributed
to raise awareness in the fishing industry about
the need to ensure sustainable fishing practices,
its criteria to certify fisheries is not without crit-
icism. While in some cases MSC has certified
fisheries, in some other cases they have certified
fishing practices. This is the case for example, of
the fish aggregating device-(FAD)-free fisheries
by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)
in the Pacific. According to this certification,
tuna fisheries without FADs are deemed sus-
tainable while fisheries with FADs are not,
all for the same stocks. This has given rise to
9 www.msc.org/global-impacts/key-facts-about-msc/
216 Chapter 9
serious questioning of this certification. By
certifying the fishing technique rather than
the whole fishery, the certification no longer
reflects the sustainability of the fishery as such.
As the industry concerned has pointed out, this
kind of certification means that the same vessel
fishing the same stocks with two different tech-
niques can catch sustainable fish in one haul
and unsustainable fish in the next one (Moreno
et al. 2016).
Another good example is the criticism to the
MSC standards by a number of environmental
organizations that consider that MSC’s certifi-
cation standards largely ignore the effects of the
fisheries certified on by-catches of sharks and
marine mammals. This has led MSC to regularly
revise its own standards to try to accommodate
such considerations, so the certification is not
fixed in time, but subject to evolution through-
out the years (Agnew et al. 2014).
The question of a possible harmonization
of criteria between the EU and MSC has been
often floated as a possibility. This idea, however,
seems very difficult to implement in practice.
The EU would have a problem of principle if it
should adapt its standards to those of a private
arrangement. And MSC may consider that
adapting to EU standards may question its role
as a global certification system, well beyond the
specific case of the EU.
The dolphin safe certification
This certification was originated when it became
obvious in the 1990s that the fisheries for yel-
lowfin tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean
involved a high level of mortality of dolphins.
Since then, different measures have been taken
to ensure that the tuna can be caught without
or with very low dolphin mortality. Promoted
notably by an environmental NGO (the Earth
Island Institute), this certification does not
concern the sustainability of the target species,
but only the side effects of the fishing activity
as regards the mortality caused to dolphin
populations. Importantly, the certification is
given to fishing techniques for their low impact
on dolphins, regardless of whether the level of
dolphin mortality by the alternative techniques
is actually sustainable.
This question has been very well illustrated
by James Joseph (1994). The implementation of
this certification has had a considerable effect
on fishing practices: the US tropical tuna fleet,
to avoid any problem with this certification, had
to move to the western Pacific, where the catch
of tuna is not associated with dolphins.
To this day, this certification remains one
of the most powerful ones in the fisheries
world, notably due to its relative simplicity and
because it appeals to an issue (killing dolphins)
that a large part of consumers worldwide have
at heart. Meaningfully, this certification has no
impact on the fish (the main species affected
is yellowfin tuna, Thunnus albacares) but it
has a tremendous impact on the fishery by
purse-seiners.
Other certification systems
A different approach is that of the Monterrey
Bay Aquarium, that rather than certifying
seafood, it provides consumers with informa-
tion about the status of different species, so that
consumers can make informed choices when
buying it.10
Other systems are being developed with
similar objectives. Among them, it is worth
mentioning one that has the ambition to
become a world standard: The Global Sustain-
able Seafood Initiative (GSSI). GSSI is a global
platform and partnership of seafood companies,
NGOs, experts, governmental, and intergov-
ernmental organizations working toward more
sustainable seafood for everyone. This initiative
sets sustainability standards based on Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) guide-
lines, and is sponsored by different partners
around the world, notably from the fishing
industry.
10 www.montereybayaquarium.org/conservation-
and-science/our-programs/seafood-watch?
gclid=CjwKEAjwgtTJBRDRmd6ZtLrGyxwSJAA7Fy-
h79_tHnqLTcOi2Oetg_V92-x-_P-vehUrUtK_
FzkZ2RoCa9Pw_wcB/

The growth of different certification systems
has been such that FAO had carried out a com-
parative study of the existing schemes, already
in 2001 (FAO 2001). FAO distinguishes three
types of certification schemes:
• Type I environmental labels are those
based on voluntary multi-criteria prod-
uct life-cycle assessment of effects with
verification through a third party.
• Type II environmental labels are based on
self-declared claims by producers, importers
and retailers on products and services.
• Type III environmental labels provide quanti-
fied product information according to pre-set
indices, similar to general consumer informa-
tion on product packages.
This clearly indicates that certification or
information systems are extremely varied and
put emphasis on different aspects of the fishing
activity and the exploitation of resources. The
idea of any certification system for EU fisheries
would start, then, by a consideration of the
main questions that European consumers care
about.
It is important to underline that during
the 2013 reform process, the European Com-
mission used, very successfully, campaigns
in the mass and social media to raise aware-
ness among European consumers about the
need to consume sustainable fish. But while
this proved successful, the Commission could
not complete such a campaign with any spe-
cific definition of what sustainable fish actually
meant, in a clear demonstration of the difficulty
to turn the generic interest on sustainability
into a workable, reliable, and fair formula for
certificating fish.
Public or private labels?
The initiative by the European Commission to
conduct a public consultation on the possibility
of an EU label for sustainable fish was inconclu-
sive, showing a considerable division between
citizens and stakeholders (EU 2016b). This is
not surprising, since the debate has always
been complex and divisive. But the question
is: is there a case for an EU-based eco-label for
European fisheries?
Fisheries governance and the CFP 217
The possible establishment of an EU-based
eco-label would have a number of difficulties:
• What would it certify? From the above dis-
cussion it follows that an eco-label cannot
possibly inform about all the objectives of
Article 39 TFEU. Then what of the objectives
of that article would be reflected in that
label? And why?
• As we saw above, the sustainability of a fish-
ery for a stock is not necessarily related to
the level of preservation of biodiversity in the
ecosystem where it lives. What policy objec-
tive should prevail in the certification?
• For the EU it would be difficult to imply
that a stock under the CFP could be
non-sustainable; this would be equiva-
lent to publicly admittingthat the policy is
not working.
• Ultimately, there is a question of fairness and
equity that is difficult for a public adminis-
tration to establish. If a stock is overexploited
and catch levels under the CFP are estab-
lished at very low levels, and such low levels
are respected, why is there a need to tell
consumers not to buy that fish? One can
construe the opposite logic: if a stock is in
trouble, there is a need to reduce catches, but
not to reduce income to fishermen; on the
contrary: it could make sense to ensure that
fishermen can have a viable fishery on the
basis of much lower quotas, and this would
imply better prices for the limited fish avail-
able, and not the lower prices that would,
presumably, result from a low qualification
in the label.
Perhaps the most positive contribution of an
EU-based eco-label would be that of unifying a
very dispersed system of eco-labels and provid-
ing a guarantee of impartiality. However, the
diversity of labels is justified by the diversity of
interest by consumers, and the impartiality of
the EU is, unfortunately, not necessarily some-
thing many consumers would take as a given.
Overall, today, as in years past, the prospect of
an EU-based eco-labeling system poses many
questions and does not seem to provide too
many answers.
218 Chapter 9
What to certify in the future?
The certification systems referred to above are
largely private, and their variety may induce
consumers to a certain level of confusion as
to what they exactly mean and, meaning-
fully, who and how controls the adherence of
seafood companies with the conditions of the
label. This is not surprising: many different
communities care about very different things.
Biological sustainability is important for certain
consumers; others are more inclined to buy
on the basis of geographical origin, or by the
type of fleet which has caught the fish (arti-
sanal or industrial). Other consumers favor fish
caught while respecting social conditions and
others based on human health considerations.
It seems difficult, if not impossible, to establish
a labeling system that will address all these
questions at once and, at the same time, be
simple and understandable. For these reasons,
it is difficult to imagine a single eco-label for
fisheries management that could put together
all those elements. And, if the idea is to make
an eco-label only for a certain question, such
as the sustainability of a given fish species,
then the question is why such a label should
inform consumers about the achievement of
that policy objective for that species, and not
about other – equally legitimate – objectives of
Article 39 TFEU?
The different objectives referred to above are
in fact independent and may have little overlap.
For example, a stock can be sustainable in a
fishery with very poor working conditions, or a
fishery with very high income for the producers
can be unsustainable. Likewise, a fishery for a
stock can be sustainable in an ecosystem where
all the biodiversity has been lost, or a fishery
can be unsustainable even when conducted
with an environmentally friendly gear in an
almost undisturbed, high biodiversity envi-
ronment, if the catches are too high. Since the
objectives of Article 39 TFEU are fundamentally
socio-economic, certification systems may also
refer to the working conditions under which
certain fish are caught. But combining all possi-
ble criteria in one single level seems a daunting
task, likely to induce more confusion in the
consumer.
Overall, it seems very unlikely that the CFP
will ever have a public certification system.
Instead, the possibility of adopting guidelines
and minimum conditions for the acceptabil-
ity of private labels seems more realistic. These
conditions would be, for example, requirements
to ensure that the certification is transparent
and fair, and not based on false information or
influenced by vested interests.
Governance in the reformed CFP:
the example of multiannual
plans
To analyze the current governance of the CFP
as reformed in 2013 the best example is that of
multiannual management plans (MAPs), which
were identified as the main management instru-
ment in that context. Article 9(1) of Regulation
1380/2013 establishes that:
Multiannual plans shall be adopted as a priority,
based on . . .
This language clearly underscores the empha-
sis of the co-legislators on the use of this kind of
instrument as the main framework for fisheries
management in the CFP. Not only that: certain
features of the regulation, such as the limitation
to three years of the validity of the discard plans
was also justified by the need to consolidate
MAPs as the carrier of these measures. The
understanding was that by the time the discard
plans were necessary (2015) not all fisheries
would yet be covered by MAPs, and so the
co-legislators decided to allow these discard
plans to be adopted through regionalization
for a limited period of time, so there would
be an incentive to ensure that within these
three years all fisheries would be covered by
MAPs. The reasons for this emphasis were
twofold:
• Institutional, because the adoption of the
MAPs by co-decision (unlike annual TACs)
made it very important for the European
Parliament to ensure that the main thrust

of the conservation policy would be a
co-decision act.
• Substantial because it was understood that
the achievement of the MSY 2020 objective
would require a balance between gradual-
ness and discipline that has always been the
trademark of the MAPs.
For these reasons the experience of decision-
making around MAPs represents the best
example of the interplay among the three
institutions in the decision-making process
of the CFP, and the best example of what
works better or worse in the governance of
the CFP.
Background
Although the 2013 emphasized the need to
adopt multiannual plans as the main gover-
nance instrument of the CFP, such plans are
much older. They were actually incorporated
as an instrument in the 2002 reform (EU 2002)
and in subsequent years, a number of different
plans were adopted, starting by the recovery
plan for cod (EU 2004a) followed by many
others until 2008. The main different between
the two generations of multiannual plans is that
before the Treaty of Lisbon, they were adopted
by Council alone. After the new Treaty, they
are adopted in co-decision by Council and
Parliament.
The implementation of the old plans has
provided important experience that should be
taken into account when dealing with the new
generation of plans being prepared under the
reform of 2013:
• In some cases, the Council had a problem
following its own rules: in the case of cod
and southern hake, it did not want, in some
cases, to follow the plan when establishing
annual TACs or effort levels. The idea of
self-discipline was often not achieved.
• The cod recovery plan illustrated the
dichotomy between the need to recover
individual stocks and its effects on other
(healthier) stocks in mixed fisheries.
• The objectives of the plan once the objectives
were achieved were not always clear. This
was the case with the northern hake plan,
Fisheries governance and the CFP 219
which ended somehow in limbo when the F
level established as target was reached.
• The implementation of the effort manage-
ment system included in some of these plans
was patchy at best. In other cases, effort man-
agement was not effectively implemented
because it was seen as an obstacle to fully
fish quotas under relative stability.
The new plans, to be adopted by co-decision,
are an excellent opportunity to learn from that
experience.
Multiannual plans and the role of the
institutions
The adoption of multiannual plans has been
the main battleground for the co-legislators
after the introduction of co-decision as the
ordinary legislative procedure of the CFP as
a result of the entry into force of the Treaty
of Lisbon. As a new procedure, after more
than 30 years of decision-making by Council
alone, co-decision has been a governance chal-
lenge in terms of striking the right balance of
power between the co-legislators and between
them and the Commission. In Chapter 3 we
referred to the difficulties associated with the
adoption of the long-term management plans,
or the amendment of the existing ones, as
the ultimate expression of the new balance of
power stemming from co-decision, and how
fishing mortality ranges contributed to solve
this problem.
The different roles of Council
and Parliament
Council and Parliament are co-legislators on an
equal footing, but in fact their respective role
tends to be different, and this has a bearing on
the overall governance system:
• Council tends to pay more attention to prac-
tical questions of applicability and enforce-
ability. It takes a more flexible view of pol-
icy objectives. It also tries to keep as many
questions as possible outside co-decision, to
be decided by Council alone, in the context
of annual TACs for example.
• Parliament tends to reflect a much wider
scope of societal interests, such as
220 Chapter 9
environmental concerns or specific prob-
lems of small-scale fisheries. Parliament has
often defended more ambitious interpreta-
tions of the objectives of the policy, and has
insisted, for example, in imposing biomass-
related thresholds to apply fishing mortality
ranges, much in line with NGO positions.
The trilogues to decide the two multiannual
plans in force (Baltic and North Sea demersal
stocks respectively) have been the battle-
ground for the debate on the interpretation
of policy objectives, as indicated in Chapters 2
and 3, with Council advocating more flexible
approaches and Parliament defending more
ambitious ones.
The Commission as an honest broker
The role of the European Commission as the
exclusive provider or legislative proposals
underlines the important role of this institu-
tion. What the Commission proposes has an
influence on the final decision, but can and is
often changed or rejected by the co-legislators.
But the role of the Commission is not just to
make a proposal, it is to act as an honest broker
in the co-decision process.
Every trilogue is different, but the experience
of this author after half a dozen important tri-
logues is clear: the Commission has more influ-
ence (and a more positive one) when it plays
less politically, and concentrates on providing
credible policy advice, based on its experience
on what works and what doesn’t. It is in this
context that it can build the trust necessary for
the co-legislators to give it the essential role of
honest broker.
For that to be the case, the Commission
should ensure a high level of expertise by its
officials as well as a good system to preserve
and exploit the accumulated wisdom and expe-
rience. This is something that can be at odds
with the current policy of mobility of the staff,
which can have some positive effects, but can
also have a serious drawback: it does little to
preserve the critical mass of experience and
expertise in the services.
This is important in all policies, but perhaps
even more in the CFP, given its character as a
very specialized, very detailed and very pre-
scriptive policy, that requires the handling of a
great deal of technical information and knowl-
edge of the real world. For the Commission to
play its role in the governance of the CFP, it is
essential that it has a critical mass of staff with
technical expertise, with hands-on experience
in the policy, and with knowledge of the real
world.
How has co-decision fared for the
CFP?
Co-decision is a procedure well-designed to
provide a higher democratic control in EU law
making. However, that improved democratic
control comes at a price: increased complexity.
This complexity has different implications in
different policy areas:
• In areas of a low legislative production,
for example policy areas based on a few
directives, spread over many years, the com-
plexity of co-decision is easier to handle by
co-legislators and the Commission alike.
• However, in areas with a very high legislative
production, and with a high level of technic-
ity, the complexity of co-decision represents
an added difficulty because the system has a
limited capacity to handle too many regula-
tions all at once.
The CFP is clearly on the second case: the
CFP’s legislative production is very high and
often with a high technicity, given its character
of exclusive competence and its tradition of
micro-management. In this context, adopting
so many complex, detailed rules by co-decision
represents a big challenge to the legislative
system.
Reducing the number of regulations is not
necessarily bad news, many would argue. That’s
why a simple comparison of the total number
CFP regulations before and after co-decision
may not necessarily be a good indicator of
how the system fares in terms of its effi-
ciency in adopting policy. A more meaningful
comparison may be that regarding the num-
ber of long-term management plans, that all
three institutions consider the fundamental
instrument (apart from annual TACs) of the

conservation policy. Since these plans were
introduced in the 2002 reform, and up to 2009,
the Council (alone) adopted and amended
seven multiannual plans. After 2010, at the
time these pages are written, only two (the
Baltic and North Sea demersal plans) were
adopted and those only after 2016. From 2010
to 2016 (the first years of co-decision) no single
plan was adopted or amended. At the very
least, it has taken a lot of time to take off as the
CFP’s ordinary legislative procedure.
This is the result of an increased complexity of
the decision-making process, and an increase in
the level of ambition and the scope of elements
to incorporate in legislation between the two
co-legislators. As a result, it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult to adopt multiannual plans under
the new system. The inevitable question, then,
is: can the CFP adopt all the necessary legisla-
tion, on time, under co-decision? The question
leads to another one: can the CFP afford to con-
tinue with its tradition of micro-management of
the policy?
Co-decision in the CFP must re-adapt to
its core task: to take the important political
decisions of the policy, and not use too much of
its limited time to discuss and adopt technical
details. This is certainly difficult because it
requires a cultural change. This author remem-
bers very well a Director General of a Member
State, with many years of experience dealing
with the CFP, declare that: “on the general
principles we all agree; what is really political
is the details.” While there can be some truth
in this, it is also true that a CFP where all
technical details are decided by co-decision is a
policy that will only be able to handle a limited
number of legislative initiatives and will hardly
ever find the time to revise and improve its
own provisions, something that at the very
least should be through for thought for future
governance initiatives.
An emerging challenge: are EU
management plans quicker than
multilateral plans?
The above difficulties to adopt plans and,
by extension, any new legislation under the
Fisheries governance and the CFP 221
CFP, has also an unintended consequence. In
Chapter 10 we will look at the multilateral
management of international fisheries. It is
commonplace that reaching agreement on
the management of a fishery shared by many
countries is very difficult and time consuming.
The example of the management of tuna fish in
ICCAT among well over 50 countries is a good
example. Traditionally, adopting management
measures at EU level was easier, and quicker,
than doing it at multilateral level, including
non-EU countries with very different interests
and agendas. But is this always the case today?
If we look at the Mediterranean, for example,
the traditional wisdom was that the EU should
go ahead and adopt its own conservation policy
in view of the difficulty to agree at multilateral
level in that sea basin. But the experience of
the difficulty to adopt the two EU plans pro-
posed by the Commission (see Chapter 5) and
the relative success of the multilateral body
(the General Fisheries Commission for the
Mediterranean [GFCM]) in adopting certain
plans recently seems to question this traditional
wisdom.
The complexities of co-decision and the very
slow pace of progress in the trilogues contrast
less and less favorably with the flexibility of
multilateral agreements where the Commis-
sion negotiates with non-EU countries and
the agreement quickly becomes legally bind-
ing upon the EU.11 This represents a warning
for the CFP: the EU internal procedure to
adopt legislation should not be slower and
more difficult than an international nego-
tiation. There is something wrong if that
happens. This should open up a reflection
on how to make co-decision a more efficient
instrument for the CFP. The answer is clear:
concentrating it on fundamentals, on polit-
ically important principles and objectives,
and decentralizing decision-making on more
detailed rules to another instance, for example
regionalization.
11 Except in case of filing an objection.
222 Chapter 9
Addressing variability
and uncertainty
The marine environment and its resources are,
by nature, variable, and their relative abun-
dance is subject to a high degree of uncertainty.
The variability is and will always be significant,
and the uncertainty can to some extent be
reduced through improved research, but can
never be removed entirely. That means that
any governance system for fisheries has to take
this variability and uncertainty into account.
Yet, fisheries management under the CFP has
somehow evolved under the illusion that vari-
ability and uncertainty can, to some extent, be
ignored, or even that it can be legislated.
Figure 9.2 illustrates the evolution of the
biomass of the saithe stock in the North Sea
and the west of Scotland. This stock has been
considered within Fmsy objectives for a number
of years and is generally considered a very
stable stock. Yet, as we see in the figure, this
“stability” is subject, over the years, to consider-
able fluctuations. One can use this example to
understand what stability means in the context
of the management of fishery resources: this
is really how stability looks like in the real
world!
The variability of the resources and the uncer-
tainty of the scientific advice has two elements
with a bearing on governance:
Spawning Stock Biomass
600
500
SSB in 1000 t
400
300
200
100
0
1967 1972 1977
Figure 9.2 Evolution of the spawning stock biomass of saithe in ICEAS areas IV and VI. Source: www.imr.no/
radgivning/kvoterad/kvoterad_for_2011/ices-rad_nordsjobestander/sei_i_nordsjoen/en/.
• The phenomena are not necessarily stable
over time. The abundance of resources can
be subject, beyond short-term fluctuations,
to trends, that only sufficiently long-time
series can detect. This implies that policy
should tend to be based on trends, not on
short-term fluctuations.
• The trends are practically never monotonic:
even clear trends are subject to ups and
downs. This also indicates that ups and
downs do not say anything about stability
or change in the long run. Again, look-
ing at trends is essential to understand the
underlying problems of natural resources.
It is important to bear in mind that long-term
objectives are necessary to focus the policy in
their delivery, but the corresponding long-term
targets should not be considered fixed, magic
figures; in reality all targets in the management
of natural resources are to some extent moving
targets, and the policy must be adaptive to take
this into account. A good example is the MSY
itself: enshrining this concept in EU law is a
very important contribution to give the CFP a
long-term perspective that was badly missed
before. But the MSY values cannot be con-
sidered fixed, sacred values that are expected
to remain unquestioned and unchanged over
time. On the contrary: MSY is inherently vari-
able and difficult to define, not only due to
multispecies and mixed fishery interactions,
but even in the narrow single-stock approach,
Blim
Bpa
MSYBtrigger
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007

where productivity and growth of fish popu-
lations are constantly changing (Mace 2001;
Ulrich et al. 2017).
Indeed, this is not just a problem for fisheries
managers; the management of the marine
ecosystem as such is subject to a very high and
inevitable level of variability, and this makes
any certainty on the future projections on the
marine ecosystem a “grande illusion” (Planque
2016).
Proofs of the frequent tendency of policy
makers to ignore the variability are the detailed
regulations that aspire to cater for all possible
scenarios, the establishment of very detailed
policy objectives that are often based on fixed
parameters, the emphasis on the “level playing
field” that often ignores regional differences,
and the extensive use of hard law, very slow
and difficult to modify as variability acts upon
the marine environment. This tendency consti-
tutes a whole tradition of dealing with fisheries
management on the basis of fixed parameters.
There are many examples of how this tradi-
tion influences the governance of the CFP:
• The importance given to inter-annual TAC
variability, established for a long time around
the plus–minus 15% inter-annual TAC
variation, regardless of the circumstances.
• The still frequent use of the “reverse precau-
tionary approach,” where administrations
and the industry often refuse adopting
measures “until we have clear scientific
proof”.
• The “fear of the precedent” which often
prevents the adoption, under the EU system,
of policies that are well-adapted to particular
circumstances. Member States not directly
involved oppose such policies for fear they
will eventually be applied in their case, as a
result of the “level playing field” philosophy.
• The legislation, often unchanged during
decades while the environment and the
fishing activity itself are ever fluctuating.
• The request for advice by managers that
ignores uncertainty can produce frustration
and inefficiency in the science/management/
stakeholder complex.
Fisheries governance and the CFP 223
Curiously, the industry also contributes to
this in some cases, since they want certainty
for investment, and often require the system
to provide such certainty in a context where
nature does not. This may be also be influenced
by the banks, which require such certainty
in their credit policy to the fishing industry,
often also ignoring the traditional fishermen’s
culture, which understands variability and
uncertainty as a fact of life.
Of course, there are also good reasons to have
a policy favoring stability: a policy permanently
questioned or modified would not contribute
to alleviate the uncertainty: it would proba-
bly aggravate it. No policy can work under a
permanent questioning and revision.
Overall, the policy must look for a reasonable
balance between two opposing factors:
• The need for policy stability, to provide the
industry with a long-term perspective for
planning their activity ahead as much as
possible.
• The need to accommodate the inevitable
variability and to deal with the uncertainty
in a way that will allow for policy adaptation
whenever necessary.
This question has in fact been examined
by scientists. The ICES/MyFish symposium
identified three main considerations around
the variability that require further attention:
(i) the need to communicate the uncertainty
and variability; (ii) the importance of consid-
ering spatial dynamics and changes in spatial
distribution; and (iii) the process by which
variability is included in the policy decisions
(Rindorf et al. 2017). These three elements are
worth examining in more detail.
On the basis of that analysis, the policy
should establish as clearly as possible what are
the elements that require stability over time,
to provide for legal certainty and long-term
planning; what are the elements that must be
kept flexible and open to frequent change to
better reflect variability; and what are those
where geographical differences in policy are
justified.
224 Chapter 9
Communicating the uncertainty
The variability and uncertainty of the fishing
activity is not just biological, it also concerns
all aspects related to fishing as a social and
economic activity. There is a clear need for
awareness, assessment, and dissemination of
information about variability in all aspects
of fisheries management (Punt 2017). While
this variability is well-known by scientists, the
awareness by managers and other actors in the
management is often less than obvious. This
requires a good, active policy to communicate
the variability and uncertainty.
In Chapter 3 we have referred to different
models of management for mixed fisheries, and
how scientists can build scenarios considering
different levels of overall exploitation and their
overall impact beyond single-stock considera-
tions. These are a prime example of the need
to communicate the uncertainty. Any such
scenarios may actually lead to a modification
of fishing patterns and fishing behavior, thus
invalidating the initial models. Such possi-
ble changes will always remain as the largest
unknown (Fulton et al. 2011). This ultimately
means that avoiding risks should be prioritized
over achieving a given optimum (Hilborn et al.
2015; Ulrich et al. 2017).
The challenge is to turn what is well-known
by scientists in their everyday work into the
agenda of fisheries managers and stakeholders.
Somehow, the uncertainty has to come out of
the scientific circles and be fully integrated into
the mainstream of the management system
(Dankel et al. 2012). This will require a cultural
change in the governance of the CFP, where
administrations should be well-equipped to
grasp the implications of uncertainty and be
ready to make difficult decisions on levels of
risk and their trade-offs.
Spatial dynamics
Fish stocks are very well-known to be highly
mobile, and their management must also con-
sider their spatial dynamics. The movements of
fish stock can respond for different reasons, and
they can be random or follow certain trends.
Some stock distributions change annually with-
out clear or predictable trends, while others
have shown, over time, a clear trend in their
displacement: such is the case where certain
species are moving the area of distribution
northward, as a result of climate change, as we
will see in Chapter 12. The consequences for
management in both cases are clear: a policy
based on fixed areas will end up producing a
mismatch between the management system
and the reality in the fishing grounds.
A good example is the use of certain area
closures. In the early 2000s, the Commission
examined the possibility of using closed areas
to dissociate cod from accompanying stocks in
the North Sea. But scientists showed that the
areas of spawning changed every year, so it
was not possible to identify specific and stable
spawning areas that could be subject to an
annual or seasonal closure, unless such closure
was so large that would be economically unac-
ceptable to everyone. The possible closure of
cod spawning areas thus would have required
real time measures that the governance system
of the CFP is just not adapted to. Another
example is that of the displacement of the areas
of distribution of many EU-regulated stocks
that are gradually turning their traditional
management areas under the CFP obsolete, as
they no longer reflect the areas where the fish
occurs.
Addressing that spatial variability, and dis-
tinguishing annual variations from trends is
subject to much ongoing research (Rindorf
and Lewy 2012). But, as ever, any progress in
research has to be accompanied with adapta-
tions in the governance system to ensure that
the policy can adapt to the incoming scientific
evidence.
A key question is how the CFP can adapt to
the spatial variability. True, regionalization is
an important step forward in that regard. But
the scope of regional decision-making is still
very narrow, and limited to a small number
of measures and within a narrowly defined
framework, as shown for example in the case
of the discard plans. Of course, an excessive
emphasis on more spatially-specific measures

might eventually affect well-established princi-
ples of EU law such as non-discrimination. The
dividing line between adaptation to local con-
ditions and discrimination is probably blurry,
but that is not a reason to limit such region-
alization. Rather it should justify a serious
discussion of what are the policy areas and
aspects where the policy can be adapted to local
conditions without affecting the principle of
non-discrimination.
Addressing these questions has always been
a problem in the CFP, given the rigid and fixed
nature of its management system. For this rea-
son, addressing spatial variability is another rea-
son why a change in paradigm is necessary, as
we will outline below.
A governance system that quickly
incorporates variability
Marine ecosystems are highly fluctuating, and
over and beyond important periodic varia-
tions there are also trends that can only be
observed over relatively long periods of time.
This makes it inevitable that the parameters
estimated by science to manage the fisheries are
highly unstable. Good science and management
require that the system, from the provision of
advice to the adoption of management mea-
sures, be equipped to adapt quickly to changing
circumstances.
One of the best examples of the need for vari-
ability to be incorporated in governance is that
of the single-stock reference points. Scientists
perceive that changes in reference points are
a fundamental aspect of the system, so these
changes should be speedily incorporated into
the governance system (Gaichas et al. 2017).
In the CFP, the example of the Baltic Sea
management plan, adopted in 2016 (EU 2016a)
shows that the modification of the fishing
mortality targets is still subject to a rather
complicated procedure. In fact, Article 4.6 of
regulation 2016/1139 reads:
Where, on the basis of scientific advice, the Com-
mission considers that the fishing mortality ranges
set out in Annex I no longer correctly express the
objectives of the plan, the Commission may as a
Fisheries governance and the CFP 225
matter of urgency submit a proposal for revision of
those ranges.
That means that the adaptation of the fish-
ing mortality targets, subject to variability and
improvement of advice, must be done through
fully-fledged co-decision on an urgent proposal
from the Commission, still a heavy procedure.
This author keeps memories of how this was
decided. While the Commission had proposed
that these targets be quickly adapted through
much quicker delegated regulations, the legis-
lators rejected this idea, notably to keep these
changes under their control. The underlying
reason for this was the lack of trust in the
Commission (even despite the assurances that
it would only modify these targets if and when
ICES would so suggest). Rather than the need
for quick policy adaptation, it was control on
decision-making that prevailed. This is just one
among many examples that illustrates how the
CFP has given itself a governance system that
tends to favor stability and top–down control
of decision-making over adaptability to a vari-
able and uncertain policy environment. This
is an example of why the policy must exploit
the possibilities for adaptive decision-making
much more.
But there is an optimistic perspective: the
above requirement was subsequently elimi-
nated in the following multiannual plan, that
for demersal stocks in the North Sea (EU 2018).
There, the F ranges are not spelled out in the
regulation, and are simply referred to as those
recommended by ICES. This is an extremely
positive development, but it took a very nega-
tive experience to ensure that the co-legislators
would change their minds: the case of a Baltic
herring stock where ICES modified its estimated
Fmsy range so the Baltic MAP became quickly
obsolete and had to be modified by co-decision!
Another clear example that the policy should
always be ready to learn from mistakes.
The other source of uncertainty:
the management system
Interestingly, while the notion of uncertainty
is generally associated with the natural fluctu-
ations of natural resources, outside the control
226 Chapter 9
of managers, other sources of uncertainty also
exist in fisheries management: the uncertainty
about human behavior. In an interesting arti-
cle, Fulton et al. (2011) underline that fishers
behave in a manner that is often unintended by
the designers of the management system. This
certainly requires that the drivers of human
behavior should be much better integrated in
the policy design. How to do this is another
question, but one obvious conclusion is that
human behavior be integrated in policy making
from the very beginning: what many authors
call co-creation.12
The notion of co-creation is not easy to imple-
ment in basic EU legislation where the roles of
the institutions are well defined. However, in
the context of regionalization, the system fore-
seen in the current legal basis is fully amenable
to this approach: the recommendations to be
made by groups of Member States could be
the result of a co-creation procedure where
the Advisory Councils together with national
administrations would take the initiative from
the start.
How to make the CFP more adaptive
to variability and uncertainty?
The above example on the slow procedure for
adapting policy targets as science evolves creates
a big divide between science and management.
To bridge this divide, scientists and managers
should collaborate to identify and communicate
the ecological and fishery processes that may
vary over time, as well as having a realistic esti-
mate of the time required to accommodate such
changes in the management system (Rindorf
et al. 2017; Bailey et al. 2017).
Incorporating variability and uncertainty
requires a cultural change, where decision-
makers should be familiar with the concept,
and where the uncertainties expressed by
scientific advice will not be considered a hin-
drance but rather a natural fact of life to be
12 www.msp-platform.eu/projects/mareframe-co-
creating-ecosystem-based-fisheries-management-
solutions/
fully integrated into the way decision-makers
do their job.
But this cultural change cannot operate
unless the governance system is adapted too:
a very rigid system, based entirely on hard
law will not be adaptable. For this reason, tak-
ing account of the variability and uncertainty
requires a change in the governance paradigm,
where the tradition of top–down, prescriptive
management that characterizes the CFP (even
under the new regionalization) evolves toward
a more flexible, participative, and coopera-
tive governance system. We will develop this
question below.
Testing policy development?
The CFP, as a complex policy that results from
long and often protracted negotiations, cannot
be changing all the time. This clearly calls for
policy stability. And often, the ideas of alter-
native approaches to a certain problem are
dismissed as “untested.” However, a policy that
aspires to be adaptive should have the possibil-
ity of testing new approaches. Yet, the tradition
of the CFP is that there is little or no room for
testing new approaches.
An exception is the traditional technical
measures regulation (EU 1998) where the
general rules can be derogated in the case
of experimental campaigns. But these provi-
sions have been used only to allow for certain
scientific campaigns, not to test new policy
approaches.
The new basic regulation (EU 2013) actually
considers, in its Article 7§1(h), the possibility of
using:
Pilot projects on alternative types of fishing man-
agement techniques and on gears that increase
selectivity or that minimise the negative impact
of fishing activities on the marine environment
(emphasis added).
Yet, in practice, the regulation only considers
the idea of testing in the context of the devel-
opment of new control and data management
technologies (Article 38). Despite that, the test-
ing of new technical rules has traditionally been
very limited, and the number of amendments to

the regulation as a result of testing of new mea-
sures is limited.
In practice, the possibility of doing pilot
projects on alternative types of fishing manage-
ment techniques is barely used, if at all. This
is in contrast with scientific recommendations
that technical measures must fundamentally
have industry buy-in and must be carefully
tested before becoming law (Suuronen and
Sardà 2007).
Furthermore, certain experiences proposed
by stakeholders and certain national admin-
istrations, such as the management by effort
only or the anticipated discard ban, both in
Kattegat, did not succeed in the end. Although
the reasons for that failure were varied, it is
obvious that a leading factor was that in both
cases, the testing of new approaches required
derogations from certain current rules, and
such derogations were seen by other Member
States either as a kind of privilege that would
break the level playing field or as a precedent
that could be extended to their own fisheries.
These facts deserve a reflection: once more,
the rigidity of the CFP, its approach based on
hard legislation (even for technicalities, even
for regionalization), and the emphasis on pre-
serving the status quo clearly stand in the way of
the testing of new, alternative, and innovative
policy approaches. This results in a tendency
to a policy “fossilization,” where novelties are
extremely difficult to introduce. There are
exceptions, though, and perhaps there is no
better example than the control and data policy,
where new technologies have been introduced
and reasonably quickly incorporated into the
CFP’s acquis. But in terms of new fishing
practices and, in particular, new management
methods, the CFP is extremely resistant to
change and innovation, and the lessons learnt
often have to wait to the next major policy
reform, every 10 years, to materialize into new
policy approaches.
To meet many of the challenges of the pol-
icy, and to be more open to new approaches
that would allow learning from experience and
Fisheries governance and the CFP 227
adapting the policy flexibly, it appears that hav-
ing a mechanism to allow testing of new man-
agement approaches may be necessary and even
urgent.
Such a mechanism shouldn’t be seen as a
privilege: those testing new approaches would
still have the same policy goals, but they could
be given the possibility of achieving them
through different mechanisms. Likewise, they
should not be seen as precedents either. If
the CFP wants to be able to learn from expe-
rience and adapt to new circumstances, it
should become more open to the testing of
new approaches, and it should get used to
different solutions being applied in different
fisheries, to better reflect upon the high vari-
ety of approaches and solutions advocated, or
accepted, by different industry interests.
Policy monitoring: from description
to causality
Any policy that learns from experience and
adapts itself must provide for the monitoring
of its results, so the learning from experience
is based on objective outputs, and the adapta-
tions on objective data and not just on political
reactions.
The CFP has indeed a number of monitoring
instruments: from the evolution in the state
of stocks developed under the Commission’s
annual “communication on fishing opportuni-
ties” since 2006, to the increasingly complete
annual reports on the economic performance
of the EU fleets, and the EMFF indicators, the
CFP has an increasingly complex and complete
set of performance indicators.
However, there is still an important gap to fill:
these indicators are still primarily descriptors
of trends, but there is still very little in the
way of developing causality studies. In other
words, the CFP has an increasingly good level
of knowledge of what happens, but it still has a
low level of understanding of why the observed
trends are taking place. In particular, there is a
very incomplete understanding of the driving
forces behind the trends observed: are these
trends due to policy implementation? Or are
they the result of economic factors outside the
228 Chapter 9
control of the policy? Or in some cases do they
happen just by serendipity? In other words: we
still know very little about the causality of the
trends observed.
A policy that is adaptive and tries to learn
from experience should improve its under-
standing of the reasons and causes of the trends
observed, if such adaptations are to respond
to objective criteria on policy efficiency. This
should be done without taboos. Policies should
be changed or maintained on the basis of their
demonstrable merits, but not just maintained
unchanged because it is “politically sensitive”
to raise their possible reform.
Policy complexity: can the CFP
be simplified?
Policy complexity seems to be hard-wired in
the CFP. It is so strong that it seems to persist
regardless of legal changes. It is more than a
legal question: it is a cultural one. I will argue
that under the current legal framework, the
CFP could be simpler than it actually is. It is
the tradition of decision-making that favors
complexity. This implies that legislative changes
are not enough to simplify the policy: it is the
practice that has to change, and this is probably
the biggest difficulty. Since 1983, the legal
basis of the CFP has changed three times, but
the deeply-rooted tendency to develop ever
increasing complexity has not.
The complexity of the CFP has always been
criticized as one of its main weaknesses and one
of the main reasons of its low buy-in by the
stakeholders, and its simplification features in
practically all documents relating to the policy’s
future prospects.
Pastoors (2014) has illustrated the increasing
complexity of the CFP using as an indicator the
number of words in the basic regulation of the
CFP over the years. This number actually fits
an exponential curve. Although this is a very
crude measure of policy complexity, it certainly
means that the CFP is traditionally responding
to new challenges by including more and more
elements in its legal acquis, rather than by using
alternative instruments such as recommenda-
tions, guidelines or more flexible instruments.
Among many other examples, one can
cite the provisions contained in Regulation
2187/2005 (EU 2005) on technical conser-
vation measures for Baltic fisheries, which
contain provisions on how fishermen should
mend broken Bacoma nets to avoid reducing
their selectivity (!).
Is policy complexity inevitable?
Simplifying the CFP is probably one of the few
ideas everyone would agree on, from adminis-
trations to stakeholders. However, while a num-
ber of EU legislations are undoubtedly complex
(the regulation on technical conservation mea-
sures (EU 1998) is often cited as an example of
this complexity), this complexity must be put
into perspective:
• This complexity is, more often than not, the
result of pressure from stakeholders, who
want the rules adapted to their particular
circumstances. While everyone wants simpli-
fication, most stakeholders are also opposed
to what they see as “one-size-fits-all” solu-
tions.
• The European waters are extremely diverse,
and so are their fisheries, so simple rules are
poorly adapted to that diversity.
• The lack of trust among different actors in
the policy makes simple regulations difficult.
Simple, non-detailed legislation is generally
open to different interpretations or options
for practical implementation. The mistrust
among different actors and the need to
ensure a level playing field in enforcement
have the effect of pushing law-making to
develop very detailed rules, in order to
dissipate the risk of different interpretations.
• In turn, the very detailed regulations often
underscore the difficulty to apply such
detailed rules in all circumstances, thus
ignoring the diversity of situations where

the rules may have different effects. This
originates the search for specific derogations
and special conditions that only increase the
complexity of the legal texts.
• Finally, one should not underestimate the
capacity of new, simpler measures to gen-
erate more problems than they resolve.
In a policy with a tradition of prescriptive
measures, simpler provisions often create
different interpretations that may end up
causing confusion and time-consuming
work to iron out the difficulties.
For the above reasons (and possibly others)
one must have reasonable expectations about
the simplification of the policy. In addition, the
drive to simplify should always be conscious
that complex problems are not necessarily
best resolved by over-simplistic solutions. The
famous quotation by the American journalist
H.L. Mencken comes in very handy in this
context:13 “For every complex problem there is
an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.”
This may appear as a contradiction, but it is
not: the policy can and should be simplified,
but that also requires reasonable expectations:
the policy can never be very simple, it can only
reduce some of its unnecessary complexity.
The complex political/geographical/
jurisdictional context
The critics about the complexity of the CFP are
often warranted, but this must be considered
in the right context: Europe and its adjacent
waters have a level of complexity that makes
comparison with other policies (for example
the US policy under the Magnuson-Stevens
Act) unjustified.
In the US the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
is a linear, 200-mile band without neighbors or
limitations to East and West, while in Europe
the national EEZs only reach 200 miles in west-
ern waters, while the other European seas have
a complex maze of EEZs limited with their
neighbors’ EEZs with median lines, overlap-
ping claims and unresolved conflicts. While
13 https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/H._L._Mencken/
Fisheries governance and the CFP 229
most resources in the US are distributed (and
managed) only nationally, in European waters
a high percentage of these resource are shared
with third countries and jointly managed with
them. Furthermore, this will be made much
more complicated as a result of Brexit.
In this context, one cannot reasonably ask the
CFP to have the same level of simplicity as the
policy of countries like the US, Canada, Norway,
New Zealand and so on.
The evolution of the decision-making
workflow in the CFP
The possibilities of simplifying the CFP are
limited insofar as the adoption of legislation is
concerned. Over and beyond the obvious fact
that under the Treaty of Lisbon co-decision is
the ordinary legislative procedure, there are
other developments that do not facilitate policy
simplification:
• The introduction of compulsory consultation
with stakeholders and with the public at
large.
• The impact assessment.
• The interaction with other EU policies, in par-
ticular environmental policy.
These relatively new elements have very
positive aspects: they improve the evaluation of
possible effects, help understand the overlaps
with other policies, allow for improvements
from stakeholders, etc. But they also have a
downside: they make policy making much
slower, and much less adaptive: from the iden-
tification of a problem requiring legislation, to
the actual adoption of that legislation, the time
elapsed can be of several years. In a number of
circumstances, this long period is sufficient to
discourage the adoption of the legislation in the
first place.
This is a consideration quite specific for the
CFP. While in other EU policies, where legisla-
tive production is much lower (for example, one
new, or amended directive every five years) the
CFP is managed through abundant regulations.
In this context, the long delays in producing,
or even amending legislation becomes a funda-
mental problem of policy complexity. This is also
a very important question: if a policy provision
230 Chapter 9
needs to be modified, and such modification is
slow and complex to introduce, even if stake-
holders and Member States all agree, this cer-
tainly contributes to the overall impression that
the legislation is heavy and complex.
The example of the US
The US could be expected to provide examples
of policy simplification. After all, according to
extended wisdom, the CFP is “over-regulated”
while the US enjoys a tradition of preferring
“small government” as part of the mainstream
philosophy of most of the political spectrum.
However, things are not that simple. The expe-
rience of the northwest coast of North America
provides an excellent example. This coast has
continuous 200-mile EEZs shared by only two
countries (the USA and Canada) which in
addition largely share principles, culture, and
interests. By comparison with the North Sea
(common waters among eight countries) or,
even more so, the Mediterranean (with no place
for 200-mile EEZ anywhere, extremely rugged
coasts and extreme political and socio-economic
differences among the 23 coastal States), it is
difficult to find a place where fisheries man-
agement could potentially be so simple. Yet,
it is estimated that the Magnuson-Stevens Act
(MSA) interacts with six other pieces of major
US legislation, so that fisheries management
should conciliate fisheries rules with those of
such other acts as the National Environmental
Protection Act, the Marine Mammals Protection
Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Coastal
Zone Management Act and around 100 other
legislative acts and Executive Orders (Penny
Dalton, personal communication).
In terms of the complexity of the legisla-
tion, while EU Regulation 812/2004 on the
protection of marine mammals has 19 pages
(EU 2004b) the US Marine Mammal protection
Act has 118 pages in the US Code of Federal
Regulations and has been amended two dozen
times!14
14 www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa/mmpa_2015_
revised_2017.pdf/
Actually, the main difference in legislation
between the EU and the US in this context
is not policy complexity as such, at least as
expressed in the number and complexity of
the legal acts. The real difference is that the
US provides for a level of flexibility and policy
interpretation that is often missing in EU law.
Other sources of complexity of the US system
(as well as the Canadian one) is the consid-
eration of the special rights granted to the
First Nations, that is, the communities of native
north Americans that have in recent decades
been accorded special rights for hunting and
fishing, and who exert them with a variety of
means and interests. These First Nations are
quite varied, have a rather low level of hori-
zontal integration (as they consider themselves
different nations, even among themselves) and
introduce in management a considerable level
of complexity which is absent in Europe.
There is, however, an important characteris-
tic that makes the US model potentially more
amenable to simplification: the fact that is based
on standards that can be applied through simpli-
fied means instead of hard law. The fact that it
is open to certain approaches based on private
arrangements by the industry is a case in hand.
In principle, recommendations by the
Regional Fishery Management Councils are
translated in often complex implementation
rules by the federal government. But these
are certainly much simpler and quicker to
implement and modify than even Commission
implementing rules, so overall the US system
has an in-built capacity to quickly improve
the detailed rules as a result of the emerging
evidence coming from implementation.
In addition, when and where the industry
can agree to achieve the results through private
arrangements, simply subject to a performance
standard, the system is open to that kind of
solution. This is the case in a limited number
of circumstances, where the industry is sophis-
ticated enough for this kind of business-like
approach. Whatever its extension and poten-
tial development, the system accepts this as a
possibility, and certain good examples exist, in

particular in the fishing area that constitutes the
best management model in the USA: Alaska.
Can regionalization reduce
complexity?
The regionalization of the CFP introduced in
the CFP in its 2013 reform intended, inter alia,
to simplify the policy. Is this going to be the
case? It has been argued that the new process
should allow a much better integration between
fisheries and environmental policies, as well as
a better adaptation to the conditions of specific
sea basins, but not necessarily simplification
(Osterblom et al. 2011).
We must bear in mind that the regional-
ization of the CFP intended to simplify EU
legislation, that is, to remove from the EU
legislation much of the minute technical detail
that it contains, still today. The idea was that
the technical aspects would not be legislated
by the EU but rather by Member States con-
cerned in a given area/fishery. The implication
of this is that EU legislation, as such, would
be simpler. However, this does not mean that
for the ultimate users (notably fishermen and
fisheries inspectors) the complete set of rules to
be applied in any given place at any given time
will necessarily be simpler. This will depend on
the ability of Member States (with the crucial
participation of the Advisory Councils) to find
ways to legislate the details in a more open,
flexible, and non-prescriptive way than it has
been the case in the past.
This is not simple. Whether Member States
under regionalization will achieve this, it will
depend on a number of factors:
• The ability to develop trust, so less detailed
rules can be applied while ensuring that the
level playing field will be respected. In this
regard, the work of the European Fisheries
Control Agency seems crucial.
• The ability to find a reasonable balance for
the dichotomy harmonization/adaptation to
local conditions. Legislation adapted to local
conditions is fine, but only for those that
fish always in that area. For those who fish
crossing lines, adaptation to local conditions
Fisheries governance and the CFP 231
is an added complexity: having to apply dif-
ferent rules when crossing an imaginary line
makes their operation much more complex
and burdensome. When the first Discard
Plans were presented and adopted in 2014,
they established different rules for each sea
basin in European waters, reflecting alleged
specific local conditions. This was strongly
criticized by fleet segments that have quo-
tas in more than one sea basin, since the
changes in legislation as they changed sea
basin were considered an unnecessary policy
complexity.
Ultimately, the simplification of the CFP will
fundamentally require a change in governance
as we will see below.
Can guidelines replace regulations
in the CFP?
The above example of the US where the
basic legal rules are fundamentally developed
through guidelines, more easily updated and
adapted, could be examined in the context of
the CFP. Theoretically, the possibility is limited
by the fact that the basic regulation requires
that a number of instruments, such as man-
agement plans and technical measures should
have the form of legally-binding acts. This
certainly limits the possible scope for guidelines
as an instrument to develop the basic rules.
However, the regionalization process could
introduce the possibility of enlarging the scope
of non-legislative rules.
Indeed, the basic regulation (1380/2013)
does not prescribe in all cases how many
rules will be established by co-decision acts
and by regionalization. If there is political
will from both co-legislators, the basic leg-
islative acts could be very simple and focused
on major objectives and targets. Nothing in
principle prevents a great deal of technical
rules being established through regionalized
decision-making.
In turn, the regionalized process is still less
prescriptive, so in theory it would be possible
that the Commission regulations adopted under
the regionalization process would be also very
simple. In that context, the Commission could
232 Chapter 9
issue guidelines, to be applicable to all region-
alized decisions, that would simply establish
some standards but would leave ample room
for maneuver in different regions (through the
advice of the Advisory Councils) to apply such
guidelines in a flexible way, adapted to the
regional characteristics.
The real challenge, in this context, is to build
trust among Member States in different areas
to the effect that a system largely based on
guidelines will be sufficient to ensure the level
playing field that, for so many national adminis-
trations, constitute a political priority. This trust,
as we will see below, will require an impor-
tant change of paradigm in the governance of
the CFP, from a prescriptive to a collaborative
system.
Changing the paradigm: from
prescriptive to collaborative
governance
The above sections look at the problem of the
governance of the CFP from different angles.
But there is at least one element that stands out
as an underlying problem to resolve: despite
the recent reform, the CFP is still largely a
central command policy, based almost entirely
on hard law, difficult to modify as a result of
experience and learning, extremely complex
and rigid, and thus not easily adaptable to vari-
ability and uncertainty, and where the advisory
input from stakeholders is limited to a few
policy strands. Addressing these shortcomings
requires more than the changes introduced
in the 2013 reform with regionalization: it
requires a change of paradigm. The CFP should
evolve from a prescriptive policy to a much
more collaborative one. The question is: can
this be done?
Scientists have developed a basis for this evo-
lution in recent years. Collaborative approaches
for fisheries management have multiple advan-
tages, including increased transparency of
scientific advice, greater inclusion of eco-
nomic and social concerns, inclusion of local
knowledge, as well as potential for increased
value of the fisheries (Rindorf et al. 2017;
Bailey et al. 2017). In addition, the gradual
introduction of collaborative methods has
increased the trust among stake-holder groups,
improving communication and mutual under-
standing (Mackinson and Wilson 2014). This is
extremely important: as we saw above, trust is
the key factor to simplify the policy and make
it more flexible and adaptive.
Results-based management
The whole idea of collaborative management
also implies that policy cannot be as prescriptive
as that corresponding to traditional, top–down
policy. Collaborative management implies
therefore results-based management. However,
results-based management is extremely hard to
develop in practice. Stakeholders prefer part-
nership than co-management. Co-management
comes at a high cost: commitment, resources,
and organizational capacity are a challenge, that
only relatively few interests can afford, or are
ready to invest on. In addition, existing authori-
ties show resistance to losing power and control
(Santiago et al. 2015).
The advantages, however, would be sig-
nificant. Results-based management would
provide much needed flexibility to adopt
ad hoc solutions in different cases; it would
dramatically increase the buy-in to the pol-
icy by stakeholders and would simplify EU
legislation. Co-decision under a tradition of
micro-management is increasingly in diffi-
culty to deliver policy development on time.
Results-based management can fit in this con-
text: by changing the paradigm, from detailed,
prescriptive regulations to much simpler ones
based on objectives and standards; the notion
of results-based management could perhaps
make headway in the future.
Does the CFP have the structures
for collaborative management?
The answer is yes: Advisory Councils. Here, a
comparison with the US Advisory Management
Councils reveals a fundamental difference in
the way they work, but not so much in terms
of their legal basis and their formally advisory

character. The US Advisory Councils do not
have, on paper, more responsibility than the
CFP’s ACs; the difference is in the practice.
The ACs have a composition where the main
stakeholders are included. Rindorf et al. (2017)
indicate that existing governance lacks struc-
tures to provide, in addition to the ecological
and economic input, the social dimension.
Several authors consider that effective collabo-
rative management would require a structure
that defines clear stakeholder roles, responsibil-
ities, and mandates, such that the collaboration
between stakeholders and scientists from dif-
ferent disciplines can be productive and have
an effect on management (Eliasen et al. 2015;
Ramírez-Monsalve et al. 2016).
For the current Advisory Councils to become
the right stakeholder bodies for collaborative
management there would need to be some
changes, inter alia:
• The need to end the frequent strife between
industry and environmental NGOs, notably
by making clearer the “rules of the game”
and dissipating different interpretations of
the real objectives of the policy.
• The full participation of under-represented
interests, such as those of the small-scale sec-
tor, or those representing local communities.
• A higher level of trust by national adminis-
trations; for stakeholders to consider that the
heavy investment necessary to make the ACs
work is really worth the effort.
• A better combination of the work of the ACs
with that of the scientists providing the sci-
entific advice.
On the question of the NGOs and their role
in the ACs, there is much to learn from the
US experience. This author has seen how the
industry has discussed openly many options
for management without any direct interven-
tion from the NGOs. The reason seems to be
that the system provides NGOs with sufficient
guarantees that the management will have to
accommodate a few, but clear and important
principles, and they are happy to stay out of
the industry discussions just as far as the final
outcome is in conformity with such principles.
Fisheries governance and the CFP 233
This, in turn, requires that managers estab-
lish the framework that the NGOs will consider
satisfactory, and in the light of some of the pre-
vious chapter, this clearly remains a challenge.
But this also requires other things, such as the
acceptance by the NGOs that their role cannot
be to micro-manage the policy: the industry
knows much better how to micro-manage
itself.
Creating trust
In addition to the changes in the governance
system, there is an element for collaborative
management that goes beyond structures; it is
an intangible that we can refer to as “trust”:
trust among the industry actors, that all have
legitimate and similar interests, trust between
industry and government, between industry
and science, and so on. Collaborative manage-
ment cannot work properly, even under the
best structures, if there is no such trust.
The experience of the US is very mean-
ingful: while cooperation is excellent in the
NW Council (which manages fisheries in
Alaska, for example) it is notoriously worse
in New England, where industry members are
less likely to agree on their own and much
more prone to call their representatives in the
US Congress in search of influence for their
interests (D. Fluharty, J. Armstrong, personal
communication).
Several factors favor this trust, and they are
not necessarily available in all cases:
• The state of the stocks. When there is little
overfishing and the economics of the fishery
are good, collaborative management is much
easier. Sacrifices for conservation are much
easier to assume and the general atmosphere
is much more relaxed, open to cooperation
and innovation. On the contrary, in cases of
strong stock depletion, high stress conditions
are a barrier to collaboration. This implies
that in areas where cooperation is weak, the
improvement of stock status should facilitate
better future cooperation.
• Geography. Collaboration is certainly
stronger when all actors are considered
fully legitimate. In areas where non-coastal
234 Chapter 9
fisheries interests are involved, there is less
trust because some coastal interests question
the legitimacy of long distant fishermen to
be there in the first place. This can partially
explain why collaboration in the Baltic Sea
(where only coastal States fish) is easier than
in western waters, where the presence of
Spanish and French fleets is often questioned
by fishing interests from the British Isles.
• The work of the EU fisheries control agency,
EFCA, is a crucial contribution. Probably only
EFCA can dissipate the image that control
standards are not the same, and that certain
national authorities are more lenient than
others. The joint Deployment Plans are an
excellent instrument to build trust. The more
EFCA intervenes in control, the more trust
can be created that the system is “fair.”
• The lack of institutional trust is also a prob-
lem. We have seen in Chapter 2 the question
of F ranges between Council and Parliament.
And trust in the Commission is also low,
notably for fear of it being too conservation-
ist. This requires as a crucial contribution, the
clarification of the rules of the game and, in
particular, to clarify further how to interpret
the objectives of Article 2.2 of Regulation
1380/2013; including all the questions we
saw in Chapter 2.
There is no magic formula to create such trust,
and it is obvious that trust is an intangible that
is hard to create and easy to destroy. But some
ideas could be discussed on how to build such
trust:
• Trust can be favored by entrusting the Advi-
sory Councils with more responsibility for
decision-making. The experience of ACs is
that in certain cases they have successfully
built trust among different industry interests
that did not talk to each other previously.
• Trust between the industry and NGOs can
be favored if the system, and particularly
the Commission, establish very clear rules
of the game. As we saw above, in the US
much concertation takes place among the
industry without NGOs intervening directly.
Arguably, the rules of the game (and in
particular the Fmsy “as reduced by”) are
reassuring enough for NGOs so they don’t
need to get so involved.
• The Commission can contribute to building
trust also by ensuring a critical mass of offi-
cials with in-depth knowledge of fisheries as
interlocutors with science and stakeholders.
When and where it has ensured such cred-
ibility, it has been able to broker solutions
based on trust.
• Last but not least, trust is also an institutional
question. In the US, the trust to implement
the 10 standards with different solutions is
largely provided by NOAA, a well-respected
body whose expertise and even-handedness
is not fundamentally questioned.15 The Euro-
pean Commission cannot provide such trust
because it is seen as a political body, not an
administrative one. In this context, the idea
of having at EU level an “EU-NOAA” could
be dreamed up. The control agency pro-
vides an example of such highly-respected,
professional body. Could EFCA be extended
to act as honest broker in translating more
flexible, results-based regulation into dif-
ferent practical solutions in different EU
fisheries?
In Chapter 14 we will come back to this
question.
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CHAPTER 10
The CFP and international fisheries
The external dimension as an
essential part of the CFP
Introduction
European Union (EU) fisheries have a very
important component of international cooper-
ation. Contrary to other cases (USA, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Iceland) where the
fishing takes place primarily within the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ) of the country, the
international dimension of the Common Fish-
eries Policy (CFP) is comparatively much larger.
This is the result of several factors:
• The important overlap between the Euro-
pean EEZs and those of many of the EU
neighbors, and the high proportion of EU
fisheries that take place on stocks shared
with third countries.
• The existing network of bilateral fisheries
agreements with third countries and the
participation of the EU in many regional
fisheries organizations.
• The long tradition of distant water fishing by
a number of EU Member States.
• The key position of the EU as the world’s first
import market of fishery products.
• The active role of the EU in the development
of the international governance of fisheries.
Today’s CFP is therefore highly dependent
upon cooperation with third countries. This
will be greatly exacerbated by the withdrawal
of the United Kingdom from the EU: nearly 100
stocks occur in EU27 and UK waters and have
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
quotas shared between the two. Once Brexit
takes place, and whatever the conditions agreed
on the future management of these stocks, the
CFP will not be the same again and the inter-
national cooperation for the management of
stocks will become not only important, but in
fact predominant.
This implies that the EU must actively partic-
ipate in the management of shared resources,
both bilaterally and multilaterally. As a conse-
quence, the “external” policy is an essential part
of the CFP, one where the reputation of the pol-
icy is often at stake, and one that has regularly
contributed to shape up internal policy.
Indeed, the internal and external policy influ-
ence each other. For many years, however, the
two parts of the policy have been run separately.
While the internal policy was a stand-alone pol-
icy where the EU decided on its own, the exter-
nal policy has traditionally been dominated by
what can be negotiated with bilateral and mul-
tilateral partners that did not necessarily share
the EU’s view and priorities. In many cases, the
external policy has been dominated by the over-
riding interest to defend the legitimate interests
of EU fishermen in very competitive contexts,
and this has in certain cases taken priority over
the adoption of sustainable policies for all con-
cerned.
This state of affairs was favored by the general
lack of objectives and principles inspiring the
international dimension if the CFP, giving rise to
a policy often inconsistent with the EU internal
237
238 Chapter 10
fisheries policy. This has certainly changed in
the last CFP reform of 2013, in which for the
first time ever the basic regulation of the CFP
has laid down the principles that must inspire
the CFP’s external policy, which are the same as
those inspiring the internal one.
Over the years, the CFP (including the
internal policy) has been influenced by devel-
opments taking place in the external side, so
the links between the two policies are clearly
two-sided. For example:
• The notion of a long-term management plan
was adopted and promoted first by the EU
in certain multilateral negotiations rather
than in internal policy. The long-term plan
for the management of Atlantic swordfish
was adopted by the International Commis-
sion for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT) in 1997, with a crucial contribution
from the EU long before the first such plan
was adopted in EU waters, namely, the cod
recovery plan of 2004 (EU 2004).
• Certain decisions on allocation of EU fishing
rights within regional organizations have
been a precedent for the internal allocation
of the EU quotas among Member States:
the case of bluefin tuna, allocated in 1998
following the ICCAT allocation formula (EU
1999), is the best example.
• A number of improvements in control and
monitoring of fisheries in the CFP were
introduced as a result in negotiations in
certain regional fishery organizations, such
as Northeast Atlantic Fishery Organization
(NAFO), Inter American Tropical Tuna Com-
mission (IATTC), or North East Atlantic
Fishery Commission (NEAFC).
The obvious links between the internal and
external dimensions of the CFP means that the
CFP itself is highly dependent from the interna-
tional governance of fisheries, but it also implies
that the EU must have an important responsi-
bility in shaping up such international gover-
nance. Let’s look at the most important aspects
of the international management of fisheries.
The EU as the crucial actor
in international fisheries governance
The management of fishery resources exem-
plifies the absolute need for multilateral
approaches as the best way to ensure sus-
tainable and equitable exploitation. Although
the international management of the ocean’s
resources initially evolved largely on the basis
of unilateral action (for example, the unilateral
declaration of 200-mile exclusive economic
zones by Iceland and some south American
countries in 1975) the entry into force of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994 represents a crucial step
toward the multilateral management of the
ocean’s resources.
In this context, the EU is the world’s most
important actor in shaping up this multilateral
policy:
• The EU legitimately fishes in the three main
oceans of the world, and participates in most
regional fishery organizations.
• The EU (and its Member States) is a signa-
tory to all the important conventions dealing
with the management of fisheries, while
other important powers around the world
are not signatories of all instruments. And,
unlike other powers, the Union inscribes
all its international actions in the respect of
international conventions.
• The EU is the world’s main donor of devel-
opment aid, and thus contributes crucially to
the developing States’ efforts to build capacity
for management.
• The EU is the world’s first market of fish,
which gives it both the opportunity and the
responsibility of influencing fisheries gover-
nance through trade, in particular as regards
the fight against illegal fishing.
These factors make the EU the most impor-
tant contributor to the multilateral manage-
ment. Over and beyond the defense of its
legitimate economic interests in international
fisheries, the Union continues to play a key
role in shaping international policy. Nobody

else has the capacity and influence to promote
multilateral, cooperative solutions for the inter-
national fisheries governance. While other
world’s powers tend to favor, in different ways,
national interest and unilateral action, the EU
is the only world power that unmistakably
promotes multilateral solutions, and this makes
it an absolutely essential actor in international
fora. This strategic element clearly goes beyond
the most evident and immediate economic
interest of EU’s operators.
One cannot overstress the importance of the
role of the EU in the context of international
fisheries management. The Law of the Sea, as
represented by the UNCLOS has been ratified
by 168 countries,1 but for example the United
States have not done so. The EU ratified it on 1
April 1998 and all EU Member States have rat-
ified the convention too.
In the international arena, some countries
pursue aggressive agendas of development of
long-distance fleets; others believe that coastal
States must extend their jurisdiction over the
200 nautical miles of their exclusive economic
zone as the best way to sort out problems in
international waters; others are oblivious to
the problem of illegal fishing. Of the important
blocs, only the EU has a clear agenda of respect-
ing the international order as represented by
UNCLOS and, at the same time, has an active
policy against illegal fishing, and in favor of
the improvement of multilateral management
and the empowerment of developing countries.
This puts the EU in a privileged position to lead
the search for an improved, multilateral, and
fair governance of the world’s fisheries.
The external dimension of the CFP
and international governance
As we saw above, the EU coast and jurisdic-
tional regime is extremely complex, particularly
when compared with the remarkable simplicity
1 www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm/
The CFP and international fisheries 239
of the US coasts and EEZs. In addition, the
long tradition of long-distance fishing in the EU
makes the EU fishing management system
highly dependent upon international fisheries
management. Some figures help understand
this:
• The EU has over 20 bilateral agreements with
different countries of the world.
• The EU fishes in almost all oceanic areas of
the world and participates actively in most
regional fishery organizations as a full mem-
ber.
• The EU external sector represents a very sig-
nificant contributor to economic activity and
jobs in certain areas of the EU, and supplies a
very important part of the EU fish market.
The joint management of stocks internation-
ally is also very challenging, given the legal and
political implications of this activity and its over-
lap with many other human activity and inter-
national governance issues:
• International management of fisheries often
overlaps with international politics (i.e. the
fisheries agreement with Morocco and the
question of the Western Sahara).
• Fisheries overlap with issues of development
policy, in terms of capacity building, alloca-
tion of fishing rights and so on.
• Illegal fishing clearly overlaps with trade
policy (through the illegal, unreported, and
unregulated [IUU] legislation) and with
other kinds of illicit activities at sea (piracy,
human trafficking, labor issues, etc.).
The above are just a few examples of the wide
implications of international fisheries activity
and management, and illustrate the importance
of ensuring good governance.
Governance is also essential to ensure an
international level playing field. In its absence,
the result is a tendency for a “first come first
served” type of initiative, and this undoubt-
edly benefits only those without principles.
As the EU is an organization based on very
solid principles (rule of law, respect of inter-
national law and agreements, fight against
240 Chapter 10
corruption, etc.) the lack of good international
fisheries management only benefits those with-
out scruples. In this light, international fisheries
governance is not only necessary to better man-
age the common international resources; it is
also the best way to defend the legitimate Euro-
pean interests in that international context.
All the above considerations clearly point at
the international governance of fisheries as a
crucial question for the future of EU fisheries.
Much of what will characterize the CFP of the
future will be played in the international arena.
At the same time, the EU as a global player
and the “champion of multilateralism” has a
particularly important role to play in those
developments. The EU has understood that
role very well, as demonstrated by the recent
initiative on the world’s ocean governance (EU
2016). This communication includes, inter alia,
two important questions related to fisheries:
the improvement of the management of inter-
national fisheries, and the increase in marine
protected areas (MPAs).
Beyond this important communication,
which has a much wider focus than fisheries,
the future of international fishing has a number
of challenges that must be faced. These include
the current initiatives to increase MPAs, the
fight against illegal fishing, the problem of the
world’s fleet capacity and the need to improve
the multilateral cooperation for management,
including the crucial question of the role of
developing States. These are all issues where
the EU, or indeed any other individual player
around the world cannot act on its own; these
are the kind of challenges that require an
improvement in the current mechanisms and
instruments for multilateral cooperation.
Marine Protected Areas:
the miracle instrument?
One of the most important challenges of inter-
national fisheries governance is that of the
establishment of large scale MPAs. In Chapter
8 we discussed MPAs from the point of view of
their contribution to protect biodiversity. But
in this context, MPAs must also be discussed
from the point of view of their potential con-
tribution to international fisheries and ocean
governance.
The current process of negotiation in the
United Nations of the future Agreement on
the Protection of Biodiversity in areas Beyond
National Jurisdiction (known by its acronym
BBNJ) is largely about how to establish these
areas. To the extent that these areas will include
international waters, they have very important
implications on the international management
of fisheries.
MPAs have become in recent years a very
fashionable idea, strongly supported by an
array of interests including Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) and relevant scientists
(Walters et al. 1999; Pauly et al. 2002, 2005).
Their specific role in the Mediterranean is also
highlighted (Coll et al. 2012). In this context,
MPAs are often presented by their advocates
as the best alternative to the alleged failure of
traditional fishery management systems.
In the mainstream public opinion and large
parts of the scientific community it is taken
for granted that these MPAs provide evidence
about the social, economic, and environmen-
tal benefits of full protection of the marine
environment in such areas. However, such
an approach is also subject to considerable
skepticism. A recent study by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), based on a
number of case studies (FAO 2017), showed
that:
The positive outcomes observed relate to the
improved social cohesion and participation, con-
servation and incomes, but concerns are also
expressed about lack of attainment of expected
outcomes. It is stressed that no generalisation on
the efficacy of PAs in supporting livelihoods is possible.
(Emphasis added)
In the Mediterranean, where this instru-
ment was favored in the 2006 regulation (EU
2006) there is evidence of spill-over, shown
by a negative gradient of fish abundance from
the MPAs to the fished areas. However, the
spill-over is limited to a few hundreds of meters
around MPAs, which is an important factor

when considering size and design of these areas
(Harmelin-Vivien et al. 2008).
The initiatives to establish large MPAs around
the world are achieving momentum, in differ-
ent international fora and through a variety
of public and private interests, including an
important contribution from philanthropic
organizations and individuals. The issue is cer-
tainly popular since it resonates well with many
audiences, over and beyond its objective merits.
The problem of MPAs is often that they are
proposed (and adopted) before their specific
objectives are clearly spelled out. This author
has argued that MPAs are often a solution in
search of a problem. In reality, the logic should
be the inverse one: in the face of a problem
or objective, one can evaluate if an MPA is
the right solution. Of course, in many cases it
is: when and where the objective is to protect
biodiversity in a well-identified area, as it is
the case with the Natura 2000 network in EU
waters, or to protect relatively stable areas with
aggregations of juvenile and spawning fish,
they can be a very useful instrument.
However, when they are established in very
large areas, comprising different ecosystems,
involving many mobile species, and without
clear objectives, their justification is less than
obvious, and so is the possibility of monitoring
their relative usefulness. The on-going pro-
cess to declare as an MPA 30% of the EEZ of
the Seychelles is a case in hand: after having
received widespread praise as an example of
how private money can contribute to preserve
the ocean’s biodiversity2 , plans for fast-track
oil exploration in other areas of the Seychelles
EEZ have been revealed.3
MPAs: what objectives?
The positive effects of MPAs are widely
recognized, by many authors, as effective con-
servation tools supporting greater biodiversity
2 www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/
22/debt-for-dolphins-seychelles-create-huge-new-
marine-parks-in-world-first-finance-scheme/
3 www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/02/21/oils-
new-frontier-seychelles-plans-fast-track-drilling-
despite/amp/
The CFP and international fisheries 241
and biomass, up to several orders of magnitude,
than nearby areas, and providing socio-
economic benefits even beyond their bound-
aries (D’Agata et al. 2016; Bertzky et al. 2012;
Costello and Ballantine 2015; Lester et al.
2009).
The importance of MPAs for biodiversity con-
servation is clear, and indeed EU policy has pur-
sued this approach with considerable success,
for example in the context of the Nature 2000
network. However, the usefulness of MPAs as
a mainstream fisheries management instrument
at the international scale is much less clear-cut.
Some well-known authors have considered
MPAs as a fundamental instrument to ensure
the sustainability of the world’s fisheries. The
philosophy behind this is that in the pre-
industrial era, fishery resources were “pro-
tected” by the lack of access of human beings
to an important part of the marine resources.
Pauly et al. (2005) consider that in addition to
the classical fishery management instruments,
non-conventional instruments such as MPAs
are necessary to re-establish the protection
of these zones as refuges, to make possible
the apparent sustainability of pre-industrial
fisheries.
However, this faith in the value of MPAs must
be compounded with many other elements:
• MPAs displace, not reduce fishing effort. For
an MPA to have positive effects, it is neces-
sary to know how the fishing effort will be
displaced, and whether the areas where the
effort is displaced have the capacity to absorb
it (Sen 2010). Otherwise, unintended nega-
tive effects can take place.
• MPAs can modify access to the resources,
with large, ocean-going fleets being more
able to adapt and fish elsewhere than local,
small-scale fleets. The above-mentioned case
of the Seychelles is clear; while local fish-
ermen may lose access to some areas, large
scale tuna fishing will still be conducted in
most of the waters of the Indian Ocean.
• Many ocean resources are highly migratory
and are not necessarily amenable to zonal
management; what counts in these cases is
242 Chapter 10
the total fishing effort exerted in a very wide
area of distribution.
• The hypothesis that the pre-industrial fish-
eries were “apparently sustainable” is not
warranted; history tells us about many cases
of collapse and exhaustion of many marine
resources even before the pre-industrial era
(Roberts 2007).
Overall, the problem with MPAs is that they
do not, by themselves, resolve the question of
the overall fishing effort exerted on the world’s
resources. While there can be positive effects if
and when the MPAs protect spawning or juve-
nile aggregations of fish, the effects are poten-
tially very varied as a function of the mobility
and distribution of the species concerned.
It is very important to ensure clear and trans-
parent objectives, since the effects of MPAs are
highly variable, and can even be negligible,
such as for example in the case of highly mobile
species with little or no by-catch or habitat
impact. Just assuming that the more MPAs the
better for ocean conservation is misguided. As
Hilborn et al. (2004) indicate:
If MPAs are implemented without a case by case
evaluation and monitoring, there is a risk of unful-
filled expectations, the creation of disincentives
and a loss of credibility of what is potentially a
valuable management tool.
It is very important to underline that the
value of MPAs is largely a function of its objec-
tives and associated conditions of application:
• If the objective is to preserve biodiversity,
MPAs can be the ideal instrument, if and
when the areas of high biodiversity are
well-identified and the MPAs reflect those
areas. However, if the MPAs correspond to
a “blanket” approach encompassing areas
of high biodiversity with others without
particular value, the cost/benefit ratio can
change substantially.
• If the objective is to manage fisheries, many
considerations must come into play, notably
the mobility and distribution of the stocks
to manage, the access to the resources by
different fisheries communities and so on.
And again, the more targeted the areas for
specific purposes, the clearer the value of the
measure. That’s why the “blanket” approach
of multi-purpose MPAs tends to have a much
less clear cost/benefit ratio.
A study of 87 MPAs revealed that the effects
of MPAs increase with the accumulation of five
features: no take, well-enforced, old, large, and
isolated. However, the same study recognized
that global targets based on area alone will not
optimize biodiversity protection: better MPA
design, durable management and enforcement
are crucial to ensure their conservation value
(Edgar et al. 2014).
All these questions are very important
because they imply that the idea of very large
MPAs with general objectives and little or no
means for monitoring and enforcement are not
necessarily a good idea in terms of cost/benefit
analysis. Though increasingly popular, their
relative merits should be analyzed objectively
and not just taken for granted as dogma.
The Aichi targets
The so-called “Aichi targets” are the best expres-
sion of the current efforts by the international
community to protect marine biodiversity
through an international instrument. The
United Nations Decade on Biodiversity serves
to support and promote implementation of the
objectives of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity
and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, which were
adopted at the 10th Conference of the Parties to
the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD),
in Nagoya, Japan, in 2010. Concerning marine
biodiversity, target no. 11 agreed in Nagoya is:
By 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and
inland water, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine
areas, especially areas of particular importance for
biodiversity and ecosystem services, are con-
served through effectively and equitably managed,
ecologically representative and well-connected
systems of protected areas and other effective
area-based conservation measures, and integrated
into the wider landscapes and seascapes.
These targets are implemented by the EU,
which reports periodically on how they are
implemented in European waters (EU 2015).

The Aichi targets are very loosely defined,
leaving ample room for maneuver on how to
identify the areas to be protected as part of the
10% target. In reality, the protection of marine
areas poses a problem of balance between two
factors: the relative value of the areas in terms
of the biodiversity they contain, and the impor-
tance of the current human use of such areas,
and thus the economic and social difficulty to
protect the areas against human use.
Ideally, the best areas for MPAs are those
with a high biodiversity and low human use,
but these tend to be scarce in areas close
ashore. The difficult part is what to do with
areas of high biodiversity and a high level of
human use. The Aichi target approach has a
fundamental flaw: if focuses on a percentage
of marine areas protected, regardless of their
value to preserve biodiversity. This has pro-
duced a tendency to establish very large MPAs,
notably in distant, unpopulated areas, to fit
the objective while avoiding more conflicting
areas. This phenomenon has been called a “just
add water” approach, which fails to address the
need to protect coastal areas where most of the
biodiversity is actually found.
This difficulty tends to lead to the establish-
ment of large MPAs in remote locations as an
“easy” way to comply with the Aichi targets
while avoiding too much social conflict. The
problems with that approach is that the recent
increases in the designation of very large MPAs
around the world threatens to undermine the
objectives of the Aichi targets they are aiming
to address. The push for such designations in
countries’ overseas territories deflects attention
and efforts from the challenge of designating
and effectively managing MPAs closer to home
(Jones and De Santo 2016).
Indeed, this question goes to the core of the
problem: what is the best way of protecting
biodiversity: to identify and protect (arguably
much smaller) areas of well-known high bio-
diversity, or to protect much larger areas with
much less clear biodiversity value and objec-
tives? De Santo (2013) argues that the push
for quantity over quality undermines sustain-
ability and social justice: well-managed no-take
The CFP and international fisheries 243
MPAs set-up within a network of multiple-use
areas is more likely to achieve conservation
objectives than large off-shore no-take areas
that are difficult if not impossible to monitor
and enforce.
The question is, however, complex, and
certain authors argue that the drive to declare
very large-scale MPAs in remote seas puts
pressure on governments to pursue similar
agendas closer to home, in heavily exploited
areas (Singleton and Roberts 2014).
The above trend toward large areas is, in
fact, contradictory with the approach favored
by other instruments, such as for example the
Natura 2000 network established under the
EU’s habitats (EU 1992) and bird directives (EU
2009). In these cases, the protection regime
affects relatively small, but very well-identified
areas where the species or habitats to be pro-
tected are also well-identified. In addition, the
control of fishing activities in these areas is an
integral part of the CFP control and enforce-
ment obligations. This allows, inter alia, mon-
itoring and reporting on how the closed areas
are contributing to achieving the objective.
The example of the marine Natura 2000 areas
established in the EU is a very positive one: they
are well-identified areas of demonstrated high
biodiversity; their objective is clear (to preserve
such biodiversity, not to do fisheries manage-
ment); and their extension is proportional to the
area to be protected and avoids unnecessary clo-
sures to the sustainable fishing activity. This is
perhaps a model worth promoting in the inter-
national arena also.
The notion of “ocean grabbing”
MPAs also raise an important question of fair-
ness in the way countries around the world
benefit from the bonus of the ocean’s resources,
and this is an essential question in terms of
international governance. A number of authors
argue that the initiatives toward the establish-
ment of large-scale MPAs amount to “ocean
grabbing” by certain vested interests, whose
legitimacy to do so is at least questionable
(Bennet et al. 2015). This is particularly so for
those cases where the MPAs are sponsored with
244 Chapter 10
private money from non-profit organizations.
In certain cases, the sponsoring consists of writ-
ing off the public debt of certain governments
in exchange for the declaration of these MPAs,
as is the case in the above mentioned MPA
around the Seychelles.
The reasons to question such approaches are
diverse:
• The sources of the private funds behind these
initiatives are not always clear, but in some
cases, however, they are all too clear: large
real estate interests or oil companies. What
looks like a commendable initiative to protect
the ocean’s biodiversity can reflect the inter-
est of these companies to deflect the public
attention to other threats to the marine envi-
ronment, or to “grab” these areas and expel
other economic interests to have an almost
private use of their resources.
• The consultation mechanisms leading to their
establishment often ignores altogether some
of the stakeholders more directly concerned,
such as small-scale fishermen, by far the most
affected.
• The large areas have very generic objectives,
making it very difficult to judge, and to eval-
uate scientifically, the relationship between
these objectives and the effectiveness of the
instrument. In the absence of such objective
evaluation, dogma is more easily imposed.
• Large areas may also affect much more small-
scale interests without the capacity to dis-
place their activity to areas outside the MPA,
while large, industrial interests (including
IUU) have shown remarkable ingenuity to
find alternative fishing grounds.
These initiatives are very popular for the
general public, but can represent a privatization
of the world’s ocean to less than transparent
economic interests, and following procedures
dominated by the availability of large sums of
money, and not necessarily by good and fair
governance. Attractive though they may seem,
it is important to bear in mind that nothing
can replace good, fair management by public
authorities including consultations with all
interests concerned, including notably those of
the most fragile.
The ultimate MPA: a ban on high
seas fishing?
The ultimate consequence of the initiatives on
MPAs is the idea, proposed by a certain number
of private and public advocates, of banning all
fishing in the high seas; in other words, to turn
the world’s high seas into a huge MPA.
This idea resonates well with many audi-
ences, which include some scientific under-
pinning, arguing that such a measure would
improve coordination across EEZs, reduce over-
all exploitation and protect sufficient range
of the stocks to allow rebuilding (White and
Costello 2014). Certain estimations conclude
that this measure could increase catches within
EEZs by around 10% by 2050, against a likely
reduction by 6% expected from “business as
usual.” This would also build resilience against
the effects of climate change, which are likely
to reduce available resources in tropical waters
(Cheung et al. 2017).
Other authors have estimated that such an
action would increase the production within
EEZs by 18% through “spill-over” of the con-
servation effects in the high seas, with no loss
in global catch. In addition, they argue that
the inequality of the distribution of catches,
today largely dominated by high-seas fishing
nations, would be reduced by 50%, that is,
global catches would be more equally dis-
tributed among all coastal States of the world
(Sumaila et al. 2015).
The idea may seem attractive, both from a
conservation viewpoint but also from a per-
spective of increased “equity” in the way the
world fishery resources are utilized. However,
a number of initial objections can be made to
this idea:
• The ban on high sea fishing may aggravate
fishing pressure within EEZs. Vessels cur-
rently fishing in the high seas could easily
find ways to have access to EEZs through
either public or private agreements. Or, even
worse, through IUU activity: most illegal
activity in the world’s fisheries actually takes
place within EEZs; a ban on high seas fishing
would likely increase this pressure.

• Who would enforce such measure? Cur-
rently, high seas fishing is controlled by
high-seas fishing nations as part of their
obligations under UNCLOS. If no high seas
fishing is authorized, who would have the
interest to deploy the very expensive means
to enforce it?
• It would not resolve the problem of illegal
fishing: this is well-known to take place
mainly within EEZs, where the coastal States
have weak governance and enforcement
systems.
• The main argument in favor, the so-called
spill-over effect, has been well-demonstrated
for MPAs in a number of cases (Buxton et al.
2014), but at global level it is more doubtful.
If relatively clear for highly-migratory fish,
it remains doubtful in the case of demersal
stocks where important abundances exist
in distant, deep-waters. The spill-over effect
is a function of stock “viscosity,” a notion
well-demonstrated for certain stocks but
poorly known for many others.
• Last but not least, the question of “equity”
is multi-faceted. Certain self-qualified devel-
oping countries consider that a more
“equitable” distribution of fishing rights
means their right to expand their fisheries
in the high seas. The case of China, whose
high-seas fishing fleets have exploded in
recent years, illustrates this point.
High seas fishing: economic
nonsense?
The idea of high seas fishing has also been pre-
sented by some authors as economic nonsense
(Sala et al. 2018) arguing that such activity
can only be maintained through very high fuel
subsidies: the authors estimate that 54% of all
high seas fishing would be unprofitable without
such subsidies. This study, however, does not
explain why, for example, long distance fleets
fishing in the high seas are among the most
profitable of all EU sectors, despite the absence
of any specific subsidy for this segment. For
example, the last study on the profitability
of the EU industry (EU 2018) indicates that
the performance of the EU distant water fleet
The CFP and international fisheries 245
is – on average – at a healthy 15% of net profit
margin. Trends are positive (not only in eco-
nomic performance but also in catch per unit
effort [CPUEs]) and net profits have increased
in recent years. Among these fleets, the most
profitable is that fishing in NAFO waters, an
area very strictly managed and controlled. This
compares very favorably with, for example,
the small-scale sector in the Mediterranean,
which show the lowest levels of profitability.
This clearly shows that high seas fishing can,
in a context of sound management and strict
enforcement, be sustainable in biological as
well as economic terms.
Overall, the idea of banning high seas fishing
resonates well for many audiences and will
certainly be around for debate in the years to
come. However, the proclaimed advantages
are less than obvious and a full evaluation
of its effects, both in terms of fishery conser-
vation and management, as well as in terms
of distributional effects, seems necessary to
ensure that the question is handled on a solid,
non-ideological basis.
A ban on high seas trawling?
This is another idea that we can consider as a
minor version of the complete ban on high seas
fishing. Like the former, this idea is also very
popular among environmental NGOs and also
resonates well with other audiences. Some of
its proponents have depicted an image of the
world’s sea bottoms being almost completely
wiped out by trawling activity. A recent article,
focused on the global footprint of fisheries, esti-
mated that industrial fishing occurs in >55% of
the ocean area, and that “the absolute footprint
of fishing is much larger than those of other
forms of food production” (Kroodsma et al.
2018). This article received considerable atten-
tion by the media and projected a very negative
view of the fishing activity and in particular
trawling by industrial vessels. However, as we
saw in Chapter 8, the comment on that article
by Amoroso et al. (2018) demonstrates that
when more detailed resolution is applied, the
effect of bottom trawling is very significantly
lower.
246 Chapter 10
That bottom trawling affects the sea bot-
tom has been abundantly illustrated (Kaiser
1998; Jennings and Kaiser 1998; Hinz et al.
2009; Lindholm et al. 2015). These effects
are variable depending on the type of trawl-
ing and the nature of the sea bottom, but
may include smoothing bed-forms, removing
structure-forming invertebrates and remov-
ing structure-building organisms that create
habitat.
While these effects are more clear-cut in the
case of sea bottoms with complex communities
of invertebrates, such as coral, sponges, and the
like, the effects on sandy or muddy bottoms can
indeed be very limited (Lindholm et al. 2015).
This implies that the generalization of conclu-
sions on the effects of trawling must be taken
with care, as these effects are largely the result
of the type of sea bottom under consideration.
There is abundant scientific literature on the
real effect of bottom trawling in the world’s
oceans. A recent study confirms that bottom
trawling is highly aggregated, with effects on
seabed biota being dependent upon penetra-
tion in the sediment; this is lower for otter
trawls (6% of biota removed) and highest for
hydraulic dredges (41% of biota removed).
Median recovery times post-trawling (from
50% to 95% of unimpacted biomass) ranges
between 1.9% and 6.4% years. The study
also established a methodology that enables
the assessment of the trawling impacts on an
unprecedented spatial scale (Hiddinck et al.
2017).
For European waters, another study has
recently evaluated the footprint of bottom
trawling and has identified the areas and the
level of impact of this technique (Eigaard et al.
2017). These studies (among others) allow for
an objective consideration of the problem based
on very specific evidence, and should be the
basis for any possible future decision on this
topic, over and beyond the more media-savvy
approach by Kroodsma et al. cited above.
There is still however a lot to investigate on
this question, and the need for more data is
well-assessed, including data leading to best
practice (Kaiser et al. 2017).
Another question is that of the alternatives to
trawling: if the problem with this activity is the
disturbance of the sea bottom, would it be pos-
sible to shift from trawling to other kind of fish-
ing (i.e. long-lining?) as an alternative? This is
certainly worthy of consideration, and the exis-
tence of a number of profitable long-line fish-
eries for deep-sea resources demonstrates that
at least in some cases the ban on trawling could
perhaps be compensated by fishing with other
gear with less impact on the sea bottom. This,
in any case, would have to be fully evaluated
before a dramatic measure like a complete ban
on trawling in the high seas is considered.
International governance
and developing countries
In Chapter 12 we will look into the question of
the state of conservation of the world’s fishery
resources. An important conclusion emerges:
while the overall trend worldwide is rather
negative, this trend has many exceptions: those
of developed countries, and multilateral orga-
nizations dominated by these, that in recent
years have managed their fisheries relatively
well and can now enjoy a positive trend in the
abundance of their fishery resources.
This implies that the problem of the con-
servation of the world’s resources lies to a
considerable extent in developing countries
and in poorly managed international fisheries.
This may be the result of their lack of means,
lack of tradition or even in some cases lack of
political priority to carry out fisheries manage-
ment. Any future global governance of fisheries
should take this into account.
International fisheries governance:
a rich country’s agenda?
Ocean governance is a notion often developed
and advocated by developed countries, while
many developing countries view that notion
with some suspicion. Yet, it is in develop-
ing countries that there is a clearer need to
improve fisheries management. International
ocean governance is seen by a number of

developing countries as an attempt by rich
countries to limit their access to the resources,
by establishing restrictions that generally tend
to perpetuate a status quo that prevents new
entrants in the system. From that perspective,
progress in this area seems only possible if
developing countries are given what they see
as a fair opportunity to enter the club of those
who benefit from the ocean’s riches. This has
at least two components: (1) capacity building,
through aid to development and (2) access to
the fishing rights.
In the absent of good ocean governance, cer-
tain countries benefit unfairly. However, all too
often developing countries see little incentive in
investing in this question, preferring unilateral
action instead.
This is somehow a vicious circle: develop-
ing countries see little benefit in engaging in
improved management if there is no guarantee
of a better deal in the overall share of the
ocean’s resources. On the other hand, some
developed countries (including those of the
EU) promote ocean governance but at the same
time want to preserve their acquired rights to
exploit the ocean’s resources. How can a deal
be struck? As we will see below, partnership
seems the way to go.
Capacity building
The need for capacity building is well-
recognized under UNCLOS as well as in the
EU development policy. Indeed, the UN has
established a specific Assistance Fund to help
developing States improve their governance.
However, an analysis of the UN webpage con-
cerned reveals that most of the contributions
to this fund are focused at supporting legal
claims for sovereignty or jurisdiction by coastal
States, but not to support actions on scientific
advice, management, and control of fisheries.
In addition, the Fund is currently exhausted.4
Clearly, the UN trust fund is still not a significant
contributor to improved fisheries management
in practice.
4 www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/
fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm/
The CFP and international fisheries 247
The EU is the world’s first contributor to aid
to development, and this important policy has
always been available for matters pertaining
to fisheries management in the incumbent
countries. However, this policy does not impose
priorities. The EU cannot decide that part of its
budget be dedicated to improve fisheries man-
agement if the countries concerned prefer other
priorities. For this reason, the contribution of
this policy to improve fisheries management
has always been incomplete. Perhaps the most
important element to convince many of the
receiving countries of the need to use part of
the development funds for this purpose is the
EU’s action against IUU fishing. Countries being
investigated and identified as contributing to
this fishing have consistently showed interest in
improving their management, using if possible,
development funds.
For these reasons, the combination of the
development policy and the parallel pressure
exerted by the EU on this question seems to
be a far more efficient system to build capacity
in developing countries, and underscores the
positive side-effects of the EU’s IUU policy in
recent years.
Fight against poverty
Among the objectives to be sought by good gov-
ernance in developing countries, the use of fish-
ing for poverty alleviation is an obvious one.
The sustainable livelihood approach (SLA) has
been defined and applied as the main standard
to apply in fisheries development policy (Allison
and Horemans 2006).
However, the needs and aspirations of many
developing States are not reduced to that. The
SLA mentioned above is actually an issue for
countries with extreme poverty and famine.
However, for many other countries also con-
sidered as “developing” (let’s bear in mind
that China still considers itself a “developing
country”!) the challenges are different. They
include in some cases the need for capacity
building, but most importantly, the aspiration
for a larger “part of the cake” of the ocean’s
resources.
Beyond that, the fight against poverty does
not mean that the fish to be caught will be
248 Chapter 10
eaten by the local populations in developing
countries. In fact, more often than not, fish
(even local fish) is more a cash crop than a
direct source of food. In a number of cases,
the fishing rights by developing countries are
exerted by operators whose interest is to sell
the fish abroad, in exchange for cash. Certain
African countries with abundant resources in
their EEZs see how much of this wealth goes
away to produce fishmeal, to feed other sources
of animal protein, generally in very distant
countries such as, again, China.5
These are, in any case, sovereign choices by
the developing States, and nobody has the right
to tell them what they should do with their fish.
The question boils down to one: to alleviate
poverty, do these countries have a fair access to
the ocean resources?
Access to fishing rights
We have seen in various sections of this doc-
ument how crucial it is for good fisheries
management that the allocation of fishing
rights be resolved. In certain Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations (RFMOs), existing
allocation keys are under almost permanent
questioning. In some cases, the problem has
been tackled through the preparation of allo-
cation criteria to inspire future allocation
exercises. This type of initiative, however, is of
very limited use, as the experience of ICCAT
in 1999 clearly demonstrates: on that occasion,
ICCAT did actually agree on a set of allocation
criteria, but to strike a deal the criteria were so
general that almost any allocation key could
possibly be justified on that basis.
This issue is extremely difficult, yet it is essen-
tial if progress is to be made in fisheries gover-
nance. The difficulty can be easily understood
from both sides:
• From the developing States’ side, it is impos-
sible, either legally or politically, to deny
them access to their fair share of the ocean’s
resources.
5 www.dw.com/en/foreign-appetite-for-fish-meal-
threatens-west-africans-livelihood/a-44506336/
• From the developed States’ side, it is difficult
to convince the industry to give up rights
that they obtained after years of effort, risky
investment and hard work.
Some developing nations often claim fishing
rights without having the capital, the technol-
ogy, the tradition and the markets for fishing. In
addition, more often than not they want to fish
to export their catch to the same countries they
want to replace in the world’s fishing grounds.
How can this be resolved?
As we saw above, the idea of closing all
fishing in the high seas has been presented also
as a way to redistribute fishing rights on a fairer
way, to the benefit of developing countries
(Sumaila et al. 2015). However, in that analysis
we see that some of the “winners” of this mea-
sure would be, inter alia, the US, Guam (US)
and the United Kingdom, which are hard to
classify as developing countries. This is certainly
counter-intuitive.
One promising way forward would be to
develop the idea presented already by the
European tropical tuna industry to invest in
third countries in a way that these would ben-
efit from the revenues of the fishing activity,
but using Europe’s technology and capital, as
well as the European markets. In fact, language
to this effect was included in the conclusions
of the third session of the Kobe process (see
section on “Global fleet capacity” below). This
idea would provide a win–win situation for
both parties, and would have the crucial advan-
tage of being agreed by the party that would in
principle have more to lose: the industry from
developed countries.
Unfortunately, this idea has not made signifi-
cant headway in practice.
A new partnership
The key to resolve the above problem is part-
nership. Partnership between the industry in
developed States and the local interests in devel-
oping countries to jointly run a healthy and
sustainable fishery, using developing countries’
increased fishing rights through developed
countries’ capital and technology. Failure to
establish these partnerships can only lead to
frustration in both sides, for the benefit of third

parties, such as China, that do not hesitate to
extend their investment in the world fisheries
squeezing out existing interests and preventing
the development of new ones.
Such partnership, to be sure, also has oppo-
nents: for many NGOs, the development of
fisheries in developing countries must be
done based on a small-scale basis, away from
large industrial interests. Theoretically, this
is supposed to represent a more inclusive,
labor-intensive, and autonomous way of
developing fisheries, for the benefit of local
populations.
This deserves careful analysis: while it is true
that small-scale fishing can be extremely impor-
tant in many areas of the world (and not only
in developing countries), it is also important to
remember that the small-scale option must not
necessarily be the only one, or even the best, for
a number of reasons:
• Developing countries have the right to
choose their own socio-economic model to
develop their fisheries. Trying to impose
a specific model on them is somehow
neo-colonialist.
• In many cases, small-scale development is
simply not viable. There is no better example
than Namibia. Its extremely rough seas and
absence of coastal population in very large
areas of their territory makes it impossible
to rely on small-scale fishing. Certain NGOs
have criticized the Namibian model of fish-
eries development because it is based on
large-scale industrial fishing through foreign
investment. However, just looking at a map
of Namibia, and knowing a little about the
Namibian Sea under the Benguela current,
is more than enough to understand the
Namibian approach.
• Another case in hand is that of the countries
(small Pacific Island States) constitut-
ing the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA) who exploit their abundant tuna
resources through licensing of foreign (very
large) vessels. It is difficult to see how
the tuna occurring in a maritime area of
14.3 million km2 and producing 25–30%
of world’s tuna catches and 60% of Pacific
The CFP and international fisheries 249
catches6 could be exploited through small-
scale fishing.
Overall, the above partnership is indeed a
very valid model for at least those cases where
small-scale fishing is not a practical option, or
perhaps even more simply, for those cases that
developing countries in question would choose
based on their own sovereignty.
Large-scale MPAs and developing
countries
Large-scale MPAs and the defense of small-scale
fishing often go hand in hand, notably because
they tend to share certain advocates (envi-
ronmental NGOs). However, both things
are not necessarily compatible; in fact, they
tend to work in opposite directions. Indeed,
large-scale MPAs have a much greater impact
for small-scale fishing than for large-scale fish-
ing. No-take zones affect much more those
who cannot displace their fishing activity to
other areas, whereas most ocean-going vessels
can easily change fishing area and continue
fishing outside MPAs. When considering MPAs,
one should not take for granted that they
would benefit mostly small-scale fishermen
from developing countries. Depending upon
how they are designed, they may have the
opposite effect.
There is another important side-effect of a
policy on large-scale MPAs: since their estab-
lishment implies the termination of certain eco-
nomic activities, there is much more resistance
for their establishment in areas densely popu-
lated and intensively exploited. These generally
correspond to developed States. This, in turn,
combined with the quantification of objectives
(the 10% Aichi target) may produce a tendency
to establish large MPAs in remote areas with
low activity and low social and economic resis-
tance, or simply in areas where vested interests
are less articulate in defending their economic
activity. These circumstances may gener-
ally coincide with developing countries. As a
result, the need to achieve quantified targets,
6 http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/factsheet_7
.pdf/
250 Chapter 10
combined with different levels of political/
economic resistance, may result in MPAs being
established disproportionately in developing
countries’ remote areas, both questioning the
objectives established in the first place, and
especially the fairness of the whole process:
in the end those excluded may tend to be
small-scale interests from developing countries.
Global fleet capacity
A problem of global governance
The uncontrolled development of fishing fleets
(very particularly from the Far East) represents
one of the main threats to the world’s ocean
resources today. While the need to cap total
capacity is recognized by everybody, practical
efforts to do so at a global level have failed.
Roughly speaking there are three groups of
countries regarding fleet capacity:
• Countries having voluntarily capped their
fleet capacity. Mostly developed countries,
they have decided to limit the size of their
fleets even in the absence of an international
agreement to do so. The EU, Japan, and the
US are part of that group.
• Countries having small fleets but wish-
ing to expand them. Typically developing
States that see fisheries as a possible area
for economic development. Many of them,
however, lack the finance or the know-how
to do so, but maintain their aspirations. India
or Brazil are good examples.
• Countries developing their fleets without
limitation. These are increasing dramati-
cally their capacity without control. China,
Taiwan, and Korea are leading this group.
They do so both with vessels under their own
flag or vessels under third countries’ flags
(notably in flag-of-convenience countries). A
significant part of this uncontrolled growth is
linked at different degrees with IUU fishing,
notably in the case of China.
The overall trend is one of continuous
increase in the global world’s fishing effort,
particularly in the tonnage class of 100–149
gross registered tonnes (GRT) (Anticamara
et al. 2011). This is clearly due to the fact that
the self-restraint practiced by certain blocs (the
EU, Japan, USA) is more than compensated by
the increase in fishing capacity and effort by a
number of developed countries, notably in the
Far East.
In the above context, the exponential growth
of the Chinese long-distance fleet is a major
cause of concern. According to FAO, China has
increased its total combined power of its fleets
in recent years notably through an increase in
the average engine power from 64 to 68 kW
between 2010 and 2012, while for example
the EU the downward trend in terms of num-
bers, tonnage, and power has continued (FAO
2014). Data from the Chinese Association of
Vessel Owners show that in 2016 China had
more than 2400 ocean-going vessels. Of these,
around two-thirds are flagged in China and
around one-third are flagged in third countries,
most of them flag-of-convenience ones.
According to FAO, most Asian countries
have shown considerable increases in marine
catches in the last 10 years, with the exception
of Japan and Thailand. Myanmar, Vietnam,
Indonesia, and China have shown continuous
growth, sometimes in an astonishing decadal
increase (FAO 2014). The Asian fleet is more
than an order of magnitude larger than any
other region in both capacity and effort, and
continues to increase. Most other regions have
stabilized capacity, in particular Europe where
such capacity has declined. Overall, the devel-
oped world as a whole has reduced capacity
in recent years while developing countries are
showing the greatest relative increase (Bell
et al. 2016).
The Kobe process
The so-called Kobe process was an initiative
to try to find a solution to the problem of
the world’s tuna fishing capacity. Originated
in Japan, who organized the first meeting in
Kobe, the process organized two subsequent
gatherings, in Spain and the USA, but went no
further due to lack of progress.
The process, attended by most tuna-fishing
countries and by the five RFMOs dealing with

tuna fish, was made very difficult notably by
two factors:
• The absence of China, whose fleet has grown
in recent years into the largest in the world.
This made it difficult for participants to make
strong commitments on self-restraint in fleet
development when the biggest player did not
even attend.
• The legitimate interest of certain developing
countries to develop their fishing rights. In
particular, the small island developing States
of the Pacific viewed the process as an excuse
by wealthy, long-distance fishing nations to
preserve the status quo.
The Kobe 3 process adopted some recommen-
dations on the question of capacity. However, it
did not create any over-arching system to deal
with the transfer of capacity among oceans and
charged every tuna RFMO to evaluate capacity.
On that basis it recommended that:
Kobe III participants recommend that developed
fishing members freeze large-scale purse seine
capacity under their flag. Based on the status of
the stocks, each RFMO should consider a scheme
for:
• Reduction of overcapacity in a way that does
not constrain the access to, development of, and
benefit from sustainable tuna fisheries, includ-
ing on the high seas, by developing coastal
States, in particular small island developing
States, territories, and States with small and
vulnerable economies; and
• Transfer of capacity from developed fishing
members to developing coastal fishing mem-
bers within its area of competence where
appropriate.
It also adopted some vague language by par-
ticipants to cooperate in the fight against IUU
fishing. Overall, the Kobe process made limited
progress in addressing the problem:
• Some RFMOs have adopted capacity freezing
measures, but some of these have in fact
been completely undermined by the need
to accommodate new entrants from coastal
States having a genuine right to fish in the
high seas.
• These limitations are not adhered to by
a number of countries that act as flags of
convenience.
The CFP and international fisheries 251
• There has been very limited transfer of capac-
ity from developed to developing States, at
least in terms of genuine investment. In fact,
most of the investments have taken place as
IUU to flag-of-convenience countries by Far
East operators.
As a result, the increase in the world’s fleets
still continues fundamentally unchecked, and
not only for tuna fishing, but also in other types
of fishing.
In the context of the IUU dialog between the
EU and China, the latter showed no intention
whatsoever to check the tendency described
above of an explosive increase in their ocean-
going fishing fleet. This is the clearest demon-
stration that the problem has not yet been
resolved.
The current initiative by the Commission on
global ocean’s governance would have been
an ideal context for new political initiatives
in this regard. Unfortunately, this idea did not
make the “final cut” of the selected initiatives
(EU 2016). Although the important initiative
on IUU will help in this regard (as much of
the current development of the Chinese fleet
is through flags of convenience) this kind of
initiative alone will not solve the problem.
A key factor: the allocation of fishing
rights
The limitation of the world’s fleets is made
extremely difficult by the lack of agreement
on how to share the capacity ceilings. As we
saw above in the section “A problem of global
governance,” any attempt to limit global capac-
ity is still seen by many countries as a way to
limit their legitimate right to develop their own
fishing industry and take their fair share of
the world’s fishery resources. This implies that
there is no possible solution to the problem
of global fleet capacity unless there is some
agreement on how to allocate such capacity
among the countries.
There are some examples of how this can
be done. The best example of a limitation of
fleet capacity as an instrument for management
is that of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) which at the end of the
252 Chapter 10
1990s, upon the increased interest in fishing
in the area by a growing number of countries,
established a vessel capacity ceiling. This was
difficult to establish because of the need to
accommodate the legitimate rights of all States
with a right to fish. The allocation of capacity
rights even gave fishing rights to countries
like Costa Rica that at the time did not want
to develop a fleet. Even so, at the end of the
1990s a difficult agreement was reached and
IATTC established a capacity ceiling allocated to
participating countries.
In subsequent years, however, the closed
nature of the allocation raised problems with
coastal nations, such as Peru, that could not
accept that a coastal State like them would be
denied the right to fish in the area, by virtue of
their lack of a capacity quota. Similar claims by
other countries resulted in a repeated adapta-
tion of the capacity ceilings that, by admitting
new entrants, ended up losing much of its value
as a management instrument.
This experience is an excellent illustration of
how the legitimate aspirations of countries to
have a share of the cake stands in the way of
a stable agreement on capacity. The solution is
not simple or straightforward, because indus-
trialized nations having the tradition (and the
markets) are understandably reluctant to give
up the status quo to accommodate new entrants,
but also because some developing nations reg-
ularly make over-ambitious, unrealistic claims
for fishing rights, not supported by a real capac-
ity to use them in practice. In the end, only
a few countries in the Far East, as mentioned
above, have benefitted from this situation, by
taking advantage of the lack of limitations to
increase their fleets at unprecedented levels in
recent years.
There is probably no single solution to
this problem, but at least some ideas can be
explored:
• Extending the approach initiated by IATTC
in the 1990s to other RFMOs, even if their
efforts to cap capacity have to be re-opened
regularly.
• Establish within the RFMOs a system to facil-
itate investment by industrialized nations
in developing ones, so that the legitimate
aspirations of the latter can be satisfied
through partnership with the former, thus
preventing IUU investment.
• Opening fishing rights to a market mecha-
nism that would ensure a minimum share
of the total capacity to developing countries,
so that these could use them either through
their own development or through foreign
investment.
In any case, there is hardly a more pressing
question of international fisheries management
than this one. One way or another, the EU will
have to play a key role in finding a solution. As
indicated above, the current emphasis by the
EU on the improvement of the world’s ocean
governance should provide the right frame-
work where this important question could be
addressed.
Fisheries enforcement at global
level: fighting against illegal
fishing
Introduction
IUU fisheries are one of the main problems
of today’s fisheries around the world. Its
impact on the world fisheries is, by its own
nature, difficult to estimate, but different
sources advance amounts ranging between
11 and 26 million tonnes a year, in a context
of total catches of wild fish being around
90 million tonnes. The European Commission
estimates the economic value of IUU fishing to
be around €10 billion a year, that is, 19% of the
worldwide reported value of catches.7
It is important to emphasize that IUU fishing,
in the context of the CFP, is not just any illegal
fishing activity, but rather an illegal activity
that takes place regularly and is not controlled
or penalized. This is an important distinction
because many vessels can commit infractions,
even serious ones, but that does not make them
IUU, if they are sanctioned by either the coastal
7 https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/
docs/publications/2015-04-tackling-iuu-fishing_en
.pdf/

or their flag States. IUU is therefore about illegal
behavior mixed with impunity.
The negative effects of IUU fishing are
obvious:
• They discourage compliance by non-IUU
fleets.
• They produce unfair competition in the mar-
kets for the law-abiding fishermen.
• They undermine the ability of developing
countries to develop their own, legitimate
fishing industries.
• Their unreported nature undermines data
collection and the production of good scien-
tific advice.
• In some cases, IUU fishing is also associated
with very poor working conditions, and even
slavery.
In the US, the IUU activity is also strongly
resented as a source of revenue and job losses
for local communities. For example, the Alaska
Bering Sea Crabbers have estimated that unof-
ficial over-quota catches of king crab by Russian
vessels amounted to 10 million pounds in 2014,
mainly from vessels with Russian ownership
and crews but flagged in such countries as Sierra
Leone, Myanmar, or Belize, and imported into
the US market partially processed without indi-
cation of origin. This provokes important losses
of revenue notably through depressed prices in
the US market (Anon 2016).
The fight against illegal, unreported, unreg-
ulated (IUU) fishing must be therefore a
fundamental objective of any international
governance of fisheries.
The success of the EU IUU policy
The fight against illegal fishing is one of the
most significant and successful policies within
the framework of the CFP. Although other
countries around the world are also applying
measures against illegal fishing, the EU system,
based on Regulation 1005/2008 (EU 2008), is
the most advanced and effective one available
today.
The system is based on documenting the
origin of fish imports to the EU. When and
where there is evidence of IUU fishing from a
given country, an investigation is conducted.
The CFP and international fisheries 253
Failure to address the problem leads to a
pre-identification of the country concerned,
followed by a cooperation initiative from the
EU to improve fisheries management in the
country in question. Only consistent and
repeated failure to engage in that cooperation
can lead to the identification of that country
as non-cooperating and thus to the application
of trade measures as a very last resort. Both
the pre-identification and the identification are
lifted when the country in question improves
its fisheries management.
The system is not protectionist: in case that
trade measures are applied to a third country,
the EU operators fishing in that country would
be first affected: they would not be able to
sell their fish in their own market. The whole
system is not based just on the “threat” of trade
measures, but on cooperation. A number of
developing countries have benefited from the
EU development aid, or from the new genera-
tion of bilateral fisheries agreements to improve
their fisheries management systems. Thanks to
this cooperation, more than 30 third countries
have improved their systems to fight IUU. In
some cases, such as Indonesia or South Korea,
the improvements in their fisheries manage-
ment and in their handling if illegal fishing has
been nothing short of extraordinary.
A multilateral IUU policy
The EU’s IUU policy, successful as it certainly
is, still has a major drawback: it is applied by
the EU alone. Neither the US system nor the
Japanese one (the other world’s largest fish
markets) are nearly as efficient as the European
system. Ensuring that this policy is applied
by an increasing number of countries, and
particularly by the biggest importers of fish is
essential to “close the circle” and increase the
effectiveness of the policy.
In this regard, the recent entry into force of
FAO’s Port State Agreement is excellent news.
With 51 ratifications (including the EU, Japan,
and USA, three main fish markets, but still
excluding China and Russia)8 the Agreement
8 www.fao.org/fishery/psm/agreement/parties/en/
254 Chapter 10
is formally in force. FAO itself recognizes, that
now the priority must be the effective imple-
mentation of this agreement. This requires inter
alia the development of the access to infor-
mation. The High Sea Vessels Authorization
Record is a fundamental step. Current coverage
and completeness of this instrument is vari-
able. Even more importantly, imposing as an
obligation the vessels International Maritime
Organization (IMO) number as Unique Vessel
Identifier would provide an extremely valuable
instrument that would allow tracing all vessels
regardless of any change of name, flag, or
owner: the ultimate instrument to track and act
on identified IUU offenders.
The EU has identified the need to make
further progress at a multilateral level on the
fight against IUU fishing one of the priorities
in its recent approach on the improvement of
the global ocean governance referred to above.
Today, IUU operators can still sell their illegal
fish to a number of alternative markets around
the world in the event of a trade ban from
the EU. Only when all the large fish markets
around the world establish a coordinated ban
on that fish will the illegal activity be severely
curtailed. This calls for a stepwise approach to
further increase coordination with like-minded
countries. But this is difficult and time con-
suming, and requires a level of priority for the
external EU fisheries policy that is not easy to
meet in today’s context of reduction of human
resources in the EU institutions.
What future for the fight against IUU
fishing?
Beyond the very obvious need to develop a
more multilateral approach in fighting IUU
activity, there is another crucial question: the
overlap between illegal fishing and other illegal
or illegitimate activities in the world’s oceans.
Illegal activities such as slavery (or illegitimate
such as extremely poor working conditions in
certain third country vessels without adequate
legislation), smuggling, and piracy have been
conducted a number of times using fishing ves-
sels, and certain IUU offenders are also involved
in other kinds of illegal activity.
In the long run, there will have to be an
increasing integration and coordination by the
different services concerned in the fight against
these other activities. This is not simple, inter
alia because the legal basis to act in these areas
is not always necessarily there, at least to use
trade measures as a deterrent as in the case of
IUU fishing. However, the recent example of
the establishment of an EU Coast Guard facility,
integrating different maritime surveillance sys-
tems dealing with different types of crime at sea
clearly sets the tone of the kind of cooperation
that can be developed in the future. And, in
this case, the question is effectively included
in the Commission’s global ocean’s governance
initiative.
Dreaming on: a “social IUU”?
There are very many examples where vessels
(IUU or not) apply very poor working condi-
tions which, if not properly slavery, undermine
basic human rights and represent a distor-
tion of the competition against vessels that
respect such rights. Among them, it has been
demonstrated that certain IUU vessels actually
employed slave labor. Certain countries, such
as Indonesia, have taken action against this
practice (following an EU investigation on
alleged IUU activity by Indonesian vessels) and
have actually taken very dramatic measures to
publicly discourage illegal operators, such as
sinking confiscated IUU vessels.
However, the international legislation to
deter IUU activities (see FAO’s Port State Agree-
ment above) and the EU’s legislation provide
a legal basis to act against activities in contra-
vention to fisheries measures, but they do not
provide a basis to act in case of contravention
against basic human rights.
The entry into force of the Work in Fishing
Convention (No. 188) of 2007 by the Interna-
tional Labour Organization (ILO) represents a
unique opportunity to provide a legal basis and
an international political legitimacy for coun-
tries to act against vessels that do not respect
basic workers (or simply human) rights on
board fishing vessels around the world. So far,
only ten States have ratified this instrument,

including two EU Member States (Estonia and
France).9 Certain NGOs are very active fighting
against these practices. Upon entry into force
of the 2007 ILO Convention the opportunity
is there to launch an initiative to act decisively
against vessels involved in these practices and
even against flag States tolerating them in their
vessels.
This will not be straightforward, in particular
because lack of progress at the level of the
World’s Trade Organization (WTO) in matters
pertaining to social policy. While WTO rules
allow measures to protect natural resources,
the lack of progress on issues related to social
dumping would make the above initiative
legally difficult, since any trade measure to
be applicable by the EU would have to be
impeccably compatible with WTO rules.
However, an increasing number of people, in
view of the success of the EU’s policy on IUU,
are wondering why it is possible to apply trade
barriers to protect the fish, but not to protect
human beings. Different sectors of the indus-
try are calling for action against forced labor on
board European fishing vessels, but this cannot
be handled by Europe alone. Sooner or later this
question will have to be addressed as a funda-
mental global maritime governance issue.
The improvement of RFMOs
Why RFMOs are so important
RFMOs are the fundamental instrument for
carrying out the multilateral management of
fisheries. The Commission has clearly identified
the reinforcement of RFMOs as one of the
keystones of the improvement of the world’s
ocean governance (EU 2016). This is justified
for a number of reasons:
• RFMOs promote and develop cooperation
among coastal States that would probably
would not exist otherwise. Areas such as
the Indian Ocean benefit from the data col-
lection, scientific advice and management
9 www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:
11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312333/
The CFP and international fisheries 255
measures promoted by such RFMOs as the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC),
where the weaknesses of many of the
coastal States of the region are addressed
through cooperation (and funding) from
long-distance fishing interests such as the EU
or Japan.
• Where RFMOs are not present or are not
operational, there is little cooperation among
coastal States. West Africa with the Fishery
Committee for the Central Eastern Atlantic
(CECAF), or South America (outside IATTC)
are examples of non-operational or inexis-
tent RFMOs. In these areas, the cooperation
among coastal States for the purpose of the
management of shared resources is very
small. Where such cooperation exists (for
example, the PNA on Pacific tuna) it is
difficult to see if such cooperation would
have ever taken off without the previous
establishment of the Western and Central
Pacific Tuna Fisheries Commission. Again,
the establishment of an operational RFMO
was instrumental for the cooperation among
coastal states to take shape.
• Strong, operational RFMOs are the best
guarantee against illegal fishing. A number
of them elaborate lists of IUU vessels, thus
facilitating the implementation of measures
against such vessels and those providing
them support or tolerating their activity.
Reinforcing RFMOs is also essential to ensure
that fisheries management remains in the
hands of fisheries management organizations.
Failure to do their job results in environmental
organizations (i.e. The Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora [CITES], etc.) taking over the
management. The case of sharks is well-known:
NGO-led boycotts of the transport of shark fins
resulted from the failure by ICCAT to regulate
shark stocks.
The necessary improvements
FAO (2014) has made an excellent summary of
the situation of all the RMFOs in the world. A
number of these have made a lot of progress but
still have a number of weaknesses, inter alia:
256 Chapter 10
• Incomplete geographic or species coverage.
• Coordination among RFMOs.
• Insufficient participation of developing
States.
• Patchy scientific advice.
• Limited capacity for enforcement.
• Need to adapt to new challenges such as cli-
mate change.
Let’s look at these issues one by one.
Geographical and species coverage
While the coverage of tuna organizations is
practically complete, for non-tuna organiza-
tions, there are still large areas of the world
that are not covered by operational RFMOs.
The particular case of NW Africa is paramount:
although there is an organization to manage
resources in this area, the CECAF mentioned
above, this organization is hardly operational.
Little wonder that this is one of the areas around
the world that suffers a significant amount of
IUU fishing and mismanagement. Other areas
are also unregulated internationally. A case in
hand is that of the fishery for squid between
Argentina and the Falkland Islands, where
earlier attempts to establish a RFMO failed
because of the conflict over the sovereignty of
the Falkland Islands.
In a 2016 report FAO maps the areas of
the world where there are significant fishery
resources that are still not managed by an
international management organization. While
tuna fish are well-covered by these bodies,
demersal resources still suffer from a number
of unregulated areas including international
waters (FAO 2016).
Beyond the geographical coverage, there is
also an issue of species coverage. In particular,
the management of sharks has in some cases
suffered from an alleged lack of mandate of cer-
tain RFMOs to manage them, even when the
geographical coverage was assured by existing
ones. For example, the case for a dedicated fish-
ery organization has been already convincingly
made (Herndon et al. 2010).
Improving scientific advice
We saw above that a basic pre-condition for
fisheries management is the availability of sci-
entific advice, and that most of the problems
with fisheries management around the world
are related to unassessed or poorly-assessed
stocks. Although this is a question that can be
partially addressed by individual countries, in
many occasions the very wide distribution of
certain stocks and the small size of a number of
coastal States makes it very difficult to improve
scientific assessment on a country-by-country
basis. Here, the importance of RFMOs to
improve regional scientific advice is key.
In particular, for widely distributed stocks
(notably small and large pelagic fish), and in
areas where coastal States are small and even
coastal resources are straddling among sev-
eral countries, tackling scientific advice on a
country-by-country basis is not efficient. The
case of the numerous small countries in the
Gulf of Guinea in Western Africa is the best
example. In these cases, the scientific bodies
established under RFMOs can play a key role in
improving scientific advice. In this context they
can provide coordination, training, appropriate
geographical coverage and strong incentives to
collect scientific data and advice. In addition,
their activity and their bids for research funds
can be very effective in mobilizing sources of
funding for such research from various sources,
such as the EU or even the World Bank and
other institutions.
Coordination among RFMOs
Even in the case of tuna organizations where
geographical coverage is practically complete,
there is an issue with the coordination among
the existing RFMOs. Many vessels fishing for
tuna are ocean-going and can fish anywhere
in the world. That implies that if one partic-
ular RFMO becomes much stricter and more
effective than others, there is always a gen-
uine chance that many vessels will displace
their activity to another ocean, where the

corresponding RFMO would be less effective in
controlling abusive practice.
We saw above the case of the Kobe process,
where all RFMOs participated exactly for that
reason; controlling fleet capacity in one place is
useless if this can produce a displacement of the
excess capacity from one ocean to another. This
issue can only be resolved through coordination
among the RFMOs in different oceans so as to
make such displacements impossible.
Failure to address this can lead to problems
even beyond fisheries. Pinsky et al. (2018) have
summarized it in very dramatic terms:
An alternative future of widespread non-cooper-
ative management over new transboundary stocks
risks extensive overfishing, decline in global food
and livelihood provisioning from the ocean, frac-
tured international relationships, and political con-
flicts that could spill over into other, non-fishery
areas of international politics.
These words may sound overdramatic for
some, but for all those who have witnessed how
fisheries non-cooperation can quickly escalate
into much more serious conflict, addressing this
question is of the highest importance.
Further improving developing states’
participation: the allocation of fishing rights
Even more important than capacity building to
improve the participation of developing states
is the question of the fair allocation of fishing
rights. In reality, many of these countries have a
very limited access to the fishery, either because
they have low quotas for the fisheries where
catch opportunities are limited and allocated,
or in the case of open fisheries because they
lack the capacity to compete in such open
circumstances. While this is not necessarily
unfair for developed states that have tradition-
ally invested in developing these fisheries, this
situation is certainly seen as unfair by many
developing States. These tend to consider that
the weight of historical track records makes it
difficult for them to expand their own fisheries.
As we will see in Chapter 12, this fact may be
The CFP and international fisheries 257
aggravated by climate change that seems to be
producing a displacement of fish abundance
away from tropical and subtropical waters to
higher latitudes.
We saw this question above in the context
of the global fleet capacity, but obviously the
same applies for the allocation of catch limita-
tions that apply in a number of RFMOs. It is
important to underline that this is typically a
developing country issue: in those shared only
by developed states, such as NAFO or NEAFC,
existing allocation keys based on historical track
records are fundamentally unquestioned, with
the exception of the cases of important recent
displacements of biomass as a consequence of
climate change.
The experience of ICCAT, with a growing
number of members who legitimately claim
their share of the cake, constitutes the best
example, in particular because this continuous
pressure for re-opening allocation keys has an
important risk: that in order to accommodate
new entrants while minimizing the effects on
existing quota holders, the overall catch lim-
itations will be increased well over scientific
advice.
There is not obvious solution to this problem,
particularly in areas where developing coun-
tries may wake up to their rights under the Law
of the Sea as coastal States. Over and beyond
the regular updating of allocation keys (an
extremely difficult process that would deviate
the efforts of the RFMO from management to
allocation) it is necessary to look at more cre-
ative initiatives, like for example that suggested
by European tropical tuna operators, which
consider the possible establishment of a market
of fishing rights that can potentially benefit all
States involved.
Enforcement
The level of enforcement by different RFMOs is
extremely variable. While some, such as NAFO
or NEAFC, have quite effective control mecha-
nisms, other organizations still lack appropriate
258 Chapter 10
mechanisms. This is particularly grave in certain
cases, notably around Africa, where important
IUU activity is still rampant.
The lack of “teeth” has been one of the most
common criticism of RFMOs as the main instru-
ment for international fisheries management.
Certain coastal States, known for aggressive
policies of extending jurisdiction beyond the
current 200-mile EEZ, regularly resort to this
argument to justify their bid for a wider juris-
diction by coastal States. From that perspective,
ensuring good enforcement is indirectly a very
effective way to prevent developments by
coastal States outside the rules established by
the UNCLOS.
Perhaps the most effective instrument to
ensure compliance, over and beyond the very
costly joint inspection and control schemes, is
the decision by RFMOs to identify IUU activ-
ities, and to propose trade measures to them.
Already in the late 1990s, ICCAT identified
certain countries as not respecting bluefin tuna
and swordfish total allowable catches (TACs)
and, on that basis, the Union adopted its first
trade measures against the countries con-
cerned, in anticipation of later measures under
the IUU framework. Today, a number of RFMOs
draw lists of IUU vessels that subsequently are
included in the EU list of vessels not authorized
to land their catches in EU territory.
Although spectacular progress has been car-
ried out through the EU’s IUU policy, the role
of RFMOs will remain fundamental. They can
provide two precious elements in the fight
against illegal fishing: the access to detailed,
reliable information on illegal activities in the
fishing area concerned, and especially its mul-
tilateral character, which will protect trade
measures from challenges in the World Trade
Organization much better than any unilateral
measure.
Enforcement is the weakest part of any inter-
national system for the governance of fisheries.
While certain RFMOs (NEAFC, NAFO, ICCAT)
have established good control and enforcement
schemes, many activities in world fisheries still
remain largely uncontrolled. This is due to sev-
eral factors:
• Lack of multilateral efforts. Many initiatives
(such as the EU’s IUU policy) are still unilat-
eral and not applicable by everybody.
• Control and enforcement is expensive and is
not necessarily a high priority, in particular
for developing countries.
• Many undesirable activities in the world’s
fisheries do not have a clear legal basis in
international law to allow for international
action.
Bad enforcement is not in the interest of
sustainable fisheries and, in most cases, benefits
only certain illegitimate economic interests.
The need to improve enforcement is crucial to
ensure the survivability of legitimate fishing
interest in both developed and developing
countries.
Beyond the highly successful anti-IUU policy
of the EU, the issue has also raised consider-
able interest in the US. It has been estimated
that between 20% and 32% ($1.3–2.1 billion)
of wild-caught seafood US imports are ille-
gal (Pramoda et al. 2014). These estimates,
however, have been seriously questioned as
exaggerated, and very recently the above article
has been retracted.10
US policy was boosted in 2015 through the
establishment of a Presidential Task Force on
combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud, to
be developed through a 15-point Action Plan
for implementing the task force recommen-
dations. Under the new US Administration,
however, it is still to be seen if and how this
plan will be followed up in practice.
Getting ready for climate change
Climate change will have consequences on the
work of RFMOs. In particular, the following
issues emerge as particularly relevant:
• The number of trans-RFMO stocks will
increase. There are already cases of shared
stocks, for example, between NAFO and
NEAFC.
• In certain RFMOs, the evidence that some
stocks may be migrating poleward may
10 www.intrafish.com/fisheries/1670981/
controversial-iuu-science-paper-fina/

produce a race to fish while the fish are
still there that will do nothing to ensure
sustainability.
• Conversely, in the RFMOs “receiving” the
fish, there is the risk that slowness in regu-
lating the new resources will endanger their
sustainability.
• And in all cases, because the inter-area
movements of fish will call into question
existing allocation exercises, not only among
RFMOs, but also within them, since the
gradual “loss” of a fish from its traditional
area of distribution, no matter how slow
and gradual, will alter the status quo. A
status quo which, in addition, is seriously
questioned by many countries already.
These issues must be addressed by RFMOs in
a cooperative way, something that will require
a new approach among them, when for so
many years they have worked as separate enti-
ties (perhaps with the exception of the tuna
RFMOs under the Kobe process), completely
independent from each other.
NEAFC and the “coastal states
arrangement”
A case of particular interest for the EU is
the so-called “coastal States arrangement”
which decides on the management of the
widely-distributed stocks (Atlanto-Scandian
herring, Atlantic mackerel, horse mackerel and
blue whiting) in the North East Atlantic, the
area theoretically regulated by NEAFC.
Under this arrangement, NEAFC decides
on management measures applicable only to
international waters and only once the coastal
States arrangement has been decided in the first
place. This is a completely unusual arrange-
ment: while NAFO or ICCAT take measures
that are applicable both to EEZs and interna-
tional waters, in NEAFC nothing is decided
unless there is previous agreement by the
coastal States. The problem is: this arrange-
ment is informal, has no solid legal basis, no
voting or enforcement mechanisms and no
dispute-settlement procedures either.
As a result, measures tend to be taken only
by consensus, thus allowing some States to
The CFP and international fisheries 259
block any agreement for years. This was the
case for Atlantic mackerel, that for several years
lacked a management system since the “coastal
States” could not agree on a new allocation
key, so they established autonomous quotas
corresponding to their own claim for a quota
share: the total sum of these autonomous quo-
tas by the coastal States was, for years, largely
in excess of the total TAC recommended by
science.
This system, however, despite its obvious
inefficiency, seems to be extremely difficult to
change, and it constitutes an anomaly in the
context of an international cooperation that is
full of examples of much better management
systems. It is all the more an anomaly since
the coastal States are signatories of UNCLOS
and some of them are widely regarded as hav-
ing very successful fisheries management at a
national level. In the context of international
fisheries management, this anomaly will have
to be addressed one day.
Any improvement of international fisheries
governance, even more so in the EU’s own
backyard, would be very difficult to under-
stand if this question is not addressed. Climate
change (see Chapter 12) will only exacerbate
this problem, notably by altering the geograph-
ical distribution of the stocks (as was the case
with mackerel). This only underscores the
urgent need to address this question head-on.
The changes in the traditional
status quo of the oceans
This is an important emerging challenge, which
cannot be identified with any particular event,
but whose effects are becoming increasingly
apparent. The most important questions are:
(i) the increasing privatization of the world’s
oceans; and (ii) the change in the rapport de force
among traditional and emerging fishing nations
around the world. But it is also important to
refer to another challenge whose effects are less
obvious, but that have a significant potential to
affect the place of fisheries in an increasingly
complex world: the effects of the information
260 Chapter 10
society in the way decisions are made, and in
the way different interests defend their case.
The challenges mentioned below require a
new thinking about how the fishing sector
must situate itself within this emerging world,
characterized by the emergence of new players
in the marine space and the development of a
much wider policy context than ever before.
The increasing privatization of the
world’s oceans
Traditionally, we used to think about the oceans
as free space, free of physical barriers for fisher-
men to chase their resources. The only barriers
were those established by law, but beyond that
the ocean was free space. This is changing. An
increasing proportion of the world’s oceans are
being occupied by other economic activities that
affect fishing, that prevent or limit it, or that can
affect it in different ways.
The number of marine wind parks is
sky-rocketing in many areas of the world.
In Europe, the shallowness of the North Sea
makes it an ideal area for such development.
The high priority accorded to the development
of sustainable sources of power makes these
developments a high political priority that is
without comparison with the small weight of
the fishing sector in the economy. For obvious
safety reasons, wind parks are incompatible
with fishing.
In the North Sea alone, 40 wind parks have
been established up to 2016 and many more are
planned. These are not just coastal: some parks
are beyond 100 km from the coast. Added to
other uses (see below) and to the environmen-
tal protection through Natura 2000 sites, fishing
activity will be increasingly squeezed out of its
traditional area of activity.
If this is resolved through a law of the jungle
approach there is little doubt who will be on the
losing side. This is why it is so important for the
fishing sector to embrace the maritime spatial
planning that the EU has adopted as a Directive
(EU 2014).
Oil and gas drilling are older than wind
parks, but the activity is still important. In the
North Sea alone, there are 184 offshore oil
rigs, more than anywhere else in the world.
This implies that a significant part of the North
Sea has become incompatible with fishing
activity.
Seabed mining is still relatively undeveloped,
but the potential for a much higher levels of
exploitation is obvious. Since its inception in
1982, the International Seabed Authority (ISA),
charged with regulating human activities on
the deep-sea floor beyond the continental shelf,
has issued 27 contracts for mineral exploration,
encompassing a combined area of more than
1.4 million km2 . Many of the regions identified
for future seabed mining are already recognized
as vulnerable marine ecosystems (Miller et al.
2018). And this is only the beginning.
As we saw above, the international commu-
nity (including the EU) is committed to establish
10% of the oceans as MPAs, and important ini-
tiatives are taking place to increase that target to
30%. These MPAs may have different character-
istics, but they all coincide in the need to make
them “no-take” zones, that is, zones where fish-
ing is prohibited.
In some specific cases, this development is
however compatible with the development
of high-end coastal tourism, including recre-
ational fishing, in what corresponds to a real
privatization of hitherto public areas for the
benefit a few interests.
The emergent fishing nations
In recent years, the development of new fish-
ing fleets is dramatically altering the traditional
status quo. While the traditional developed fish-
ing countries (Japan, the US, the countries of
the EU) have applied policies to self-limit their
fishing fleets, and while many developing coun-
tries have not yet succeeded to fully realize their
plans for an expansion of their fishing sectors, a
few countries around the world account for an
unprecedented increase in the overall capacity
of their ocean-going fleets, in particular China,
Taiwan, and Korea.
The countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
have been reducing their capacity in recent
years from 5 120 000 gross tonnage (GT) in

2005 to 4 021 000 GT in 2015.11 In the same
period the fleets by the three Asian countries
mentioned above have increased considerably.
Today, Asian fishing capacity represents 80%
of the world’s fishing capacity of motorized
vessels, and Asian fleets also claim the high-
est percentage of vessels of more than 24 m
of length (FAO 2016). It is also important to
underline that economic interests from Asian
countries account for a very large percentage
of the fleets registered in flag-of-convenience
countries around the world.
These developments are extremely challeng-
ing, both in terms of the overall management
of ocean resources, but also in terms of the
role that international fisheries will play in
the emerging context. The current initiative
on the global ocean’s governance (EU 2016)
is largely motivated by the need and oppor-
tunity to develop the ocean economy in a
well-governed, sustainable, and fair manner.
While fisheries represent a relatively small part
of the potential blue economy, the opportunity
to use such an important initiative to improve
international fisheries management should not
be missed.
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CHAPTER 11
The missing elements of the 2013 Policy
reform
What the 2013 CFP reform
missed
The 2013 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)
reform achieved three major policy changes:
the landing obligation, the objective of maxi-
mum sustainable yield (MSY) by 2020 and the
regionalization (EU 2013). These have been
discussed in previous chapters. There were,
however, certain other issues where the CFP
reform did not achieve any substantial change,
and where the Commission proposals did not
succeed.
The issues beyond the “big four”
The 2013 CFP reform was dominated by dis-
cussions on the so-called “big four” issues:
MSY, landing obligation, regionalization, and
rights-based management. While the first three
were adopted in the new CFP, the fourth
(rights-based management) was not. This issue
therefore remained as a pending one that, short
of a majority in favor, received nonetheless
support from a number of Member States in
Council and a number of stakeholders.
In addition, many other issues were subject
to important discussions that, ultimately, did
not result in important innovations in the CFP.
But their importance is such that it is easy to
anticipate that they will remain on the agenda
of future issues to discuss in the CFP. Among
these, it is important to mention the fleet
policy, the dilemma between small-scale and
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
large-scale fishing, the control system (that had
been subject to a reform in 2009) including
the idea of cost-recovery, and the fleet policy
as an alternative to rights-based management.
As for the structural policy, a new regulation
was adopted with a number of interesting new
features, but it is legitimate to question whether
the new regulation (EU 2014) really met all the
expectations.
The issues that were not incorporated into
the CFP in 2013 are still important; they will
be around in future discussions and they had
important support. It would be a mistake
to dismiss them; they should be part of the
on-going and future debate because the relative
balance between support and rejection is not
necessarily fixed in time, and there is plenty of
experience showing that yesterday’s political
“non-starters” can become tomorrow’s oppor-
tunity for a number of actors as circumstances
change.
Rights-based management
Rights-based management is a generic group
of management instruments based on the
notion that fishing rights are allocated to pri-
vate owners, generally as percentage shares of
the resources available. Among rights-based
management (RBM) systems, the best known
are the individual transferable quotas (ITQs)
where the fishing rights can be freely traded
265
266 Chapter 11
among operators. Many such systems are used
to manage fisheries around the world. New
Zealand, Iceland, Canada, the US and Norway,
among others, use this kind of system for all or
many of their fisheries.
The Commission has discussed RBM on var-
ious occasions, particularly in recent years, as
examples of this kind of management have
multiplied in many countries around the world
including some EU Member States. In 2007, the
Commission issued an unprecedented commu-
nication on this issue (EU 2007), recognizing
the difficulties of conciliating this principle with
relative stability but inviting Member States
nevertheless to debate it. As with some other
initiatives, no real debate took place following
this communication and the question of RBM
remained a non-issue until the Commission
revived it in the context of the preparation of
the 2013 reform.
In that context, RBM was considered only at
national level. The initial idea of RBM between
Member States was abandoned at an early stage
of the consultation process prior to the Commis-
sion’s proposal, due to very strong opposition
by many Member States, which considered that
such a possibility would lead to a breach of rel-
ative stability.
Is rights-based management good or
bad?
In the EU, RBM systems are used at national
level in several Member States. The systems
used by the Netherlands and Denmark are the
best known. The generally positive results of
these systems led the Commission to propose
them in the context of the 2013 CFP reform,
in the form of transferable fishing concessions
(TFCs) at national level (and allowing for the
exclusion of small-scale vessels). However, for
a number of reasons explained by this author
(Penas Lado 2016, chapter 16), this proposal
did not succeed. It is however important to
re-examine the case of the RBM instruments,
notably to evaluate if they could contribute
to a better implementation of the CFP as
reformed in 2013 and in particular the landing
obligation.
In general terms, both theory and empirical
evidence suggest a robust link between strong
RBM systems such as ITQs and economic
performance of a fishery, although the link
with ecological performance is more tenuous.
The idea behind such systems is that, once
the fishermen have a financial stake in the
returns from sensible investment in sustainable
practices, they are more easily convinced to
make the sacrifices required to rebuild and
sustain fisheries at high levels of economic and
biological productivity (Costello et al. 2008).
In the specific case of the EU, it has long been
shown that economic gains can be achieved in
each Member State through the introduction of
RBM, particularly in mixed fisheries (Squires
et al. 1998). This confirms that the opposition
to this kind of mechanism by many actors of
the CFP is not necessarily based on economic
grounds, and stands in the way of an improve-
ment of the economic outlook of the industry
in Europe.
The proposal by the Commission for the 2013
reform in 2011 introduced RBM through a for-
mula, the TFCs, which carefully avoided the
impression that the instrument would amount
to privatization of the fishery resources, some-
thing contrary to the constitution of certain
Member States. The Commission proposed
the instrument based on the existing experi-
ence showing how RBM improves economic
performance and reduces fleet capacity. In
consequence, it also proposed to eliminate the
fleet policy (as unnecessary) and the scrapping
funds: no taxpayer money should be used to
reduce capacity if a market mechanism could
successfully do it.
Despite the above arguments in favor, there
were also very critical voices against this kind of
system. As a few examples:
• For some authors, RBM systems do not
guarantee sustainability themselves, and
must be combined with other management
instruments (Chu 2009).
• For others, the advantages of strong RBM
systems may be obvious when studied under
certain disciplines (economics), but not so
under different ones (social science), and
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
their evaluation must take account of all
relevant effects (Gibbs 2009).
• Social scientists tend to be very critical of
ITQs on account of their effects on certain
small-scale communities, who tend to lose
out when market instruments are applied.
For example, when studying the French
system to allocate non-transferable quotas
through producer organizations, it was found
that this non-transferable system success-
fully avoided concentration of fishing rights;
it included greater equity within particular
sub-fleets; and in some cases greater benefits
for the small-scale fleets (Bellanger et al.
2016).
• European NGOs are very critical because
ITQ systems do not necessarily contribute
to favor more ecologically-sound fishing
practices: the market of fishing rights tends
to be dominated by economic muscle and
competitiveness, not by environmental
friendliness.
It is therefore of interest to review the use
of these systems in different contexts, to try to
draw some conclusions based on experience
and considering their overall effects as regards
the different policy objectives.
A meta-analysis carried out by Costello et al.
(2008) on data on stocks managed from 1970
shows that well-designed catch-shares (another
name for RBM) may prevent fishery collapse
across diverse taxa and ecosystems. Although
the global rate of adoption of catch-share sys-
tems has grown since 1970, the fraction of fish-
eries managed under catch-shares still remains
small. This implies a considerable potential for
improvement if these systems are extended fur-
ther.
By comparison, in the US, a very interesting
study in 2013 of the 15 fisheries subject to a
catch-share system at the time revealed inter-
esting conclusions. The catch-share programs
were successful in having fishermen improve
quota limits, improving efficiency and eco-
nomic benefits, and ending the race to fish,
thereby reducing the pressure of fishermen to
fish during unsafe conditions. They were also
effective in reducing capacity. However, they
267
had distributional consequences, in that the
lower number of vessels tended to be coun-
terbalanced by reductions in the number of
shareholders (Brinson and Thunberg 2013).
When considering RBM, it is important to
have clear expectations as to what these systems
can provide and what they cannot. Tradition-
ally, there is little doubt that RBM systems are
positive for the economic rationalization of the
fishing sector, providing for higher profitability,
high industry involvement and responsibility
and higher flexibility to deal with discard ban
policies. It is equally clear that RBM has dis-
tributional consequences, with the number of
quota holders tending to be reduced. But what
remains less clear and always controversial is
whether RBM systems actually contribute to
fish conservation.
Why did TFCs fail in the 2013 reform?
The reasons why the Commission proposal
on TFCs failed in the 2013 reform have been
explained by this author (Penas Lado 2016,
chapter 16). It is important to revisit this ques-
tion in the light of the further development in
the policy.
TFCs represented for a number of fishing
industry segments and Member States’ admin-
istrations a radical breach with a long tradition
of paternalistic, government-led management
of fishing rights. The very notion of submit-
ting fishing rights to a “market” (even one
limited to operators owning vessels flagged
in a given member State) was considered by
many actors in the policy as a sign of an “ul-
traliberal” socio-economic model, and opposed
on ideological grounds. In other cases, the
national administrations responsible felt that
TFCs would remove their power and influence
and this would turn upside down a tradition of
paternalism. Others clearly declared that their
objective for fisheries management was led
by “social engineering” incompatible with free
market considerations. These considerations
are not likely to disappear any time soon.
In some specific cases, opposition came from
fear that the TFCs, even if proposed only at
national level, would actually be extended to
268 Chapter 11
EU level as a result of a possible case in the
Court of Justice, based on the case law of the
Agigate ruling.
On the other hand, the opposition was not
unanimous. A number of Member States actu-
ally supported the proposal, and so did some
MEPs in Parliament. The European industry
was very divided, and not only along national
lines: in the larger fishing Member States,
different positions had to be combined, and
even different regions held opposite views. For
example, in the case of Spain the regional fish-
eries minister from Galicia was in favor, but the
regional minister from Andalusia was against,
curiously for fear that Andalusian fishing rights
could be bought by Galician operators.
The support to TFCs was, albeit in a minority,
very strong and also based on a variety of
arguments, and notably on its demonstrated
merits to favor economic self-sufficiency and
rationality. This confirms something that is
very important for future policy debates on
the question: that the use of rights-based man-
agement is extremely divisive, and although
short of majority support, it also enjoys many
favorable views around Europe. While its uni-
versal application seems out of the question
in the foreseeable future, its partial applica-
tion when and where Member States and the
industry would agree seems an option worth
exploring. We will come back to this question
in Chapter 14.
The experience of third countries
The experience of a number of third countries
on the use of RBM is extremely interesting as
a source of inspiration. Let’s see some of the
best-known cases.
The US case
According to the catch-share policy in the US,
part of the catch – or a share – of a species is
allocated to individual fishermen or groups.
Each holder of a catch-share must stop fishing
when he reaches his limit. In most cases, fisher-
men can buy/sell or lease shares in a given year.
This allows them to plan their fishing around
the weather, markets, or other considerations
and allows other fishery-dependent businesses
to plan more effectively. The catch-share sys-
tem is voluntary. Catch-share programs are
just one management option regional fishery
management councils can choose to meet their
management objectives. Catch-shares are not
required and are not appropriate for every
fishery.1
Regular evaluations of the catch-share sys-
tems of the US are carried out. They consistently
show that the expectations for economic per-
formance are met. Capacity of active vessels
is reduced, prices have improved, average
revenues per vessels have increased, and the
season length has been restored in fisheries
where effort control had been required to
spread out landings and avoid early closures.
However, the system has distributional con-
sequences, in particular the consolidation of
quota use and the accumulation of ownership
(Brinson and Thunberg 2016).
Iceland
The Icelandic case is of particular interest for
one main reason: fishing is the bread and butter
of the country, and that implies that they abso-
lutely have to get their fisheries management
right: their economic survival largely depends
on that.
Iceland applies a very complete ITQ system
to manage its quotas. Today, Iceland’s fishing
industry is one of the most competitive and
profitable in the world, and has remarkably
recovered from the effects of the financial
bubble. This has required losing employment,
closing down factories and scrapping vessels,
but has allowed an increase in profitability,
in particular for the enterprises dealing with
fish processing, less affected by the high costs
of fuel and license fees (Gunnlaugsson and
Saevaldsson 2016). As in the Norwegian case,
the increases in profits may not be attributed
entirely to the ITQ system, but it is the ITQ sys-
tem that has allowed the concentration of the
activity in the hands of the most competitive.
The Icelandic system is led by the need for
economic efficiency. However, this does not
1 www.fisheries.noaa.gov/insight/catch-shares/
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
mean that the system is socially blind: on
the contrary, the system allocates 17% of the
fishing opportunities for small coastal com-
munities based on small-scale fishing. This is
an extremely interesting example of how an
ITQ system can indeed combine two different
objectives: a main one geared up to economic
efficiency, and another one with a clear social
objective in mind. This is an example that the
EU policy should bear in mind.
Norway
RBM have been applied in Norway on a gradual
basis, with an increase over time of the number
of vessels and fisheries involved in the system.
According to Hannesson (2013), the process
was gradual because of significant “ideological”
opposition to this kind of system from certain
quarters, as well as from other operators as a
result of the observed changes in the number,
location, and type of vessels benefiting from
the system.
The system has produced an enormous
increase in the value of landings per fisherman.
This conclusion has been nuanced by Heen
(2014) in the sense that the increase in prof-
itability cannot necessarily be associated to the
ITQ system alone. In any case, it is significant
that, despite the above hesitations, the system
has been gradually extended to more opera-
tors (by 2013 Hannesson considered that ITQs
covered the bulk (75–80%) of Norwegian fish-
eries), without any significant backlash: once
the system was established, it has continued
being extended without major calls for a return
to the old system.
New Zealand
The ITQ system established in New Zealand as of
1986 is one of the best known and better studied
and evaluated in the world. Mace et al. (2014)
offer a very complete evaluation of how the sys-
tem has operated and delivered on policy goals.
The above authors recognize that at the time
of the initial design, a number of issues were not
adequately considered and subsequent efforts
to address these issues have been challenging,
many not yet fully resolved. They conclude
269
that the outcomes for fisheries science, stock
status, multispecies management, ecosystem
effects, and fishing industry accountability
have been mixed, although mostly positive.
New initiatives to further improve the system
continue to be researched and implemented.
Overall, the authors believe that the positives
considerably outweigh the negatives, and the
initial design has proved to be a system that can
be built upon.
Interestingly, and like in Norway, the number
of species subject to ITQs was initially limited
and grew only gradually over time (Bess 2005),
so the system is not a one-off effort to manage
all fisheries, but a system gradually extended
and improved over time. Within New Zealand
there is growing evidence that their Quota
Management System has lessened the ecolog-
ical consequences of the incentive for fishers
to “race for fish” at the same time that the
industry has experienced substantial growth in
the volume and value of production (Bess and
Harte 2000). The security of tenure in access
to the fisheries resources allows ITQ holders
to develop high value products that improve
their competitiveness in overseas markets. The
system has also been an effective means for
the Government to meet its obligations to the
Māori under the Settlement Act 1992 (Bess
2001). This implies that the system is amenable
to taking into consideration the special rights
of certain communities within the countries
concerned.
A remarkable feature of the New Zealand sys-
tem is its total absence of social objectives: all
quota holders exploit their shares as they see fit.
This implies, for example, that the fishing rights
held by the Māori are not subject to any par-
ticular management system, or any protection
to small-scale fishing. In fact, the Māori exploit
their fishing rights largely by leasing those rights
to other fishermen, including foreign large-scale
fleets. This is another important point for reflec-
tion: there is an alternative to the active protec-
tion of the small-scale interests: providing them
with a fair allocation of the resources and allow-
ing them to exploit them as they wish. We will
discuss this question below.
270 Chapter 11
Some lessons learned
Overall, ITQ programs have been incorporated
into many marine fisheries management strate-
gies for 30 years, but their implementation
and utility remain controversial. According
to a study in 2008, eighteen countries used
ITQs to manage several hundred stocks of at
least 249 species. ITQs were adopted in these
countries for many reasons: overcapitalization,
economic gains, safety concerns for fishers and
political change. The implementation of ITQs
did not translate into consistent changes in
stock biomass. This suggests that alternative
or complementary measures are needed to
sustain those fisheries, such as combining ITQs
with more effective total allowable catches,
better enforcement and monitoring, and imple-
menting aspects of ecosystem-based fisheries
management (Chu 2009).
This is also important to bear in mind: ITQs
seem to be much more a system of economic
rationalization of the fishery, but it is not a sys-
tem to manage biological resources in its own
right. This is important to remember because it
shows that RBM systems are neither a closed,
fixed system nor a one-size-fits-all approach.
On the contrary, the experience of the three
countries referred to above shows that RBM
is a methodology that: (i) can be designed to
deliver different goals, according to the polit-
ical/economic priorities of the governments
in question; and (ii) even if getting the initial
design right, RBM is amenable to continuous
evaluation and improvement, so the initial
scheme can always be improved over time
on the basis of the on-going experience. This
adaptability is in sharp contrast with the sys-
tem of management and allocation established
under the CFP, which clearly lacks adaptability:
the stocks covered and their management and
allocation have been fundamentally unchanged
since 1983.
All experiences show that ITQs are extremely
variable in design and objectives, and that
different countries and communities will react
very differently to the idea and its implemen-
tation. A comparative study of ITQs in the US
and Canada showed the critical importance of
decisions about transferability of quotas and
the political and historical context, and pre-
existing industry structure, to the acceptance
and performance of ITQs (McCay et al. 1995).
This certainly explains the different attitudes
about this instrument from different Member
States, and from different regions and fleet
segments within them. This, in any case, clearly
indicates that one-size-fits-all ITQs in Europe
cannot work. Much more differentiated and
partial approaches should be necessary to adapt
any ITQ system to the different political and
historical context.
Importantly, the implementation of RBM is
not incompatible with measures of “social engi-
neering” to protect certain collectives from open
competition. In fact, most such systems around
the world consider different ways to protect cer-
tain interests; from the allocation of resources to
tribes or first nations in North America, to the
reserve of around 17% of quotas to small-scale
fishing by rural communities in Iceland, there
are many ways in which the rights of certain
interests can be protected. The only case where
no such “social engineering” takes place is that
of New Zealand, where in fact the Māori com-
munity owns a very significant part of the coun-
try’s fishing rights that they are free to sell if
they wish.
This social engineering is not always success-
ful, and certain regions and collective interests
generally tend to lose out regardless. In addi-
tion, in a number of systems the high value
attached to the fishing rights makes it difficult
for newcomers to invest and buy new fishing
rights, thus undermining generational change.
For this reason, all systems are dynamic and
evolve gradually as problems come up.
Finally, it is also important to mention that a
number of RBM systems around the world are
associated to different forms of cost-recovery.
While in New Zealand the industry pays for
research and control, and in NW Canada the
industry pays between 7% and 10% of their
profits to fund the management system, in
Iceland the industry pays a fee (up to 6% of
the value of catches, and 3% of the value of
exports) that goes to the state’s coffers. And
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
this fee does not cover the cost of observers on
board, also paid for by the industry. Under all
these models, the high profitability of the fish-
eries activity under RBM allows for the industry
to pay all or at least part of the cost of the man-
agement system, thus reducing the burden on
taxpayers.
The experience of some EU Member
States
ITQs or similar systems have been applied in a
number of Member States, to manage all or part
of their national quotas. The two better studied
cases are those of the Netherlands, that estab-
lished ITQs in 1985, and Denmark that intro-
duced the system in 2007 although there are
also other cases.
The Dutch case
Among EU Member States, the most impor-
tant experience is that of the Netherlands
that introduced an ITQ system shortly after
the inception of the CFP. This system is very
well-analyzed by Salz (1996) and Van Hoof
(2013). Interestingly, the transferability of
the quotas, initially established in 1975, was
introduced following the evidence that the
system was not being effectively enforced
and that a de facto, non-transparent market of
quota transfers was actually developing. The
ultimate motivation was the improvement of
quota compliance and economic performance,
with open and transparent markets, and the
co-management groups established between
industry and government were considered a
key of the success of the system. It is important
to draw a comparison between this and the
also de facto and non-transparent market in
fishing rights developing under relative stability
through foreign investment and intra-company
transfers and swaps.
The result of the implementation was a rapid
improvement in the profitability levels of the
industry, with a reduction of input of capital
and labor and a more efficient and sustainable
use of the resource. Van Hoof (2013) further
indicates that the limits to transferability, such
as those proposed by the Commission in its
271
initial proposal for TFCs in the last reform (EU
2011) would defer economic efficiency in the
long run. The system also had its downsides:
in particular the reduction in the size of the
fleets. However, this was the case also in other
fleet segments in other Member States not
subject to ITQs, and it is not warranted that the
fleet reduction was due mainly to the imple-
mentation of the ITQ system. In addition, the
loss of activity observed in certain ports as a
result of their fishing rights being purchased
from other ports is also a typical effect of ITQs,
but in the Dutch case this was compensated
by alternative jobs from other sectors as well
as by fish processing of fish coming from
abroad.
It is important to underline that the Dutch
system is based on the marketization of catch
rights, not on privatizing fish ownership. This
is important because one of the main diffi-
culties encountered in the discussion on the
Commission proposal on TFCs was the legal
and political opposition in some Member States
to what they considered a “privatization” of
fishery resources.
Other EU cases
The Danish ITQ system, introduced in 2007,
is analyzed by Anderson et al. (2010). The
findings confirm that resource rents are larger
under an ITQ system than in fisheries regulated
by various form of entry restrictions and effort
regulations. However, this improvement is not
neutral: evidence shows that such a system
favors larger vessels over small ones. This, how-
ever, seems to be a result of the design of the sys-
tem, where economic efficiency considerations
prevailed over social engineering arguments.
In Sweden, the introduction of an ITQ sys-
tem for demersal fisheries has been subject to
a study on its consequences. Waldo and Palrud
(2013) estimated the reduction in the number
of vessels between 30% and 50%, with an
important increase in profitability, allowing for
competitive wages and future contribution of
the industry to the costs of management. The
design also allowed for special measures to
protect small-scale fleets.
272 Chapter 11
The above examples are very illustrative, but
both cases underline the importance of adapting
the design of the system to local circumstances.
No “cut and paste” is possible.
Rights-based management
and discards
A very important question to analyze is the con-
tribution of ITQs and similar systems to address
the challenges of a non-discard policy. The
experience in this regard is extremely useful.
The European Parliament commissioned a very
illustrative study on this topic (Anon. 2014).
This study confirms that nations that have
adopted rights-based management generally
have comparatively low discards.
The reasons are obvious: ITQ systems allow
for real-time purchase of the quotas of any
choke species that the individual operators may
encounter. ITQs, in this regard, maximize the
efficiency in the use of national quotas and
minimize choke species effects. As an example,
in an interesting case study on the ground-
fish fishery in British Columbia, discard levels
declined after the introduction of observers
on board. When ITQs were additionally intro-
duced, total discard fractions declined for most
species (Branch et al. 2006).
Despite these evidences, the relationship
between RBM and the implementation of the
landing obligation was not discussed in the
process of adoption of the reform. The Com-
mission did make the case repeatedly, but the
RBM and the landing obligation debates took
place separately without enough discussion on
their relationship. Any attempt to link both
issues met opposition on the grounds that the
CFP already has a system of exchanging quotas:
the quota swap system. However, given the
limits shown by this system (see Chapter 6),
this remains a pending question.
Is there a market of fishing rights
in the EU?
Fishing rights can be exchanged by Mem-
ber States under the quota swap system (see
Chapter 6). Whether this would correspond to
a real “market” of fishing rights, that is another
question. Indeed, the quota swap system lacks
many of the features of an open EU market
like those operating under the single market
legislation. In particular, quotas are swapped
among national administrations only, not by
particulars, and in the form of swaps as in a
barter economy. And, especially, the system has
no transparency.
In Chapter 2 we referred to the application
of the principles of the internal market to EU
policies, and how this includes fisheries policy.
The European Commission insists on the high
economic value of implementing the internal
market through:
increased competition, increased specialization,
larger economies of scale, allowing factors of pro-
duction to move to the area where they are the
most valued, thus improving the efficiency of the
allocation of resources.2
This raises a simple, straightforward question:
does relative stability contribute to achieve the
EU internal market? In this section we will try
to argue that it represents an obstacle to the
achievement of the internal market, in partic-
ular as regards the idea of “allowing factors of
production to move to the area where they are
the most valued.”
Overall, there is no such thing as an EU
market of fishing rights worthy of that name.
However, based in the four freedoms within the
EU, it is possible that foreign operators buy ves-
sels and their associated fishing rights in another
Member State. This practice is very common
and means, for example, that certain vessels
flying the flag and exploiting the quotas of a
Member State can have ownership, crews and
landing and marketing sites in another Mem-
ber State. Attempts to prevent this through
national law, as in the famous case of the UK’s
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988, were annulled
through landmark rulings of the European
Court of Justice: the well-known cases Agigate
and Jaderow. In other cases, this practice may
be limited by national legislation requiring
different conditions to foreign ownership to
2 https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_en/
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
ensure the economic link between the quota
holders and the Member State concerned, as
established in the Jaderow case law. In some
other cases, the practice is made difficult by
requirements of affiliation of all crewmen to
the Social Security of the Member States where
the vessel is flagged, regardless of their EU
nationality.
Although there is little information about the
extent of this “hidden” quota market EU-wide,
the question can be examined based on the
best-known case: the so-called “quota-hoppers”
in the UK: the Spanish and Dutch interests hav-
ing bought UK-flagged vessels and UK quotas.
Despite the high political profile of this kind of
investment, a study of the European Parliament
has shown that the impacts in the UK were not
very significant, in terms of employment for
example (cited in Hatcher et al. 2002). From an
exclusive economic perspective, there are good
economic arguments to grant fishing rights
to other nations (Munro et al. 1985, 1989).
Foreign operators investing in UK fisheries
place a greater value in quota assets than did
the former UK owners. Hatcher et al. (2002)
argue that if the benefits from resource rental
charges and/or access fees outweigh any cost in
terms of lost domestic production and employ-
ment then it is rational (if not always politically
acceptable) to use one’s own human and capital
resources elsewhere in the economy and to sell
fishing rights to foreign currency. The authors
also conclude, crucially, that:
While this could result in increased efficiency . . .
there would undoubtedly be distributional impacts.
That is the real problem of an EU-wide mar-
ket of fishing rights: while it would undoubtedly
contribute to economic rationality, it is the dis-
tributional impact that makes it so politically
difficult, in a policy shaped in the late 1970s on
the basis of distributional difficulties. Different
authors (Symes and Crean 1995; Schweiger
2010; Penas Lado 2016) have stressed the cru-
cial importance of the distributional aspects in
the birth of the CFP (the search for national
interest rather than the common good) and
how these have continued to shape the policy
273
up to now. The fact that the CFP, after more
than 30 years, has not been able to evolve along
the lines of other economic sectors in the EU in
developing a real internal market is a clear sign
of backwardness of this policy from the point of
view of European integration.
Having clear and transparent information
about this quota swap system may be a very
useful tool to determine to what extent the
national quotas under relative stability have
been exchanged through this non-transparent
market, and what is really the magnitude and
importance of the “economic link” between
Member States and their national quotas.
Although there may be certain reticence to
do this (the exercise would show up the level
and the Member States withholding unused
quota without clear justification) the potential
contribution to this idea to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the landing obligation should be
a powerful motivation for it to be explored
and developed. Some ideas are presented in
Chapter 14.
Small-scale fisheries: no specific
policy
The issue of small-scale fisheries has always
attracted a lot of attention in all fisheries man-
agement fora. In the EU, the discussion about
some kind of special treatment for this sector
features every time the policy is reformed. In
practice, a certain special treatment is already
granted to this sector, notably in the form of
exemption from a number of EU obligations
that apply only to larger vessels. For example,
certain obligations under the control regulation
(1224/2009, EU 2009a), such as the electronic
logbook or the vessel monitoring system only
apply to larger vessels.
In addition, under the new structural instru-
ment, the European Maritime and Fisheries
Fund (EMFF) (EU 2014), they enjoy a higher
aid intensity than larger vessels, and Member
States are under an obligation to elaborate a
specific strategic program for this part of the
fleet, to ensure they are not squeezed out of
274 Chapter 11
the structural financing under Regulation 508/
2014 (EU 2014).
Small-scale fishing seems to be everybody’s
priority, from national and local authorities
to NGOs. Yet, this is clearly not enough, as
the small-scale sector is generally not doing
well economically and continues to be largely
excluded from investment. Recent evidence on
the economic performance of EU fishing fleets
shows that despite the overall improvement in
the economic performance of EU fishing fleets,
most of the fleet segments that are making
losses are small-scale (EU 2018a). This is clearly
a cause of concern. The theoretical political
priority they enjoy does not translate into a
positive trend in their levels of profitability. In
Europe, they are largely lagging behind more
industrial sectors. They are often squeezed out
from financing under the structural funds and
innovation in the sector is almost inexistent.
The issue was debated in the reform process.
However, the final text of the basic regulation
1380/2013 does not contain specific provisions
or a separate regime for small-scale fishing.
Only in the context of the structural policy, the
new structural fund, the European Maritime
and Fisheries Fund, EMFF (EU 2014) contains
certain elements of positive discrimination
in favor of these sectors, consisting of higher
financing levels and the obligation for Mem-
ber States to present a specific plan for their
artisanal sectors and secure priority financing
for them. This was done on the initiative of
the European Parliament and met consider-
able opposition from Council, notably because
Member States wanted to have free hands
on the priorities for spending, and because
certain Member States (i.e. the Netherlands or
Belgium) do not have a small-scale sector.
The question is important because there is a
significant trend toward the consideration of
small-scale fishing as being more sustainable.
NGOs are well-known for favoring this type of
fishing and academia often expresses support
for this view (Pitcher and Cheung 2013).
When analyzing the merits of small-scale
vis-à-vis large-scale fishing we must con-
sider at least two aspects: (i) those related to
sustainability and impact on the environment;
and (ii) those related to economic and social
equity. Both are important. In this document,
however, we concentrate on the first one, since
the question of social and economic equity is
much more a political question where differ-
ent national governments within the EU, and
beyond, have entirely different (but equally
legitimate) views, aspirations, and objectives.
Defining small-scale fishing: more
difficult than it seems
One of the problems encountered when dis-
cussing issues related to small-scale fisheries
is the definition of this sector. The EU, tradi-
tionally, has defined the sector through the size
of vessels and the gear they use. Small-scale
are vessels less than 12 m in length and that
do not fish with trawl gear. This definition,
however, has always been questioned by many
and, during the negotiation of the 2013 CFP
reform, a lot of time was devoted to discuss this
very issue.
Critics of this definition argue that many
vessels can be longer than 12 m and still have
many of the characteristics of small-scale fish-
ing, such as coastal activity, social structure
based on the owner/skipper model, catching
local fish for local consumers, low capitaliza-
tion, and so on. On that basis, alternative ways
of defining small-scale have been proposed,
including parameters such as the time of fishing
or the structure of property.
In the end, however, the advantage of the
under-12 m, non-trawler definition is its great
simplicity and its easiness to control and man-
age. A vessel size is simple to measure and is
stable: it does not change over time, and the
trawler structure is also stable and not easy to
modify for different gear. This makes this def-
inition very easy and stable. On the contrary,
all other criteria are complex and crucially,
non-stable. It is easy to see how complex it
would be (in a policy already considered too
complex) having to check a vessel’s individ-
ual fishing time and structure of property to
decide whether it would be entitled to a special
measure. As for stability, property, and fishing
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
time can change, and so would the vessel’s
qualification for certain measures.
Not surprisingly, the traditional definition has
survived to this day.
What small-scale and large-scale can
provide
At global level, FAO considers that strengthen-
ing small-scale fisheries is crucial to empow-
ering the sector’s operators to secure their
livelihoods and to contribute to food security
nutrition and rural poverty reduction (FAO
2014).
From a European perspective, small-scale
fishing can provide a series of well-known
advantages:
• It is more intensive in terms of employment,
as shown by the annual Commission report
on the economic performance of EU fleets
(EU 2018a).
• It can provide consumers with fish of excep-
tionally high freshness, quality, and variety.
• It can interact positively with other economic
sectors such as tourism. The prospect of find-
ing fresh, local fish in local restaurants con-
stitutes an important added value in coastal
touristic areas.
• It contributes to fix the population in small
coastal towns that may otherwise tend to be
deserted for lack of economic opportunities.
• It generally provides women with a more
substantial role, notably in shaping the
management by local communities.
All these advantages are true. However,
large-scale fishing also has a certain number of
advantages:
• It can exploit resources in more distant,
rough fishing grounds where the small-scale
sectors could never accede. These resources
are either exploited by large-scale vessels or
are not exploited at all.
• Contrary to extended belief, some large-scale
fleets are based in small coastal towns with
little or no economic alternative. Ports like
Concarneau (population 20 000) in France or
Bermeo (population 17 000) in Spain are the
base for the large-scale tropical tuna vessels.
Burela (population 9000) in Spain is the base
275
of vessels that operate in distant Irish waters.
This clearly shows that long-distance fleets
are often based in relatively small ports well
outside metropolitan areas. In all these cases,
the protection of local communities would
imply the protection of these large-scale
sector vessels.
• It can provide certain economies of scale
that can allow for productivity gains, as
demonstrated by the recent Commission
evaluations of the economic performance of
the European fishing industry (EU 2018a):
long distance fleets enjoy a very healthy 15%
of net profit margin. Trends are positive (not
only in economic performance but also in
catch per unit effort [CPUEs]) and net profits
have increased in recent years.
• Experience shows that large-scale fishing
tends to be more strategic and amenable to
rationalization, long-term planning and self-
management, and can assume costs of
management, thus reducing taxpayers’ inter-
vention.
• Certain large-scale fisheries are among the
best managed and most sustainable in the
world. The fishery for Alaskan pollock is the
best example: conducted by large industrial
vessels, it is fully sustainable and includes a
number of advanced measures of by-catch
avoidance.
The above indicates that the two sectors
are not mutually excluding. In fact, the con-
flict between the two exists only in a certain
number of areas of overlap. Resolving these
areas of overlap seems the best way to promote
small-scale fishing, rather than proposing the
suppression of large-scale fishing altogether,
presenting them as “monster vessels”, as some
NGOs advocate.3
The comparative impacts
of small-scale vs. large-scale fishing
The debate on vessel size is often accompa-
nied with allegations that small-scale fishing
is more selective, or implies fewer discards, or
3 www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/en/
campaigns/oceans/Fish-Fairly/boat_list/
276 Chapter 11
has a lower impact on marine ecosystems, or
even that it is more desirable economically or
socially. Are these allegations true?
This analysis is made very complex by a num-
ber of factors that go beyond vessel size. Some
of these factors are:
• The gear used. Many of the effects on the
environment largely depend on the gear
used. And, although certain gear are more
typical of large vessels, they can also be used
by small ones. Trawl is the best example:
while trawl fishing is generally associated
with large vessels, there are also many
examples of trawling activities by small-scale
vessels such as the small-scale dredges to
fish for bivalve molluscs or the UK’s “super
under-10s”.
• The areas of fishing. Sometimes artisanal
boats operate in fragile coastal ecosys-
tems. The activity of the French gangui (a
small-scale trawl) in Mediterranean seagrass
beds (important breeding areas for many
species) is an example among many.
• The distance from the base port, with impli-
cations on fuel consumption and on impact
of coastal zones of high biodiversity.
• The different end markets of the catch con-
cerned, that can change substantially the pro-
portion of the catch retained on board or that
discarded as by-catch.
• Ultimately, sustainability is about the total
fishing pressure exerted on a stock, not a
question of how many vessels are fishing
and of what size.
All these elements must be studied carefully
to avoid simplistic generalizations that tend to
consider small-scale fishing as “sustainable” as
opposed to larger scale fishing.
A very variable picture
In terms of environmental impact, small-scale
sectors can also be very detrimental for the
environment: their focus on small, juvenile
fish in many cases, their activity within coastal
areas that are often breeding grounds for many
fish species, the high density of their activ-
ity in coastal areas, etc. are all factors that
can generate a very substantial impact on
the environment where they operate. Often
enough, the rather “social” perspective that has
often dominated their management can result
in levels of activity that are more difficult to
rationalize (and reduce) than those of the larger
fleets. The difficulties to reduce fishing pressure
and improve selectivity in the Mediterranean
(comparatively dominated by small-scale fish-
ing) is perhaps the best demonstration that
small-scale does not necessarily mean sustain-
ability or low environmental impact.
Overall, it is difficult to conclude as a gen-
eral point that small-scale is “sustainable”
while larger scale is not, as some NGOs like
to describe. Apart from the fundamental point
that the sustainability of a fishery depends from
the amount of fish removed and not from the
number and size of vessels responsible for the
removals, small-scale fishing represents a very
important social component of fisheries man-
agement, which one can defend and promote
on very many legitimate grounds (employment,
fixation of local populations and preservation
of cultural values in remote areas, provision of
local fish for tourists, etc.) but these arguments
do not require the simplistic consideration that
small-scale fishing is either more sustainable or
ecologically sound.
What can we learn from aboriginal
fishing rights?
In several countries around the world there are
specific policies focused, if not on small-scale
fishing, at least on fishing by traditional com-
munities that tend to use traditional fishing
methods as a way to preserve their cultural
heritage and lifestyle. Although these can vary
considerably, the cases of the Māori in New
Zealand, the First Nations in Canada and the
tribes in the US are good examples of policies
where a part of the fishing rights is reserved for
fishing by these local communities. Although
there is no equivalent in the EU to these com-
munities, the experience of managing two
different worlds in the same system is worth
looking at.
The model of the Māori in New Zealand is
very particular in that they chose to operate as
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
any other quota owner, as we saw above. But
the US tribes and the Canadian First nations
offer a number of experiences where the same
stock is exploited under two separate regimes:
(i) one for the aboriginal communities, often
using traditional fishing methods and managed
following their own social traditions; and (ii)
another for commercial operators using mod-
ern fishing methods and management systems.
What is particularly interesting is that the two
systems can be used for the same stocks, whose
TACs are divided in quotas for the two kinds of
community.
The main lesson that can be drawn from
these examples is that a good management
system can incorporate two entirely different
regimes, that the fishing rights can be allocated
to these different regimes in a meaningful way
ensuring the overall responsible management
of the resources, and that this is in no way seen
as discriminatory or unfair.
The fisheries control system
In the 2013 CFP reform, the control system
was not discussed, since a new control regu-
lation had been adopted a few years earlier
(2009a), so it was considered unnecessary to
reopen a recent policy decision. However, it
is obvious that the reform of 2013 introduced
new policy elements that were not consid-
ered in the 2009 control reform. Despite its
very important improvements, the new con-
trol regulation of 2009 has quickly become
somehow obsolete, for a number of reasons:
• The regulation was adopted just before the
political drive toward CFP reform started
with the 2009 Green Paper (EU 2009b) and
still represents the “old approach” to policy
making.
• This regulation was the last important one
adopted before the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty and co-decision for the CFP. The
regulation therefore represents what Council
wanted, not what the two co-legislators
want under co-decision now. This is very
277
significant, because the European Parliament
has demonstrated to have very different
(and generally more ambitious) positions on
fisheries control than Council.
• The proposal is not adapted at all to some
new features of the CFP and, in particular, to
regionalization.
For, at least, the above reasons the European
Commission has introduced a proposal for a
reform of this policy, with the aim, inter alia,
of adapting it to the reformed CFP (EU 2018b).
This proposal reflects very well the position
of Member States’ administrations, that can
be summarized as “evolution, not revolution”,
implying that such administrations are averse
to dramatic changes and to very creative ideas,
and prefer instead to introduce rather limited
changes in the existing framework.
This is very important to bear in mind. If
the CFP is largely conservative, as we saw
in Chapter 1, it is all the more so in matters
pertaining to fisheries control, a national pre-
rogative of national administrations. The pos-
sibilities to innovate policy approaches in this
area are particularly low.
The dichotomy between EU policy
and national control
The CFP is an exclusive competence of the EU.
However, its control is an exclusive competence
of Member States. This dichotomy is one of the
sources of what has long been considered a
significant weakness of the CFP: the insuffi-
cient control of the rules. This dichotomy is
difficult to understand outside the EU, where
it is generally believed that those who manage
the policy should also be those responsible to
enforce it.
In Europe, control is still a full competence of
Member States, and these are still very adamant
in wanting to keep this activity under national
competence. Yet, national competence to con-
trol a European policy is in itself a contradic-
tion, and a source of inefficiency. In addition,
as happens in other policy areas, the necessary
cooperation among national administrations on
control matters is still riddled with reticence and
lack of trust.
278 Chapter 11
A report of the Court of Auditors in 2007,
denouncing the insufficient control of the CFP,
was one of the main drivers of the ambitious
reform of the policy proposed by the Commis-
sion two years later. After one new control
regulation, an important investment by the
European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA)
and increased control means through EMFF,
the situation continues to be unsatisfactory, as
summarized by a new report of the European
Court of Auditors (EU 2017):
The Member States were not yet carrying out all
the required controls, and that the control system
itself needed to be updated. There were weaknesses
with the verification of the accuracy of their fleets’
capacity, with the control of small vessels, with the
reliability of reported catch data and with the equal
treatment of fishing operators in the application of
sanctions.
In other words, despite significant progress,
the poor control continues to be a fundamental
weakness as well as an important embarrass-
ment for the CFP.
As the control regulation of 2009 is currently
under the five-year review, it is opportune to
revise certain aspects where progress has been
slow or non-existent. In particular, the issues of
the harmonization of sanctions, and the powers
of the European Fisheries Control Agency must
be discussed. But other possibilities must also
be explored, such as for example the use of
industry-based self-control mechanisms, and
also the possible contribution by the industry
to the very important costs of fisheries control.
Ultimately, the challenge of controlling the
main new element of the reformed policy in
2013 (the landing obligation) will certainly be
a test case of the ability of the control system of
the CFP to face up to the challenge.
Harmonization of sanctions?
The harmonization of fishery sanctions among
Member States is an issue as old as the CFP
itself. Even though the value of such har-
monization is recognized by all, in terms of
ensuring a real level playing field among
national administrations, it has never been
possible to make any progress in this regard
since national administrations consider this
a question of national sovereignty. It is also
true that although most sanctions for fish-
eries infractions are considered administrative
penalties, some of them in at least a number
of Member States pertain to penal law. While
Member States may be ready to harmonize
administrative sanctions, they are not ready to
do so in penal law.
Having an effective system of fisheries sanc-
tions is not only necessary as an instrument
of the CFP for its own sake, but it becomes
even more important in the context of the
current IUU policy, where the EU requires that
the countries exporting fish to the EU market
have, inter alia, an effective system of deterrent
sanctions for fisheries.
On the occasion of the adoption of the con-
trol regulation in 2009 (Regulation 1224/2009)
there was no question of including any har-
monization of fisheries penalties. However,
it is to be borne in mind that this regulation
was adopted just before the entry into force of
the Treaty of Lisbon, that is, it was decided by
Council alone. In the context of the on-going
revision of that regulation, the picture changes
dramatically since any amendment of Regu-
lation 1224/2009 will have to be done under
co-decision, and one can certainly expect the
European Parliament (which tends to have
strong views on control and enforcement) to
take a much more positive view of harmonizing
sanctions than Council ever had in the past.
There can be ways of addressing the strong
opposition of Member States to the harmoniza-
tion of penal law in fisheries policy. A strict
harmonization would not as such be adequate,
because the same sanction would have dif-
ferent meanings for different fleet segments
and for different Member States with different
standards of living. However, some common
criteria could be established, such as sanctions
representing a certain percentage of the value
of the catch. That is, the proportionality of the
penalty taking account of several parameters
could at least be established. And, ultimately,
the possibility of a recommendation by the
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
Commission, that would not be legally binding
but would have an orientation effect, could also
contribute to a better harmonization.
This question is important because non-
harmonized sanctions are a source of mistrust
among Member States, and do therefore con-
tribute negatively to the necessary trust building
that this document strongly advocates as a pre-
condition for a simpler and more collaborative
policy governance.
Enhanced powers for EFCA?
This is another very important question for
the future of the control of the CFP. EFCA,
established in 2002 (EU 2002), was conceived
as an instrument to ensure coordination of
the national fishery control system, but not to
establish a fully-fledged EU inspection system.
However, there are reasons to justify a possible
re-thinking of this state of affairs:
• The experience of EFCA over the last
10+ years, showing that, although the coor-
dination of inspections among national admin-
istrations has been a big success, there
are areas where progress has not been
made, notably the follow-up of the detected
infractions by the Member States’ legal
systems.
• The precedent of the establishment of the
European Coast Guard facility in 2016 (EU
2016), notably to respond to the challenge
of immigration in the Mediterranean basin,
has shown that the level of integration and
cooperation of Europe’s national maritime
surveillance systems has reached a point that
not so long ago was unthinkable.
In this context, the idea could be that EFCA
inspectors would have the status of Commu-
nity inspectors and would have the power
to establish infraction reports that Member
States’ authorities would subsequently have
the obligation to follow up in national law.
If combined with harmonized sanctions, this
would create a real level playing field that
could eventually build up the level of trust that,
in turn, could allow more creative systems of
control, simpler, and more adapted to particu-
lar local circumstances. But this level playing
279
field would not be based on an excessively
prescriptive legislation, but rather on the idea
that different and simpler control systems could
exist in different areas while avoiding the
impression that such systems mean getting one
particular fleet segment or Member State “off
the hook” in terms of control.
The CFP is today nowhere near admitting
this possibility. But today the CFP has many
features that would have seemed unthinkable
not so long ago. If the EU wants to advance in a
simplified yet effective control policy, including
a much higher involvement of the industry
itself, the idea of these enhanced powers for
EFCA should not remain forever a taboo.
The control of the landing
obligation: a test case
The introduction of the landing obligation
represents a huge challenge for the CFP, and
one where the very credibility of the policy will
be at stake. Controlling the level of discards
on board is difficult and costly, and almost
inevitably requires monitoring of the activity
on board the vessel. No amount of control on
landings can provide the necessary evidence
to effectively enforce a non-discard policy. The
methodologies available for on-board monitor-
ing are of two main types: observers on board
and CCTV cameras.
The control of the EU landing obligation
has been subject to important methodological
development by EFCA. Yet, the current level of
control of this measure is generally considered
very low. There can be different explanations
for this, but the one that looks more obvious is
that, in the early stages of the implementation,
when the rules are still under development
and when the economic effects of this policy
on the industry are still to be fully evaluated,
most control authorities of Member States,
if not all, apply a prudent policy of warning
but not necessarily sanctioning the observed
infractions.
This does not seem to be a problem for the
time being, but it is just a question of time that
it will become so. A policy on discarding (a very
ambitious one in fact, if we compare it with
280 Chapter 11
that of other countries) can be easily discredited
if it is seen as not being seriously enforced in
practice. This could be a very serious source
of embarrassment for the CFP in the not so
distant future, and measures should be taken
to address it.
As we saw above, a serious enforcement of
a discard ban requires monitoring on board.
The CCTV cameras, strongly advocated by
Denmark in the last decade can be an effective
mechanism, but their use is still limited, despite
the quota top-ups applied in certain TACs to
encourage their use. Strong opposition by some
Member States still stand in the way of their
extension to many more fisheries. In addition,
technical difficulties remain to be solved as
related to the use of CCTV cameras in fisheries
with high diversity, where the small sizes and
large number of species would make species
identification through TV imaging very diffi-
cult. As for observers, these have been used
only in a few specific circumstances, such as
for example in deep-sea fisheries, and also
in certain international fisheries (the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries Organization [NAFO]
is the best example) but in these cases the
observers have been the result of international
agreement.
Overall, if the landing obligation and, by
extension, the whole of the CFP is to be credi-
ble, the EU will have to tackle, sooner or later,
the question of the effective enforcement of
this new policy. And, despite the best efforts by
EFCA to develop methodologies; there seems to
be no better alternative than either cameras or
observers on board. These methods do not nec-
essarily have to apply to all vessels, but at least
it would be important that a significant number
of them are seriously monitored, either as (i)
a percentage of the total; or (ii) on the basis
of vessel size; (iii) on the basis of the level of
discarding; or even (iv) on those volunteering,
in connection with some kind of incentive.
The EU should not wait too much to resolve
this question as a matter of fundamental credi-
bility. As in many other instances, this question
could well be subject to another test case, where
a given fleet segment of fishery could lead the
way in exchange for some kind of incentive.
The management system: is
cost-recovery possible in the CFP?
In certain countries the costs associated to the
management of fisheries (notably research and
control) are – at least partially – paid for by
the industry enjoying the fishing rights. This
seems to increase the sense of “ownership” and
responsibility vis-à-vis a responsible implemen-
tation of the management system. The question
is: is this kind of – at least partial – cost recovery
a good idea worth developing for Europe?
The question is inevitably linked to many
others: if fishing quotas are a public property
in Member States, should their exclusive users
enjoy them free of charge? Many other activ-
ities where private interests enjoy exclusive
access to public property are subject to payment
of a canon: the concessions for the occupation
of public land are subject to concessions against
a canon in all Member States. Should fisheries
be an exception?
The costs of fisheries management have
never been evaluated at EU level. However,
this kind of analysis has been carried out in
certain important fishing nations or provinces.
For example, Arnasson et al. (2000) evaluated
the costs of fisheries management as a percent
of gross value of landings to be very high in
Newfoundland, Canada (15–25%), very low
in Iceland (about 3%) and more moderate in
Norway (about 10%). This raises the question
of the economic efficiency of the management
system, and whether the same benefits could
be obtained at lower costs. In this regard, the
authors conclude that the lowest costs are
found in the country having, arguably, the best
managed fisheries, which implies that better
management is possible with a lower cost for
the taxpayer.
For many years, the popular wisdom was
that the European fishing industry was eco-
nomically weak, so that the idea of taxing
them further under a cost-recovery scheme
would be fatal. At present, however, the eco-
nomic situation of the fleets (though not
all of them) is improving, as shown by the
Commission’s recent reports on the economic
performance of the European fishing fleets
(EU 2018a). In particular, the resource rent
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
in European fisheries is increasing, and this
means that European fisheries already produce
a net benefit to society. In this scenario, the
old wisdom must perhaps be revised, and the
idea of some, at least limited cost recovery
should not necessarily be seen as out of the
question.
There is also a potential link between the
use of RBM (see above) and the possibility of
applying cost recovery. The above study by
Waldo and Palrud (2013) demonstrates how
the implementation of rights-based manage-
ment can produce the resource rent allowing
for some cost-recovery to be implemented.
In any case, the fact remains that the CFP
is still very closed to this possibility and its
legislation is sending a very clear message: the
funding of science and control are important
priorities but must be assured by the admin-
istrations, with a very high contribution from
the EU. The new basic regulation stipulates that
Member States are responsible for discharging
these obligations (EU 2013, Articles 25 and 36)
and the new structural instrument EMFF pro-
vides extremely generous EU public funding for
those two purposes (EU 2014, Article 13). This
has a positive angle, as mentioned above, but
it also has a negative one: by putting so much
emphasis on paying for control with taxpayers’
money, the opportunity for cost recovery seems
to vanish as unnecessary. This question should
be discussed eventually.
Cost recovery in third countries
A number of countries around the world have
systems of partial cost recovery, that is, the
industry pays a part of the budget dedicated
notably to fisheries research. The best example
of cost recovery is that of New Zealand.
The introduction of a cost-recovery regime
for fisheries services in New Zealand took place
from 1994 onwards. This was possible following
the establishment of the quota management
system in 1986 based on individual transfer-
able quotas that allowed for a considerable
capitalization of quota holders.
A critical review of this system by the indus-
try reveals success in providing high-quality
research largely funded by those that benefit
281
from it, but only limited progress toward
the objectives of increasing efficiency and
accountability and devolving responsibility to
stakeholders. The industry still requests greater
public funding of marine research (although not
as an alternative to industry’s paying its share);
and improvement of government planning
processes to provide clear linkages between
fisheries-management needs and all required
research, less research-provider influence, and
use of the most appropriate funding mechanism
(Stokes et al. 2006).
Interestingly, there are no significant allega-
tions of bias in the scientific advice toward the
industry that finances it. Arguably, the property
rights lead the industry to request the best pos-
sible advice to ensure long-term profitability of
their investment, so that the incentive for advice
that would privilege short-term benefit does not
seem to be there.
Is self-control an option?
Among other issues to examine, one is par-
ticularly innovative and worth exploring:
self-control by the industry. Top–down control
is expensive, largely ineffective and always
burdensome and complex. The idea that the
fishing industry will take care of controlling
itself under certain circumstances is appealing,
but its feasibility is in question.
The idea in fact has been floated a number
of times, but it never went far. The main rea-
son is the importance attached to the notion
of a level playing field and the lack of trust
among Member States and fleet segments
within them. If applied seriously, self-control
by the industry could actually be stricter than
that exerted by the authorities. The experience
of self-regulation of fishing time in certain
Mediterranean ports is encouraging: peer pres-
sure ensures that these self-imposed rules are
strictly adhered to. Arguably, much more so
than the rules imposed by EU or national
law.
However, such rules apply today without
any problem when they are locally applied and
enforced, but when different fishermen from
different ports share a resource in a common
282 Chapter 11
fishing area, such schemes are much more
problematic.
As in other examples related to policy gov-
ernance, it would be a mistake to think always
in terms of adapting all the policy to this alter-
native approach, under the principle of level
playing field that stifles policy innovation. The
CFP should be more open to experimentation.
The idea could be to make self-control an expe-
rience applicable by a certain fleet segment
in a certain area, where the industry and the
Member States involved would agree to do
so. The conditions for the experiment could
be fixed in a way that would ensure that the
industry concerned would not be considered
positively discriminated, and would be closely
monitored to study the effects of such scheme.
In Chapter 14 we refer to the fundamental
question of testing new policy options as one of
the fundamental steps to make the CFP more
adaptive to the emerging challenges.
Delegated management?
An idea that would be interesting to test is that
referred to in Chapter 4 and applicable to cer-
tain fisheries in Alaska: the possibility of having
certain rules (in that example, moving-on rules
for by-catch avoidance) agreed by the sector
but enshrined in legislation so as to allow
private fishing cooperatives to penalize those
who do not respect the rules. This is a cre-
ative combination: the rules are legally-binding
legislation, but their management in practice,
including enforcement measures, is delegated
to the cooperatives. With all the necessary legal
adaptations, this type of scheme could be one
day tested in the EU.
Fleet policy: does it still have
any sense today?
Background
This policy has always been controversial, com-
plex and, arguably, also ineffective. Nominal
fleet capacity has been reduced all across the EU
(EU 2018c), and the current status of fishery
resources in the EU indicates an improvement
that, one way or another, would have not been
possible without a reduction of fishing capacity.
Another question, however, is whether the
reduction has really been the result of the fleet
policy or the effect of the economic evolution of
the industry, where gains in productivity allow
for the same fishing with fewer vessels (and
lower costs). What is clearer, however, is that
the respect of the capacity ceilings of the current
policy does not prevent the possible increase in
capacity of specific fleet segments. As a result,
some authors consider this policy ineffective,
both in terms of its overall effect and also in
terms of its inability to curb the important
development of certain fleet segments within
the overall ceiling of some Member States
(Villasante 2010).
Criticism of the ineffectiveness of the EU fleet
policy has been around for a long time. Cer-
tain authors, already in 2000, considered that
the reduction in harvesting capacity is less than
the nominal reduction in physical capacity and
that there is potential for harvesting capacity to
increase, if the remaining vessels improve their
efficiency (Pascoe and Coglan, 2000).
Indeed, the Commission itself has not shied
away from self-criticism in this respect. In addi-
tion to the above arguments from academia,
it recognized that the nominal fleet capacity
ceilings did not reflect a real level of harvesting
capacity and, in addition, even had room for
maneuver for increase (EU 2009b).
Fleet policy in the 2013 reform
The fleet policy was necessary in the past, to
revert the tendency to increase capacity in the
first years of the CFP, instead of adapting it to
available resources. The obligation to achieve
objectives of fleet reduction was suppressed in
2002, and since then the fleet policy has been
reduced to a general obligation to respect an
overall capacity ceiling (high enough so that
all Member States respect it without problem)
and to ratchet down that ceiling when capacity
withdrawal takes place with public money, to
ensure that it is not rebuilt. This was combined
with abundant EU funds for voluntary scrap-
ping that has been phased out since 2017. The
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
question is: given that EU fleets have all been
reduced, to levels that today appear to be much
better in balance with resources (although with
exceptions) and that the existing policy is in
fact not limiting capacity (all Member States
have voluntarily reduced capacity below their
ceiling), is the fleet policy still relevant?
As mentioned above, the biggest disappoint-
ment of the 2013 reform was the failure to
make RBM compulsory at national level so as
to replace the traditional fleet policy. This fail-
ure led to an alternative fleet policy consisting
of an enhancement of the existing system since
2002. The only improvement was a greater
emphasis on the need to evaluate properly the
existing overcapacity by fleet segment, and the
linkage of that evaluation with the access to
certain structural measures under EMFF. On
the contrary, the elimination of aid to scrapping
after 2017 meant the loss of the only instrument
left in the policy to remover overcapacity.
The US case
The US system does not impose restrictions on
fleet capacity, but it does not subsidize the fleet
either. It is a system where the industry enjoys
more freedom and fewer limitations, but where
they have to be economically self-sufficient: the
only public funds available are for scrapping,
through the capacity reduction programs,4 but
not for modernization and other actions as is
the case in the CFP under the EMFF. The US
system also includes a fishery disaster assis-
tance5 to compensate for the losses incurred by
natural disasters.
Interestingly, these buy-out schemes have
been proposed on different occasions, but
always according to a bottom–up approach.
This approach is very interesting because it
removes any subsidy that might be considered
as capacity-enhancing, so any possible irre-
sponsible growth in fleet capacity will not be
4 www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/funding-and-
financial-services/fishing-capacity-reduction-
programs/
5 www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/funding-and-
financial-services/fishery-disaster-assistance/
283
carried out on taxpayers’ money. It then offers
the possibility of addressing specific cases of
scrapping for those who volunteer on the basis
of their own interests. This makes fleet adjust-
ments an economic, not a political decision, an
idea that was behind the Commission proposal
for RBM. Sooner or later, this question will
have to be re-discussed.
Are capacity ceilings limiting
anything?
Since the current policy is based on the princi-
ple of national ceilings in capacity, the obvious
question is: are these ceilings really limiting
anything? The reply is very clear in Figure 11.1:
all Member States have nominal capacity levels
that are below the ceilings, sometimes well
below. This means that current capacity in
Member States is not being limited by these
ceilings.
One can certainly ask the question of what is
the added value of a policy on capacity ceilings
that do not limit anything. Is there really a
risk that, in the absence of such ceilings any
Member States would actually increase its fleet
capacity beyond that point? The key to the
answer is the ban, introduced in 2002, on the
financing of the construction of new vessels.
With such aid, one could hold the view that
there is a risk of the capacity being rebuilt.
However, since the suppression of such aid,
new vessels are to be built without public aid.
In these circumstances, the on-going experi-
ence shows that such new capacity is simply
not being built, and thus the risk of removing
the ceilings seems in principle rather low.
Another related question is that of the alleged
influence of capacity ceilings on vessel safety.
The EU has been criticized frequently for risking
human lives through its limitations to increase
capacity. As the argument goes, the fleet policy
would limit vessel size and this would prevent
fishermen from building larger, safer vessels.
This is a completely unfounded allegation.
Firstly, the EU fleet policy does not limit indi-
vidual vessel size at all. Secondly, there is room
for an increase in overall capacity if need be, as
shown in Figure 11.1. And thirdly, it is a false
assumption that smaller vessels are less safe. On
284 Chapter 11

100.00%
90.00%
80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
BE
BG
CY
DE
DK
ES
EE
FI
FR
EL
HR
IR
IT
LT
LV
ML
NL
PO
PR
RO
SI
SE
UK
TOT
GT KW

Figure 11.1 Fleet capacity by Member State as a percentage of the total national capacity ceilings. Source: EU
(2018c).

the contrary: a very interesting report by the US
Coast Guard on fishing vessel fatalities shows
how the rate of accidents per 1000 vessels
increases with vessel size, to reach a maximum
for vessels between 60 and 70 ft6 (Dickey 2008).
That means that small-scale vessels are actually
safer than mid-sized vessels. The reasons are
also specified in the above report: mid-sized
vessels, unlike small-scale ones, venture far-
ther away from the coast or in worse weather
conditions, thus actually taking more risks.
Is there a case for fleet policy?
The nominal capacity of European fleets has
been diminishing for the last 30 years (Penas
Lado 2016, chapter 5). Today, all European
Member States have overall capacity ceilings
comfortably within the capacity ceilings estab-
lished by the CFP’s fleet policy as we saw
above. However, this does not mean that the
real capacity, understood as the “ability of the
fleet to catch fish” has been reduced at the same
level, or even that it has been reduced at all.
The question of the balance between the
reduction in nominal capacity, expressed in
gross tonnage and engine power, and the
6 18 to 21 m.
“technical creep” provided for by the invest-
ment in better gear, more efficient fish-finding
equipment, storage techniques and so on, has
always been open and inconclusive. According
to a recent study, in only a few years the reduc-
tion of overall capacity has been higher than the
estimated technical progress. This means that
in general terms the technological efficiency
always grew faster than the real reduction of
fishing capacity (Villasante and Sumaila 2010).
This conclusion seems to be at odds with
the general improvement in the state of EU
resources in the last decade (at least in the
Atlantic) as a result of a reduction in overall
fishing effort since the turn of the century (see
Figure 12.1 in Chapter 12), and the more recent
increase in the profitability levels of many fleets
segments (EU 2018a). These improvements are
difficult to conciliate with an increasing overall
fishing power. There is, however, a possible
explanation to this apparent contradiction:
the increased number and total capacity of
the “inactive” vessels in a number of Member
States, as demonstrated by the annual report
on the EU fishing industry. In other words,
according to this hypothesis, the European fleet
is being reduced in total numbers, but also
being reduced in terms of the percentage of
active vessels.
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
The best example of the limited use of the
fleet policy is the Mediterranean. The 2013
reform established the same objective, MSY by
2020 for all stocks, in all EU areas, including
the Mediterranean. However, as shown by the
annual Commission communication of fishing
opportunities (EU 2018c), the levels of fishing
mortality with respect to Fmsy in this area are so
high, that it will be necessary to reduce them
dramatically to get anywhere close the policy
objective. If this is to be done under the current
capacity levels, the fishing effort corresponding
to the necessary reductions in fishing mortality
would not be sustainable economically. The
only way in which the reductions in fishing
mortality could take place while ensuring a
reasonable level of economic viability in the
fleets concerned is by reducing the capacity
of certain segments substantially. This is com-
pletely at odds with the existing fleet policy
that indicates a total capacity that is lower than
the ceiling, and also with the associated policy
on scrapping, phased out after 2017.
It can certainly be argued that, insofar as
quotas are adhered to, it is not important if part
of the European vessels are inactive. However,
to the extent that European fleets have a “dor-
mant” part that could theoretically be activated
at any given time (without overshooting the
legal capacity limits!), this poses a question of
whether the fleet policy as it stands today is
of any practical use. In a CFP so criticized for
its complexity, it is worth discussing if a policy
with so little demonstrable effect deserves to be
continued.
The EMFF: an instrument
to accompany the reform?
The EMFF (EU 2014) was adopted a year later
than the new basic regulation of the reform
(EU 2013). This provided for an unprecedented
opportunity to shape up the new structural
instrument as a tool to facilitate and promote
the implementation of the reform. Indeed, the
idea that the EMFF is a bespoke instrument to
promote reform has become a commonplace.
285
But with a few years of experience, is this really
true?
Some positives . . .
The EMFF of 2014 has included a number of
positive elements to become effective in sup-
porting policy implementation:
• The emphasis on the financing of control and
data collection, essential elements to ensure a
good policy implementation.
• The different conditionality mechanisms,
that make access to the funds conditional on
the fulfillment of a number of obligations
under the policy, both in terms of the obli-
gations of individual operators, and those of
Member States. Another question is the level
of implementation of these mechanisms in
practice.
• The continued emphasis on some social
objectives, such as safety on board.
• The special conditions given to small-scale
fleets, demonstrably squeezed out of struc-
tural funding in previous exercises.
• The continuous emphasis on community-
based local development, a useful tool
to promote local development in fishing
communities.
• The emphasis in funding actions to develop
more sustainable and selective fisheries,
as well as to improve industry/science
cooperation.
• The funding of actions to improve the respect
of environmental legislation.
These elements are objectively important to
ensure that the new structural instrument con-
tributes to the implementation of the new pol-
icy. However, this regulation fell short of what
was necessary to tie up the public funds with
the achievement of the new CFP goals.
. . . and some negatives
The least positive aspects can also be identified:
• The regulation has too wide a focus, with
too many measures many of which have
no relationship with the achievement of
policy goals. This makes the regulation an
all-purpose tool, more than one focused on
accompanying policy change.
286 Chapter 11
• The main instrument to cut any remaining
overcapacity (scrapping premiums) is phased
out.
• Excessive harmonization, and no possibility
for regionally-specific measures. For example,
scrapping could be much more necessary in
certain regions than in others, but conditions
are identical. The same applies to temporary
laying-ups.
• No clear objectives to be achieved, and weak
links with the main policy objectives (MSY,
landing obligation, etc.).
• No progress at all on industry respon-
sibility: everything is paid for by public
administrations. There is little in the way of
co-responsibility by the fishing industry in
co-financing necessary changes in control
requirements or fishing practice.
• The regulation is also too reticent on climate
change, while its effects were already known
in 2014.
It is premature to evaluate what is the con-
tribution of the EMFF to the implementation of
the policy adopted in 2013. Many actions are
on-going, the level of budget execution is still
low and much of the best use of that budget may
be yet to come. However, something seems to
be already apparent: if one of the objectives of
the fund was to facilitate the implementation of
the new policy obligations, the evidence shows
that the level of investment by Member States
in more selective gear to contribute to imple-
ment the landing obligation is very low, and that
the contribution of the structural instrument to
accompany the substantial reductions of fish-
ing mortality necessary to make progress on the
conservation policy in the Mediterranean is also
disappointingly small. At least on these ques-
tions it seems easy to conclude that, for the time
being, the EMFF is not significantly contribut-
ing to facilitate the implementation of the most
prominent feature of the reformed policy. This
is a cause of concern.
The structural measures of the US
as a point for reflection
The experience of the US is certainly not
one that Europe should “cut and paste,”
because there are more than obvious differences
between the two. However, looking at the US
system is always a good way to discuss inter-
nally in Europe about our own policies, and
perhaps to reconsider if some of the things
we tend to take for granted in policy-making
should not also be part of our reflection on the
future structural policy.
The US structural policy is made up of two
types of measure:
• Fisheries catastrophe relief. This is a type of
measure intended to palliate various effects
of unforeseen circumstances that are not
attributable to normal management or to
the normal conduct of a private business.
It is applied generally on request from the
Regional Councils in a very flexible manner.
The unforeseen circumstances are generally
natural events (such as red tides, oil spillages)
but theoretically can be applied also to other
type of catastrophe.
• Transition to sustainable fisheries through
fishing capacity withdrawal. This instrument,
like the EU’s scrapping premiums, is applied
in the US on an ad hoc basis, at the request
of the States or the Regional Councils, and
applied on a case by case basis.
These measures have something in com-
mon: they are not permanent schemes, but
measures to be taken if and when necessary,
as determined notably by recommendation
from the Regional Management Councils. Is
this kind of structural policy thinkable in the
EU?
This type of structural policy cannot be just
copied in the EU. At least two factors make this
type of policy difficult to apply:
• The fact that the funds are not previously
allocated to anybody, but used when and
where necessary. This would be difficult to
conciliate with an EU policy where alloca-
tion of structural funds is considered as part
of the political status quo of the policy. The
possibility that, for example, much of these
funds may end up being used to pay French
oyster producers to palliate high mortalities
produced by an uncontrolled disease, instead
of benefiting modest artisanal fishermen’s
 The missing elements of the 2013 Policy reform
communities in poorer Member States would
be politically difficult.
• The fact that this type of policy would require
the funds to be managed centrally by the
Commission (thus requiring probably more
staff), and this runs counter to the tendency
to decentralize the management of structural
funds to Member States and to reduce the
Commission’s staff means.
Despite the above caveats, the US system
provides a good opportunity to reflect on what
changes may be desirable (or inevitable) in the
structural pillar of the CFP if it is to deliver its
declared goals.
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CHAPTER 12
The global context: emerging challenges
The status of the world’s fishery
resources
The future of the Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP) will certainly be influenced by the global
trends in the perception of the status of the
world’s fishery resources. The use of the word
“perception” in this context is intended to
underline the growing importance that images
and stereotypes have for the public at large
in shaping up societal positions on fisheries
management around the world, over and
beyond the real situation of the world’s fishery
resources based on the best scientific advice.
This perception will have a crucial role in
future political debates where the place of
the fishing activity in the framework of ocean
activity and governance will be at stake. This
perception will have serious consequences on
the way modern societies will look at fishing
activity in general and the fishing industry in
particular. In these times, when public per-
ceptions are so easily influenced by superficial
information, it is essential that the future
development of the policy be based on in-depth
knowledge of the reality.
The Pauly/Hilborn controversy
In recent years, certain authors have predicted
the collapse of the world’s fishery resources by
2048 (Worm et al. 2006). These forecasts have
given rise to a hot public debate. Although
this article has been abundantly questioned
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
by many prominent scientists (Stokstad 2009)
including Worm himself, the image of a total
collapse of the world’s fisheries by the middle
of the century is so powerful that it remains
strongly anchored in social media and is fre-
quently cited in public debate, often being
taken at face value as the undisputable scientific
evidence.
That doomsday scenario has been supported
by well-known scientists such as Daniel Pauly,
who successfully took the debate to the public
media, stating that (Pauly 2009a):
There are basically two alternatives for fisheries sci-
ence and management: one is obviously continuing
with business as usual. This would lead, in addi-
tion to further depletion of biodiversity, to intensi-
fication of ‘fishing down marine food webs,’ which
ultimately involves the transformation of marine
ecosystems into dead zones.
He also created a new, catchy term to refer
to this apocalyptic situation: Aquacalypse. In
this analysis, the critical view of the status
of the world’s fish resources included a cri-
tique of Food and Agriculture Organization’s
(FAO’s) evaluations, notably on the basis of a
presumed under-estimation of the catches by
the small-scale sector (Pauly and Froese 2012).
According to this school of thought, fishing
capacity has increased 10-fold (25-fold in Asia)
since the 1950s and, if real catches are properly
recorded or reconstructed, the global marine
yield is not stable, but has actually halved in
that period (Watson et al. 2013).
289
290 Chapter 12
Such a doomsday scenario, prominently
displayed in newspapers worldwide, imply that
current management systems are not effective
so that new, more dramatic approaches are
necessary. These views have been actively used
by environmental Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGOs) to call for dramatic solutions for
the management of fisheries.
In the wake of this campaign, important
personalities have joined the debate, often
advocating very extreme solutions. Such is the
case of Professor E.O. Wilson, Professor Emer-
itus at Harvard University, who proposes that
humankind should set aside 50% of the planet
undisturbed for environmental protection,
including the elimination of fishing in the open
sea.1 Another example is that of Dr. Sylvia
Earle, highly-regarded marine biologist and
sea-explorer, who currently advocates a stop in
all fishing of predator fish (considering them
equivalent to Bengal tigers) and considers all
fishing “a torture to wildlife.”2
All these contributors depict a very negative
image of fishing activity and promote the idea
that current management methods are neither
sufficient nor adequate to handle the current
threats to the oceans from the fishing activity.
Among these alternative management scenar-
ios, the establishment of very large marine
protected areas has been suggested as the ideal
solution, giving rise to a tendency, largely
favored by many environmental NGOs, to pro-
mote this kind of instrument as the solution to
the world’s fishery management failures (Pauly
2009b).
The debate has gone public, and some media
have called it an “epic battle” notably between
Daniel Pauly and Ray Hilborn, the two best
known personalities representing opposite
views on this question.
Branch (2008) inter alia have questioned
the methodologies proposed by the Pauly
school and have underlined that, although
the global picture is not necessarily rosy, with
1 http://cfooduw.org/eo-wilson-fishing/
2 www.outsideonline.com/2030946/marine-
biologist-sylvia-earle-profile/
many resources being overexploited, there are
positive trends in many fisheries around the
world, so there is not objective basis for that
doomsday scenario.
Later studies to resolve this question have
shed new light on the debate, showing that fish-
eries management is providing for the recovery
of stocks in many areas of the world, and that
the current trends in stocks status show stability
in fish abundance, and not a collapse (Worm
et al. 2009).
As regards highly-migratory fish, in 2015,
76% of the world catches of tuna came from
healthy stocks, which contradicts doomsday
scenarios about stocks collapsing, according to
data from the tuna multilateral organizations
(Juan-Jorda et al. 2011; Pons et al. 2016).
Other studies present themselves as being in
the middle of the debate, and propose as a solu-
tion a community and ecosystem-based man-
agement favoring small-scale fisheries (Pitcher
and Cheung 2013).
FAO, in its 2014 report on the state of world’s
fisheries, estimates global capture fisheries pro-
duction as representing “a continuation of the
generally stable situation reported previous-
ly” (FAO 2014, p. 5). Although there is a
recognition that a lot remains to be done (For
2011, FAO estimated that 71.2% of stocks
were exploited at biologically sustainable
levels, but 28.8% were exploited at unsustain-
able levels), little in this report hints at the
doomsday scenario first described by Worm
et al. (2006).
Overall, most of the scientific evidence shows
a trend: where serious management takes
place, fishery resources seem to be increasing,
while the decline appears notably in areas
where management is poor or non-existent.
In fact, the 28.8% of stocks that FAO consid-
ers as exploited unsustainably, come largely
from areas where traditional fishery manage-
ment is still lacking or is very weak. Costello
et al. (2012) indicate that in particular small
unassessed stocks are in substantially worse
condition than assessed fisheries, and that, if
correctly managed, could bring about impor-
tant increases in abundance (56%) and fishery

yields (between 8% and 40%). This implies
that current management is not the problem;
the problem is its absence in many areas and
fisheries.
Overall, with good management, FAO con-
sidered in 2014 that fishery resources will not
only not collapse, but they have a potential for
an extra increase of around 16.5 million tonnes,
worth US$ 32 billion (FAO 2014, p. 7). In its
more recent analysis, FAO (2016) gives a
slightly more negative view, stating that marine
fish stocks have not improved overall, despite
notable progress in some areas. For FAO (2016)
the number of stocks fished at unsustain-
able level has been increasing since the 1970
although the increase has leveled off in recent
years. As for the under-exploited stocks, these
have been decreasing up to the level of 10% in
2013. In any case, the total production of cap-
ture fisheries reached a peak in the late 1980s
and has remained stable, fluctuating around
90 million tons a year ever since. Clearly, cap-
ture fish production is stagnant, but it is not
collapsing. Importantly, FAO continues to think
that there is a potential for increase of that pro-
duction, coming from two sources: the limited
(and shrinking) under-exploited stocks and,
specially, the increase in over-exploited stocks
thanks to better management.
More recent estimates identify significant
room for increase in fish production. Meaning-
fully, this increase may come from two sources:
the improvement of management in currently
overfished stocks, but also from fishing harder
(at least in the developed world) stocks that are
currently fished lightly (Costello et al. 2016;
Hilborn and Costello 2017), although this later
possibility is limited by consideration on eco-
nomic feasibility. In any case, this study shows
how the world’s fishery resources can indeed
produce higher yields than today, rather than
collapsing towards the middle of the century.
These increases are compatible with increases
of the biomass of the fish in the sea. This is in
contrast with other economic sectors where
economic growth implies trade-offs with the
environment (Hilborn and Costello 2017).
The global context: emerging challenges 291
So, who is right and who is wrong?
The evaluation of the state of the world’s fish-
ery resources has been attempted by different
methodologies, inter alia:
1 FAO Sofia (FAO 2016). This report is the
most complete overview of capture fish
production and stock status, with trends and
geographical breakdown, thus allowing for
an analysis of trends and differences among
fisheries and regions.
2 The random access memory (RAM) Legacy
Stock Assessment Database (Ricard et al.
2012), a permanent database regularly
updated and improved which includes time
series of fishing mortality and biomass by
region, thus allowing for a dynamic evalu-
ation of trends in stock status as a result of
management.
3 The panel regression by Costello et al. (2016)
assembled the largest-of-its-kind database
and coupled it to state-of-the-art bio-
economic models for more than 4500 fish-
eries around the world.
4 The “ensemble approach” by Rosenberg et al.
(2017) which analyzed 785 stocks and clas-
sified them on the basis of the relationship
between current biomass and Bmsy.
5 The expert opinion survey by Melny-
chuk et al. (2016), where fishery experts
from diverse backgrounds were invited to
complete a survey characterizing the man-
agement systems for 10 species in their
country of familiarity, to arrive to a global
picture on stock status and the effects of
management.
6 The Ocean Health Index3 which calculates
the status of the world’s fishery resources on
the basis of the relationship between their
biomass and the biomass that would deliver
maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
7 “The Sea Around Us,” a research group
of scientists of the University of British
Columbia. This group represents the views
of Daniel Pauly and his school of thought
3 www.oceanhealthindex.org/methodology/
components/fisheries-status/
292 Chapter 12
referred to above. They base their methodol-
ogy largely on the notion that the evolution
of catches (which they recalculate from
FAO’s statistics) is directly proportional to
fish abundance.
These methodologies, not surprisingly, arrive
at different conclusions and refer to common
concepts such as “overfished” with different
standards. For example, if we take as a reference
the work of FAO (2016), the 2048 doomsday
scenario is not confirmed. Although the situa-
tion clearly needs to improve in many places,
there is no basis to say that the fisheries will
collapse by the middle of the century. How-
ever, FAO’s idea that world’s capture fisheries
are stable is still strongly disputed by certain
authors, who believe that the “stability” of
catches referred to by FAO is an artifact of
their (allegedly poor) estimation of real catches,
suggest that FAO’s “stability” is a myth, that the
situation is being degraded, and on that basis
consider that if the situation continues, there
will be a crisis by mid-century (Pauly and Zeller
2017).
That point is made stronger in a book by
Pauly and Zeller (2016)4 who insist on using
catches as an indicator of fish abundance and,
by “reconstructing” historical catches make the
point that what FAO considers stable situations
in reality correspond to declining abundances.
The problem of this approach is, as stated by
Paul Fernandes in his review of the book,5 that:
trends in catch simply do not always reflect trends
in biomass, particularly where there have been sig-
nificant successful management interventions.
In the managed fisheries, lower catches cor-
respond to lower levels of fishing mortality
due to management and not to lower fish
abundances. In fact, as we will see below, in
the NE Atlantic a reduction in catches is com-
patible with an increase in fish abundance,
as a result of the restrictions imposed by the
4 The
book summarizes the work of 15 years financed
by the NGO Pew Charitable Trust.
5 http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4135-115X/
management systems and the improvements in
enforcement.
When evaluating this question, it is neces-
sary to be very careful about how different
authors refer to “over-exploited” and other
related terms. Rosenberg et al. (2017) eval-
uate 785 fisheries around the world and
found that 56% of these (439 stocks) were
below Bmsy and considered that, contrary
to the FAO classification referred to above,
these stocks were “over-exploited” and not
“fully-exploited” as FAO indicates. To add to the
confusion, let’s remember that the US considers
over-exploited only those stocks with an abun-
dance lower than half Bmsy , and if all stocks were
exploited at Fmsy half would be below Bmsy at
any time.
The different evaluation methods produce
different results. They all coincide, however,
to underline that there is still a lot to achieve
and that many stocks around the world are
overfished and need effective management to
ensure their sustainability. Only one approach,
that of The Sea Around Us actually insists on
the doomsday scenario of a major fish stock
collapse in the middle of the century. However,
they do not look region by region to show
that stocks are increasing or stable in coun-
tries where 1/2 of the world’s fish catch comes
from.
These examples clearly show that easy, popu-
lar messages about the status of the world’s fish-
eries must always be taken carefully and with
a clear idea of how the different categories of
stocks are defined in terms of their conservation
status. In other words, that doomsday scenarios
about the collapse of fisheries must not be taken
at face value, and that the question must be con-
sidered seriously looking at different sources to
have a balanced picture.
In that regard, the bulk of the scientific evi-
dence shows that the situation of the world’s
fishery resources is very variable, with many
problems still to be resolved, but with many
cases where the trends are positive, as a result
of sound management with traditional and
well-tested methods. Over and beyond the
overall trend, the areas of the world where

good, traditional fisheries management is
conducted, the evolution of fishery resources
is positive. Doomsday scenarios are not war-
ranted by a large majority of the scientific
evidence.
The case of the EU
The European experience, in this context, must
be considered: while the status of stocks (in the
Atlantic where the time series of data allows
this) showed a negative trend for many years,
stock abundance has been increasing in recent
years, and the number of overfished stocks is
diminishing during this period. This was shown
in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 in Chapter 1.
In the case of the European Union, after
many years of failure to manage fish stocks, the
changes introduced in the turn of the century
have resulted in a positive trend in recovering
stocks, to levels that are close to producing MSY
(Cardinale et al. 2013). This is also confirmed
by the annual analysis commissioned to the
Scientific, Technical and Economics Commit-
tee for Fisheries (STECF) by the European
Commission. These trends appear in the last
decade. However, it is important to underline
that the reduction of fishing mortality that
has made that possible started years earlier,
as shown in the figures referred to above.
These positive trends, however, do not take
place in the Mediterranean, where the state of
stocks is still that of an extremely high level of
over-exploitation (Cardinale et al. 2017).
0.4
0.3
LFI
0.2
0.1
0 Figure 12.1 Time-series of the large fish
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
The global context: emerging challenges 293
These data show for the EU what is true
for the whole world: fisheries manage-
ment, though slowly, works. The poor state
of Mediterranean fisheries can certainly be
related to the traditional absence or insuffi-
ciency of a fisheries management worthy of
that name, both at EU level and even more, at
multilateral level for the whole of the basin.
It is also important to check on the allegation
that overfishing around the world is reducing
the average size of fish. A 2014 report by Inter-
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) for the North Sea shows how this index,
which was considerably reduced in the 1980s
and 1990s to an all-time low towards 2001 (see
Figure 12.1) has increased since then, following
the overall reduction in fishing mortality as of
the turn of the century.6
Figures 1.2, 1.3 (Chapter 1), and Figure 12.1
together clearly show that where management
takes place, the status of the stocks improves.
It can certainly be argued that progress is not
quick enough, but it can certainly not be argued
that the doomsday scenarios described above
are about to turn into reality in EU Atlantic
waters.
6 www.ices.dk/explore-us/Action%20Areas/ESD/
Pages/Greater-North-Sea-Pressures-Selective-
extraction-of-species,-including-incidental-non-
target-catch.aspx/
2020 indicator (LFI) for the Greater North Sea.
Source: ICES (2014).
294 Chapter 12
Does fisheries management
work?
All the above discussion has a very obvious con-
sequence: if resources are collapsing it means
that current management of fisheries is not
succeeding, so that a different, more dramatic
kind of approach to fisheries management
is necessary. On the contrary, if fisheries are
not collapsing, this means that existing man-
agement is bringing gradual positive results,
so it is necessary to continue with current
management efforts and improve them where
they are not yet effectively applied. This is
therefore a debate on whether traditional fish-
eries management can and is providing results
and whether dramatic alternatives would be
necessary and justified.
What we understand by traditional fish-
eries management is best represented by that
exerted notably by developed countries. It is
clear that the poor state of conservation of
many fisheries around the world corresponds
to developing countries where such tradi-
tional fisheries management is not applied, or
only very inefficiently so. In fact, comparative
studies based on meta-analysis have shown a
very clear correlation between the status of
conservation of stocks and the development
of fisheries management, and this, in turn, is
also correlated with the socio-economic status
of the country in question (Melnychuk et al.
2016).
An evaluation of the traditional fisheries
management methods has also been realized
using meta-analysis by Hilborn and Ovando
(2014). This showed that stocks that are scien-
tifically assessed are in better shape and indeed
are not typically declining but rebuilding, and
that large stocks appear to be in better shape
than small ones. The latter may be due to
the fact that larger stocks generally receive
more attention and investment in research and
management than small ones. This implies that
current management methods can (and often
do) lead to sustainable fisheries, so that more
precautionary management is not necessary.
In other words, what is necessary is not to
re-invent fisheries management with more
dramatic or precautionary systems, but rather
to ensure that all significant stocks are managed
properly. Put it another way: the problem is not
current management; it is the lack thereof. On
this basis, some authors propose that manage-
ment should concentrate on a number of “hot
spots” where effective fisheries management is
basically missing (Worm and Branch 2012).
Costello et al. (2016) state that, although
business as usual management would produce
a continued collapse of many of the world’s
fisheries, sound management “common sense”
reform could generate annual increases exceed-
ing 16 million tons in catch US$ 53 billion in
profit and 619 million tons in biomass. In other
words, common sense fisheries management
has the potential to bring about a very substan-
tial improvement in both the situation of global
fish stocks and in their biological and economic
outputs. The above authors also showed that
business as usual did not lead to overall collapse
and long-term yield wasn’t much lower than
the current one.
In Europe, Smith (2013) has summarized the
contribution of traditional management to the
improvement in the state of European stocks:
Fishery management is widely perceived to be
failing, and proposals for new approaches abound.
However, evidence is accumulating that tradi-
tional approaches, where properly applied, do
work. European management of fish stocks in the
north-east Atlantic may be the latest case in point.
It is important to bear this in mind. If prop-
erly conducted, fisheries management works. In
Europe too, under the CFP, this is also the case.
While it is important to keep the policy under a
permanent critical scrutiny, it would be a mis-
take to discredit the policy entirely as useless
or ineffective. It is not the implementation of
the CFP that is a problem, it is its absence or its
bad implementation. And while it is obviously
imperfect and should always be improved, it is
not justified to use legitimate criticism to pro-
pose its dismantling and its replacement by an
unknown, untested alternative.

We have referred above to the failure to
improve fish stock status in the Mediterranean
basin. Apart from other factors (the responsibil-
ity of non-EU countries in this basin) one can
also conclude that it is the absence of manage-
ment of Mediterranean fisheries under the CFP
that is the problem. Despite its shortcomings,
the CFP is succeeding to rebuild stocks in the
Atlantic after many years of management. In
the Mediterranean area, it is the traditional lack
of management under the CFP that can be held
responsible for the failure.
The “perfect protein”: can
the world afford
to under-exploit its fishing
opportunities?
Fish are caught without fertilizers, pesticides,
antibiotics, or freshwater. Combining that with
the generally low carbon footprint of most fish-
eries compared to land-based animal protein
alternatives, and we have “the perfect protein”
(Sharpless and Evans 2013).
Still today, the main source of worry about
the capacity of the world’s oceans to sustain-
ably feed the world is the over-exploitation of
resources, and the fight about it must continue
to enjoy full priority, in particular in these areas
of the world where effective fisheries man-
agement is still not applied. However, as the
example of certain developed nations shows,
the new emphasis on the preservation of bio-
diversity is raising a new problem, namely, the
under-exploitation of certain resources. The
question is, while we need to continue to fight
against over-exploitation, can we at the same
time afford to under-exploit other resources?
Hunger and poverty: fish
consumption and the global demand
for fish
According to FAO, world per capita apparent
fish consumption increased from an average
of 9.9 kg in the 1960s to 14.4% in the 1990s
and 19.7% in 2013, and preliminary estimates
point to at an increasing trend beyond 20 kg
The global context: emerging challenges 295
in subsequent years. In 2013, fish accounted
for about 17% of the global population’s intake
of animal protein and 6.7% of total protein
consumed (FAO 2016).
The growing demand for fish in recent
decades has been met notably thanks to farmed
fish, both marine and fresh water. While cap-
ture fisheries have been stable since the late
1980s, aquaculture production has been increas-
ing steadily and in 2014 a milestone was reached
when the sector’s contribution to the supply of
fish for human consumption overtook that of
wild-caught fish for the first time (FAO 2016).
FAO data also show very important elements:
• Arable land in the world has been stable
since the mid-1980s. This means that progress
in agriculture requires more intensive prac-
tices, or chopping down more forestland.
• As people improve their income and get out
of poverty, their preference for animal pro-
tein increases.
• Poorer countries tend to fulfill their demand
for animal protein with more fish, as com-
pared to wealthier countries. This means that
fish is “animal protein for the poor.”
What this means is that fish represent a key
component of any strategy of reducing poverty
and hunger around the world. In view of the
projections on the growth of human popu-
lations, there is little doubt that fish protein
will be called to represent an increasingly crucial
role in supplying humankind with high qual-
ity animal protein. Any attempt to conserve
the world’s ocean resources largely as nature
reserves, or to manage resources in a way
that produces significant under-exploitation
of sustainable resources should bear this
in mind.
Are the land-based alternatives
better? Protein from livestock
The challenge of producing protein for a grow-
ing global population is subject to endless
discussion, including many advocates of an
increasingly vegetarian diet as the only possi-
bility, in view of the effect of animal farming
on biodiversity and climate change. However,
296 Chapter 12
animal protein has been essential in human
evolution, and it is not obvious that the future
of humankind should necessarily be vegetar-
ian. Besides, people like animal protein, so
the question is: what is the kind of animal
protein that is healthier and has a lower impact
on biodiversity and climate change? Are the
land-based alternatives to capture fishing and
aquaculture better in that regard?
We saw in Chapter 2 the effects of animal
protein production based on livestock, and
how they compare very unfavorably to fish
in terms of biodiversity reduction and con-
tribution to greenhouse effects. This clearly
points to fish and other aquatic animals as
not only the healthiest, but also the most
environmentally-friendly of all animal proteins.
The global impact of different food pro-
duction systems has been studied in recent
years. Although these effects can vary up to
50-fold even for the same products, depending
upon production methods, transport, and other
factors, certain patterns clearly emerge. In gen-
eral terms, it appears that the impacts of the
lowest-impact animal products typically exceed
those of vegetable substitutes, providing new
evidence for the importance of dietary change
(Poore and Nemecek 2018). The production
of food on land is very resource-intensive:
covering 43% of the world’s ice and desert-free
land, it creates c. 32% of the global terrestrial
acidification. It is also responsible for 2/3 of total
freshwater consumption, driving 90–95% of
global scarcity-weighted water use.
Concerning the production of animal pro-
tein, a study carried out reviewing 148 animal
sources of food (comparing them in terms
of energy use, greenhouse effect, release of
nutrients and acidifying compounds) showed
that the lowest impact forms of animal protein
come from species that feed naturally in the
ocean and that can be harvested with low
fuel requirements. In more specific terms, the
study found that the lowest impact production
methods were small pelagic fisheries and mol-
lusk aquaculture, whereas the highest impact
production methods were beef production and
catfish production in freshwater (Hilborn et al.
2018).
All these data must be compounded with
the growing evidence that consumers deprived
of one food source will shift their demand for
other (Brashares et al. 2004). This is extremely
important: any policy that will restrict the
exploitation of marine protein more than is
necessary to ensure full sustainability will
result in an increase of the consumption of
animal protein produced on land, with a higher
environmental impact. When judging the mer-
its of seafood protein and its environmental
impact, this has to be done in the context of the
comparison of such effects with the land-based
alternative.
The two lowest-impact production methods
of protein are certainly capture fisheries and
marine aquaculture practices, while the two
highest impact methods are cattle raising and
freshwater aquaculture. This emphasizes the
key importance of seafood in the future of
animal protein supply to humankind.
A question of equity: the notion
of “leakage”
The question is not just one of balance between
supply and demand of seafood, and their sub-
sequent effects on the world’s ecosystems; it is
also about equity, because the effects of fishing
policy are differently felt across the globe. We
referred above to the very dramatic proposals
by highly-respected personalities about massive
reductions in fishing activity in the world.
Besides the point that these measures would
reduce considerably fish supply and thus aggra-
vate pressure on land ecosystems to produce
animal protein, it is obvious that the effect of
the shortage of seafood would be felt primarily
by developing nations. This raises a question of
equity.
As we saw above, fisheries management is
producing reasonably good results in a number
of developed countries around the world, but
where sound management does not apply,
resources tend to be over-exploited. Actually,
both things are related: given the global demand
for fish, good management in some areas of

the world can contribute to a greater impact of
fisheries in other areas. We saw above the high
level of under-exploitation of fish resources
in the US. Yet, the US imports seafood from
third countries. In this connection, it has been
argued (Helvey et al. 2017) that:
The full impact of US seafood consumption pat-
terns needs to be considered at the global level in
light of continuing efforts to further marine bio-
diversity protection. Failing to do so only serves
to counteract the effectiveness of domestic actions
by externalizing negative environmental costs to
others.
The effect of exporting to third countries
the environmental protection of the import-
ing countries, thus increasing pressure on the
exporting ones is referred to by the above
authors as “leakage.” The authors examine
a series of possible solutions to this problem,
including the support of good management in
third countries, but also a recognition of the
externalities of management decisions and the
consideration of capture fisheries as part of
the food system.
A number of years ago, the EU policy of
financing the export of redundant fleet capacity
to third countries was criticized as “the EU
exporting its overcapacity problems to other
countries.” This policy was discontinued largely
due to this bad image. It is interesting to observe
that the more the US and the EU protect their
waters to preserve biodiversity, the more pres-
sure will be put into third countries ecosystems.
Given their seafood consumption patterns, it
will also become clear that the main import
markets in the world: Japan, the US and EU
would be, allegedly, exporting their impact on
marine ecosystems to third countries if they
fail to exploit fully their own resources. This is
something to reflect upon.
The solution to the problem of leakage is not
simple, and it varies for different countries. It is
clear that while the US could reduce its leakage
through full exploitation of its resources, Japan
has limited or no room for maneuver to do
so, and the EU is somehow in the middle. In
any case, it seems clear that one of the most
The global context: emerging challenges 297
obvious solutions to the problem of leakage is
to ensure that the import markets fully exploit
the resources at their disposal in their own
waters, so as to minimize their impact on third
countries.
Fisheries: a key component of future
diets
All the above considerations must also be com-
bined with considerations of the value of fish
as health food. It is obvious that the world’s
future needs for food simply cannot be fulfilled
in quantity and quality without an increasing
contribution from fish and other marine organ-
isms. This makes, on a global scale, the potential
under-exploitation of fishery resources a prob-
lem as serious as that of over-exploitation,
in that it contributes to exploit inefficiently a
fundamental source of healthy animal protein
that the world will so badly need in the years
to come.
This will be very variable for different coun-
tries around the world. Certain countries with
very extensive farmland will still be able to feed
all their people and even export food without
exploiting their fishery resources, and may be
tempted to under-exploit these resources and
consider the oceans as areas of low priority for
food production and high priority for recre-
ation and biodiversity preservation. However,
the world as a whole simply cannot afford that
option, and many countries around the world
see today’s emphasis on the conservation of
marine biodiversity through the extension of
“no-take zones” as a “rich country agenda.”
This makes full (sustainable) exploitation
of marine resources a world need, but not a
need for a number of influential countries,
thus making the solution very complicated.
This author has already referred to the cru-
cial importance of the distributive aspects of
fisheries management in the EU (Penas Lado
2016; chapter 2). On a global scale, the above
situation represents a huge challenge which
will, sooner or later, have to be addressed.
This challenge is all the more important
in the context of climate change, as we will
see below. Certain forms of aquaculture and
298 Chapter 12
capture fisheries are among the lowest-impact
systems for the production of animal protein
(Hilborn et al. 2018), and thus represent an
advantage as compared to livestock production
on land in that particular context.
Aquaculture: the seafood of the
future?
FAO (2016) has reported on the growing role
of aquaculture in the overall global supply
of seafood. While the production of wild fish
from capture fisheries has been stable since
the 1990s, aquaculture production continues
growing and has already overtaken capture
fisheries, and the trend continues. There is no
doubt about the crucial role that aquaculture
will play in the world’s future supply of seafood.
This is the fastest growing animal-food-
producing sector in the world, but there are
considerable growth disparities among coun-
tries. One factor that contributes substantially
to these disparities is the stringency of envi-
ronmental legislation. A cross-country analysis
showed that developed countries with stringent
policies have a difficulty in balancing act when
promoting aquaculture development, to the
benefit of developing economies with more
lenient regulations (Abate et al. 2016).
The difficulties for aquaculture development
are generally similar in much of the developed
world, including for example the US (Knapp
and Rubino 2016) where social opposition
and the governance system, inter alia, hinder
the development of the industry. Aquaculture
development also poses a number of questions,
notably in terms of the relationship between
this activity and capture fisheries.
Aquaculture and capture fisheries:
are they compatible?
Aquaculture has shown an impressive growth
in the last decades. Since the 1990s, while the
production of capture fisheries has remained
stable around 90 million tons a year, aquacul-
ture production has been growing steadily to
around 70 million tons a year. If the production
of aquatic food has reached levels of around
160 million tons in recent years it has been
only thanks to the development of aquaculture
(FAO 2014).
Yet, certain types of aquaculture still suffer
from frequent criticism as being “unsustain-
able”: the farming of carnivorous fish is often
believed to cause undue pressure on the cap-
ture fisheries for the forage fish used to produce
fish feed. While it is true that using wild fish
to produce farmed fish can be considered an
inefficient way to use fish protein, it is also
true that the general state of forage fish stocks
is not necessarily worse than that of human
consumption fish, an argument that tends to
dissipate the fear that this development will be
detrimental for forage fish species.
Certain authors have warned that aqua-
culture development (at least fish farming
for carnivorous fish) requires huge amounts
of wild fish as feed and this raises issues of
food security and malnutrition in developing
countries (Pauly and Zeller 2017). However,
different authors have indicated that, despite
certain bad practices, aquaculture has a lower
ecological footprint than other, land-based ani-
mal protein production systems (Ye et al. 2017).
Importantly, the dependence of fish farming
on wild fish is steadily decreasing. FAO (2016)
indicates that the amount of fishmeal and fish
oil used for animal feed has been decreasing,
and is now being used more selectively as a
strategic ingredient in lower concentrations,
particularly in key stages of production, such
as hatchery, broodstock, and finishing diets. In
fact, despite the spectacular growth of aqua-
culture around the world, the share of human
consumption of the capture fish has increased
in recent decades up from 67% in the 1960s
to 87% in 2014. In other words, aquaculture
production has been sky-rocketing despite a
reduction of the use of wild fish as feed.
There has been an impressive tendency in
recent years toward replacing the use of forage
fish from the production of fish meal toward
direct human consumption. This is largely due
to the development of alternative fish feeds
notably from vegetable origin. The proportion

of fish meal and fish oil in the diets of farmed
fish are decreasing (Little et al. 2016). For
example, the contribution of fish meal and
fish oil from capture fish to the diet of farmed
salmon decreased from 65% to 24% and from
19% to 11% between 1990 and 2013 (Ytrestoyl
et al. 2015). The food conversion ratios (the
ratio of food fed to fish produced) over the
past 25 years has fallen from 3 : 1 to 1.3 : 1
(Ye et al. 2017).
These trends, however, must also be com-
pounded by the fact that vegetable alternatives
to fish feed may actually have higher envi-
ronmental impacts than capture fisheries for
forage fish. For this reason, the alternative use
of fish trimmings, and other low value marine
by-products for the production of fish feed
constitutes an extraordinary development and
an excellent example of circular economy. With
these evidences at hand, there seems to be no
major conflict between further development of
aquaculture and the sustainable exploitation of
capture fisheries, including that of the forage
fish species.
A different problem altogether is the conflict
between aquaculture and other uses of the
limited coastal space. Competition for space has
long been identified by the European Com-
mission as one of the main bottlenecks for the
development of aquaculture in Europe. Finding
physical space devoid of conflict with other uses
is perhaps the single most important barrier to
this development in Europe and in many other
places in the world. In many cases, the activ-
ities potentially overlapping with aquaculture
development are unrelated to fisheries, so that
the interaction of fisheries–aquaculture, from
that point of view too, is not the crucial one.
Two kinds of solutions clearly emerge in any
case: integrated coastal management, and the
development of the offshore sector.
• Integrated coastal management is an obliga-
tion for Member States under the new CFP.
As a precondition for benefitting from Euro-
pean Maritime and Fisheries Funds (EMFFs)
for the development of aquaculture, member
States should “do their homework” in terms
of integrated coastal management.
The global context: emerging challenges 299
• As for the offshore dimension, the new direc-
tive on maritime spatial planning should
provide the basis for Member States to iden-
tify potential areas for offshore aquaculture
while reducing conflict with fisheries (and
other uses).
That means that the instruments to ensure
development without major conflict with cap-
ture fisheries are in place. Whether they provide
a solution and prevent conflict between the two
activities will rely heavily on the way Member
States implement such instruments in practice
and on the level of priority that they will accord
to aquaculture in the context of their ocean and
coastal management.
Is aquaculture ecologically
sustainable?
Aquaculture has a negative image among envi-
ronmental organizations. This image has impor-
tant consequences: the licenses in coastal zones
are frequently opposed on grounds of their
presumed effects on the marine and coastal
ecosystems. In some EU Member States, this
has resulted in an extremely low number of
new licenses being granted for aquaculture
in recent years. Of particular relevance is the
conflict between aquaculture and coastal areas
protected by the Natura 2000 network that has
been a frequent cause of conflict and litigation.
The (real or perceived) negative effects
of aquaculture
Aquaculture tends to have a negative image in
terms of environmental impact. NGOs are very
critical of this sector (particularly when it is for
sale, not for self-consumption) and science has
also been extremely critical with the farming
of carnivorous fish, considered as a practice to
“raise tigers” in reference to its allegedly low
trophic efficiency (Naylor and Burke 2005).
This negative environmental image is due to
a number of reasons:
• The preference of aquaculture facilities for
Natura 2000 areas, due to the importance of
clean water for this sector.
• The traditional use of antibiotics in fish
farms. Although impressive progress has
300 Chapter 12
been made, the bad image resulting from this
old practice still remains.
• The “genetic pollution”: the escapees from
fish farms (with a very low genetic diver-
sity) mix with the wild stocks reducing the
genetic diversity of the wild populations. This
also remains as a perceived problem despite
important progress in reducing escapees
from farms in recent years.
• The production of residues that accumulate
in the bottom of the farms, producing anoxic
conditions.
• Beyond Europe, the production of certain
species, such as shrimp, has been made
in many cases at the cost of cutting down
mangroves or other highly valuable coastal
ecosystems.
These are (or were) real concerns, and the
future of aquaculture certainly requires that
these concerns be addressed and resolved.
Can the negative effects be solved or
mitigated?
The aquaculture industry and the adminis-
trations responsible, conscious of the above
problems, have taken numerous steps to
address them, inter alia:
• The conflict between aquaculture and Natura
2000 sites is complex, and can give rise to
different solutions. In Ireland, for example,
the conflict with Natura 2000 has led to
the development of salmon farming off-
shore.7 In other cases, such as Galicia, NW
Spain, coastal planning has addressed these
concerns by establishing a zonation that pre-
serves Natura 2000 areas while identifying
zones for aquaculture development8 .
• Escapees have been reduced considerably,
thanks to new practice and protocols based
on accumulated experience.
• The accumulation of detritus is handled with
different methods. One in particular consists
of moving the cage sites periodically, so the
accumulation of detritus from the pens is not
7 www.bim.ie/media/bim/content/downloads/
Farming,the,Deep,Blue.pdf/
8 www.intecmar.gal/esga/PDAL/Default.aspx/
excessive and the areas affected can regener-
ate. In other cases, the accumulated detritus
can be extracted and used for other purposes
on land; certain pilot projects have been car-
ried out in this regard.
• The question of the destruction of mangroves
in some developing countries is a problem
in principle beyond the CFP. But the more
the EU is self-sufficient in the production of
seafood, the less it will put pressure on third
countries to cut down their mangroves to
export to the European market.
Overall, the environmental problems tradi-
tionally associated with aquaculture are being
addressed at different levels. While it would
be too simplistic to pretend they have disap-
peared, they must be examined in the context
of the advantages that this sector represents as
a fundamental source of food.
The positive effects
Over and beyond the increasing ability to
address its well-known (and much publicized)
shortcomings, aquaculture development can
also have direct positive effects on the environ-
ment:
• Compared with the production of animal
protein on land, protein from aquaculture,
and particularly mollusk production, has
a generally low carbon footprint (see for
example Hilborn et al. 2018) and can there-
fore contribute to mitigate climate change.
• Mollusk aquaculture is well-known to con-
tribute to clean fouled water9 .
• Aquaculture needs clean water. Producers
are, unlike many other economic sectors,
strong advocates of high standards of water
quality. In this regard, they should be natural
allies to environmental NGOs.
For these reasons, among others, aquacul-
ture, and very particularly mollusk production,
must be seen as an opportunity more than as
an environmental problem.
9 https://e360.yale.edu/features/how_mussel_
farming_could_help_to_clean_fouled_waters/

The offshore option
In recent years aquaculture has initiated its
development offshore. The advantages of their
offshore option can be summed up by the
traditional saying: “out of sight out of mind”. In
other words, when aquaculture is no longer vis-
ible in the coastal zones, conflict with other uses
and worries about its effects tend to disappear.
In recent years, technological development
has been impressive. Today, offshore fish pens
can be entirely submerged, and be equipped
with automatic feeding systems (thus reduc-
ing the costs of transport and handling of
the feeding operation) and with cameras to
monitor all aspects of the farm from land. In
addition, offshore farms have also an advan-
tage in terms of the high energy environment
where the detritus they produce is much more
effectively diluted and recycled by the marine
environment.
The real potential of marine aquaculture
is illustrated by the estimation that the cur-
rent total landings of wild-capture fisheries
could be produced by using less than 0.015%
of the global ocean area. That means that if
we consider the offshore option, the limiting
factor for development would not be the limi-
tation of physical space, but other factors such
as governance and economics (Gentry et al.
2017).
Offshore aquaculture can still pose problems
of conflict with other uses of the maritime
space, such as capture fishing, tourism, or sea
transport, but the development of maritime
spatial planning can be the answer to these
potential problems. Overall, offshore aquacul-
ture is an option that, particularly in countries
with a high population density in coastal zones,
holds the promise of further development
largely devoid of the kind of conflict that
has so far held back development in the EU.
Furthermore, there is a potential to develop
certain types of sea farming simultaneously
with other uses of the marine space, such as
windfarms.
The global context: emerging challenges 301
Aquaculture and wind parks
One of the most promising developments is
that of the multi-use of wind farm projects. The
combination of wind farms and aquaculture
facilities may actually represent an opportunity
rather than a threat. Incompatible with other
uses (navigation, capture fishing, mining, etc.)
wind farms can be easily made compatible with
certain sea farming practices. By associating
itself with wind farms, aquaculture can benefit
from the high priority that wind energy enjoys
in most if not all coastal countries.
Some authors have identified the opportunity
of developing a fourth dimension in the plan-
ning of wind farms, by making them adaptable
to farming practices through “eco-engineering.”
These can actually produce a better resistance
of the ecosystem in the long run to anthro-
pogenic pressures and reduce multi-user
conflict in the maritime space (Lacroix and
Pioch 2011).
Specific projects such as MERMAID10 are
developing the potential to combine offshore
production of food and energy by developing
ideas on how different industries can work
together (Christensen et al. 2015). Other stud-
ies, on complementary benefits of alternative
energy and suitability of offshore wind farms
as aquaculture sites11 revealed that less than
3% of the total area leased for an offshore wind
farm is actually occupied by the offshore wind
farm piles and foundations, so there is ample
space between the piles to start aquaculture
operations without disturbing the main activity
of electricity generation.
Many other initiatives and studies exist in this
area and, while the energy industry may not
be enthusiastic about sharing their maritime
space with aquaculture, they can be receptive
to study habitat enhancement as a means of
mitigating the impact of offshore wind farms
on the marine environment. This can be an
opportunity to develop a strategic partnership.
10 www.coastalwiki.org/wiki/Portal:MERMAID/
11 www.seafish.org/media/Publications/10517_
Seafish_aquaculture_windfarms.pdf/
302 Chapter 12
Land-based marine aquaculture
The very enunciation of this possibility seems
a contradiction in terms, except that it is not.
In addition to already existing practice (for
example, turbot farming in land-based tanks),
in recent times different projects have been
testing farming of seawater species in green-
house facilities on land. These tend to be based
on closed systems with re-circulated seawater,
powered by solar energy and with combined
species and full recycling of waste, including
the use of the waste organic matter as fertilizer
for associated greenhouse farming. The advan-
tages of this kind of aquaculture are that they
avoid competition for space in the overcrowded
coastal zones, they can ensure zero waste and
the production can be much better planned
and controlled to fit market needs, regardless of
weather conditions or other random factors.
This kind of practice is extremely promising,
in that it can resolve many of the problems men-
tioned above, in particular related to the compe-
tition for space in coastal areas, a problem that is
practically impossible to resolve on most of the
European coasts.
Fisheries and employment
As we saw in Chapter 2, Article 39 9 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) establishes, inter alia, the objec-
tive of:
The optimum utilisation of the factors of produc-
tion, in particular labour.
This clearly implies that optimum employ-
ment is among the key objectives of the fisheries
policy. The Treaty, however, does not provide
further guidance as to what this “optimum uti-
lization” is about. Traditionally, in any case, the
CFP has been criticized for the continued loss
of employment, at least on board the fishing
levels.
However, judging the performance of the
CFP on the basis of the losses of jobs on board is
far too simplistic: the fishing industry, like any
other industry, is always subject to technical
progress which increases labor productivity.
And in a context of limited natural resources to
exploit, this implies that the gradual reduction
of jobs at sea is a natural trend, not necessarily
a policy failure.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 in Chapter 1 show how
the reduction in the number of jobs at sea is
accompanied by an overall increase in salary
levels and in the overall profitability of the
sector. And, although this is very difficult to
quantify, the safety and working conditions
on board fishing vessels have dramatically
improved under the CFP.
Despite this, in recent years the problem of
employment in EU fisheries is not just the loss
of jobs on board; it is also, or even primarily,
the lack of attractiveness of the jobs. This is
shown by the tendency for crews to be made
up largely of foreign workers: in many Euro-
pean fleets, young people simply do not want
to work on board a fishing vessel anymore.
This turns the whole question from one of job
losses to another one of lack of attractiveness of
such jobs.
For the above reasons, the question of employ-
ment in the CFP must be examined from the
point of view of employment quality, and not
just quantity. The normal evolution in a healthy
fisheries sector is to have fewer jobs at sea, but
better paid, safer, and more attractive jobs.
Employment at sea
The mechanization of the fishing activity
inevitably leads to a reduction of the number
of jobs at sea. The EU is frequently criticized for
having produced a substantial reduction in the
number of jobs in the fishing industry. How-
ever, this is by no means a result of a specific EU
policy. Rather, it is the inevitable result of the
technical progress in fishing vessels that makes
it possible to fish more with fewer vessels and
smaller crews. In the most successful fishing
countries, the tendency in recent years is very
similar.
What happens in other countries?
The reduction of employment in the fishing
sector is strongly resented in many fishing areas
of the EU, and is often blamed on the “failure

of the CFP to preserve employment.” However,
the most successful countries in the world
in terms of management (often presented as
the model the EU should follow) have been
losing jobs at sea in recent decades, as a result
of greater automation and increased fishing
power of modern vessels.
In Iceland, the official Government’s website
indicates that:
The highest number of people working in the fish-
ing industry was in the 1980s about 16 thousand
employees. After that the number of people has
declined constantly to the current level of about
eight thousand.
This reduction, however, corresponds also to
an increase in the average levels of salaries by
fishermen. This shows the trends toward fewer
but better jobs.
In Norway, the number of jobs has been
steadily decreasing for many years. According
to FAO, full-time employment in the catching
sector decreased from 17 087 in 1996 to 13 260
in 2003. And the trend continues.
These two examples, coming from countries
generally acknowledged as successful examples
of preserving a thriving and competitive catch-
ing sector, illustrate the point that the reduction
of jobs at sea is not necessarily a sign of pol-
icy failure, but rather an inevitable tendency in
modernizing fisheries.
From the above data it follows that the ten-
dency toward fewer jobs at sea is neither an
exclusive EU problem, nor an exclusive prob-
lem of the fishing industry. Other industrial
sectors also have a clear reduction in the num-
ber of jobs, all as a consequence of productivity
gains. The question then is not just number of
jobs at sea, but also the quality of these jobs.
The ILO convention
Convention 188 of the International Labour
Organization (ILO) is an international instru-
ment concerning working conditions on board
of vessels with three clear objectives, notably to
improve:
• Safety on board fishing vessels;
The global context: emerging challenges 303
• Food, accommodation, and medical care at
sea; and
• Employment practices, insurance, and
liability.
This convention must be ratified by EU Mem-
ber States, which are competent on social policy.
In the EU, only two member States had
ratified this instrument by the time these pages
are written. However, the EU social partners
in the sea fisheries sector, European Trans-
port Workers’ Federation (ETF), Europêche,
and European Farmers and European Agri-
Cooperatives (COPA-COGECA), agreed on a
common text implementing the provisions of
the ILO Convention in 2013 and requested the
Commission to implement their Agreement by
a Council decision (in accordance with art. 155
and 153 TFEU). In 2016, the Council adopted
a Directive to implement the Social Partners
Agreement. Both the Convention and the EU
Directive entered into force on 16 November
2017 (EU 2017).
In the context of the future implementation
of this convention, which we must consider a
fundamental step in ensuring better working
conditions in a sector that has long been char-
acterized by extremely long working hours,
less than perfect safety and often low hygienic
conditions, the full implementation of this con-
vention will imply better working conditions
and, hopefully, higher attractiveness of the
fishing industry for young Europeans.
However, this will obviously come at a cost.
Such better working conditions cannot be
achieved with very high numbers of workers
on board with low wages. The inevitable con-
sequence of the convention is better, but fewer
jobs at sea. The Commission reports on the per-
formance of European fleets show a correlation
between the quality of jobs (in terms of salary
levels) and the gains in productivity (higher
profits and lower employment) in the sectors
concerned (EU 2016).
This only underscores the need to consider
the question of employment in the fishing
industry not just as a quantitative question, but
notably a qualitative one, where the inevitable
304 Chapter 12
loss in the number of jobs at sea should be con-
sidered against the gains in the quality of these
jobs. In this vein, as we suggested in Chapter
1 under the heading: “Optimum utilization of
the factors of production, in particular labor,”
the improvement of working conditions on
board EU fishing vessels, including high levels
of income, should be considered an element of
policy success according to Article 39 TFEU.
The property of the means
of production: who owns
the fishing rights? Does it
matter?
Why the structure of property
matters
The question of the property of the means of
production and its possible influence in fisheries
management has gone completely unnoticed
for many years in the context of the CFP. Yet,
it is easy to imagine that depending upon the
ownership of the fleets and the ancillary indus-
try, certain policy options may or may not be
acceptable by the industry. An obvious example
can be that of rights-based management: where
the ownership of the vessels and the fishing
rights is distributed among a myriad of boat
owners strongly attached to their local com-
munities the industry is likely to oppose such a
mechanism. However, where the ownership is
concentrated in fewer hands, and particularly
those of investors from foreign countries, such
a mechanism can be much more desirable.
Few studies are available on this question,
largely due to the less than transparent struc-
ture of ownership in the fishing sector. This is
particularly true for the large-scale fleets, where
ownership is often hidden behind instrumen-
tal ownership. On the contrary, the structure
of small-scale sectors is generally clearer and
more transparent; here, the figure of the boat
owner/skipper is still largely predominant. The
European Commission has recently commis-
sioned a first study on this question, which
by and large has long remained opaque at EU
level.
The question of ownership remains contro-
versial, in at least two aspects:
• The rapport de force between small-scale own-
ers and large-scale owners which determines
important policy positions in the industry and
administrations concerning the extent of the
use of market mechanisms in fisheries man-
agement.
• The question of foreign ownership of the
fishing fleets and fishing rights. Although
this should not be a problem under the
four freedoms of the EU (capital, citizens,
investments, and services) it is certain that
investment in the fishing fleets (particularly
the small-scale ones) by foreign interests is
still surprisingly resented in many Mem-
ber States as an unacceptable invasion of
their coastal communities. In addition to
the well-known case of the UK’s Merchant
Shipping Act of 1988, other Member States
also voice strong opposition to any foreign
investment (even from other EU countries!)
in their fishing industry.
This of course does not stop the significant
changes in ownership of fishing vessels and
their associated fishing rights. Despite the lack
of data and the lack of transparency of many of
these changes in ownership, such changes con-
tinue to be significant in Europe and they often
concern non-EU interests as well. In certain
Member States, for example, there is an impor-
tant penetration of Icelandic fishing interests,
and the important penetration of Norwegian
interests in the EU aquaculture industry is also
a well-known phenomenon. For these reasons,
it is clear that the question is important and
has a bearing on the management of European
fisheries.
Investing in the fisheries sector may be con-
sidered by many as a risky business, given
the troublesome image often projected on
the fishing industry and its management.
However, it has been argued that investing in
well-managed fisheries can indeed be very prof-
itable, due to potential large and quick returns
on investment in well-selected cases (Serge
Garcia, personal communication). In any case,
the fact is that the ownership of the fleets and

fishing rights in Europe is, from abundant anec-
dotal information, changing intensely, which
suggests that ownership is not necessarily
stable over time. And this raises the following
question: if the ownership of fishing rights is
changing, can these changes lead to changing
positions in the European fishing industry as
regards its position on management options?
And can these changes influence the posi-
tion of their national administrations on these
issues?
What possible effects
on management?
In the absence of data in Europe, one can only
theorize about the possible effects of different
structures of ownership in the attitude of the
fishing industry to different fisheries manage-
ment options:
• The use of market mechanisms as rights-
based management is much more acceptable
for large interests than for small owners.
• Relative stability is also seen differently by
large owners with fishing interests in more
than a Member State than by small owners
entirely dependent upon national quotas.
• Non-EU owners are unlikely to have the
same views on the rigid allocation keys
under relative stability as the owners from
Member States depending upon national
quotas.
The stakeholders’ position on the above
points (and, by implication, the position of
their national governments) is likely to evolve
as changes in ownership take place. This is of
course a slow process, as these changes in
ownership are gradual and often discreet. In
addition, the changing position of stakeholders
are probably slow to trickle-down into national
positions on management.
In any case, this is a question where the
Commission cannot and should not intervene
(except in cases of breach of internal market,
competition, or state aid rules for example).
But monitoring the situation and investigating
where we stand on this question will be impor-
tant to gauge the industry’s readiness to accept
certain policy changes.
The global context: emerging challenges 305
As a matter of free markets, the Commission
should take a hands-off attitude, except to
ensure that the EU’s four freedoms are strictly
respected. But beyond that, the monitoring
of what is happening should be a matter of
interest, in so far as it could have a bearing on
what the EU “industry” may be ready to accept
at any given moment.
Overall, the question of the property of the
means of production is not as such a policy
strand: the market should work properly under
general EU rules. However, providing trans-
parency as to what is happening can shed some
very interesting light as to the possibilities for
developing certain management instruments in
the future.
Climate change and fisheries
management
Despite the existence of well-organized global
warming deniers (Dunlap and McCright 2011)
this author takes the view that the proofs of the
existence of a phenomenon of global warming
induced by human activity are so overwhelm-
ing that they are impossible to ignore. This
is more than a personal opinion. At least for
two reasons the CFP must assume that global
warming is real and that it will have effects on
European fisheries:
• The precautionary approach, which means
the CFP should take measures to address
well-identified problems even if the proofs
are not definitive.
• The obligation of the CFP to base itself on
the best scientific advice available. Even if
certain voices disagree, this is, beyond any
doubt, that of the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (see below).
The last report of the IPCC, published in 2014,
contains specific sections on the effects of global
warming on the world’s ocean systems (chapter
6) and on the “Food security and food produc-
tion systems” (chapter 7) including fisheries and
aquaculture. It is important to revise their main
conclusions because their implications are sim-
ply impossible to overlook by managers of ocean
and fishery resources worldwide.
306 Chapter 12
Global warming and the oceans
Chapter 6 of the panel summarizes its findings
adding an evaluation of the level of confi-
dence of the conclusions, to allow managers
to evaluate the associated risks. A number
of the conclusions are important for the CFP.
Importantly, the panel qualifies its conclusions
with a level of confidence, to fend-off allega-
tions of scare-mongering by certain parts of
public opinion, who think that governments
and people should not be scared on the basis of
uncertain conclusions.
Some of the conclusions by the panel clearly
demonstrate the effects of global warming
on the world’s oceans with a high degree of
confidence. The consequences, however, are
not necessarily always negative for all oceanic
systems, and the effects may combine and may
result in unforeseen consequences:
• Climate change alters physical, chemical, and
biological properties of the ocean (high confi-
dence).
• The fossil record and current laboratory work
confirm the link between key environmen-
tal drivers and responses of ocean systems to
climate change (high confidence).
• Vulnerability of most organisms to warming
is set by their physiology, which defines their
temperature ranges.
• The warming-induced shifts in abundance,
geographic distribution, migration patterns,
and timing of seasonal activities of species
(very high confidence) have been and will be
paralleled by a reduction in their maximum
body size (medium confidence). This will fur-
ther result in changing interactions between
species (high confidence).
• By the mid-twenty-first century, spatial shifts
of marine species will cause species richness
to increase at mid and high latitudes (high
confidence), resulting in global redistribution
of catch potential for fish and invertebrates,
with implications for food security (medium
confidence).
• Rising CO2 changes carbonate chemistry
producing ocean acidification, with impacts
ranging from organismal physiology and
behavior to population dynamics. However,
the observed responses to acidification are
not yet outside the natural range of variation
so the overall effects remain more uncertain.
• The expansion of anoxic zones (“dead
zones”) will constrain the habitats of oxygen-
breathing organisms and favor anaerobic
microbes (medium confidence).
• In certain ecosystems, water cooling will take
place, resulting in more intense upwelling
and higher productivity (medium confidence)
but also enhanced hypoxia, acidification,
and associated biomass reduction in fish and
invertebrates.
• Environmental drivers acting simultaneously
on ocean organisms often lead to complex
responses (high confidence) which are difficult
to anticipate.
• The combination of global and regional
climate change with local anthropogenic
factors (overfishing, pollution, etc.) results
in enhanced vulnerability of natural and
human systems (high confidence).
• The progressive redistribution of species and
the reduction in marine biodiversity in sen-
sitive regions and habitats puts the sustained
provision of fisheries productivity at risk
(high confidence).
• With continuing climate change, local adap-
tation measures (such as conservation) or a
reduction of human activities such as fishing
may not sufficiently offset global-scale effects
on marine ecosystems (high confidence).
In the light of all the above points, it is clear
that global warming poses a huge challenge to
the oceans and the human activities that depend
from them. It is particularly important from the
above conclusions of the IPCC that:
• There have to be global solutions because
local solutions may not suffice.
• Many effects are difficult to foresee, and this
implies more research and more precaution
in management.
• Many effects will be different in different geo-
graphical areas, so one-size-fits-all fixes will
not work.
Although the effects of sea temperature on
species distribution are much better assessed
than those of ocean acidification, studies show

that future levels of acidification could mediate
temperature-driven shifts in species distribu-
tions, thereby influencing future biogeography
and the functioning of marine ecosystems
(Calosi et al. 2017).
A problem that may be of particular relevance
in the Mediterranean is that of the invasion of
non-native species. This has been considered
as the biggest threat for the world’s ecosys-
tems (Margolis 2007). Although the problem
is caused by the Suez Canal that opens the
basin to Red Sea species, the problem is cer-
tainly aggravated by climate change: without
it, many species of the Red Sea would not be
able to colonize the Mediterranean due to the
temperature difference.
The EU as a fundamental contributor to the
world’s maritime agenda has to consider all
these challenges as a fundamental part of its
future initiatives on maritime governance.
Global warming and food production
The report of the panel also dedicates an
extremely important chapter to the effects of
global warming on the production of food. A
number of its conclusions are of relevance,
directly or indirectly for the management of the
world’s fisheries:
• Climate trends are affecting the abundance
and distribution of harvested aquatic species,
both freshwater and marine and aquacul-
ture production systems in different parts
of the world. These will have negative con-
sequences on nutrition and food security
especially for more vulnerable people in
some tropical developing countries, although
in other regions there can be benefits in
aquatic food production (medium confidence).
• All aspects of food security are potentially
affected by climate change, including food
access, utilization, and price stability (high
confidence).
• Global temperature increases of c. 4∘ C or
more above late twentieth century lev-
els, combined with increased food demand
would pose large risks to food supply globally
and regionally, particularly in low-latitude
areas (high confidence).
The global context: emerging challenges 307
• Changes in temperature and precipitation
will contribute to increased food prices by
2050 (medium confidence).
• Adaptation in fisheries, aquaculture, and
livestock production will potentially be
strengthened by the adoption of multi-level,
adaptive strategies to minimize impacts. For
fisheries this implies preserving ecosystem
resilience, enabling occupational flexibility
and developing early warning systems for
extreme events (medium confidence).
• A range of potential adaptation options,
beyond production, includes food processing,
packaging, transport, storage, and trade.
• The points above are extremely important as
food for thought, particularly with regard to
the following aspects.
• The different regional implications of global
warming, with more negative effects on
tropical areas, pose a difficult distributive
problem, which only adds to the problem
mentioned above of the level of exploitation
of marine resources and its implications on
food security. Global warming will certainly
aggravate these distributive problems.
• The negative effects on land, with lower pro-
duction and higher prices of land-based food,
would only make more crucial our future
dependence on seafood. Again, the point
made above on the need to fully and sus-
tainably exploit the world’s fishery resources
becomes more crucial in the light of global
warming. The world simply cannot count on
producing all the future food needs through
agriculture and livestock alone.
• A recent study on economic effects estimates
that global fisheries revenues could drop
by 35% more than the projected decrease
in catches by the 2050s under high CO2
emission scenarios. Regionally, the projected
increases in fish catch in high latitudes may
not translate into increases in revenues
because of the increasing dominance of low
value fish, and the decrease in catches by
these countries’ vessels operating in more
severely impacted distant waters. Also,
developing countries with high fisheries
308 Chapter 12
dependency are negatively impacted (Lam
et al. 2016).
FAO has also evaluated the effects of climate
change on the world’s fisheries.12 These effects
are summarized as follows:
• Indirect wider socio-economic effects (e.g.
fresh water use conflicts affect all food pro-
duction systems; adaptation and mitigation
strategies in other sectors impact aquatic sys-
tems in general or fisheries and aquaculture
directly).
• Biological and ecological responses to phys-
ical changes (e.g. productivity, species
abundance, ecosystem stability, stock loca-
tions, pathogen levels and impacts).
• Direct physical effects (e.g. sea level change,
flooding, storm impacts).
The growing evidence of the effects of global
warming has led certain countries, and cer-
tain regions of the world, to develop very
forward-looking strategies to adapt. A case in
hand is the US State of Alaska.
The effects of climate change
on fisheries and aquaculture
The effects of climate change on fisheries and
aquaculture have been studied for a while.
Although the evidence is still preliminary and
much more research is needed, the situation
was summarized by FAO through a dedicated
overview (FAO, 2018).
A first question is the possible reduction in
ocean productivity. As surface waters warm up,
sea water stratification will increase and this
may cause lower levels of upwelling and thus
lower primary production of phytoplankton.
However, in high latitudes the residence times
in the euphotic zone will increase and so will
primary production through an extended grow-
ing season. Overall, it is difficult to predict if the
global primary production of phytoplankton
will be reduced or increased, but it certainly
seems that there will be increased geographical
differences in ocean productivity, generally in
favor of waters closer to the poles and against
12 www.fao.org/fishery/climatechange/en/
tropical and sub-tropical waters (Barange and
Perry 2009).
A recent study using satellite imaging found
no significant trend in global annual median
chlorophyll from 1998 to 2015 (Gregg et al.
2018). However, in certain areas like the Indian
Ocean, there is an important change in the
composition of the phytoplankton species,
with mid-sizes species such as diatoms and
chlorophytes declining dramatically and their
decline being compensated partially by much
smaller cyanophytes. This is significant because
cyanophytes may not be retained by filter
feeders such as pelagic fish, so even if total
productivity does not decline substantially, the
ability of primary production to be incorporated
to the food chain may actually change.
Changes in sea temperature are expected to
drive most marine species ranges toward the
poles, expanding the range of warmer-water
species and contracting that of colder-water
species. A possible effect of these displacements
is that they will affect different species differ-
ently, thus potentially accentuating predator-
prey mismatches. In the specific case of the
Mediterranean, the narrowness of the basin
makes it difficult for traditional species to
mover northwards. This results in these species
being gradually squeezed by new species to the
northern rim of the basin, thus increasing bio-
diversity and substantially altering traditional
species composition.
As for ocean acidification, due to the increase
in the CO2 dissolved in sea waters, the effects
are still very difficult to predict, but they will
likely be particularly severe for shell-borne
organisms, tropical coral reefs and cold-water
corals.
Important uncertainties and research gaps
remain, in particular the effects of synergistic
interactions among stressors (fishing, pollution,
etc.), the occurrences and roles of critical
thresholds and the ability of different marine
organisms to adapt to the evolving circum-
stances (Barange and Perry 2009).
However, the effects are not only to be
expected on marine biota. Fisheries are social–

ecological systems, and the changes of pro-
ductivity and distribution will mean that
populations dependent on fishing will be
exposed to a number of direct and indirect
impacts, including displacement and migra-
tion of human populations, impacts on coastal
communities and infrastructures due to sea
level rise and changes in the intensity and
distribution of tropical storms.
The vulnerability of human population to
these changes varies considerably, with poorer
and less empowered countries suffering the
most acute effects, and with higher expo-
sure by those countries already suffering from
over-exploitation and over-capacity (Daw et al.
2009). These effects will have a strong bear-
ing on fisheries management: in developed
countries these changes mean the need for
the management system to adapt to changing
distribution patterns by adapting management
areas. For the international community it
means that there may be increased inequality
in terms of access to the changing resources,
with important consequences in terms of food
security.
As for aquaculture, climate change will imply
significant impacts notably through sea level
and temperature rise, changes in monsoonal
rain patterns and extreme climatic events and
water stress. The increase in water temperatures
may have negative effects on aquaculture in
temperate zones because such increases would
exceed the optimal temperature range for the
organisms currently cultured. However, it may
have certain positive effects such as an increase
in growth rates in tropical and subtropical
waters (De Silva and Soto 2009).
Beyond the effects on the farmed species
themselves, another source of concern is the
possible effects of the warming of waters in
the extension and prevalence of certain dis-
eases. It has been reported, for example, that
warmer waters are increasing the prevalence
of certain bacteria in oysters, not only increas-
ing oyster mortality, but also representing a
threat to human health. Other species may also
contribute to increase toxicity such as certain
species of toxic algae.
The global context: emerging challenges 309
How to address the problem:
the case of Alaska
In the US a number of initiatives are being taken
to address the problem of global warming on
fisheries. Recently the US National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has set up
the OceanAdapt website, with the objective of
tracking fish populations as the climate changes.
The case of Alaska is of particular relevance.
The SeaGrant Alaska project has developed
ideas on how to adapt Alaskan fisheries includ-
ing the necessary adaptations in science, gov-
ernance, action by fishermen and fishing
communities and so on (Johnson 2016).
Although the adaptation to global warming
has to be adapted to local conditions, the South
Eastern Bering Sea Regional Climate Science
Strategy has the value of including all the
essential elements of what should be a general
strategy to adapt to climate change. This plan
has six steps:
1 Identify climate informed reference points
for managing living marine resources. This
implies, for example, revising the esti-
mations of parameters such as Bmsy to
adapt them to the new climatic conditions
emerging.
2 Identify robust strategies for managing
resources under changing climate condi-
tions. This implies identifying management
strategies that will not be so dependent from
climate-related uncertainty.
3 Design adaptive decision processes that
respond to changing climate conditions. This
implies that fisheries management cannot be
based on instruments and principles that are
too heavy or difficult to modify and adapt.
4 Identify the resources and dependent human
communities most affected by climate
change. This is very far-reaching because
it implies that the traditional distributive
policies may not correspond to future needs
under changing climatic conditions.
5 Identify the mechanisms of climate impacts
on resources and dependent communities.
This is essential to identify the type of cor-
rective or compensatory action that may be
needed.
310 Chapter 12
6 Track trends in ecosystems and depend-
ing human communities and provide
early warning of changes. This means that
adaptation to climate change also implies
a permanent monitoring of the situation to
ensure that negative changes can, to the
extent possible, be anticipated.
The above six points are an extremely useful
source of inspiration to adapt any fisheries man-
agement system to climate change. In addition,
however, and beyond this regional strategy, a
worldwide strategy is also necessary, notably to
address the global distributive problems identi-
fied above.
Marine pollution: the example
of micro-plastics and marine
resources
In addition to the effects of climate change,
the future of fisheries is also dependent upon a
number of challenges concerning the preserva-
tion of the marine ecosystems. It is opportune
to bear in mind that, although fishing alters
the marine environment, this activity is by
no means the only threat to the preservation
of the marine ecosystems. Marine pollution
represents a fundamental threat as well, and
the problems to fishing and the environment
posed by oil pollution, heavy metals, pesticides,
and the like have been well known for many
years.
However, among the different problems
related to marine pollution, there is one that
emerges as a problem for the fishing and aqua-
culture activity in the future: the problem
of micro-plastics, for which new evidence is
being put together by scientists about their
abundance, accumulation and, crucially, their
incorporation to the food webs and its effects
on consumers. The emergence of this problem
and its potential effects on the future of marine
ecosystems and their exploitation deserves
much attention as an important challenge.
Micro-plastics have been traditionally defined
as plastic elements of less than 5 mm in size,
but lower threshold levels (0.5–1 mm) are also
used by other scientists. They may pose a risk to
aquatic environments due to their documented
ubiquity in marine ecosystems, long residence
times, and propensity to be ingested by biota
(Anderson et al. 2016).
Micro-plastics have different origins, but can
be classified in two categories: (i) those pro-
duced intentionally through specific manufac-
turing processes (microbeads, resin pellets, etc.)
generally called “primary micro-plastics”; and
(ii) those resulting from breakdown of larger
plastic material, generally called “secondary
micro-plastics” (Andersson 2014). Recent evi-
dence also suggests some may come from
shedding of synthetic fibers from textiles. In
any case, their presence in the ocean is often
associated with poor wastewater management
(Markic and Nicol 2014).
Distribution and incorporation to the
food chain
Plastics have been well-known to accumulate
in oceanic subtropical gyres, such as the Sar-
gasso Sea (Law and Thompson 2014). In the
North Pacific gyre, a study found six times
higher abundance of micro-plastics than zoo-
plankton (Moore et al. 2001). However, given
their floatability and longevity, they are also
distributed throughout the marine environ-
ment through hydrodynamic processes (Law
et al. 2010). This includes also accumulation in
marine sediments.
Micro-plastics are of extremely varied sizes,
including microscopic ones, equivalent to many
components of plankton. The potential for
their incorporation to the marine food chains
through suspension feeders is obvious. As for
their incorporation into sediments, it has been
observed that they can also be ingested by
detritus feeders, thus entering the benthic food
chain (Murray and Cowie 2011).
Micro-plastics may also have other secondary
effects: in particular they can also provide sur-
face for the attachment of other marine pollu-
tants and toxic chemicals, thus enhancing and
aggravating the effects of such chemicals (Mato
et al. 2001).
There is also evidence of plastics providing
hard surfaces for fouling, thus allowing sessile

species to find adequate substrate in these
plastic particles, which may subsequently drift
to other marine areas, increasing the risks
of invasive species, with subsequent risks for
ecosystems as well as for aquaculture practices.
There is abundant evidence of toxic effects
by plastics or at least a number of its chemical
components (Markic and Nicol 2014; Anderson
et al. 2016). These may have direct toxic effects
on many marine biota after being ingested.
Although the research on this topic is recent
and still largely under development, its poten-
tial effect on the marine ecosystem is extremely
worrying, particularly considering the persis-
tence of micro-plastics and the continuous rate
of production and dumping of plastic material
around the world.
The effects of micro-plastics
on consumers
The incorporation of micro-plastics in fish and
mollusks poses the next question: what is their
effect on consumers? This is an area where
research is very recent and still largely incon-
clusive. In addition, as it happens always with
toxicology, the levels of risk for consumers are
not only a function of the toxicity of the prod-
uct in question, but also of the total amount
of product ingested. The potential effects of
the ingestion of micro-plastics in vertebrates
can in principle be considered similar to those
of macro-plastics, which includes a variety of
negative effects on health and reproductive
capacity (Wright et al. 2013).
The most obvious threat for consumers is
that of bivalve mollusks that feed by filtering
plankton and that are known to accumulate
micro-plastics present in their environment.
In a study conducted with blue mussel and
oyster, Van Cauwenberghe and Janssen (2014)
concluded that:
The annual dietary exposure for European shellfish
consumers can amount to 11,000 micro-plastics
per year. The presence of marine micro-plastics
in seafood could pose a threat to food safety,
however, due to the complexity of estimating
micro-plastic toxicity, estimations of the potential
risks for human health posed by micro-plastics in
food stuffs is not (yet) possible.
The global context: emerging challenges 311
This advice represents a serious warning that
the issue of possible toxicity of marine species
that have ingested micro-plastics deserves a lot
of attention and must be addressed head-on,
sooner rather than later.
What to do?
The problem is more difficult to address than
that of macro-plastics. The European Commis-
sion has recently proposed a strategy to address
the latter, notably on the basis of the concept
of circular economy, which includes inter alia,
collection, and recycling (EU 2018a). However,
micro-plastics and microfibers are much more
difficult to handle, since physical collection of
existing plastics cannot take place, or at least not
with current methodologies.
The problem is technically very difficult to
resolve. Methods devised to remove plastics
from the sea are effective only for relatively
large pieces of plastic, but micro-plastics are
much more difficult to remove, at least using
physical methods.
At least two types of solution are necessary:
• For primary micro-plastics, where removal is
probably impossible, the only solution seems
to be the phasing out of their production.
Indeed, certain European Member States, led
by the Netherlands, have taken initiatives
in this regard in the context of the United
Nations Environmental Programme in 2015.
This type of initiative should be fundamen-
tally supported and encouraged not just as
an environmental problem, but also one that
can potentially affect human health and food
security.
• For secondary micro-plastics there can be
other solutions, such as current initiatives to
remove large plastic materials, better waste
water management and the development of
biodegradable plastics.
There is a need to invest on research on meth-
ods to detect high-content micro-plastics in fish
to protect consumers. But in particular there is a
need to address this issue as one of global ocean
governance. In this regard, the recent initiative
by the Commission on the matter provides
for the right platform where solutions must
312 Chapter 12
be found. These will require active policies to
reduce and eventually eliminate the production
of non-biodegradable plastics around the world
and substantial improvements in wastewater
management. But it will also require the much
more difficult problem of how to remove (if at
all possible) the high amount of plastics already
present in the oceans that are gradually being
incorporated into the food chains.
This is also clearly an issue where the interest
of the fishing industry and that of NGOs will
tend to converge. In Chapter 9, we discussed
the relationship between NGOs and the fishing
industry, and how the future should be one
of cooperation rather than confrontation. This
issue is probably one where this cooperation
may take place: the fishing industry here is
clearly on the receiving end of an environ-
mental problem. It is not the industry that
is creating it: it is suffering from it, and the
industry’s interest and the environmental one
should coincide almost seamlessly.
For the above reasons, the fishing industry
should take a clear initiative. Although the
solution to this problem involves a wide range
of governmental and industrial interests, well
beyond the reach of the fishing industry, the
latter should lead by example. Anyone familiar
with wild beaches in coastal areas of high expo-
sure will have seen the accumulation of plastics
brought ashore by the tides and the currents. It
is safe to assume that most of these plastics come
from vessels at sea, which simply throw their
rubbish (including plastics) overboard. Many of
these are probably fishing vessels, oblivious of
the possible negative effects of these plastics on
the very resource they depend on.
Over and beyond some existing experiences
of collaboration to remove plastics from the
marine environment, the fishing industry
could lead by example by adopting an active
policy of not dumping plastics in the sea, and
use it as an example to the rest of society about
the dangers of plastics in the marine environ-
ment, and about how an industry can take a
problem head on and actively contribute to
solve it by setting the example.
Fisheries in the information age
Today’s information society is changing the basis
for decision-making in all policy areas, notably
by the increasing influence of short-term,
superficial messaging in public opinion, and
consequently in political positions and priori-
ties. Fisheries are no exception.
The influence of the information
society on policy making
Ultimately, fisheries management suffers from
all the problems of the information age, just
like traditional politics, increasingly questioned
by the flow of superficial information that
can somehow replace the in-depth analysis of
objective data and evidence. A characteristic of
current populism is the presentation of reality
in very negative terms, to undermine the ways
of addressing societal problems, thus giving rise
to social demand for radical, untested alter-
native approaches. As Pinker (2018) points
out, today’s populist view of the world’s affairs
is based on a false image that the world is
relentlessly deteriorating, when the contrary
is true, as shown by the objective data and
in-depth analysis. The alternative is the attach-
ment, more than ever, to the values of the
enlightenment: science, reason, humanism,
and progress.
A similar phenomenon occurs with fishing,
particularly with the publication of certain
scientific papers that depict very dramatic
doomsday scenarios, such as for example those
predicting a total collapse of the world fisheries
by the middle of the century, as we saw under
“The Pauly/Hilborn controversy” above. The
publicity given to these publications, and the
multiplication by the social media constitute a
powerful tool to carry a message that fisheries
are leading to collapse with the implication that
fisheries management does not work so that
more radical solutions are necessary.
A good case in hand is the article by Kroodsma
et al. (2018) mentioned in Chapter 8, which
provided a very negative view of the effects
of the fishing activity on the world’s oceans,
and received considerable attention in the mass

media and the social networks. A reply to that
article by Amoroso et al. (2018) providing a
much more accurate view on the question
received practically no media attention.
This represents a challenge not only for
the fishing sector, but also for the scientific
community: the recent trend to publicize cer-
tain scientific works may introduce a bias in
public opinion, in that this most publicized
work is certainly not the only available and,
also arguably, not the best-informed and more
balanced either.
The bad image of industrial fishing
In a world where the superficial image on
an activity can have significant effects on the
position that public opinion (and subsequently
governments) can take on that activity, it is
important to refer to the important problem
of image of the fishing activity in general and
industrial fishing in particular. This is leading
to increasing initiatives to declare larger zones
as protected from commercial fishing in certain
countries (Hilborn 2018).
The divide between small-scale coastal fishing
and long-distance industrial fishing is clearly
influenced by the position of a number of NGOs,
which consider large scale industrial fisheries
as unsustainable by definition, regardless of
their relative merits in terms of conducting
sustainable fisheries. Public campaigns such
as Greenpeace’s “monster boats” are a good
example: they consider that large vessels are
bad per se, without reference to whether they
conduct sustainable fisheries.13
The argument is biological, but also social:
industrial fishing is always presented as remov-
ing fish resources that could (and should) be
exploited by small-scale coastal communities.
The fact that some of the industrial fisheries
around the world (for example the Alaskan
pollock fishery in the North Pacific) are among
the most sustainable and that they exploit a
resource in an area that could not possibly
be exploited by small-scale fishers, does not
change the negative image of this segment.
13 www.greenpeace.org/sweden/se/hav/Fish-
FairlyOLD/boat_profile.
The global context: emerging challenges 313
The bad image is largely unfair:
• Many resources are accessible only through
industrial fishing. Fisheries for Greenland
halibut in the Northeast Atlantic Fishery
Organization (NAFO) area, at more than 200
nautical miles from the Canadian coast in
the NW Atlantic, in ice cold, rough seas, can
simply never be conducted by small-scale
fishing.
• Industrial fisheries can be sustainable. In
addition to the example above, a number
of fisheries for tuna by industrial vessels are
also sustainable (Pons et al. 2016).
• The sector tends to be more strategic, take
initiatives and assume part of the cost of man-
agement.
• It is generally easier to control. For example,
in the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Com-
mission (IATTC) tuna fisheries, all vessels
over 400 gross tonnage (GT) have an
observer on board.
• Economically, it can be profitable and effi-
cient, and not necessarily more dependent
on subsides (EU 2018b).
• In some cases, industrial fishing is actually
the preferred option to exploit certain fishery
resources by coastal communities. The eight
small island States of the Pacific constituting
the PNA (Parties to the Nauru Agreement)
have chosen a system of licensing large-scale
foreign fishing vessels as the most efficient
model to exploit profitably their immense
tuna resources of their exclusive economic
zones (EEZ).
Overall, there is no basis to say that industrial
fishing is less sustainable than artisanal fishing
per se. Yet, the campaigning against it contin-
ues to be rife. It has been suggested (Hilborn
2018) that one way to fend off these unfair alle-
gations is for the industry to voluntarily ensure
full transparency in their activity. This coincides
with the experience of this author in connec-
tion notably with the non-discard policy (Penas
Lado 2016); in the face of a challenge, what the
industry will not do voluntarily will probably
end up being imposed on them top–down. The
industry should be proactive to respond to the
allegations about the destructive nature of their
314 Chapter 12
activity; either the industry does it, or it will
ultimately be imposed on them in much worse
terms.
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CHAPTER 13
Adapting the CFP to emerging
challenges
Adapting the CFP beyond reform
In Chapter 1 we referred to the balance between
policy stability and policy change. This balance
is tested repeatedly on the occasion of the
reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP)
that takes place roughly every 10 years. But
policy reform is much more than that:
• Policy reform is also a gradual but determined
change of practice within a given legislative
framework.
• Policy change is also anticipating problems
and planning possible solutions before their
consequences are fully realized.
• Policy reform is also implementing the policy
in an intelligent way in the light of emerging
evidence.
• Policy reform is also learning from mistakes
and correcting measures when necessary.
All this means that the period between two
policy reforms should not be necessarily a
period where no change takes place and the
policy is applied automatically, but rather a
period where the policy should improve grad-
ually under the existing legal basis. As has
been argued in previous chapters, a number
of significant changes of practice could take
place without modifying a comma of the basic
regulation of the CFP.
Emerging challenges and the value
of long-term strategic thinking
One of the reasons why the policy should
always be subject to improvement and adapta-
tion, even in the absence of legislative change,
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
is the emergence of new challenges that were
not so obvious when the last reform took place.
Facing these challenges simply cannot wait for
10 years until the next reform. The policy has
to try to adapt to these challenges within the
existing legal framework. This is desirable and
possible.
Some of these challenges may be gradual, and
their effects may become evident only in the
mid-term. This may give the impression that
they are not “urgent,” and that addressing them
can be a matter for the next policy reform. But
that would be a mistake: good policies should
always anticipate problems, not just address
their consequences when they become obvious.
We can distinguish several ways in which this
gradual change can take place:
• In some cases, the policy can develop through
strategic plans that will identify a problem
and propose a roadmap to addressing it,
using policy elements already existing or
proposing a combination of these existing
policy elements with others to be developed
in the future. The adaptation of the policy to
the “perfect storm” referred to in Chapter 4
is a good example. But perhaps a better
example would be a strategic plan to adapt
the CFP to climate change.
• In other cases, the policy can be adapted by
learning from experience and introducing
new elements (all under the existing basic
regulation). A very good example is the
evolution of long-term management plans,
where the second plan (for the North Sea, EU
317
318 Chapter 13
2018) introduced two important elements
compared with the first one (for the Baltic
Sea, EU 2016): the target and non-target
species approach, and the fast-track adap-
tation of the biomass and fishing mortality
parameters.
• The evolution of the policy can also take
place, still under the same legal basis, by
developing the non-legislative elements to
facilitate or promote the implementation
of policy instruments hitherto not imple-
mented. We have referred to the possible
implementation of real-time closures as an
effective tool to reduce discards, and how the
legal basis exists and only needs other
accompanying factors to be applied in
practice.
The crucial factor for the timely adapta-
tion of the policy (indeed, of any policy) to
these emerging challenges is strategic thinking.
This is one of the most important roles of the
European Commission: the instrument of the
Communications to the European Parliament
and the Council are an ideal format to put
forward strategic thinking and proposing a
long-term plan to implement the necessary
policy changes. In a time where policy com-
plexity is on the rise and where the everyday
responsibilities leave those responsible with
very little time for strategic thinking, it is
important to underline the value of this kind of
instrument.
Adapting the CFP to climate
change
We saw in the previous chapter how global
warming is starting to affect fisheries manage-
ment worldwide. The question immediately
arises: how does global warming affect the
CFP? What changes or adaptations would
be justified on this basis? And in what time
scale?
The changes introduced by climate change
are gradual, and their effects become apparent
very gradually too. This implies a risk: thinking
that these changes are minimal, so no urgent
change of policy is necessary. For this reason,
the adaptation to climate change constitutes
a test case of the ability of the CFP to think
ahead, to try to anticipate the problems rather
than reacting to them. In other words, climate
change provides the CFP with an opportunity
to demonstrate that it can be a proactive, not
just a reactive policy. But for that to be the case,
it is important that the evidence of the effects,
present and future, be clearly spelled out.
In any case there is an obvious effect of
climate change on the traditional management
system of the Atlantic and Baltic Seas, based
on single-stock management in rigid manage-
ment areas with rigid allocation keys: climate
change is a very dynamic process for which
the fixed, rigid management system applied
since 1983 is fundamentally ill-adapted. The
management system applicable in the CFP for
more than 30 years and its fixed nature will
have to be adapted to face the challenge of an
increasingly dynamic marine ecosystem. This
also means that in the Mediterranean, where
fisheries management is 30 years behind, there
is an opportunity to establish a management
system that, from the beginning, will develop
a more flexible and adaptive fisheries man-
agement system that will address the dynamic
nature of the processes taking place in that
basin.
The evidence of climate change in EU
fisheries
This fundamental question has been subject
to a specific analysis by ICES, on request from
the Commission (ICES 2016). This report, of
exceptional importance for the future of the
CFP, refers to a number of different causes
for the shift in stock distribution. Temperature
changes (and thus the effects of climate change)
seem to be the main driver for the observed
changes in distribution. And, ultimately, what
is important is to evaluate to what extent these
shifts, whatever their cause, may have on the
management of the stocks.
ICES found that, among the 19 species
studied, most exhibit some changes in their dis-
tribution, with the exception of Greenland
halibut, Norway pout and spurdog, for which no
 Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges
evidence was found. Among them, eight were
identified as being subject to very significant
displacements of their traditional areas of
distribution; these are called by ICES “big
movers.”
The following species were identified as “big
movers” by ICES:
• Anchovy (Northward shift in the North Sea)
• Anglerfish (regional changes in the North
Sea)
• Cod (northward shift)
• Hake (expansion in the North Sea)
• Herring (changes among different manage-
ment areas)
• Mackerel (major changes across northeast
Atlantic)
• Megrims (regional changes in the North Sea,
Bay of Biscay, and Celtic Sea)
• Plaice (changes among different manage-
ment areas).
Figure 13.1 shows the changes in distribu-
tion of anchovy in recent years. The presence/
absence method shows clear increasing patterns
in anchovy occurrence probability in northern
divisions.
Anchovy 2011–2015
Figure 13.1 Changes of distribution of anchovy in northern European waters, between 2011 and 2015.
Source: ICES (2016).
319
The consequences of these shifts are very
clearly spelled out by ICES:
The main management implication is the mismatch
between regional abundances and TAC allocation,
with hake and mackerel as clear examples. This
mismatch, in combination with the landing obli-
gation, could result in choke species issues and
challenges the relative stability currently used to
distribute quotas.
Climate change is likely to continue aggra-
vating these shifts. According to ICES, the
main risk areas are the North Sea (warming
and latitudinal shift), Celtic Sea and below
(warming and lower primary production),
west of Scotland (northward shift), Norwegian
Sea and Skagerrak and Kattegat (increase in
abundance).
It must also be borne in mind that not all shifts
in abundance and structure are due to climate,
some of these changes are due to fishing (Bell
et al. 2015). It is important to distinguish the
effects of climate change from the effects of fish-
ing: adaptation to climate change should not be
an alibi for poor fishery management.
320 Chapter 13
A case study: Atlantic cod
The above conclusions are applicable glob-
ally, but the problem for Europe and the CFP
is better illustrated by a case study: Atlantic
cod, an iconic species that has been at the
origin of many of the innovations and changes
introduced in the CFP.
The potential effects of climate change on
the distribution and productivity of cod were
already studied some time ago by Drinkwater
(2005). Already at that time it was consid-
ered that stocks in the Celtic and Irish Seas
were expected to disappear under predicted
temperature changes by the year 2100, while
those in the southern North Sea and Georges
Bank would decline. Cod would likely spread
northwards along the coasts of Greenland and
Labrador, occupy larger areas of the Barents
Sea, and may even extend onto some of the
continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean. In
addition, spawning sites would be established
further north than was the case at the time.
However, this does not mean that overall
productivity would be lower since individual
growth rates for many of the cod stocks would
increase, leading to an overall increase in the
total production of Atlantic cod in the North
Atlantic.
More recent studies in the Kattegat confirm
that future and ongoing rises in sea surface
temperature may increasingly deprive cod in
this region from shallow feeding areas during
summer, which may be detrimental for local
populations of the species (Freitas et al. 2015).
In contrast, in waters of the Barents Sea
the situation is the reverse. According to a
recent study (Kjesbu et al. 2014) the Barents
Sea cod stock has recently increased markedly
and the spawning stock biomass (SSB) is now
at an unprecedented high. The study shows
that management alone was not solely respon-
sible; prevailing climate, operating through
several mechanistic links, positively reinforced
management actions.
Beyond the effects of temperature, other
studies are evaluating the effects of ocean acid-
ification. It has recently been estimated that
increasing ocean acidification could double the
mortality of newly hatched cod larvae, thus
resulting in a decrease in recruitment between
one quarter and one twelfth of last decade’s
recruitment (Stiasny et al. 2016).
These predictions, uncertain though they
are, clearly point at a fundamental change
in the way the CFP will have to handle the
management of fisheries in European waters
and the relationship with the Union’s northern
neighbors.
The consequences of climate change
in the CFP
The effects of climate change will, beyond
reasonable doubt, have consequences for the
CFP. These will concern both the domestic
management in EU waters and the bilateral and
multilateral management of shared fisheries
and fisheries in international and third country
waters. This has already been recognized in the
scientific literature (Arnason 2012).
The total allowable catch (TAC) and quota
system and the relative stability are established
on the basis of the ICES management areas.
However, as we saw above, the areas of distri-
bution of many stocks have been changing over
the years, and this change is being accelerated
by climate change. This means that the tradi-
tional management associating stocks and their
relative stability to specific ICES areas is gradu-
ally becoming obsolete. The already mentioned
2016 ICES report on this question illustrates
the scale and importance of the geographical
displacement of the area of distribution of a
number of European stocks.
The problem is similar in the case of resources
shared between the Union and third countries
of the NE Atlantic, such as Norway, Iceland, and
the Faroe Islands. The case of Atlantic mack-
erel can be considered, arguably, the first case in
which the displacement of the area of distribu-
tion of a stock (arguably due to climate change)
altered the traditional agreement on allocation
among the parties concerned, leading to a con-
flict over the distributive arrangements for that
stock. This kind of phenomenon is likely to hap-
pen with other stocks as their area of distribu-
tion gradually changes.

Beyond issues of management and alloca-
tion, changes in stock distribution may also
have effects on economic performance, due to
changes in the abundance of the traditional
species and the difficulty to replace them with
new, emerging ones in traditional markets.
In the international context, an obvious
consequence is that the traditional allocations
agreed in the context of Regional Fisheries
Organizations, already subject to questioning
and tension, will likely aggravate in the future,
as we saw in Chapter 10.
Global warming will also question many
other aspects of the CFP. The higher frequency
of storms and the possible deterioration of
coastal infrastructure may displace the main
focus of the structural policy toward mitiga-
tion. The changes in economic expectations
as a result of the geographical displacement
of traditional stocks may aggravate conflict
among Member States, regions, fishing com-
munities or fleet segments. The growing public
interest in climate change may also introduce
new demands by consumers, which can be
an opportunity for those taking measures to
mitigate negative effects on global warming.
The markets may also have to start looking at
species currently unknown or having a low
value.
All these questions are of such gradual nature
that they may not seem to justify urgent action.
That is their main risk: that they will be consid-
ered as a low priority, and that could mean that
the CFP may one day have to address their neg-
ative effects rather than anticipate the possible
adaptations to mitigate them.
The US example
There are good examples of how this is being
addressed in other places. A fundamental step
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) has been to adopt a
strategy to adapt the science basis for the pol-
icy to climate change.1 And NOAA’s National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has adopted
1 www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/ecosystems/climate/
national-climate-strategy/
Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 321
a 7-point plan to adapt the US management
system to global warming, based on a new
science strategy to address all the presumed
effects of climate change. The points are:
• Determine climate-informed reference
points.
• Identify robust strategies for managing
marine resources under changing climate
conditions.
• Design decision processes that are robust to
climate change scenarios.
• Predict future states of resources and ecosys-
tems and dependent human communities.
• Determine the mechanisms of climate change
related effects on ecosystems.
• Track trends in resources, ecosystems, and
human communities to provide early warn-
ing to change.
• Build and maintain the science structure to
fulfill the mandate of the NMFS under chang-
ing conditions.
These steps are of a general nature, not
country-specific and can constitute a reference
of what the EU could look into when con-
sidering a similar plan. But specially, they are
anticipative, not reactive, something the CFP
must improve on for the future, thus reflecting
the fact that the gradual nature of the climate
change effects can induce the error of consid-
ering that “we have plenty of time” to react.
In practice, the above strategy responds to the
opposite philosophy: that it is not too early
to adapt, and that if no change is introduced,
then the effects of climate change will no doubt
catch up when it is too late.
A strategic plan to adapt the CFP
to climate change
The US example above is an important source
of inspiration for what is a fundamental debate
for the future of the CFP. The consequences
of climate change are such that the CFP needs
to develop a strategic plan to adapt to this
challenge. This plan cannot wait until the next
policy reform; it has to be addressed now,
among other reasons because much, if not most
of what needs to be done, is possible under the
322 Chapter 13
current legal framework. Possible elements for
such a strategy are presented below.
New scientific advice
There are several questions that will have to be
integrated in the scientific advice as the CFP will
try to grapple with the effects of climate change.
Some of the most obvious ones are:
• Re-evaluating parameters such as Bpa , Bmsy ,
and even fishing mortality rates as a function
of changing circumstances.
• Observing changes in the natural distribution
of the stocks, (ICES 2016) further to the 19
stocks already studied by ICES.
• Observing the changes in the composition of
species, including the presence of invasive
species, and assessing the ecological effects,
including the new species relationships.
• Assessing possible changes in the overall pro-
ductivity of fish stocks in different areas, and
the contribution of different species to that
productivity.
• Evaluating how the changes in stock abun-
dance and location can affect the economies
of coastal communities depending upon
them.
This should be subject to a specific debate
where all possible questions of interest should
be discussed between science, managers, and
stakeholders.
Revising management areas
This is the most important and clear chal-
lenge for adapting the CFP to the effects of
climate change. The traditional management
areas for the EU-managed stocks (the areas
for which catch limitations and allocation keys
are established), were established in many
cases several decades back, and are becoming
obsolete, as an increasing part of the biomass of
the stocks concerned may occur outside these
management areas. This has the potential effect
of undermining management and creating
conflict.
There are precedents in the way changes
in management areas have influenced quota
allocations. On the occasion of the division
of the Baltic cod stock into two stocks (east
and west) the new scenario required a new
allocation key, which was negotiated ex novo
(Penas Lado 2016). It is difficult to see how
the displacement of the fish could simply be
followed by a corresponding displacement of
the traditional fleets catching it, without any
change in allocation. If we take the above
example of anchovy, the extension of the stock
to the North Sea would have very clear implica-
tions for the fleets having the traditional fishing
rights; coastal purse-seiners from Northern
Spain could not possibly go to Kattegat to fish
that anchovy, while Danish industrial vessels
would probably not be able to avoid catching
it in that area. In these circumstances, keeping
the traditional allocation keys would be an
extremely inefficient way to allocate resources
to the fleets that could catch them profitably.
Obviously, the same would apply to all other
stocks subject to significant displacements.
This would be difficult to do because it may
have some inevitable consequences on relative
stability. But failing to do so will only lead to an
increasing number of conflicts. As we will see
in Chapter 14, it is better to take these issues
head-on, and try to resolve them through a
transparent, deliberative process rather than
having to resolve the emerging crisis on an ad
hoc basis.
The effects on the EU shares
of international fisheries
The allocation of shared stocks is and will
always be controversial and subject to pressure
for change. These pressures exist in certain
international organizations even regardless of
climate change: as coastal States develop an
interest to fish for certain stocks, the existing
status quo becomes more difficult to accept
by them. The best example is ICCAT, where
the allocation of bluefin tuna is permanently
subject to pressures to allow new entrants.
In the neighboring EU policy, it is already
obvious through the example of Atlantic mack-
erel that the displacement of the biomass north-
ward will create new expectations for higher
quotas by countries of the North Atlantic. And,
given the important role that some of the

shared stocks have in the overall balance of
quota exchanges between the EU and Norway,
climate change will likely exacerbate these
effects.
These cases call for a forward-looking EU
strategy to combine the defense of the legiti-
mate traditional fishing rights while addressing
the changing picture in which new players
are claiming a higher share of the common
resources, as we referred to in Chapter 10.
Revised structural policy to facilitate
adaptation
The European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
(EMFF) adopted in 2014 represented proba-
bly the biggest departure from the traditional
status quo of the structural policy since 1970,
perhaps with the exception of the suppression
of aid to the construction of new fishing vessels
adopted in the 2002 reform. Even so, regu-
lation 508/2014 still contains many elements
and eligible actions that make it look relatively
similar to previous instruments.
Article 41 of Regulation 508/2014 on Energy
efficiency and mitigation of climate change lays
down a number of measures aiming at reducing
the effects of fishing on global warming, but
these are practically limited to reducing the
carbon footprint through improvements in
engines, and there is no obligation for Mem-
ber States to prioritize the adoption of such
measures.
As the effects of climate change unfold, the
structural policy should become much more
ambitious in this regard, and should consider a
whole new set of possible measures, including
for example:
• Funding of projects to develop new markets
for the new species compositions that may
appear.
• Funding of projects to compensate local
losses due to the displacement of traditional
species.
• Infrastructure actions to cater for the possible
displacement of adequate areas for different
types of aquaculture.
These are just examples of what should be,
sooner rather than later, a new emphasis on
Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 323
focusing the future structural policy to more
clearly defined objectives.
A mitigation strategy
We have seen in the previous chapter how
different systems of food production have very
different levels of impact on climate change.
Beyond that, a recent study has also shown that
these impacts can vary up to 50-fold for pro-
ducers of the same food (Poore and Nemecek
2018). This implies that there is a considerable
room for mitigation at the level of producers.
An associated question, also developed by
the above authors, is the active participation
of consumers in a mitigation strategy. Through
increased information on the carbon footprint
of different types of seafood (and other source
proteins) consumers may have a fundamental
role to play in choosing food items with a
(certifiable) lower impact on climate change.
. . . And a new policy approach
The above adaptations are also an opportunity
to advance in the new paradigm of policy
making under the CFP, as explained in Chapter
9. Indeed, the effects of climate change are
likely to be gradual but continuous. Its very
nature means that the changes to the pol-
icy are not necessarily radical changes every
10 years, but rather a slow and gradual process
of policy adaptation and adjustment in small
steps, and this, in turn, calls for a much more
flexible policy, where technical rules could be
easily adapted through collaborative manage-
ment, and hard-law regulations are kept to the
minimum necessary.
More food from the sea
As we saw in the previous chapter, protein from
seafood will have to play an essential role in
the future supply of food for humankind. And
the effects of global warming on agriculture
and husbandry on land will only exacerbate
this role. So far, the CFP (just as the fishery
policy of most developed countries around the
world) has been judged fundamentally on its
324 Chapter 13
performance to reduce overfishing and achieve
sustainable fisheries. In the future, however,
the policy should also be fundamentally judged
on its ability to maximize the production of
sustainable seafood. An objective that, after all,
is that of Article 39 TFEU.
Europe is well-known to have a significant
deficit of fish: the EU produces only 46% of
the fish it consumes (see Chapter 1). This rep-
resents a policy failure since Article 39 TFEU
is clearly about food security. And while much
of the imported fish comes from countries
with well-managed fisheries (Norway, Iceland,
etc.) much also comes from poorly-managed
fisheries. This implies that the EU’s failure to
take full advantage of its fishery resource also
contributes to over-exploitation in certain third
countries (see “leakage” in Chapter 10). For this
reason, improving the production of seafood in
the EU is also an imperative of the EU’s legal
basis.
Seafood vs. land-based food
This debate is also important from another point
of view: the comparison between the effects of
seafood as compared to land-based food. This is
important because it shows not only the pos-
sibilities of developing seafood production, but
also the need and opportunity to do so.
Emerging evidence of the carbon footprint
and other environmental effects of seafood
clearly show how it compares favorably to
many land-based animal protein production
systems. In a recent meta-analysis of ca. 150
animal protein production systems around the
world (comparing them for energy use, green-
house gas emissions, release of nutrients and
acidifying compounds) many seafood sources
have a lower carbon footprint and a lower
environmental impact than livestock produc-
tion on land (Hilborn et al. 2018). This puts the
production of seafood in a very positive light
in terms of the challenge of feeding the planet
while fighting climate change and reducing
impact on the ecosystems.
In effect, the study shows that the production
systems of animal protein with the lowest envi-
ronmental impact are mollusk aquaculture and
capture fisheries for small pelagic fish, whereas
the highest impact methods are beef production
and catfish farming in freshwater.
This is extremely important, because it gives a
signal that the development of seafood produc-
tion is preferable to that of land-based animal
protein, and that the production of the extra
food that humankind requires should be pro-
duced from the oceans as much as possible.
Is the EU producing enough food
from the oceans?
As we saw in Chapter 2, Article 39 TFEU is
clearly based on the notion of food security
for Europe. In this context, the above question
is not rhetoric: it amounts to asking whether
the fundamental objective of the fisheries
(and agriculture) policy is being achieved. The
answer for fisheries is straightforward: no.
Figure 13.2 shows the evolution of the pro-
duction of capture fisheries and aquaculture in
the EU.
The figure shows that the EU is not being
able to increase substantially its production of
seafood. While capture fisheries seems to look
more promising (the lowest level of production
took place in 2012 and has increased slightly
ever since), aquaculture production remains
stagnant. As a result, the self-sufficiency rate of
the EU in seafood is in the vicinity of 40%, and
not growing, as shown in Figure 13.3.
Some background
The need to produce more food from the sea has
been clearly identified by the European Com-
mission as a very important strategic objective,
and a fundamental element of its global ocean’s
governance strategy. A report by the High-Level
Scientific group appointed by the EC (EU 2017)
considered in particular 15 options to work on,
as follows:
1 Improve management of the established
fisheries on wild species.
2 Tackle the problem of discards and other
wastes.
3 Redirect part of the landings from reduction
to direct human consumption.
4 Harvest wild species at lower trophic levels.
5 Support mariculture.
 Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 325

9000

8000

7000

6000
Thousand

5000
tons

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Aquaculture Catches
Figure 13.2 Evolution of the total production of capture fisheries and aquaculture in the EU since 2000. In
thousands of metric tonnes. Source: European Commission Services.

14,00 100,0%

90,0%
12,00
80,0%
Apparent consumption

10,00

Self-sufficiency rate
70,0%

60,0%
8,00
50,0%
6,00
40,0%

4,00 30,0%

20,0%
2,00
10,0%

0,00 0,0%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Apparent consumption (million tonnes) Self-sufficiency rate
Figure 13.3 Total apparent consumption of seafood by the EU and self-sufficiency rate (percentage of total
consumption provided by EU producers). Source: European Commission Services.

6 Integrate multi-trophic aquaculture. 12 Involve citizens and relevant stakeholders.

7 Support rights-based management.
8 Support start-ups.
9 Ensure the long-term viability of start-ups.
10 Provide trustworthy consumer information.
11 Cultivate new approaches to social respon-
sibility.
13 Prioritize resulting new jobs.
14 Introduce financial strategies.
15 Design new coastal and engineering devel-
opments.
The above ideas are an interesting approach
to the question, but from a fisheries manage-
ment point of view they are of very variable
326 Chapter 13
interest, and in some cases do not go far enough
in analyzing potential issues of interest.
Some of the above ideas have been discussed
in previous chapters (rights-based manage-
ment, mariculture development, redirecting
low value fish for direct human consumption,
etc.) and we will not revisit them here. But
there are certain questions that require a more
in-depth analysis.
Are there untapped fish resources?
The increasing pressure on the world’s sources
of animal protein makes it opportune to ask
this question. In principle, there can be three
sources of additional capture fisheries. The
first and most obvious one is that of exist-
ing, well-known resources that are not fully
exploited. As referred to above, many scientists
have identified a number of resources where
additional yields from the ocean can be derived
from fishing harder. But beyond these, there are
also other resources where the extra potential is
identified but not fully realized. Two examples
are worth mentioning: krill and mesopelagic
species.
Krill
Krill (Euphausia superba) is not a new or
untapped resource, but it is still one that, by
virtue of its sheer productivity and abundance,
is still often referred to as amenable to expan-
sion. Some countries are already exploiting the
krill (Norway) or having plans for a substantial
development of this fishery, like China.
CCAMLR has established a number of man-
agement measures for this species. Total catches
are, however, not increasing, and have evolved
from levels around 40 000 tons between the
late 1970s and the early 1990s to levels in the
order of 20 000 tons in recent years, so there
seems to be a substantial potential for addi-
tional catches.2 However, even CCAMLR catch
limits are seriously questioned by NGOs. The
reasons are obvious: krill constitutes the main
food source for a number of whales and other
2 www.ccamlr.org/en/fisheries/krill/
species. This example encapsulates the debates
between sustainable exploitation of marine
resources and environmental conservation. In
any case, the quotas established by CCAMLR,
based on the best scientific advice available, do
take into account the role of krill as food for
whales. Theoretically, nothing should oppose
(if the science is right) that the full potential of
krill be exploited as is the case with so many
forage fish around the world.
Mesopelagic fish
These stocks are known to occur in relative deep
waters of the continental slope and the open
sea, and tend to be associated to the ocean’s
thermoclines. They live at greater depths in
daylight (several hundred meters) but migrate
to shallower waters (up to 50 m) at night to feed
and be fed upon. Neither pelagic nor demersal,
these stocks have long been relatively ignored
by the fishing industry, although scientists have
referred to their potential for some time.
The main difficulty to exploit these species is
their still unclear role in the pelagic ecosystem.
In particular, their role as food for large pelagic
fish that are either exploited (tuna, swordfish)
or need protection (threatened sharks).
FAO carried out a study on the potential of
mesopelagic species for commercial harvest-
ing,3 and considered that several factors should
be taken into account: behavior in relation to
fishing techniques (schooling behavior), diel
migrations, attraction to light, potential yield
and variability, and marketing and processing
possibilities.
Overall, it seems prudent not to count on
these resources as a real possibility until their
ecological role is clarified further. When the
idea of reserving a part of the biomass of forage
fish for their predators is making headway in a
number of management systems, the possible
exploitation of mesopelagic fish should first be
assessed in the light of its possible contribution
to sustain the biomass of tunas and other large
pelagic fish.
3 https://archive.org/details/
reviewoftheworld034721mbp/page/n1/

Exploiting the lower trophic levels
This idea is based on the evidence that the abun-
dance of marine organisms decreases as trophic
level increases. Traditional wisdom assumes
that as we escalate on the trophic pyramid of
the sea, each trophic level has roughly 10% of
the overall abundance of the trophic level just
below: zooplankton production is roughly 10%
of that of phytoplankton and so on.
The implication is obvious: by shifting con-
sumption patterns to low trophic level organ-
isms the total production of seafood would
be much higher. The fact that a significant part
of the production of low-level fish (short-lived,
plankton-feeding fish) is used to produce food
for farmed fish of high trophic level encourages
this idea: by shifting from salmon to sandeel we
could dramatically increase the production of
food for humans. This is in fact the most promi-
nent idea of the above study commissioned by
the EU.
Things are not that simple. For that overall
strategy to work, a number of considerations
should be made:
• The human consumption market would
need to accept the low-value species, some-
thing that may be culturally difficult to do in
mature fish markets.
• In terms of prices for fishers, the advantages
are not obvious: while most low-level fish
fetch very low prices, the highest prices are
always associated to high-trophic level fish.
• The ecological effects of a higher rate of
exploitation of low-trophic level organisms
and a lower rate of high-level would need to
be evaluated. This is far from being obvious,
particularly in the light of the notion of
balanced harvest (see Chapter 8).
The idea in any case is attractive and would
need to be studied more in depth to address the
above (and possibly other) shortcomings.
Improving quota consumption
As we saw in Chapter 2, the consumption of
quotas in EU fisheries is lower than 80%. An
obvious way to increase food production would
be to increase the efficiency of quota consump-
tion. This would imply a certain number of
Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 327
initiatives, some of which have already been
referred to in different chapters:
• Advancing toward more multispecies man-
agement (see below), thus eliminating choke
species affects.
• Promoting the consumption of low value
species, through European-wide campaigns.
• Revising relative stability to have a better
match between the basket of fishing rights by
Member States and fleets and the economic
interest of their markets (see Chapter 14).
These ideas can be developed gradually, some
of them without necessarily changing the legal
basis of the policy.
Changing the policy paradigm: a
policy based on exploiting
the surplus of the marine ecosystem,
not individual stocks
We have abundantly referred to the inefficien-
cies of a fishery management system based on
objectives and strategies designed to manage
individual stocks. To address this question the
policy could evolve by introducing the notion
of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the
ecosystems or, at least, of well-defined groups
of stocks. The changes suggested above would
require a change of paradigm in the definition
of policy objectives. To achieve the change of
policy necessary to support the above ideas,
the basic regulation of the CFP would need to
reflect the maximization of the production of
sustainable seafood as a central policy objective.
Such strategy would also have another
advantage: it would provide for a much higher
stability in the supply of fish. Figure 4.3 in
Chapter 4 shows the evolution of the abun-
dance indicator SSB/MSY Btrigger in a number
of groups of fish in the greater North Sea. It can
be observed that while the specific groups of
species are very highly variable in abundance
over time, the total portfolio of species remains
remarkably stable.
This would of course also have significant
downsides, such as those of the market prices
of different species and would also require a
more flexible way of allocating fishing quotas:
the same amount of fish would have different
328 Chapter 13
market value depending upon the catch com-
position of the total production of fish at any
given moment. This implies that an important
part of this part of the strategy would be to use
the market mechanisms of the CFP to promote
the consumption (directly or through process-
ing) of species with hitherto a low market value
and/or largely unknown for most consumers.
In any case the focus on total sustainable
output from the oceans may actually contribute
to a more efficient and more stable supply of
fish for European consumers. This is an idea
with far-reaching consequences for the policy,
some of them probably requiring some changes
in the basic regulation of the CFP. But if the
objective of food security the Treaty is to be
taken as a real priority, a discussion on possible
options to bring about this change may have to
start sooner rather than later.
Developing new aquaculture practice
As we saw in Chapter 12, aquaculture can still
have a significant potential for growth in the
EU, but this will require a new approach, based
on diversification and on exploiting the physical
spaces where competition with other activities
would be lower than in coastal zones. We
have already identified offshore and land-based
greenhouse aquaculture as two promising pos-
sibilities. Their development would require a
dedicated approach to the EU policy to promote
their investments, with new policy compo-
nents such as for example maritime spatial
planning.
The integration of fisheries
policy into a wider policy
context
The wider notion of fisheries
management
The CFP, and in general all fisheries manage-
ment policies, are a sectorial policy that “only”
deals with fisheries. However, the meaning of
“fisheries management” is one that evolves over
time. While in 1983 the initial CFP only dealt
with a narrow range of questions, all restricted
to the conduct of the fishing activity, the range
of associated issues being considered as part of
the overall heading of “fisheries management”
has not ceased to expand.
At present, the management of marine fish-
eries is at a crossroads where, beyond the
management of commercial fisheries, there
are important associated questions related to
the restoration of marine habitats, biodiversity
conservation, greater returns to fishing com-
munities, food security or poverty alleviation
(Grafton et al. 2008). In recent years, the CFP
has gradually lost its traditional policy isolation,
and today it is increasingly influenced by other
policies, notably environmental policy (Princen
2010). This has inter alia, one important con-
sequence: fisheries management is no longer
a matter of interest for fisheries constituencies
alone, but for society at large. Yet, this gradual
but substantial change is still largely ignored by
many stakeholders, and often not fully taken
into account in the management system.
The recent development of the integrated
maritime policy, together with the new
Commission’s integrated approach to ocean
management, as represented by the Marine
Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) change
the place of the CFP in the context of mar-
itime affairs (van Hoof and van Tatenhove
2009). Once isolated and protected as a
stand-alone policy, the CFP will have to face
in the future a growing influence from these
two policies, which imply different stakehold-
ers (some of them far wealthier and more
influential than the fishing industry) and a
different institutional competence. The MSFD
is mixed competence, unlike the CFP, and this
means that the isolated EU decision-making
will be exposed to a completely different
decision-making process, where the most
influential stakeholders will not be the fishing
industry, and where decisions will be made,
affecting the fishing activity, in a way that the
CFP itself would probably never do.
This may have different consequences, some
of them difficult to predict. However, it would
seem clear that the fishing activity will have

to fight for its place and legitimate inter-
ests in an increasingly complex world. This
will require, inter alia, an institutional setting
and governance systems that put fisheries
in a fair place when it comes to considering
trade-offs among different maritime activi-
ties, but it will also require a fishing industry
that will be well organized and integrated to
defend its legitimate interests, and this means
that the traditional paternalism must gradually
disappear.
The relationship between fisheries
and other economic sectors
Fishing is commonly considered as a relatively
small economic sector within the maritime
economy, somewhat dwarfed by the sheer
economic force of the energy or transport sec-
tors. However, in terms of its socio-economic
importance, marine fisheries is probably second
to none of its competitors in the world’s oceans.
Capture fisheries employ tens of millions of
people (FAO 2014). The total value of capture
fisheries is estimated at US$ 80 billion and,
including processing and retailing, the total
value is estimated at US$ 200 billion. While the
total economic value of fishing in the oceans
is relatively small compared to oil and gas and
maritime transport, the importance for employ-
ment is far greater, and its role in food security
is of utmost importance (Hilborn and Costello
2018).
Fisheries have never been an isolated activ-
ity, but in recent times the interaction between
fisheries and other uses of the maritime space
are increasing. There are some clear examples
such as fisheries and energy, where the devel-
opment of marine wind farms is reducing the
sea surface available for fishing; or environmen-
tal protection, where different initiatives both
at EU and international level are calling for the
protection of larger and larger marine areas to
preserve marine biodiversity, thus reducing the
surface available for commercial fishing.
In the future, these interactions will require
ever more complex policy decisions. Today,
some of these decisions are made on the basis
of political influence or sheer economic power,
Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 329
something where the fisheries sector cannot
compete with other societal interests. For this
reason, it is important that an integrated ocean
governance system be developed which gives
fisheries (and aquaculture) a place at the nego-
tiating table on an equal footing with other
maritime sectors.
A good example of how this can be achieved
is the implementation of maritime spatial plan-
ning. The EU Directive adopted in 2014 (EU
2014) brings an opportunity to discuss all the
uses of the marine environment in a structured,
objective, and fair way, thus preventing that the
occupation of the maritime space will respond
to the “first come first served” principle, which
in the long run would certainly not favor the
fishing industry. The opportunities offered by
this directive should be seized by the fishing
industry as the best way to defend its legitimate
interests in a context of growing, and increas-
ingly conflicting, occupation and use of the
maritime space.
The challenge of science vs. social
influence
The fishing industry must also consider the
wider context of the current trend toward
the increasing influence of public opinion by
quick information and campaigning, largely
through social media, which increasingly seem
to replace in-depth analysis as the main driver
for policy action.
Fisheries issues that years ago were discussed
only in fisheries constituencies and based on sci-
entific advice, are now increasingly dominated
by a public opinion understandably influenced
by the easy and quick access to many different
sources of information, including a number of
them of doubtful legitimacy, or many others
defending vested interests.
In today’s world, the effect of public opinion
on fisheries policy is increasing, and is clearly
there to stay. This implies that there is a growing
challenge in keeping the knowledge base for
fisheries decisions away from campaigning and
the various influences available in social media,
and in keeping such decisions well anchored
on a solid, reliable knowledge basis that, by its
330 Chapter 13
own nature, is hardly amenable to quick, easy
dissemination.
A good example of this is the tendency to
consider the repercussion on social media of an
idea or a position as a measure of its success,
regardless of its own merits when analyzed
with calm and objective criteria. The risk of
taking decisions on the basis of this social
influence (not always innocent or objective)
instead of well thought-out arguments is very
real for the fishing industry. This is also the case
for many other economic sectors, but in the
specific case of fisheries, its relatively small size
and economic muscle when compared to other
sectors present in the maritime environment
(energy, transport, etc.) or competitors in the
food production market (livestock) makes this
industry particularly exposed to the above risk.
This question has wider implications, in
that the above trend is part of a much larger
phenomenon where social media introduce an
element of superficiality and immediateness in
the way different societal interests shape up
policies through influence. In this new context,
it becomes increasingly difficult to separate
the solid evidence from the noise, and the real
position of society from the trends visible in the
social media.
In recent times, there has been a multipli-
cation of headlines in the mass media coming
from well-publicized scientific articles (see for
example, Kroodsma et al. 2018). These have a
remarkable capacity to mobilize public opinion.
However, whether these articles really repre-
sent the best available science is a different
question.
This challenge calls for a reinforcement of
the instruments to provide a reliable, objective
basis for policy making. For the fisheries sector,
this implies that the scientific advice (including
of course economic and social data) must be
preserved as the basic source of information
for decision-making. The fishing industry, with
little capacity to win the battle of economic
and social influence, must wholeheartedly
cooperate with the provision of good, reliable
science. This is their best defense, but this also
implies that fisheries managers, particularly in
the Commission services, must ensure a high
level of understanding of the scientific basis for
management. A high level of scientific literacy
is absolutely essential to be able to tell apart the
reliable scientific information from the noise
from today’s information society.
Bridging the chasm: a “new deal”
between the fishing industry
and environmental NGOs?
As we saw in previous chapter, particularly
in Chapter 9 on governance, the differences
between the fishing industry and NGOs is a
source of continuous friction in fisheries man-
agement. The question is: could what seems an
inevitable confrontation based on two oppo-
site conceptions of the management of the
oceans’ resources, one day become some kind
of alliance?
From enemies to strategic allies?
The idea is not necessarily far-fetched, in partic-
ular if we look into this question from a strate-
gic point of view. In effect, as we have seen in
this section, the world’s oceans are subject to an
increasing degree of utilization by a number of
human activities with an economic interest.
Many of the economic uses of the seas, such
as transport, energy production, seabed mining,
oil and gas drilling, and so on, do not depend
on a clean environment to prosper. On the
contrary, if certain areas are environmentally
degraded, those industries could claim that
any objection against their activity would be
unjustified, since there would be no pristine
nature to protect in these areas. Often too, the
tourist industry is also responsible for a high
degree of occupation of the coastal space, with
the inevitable loss of coastal ecosystems.
In turn, the industries that do require clean,
healthy marine ecosystems to thrive are mainly
fisheries and aquaculture. If we look at this
question from that particular perspective, one
could actually think that these industries should
be potentially the best natural allies of NGOs
in preserving the health of marine ecosystems.
Can this potential be really developed in the
future?

How to promote the strategic partnership
The strategic partnership cannot be established
with all NGOs. These are very varied in terms
of their agendas, methods, objectives and, cru-
cially, funding. Some NGOs have their raison
d’être in a permanent struggle against a number
of fishing practices, and no cooperation with
the industry seems likely to happen. However,
other NGOs are based on a different princi-
ple, that of cooperation with the industry. In
Europe, an NGO like WWF has successfully
engaged in a number of cooperation projects
with the fishing industry.4
Another example is the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF). Founded by scientists,
EDF members are evidence-based advocates.
They find economic incentives to drive envi-
ronmental progress.5 EDF advocates using
sound science, economics, and law to find
solutions that work. It is non-partisan, and its
work often advocates market-based solutions
to these problems. EDF has a long history of
partnerships with corporations, fund managers,
landowners, farmers, fishermen, and other
groups.6 In the US, they have become a crucial
actor in the development of a sound policy
from both an economic and an environmental
standpoint, notably through their work within
Regional Advisory Councils.
An idea to consider is that of developing
specific collaboration projects in areas where
there is a clear common interest. For example,
developing a plan to make the European fish-
ing industry “plastic free” (by phasing out the
use of plastics on board fishing vessels and by
contributing to the recovery and subsequent
recycling of plastics in the sea) would be a
win–win for both parties. The idea of develop-
ing a new prototype of fishing vessel, with a low
environmental impact, low carbon footprint
and optimal safety and working conditions on
board could also be an excellent opportunity for
4 www.worldwildlife.org/pages/partnerships/
5 www.edf.org/
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_
Defense_Fund/
Adapting the CFP to emerging challenges 331
collaboration, that will be, again, of common
interest.
In the emerging context of marine man-
agement, and taking into account the sheer
financial muscle and political power of some
of the players, the fishing industry needs allies
to continue its legitimate operation. They need
allies who advocate the preservation of the
ocean space as an area of high production of
seafood, which in turn requires healthy marine
ecosystems. It does not take much to realize the
strategic challenge and opportunity.
Recreational fisheries in Europe
Recreational fisheries are very important in
Europe, probably much more than they are
usually given credit for. This importance is
twofold:
• They represent a very significant level of
economic activity, notably through ancillary
activities, such as travel, boat rentals, lodging,
etc.
• They represent in a number of cases a very
substantial contribution to the fishing mor-
tality of certain stocks and have therefore
a significant impact in the management of
such stocks. The fact that this mortality is
often not evaluated and incorporated in
the evaluation of stocks can undermine the
quality of the advice and the management
measures adopted.
Yet, recreational fisheries have traditionally
been practically absent from fishery manage-
ment under the CFP, and different attempts to
include them have met considerable resistance.
Overall, however, the exclusion of recreational
fisheries from the CFP is at loggerheads with
the emerging evidence of its importance. The
current status of this activity certainly deserves
a re-evaluation.
Hyder et al. (2014) provide an excellent sum-
mary of what recreational fisheries represent
today in Europe: 8 million anglers spending
over EUR 8 billion a year. A study in the UK
revealed that recreational sea fishing repre-
sented EUR 1.55 billion in 2012, supporting
332 Chapter 13
an estimated 10 000 full-time equivalent jobs
(Armstrong et al. 2013). In France a similar
study estimated EUR 1.3 billion in 2006 and
2007 (Herfaut et al. 2013).
In terms of contribution to fishing mortality
of stocks regulated under the CFP, studies in sev-
eral Member States estimated that recreational
fishing was responsible for around a quarter of
all fishing mortality on sea bass in the North
Sea, English Channel, Celtic Sea and Irish Sea
(ICES 2014a,2014b). In Germany, recreational
fishing for cod has represented as much as 70%
of the German commercial cod landings! (Eero
et al. 2014). The effects are obvious, not only
in terms of the total fishing mortality, but also,
in the case of catch and release, there can be
mortality due to hooking and handling stress
(Suski et al. 2003) and behavioral changes
that may favor mortality from other causes
(Cooke and Philipp 2004). A more recent
study revealed that among 20 stocks studied,
the percentage contribution to total removals
(recreational + commercial removals) by recre-
ational fishing ranged between 2% for Atlantic
mackerel in the North Sea and Skagerrak to
43% for Atlantic pollack in the Celtic Seas and
English Channel (Radford et al. 2018).
It is remarkable that the CFP has so far
ignored such a significant source of fishing
mortality in a certain number of stocks. This
is due to political opportunity, and the idea
that trying to regulate recreational fisheries
would amount to typical EU over-regulation
that has been subject to so much criticism.
For a stock known for a high incidence of
recreational mortality, on the occasion of a
very difficult discussion on how to handle such
mortality, only one Member State (Germany)
actually provided data on recreational catches.
The incomplete information about recreational
fishing seriously undermines the EU’s efforts to
manage the stocks properly.
The US case
In the US, recreational fishing is an increasingly
popular activity that, for some species, takes
a significant amount of the total number of
fish caught in a year – sometimes more than
commercial fishing. To ensure that fish popula-
tions are not over-exploited, managers monitor
recreational fisheries through surveys. These
surveys are regularly reviewed.
The management of these fisheries is part of
the mainstream fisheries management through
the eight Regional Fishery Management Coun-
cils. These Councils discuss, inter alia, crucial
questions of the allocation of total catches
between commercial and recreational fisheries.
For this purpose, NOAA’s Southeast Fisheries
Science Center has produced three technical
papers to inform councils’ discussion related to
allocations between 2008 and 2014.
In the US, recreational fishing has a very high
profile. The Magnusson-Stevens Act includes
recreational fishing among the key activities. In
its Section 2 on “Findings, Purposes and Policy”
it states that the US fishery resources:
. . . contribute to the food supply, economy, and
health of the Nation and provide recreational
opportunities.
Recreational fisheries are an integral part
of the core purposes of the law. This contrasts
with the lack of references about this activity in
EU law. The consequence of the above text is
that recreational fishing constitutes in principle
an integral part of the US fish management
system. It is one that is subject to specific con-
siderations: in 2018, US Congress adopted the
Modernizing Recreational Fisheries Act,7 which
recognized that commercial and recreational
fisheries are different and their management,
though science-based, should take into account
these differences.
Overall, however, the management of recre-
ational fisheries in the US is not necessarily a
success story. The complexity of the activity and
the extraordinary number of participants, the
sheer difficulty of collecting data, the almost
hopeless enforcement in many cases, and even
the differences between the Federal Govern-
ment and the States, all these factors raise
frequent questions as to what is the purpose
7 www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/
1520/text/

and the added value of this management.
However, the US system has the merit that
the whole activity is not simply ignored, and
that whatever the management solutions, at
least the dimension of the activity and its
influence on the overall resource management
system are addressed and taken into account.
This certainly goes beyond what the CFP has
traditionally done.
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CHAPTER 14
Some ideas for the next CFP reform
A vision of the future CFP
In Chapter 1 we discussed the case for policy
reform and adjustment. It is important that any
idea of future policy evolution will be inspired
by a long-term vision. This was the case in the
2013 reform, that started by the Green Book
on policy reform published in 2009 (EU 2009a).
For the first time in the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy (CFP), the analysis of the (then) current pol-
icy was carried out based on a future vision of
how the policy should look like in the future.
The question is: is the Commission’s vision of
the future of the CFP still valid today? Or does
it need to be updated?
The 2009 vision: is it still valid today?
That vision in 2009 depicted a CFP in 2020 that
should ideally be characterized by:
• Fishery resources recovered from overfishing
with more and larger fish at sea.
• Fishermen earn more and become finan-
cially self-sufficient, attracting young people
in coastal regions to the activity again.
• The fishing activity is conducted with
environmentally-friendly gear and practices.
• Small-scale fishing produces high-quality
local produce that benefits from a favorable
image by the consumers.
• The aquaculture sector supplies a growing
percentage of Europe’s seafood consumption.
• The fishing activity is fully integrated with
other economic sectors in Europe’s coastal
zones.
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
• The CFP is cheaper and simpler to manage.
• Fishing operators are given incentives to
behave responsibly and fully participate in
the decision-making process.
• The EU contributes to improved fisheries
governance around the world.
In fact, this vision is still perfectly valid today.
The question is then twofold: (i) is the CFP
reform in 2013 contributing to achieve that
vision? And (ii) are there new important chal-
lenges that the policy must address for the
future?
The best basis for a possible future reform of
the CFP would be a revised vision of the Euro-
pean fishing sector toward 2030.
New elements of a vision of the
future CFP
By and large, the vision of 2009 is still valid for
the future. However, it needs to be updated,
notably in the light of the relative failures to
implement such vision under the 2013 reform,
but also to adapt the policy to new challenges
that in 2009 were not as evident as they are
today. A vision of the CFP in 2030 should
include at least some more elements:
• The Mediterranean fisheries are fully inte-
grated into the policy, with bespoke manage-
ment methods adapted to its particular
features, realistic objectives being achieved
and coastal communities, largely based on
small-scale fishing, thriving based on high-
quality fish for local markets.
335
336 Chapter 14
• The policy has been considerably simplified,
and the new stakeholder bodies take the ini-
tiative to design policy instruments that are
best adapted to deliver the objectives estab-
lished by the CFP legislation.
• The policy is adaptive, it allows for testing
new approaches and incorporates quickly
new ideas and improvements resulting from
experience.
• The policy is well-adapted to the gradual
effects of global warming: it monitors exist-
ing changes and is adaptive to mitigate their
negative effects.
• European fisheries and aquaculture increase
their sustainable production of seafood,
through exploitation of capture fisheries at
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) levels,
and an effective system to ensure that all
available quotas can be effectively caught,
as well as through further development of
aquaculture.
• European fisheries have a low level of
discarding and waste, and many species for-
merly discarded are used for various com-
mercial purposes.
• Although the total number of fishermen has
continued to shrink, those remaining are
well-paid and enjoy good working condi-
tions; the job of fisherman in Europe is again
attractive for young Europeans.
• Coastal communities are thriving through
a combination of varied economic activities
related to the maritime economy. All mem-
bers of these communities can benefit from
these activities and not just a few.
• Fisheries management is well-integrated into
a wider policy context including a seamless
coordination with environmental objectives
and effective mechanisms to decide on prior-
ities among maritime activities.
• International governance will be more effec-
tive, based on multilateral solutions, with
developing States playing an active role in
international efforts.
These elements of a future vision represent
an important update to the 2009 vision. Having
such vision is extremely important because
long-term objectives can only be defined if we
know what we really want to achieve. The
points above are all desirable and achievable
objectives.
The vision would imply the re-thinking of
a number of questions in the policy, from the
definition of objectives to the revision of cer-
tain pillars of the policy. These are presented
below.
New policy objectives
In Chapter 2 we touched upon the question of
policy objectives. The way these objectives are
formulated is extremely important to determine
the course of policy implementation, as well
as to ensure realistic policy expectations. From
the experience of implementation of the policy
reformed in 2013 one can identify a number of
questions where the policy objectives could be
reformulated.
• The MSY objective should be modulated to
make it clear that it is not a magic single point
but an area around which different combina-
tions of policy objectives can be sought.
• The policy should dissipate any doubt that the
operational parameter is fishing mortality,
not biomass.
• Future policy objectives should be better
aligned with those of Article 39 TFEU, and
could set out to gradually develop more
multi-species approaches to management
and, to start the process, establish that the
estimation of parameters such as Fmsy should
be done taking into account ecosystem
effects, as we saw in Chapter 3.
• The policy should focus on the main stocks,
not all stocks. This would require a defini-
tion on how to determine the stocks that will
be directly subject by management, including
Fmsy objectives.
• The date of delivery of the fishing mortality
objectives could be made more flexible to
account for certain factors:
✓ The Mediterranean case. Given the situa-
tion of the stocks in this area, the policy
could establish more modulated times for
the delivery of policy objectives, due to the

much larger distance between current F
levels and Fmsy target levels;
✓ The particular difficulties of mixed fish-
eries.
• The policy should open the door to the pos-
sibility that management will focus more on
groups of stocks and not only on individual
stocks.
• The objectives for the reduction of discards
could be reformulated to ensure that differ-
ent situations can be treated differently, while
establishing in all cases the guidance to
reduce discards as much as practicable.
• The policy could establish among its objec-
tives the maximization of the – sustainable –
production of seafood.
• The objective of adapting the policy to the
effects of global warming should also be
clearly specified.
• The new set of objectives could also include
the improvement of the economic efficiency
of the management system (to improve the
economic output from the available resources)
and the improvement in employment quality
in the industry.
• That objective could also include the contri-
bution of the CFP to achieve the EU internal
market.
Beyond the objectives, the future policy
should also establish adapted tools, such as:
• An enlargement of the scope of regionaliza-
tion to include more policy pillars (including
for example control), so as to allow for “pack-
age approaches” by sea basin.
• Further clarification of the principles appli-
cable to the co-decision acts, where these
would concentrate more on principles and
objectives and less on micro-management of
technical questions.
• Inclusion of the consideration of guidelines as
an instrument to help implement the objec-
tives, including possible delegation to indus-
try organizations.
These elements are not necessarily all entirely
new, but they could be worked out in a way
that will be clearly identified as priorities for the
future evolution of the policy.
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 337
An improved governance system
To be flexible and adaptive, the CFP must revise
its governance system. The CFP will continue
to be governed under the terms of Articles 43§2
and 43§3 TFEU, but this actually allows for a
considerable improvement in practice.
A more flexible, adaptive CFP
We have advocated that the CFP needs to be,
even beyond regionalization, more flexible and
adaptive. Can this be done under the reformed
policy of 2013? In Chapter 9 we referred to the
idea of developing guidelines instead of legisla-
tion to provide such flexibility. Can that be done
in the future CFP?
Can a legislative approach be flexible
and adaptive?
There is room for the development of a more
flexible and adaptive approach to the CFP.
Ultimately, the amount of flexibility is inversely
proportional to the level of detail of the legis-
lation. The fewer the rules the more room for
implementation by non-legislative instruments.
And with certain exceptions, nothing in regula-
tion 1380/2013 obliges the co-legislators or the
Member States under regionalization, to pro-
duce very detailed legislation. The real difficulty
for a more adaptive CFP it is the long-standing
tradition of micro-management by the admin-
istrations and the tendency to ensure a level
playing field that always pushes governance
toward the definition of very detailed rules
and harmonized legislation. This is not disap-
pearing through regionalization. Actually, this
process seems to be simply producing the same
phenomenon albeit at a regional scale.
As we indicated in Chapter 9 and will see
below, the real difficulty is not the legal basis,
but the need to create trust among the policy
actors, a trust that can allow the industry to
devise flexible solutions through approaches
that can be modified more quickly and flexi-
bly as they are implemented, a trust that will
reassure Member States that different solutions
don’t mean less demand on producing results,
so that nobody is seen as “getting off the hook”
338 Chapter 14
on fundamental obligations, a trust that the
Commission will respect these solutions. A pos-
sibility to explore is that of the industry-led
initiatives that are endorsed by the EU, so as
to provide industry organizations the capacity
to manage and enforce the rules, based on the
results-based principle.
How to build trust?
This is perhaps the most difficult question of
all. By definition, trust cannot be legislated. It
is an intangible value that often results from
long historical traditions that simply cannot
be reproduced in areas without such tradition.
This author has already written about the differ-
ences in the level of trust between, for example,
two areas like the Baltic Sea and the EU’s west-
ern waters: while in the Baltic there are no
“fishermen from abroad” (only Baltic coastal
states fish there) and have a long tradition
of joint management through the old IBSFC;
in western waters the presence of Spanish or
French fishermen in British or Irish waters is
still resented in the British Isles and this is a
considerable obstacle to build trust.
However, this is not an impossible task. In
Chapter 9 we already identified a certain num-
ber of specific actions that can favor the devel-
opment of trust. And experience shows that a
number of factors may contribute to increase
such trust, beyond the specific action by the
institutions: Investment abroad is probably a
key factor. As fishing interests become more
entangled through foreign investments, the
national factors that are at the origin of much
of the CFP’s mistrust may tend to diminish over
time. As an example, no matter how adverse
the British public may be of Spanish or Dutch
investment in the UK fishing sector, this author
has witnessed how a Spanish operator own-
ing a UK-flagged vessel has seen his interests
defended by a well-known UK industry rep-
resentative. The increase in cross-investment
in the EU fishing industry can be a significant
contributor to build trust.
All these questions, of course are not easy,
or doable in the short term. But they deserve
attention because the US experience shows that
it is this trust among operators and between
them and the authorities that allows them to
have a successful policy.
A new legislative culture:
concentrating on political objectives,
not on micro-management
Co-decision can allow a new legislative
approach: more concentrated on deciding pol-
icy objectives (deciding the “what”) but leaving
much more flexibility on the means to achieve
such objectives (not deciding the “how”). This
would imply leaving much more freedom
for regional decision-making with a much-
enhanced role for the Advisory Councils (ACs),
and also more fast-track procedures to adapt
legislation through Commission acts.
This would have several advantages:
• It would allow for greater involvement of
the Advisory Councils, thus increasing their
“buy-in” to the policy.
• The policy would be much more quickly
adaptable to changing circumstances, or to
learning from experience. It would also be
more open to experimental approaches.
• It would help make the co-decision process
more efficient: by legislating in less detail,
co-legislators could increase the number of
important regulations they could deal with.
This would also allow the whole system to
be more responsive to new challenges.
There would be difficulties too: for example,
greater emphasis on monitoring results or,
arguably, increased risk of objectives not being
achieved. This should of course be considered
against the advantages: a compromise between
these and the possible risks would need to be
struck.
The main difficulty of this approach may be
the resistance to change by certain administra-
tions, and possibly also from certain industry
segments that may be more at ease with the tra-
ditional paternalistic management. This implies
that this kind of approach could be introduced
gradually, in those cases where the administra-
tions and the stakeholders concerned would be
willing to accept the challenge.

A new decision support framework
The introduction of multispecies fisheries con-
siderations, trophic relationships, choke species
effects and so on will have a very clear effect
on governance: increased complexity. Today,
it is already difficult to discuss the biological,
economic, and political implications of setting
a single-stock total allowable catch (TAC) at
levels corresponding to two different values of
fishing mortality. It will then be much more
difficult to fathom how to come to terms with
a matrix of different possibilities with different
trade-offs. This calls for the development of
tools that will translate these trade-offs and
their biological and economic implications in a
user-friendly manner.
These decision support tools will have to
be used within the institutional framework,
which will not change under CFP reform. The
EU research program MareFrame1 is develop-
ing very interesting tools to allow for a better
implementation of the ecosystem approach in
the CFP. What is of particular interest of this
program is that it provides for instruments for
what will be a more complex decision-making
framework, that will need to evaluate the
trade-offs of different policy options.
The program develops four main areas, which
we can consider as the essential elements of
support to decision-making in the emerging
scenario of more ecosystem based (particularly
more multi-specific) management:
(a) The co-creation process, whereby stake-
holders participate from the beginning in
the conception of the management instru-
ments.
(b) The further development of ecosystem
models, to respond to the increasing need to
include multi-species and other ecosystem-
based elements in management.
(c) Decision-support tools, to facilitate the
evaluation of options, and their conse-
quences, of an increasingly complex deci-
sion framework.
1 https://cordis.europa.eu/result/rcn/231290_en
.html/
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 339
(d) Educational resources, to ensure a high
level of scientific and management literacy
among all players involved.
The future CFP simply cannot continue to
be run based exclusively on an extremely
heavy and slow procedure where everything,
from fundamental to technical or secondary is
decided by co-decision. And, since future policy
will inevitably introduce additional elements
of complexity, it is necessary that the gover-
nance of the CFP will have these instruments
to facilitate decision-making.
The future of regionalization
I have advocated in these pages the extension
of the scope of regionalization as one of the
ideas for the future. Article 18 of Regulation
1380/2013 does not necessarily limit the scope,
since it states that this process will apply “where
the Commission has been granted powers” but
then it clarifies that this includes multian-
nual plans, discard plans and regulations to
implement environmental legislation. Article
18§7 allows Member States to present joint
recommendations, but does not clarify what
follow-up should be considered.
Overall, Article 18, even if formally does not
limit regionalization to the above questions,
it does however put emphasis on them, and
makes it a political question for co-legislators
to decide if in a different context they may
decide to grant powers to the Commission. And
in any case, Article 18 is within Part III of the
regulation, on conservation measures, which
seems to imply that regionalization does not
apply to other policy pillars of the CFP.
This represents an important limitation,
because a new governance requires the prepa-
ration of package approaches, that could put
together different policy strands in coherent,
mutually supportive policy elements. The
future legal basis could foresee the possibility
of these package approaches implying regional-
ized decision-making involving different policy
choices.
340 Chapter 14
As an example, the recent proposal for a
management plan for demersal stocks for the
Mediterranean (EU 2018a) foresees an effort
management system for trawlers. To be com-
pleted, this plan would ideally include, for
example:
• A special control regime to cater for the need
to focus control on the effort levels.
• A special system of incentives to promote bet-
ter gear selectivity that may need to derogate
from some current technical measures.
• A specific scrapping program to remove
excess capacity and allow the remaining
vessels to be able to operate under profitable
conditions within a framework of reduced
overall effort levels.
These ideas are not possible today under
regionalization. To introduce such elements,
the proposal would have needed to propose
amendments to three important regulations,
and this completely discourages such initiatives.
A new paradigm of governance would imply
the possibility of allowing regionalization to
foresee bespoke packages of measures that
would achieve the general goals of the pol-
icy but would be tailor-made for the specific
features of the fisheries concerned.
The notion of co-creation and the
“irrational” part of decision-making
Those associated with decision-making pro-
cesses know all too well how decision-making
is, very often, subject to political considerations
that may not correspond to rational crite-
ria, be it scientific advice or long-term versus
short-term economic interest. These decisions
are often considered “irrational” since they
do not seem to correspond to well-supported
“objective” criteria.
Actually, these “irrational” parts of the
decision-making probably only show the level
of ignorance of decision-makers as regards the
interests of the social groups concerned, for
whom the alleged irrationality simply corre-
sponds to their societal and cultural values
and expectations. The notion of rational is
by definition arguable, since it may reflect a
very wide variety of considerations that are
not even just economic (profit levels) or social
(employment levels) but very often impinge
upon other values such as, for example, pride,
the preservation of tradition, and so on.
These considerations lead to decision-making
being often based on what is socially acceptable,
whatever the values behind such acceptability.
Including these considerations in decision-
making, as part of the objective criteria, is
extremely difficult, if not impossible. For this
reason, the idea has been developed in a num-
ber of cases of including such considerations
from the very beginning of the decision-making
process, through the so-called co-creation, that
is, the participation of stakeholders from the
initial stages of policy design.
Creating breathing space for the ACs
The above ideas imply very pro-active Advisory
Councils. This, in turn, requires the ACs to
be ready for such an enhanced role, but it
also requires that the other actors involved
in decision-making leave the ACs sufficient
breathing space for them to have a substantial
role to play. If co-legislators, the Commission
and national administrations continue to decide
on everything, including details, there will be
no space for the ACs to do a meaningful job.
Asking the ACs to do more implies the other
actors of the policy to do less:
• Co-legislators should legislate with less
detail. This is essential. If the tradition of
prescriptive legislation continues by the
co-legislators (with an important influence
by the Commission) then there will be no
breathing space for ACs. One cannot moti-
vate ACs to invest in developing policy if
their role is restricted to very narrow, or very
secondary policy elements. In particular, it
will continue to be for co-legislators to decide
the “what,” but the ACs should have more
of a say in the “how” and this can only be
done if co-legislators don’t try to do both.
• National administrations should not try to
dominate the decision-making process under
regionalization as a purely political process.
If this is the case, the process will fail to

get decision-making closer to the fishing
grounds as it was intended in 2013.
• The Commission and the ACs should ensure
a positive dialogue where sufficient flexibility
and trust should be provided to ensure that
the ACs see that it is worth investing in their
recommendations.
This is not necessarily a question for legisla-
tion, at least not the only factor. Rather, this
would correspond to a change of culture, where
the legislators would set principles, but not tech-
nical details.
In addition, more breathing space would also
be created for the ACs by admitting regionalized
decision-making for a wider range of policy
instruments. As I have argued, the scope of
regionalization in the 2013 reform was rather
narrow. Once regionalization reaches cruise
speed, the question must be asked whether
this procedure shouldn’t be allowed for a wider
range of policy pillars, so as to give the ACs the
possibility of developing “package approach-
es” on policy that would fit their particular
circumstances.
A new structure for an enhanced role
for the Advisory Councils
Under the new governance scenario, the
structure and function of the ACs should be
enhanced. Some ideas are worth exploring:
• Getting data collection and scientific advice
closer to the ACs, following the US system.
• Organizing training sessions for AC members,
so they can become more familiar with the
basic concepts of fisheries science.
• Allowing for certain decisions to be imple-
mented through industry private agreements,
outside legislation, but with an obligation to
achieve results.
• Providing for special aid to currently under-
represented interests, such as small-scale
sectors, so as to ensure an inclusive level of
decision-making within the ACs.
As mentioned in Chapter 9, it would be
important to analyze how the industry can take
up the challenge of a more bottom–up policy
where their participation in the ACs would be
more proactive. This would be very demanding
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 341
in terms of resources, and in this context the
possibility of revamping the mandate and the
funding of producer Organizations, to play a
crucial role in governance, over and beyond
their original mandate focused on markets,
could be an idea to explore.
A more executive role for the Advisory
Councils?
In the context of a more collaborative CFP, with
an increasing weight of bottom–up initiatives
under less prescriptive legislation, the idea
of the industry making private arrangements
beyond legislation must also be posed. Indeed,
some US Regional Councils have demonstrated
that the industry can accomplish certain objec-
tives through private deals outside the control
of the federal government. Can this be done in
the CFP?
In a policy with a tradition of top–down
prescriptive rules, this possibility seems rather
unlikely ever to materialize. However, certain
precedents may actually point to the con-
trary. For example, the Southwestern Regional
Advisory Council struck a deal on the manage-
ment of anchovy in the Bay of Biscay through
agreement between the industries of the two
Member States concerned. In more recent
times, the industry-led management plans
agreed and proposed by the pelagic industry,
even if devoid of legal value, are important
attempts to establish management frameworks
that decision-makers can at least consider as
important guidance on what industry can do.
In previous chapters we have seen the need
to develop strategic partnerships between the
fishing industry and the environmental NGOs.
These partnerships could well be developed in
the framework of the ACs, thus giving these
bodies a much more proactive role, including
the possibility of using private deals, which
could subsequently be endorsed by EU or
national law.
This development can be facilitated by new
technologies. A very good example is the
approach proposed by Kraak et al. (2012)
whereby a detailed spatial management of the
342 Chapter 14
fishing activity can be used to refine man-
agement and promote responsibility by the
industry, through a system of “fishing impact
credits.” Current technologies already allow
fine tracking of individual vessel behavior, thus
opening the door to that kind of approach.
That is just an example, but current technolo-
gies, starting with the electronic logbook, cam-
eras on board, submarine cameras to monitor
the catch composition of trawls before they hap-
pen, and so on, change the traditional wisdom
that fishermen don’t know what will fall in their
nets, or that they cannot all be tracked individu-
ally. These new technologies have the potential
to allow for new policy approaches which are
more reliant on individual fishermen’s behav-
ior. As we have seen in Chapter 7, these are
much more efficient than general, static rules to
obtain results, if and when the adequate incen-
tives are provided.
Who would be the arbiter?
In order to develop the idea for ACs to be more
influential, there would need to be more issues
regionalized and more flexibility of objectives
(and possibly some guidelines). However, this
requires an arbiter. In the USA, this is the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
widely recognized (even despite frequent lit-
igation) as an efficient arbiter because it is
an agency (not a political body) and has full
technical credibility. Who would be the arbiter
in the EU? Could the Commission do it? This
would be ideal, but it is difficult in practice for
a number of reasons:
• The Commission is seen as a political body,
not a government agency made up of neutral
professionals. While the services of the insti-
tution do enjoy a reputation of competence
and neutrality, the Fisheries Commissioner is,
on the contrary, seen as a politician.
• As for the technical ability, the NMFS has a
human resource base, made up of prestigious
scientists and other officials that offer more
than sufficient guarantee of technical ability.
The Commission services, on the contrary,
tend to be increasingly made of overstretched
non-specialized officials
What would then be the alternative? The idea
of a specialized EU Agency has been floated by
some. Although a new agency seems out of the
question, the possibility of using the European
Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) (whose repu-
tation for technical competence and neutrality
is solid) with an extended mandate (and addi-
tional resources) could eventually be discussed.
Relative stability: why it should
evolve
In Chapter 6 we saw a number of possible
adjustments to the fringes of relative stability
to facilitate the implementation of the landing
obligation as of 2019. But in the long term, the
policy, for a number of reasons, requires that
the possibility of seriously revamping relative
stability be considered as a possible element for
the next round of policy reform.
Why question the CFP’s cornerstone?
Relative stability is here to stay. Not only does it
enjoy ample political support from most actors
in the policy (as every CFP reform demon-
strates) but it has proven over the years to
be a pre-condition for the establishment of a
meaningful fishery management policy: in
other parts of this book I have indicated that in
the absence of a system of sharing out fishing
rights, no effective management system can be
adopted.
However, the idea that a stable system of
sharing of fishing rights necessarily means
allocations fixed forever is not warranted. Over
and beyond the cases where the allocation is
left to market mechanisms (individual transfer-
able quotas [ITQs]), there are examples where
allocations are decided at governmental level,
but the specific percentages assigned to specific
management areas and quota holders is vari-
able according to the distribution of biomass,
which is regularly monitored through surveys.
The case of the International Pacific Halibut
Commission, between the US and Canada is
perhaps the best example.
In the CFP, the experience showed that the
establishment of the policy required six years of

difficult negotiation to agree on the initial allo-
cation of resources. Only when this was adopted
was it possible to put into place a conservation
policy. This fact is always important to bear in
mind. The question is, however: if relative sta-
bility is here to stay, does it have to stay without
any change or should it evolve to adapt to the
evolution of the policy?
Questioning relative stability is not a choice,
it is a necessity, because of choke species (see
Chapter 6), climate change (see Chapter 12),
low quota consumption/inefficiency to produce
food (see Chapter 2) and ultimately, Brexit.
Under these circumstances, maintaining an
allocation system fixed in time and space more
than 30 years ago is simply not possible. While
the principle can be maintained, the specific
allocation keys and the areas to which they
apply will inevitably have to be adapted if the
CFP is to stand a chance of delivering its
objectives.
Adapting relative stability: legally easy,
politically difficult
Curiously, what the most deeply-rooted princi-
ple of the CFP is, in strict legal terms, extremely
easy to modify: it is a prerogative of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, under Article 32§3 TFEU and
can be modified at will by Council by qualified
majority. However, even if legally easy, a sub-
stantial revamping of relative stability is so deli-
cate politically that it is hard to see how it could
take place outside the framework of an impor-
tant policy reform, including other substantial
elements in the package.
Are individual annual quotas under
relative stability biologically
and economically rational?
The concept of relative stability has been crit-
icized directly or indirectly from a number
of angles, as an inefficient system to ensure
good decision-making. For example, Carpenter
et al. (2016) and Khalilian et al. (2010) have
criticized the decision-making on TACs, show-
ing how the system substantially produces
higher TACs than would be biologically and
economically rational. The fixed allocation of
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 343
fishing rights among Member States makes
ministers focus on “their” national quota, not
on the TAC level, and as a result TAC levels
have been frequently raised over sustainable
levels to accommodate one minister, while the
rest did not ask for such an increase.
As an example, a former British fisheries
minister declared, following a TAC decision in
excess of scientific advice that “the arguments
about TACs are not about conservation, unless
of course you are arguing about another coun-
try” (cited in Carpenter et al. 2016). Beyond the
cynicism or sense of humor of the statement,
that phrase encapsulates the problem of relative
stability: it places the emphasis on securing a
national quota entitlement the following year,
frequently to the detriment of the biological
and even economic rationality of the whole
system. And then one can always be very
conservationist with somebody else’s TACs.
On the contrary, fisheries economists have
evaluated the gains associated with a liberal-
ization of fishing quotas within the EU, and
have clearly concluded that they would provide
economic gains for all (Andersen et al. 2009).
In addition, scientists have long emphasized
that the success of the management system of
the CFP is severely constrained by the strong
and systemic focus on maintaining relative
stability among Member States (Schwach et al.
2007), which stifles innovation and prevents
more economically rational approaches.
From a biological point of view, relative
stability is also far from satisfactory. Reiss et al.
(2010) indicate that a policy based on TACs for
the main target species is unlikely to mitigate
the impacts of fishing on non-target species.
It can be added that the tendency of relative
stability to raise TAC levels far beyond scientific
advice only aggravates this effect.
Overall, relative stability has been remark-
ably stable over the years, but this is due much
more to the inertia of the system, and the lack
of appetite to embark on a difficult and com-
plex exercise of revision, than on the basis of its
objective biological and economic rationality.
However, these considerations will not neces-
sarily apply forever. There are several reasons
344 Chapter 14
why some current allocation keys may have to
be adapted in certain cases:
• They were established in many cases a long
time ago, and since then the stocks and their
abundance have moved geographically. This
is clearly aggravated by climate change.
• The economic interests of the fishing exploit-
ing the stocks concerned has also changed,
with many stocks of importance not having
relative stability while other, secondary ones
still being subject to it.
• The introduction of the new CFP objectives
has raised the problem of “choke species”
(see Chapter 6) that risks derailing the
smooth implementation of the new CFP.
• Relative stability resolves – partially – its
rigidity by a “market” mechanism: quota
swaps. But this mechanism is proving very
inefficient to meet the challenges of the new
CFP.
In fact, the relative stability established in the
CFP of 1983 was a principle, with the intention
of being adapted as necessary. Article 4 of Reg-
ulation 170/83 (EU 1983) reads:
1 The volume of the catches available to the
Community referred to in Article 3 shall be
distributed between the Member States in a
manner which assures each Member State
relative stability of fishing activities for each of
the stocks considered.
2 On the basis of the contents of the report
referred to in Article 8, the Council, acting in
accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 43 of the Treaty, shall enact provisions
effecting the adjustments that it may prove necessary
to make to the distribution of the resources
among Member States in consequence of the
application of paragraph 1. (emphasis added)
In practice several allocation keys have been
modified or created over the years (Penas Lado
2016). This means that it is conceivable that,
while the principle of relative stability will be
preserved, some of its specific management
units and/or allocation keys could be modified.
This need has in fact been recognized by a
certain number of interests in the industry,
notably in relation with choke species.
There can be different ways to introduce the
necessary adaptations to allocation keys so that
it can face today’s challenges and still be an
extremely useful instrument. There could be in
fact a number of possibilities, as below.
An enhanced market of fishing rights
among Member States
The current system of voluntary quota swaps
is insufficient to re-balance the rigidities of
relative stability. Since the implementation of
the landing obligation, the number of swaps
is actually being reduced, not increased (see
Chapter 6). The reason seems to be that in
the new context, Member States become more
prudent before agreeing to a swap, since they
do not know if, at the end of the year, some
of the stock they are ready to swap may actu-
ally become “choke” at a later stage. In other
cases, Member States seem to shy away from
swapping to reduce total catches and keep prices
high. Given the voluntary nature of this system,
it is difficult to see how it could be enhanced.
In addition, the lack of transparency of the
system of quota swaps casts serious doubts
about its fairness. For example, given the prac-
tice of intra-company swaps (swaps promoted
by companies owning vessels in more than one
Member State) some operators complain that
such intra-company exchanges do not fairly
allow them to participate in swaps negotiated
by their national administrations (Hoefnagel
et al. 2015). In addition, the annual nature of
the quota entitlements and the lack of guaran-
tee of obtaining supplementary quotas from the
market seriously limit the fishermen’s ability to
plan their economic activity in the long-term,
and tends to result in year-by-year economic
planning (Andersen et al. 2009).
One possibility, suggested by industry rep-
resentatives, would be to ensure full public
transparency of the levels of quota consump-
tion by Member States. The industry frequently
complains that they don’t always know who has
quotas left of their choke species. By making the
quota management database fully available to
the public, the industry could check out where
available opportunities lie, and may indicate to

their national authorities the interest in agree-
ing on certain swaps with other Member States.
There may be reticence to do this, particu-
larly from the Member States that under-exploit
their quotas, as such transparency would clearly
expose the level of inefficiency of the current
system. However, the need to ensure the effi-
ciency of the CFP, in terms of implementing the
discard ban and also on the wider objective of
ensuring a high level of exploitation of its sus-
tainable resources, should be more than enough
motivation to overcome this possible reticence.
A European market of fishing rights?
The case of milk quotas
An extreme proposal would be to create a
European-wide market of fishing rights, for
example though the establishment of a system
of tradable fishing rights. This idea was indeed
initially considered by the Commission services
in the preparation of its proposals for the 2013
CFP reform. However, the idea found such
strong opposition from much of the industry
and most Member States that it was discarded
as an option at a very early stage. Obviously,
the opposition to this idea was based mainly
on the evidence that such a market of fishing
rights would change relative stability.
The example of fish quotas could draw some
interesting conclusions from the case of the
milk quotas as part of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). The milk quotas per Member
State were very different from the fish quotas:
rather than an instrument to limit catches of
an exhaustible resource, milk quotas were set
up in 1984 as an instrument to prevent excess
production and associated falling milk prices.
The comparison should not be made between
milk quotas and fish TACs, but rather between
the use of Member State-specific limits to milk
production and the Member State-specific
and fixed catch limitations derived from the
overall TACs.
Unlike national fish quotas that continue
unquestioned, milk quotas were discontinued
in 2015, to allow EU producers to increase
production, improve competitiveness and con-
quer emerging foreign markets. One obvious
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 345
result of this is that the production of milk is
increasing much more in some Member States
than in others and thus the traditional status quo
is being broken. Could the fisheries status quo
ever be broken?
Always bearing in mind the differences
between the two instruments, what is interest-
ing about the case is the explanation of the rea-
sons why the EU scrapped milk quotas. In short,
milk quotas were suppressed for four main
reasons:
• Milk quotas raise prices;
• They distort the market;
• They are costly to administer; and
• They are unfair.
As indicated above, milk quotas are not the
same as fish quotas. However, what is interest-
ing to note is that both quotas are based on the
same article of the Treaty (Article 39). Yet, the
CFP has never questioned the role of fish quotas
under relative stability on their effect on market
prices, on whether they distort the markets,
on the cost of their administration and on
their fairness. Nor has the CFP ever wanted to
analyze the competitiveness of its industry that
must compete in an increasingly open market.
Why?
It is also true that the European Court of Jus-
tice has, on several occasions, clearly withheld
the principle of relative stability, therefore its
questioning may have also legal implications.
However, in the present context, the emphasis is
not so much whether the principle should sur-
vive, but rather if the specific quota allocations
agreed more than 30 years ago are still the right
ones, notably in the context of the new policy
after the 2013 reform.
Does relative stability raise prices?
There are no studies on this question. It is
therefore difficult to ascertain if relative sta-
bility has any influence on prices. However,
the very fact that there are no studies on this
question exposes the problem: relative stability
is applied because it is always considered a cor-
nerstone of the CFP, regardless of its economic
rationality. It is a striking example of a policy
that has survived for over 30 years without ever
346 Chapter 14
being questioned from the point of view of its
economic rationality.
In any case, anecdotal information confirms
that some Member States refuse swaps of
unused quotas as a mechanism to keep prices
high: if certain unused quotas are transferred
to other Member States and caught, they fear
prices may be reduced by the increased offer.
Does relative stability distort the markets?
There is at least one significant element of mar-
ket distortion in relative stability: the catches of
national fleets are not always adjusted to their
national markets. In some cases, Member States
under-exploit stocks of high value in other
European markets, while Member States hav-
ing those markets have low or no quota of such
stocks. There are no specific studies to quantify
this. However, abundant anecdotal informa-
tion and expert advice shows a disconnection
between the basket of fishing rights of Member
States and the demands from their markets.
For example, according to data from the
European Market Observatory for Fisheries and
Aquaculture (EUMOFA), a stock such as horse
mackerel (Trachurus trachurus) is caught by the
Dutch fleet and sold largely for export at prices
around €1/Kg, while in Portugal the same stock
is sold for around €2/Kg in the domestic market.
Another case in hand is blue whiting (Microme-
sistius poutassou) which the Danish fleets catch
for fish meal at prices around €0.1–0.2/Kg,
while Spanish vessels catch the same stock for
human consumption at prices around €2.5/Kg.
It can certainly be argued that this is not a
problem since the market is the whole of the
EU, so Dutch and Danish fleets could sell their
fish at much better prices in the Iberian mar-
kets, and help supply their markets. However,
it is not always easily doable and economically
rational to land fish for a variety of different
European markets, some of them perhaps
quite distant. The effect of this disconnection
is that the overall economic rationality and
effectiveness of the system is probably lower
than it could be: operators may have fishing
rights that are not always well-adapted to their
usual markets. This is not fully compensated
by the limited and non-transparent market of
fishing rights (the quota swap system) and can-
not always be compensated by intra-EU trade,
often constrained by the cost and conditions of
transport and other factors.
Are quotas under relative stability costly
to manage?
The notion of “costly” management is of course
relative. If preserving the system of relative sta-
bility is a high priority for most Member States,
it is probably fair to say that running the sys-
tem is not expensive. The question, however,
is whether there is a simpler system to manage
fishing rights.
In any case, the management of quotas
involves in most cases a high degree of involve-
ment of national administrations, including
notably all the control and enforcement sys-
tem, the sampling and reporting and the IT
applications to run the system. Overall, these
systems are complex and expensive, and even
relatively well-off Member States frequently
complain about difficulties in running the sys-
tem effectively and on time, based on the heavy
administrative burden it represents.
The example of other countries (New
Zealand, certain fisheries in Canada and the US,
etc.), where the quotas are managed largely
through market mechanisms and with a finan-
cial and operational contribution from the
industry itself are the best examples of how
these expenses can be reduced to a minimum.
This means that the heavy administrative
burden of running a government-led quota
management system is not an inevitable conse-
quence of fisheries management, it is the result
of a political choice not to let the market play
its part in such management.
Are quotas unfair?
This is by far the most difficult question to
answer. It is for sure, however, that if that ques-
tion is asked to different operators, most of them
would reply yes, albeit for opposite reasons: it is
unfair to many of them, but for different reasons
for different people. A non-written principle
of EU policy is that a good policy is the one

that leaves everybody “moderately unhappy,”
that is, that the policy is a good compromise
without winners and losers. Is this the case
with relative stability?
Traditionally, it has strong defenders who
consider that allocation keys should not be
touched at all. They are fully satisfied with exist-
ing keys. Others, however, are very unhappy,
although for the opposite reasons:
• Spain is by far the unhappiest Member State,
on grounds that the allocation keys agreed
upon accession did not reflect at all Spain’s
track record in the fishery and current eco-
nomic interest and dependence from the fish-
eries concerned.
• Ireland is another traditionally unhappy
Member State, for the opposite reason: Irish
waters include a high percentage of EU
fishery resources, but Irish quotas are lower
than such a percentage.
Both arguments cancel each other in any
discussion on relative stability, but the above
examples illustrate that, at this point in time,
the allocation keys agreed more than 30 years
ago are not necessarily something that leaves
everyone “moderately unhappy.”
But this traditional situation is now changing
fast, due to the implementation of the landing
obligation in the CFP. Here, even Member States
that always defended the continuity of relative
stability, are now questioning certain aspects of
it, namely, those leading to the choke species
problem. For all the Member States or fleet seg-
ment affected by this problem, it is difficult to
see the current allocation keys as fair. The above
(very superficial) analysis shows that there may
also be reasons to question relative stability, or
at least some of the allocation keys under it, and
to suggest its revision.
Evolution through adjustment
A full renegotiation of all allocation keys would
seem out of the question, as too complex,
delicate and, probably, also unnecessary. A
softer approach would seem more realistic. In
this regard, there can be very different ways
in which much-needed flexibility or adjust-
ment can be introduced in relative stability. All
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 347
these ideas are not mutually-excluding, so a
combination of some of these ideas, even in
different TACs, may be a way forward. As I have
repeatedly advocated in these pages, the search
for a one-size-fits-all solution can seriously
stand in the way of more effective, partial, and
fishery-specific solutions in different cases.
Renegotiation of a limited number
of allocation keys
A limited number of TACs could be subject to a
revision, while maintaining existing keys for the
rest. The choice of the stocks could be done, for
example, based on the following characteristics:
• A well-demonstrated problem of choke
species.
• A very low level of quota utilization, over
time, by one or more of the quota holders.
• A consistent history of swaps, showing the
permanent need for adjustment of certain
national quotas.
A precondition for this exercise would to
ensure the transparency of the information on
quota utilization and exchange, so the adjust-
ment would be designed on systematic and
transparent criteria and based on experience.
It has been reported (Penas Lado 2016)
that at least on two occasions, important rel-
atively stability keys have been re-negotiated:
Baltic cod and blue whiting are examples that,
when needed, Council can indeed re-negotiate
well-established allocation keys. While not
minimizing the difficulties, these examples
show that, at least for a reduced number of
well-identified stocks with important mis-
match problems, such re-negotiation is actually
possible.
Although there is a tendency to avoid
re-opening allocation keys, or even to talk
about it, under the all-embracing argument
that this would amount to “opening Pandora’s
box,” the above cases show that this fear is
overstated, and often reflects a simple desire
not to engage in difficult exercises, a kind of
“institutional inertia” to avoid difficult problems
even if solutions are badly needed.
348 Chapter 14
A partial application of rights-based
management
As we have explained, the idea of an EU-wide
market of fishing rights was opposed by a
majority of stakeholders at an earlier stage of
the preparation of the proposals for the 2013
reform. This opposition is most unlikely to
change any time soon. However, for certain
segments of the industry (notably the pelagic
trawler industry) this idea was worth consid-
ering, and even extending it to Norway! This
points to the possibility of introducing certain
TACs where part of the national quotas (those
corresponding to the large-scale industry ready
to play into this) could be allocated initially to
Member States, but be subsequently subject
to quota transfers among the different vessel
owners at European level. This could even
be considered as an experiment and depend-
ing upon results, could perhaps be extended
partially to other TACs and fleet segments
interested, always on a voluntary basis.
All the above considerations are, in any case,
unlikely to lead to the dismantling of relative
stability and its replacement by a liberalization
in the trade of fishing rights among Member
States. However, when looking at rights-based
management (RBM) one must always bear in
mind that their application does not necessarily
have to be universal. In fact, only the New
Zealand system applies to all fisheries without
restrictions. Many examples around the world
show how RBM systems can work for part of
their fisheries, for very different reasons. This
has also been the case (see Chapter 10) with
the EU Member States that have implemented
these systems: they have introduced them at
different times for different fisheries, showing
that RBM-managed fisheries can coexist with
traditionally-managed ones.
All this implies that it is perfectly possible to
apply RBM to a certain fleet segment, and/or to
part of the fishing possibilities available. This is
already applied in some countries. At EU level,
the idea could be to reserve part of the TACs,
at least for certain species, to management
through RBM, leaving the rest of the TAC and/
or the rest of the species to traditional allocation
through fixed national quotas. This could be
done as a test for those willing to experiment
with the system, without any obligation of it
becoming the rule in all areas and all fisheries.
The effects of RBM could then be examined
on the basis of the results by those willingly
accepting the system.
A revision of the species under relative
stability
The species currently subject to relative sta-
bility (or not subject to it) is largely the result
of the historical evolution of the policy, not
necessarily the result of an analysis of what are
the key species, the ones that determine the
behavior of skippers in the fishing grounds. As
a result, today certain very important species in
European waters (i.e. sardine, sea bass) are still
not included into the TAC and quota system,
notably due to the difficulty of agreeing to an
allocation key, while other, very secondary
species (i.e. pollack, dab, and flounder) have
TACs and are subject to the discard ban even
though they are very marginal in the fisheries
where they are caught.
In Chapter 6 we examined the question from
the point of view of contributing to reduce
choke species effects. But the revision of species
under TAC could be done on more general
objectives, taking into account the overall
value of TAC setting of secondary stocks on
the target species and on the general effects
on the marine ecosystem. As we saw in that
chapter, the scientific basis for this exercise is
beginning to be available: a recent International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
report2 states that TACs of certain secondary
stocks could be removed without a significant
risk of contributing to overfishing of the target
species.
Such a revision would not only resolve some
of the rigidities of relative stability, but would
also re-focus the policy to the most important
issues and would increase the cost/efficiency
and simplicity of the whole policy.
2 www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication&percnt;
20Reports/Advice/2018/Special_requests/eu.2018.24
.pdf/

The establishment of a two-tier quota
system
The philosophy of this system was that the allo-
cation of fishing rights should be done on the
basis of the main species (the first tier), those
that determine the basic activity of fishermen.
On the contrary, the allocation of secondary
species (the second tier) should not necessar-
ily follow the same allocation, but rather a
complementary one where catch allowances
for such species are calculated based on the
–inevitable – by-catches of these secondary
species when fishing for the target ones, and all
based on the best scientific advice on by-catch
levels.
This is of course easier said than done, mainly
because among different fleets and Member
States there is a different notion of what is a
first-tier or a second-tier species. But defining
these species as first or second-tier is some-
thing that can be agreed for different areas, for
example by asking the Advisory Councils do so.
In the US, certain fisheries allocate the main
target species and then, following recommen-
dations from the industry itself, certain by-catch
quotas are established to avoid choke species
effects. The experience in some of these cases is
that the industry is often more efficient to take
this kind of decisions than public authorities.
The establishment of limited by-catch
quotas
The idea of establishing certain – limited – by-
catch quotas is not new, and has been used in
many management systems around the world.
Meaningfully, there are also some precedents in
the CFP. That is their biggest advantage: they
are a well-known feature of the CFP already, so
their introduction in certain stocks would not
be a revolution, but just an extension to new
stocks of an approach already applied under the
CFP. Examples of existing by-catch quotas are:
• Tusk in ICES areas I, II, and XIV
• Tusk in ICES area IV
• Tusk in ICES areas V, VI, and VII
• Blue ling in ICES areas Vb, VI, and VII
• Blue ling in ICES area XII
• Blue ling in ICES areas II and IV
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 349
• Ling in ICES areas I and II
• Bluefin tuna in the East Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean
• Swordfish in the North Atlantic
• Black scabbardfish in ICES areas V, VI, VII,
and XII
• Roundnose grenadier in ICES areas Vb, VI,
and VII
• Red seabream in ICES areas VI, VII, and VIII.
The system of by-catch quotas is largely used
in the US system to ensure that the quota
holders of the main target species are not
held back because of their absence of quota
of certain secondary ones that are impossible
to avoid. It is relevant, in this context, that
these by-catch quotas are established according
to recommendations from regional Advisory
Councils based on information of real levels
of – inevitable – by-catches.
It is important to emphasize that by-catch
quotas can provide a level of flexibility that can
successfully reduce discards, protect fish stocks
and enhance profits of the fleets in the long
term (Simons et al. 2015). This means that such
a solution is not a “desperate” one to resolve
choke species effects.
Handling over-quota catches
Another solution can be to allow certain levels
of catches of fish beyond quota, but to sub-
ject them to a different market regime that
would discourage economically such practice.
In that sense, while inevitable by-catches of
over-quota fish could still be landed (avoiding
the species concerned to become choke) the
market value of such fish would be lower, thus
discouraging such a practice to the extent pos-
sible. Two examples can be mentioned in this
context: New Zealand’s “catch balance regime”
and Iceland’s system of retaining 50% of the
value of the over-quota fish.
The catch balance regime was introduced in
New Zealand in 2001 to cater for situations
where vessels would catch in excess of their
individual quota. Rather than using penalties,
the system uses economic incentives: if fisher-
men do not manage to buy quota to cover all
their catches, they can still land and sell their
350 Chapter 14
excess catches, but they have to pay a high
“deemed value” of such catch, which is set at a
high value to encourage fishermen to obtain all
the necessary quotas in advance.
Such a system requires the existence of a mar-
ket for quotas, something that does not exist
at EU level and at national level only in a few
Member States. Beyond the obvious interest of
such a system at the level of Member States,
the use of the economic incentives at EU level
could also be explored, for example by admit-
ting excess catches but against a high sale price
that could be used to fund fisheries control and
research.
In Iceland, for example, a system operates by
allowing the landing of over-quota fish but dis-
counting 50% of the sale value of such fish that
is subsequently dedicated to research.
The above systems, with perhaps certain
adaptations, could be at least tested in the EU.
In Chapter 9 we referred to the need to include
the possibility of testing new approaches. This
possibility could be used to run tests in reduced
fleets to see what effects they would produce.
A revamping of relative stability:
from single-stock shares to combined
shares
All the above options are based on the same
model: preserving the notion of relative stability
based on single-stock TACs and their respective
allocation keys. But a different, more radical
approach is possible: turning the principle from
a system of fishing rights on individual stocks
to one based on the overall production and
economic benefit obtained from all the fisheries
as a whole.
This would be surprisingly easy to do in a few
steps, as follows:
1 Summing up all national quotas for all stocks
combined.
2 Doing that sum for a number of years (say,
the last 10 years) to average out changes
in TAC levels affecting different Member
States differently. The average total quota for
the last 10 years would represent the total
amount of fish that every Member State
obtains under the current allocation keys.
3 That sum, however, would represent tonnes
of fish, not value. And a tonne of sole is
worth much more than a tonne of sandeel.
To compensate for that, the same calculation
as above would be done by multiplying the
average number of tonnes per stock by their
cod equivalent, which is a well-accepted
proxy to market value.
4 This would provide a total average quota enti-
tlement for every Member State expressed
in cod equivalents, as the best proxy of the
entitlement of every Member State to benefit
from Europe’s fishery resources. This would
be the new expression of the existing relative
stability.
5 The above entitlements being fixed by Mem-
ber States, then the individual quota enti-
tlements by stock per Member State would
be compared with every Member State catch
composition in the fishing grounds. From
that comparison, transfers would be done to
match, as much as possible, national quota
entitlements with the real catch composition
by Member State, and all respecting the over-
all cod equivalent quota by Member State.
This method would allow something extreme-
ly important: it would maintain the essence of
relative stability (every Member State would
keep its proportional share of the fisheries’
bonus) but the specific allocation by stock
would be much more adapted to the real world.
The advantages of this approach would be clear:
• This new system would practically eliminate
the choke species generated by today’s alloca-
tion keys, thus facilitating the practical imple-
mentation of the landing obligation.
• This would allow a much more efficient rate
of quota consumption, thus increasing the
sustainable production of seafood.
• This would also reduce considerably the need
for quota swaps.
• The system would also likely increase the
profitability of the industry by matching
fishing rights with the species found in the
fishing grounds.
This idea could be implemented if there are
two main conditions: political will to re-open

a politically difficult issue, and a very good
communication and education strategy, to
overcome the likely resistance that may occur
by all those who consider relative stability a
sacred cow that cannot even be discussed.
However, the price of not doing this exercise
would be higher: unless it evolves, relative
stability will become farther and farther away
from the reality of the fishing grounds and
this will make it increasingly at odds with the
effective implementation of the policy and with
the industry’s economic performance. In other
words, it will lose the very reason why it was
established in the first place.
The Mediterranean: a new
management paradigm
In Chapters 1 and 5 we stressed the enormous
differences between the Mediterranean and the
Atlantic in terms of policy development and
results. Attempts to “cut and paste” Atlantic
policy to the Mediterranean have failed, and
will continue to do so. It is therefore opportune
to discuss if, in the context of the next reform,
the CFP could change the paradigm in Mediter-
ranean fisheries and adopt a distinct policy,
with specific policy objectives and, perhaps,
even with specific instruments.
This idea runs counter to the EU tradition of
ensuring a level playing field through policy
harmonization. But given the very different sit-
uation and policy results as shown in Chapter 1
it is necessary to be bold and think about an
entirely different approach. This approach
could include the following components:
• A new definition of policy objectives, focused
on a high and sustainable yields of mixed
fisheries, and much less dependent on spe-
cific objectives for individual stocks. In other
words, more ecosystem-based policy objec-
tives where the emphasis would be put on
the notion of “optimal harvest” of the marine
ecosystem, a somewhat equivalent to an
“ecosystem MSY”.
• The deadline to achieve this objective should
also be realistic: the point of departure is
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 351
so distant from any MSY-related objective
that it would be necessary to provide for
more time to achieve the objective, so that
the necessary reduction in fishing activity
would be possible to achieve by the industry.
The need to advance at multilateral level
within General Fisheries Commission for the
Mediterranean (GFCM) also calls for a more
gradual approach.
• Effort management combined with time/area
closures would seem to be the preferred
instrument, but TACs might also be applied
to certain fisheries, such as for example those
on small pelagic fish.
• Specific instruments in the structural policy,
to address the exceptional circumstances
existing in this sea basin, and this could
include specific scrapping programs.
• A very flexible system to take into account
the need to learn from experience and adapt
the approach as necessary.
• Specific provisions to adapt the management
to the effects of climate change and the asso-
ciated invasive species.
• A special effort to facilitate the adoption of a
full and systematic system of management of
the main fisheries at the level of GFCM.
In sum, the Mediterranean needs a special
effort to bring stock recovery and thus should
as much as possible reflect the specific charac-
teristics of this sea basin. Otherwise, the current
approach based on a theoretical level playing
field with the Atlantic becomes only an alibi for
failing to make any effective progress.
Should the CFP manage
recreational fishing?
This question has always been politically
charged. In a policy characterized by a high
degree of detail as corresponding to exclusive
EU competence, certain attempts to interfere
with the national (even regional) management
of this activity has been resented and opposed
as an undue interference by the EU on issues
that are best managed at national or local level.
However, in certain specific cases, there is an
obvious need to include considerations about
352 Chapter 14
this activity to ensure that the EU fish manage-
ment policy can achieve its objectives: when
and where the contribution of recreational fish-
eries to the overall fishing mortality of a stock
is very significant, it seems necessary that the
EU system should at least take this activity into
account. The recreational fisheries interests are
increasingly active in vindicating their activity.
They are already represented in the Advisory
Councils, and regularly advocate their case
publicly, underlining its economic importance.
In other cases, such as the Mediterranean, the
impact of recreational fishing is such that this
led the industry to request some management
measures: the prohibition by fishermen to use
professional gear, as established in Regulation
1967/2006 (EU 2006).
The issue of recreational fishing was not
touched upon during the negotiation for the
2013 CFP reform, but it was discussed on the
occasion of the negotiation of the current reg-
ulation on the fisheries control system of the
CFP. The solution found was to consider that
only in special circumstances will the Council
take management measures (EU 2009b):
Where a recreational fishery is found to have a sig-
nificant impact, the Council may decide . . . to sub-
mit recreational fisheries . . . to specific manage-
ment measures such as fishing authorisations and
catch declarations.
This provision, however, has never been
invoked in practice. Apart from being mis-
placed (it is not a control provision), this article
has implications for which the CFP traditionally
has preferred to stay out.
Yet, reality shows that recreational fishing
can be a very significant component of the
fishing mortality of a certain number of stocks
in the EU. In such cases, experience shows that
the exclusion of recreational activities from the
purview of the CFP only complicates manage-
ment. Short of direct regulation, at least on the
most important cases the CFP has to ensure that
the effects of recreational fisheries are taken
into account in the evaluation of certain stocks
and that the corresponding catches be reported
and counted against overall catch limits.
The current situation has to be revised, at the
very least for those stocks where recreational
fishing represents a substantial contribution to
fishing mortality. Drawing from the example of
the US, recreational fishing should not be taboo
in the CFP. It should be openly integrated in
management, at least for certain cases. And this
may provide certain surprises, in particular that
in some cases the recreational catches may not
correspond to relative stability. This probably
contributes in no small measure to Member
States’ reticence to consider this activity. How-
ever, the lack of information on these fisheries
only hampers good scientific advice and con-
tributes to establish an unrealistic picture of
the biological and economic implications of
management.
The CFP should integrate the effects of
recreational fishing in the evaluation and man-
agement of those stocks in which recreational
catches represent a significant part of total fish-
ing mortality. ICES should bring all the data on
recreational catches and integrate such data in
the evaluations. TACs should subsequently be
established taking these catches into account.
Subsequently, each Member State should
decide what part of its national quota should be
exploited commercially and what part would be
set aside for recreational purposes. The recre-
ational fisheries themselves should continue to
be subject to national management: “Brussels”
should not be establishing the specific rules
applicable to these fisheries.
This would not apply to all stocks, but only for
those where the scientific advice would show a
high contribution of recreational fishing to the
total fishing mortality. The CFP would establish
criteria to determine what “high contribution”
means.
What future for the fishery
structural funds?
The structural funds have been an integral part
of the CFP from the beginning. In fact, the first
regulation providing for structural measures

for the fisheries sector dates back to 1970 that
is, 13 years before the birth of the CFP itself.
Despite the changes over time, the CFP’s struc-
tural pillar has been extremely stable in many
other respects, such as for example regarding
certain measures that have continued for a very
long time:
• Aid for the modernization of vessels, under
evolving conditions.
• Aid for temporary cessation of fishing, also
under evolving conditions and with an end
date in 2017.
• Clear support for the development of aqua-
culture.
• Aid to equip vessels with control and surveil-
lance material becoming compulsory under
EU law.
These measures have continued in a context
of insufficient or completely absent evaluation
of their effects. In some cases, one can also argue
that certain types of aid are not always necessar-
ily consistent with the basic philosophy of the
EU structural funds. For example, one can won-
der why the EU should pay for the equipment
on surveillance and control (video manage-
ment system [VMS], electronic logbook) that
EU legislation requires. The general trend in the
structural funds is that they should not be used
to allow for the fulfillment of legal obligations
under EU law. Yet, this funding creates a certain
dependency from the EU funds: Member States
can argue that if such funds are not available,
it would not be possible to fully comply with
EU law! This compares with the situation in
other non-EU countries where the costs of
management (scientific advice and control) are
totally or partially paid for by the industry itself.
An instrument to promote policy
change, not to maintain the status
quo
EU structural funds are there to address Mem-
ber States’ structural deficiencies, so as to make
itself unnecessary when such deficiencies are
corrected. In practice however, much of the
structural policy has been used to maintain the
status quo and even in some cases to prevent
change. The policy has perpetuated itself, by
taking for granted that a number of measures
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 353
continue to be necessary even in the absence
of any objective analysis demonstrating if they
actually address market failures.
As we saw in Chapter 9 as regards economic
advice, there has been little progress in iden-
tifying the real market failures in the fisheries
policy. There are also important interests, both
in the industry and certain national adminis-
trations, who consider that the fishing industry
is a strategic food-producing sector that, by its
own strategic nature, should enjoy public eco-
nomic support over and beyond market consid-
erations.
That philosophy has contributed to create
a tradition where structural measures are
renewed without analysis of their real effects
and needs, but rather as an acquired right.
If this philosophy continues to be applied by
co-legislators, the risk that the policy will not
be used to support policy change, but rather
to preserve the status quo will continue to be
significant. For that reason, it is important
that the future discussions on the Commission
proposal for a new fisheries fund (EU 2018b)
will address this question as the one that should
inspire the final shape of the fund.
What structural funds for the future
CFP?
The discussion of the future structural funds
will, unfortunately, be de-coupled with that of
the possible policy reform. Unlike the excep-
tional circumstances of the current fund,
adopted in 2014 right after the 2013 policy
reform, in this case the new fund should be
ready by 2021, before any decision on possible
future CFP reform will be made. This makes
it particularly challenging to ensure that the
new fund will reflect the possible changes of
the policy and ensure it can be a real tool to
accompany such changes.
The new proposal
By the time these pages are written a proposal
for a new structural instrument will has been
adopted by the European Commission, to cover
the period 2021–2027 (EU 2018c). It is, again,
premature to anticipate how the proposal will
fare in the future trilogue with the co-legislators,
354 Chapter 14
but at least the proposal contains a number of
interesting elements that could address the
above shortcomings:
• The proposal recognizes that the ex-post
evaluation of the European Maritime and
Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 2014–2020 recom-
mended improving the link between the
funding and policy objectives, a clear recog-
nition of the weakness mentioned above.
• It establishes four objectives, including
“fostering sustainable fisheries and the con-
servation of marine biological resources.”
This priority includes support for achieving
MSY objectives, implementing the landing
obligation and, support to science and con-
trol and, crucially, inclusion of well-targeted
scrapping funds.
• The identification of climate change as a
fundamental objective of all the structural
policy (30% of all funds should be related to
that objective). It will however be important
to see if the specific nature of the mea-
sures finally agreed by the co-legislators will
indeed contribute to achieve the ambitious
goals established.
• A second objective is focused on the EU’s
food security including aquaculture and
market measures. This is a very important
point to address the fundamental strategic
question of maximizing the production of
seafood (see Chapter 13).
These are promising elements. The upcoming
negotiation of this fund will be essential to see if
the structural pillar of the CFP can, once and for
all, become the fundamental financial support
that the policy needs to accompany necessary
change, both to address policy objectives and to
face emerging challenges, and not just to pre-
serve the status quo.
The following are some ideas for reflection
with a view to the future discussion about the
instrument that will replace the current EMFF
after 2020.
The need for better targeting
The budget of the EMFF for the period
2014–2020 is €5 749 331 600 (EU 2014,
Article 13). When decided, this amount was
considered very satisfactory, even surprisingly
high, given that the discussion on the 2014–2020
financial perspectives was difficult at macro-
economic level, and also the fact that new poli-
cies (i.e. climate change) came into play. This
success in securing a very substantial package
of structural funds for fisheries and maritime
policy was due, inter alia, to the presentation of
this fund as an instrument to accompany the
implementation of a newly modified policy.
These favorable circumstances may not nec-
essarily be repeated when it comes to decide
on the structural priorities for the period
2021–2027, for at least two reasons:
• Brexit may imply a reduction of contribution
to the EU budget, as the UK is a net contrib-
utor.
• There may not be a reform agenda justifying
a substantial fisheries fund.
• There may be a tendency to simplify the
funds and eliminate the smallest of the five
ESI funds currently available. If the current
EMFF is subsumed into a larger fund, there
is a possibility that total funds really available
for fisheries may diminish.
The above scenarios are all theoretical. By the
time these pages are written, it is too early to
anticipate what changes will be produced in the
structural funds as of 2021. However, the sce-
nario of a reduction in the fisheries funds must
at least be considered as a possibility, and sce-
narios must be prepared on the future shape of
such funds if the budgetary reduction ever takes
place.
One obvious consequence of a reduction of
the structural budget would be the need to
target better the lower funds available. The
current EMFF, despite its consideration of a
fund “to accompany the implementation of the
new CFP” as adopted the year before, actually
enlarged the scope of the measures available
more than ever before. In doing so, it clearly
lost focus on the main objectives of the CFP. If
anything, the future structural policy should
try to recover the philosophy of the initial
Commission proposal for the EMFF: to focus on
fundamental policy objectives to be an effective
instrument to accompany their achievement.
Some of these possible new challenges are
referred to below.

Adaptations to new challenges: from global
warming to Brexit
The EMFF was theoretically adapted to the
new context of global warming. However, it is
not straightforward to see the results of this.
We have presented the idea of the need for an
ambitious plan to adapt the CFP to the challenge
of global warming. This will have to imply a
shake-up to some traditional visions of the
structural policy that are traditionally based on
business as usual.
Brexit will be another challenge for the struc-
tural funds, and not only because of the likely
reduction in funds, but also because of likely
changes in areas of fishing and even traditional
market circuits. The need to create new mar-
ket opportunities outside the UK is already a
well-identified problem by the Irish industry, for
example. This implies that the industry of the
EU-27 will have to undergo adaptations to this
effect.
This, incidentally, may also have other effects:
as the effects of Brexit will be very different
for different Member States (high for Ireland,
Spain, France, and North Sea Member States,
low for Mediterranean and Baltic Member
States). This may also prompt a re-discussion
of the allocation of fisheries fund among EU
Member States, with those most affected by
the possible loss of UK fishing grounds, and
markets claiming a higher share of funds on
account of the higher impact of Brexit on their
fishing industries.
A mechanism driven by market failures
The future EMFF could focus more on the
market failures of the policy. The CFP, like all
EU policies, develops under an open market
economy. This is, after all, one of the essential
conditions for membership to the EU. The
structural policy is not there to replace the
markets, but to correct their inefficiencies. This
initial philosophy has long been ignored since
the different structural instruments of the CFP
have indeed applied many instruments that,
at least in theory, could and should have been
handled by the free and open markets. Then the
next question is: what are the market failures
of the CFP?
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 355
The answer is not straightforward. One rea-
son for this is that the idea of a market failure
is not unequivocal; different Member States
and stakeholders have different views about
this question, but perhaps more importantly,
because the effect of the different structural
measures on the CFP have never been really
evaluated from that perspective.
This is changing, notably since the services of
the Commission undertook to revamp the eco-
nomic advice to the CFP, on the basis of the time
series of economic data now available under the
data collection policy. One of the uses of these
new analyses can be (and should be) to eval-
uate the effect of different structural measures
of the CFP into the general delivery of policy
objectives.
For example, the need and opportunity
of continuing with policies such as the
co-financing of vessel modernization, or tempo-
rary cessation of fishing, has never been evalu-
ated on the basis of a serious economic analysis.
How do these two instruments influence the
larger question of fleet overcapacity? Have they
delayed the solution to the overcapacity prob-
lem? And, especially, have they contributed
to achieve any of the objectives of Article 39
TFEU? And the problems they have addressed,
are they difficult or impossible to solve through
market mechanisms?
As these questions are increasingly answered
by economic analysis, it should be possible to
start looking into the different measures today
still available under EMFF to see which ones are
really necessary to favor the achievement of the
policy objectives of the CFP and that the market
forces themselves do not guarantee.
Financing the fulfillment of legal
obligations?
This is a necessary, though politically delicate
debate. Theoretically, the structural policy is not
meant to subsidize the investments necessary
for private operators to fulfill their legal obliga-
tions related to EU law. Yet, this is exactly what
the CFP has been doing all along, for example in
the case of VMS and other control equipment.
Should this continue forever? The question is
356 Chapter 14
related to the opportunity of discussing some
form of (at least partial) cost-recovery by the
industry. The EU policy in this question is in
stark contrast with the tendencies observed
in the most successful cases of fisheries man-
agement around the world. To the extent
that the structural funds will continue taking
for granted that control equipment to fulfill
legal obligations will always be paid for by the
administration, any possible debate on cost
recovery will never happen.
Another related question is whether the
structural funds should continue co-financing
Member States’ investments on control, which
remains their exclusive competence. The tradi-
tional wisdom that this aid has been instru-
mental in improving Member States’ control
capabilities should not prevent a discussion
on an important question: why should the EU
continue to pay a large part of the investment
(and even running costs in some cases!) on
control when Member States fiercely keep this
policy pillar under national competence?
Financing the contribution to governance?
I have advocated above that a more collabora-
tive approach to governance would mean, inter
alia, a heavier investment from the industry in
the decision-making process. This involvement
would be burdensome for the industry, even
more than today, when certain sectors of the
industry already wonder if participation in ACs
is worth the investment. Whether it is through
providing Producer Organizations a role in this
context, or through other means, it would be
important to consider the financing of the par-
ticipation in the Advisory Councils and perhaps
other forms of getting involved in governance.
Today, ACs enjoy a Commission financing
through a lump sum of €300 000 a year. This
can cover travel costs to participants, but it is
more than questionable if this sum can really
cover all the involvement necessary (includ-
ing outside AC meetings) for a collaborative,
bottom–up decision-making system. And this
is particularly important for small-scale fish-
ermen. We have already referred to the de
facto under-representation of this sector that
often fails to attend meetings even if financing
is available. Lack or insufficiency of a public
support system to the full participation of the
industry will benefit the most industrial sectors
that, unlike artisanal ones, can afford to invest
in governance. If the future CFP considers mov-
ing in the direction of a more collaborative sys-
tem, it will have to provide the means to ensure
that all the industry sectors are given a fair
chance of being well-represented in the process.
This point may appear contradictory with the
previous one, but it is not. While control is a
national competence, the management of fish
stocks is part of the core responsibilities of the
EU. And while the obligation to abide by EU law
is an obligation for private operators regardless
of any financial aid scheme, the management
system is an EU competence where it makes
sense that the EU tries to ensure all possible
support mechanisms to facilitate its successful
functioning.
Introducing market mechanisms
in the CFP?
In Chapter 11 we saw why and how the Com-
mission to apply RBM at national level did not
make headway in the 2013 reform. For the
next reform, it is relevant to raise the question
again, albeit under a different perspective,
learning from the 2013 experience. RBM can
have several advantages:
• It can contribute to introduce much-needed
flexibility into the fixed allocation of fishing
rights under relative stability, as we saw in
the section on “Relative stability” above.
• It would facilitate the resolution of the prob-
lem of choke species and would contribute to
make the landing obligation more effective in
practice.
• It can contribute to a better balance between
fleet capacity and resources and to a general
improvement in profitability and competi-
tiveness.
• It can increase the industry’s responsibility in
the management of the stocks.
• It can facilitate the introduction of cost
recovery and other mechanisms of direct

participation of the industry in the costs of
management.
Yet, as we saw in Chapter 11, the idea of
introducing RBM even at national level was
rejected in 2013. Should the Commission
try again? The answer to this question is, in
principle, straightforward: no. That is, if the
proposals are the same as in 2013. But we have
to remember that in 2013 there was also a
number of Member States and members of the
European parliament that were in favor. This
makes it opportune if RBM could be proposed
again but under different conditions.
An alternative approach: RBM partial
and optional
In Chapter 11 we examined the reasons for
the failure of the RBM proposal in RBM. These
reasons are legitimate, and are not likely to
disappear any time soon. A possible alternative
would be to introduce RBM only partially
and voluntarily at EU level, and then let the
experience determine if other Member States
and or fishing segments would consider the
experience positive and would like to join in
the system. This is, after all, how RBM systems
have tended to be introduced: first in some
fisheries and then extended to others if and
when the experience showed positive results.
Under this different light, some options may
be worth considering:
• Partial application of RBM to a limited num-
ber of fisheries, for example those where the
industry concerned would be in favor. In the
past, the European pelagic fleet (including
Norwegian interests) has been open to this
possibility. This would not constitute a prece-
dent to other fleet segments if they are not
ready to go down that road.
• Allocating part of the TACs for this purpose,
thus leaving a percentage of national quotas
to Member States (notably for their more
artisanal fleets) but bringing to the market
a given percentage of the national quotas.
This would combine a traditional policy (for
small-scale fisheries for example, or for those
unwilling to participate) with RBM, in rela-
tive percentages that would be agreed among
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 357
those Member States participating voluntar-
ily. The percentages and conditions could be
recommended by the Advisory Councils.
The above debate is politically delicate and
difficult. But the potential benefits of RBM
systems, particularly under the new CFP with a
discard ban and a serious problem with choke
species, the question could be given some
consideration. The idea of testing this kind of
instrument as a pilot project within a certain
fleet sector willing to give it a try justifies the
need to accommodate the possibility of testing
new management approaches in the CFP as
suggested in Chapter 9.
A specific policy for small-scale
fishing?
The possible establishment of a more specific
policy for small-scale fishing within the CFP
could be discussed for a number of reasons:
• A separate policy could include an allocation
of fishing rights for the small-scale sector that
would be “protected” from market mech-
anisms. This in turn would perhaps allow
the consideration of market mechanisms
for the large-scale part of the fleets with-
out the fear of undermining the small-scale
sector.
• The use of structural funds has always been
dominated by larger fishing interests, and
the small-scale sector has been, very often,
squeezed out from the structural investment.
As mentioned above, the key for the suc-
cess of a separate policy would be to ensure
these interests a fair share of the resources. At
present, since the responsibility of allocating
national quotas is an exclusive competence of
the Member States, the CFP cannot impose,
only recommend that Member States allocate a
fair amount of these national fishing rights to
small-scale fishing. However, for future debates,
the idea that the CFP itself will establish some
minimum share of the overall resources to be
allocated only among small-scale sectors of the
EU could be explored, in the context of the revi-
sion of relative stability advocated above. This
358 Chapter 14
share could enjoy, for example, the protection
of not being transferable to larger scale sectors
under any circumstance. This share would not
be the same in all Member States: it would have
to take into account the relative importance of
small-scale fishing in different Member States
and even the absence of such a sector in a few
ones, like the Netherlands or Belgium.
This would have a twofold effect:
• Providing the small-scale sector with a sense
of protection that would allow them to look
at their own future in a more creative way,
without the fear of being swallowed by larger
interests. This would also allow the adop-
tion of special regimes on control, technical
measures and so on, well-adapted to this
sector.
• Liberating the larger scale sector and allow-
ing them to take more business-like manage-
ment practices, that today the CFP does not
favor, notably for fear of affecting the small-
scale sectors.
Possible elements for a specific small-scale
policy could be, for example:
• Provide a specific framework for these fleets,
including control, the collection of data, and
so on. It should be a simpler, lighter system,
based on sampling.
• Ring-fence a proportion of national quotas
to this sector. That proportion would be
different for different Member States, but it
could be enshrined in EU law to ensure its
long-term stability. These quotas would be
protected from quota trading mechanisms.
• Establish an obligation for Member States to
limit access by larger boats to certain areas
of fishing, so small-scale vessels would have
exclusive access to certain fishing grounds
within Member States’ territorial seas.
• Have a specific chapter of the structural pol-
icy with ring-fenced and specific measures for
small-scale fleets.
These ideas would need to be modulated dif-
ferently in different Member States according to
the relative weight of this sector in each of them,
and even simply not applied for those Member
States where this sector does not exist.
A reformulated discard policy
Even before the overall evaluation of the policy
that usually precedes any policy revision, the
current experience on the implementation of
the landing obligation of 2013 allows us to
draw some conclusions on the need for certain
changes in the way the policy is defined.
New objectives
In the section on “New policy objectives” above
we introduced the idea of new objectives for
the policy on discard reduction. These new
objectives could have inter alia the following
elements:
• A general objective to reduce discards as
much as practicable in all fisheries, taking
into account the different levels of discard-
ing in different fisheries, with a special
consideration for mixed fisheries.
• The setting up of a mechanism to enhance
quota exchanges when necessary to facilitate
implementation.
• An obligation to monitor discard levels
(through observers or cameras on board) at a
significant part of the fleets. This is important
because a more flexible approach should be
accompanied by more strict rules on imple-
mentation to ensure the credibility of the
approach.
• A general objective of increasing selectivity
so as to minimize the amount of unwanted
catches.
• The establishment of a plan to take care of
inevitable unwanted catches, along the lines
of existing experience in third countries.
The overall objective should be to have more
flexible objectives for the reduction of dis-
cards. In exchange for this flexibility, the policy
should give itself more instruments to ensure
that this flexible approach is really implemented
in practice, in what would be a fundamental
change of philosophy as compared with today’s
policy.
In any case, the need for these new objec-
tives would be determined by other factors,
notably the full use of existing and other pos-
sible flexibility mechanisms advocated in these

pages. Questions such as the evolution of the
policy toward more multi-species approaches
or toward the introduction of changes in rel-
ative stability or to the partial introduction
of RBM would have an important impact on
the discard policy. The more such flexibility
mechanisms are introduced, the less necessary
it would be to introduce flexibility in the policy
objectives themselves. These questions should
be discussed together at some stage.
Accepting (while discouraging)
over-quota landings
In certain countries, there are also mechanisms
to admit over-quota landings under certain con-
ditions that reduce choke species effects but at
the same time encouraging avoidance of such
catches in the first place:
• The New Zealand system of “deemed value”
allows over-quota catches to be landed, but
sold for a price fixed by the government with
the intention of rendering such landings
unattractive.
• In Canada, the groundfish fishery of the west
coast has for many years already accepted
over-the-quota landings, but the value such
landings has not benefited the fishermen
concerned, and has been used instead to
finance fisheries science and monitoring.
• In Iceland, a similar system allows over-quota
fish to be landed on condition that 50% of
their sale value be taken by the State to help
finance fisheries research.
Such mechanisms are not foreseen in the
CFP. True, they may not be simple to imple-
ment, in particular in the cases where catches
of a given stock can be landed in very different
places, and where official landing statistics
take some time to collate and become official.
These are real problems that cannot be ignored.
However, the increasing use of the electronic
logbook introduces the possibility of real-time
monitoring of catch levels by Member States,
at least for the largest vessels equipped with
this technology. This opens up the possibility of
developing, perhaps as a first pilot phase, the
idea of allowing certain landings of over-quota
species, under the condition that their value
Some ideas for the next CFP reform 359
would be entirely dedicated to support fisheries
science and monitoring (for example, to pay for
observers).
Do we need to change the basic
regulation?
A number of the changes suggested above
would not require modifications of the current
basic regulation. As explained in Chapter 1, this
basic regulation contains a number of features
that have not been fully developed in practice,
so introducing certain new policy strands may
simply require the political will to do so, and can
be done under the current legal basis. In other
cases, however, the implementation of alterna-
tive approaches may require either legislative
change or at least legislative clarification.
In this section we provide examples of
whether the ideas suggested in this book could
be carried out on the current legal basis or
whether changes or clarifications would be nec-
essary. This is done based on experience, not on
legal expertise. This experience points at a long
tradition of legislative flexibility when needed.
Policy changes not requiring
legislative change
Examples of policy reform that do not require
change in the current basic regulation can be:
• Less detailed and prescriptive legislation. As
we have argued, nothing prevents the
co-legislators, under the current legal basis,
to concentrate EU legislation more on prin-
ciple and objectives and less on prescriptive,
detailed rules. This interpretation may be
questioned by lawyers, particularly those
specialized in institutional questions. A
tendency to leave more details to regional-
ization, or to other forms of decision-making,
could be considered by some as a failure to
preserve legal prerogatives.
• A revamped relative stability. Relative stability
is a principle, not necessarily a specific set
of allocation keys. Indeed, some substantial
changes in specific allocation keys have been
introduced in the CFP without any legislative
360 Chapter 14

change at all. The example of blue whiting • A new definition of MSY objectives, specify-
in December 2005 has been explained by ing the elements of flexibility referred to in
this author (Penas Lado 2016). This demon- the section “New policy objectives” above.
strates that relative stability can be revamped • Some of the new policy objectives men-
even in the absence of legislative change. tioned in that section above would need
A different question, however, is whether to be included to complement the terms of
such revamping could take place outside the current Article 2.2 of Regulation 1380/2013.
framework that a policy reform can estab- • Variable objectives of the landing obligation.
lish, but that is more a political than a legal The new approach advocated above would
question. require changes in Article 15 of regulation
1380/2013.
Policy changes requiring clarification • A larger scope for regionalization. Article 18
or interpretation
of regulation 1380/2013 would need to be
Certain policy changes may not require a new
adapted to include more policy areas that
legal basis, but perhaps simply an interpretation
could be subject to regionalization.
of the current one. Among these:
• A possible new role for EFCA in the context
• The role of Bmsy . In Chapter 3 we explained
of the above process.
how the MSY concept, and the “aspira-
• A new regime for small-scale fisheries. A new
tional” objective of Bmsy could be worked
article would be needed establishing a clear
out in practice. While the text of Regulation
definition of small-scale, the possible deroga-
1380/2013 can legitimately be interpreted
tions from the general rules applicable to this
along the lines of the ideas exposed in this
sector, and the possible specific instruments
book, this is by no means agreed by every-
to be applicable to them.
body, and a number of decision-makers
• A new regime for recreational fisheries. Over
(notably some MEPs in the European
and beyond Articles 51–54 of the control
Parliament) and stakeholders (notably envi-
regulation (1224/2009), a new article would
ronmental NGOs) are either unconvinced
precise the specific scope of fisheries and
or adverse to such interpretations. This is
measures to be subject to EU management,
therefore an area where, short of legislative
as well as the policy elements that would
changes, at least the future policy should
stay at Member State level.
make an effort to clarify the interpretation
This list is non-exhaustive and only shows
of the basic objectives, to dissipate disagree-
the possible need for legislative change that
ments that only add complexity and difficulty
may be needed depending upon the intentions
in the adoption of management measures.
of the Commission and the co-legislators on
• Multi-species approaches. Theoretically they
policy reform. Although much can still be
can be applied, but the legal basis does not
done without questioning the current basic
entirely resolve the conflict between that
regulation, some policy changes or adjustments
option and the reference to “all stocks” in
would make it desirable to revise some of the
other parts of the text. A clarification of the
existing provisions of Regulation 1380/2013.
real meaning of “all stocks” could be made
without changing the legal text.

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(EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC)
No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No
388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007,
(EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No
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2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006.
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22.12.2009.
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repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2328/2003,
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pean Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing
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Parliament and of the Council. COM/2018/390
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(2010). Designed for failure: a critique of the com-
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(2012). 21st century fisheries management: a
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fss033.
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Quest for Sustainability. Wiley Blackwell, 392 pp.
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(2010). Unsuitability of TAC management within
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Glossary
Advisory Councils (ACs): Stakeholder bodies
established under the CFP to advise on policy
decisions.
Acquis communautaire or acquis: EU legislation
applicable at any given moment.
Blim : Limit reference point for spawning stock
biomass (SSB).
Bmsy : Spawning stock biomass (SSB) that results from
fishing at FMSY for a long time.
Benthic community: The benthic community is
made up of organisms that live in and on the bottom
of the ocean floor. These organisms are known as
benthos. Benthos include worms, clams, crabs, lob-
sters, sponges, and other tiny organisms that live
in the bottom sediments.
Biodiversity: The variety of plant and animal life in
the world or in a particular habitat, a high level
of which is usually considered to be important and
desirable.
“Brexit”: Neologism referring to the exit of the
United Kingdom from the European Union.
Choke species: A term used to describe a species
with a low quota that can cause a vessel to stop
fishing even if they still have quota for other
species.
Co-decision: A procedure, in the European Union,
that requires consensus to be reached between the
Council and the Parliament for legislation to be
adopted. Since 2010 it is the ordinary legislative
procedure for the CFP.
Council of Ministers: Government ministers from
each EU country meet to discuss, amend and adopt
laws, and coordinate policies.
Demersal fish: Demersal fish live and feed on or near
the bottom of the sea.
Discards: Discards are the portion of a catch of fish
which is not retained on board during commercial
fishing operations and are returned, often dead or
dying, to the sea.
Ecosystem approach: Ecosystem approach to fish-
eries management. Management that takes into
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
account the effects of fisheries on the ecosystem
and the effects of the ecosystem on the fish stocks.
Fmsy : Fishing mortality consistent with achieving
maximum sustainable yield.
Fish mortality: Fish mortality is a parameter used
in fisheries population dynamics to account for the
loss of fish in a fish stock through death. The mor-
tality can be divided into two types:
• Natural mortality: The removal of fish from
the stock due to causes not associated with
fishing. Such causes can include disease, compe-
tition, cannibalism, old age, predation, pollution
or any other natural factor that causes the death
of fish. In fisheries models natural mortality is
denoted by (M).
• Fishing mortality: The removal of fish from
the stock due to fishing activities using any
fishing gear. It is denoted by (F) in fisheries
models.
Marine Protected Area (MPA): Protected areas of
seas, oceans or estuaries. These marine areas can
come in many forms ranging from wildlife refuges
to research facilities. They restrict human activity
for a conservation purpose, typically to protect nat-
ural resources.
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY): The value of
the largest positive difference between total rev-
enues and total costs of fishing (including the cost
of labor and capital) with all inputs valued at their
opportunity costs.
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY): The max-
imum level at which a natural resource can be
routinely exploited without long-term depletion.
Pelagic fish: Fish living in the open ocean near the
surface, as opposed to coastal areas or the ocean
floor.
Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB): The combined
weight of all individuals in a fish stock that are
capable of reproducing.
Regionalization: In the context of the EU’s Com-
mon Fisheries Policy, procedure whereby groups of
363
364 Glossary
Member States are authorized to develop basic EU
fisheries legislation applicable in a given area.
Relative stability: Principle according to which fish-
ery resources managed by the EU are shared out
among EU Member States as fixed percentages.
Total Allowable Catch (TAC): A catch limit set for
a particular fishery, generally for a year or a fish-
ing season. TACs are usually expressed in tonnes
of live-weight equivalent, but are sometimes set in
terms of numbers of fish.
Trawl: The trawls are cone-shaped nets (made from
two, four or more panels) which are towed, by
one or two boats, on the bottom or in midwater
(pelagic). The cone-shaped body ends in a bag or
cod end.
Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU): Current legal basis for the EU.
Adopted in 2009, entered into force in 2010. Also
referred to as “Treaty of Lisbon.”
Trilogue Neologism referring to the “dialogue of
three” (Council of Ministers, European Parliament
and European Commission) whereby the three
institutions negotiate EU legislation under the
co-decision procedure.
Abbreviations

ACs: Advisory Councils NMFS: National Marine Fisheries Service

EFCA: European Fisheries Control Agency
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
GFCM: General Fisheries Commission for the
Mediterranean
ICCAT: International Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas
ICES: International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea
ITQ: Individual Transferable Quota
MCRS: Minimum Conservation Reference Size
MSY: Maximum Sustainable Yield
NAFO: Northeast Atlantic Fishery Organization
NEAFC: North East Atlantic Fishery Commission
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration
RBM: Rights-Based Management
RFMO: Regional Fishery Management Organization
STECF: Scientific, Technical and Economics Commit-
tee for Fisheries
TAC: Total Allowable Catch
TCM: Technical Conservation Measures
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union
UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea

Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

365
Index
Advisory Councils, 99, 120, 130, 155, 195, 196, 198,
199, 200, 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 226, 231,
232, 233, 234, 331, 338, 340, 341, 349, 352,
356, 357
Aquaculture, 15, 17, 18, 22, 36, 120, 135, 165, 171,
176, 178, 180, 206, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299,
300, 301, 302, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310,
311, 323, 324, 325, 328, 329, 330, 335, 336,
346, 353, 354
Baltic, 7, 18, 32, 35, 44, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63,
77, 78, 81, 82, 83, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 107, 114, 127, 129, 142, 144, 145, 148,
149, 150, 157, 162, 166, 181, 220, 221, 225,
228, 234, 318, 322, 338, 347, 355
Biomass, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 30, 44, 45, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 72, 76, 79,
80, 85, 93, 101, 151, 166, 174, 182, 205, 220,
222, 241, 246, 257, 262, 270, 291, 292, 294,
306, 318, 320, 322, 326, 336, 342
Climate change, 2, 9, 23, 95, 96, 98, 105, 120, 177,
203, 207, 224, 244, 256, 257, 258, 259, 286,
295, 296, 297, 300, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309,
310, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324,
343, 344, 351, 354
Co-decision, 8, 56, 57, 108, 192, 194, 218, 219, 220,
221, 225, 229, 231, 277, 278, 337, 338, 339
Council (of ministers), 1, 2, 7, 8, 18, 30, 55, 56, 57, 87,
106, 127, 146, 163, 192, 194, 219, 220, 221,
234, 265, 274, 277, 278, 303, 318, 331, 343,
344, 347, 352
Court of Justice, 7, 36, 127, 268, 272, 345
Discard(s), discarding, 6, 11, 12, 29, 34, 36, 55, 63, 66,
73, 74, 97, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127,
128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136,
140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 155, 156,
157, 162, 169, 181, 185, 186, 191, 193, 195,
196, 201, 207, 218, 224, 227, 231, 267, 272,
275, 276, 279, 280, 313, 318, 324, 336, 337,
339, 345, 348, 349, 357, 358, 359
Quo Vadis Common Fisheries Policy?, First Edition. Ernesto Penas Lado.
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2020 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Ecosystem approach, 50, 52, 53, 75, 81, 83, 84, 149,
151, 161, 162, 164, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182,
206, 339
EFCA, 132, 133, 234, 278, 279, 280, 342, 360
Environment, 4, 18, 22, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37, 38, 39,
43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 71, 77, 81, 117, 118, 121,
142, 145, 151, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166,
167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 192,
197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207,
211, 216, 217, 218, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226,
229, 230, 231, 233, 240, 244, 245, 249, 255,
260, 267, 274, 276, 285, 290, 291, 296, 297,
298, 299, 300, 301, 306, 310, 311, 312, 324,
326, 328, 329, 330, 331, 335, 339, 341, 360
(European) Commission, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20,
25, 45, 47, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 65, 66, 77, 81, 86,
97, 100, 103, 104, 111, 112, 113, 114, 120, 122,
123, 124, 125, 126, 129, 142, 145, 146, 151,
152, 155, 161, 162, 166, 183, 184, 194, 195,
196, 199, 202, 204, 206, 207, 209, 212, 213,
215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 224, 225, 227, 230,
231, 234, 251, 252, 254, 255, 265, 266, 267,
271, 272, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283,
285, 293, 299, 303, 304, 305, 311, 318, 324,
327, 328, 330, 335, 338, 340, 341, 342, 345,
353, 354, 355, 356, 357
(European) Parliament, 2, 8, 18, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62,
106, 127, 129, 144, 154, 183, 192, 194, 218,
219, 220, 234, 268, 272, 273, 274, 277, 278,
318, 357, 360
Fishing mortality, 13, 14, 20, 25, 36, 44, 45, 47, 48,
49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61,
64, 66, 67, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 91, 92, 93, 96,
101, 104, 106, 107, 112, 117, 120, 126, 141,
142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 150, 153, 155, 162,
166, 182, 183, 192, 198, 207, 219, 220, 225,
285, 286, 291, 292, 293, 318, 322, 331, 332,
336, 339, 352
Fleet, 5, 11, 17, 21, 36, 40, 43, 58, 65, 66, 71, 77, 78,
85, 90, 94, 95, 104, 108, 112, 115, 121, 122,
125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 143,
367
368 Index
Fleet (cont’d), 5, 11, 17, 21, 36, 40, 43, 58, 65, 66, 71,
77, 78, 85, 90, 94, 95, 104, 108, 112, 115, 121,
122, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137,
143, 146, 148, 150, 152, 155, 156, 166, 168,
169, 170, 171, 172, 181, 195, 198, 213, 214,
216, 218, 227, 231, 234, 239, 240, 241, 245,
248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 257, 260, 261, 265,
266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276,
278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 297, 302,
303, 304, 321, 322, 327, 346, 347, 348, 349,
350, 355, 356, 357, 358
Governance, 87, 123, 129, 130, 147, 152, 163, 181,
183, 191, 192, 199, 200, 202, 206, 210, 211,
218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226,
231, 232, 233, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 244,
245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254,
255, 258, 259, 279, 282, 289, 298, 301, 307,
309, 311, 324, 329, 330, 335, 336, 337, 339,
340, 341, 356
IUU, 37, 170, 202, 205, 239, 244, 247, 250, 251, 252,
253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 278
Landing obligation, 4, 9, 19, 27, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 46,
47, 54, 65, 66, 68, 73, 74, 76, 83, 88, 111, 112,
113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124,
126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137,
142, 149, 151, 155, 156, 157, 185, 195, 265,
266, 272, 273, 278, 279, 280, 286, 319, 342,
344, 347, 350, 354, 356, 358, 360
Marine protected area, 106, 174, 177, 240, 290
Maximum economic yield, 45
Maximum sustainable yield, 3, 18, 25, 27, 41, 43, 44,
49, 55, 59, 71, 73, 91, 144, 166, 191, 265, 291,
327, 336
Mediterranean, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 60, 61, 77,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 114, 124,
131, 142, 147, 148, 149, 151, 156, 157, 162,
165, 195, 221, 230, 240, 245, 276, 279, 281,
285, 286, 293, 295, 307, 308, 318, 335, 336,
340, 349, 351, 352, 355
Mesh size(s), 87, 91, 106, 107, 112, 147, 149, 150,
151, 152, 156, 157
Multiannual plan, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 68, 83, 84,
99, 105, 142, 192, 207, 218, 219, 220, 221, 225,
339
North Sea, 44, 47, 49, 54, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66,
73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 99, 111,
112, 114, 118, 120, 125, 130, 136, 153, 167,
168, 175, 182, 183, 204, 205, 212, 220, 221,
222, 224, 225, 230, 260, 293, 317, 319, 320,
327, 332, 355
Plastics, 171, 179, 310, 311, 312, 331
Regionalization, 4, 60, 146, 151, 152, 156, 163, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 218, 221, 224,
225, 226, 227, 231, 232, 265, 277, 337, 339,
340, 341, 359, 360
Relative stability, 2, 9, 33, 35, 46, 47, 54, 55, 64, 65,
66, 72, 81, 82, 83, 86, 105, 112, 120, 121, 122,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, 147,
148, 149, 181, 182, 183, 219, 266, 271, 272,
273, 319, 320, 322, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346,
347, 348, 350, 351, 356, 357, 359, 360
RFMO, 170, 248, 250, 251, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258,
259
Seafood, 10, 12, 14, 22, 33, 37, 38, 52, 79, 164, 177,
184, 215, 216, 218, 258, 296, 297, 298, 300,
303, 311, 323, 324, 327, 331, 335, 336, 337,
350, 354
Selectivity, 53, 61, 72, 73, 84, 85, 86, 92, 94, 99, 106,
107, 117, 126, 127, 129, 130, 136, 149, 150,
151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 184, 185, 226, 228,
276, 340, 358
STECF, 20, 82, 92, 94, 101, 102, 103, 104, 129, 145,
147, 196, 199, 200, 204, 207, 211, 212, 293
Technical measures, 62, 84, 85, 86, 91, 97, 107, 112,
129, 130, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 157, 162,
192, 206, 207, 226, 227, 231, 340, 358
Treaty, 8, 9, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 44, 45, 56, 57, 161,
167, 191, 219, 229, 277, 278, 302, 328, 345
Trilogue, 25, 54, 57, 60, 128, 220, 221, 353
Western waters, 35, 65, 122, 125, 137, 146, 229, 234,
338
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