FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997.]

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO , petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL ,
respondents.

Yolanda Quisumbing - Javellana & Associates for petitioner.

Joracio R. Viola, Sr. for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; ACCRETION AS A MODE OF ACQUIRING

PROPERTY; REQUISITES; LEGAL CONSEQUENCES. — Accretion as a mode of
acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river: and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to
the bank of the river. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited,
while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank; the
owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly
speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by
mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen hut is not automatically
registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through prescription by third
persons.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD REQUISITE NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
There is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners'
own tract of land: (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers.
Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of
their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948,
there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of
either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been
deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of
petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is
adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of
accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's
land which is adjacent to the river bank.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED LAND IS AN ACCRETION NOT ON A

RIVER BANK BUT ON A SEA BANK; THE APPLICABLE LAW IS NOT ARTICLE 457 OF
THE CIVIL CODE BUT ARTICLE 4 OF THE SPANISH LAW OF WATERS OF 1866. —
There is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the
Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already
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 settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be
remembered that we held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands and Valeriano (108
Phil. 336, 338 [1960]) that: "Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay
cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is part
of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same: 'Bay, — An opening into the
land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of
the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the
shore of the sea or of a lake,' 7 C.J. 1013-1014." The disputed land, thus, is an
accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the
foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code
but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE DISPUTED PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION ON A SEA

BANK, MANILA BAY BEING AN INLET OR AN ARM OF THE SEA; AS SUCH, THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY IS UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE SPANISH LAW OF WATERS
OF 1866, PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. — The instant controversy brings a
situation calling for the application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, the disputed land being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay
which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea. Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows: "Lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of
the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea
and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare
them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof." In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law,
unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the
same being an accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the
foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed
land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to
the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary
for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special
industries or for coast guard services. Petitioners utterly fail to show that either
the executive or legislative department has already declared the disputed land
1966, to be the property of petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent
thereto.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J : p

Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a

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 Land Registration case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a
Government lessee, involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to
be registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay
River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay.
The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and
act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the
west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the
applicant's land. Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the
Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion
in the sense that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should
the land be considered as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two
subsequent resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of
Appeals) in Land Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was
filed by private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now
deceased, before the Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of
Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application

for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan, having an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This
application was denied on January 15, 1953. So was his motion for
reconsideration.

Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased,

Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries
covering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga,
Bataan. Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the
ground that the property formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Director of Fisheries, on May 27, 1988, gave due course to
his application but only to the extent of seven (7) hectares of the property as
may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.

The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano

Navarro's application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it
appealed to the Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the
grant. The then Executive Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the
Philippines, similarly affirmed the grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual
filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated
in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an
area of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to
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 his property, situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the
Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan River, and on the northern
side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed
the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant
Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his
predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the
same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial
Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's application for the same reason as that
advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on, however, the Director of Lands
withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry become the sole oppositor.

On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default

excepting the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry. lexlib

Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default

was lifted and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to
Pascual's application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has
always been part of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila
Bay; that he was a lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by
virtue of a fishpond permit issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by
the Office of the President; and that he had already converted the area covered
by the lease into a fishpond.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November
6, 1960, Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano
Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have
unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a
portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in
the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they have
thereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This,
notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed
to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the
appeal having been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity
of the parties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was
consolidated with the land registration case and was jointly tried by the court a
quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano
Navarro died on November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein
petitioners.

Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by

his heirs, the herein private respondents.
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 On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the
subject property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it
cannot be the subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's
complaint for ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land
registration over the land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case
No. N-84 to pay costs in both instances." 6

The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court,
assigned the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an
accretion by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the
land admittedly owned by applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is
foreshore land.
3.. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the and
is controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private
respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-
appellants [private respondents] are entitled to eject the
oppositor-appellee [petitioners]." 7

On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo
and granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding
therefrom fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters
(50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
"The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth
by the parties in their respective briefs is — whether or not the land
sought to be registered is accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or
not said land was formed by the action of the two rivers of Talisay and
Bulacan or by the action of the Manila Bay. If formed by the action of
the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land is accretion but if
formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore land.

xxx xxx xxx

It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents]
owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is
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 bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan
River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan
rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In
other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the
property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said
land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila
Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants'
[private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be
registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed
that the subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private
respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said
land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can
understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the
lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding
whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two
rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land,
it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore
part of the patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in
fact rule . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

It is however undisputed that [private respondents'] land lies
between these two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private
respondents'] land which acts as a barricade preventing these two
rivers to meet. Thus, since the flow of the two is downwards to the
Manila Bay the sediments of sand and silt are deposited at their
mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have
been the cause of the deposit thereat for in the natural course of
things, the waves of the sea eat the land on the shore, as they suge
[sic] inland. It would not therefore add anything to the land but instead
subtract from it due to the action of the waves and the wind. It is then
more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing towards the bay
emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus causing
[private respondents'] land to accumulate therein
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do
[sic] not seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land
arose only when . . . Pascual planted 'palapat' and 'bakawan' trees
thereat to serve as a boundary or strainer. But we do not see how this
act of planting trees by Pascual would explain how the land mass came
into being. Much less will it prove that the same came from the sea.
Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were the few trees that
acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would have
stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not
so because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the
trees were planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of [private respondents']
clearly show that the land that accumulated beyond the so-called
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 boundary, as well as the entire area being applied for is dry land,
above sea level, and bearing innumerable trees . . . . The existence of
vegetation on the land could only confirm that the soil thereat came
from inland rather than from the sea, for what could the sea bring to
the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On the other
hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow
which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along
their path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants'
[private respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower
court's finding. While it is true that the subject land is found at the
shore of the Manila Bay fronting appellants' [private respondents']
land, said land is not foreshore but an accretion from the action of the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is exactly what the Bureau of
Lands found out, as shown in the following report of the Acting
Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
'Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this
registration made on June 11, 1960, it was found out that the
said land is . . . sandwitched [sic] by two big rivers . . . These two
rivers bring down considerable amount of soil and sediments
during floods every year thus raising the soil of the land adjoining
the private property of the applicant [private respondents'].
About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land
whereon are planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is
the natural action of these two rivers that has caused the
formation of said land . . . subject of this registration case. It has
been formed, therefore, by accretion. And having been formed
by accretion, the said land may be considered the private
property of the riparian owner who is the applicant [private
respondents'] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the
government should be withdrawn, except for the portion
recommended by the land investigator in his report dated May 2,
1960, to be excluded and considered foreshore. . . .'
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General
representing the Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March
25, 1960, and limited 'the same to the northern portion of the land
applied for, compromising a strip 50 meters wide along the Manila Bay,
which should be declared public land as part of the foreshore' . . . . 8

Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered

the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of
private respondents and the reversion to private respondents of the
possession of the portion of the subject property included in Navarro's
fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforecited decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the
reconsideration of the same decision. Both motions were opposed by private
respondents on January 27, 1979.
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 On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of
Forestry. It, however, modified its decision, to read, viz:
"(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to
vacate that portion included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan
Psu-175181 and hand over possession of said portion to applicants-
appellants, if the said portion is not within the strip of land fifty (50)
meters wide along Manila Bay on the northern portion of the land
subject of the registration proceedings and which area is more
particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan
Psu-175181 . . ." 9

On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as

counsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in
this court, a petition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the
respondent appellate court and of the aforecited resolution dated November
21, 1980.

Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed

a petition for review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of
Appeals." 10 We, however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated July
20, 1981, such petition having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court
of Appeals was yet to resolve petitioners' pending motion to set aside the
resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of
judgment stating that the decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final
and executory as against herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-
84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial
Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision
dated November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution
granting petitioners' request for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was
filed out of time, citing Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides
that a motion for reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to
have palpably erred in appreciating the facts of the case and to have gravely
misapplied statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457
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 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.

The disputed property was brought forth by

both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila
Bay and the accretion formed on the
exposed foreshore land by the action of the
sea which brought soil and sand sediments
in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan
trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio
Pascual in 1948.
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code,
petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion
caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their
course on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own
tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of
the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is
deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river
bank 12 ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian owners
are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of
lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. 13 The
alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by
the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen 14 but is not
automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. 15

Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the

principle of accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern
boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border
or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action,
petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the
petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila
Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he
had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to
rise. 16

Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land;
(b) petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land
where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be
attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the
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 alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and
western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion
thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third
requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of
claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of
land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and
jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay
is. It is to be remembered that we held that:
"Appellant next contends that . . . Manila Bay cannot be
considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is part
of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

'Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in

on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of
the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of
the sea or of a lake.' 7 C.J. 1013-1014." 17

The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea
bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined
petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law
is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to
discern from the facts of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:
"A perusal of the survey plan . . . of the land subject matter of
these cases shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by
Talisay River, on the western side by Bulacan River, on the southern
side by Lot 1436 and on the northern side by Manila Bay. It is not
correct to state that the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers meet a certain
portion because the two rivers both flow towards Manila Bay. The
Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit
meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before
they end up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property
belonging to Pascual cannot be considered an accretion caused by the
action of the two rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . has not presented proofs to convince the
Court that the land he has applied for registration is the result of the
settling down on his registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so
as to be rightfully be considered as an accretion [caused by the action
of the two rivers]. Said Art. 457 finds no applicability where the
accretion must have been caused by action of the bay." 18

The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the foregoing
observation is that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and
therefore, part of the public domain. The respondent appellate court, however,
perceived the fact that petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to conclude that the disputed land must be an
accretion formed by the action of the two rivers because petitioners' own land
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 acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to meet and that the current of
the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt downwards to the Manila Bay
which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land. These conclusions,
however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed critical fact:
the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of
petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of
petitioners' land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are
further eroded of their practical logic and consonance with natural experience
in the light of Sulpicio Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and
bakawan trees on the northern boundary of their own land. In amplification of
this, plainly more reasonable and valid are Justice Mariano Serrano's
observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated that:
"As appellants' (titled) land . . . acts as a barricade that prevents
the two rivers to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the
boundary between said land and the Manila Bay, measuring some
593.00 meters . . . it is believed rather farfetched for the land in
question to have been formed through 'sediments of sand and salt [sic]
. . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths.' Moreover, if 'since the flow of
the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of sand
and silt are deposited at their mouths,' why then would the alleged
cargo of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of
appellants' titled land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the
mouths and banks of these two rivers? That being the case, the
accretion formed at said portion of appellants' titled [land] was not
caused by the current of the two rivers but by the action of the sea
(Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.

The conclusion . . . is not supported by any reference to the

evidence which, on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was
formed by the action of the sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual,
one of the heirs of the original applicant, testified on cross-examination
that the land in dispute was part of the shore and it was only in 1948
that he noticed that the land was beginning to get higher after he had
planted trees thereon in 1948. . . .cdasia

. . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila

Bay at high tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond
within their titled property, which dike now separates this titled
property from the land in question. Even in 1948 when appellants had
already planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved,
inasmuch as these trees were yet small, the waves of the sea could still
reach the dike. This must be so because in . . . the survey plan of the
titled property approved in 1918, said titled land was bounded on the
north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was adjacent to it on the north. It
was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in 1948 that the land
in question began to rise or to get higher in elevation.

The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer

of the sea water and at the same time a kind of block to the strained
sediments from being carried back to the sea by the very waves that
brought them to the former shore at the end of the dike, which must
have caused the shoreline to recede and dry up eventually raising the
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 former shore leading to the formation of the land in question." 19

In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of

palapat and bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay
eventually resulting in the drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular
torrential action of the waters of Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed
land on the northern boundary of petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a
sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an
arm of the sea; as such, the disputed
property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public
domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and
Laguna de Bay.

While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano 20

that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which law on
accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently
insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.

In the cases of Government of the P.I. v. Colegio de San Jose 21 , Republic

v. Court of Appeals 22 , Republic v. Alagad 23 , and Meneses v. Court of Appeals
24 , we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which,

by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to

the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the
application of Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land
being an accretion on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal
purposes, considered a sea.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as

follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When
they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the
public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an
accretion on a sea bank which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila
Bay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for
public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain
and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being appropriated by any
private person, except through express authorization granted in due form by a
competent authority." 25 Only the executive and possibly the legislative
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 departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the
lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of
public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of
petitioners as owners of the estates adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and

DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., concurs: The amendatory provisions of the Water Code (P.D.
1067) did not affect Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Footnotes
1. In CA G.R. No. 59044-K dated November 29, 1978, penned by Associate
Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Nestor B.
Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia, and Rafael C. Climaco, with Associate Justice
Mariano Serrano, dissenting; Rollo , pp. 39-54.
2. Resolution (on the First Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 21,
1980, penned by Associate Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by
Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente, Nestor B. Alampay, Jorge R. Coquia, and
Elias B. Asuncion; Rollo , pp. 68-69; and Resolution (on the Second Motion for
Reconsideration) dated March 28, 1982, penned by Associate Justice Porfirio
V. Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente, Nestor B.
Alampay, Elias B. Asuncion, and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Rollo , pp. 90-91.
3. Fourth Civil Cases Division.

4. L.R.C. Case No. 18607.

5. Branch 1.

6. Decision in CA G.R. No. 59044 dated November 29, 1978, pp. 2-3; Rollo , pp.
40-41.

7. Id., p. 3; Rollo , p. 41.

8. Id., pp. 3-6; Rollo , pp. 41-44.
9. Resolution in CA-G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 21, 1980, p. 1; Rollo , p.
68.
10. Docketed as G.R. No. 55584.

11. Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia v. Court of

Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996; Meneses v. Court of Appeals,
246 SCRA 374 [1995]: Reynante v. Court of Appeals , 207 SCRA 794, 799
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 [1992]; Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374, 385 [1991].

12. Paras, Edgardo, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 3, 1984 Edition, p. 211.
13. Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, 80 SCRA 548, 556 [1977].
14. Paras, supra, at p. 212, citing Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567; Roxas v.
Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; 3 Manresa 236.
15. Id., at p. 216, citing Grande, et al. v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30,
1962.

16. The pertinent portion of Sulpicio Pascual's testimony is as follows:

"Q: Is that portion contiguous to Manila Bay?

A: Near but not contiguous.

Q: During the high tide is that portion reached by water?

A: Before 1948.

Q: Before you introduced palapat and bakawan in that area?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: It was only after you have planted palapat and bakawan . . .

when
the sea water no longer reaches that area?

A: I only planted few trees in 1948 to serve as boundary and as

marker. . . .
Q: Was it only in 1948 that you observed that portion was
becoming

higher?
A: At the beginning of 1948 I noticed that land was getting higher."

(TSN, June 11, 1969, pp. 9-11).

17. Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano, 108 Phil. 336, 338 [1960].
18. Petition pp. 6-7; Rollo , pp. 122-123.

19. Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Mariano Serrano; Rollo , pp. 48-51.
20. 108 Phil 335 [1960].

21. 53 Phil. 423 [1929].

22. 31 SCRA 532 [1984].

23. 169 SCRA 455 [1989].

24. 246 SCRA 162 [1995].

25. Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil. 505, 517 [1911].

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 26. Joven y Monteverde, et al. v. The Director of Lands, 93 Phil. 134, 136-137
[1953].

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