Almario vs Alba case digest

Amendment to the Constitution

As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve
or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO
answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional
mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program
and a social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the
ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The
petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning
and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted
to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to
adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or
not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for
their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of
disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute
his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own
likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the
danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the
dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant"
of public land or of "urban land reform."

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among
our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the
increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically
that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an
agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."

Facts:

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed
the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding
until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance
with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department
of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask
the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons
who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners
do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum
dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table),
Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular
No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small
Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply
for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27).
For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from
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invoking this right.

The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of
the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary
land-sharing.

Issue:

Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by
him even under R.A. No. 6657.

Held:

P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed
the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It
was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the
constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.

This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions.

Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public
or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may
be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further,
That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval
of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were
unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs

DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency
Power]

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
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out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take
over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is
a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives  pursuant to PP 1017. 

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity
of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017  and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision:   “and to enforce obedience to all the laws  and  to  all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President
may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.  In these cases, PP
1017 is more than that.  In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  She
also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest.   Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.  Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.  It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-
out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: 
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.”  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. 

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

 Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers.  To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised.  But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.  This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.  Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1)   There must be a war or other emergency.
(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only. 

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 (3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. 
         Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.  The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,”
it refers to Congress, not the President.  Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. 
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a   state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.  Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.   In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress. 

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.”  Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 192856:March 8, 2011.

FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Gonzales and respondent Lim are candidates for the position of Representative of the 3 rd Congressional district
of Albay in the 2010 elections. a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed
by Stephen Bicharaagainst Gonzalez on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national and that he failed to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625.
Gonzalez denied having willfully made false and misleading statement in his COC regarding his citizenship and pointed out
thatBichara had filed the wrong petition under Section 68 of theOmnibus Election Code(OEC) to question his eligibility as a
candidate.Gonzalez also argued that the petition which should have been correctly filed under Section 78 of the OEC was
filed out of time.The COMELEC, however, granted Bicharas petition.
Subsequently, Gonzalez was proclaimed as the winner of the elections, and filed a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC decision, which was denied. The COMELEC held that the proclamation of Gonzalez was illegal, and formed a
Special Board of Canvassers to declare Lim, the second placer, as the representative of the 3 rd district. Lim then asked the
House of Representatives to include him in the Roll of Representatives, which House Speaker Belmonte denied, citing that
the issue of qualification of Gonzalez was within the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
ISSUES:
Whether or not Bicharas petition was filed on time
Whether or not Gonzales was validly declared as the representative of Albay
Whether or not COMELEC had lost jurisdiction over the citizenship dispute
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW: Period within which to file a case for COC cancellation, as distinguished from disqualification;
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and HRET over election disqualification cases.
First issue: Since the petition sought to cancel the COC filed by Gonzalez and disqualify him as a candidate on the ground of
false representation as to his citizenship, the same should have been filed within twenty-five days from the filing of the COC,
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. (This is the only provision where a person is allowed to petition for a candidates
disqualification before the elections.). Gonzales filed his COC onDecember 1, 2009.Clearly, the petition for disqualification
and cancellation of COC filed by Lim onMarch 30, 2010was filed out of time.
Second issue: The COMELEC ruled that the motion for reconsideration of the COMELECs resolution filed by Gonzalez
waspro formaand hence did not suspend the execution of the COMELEC resolution disqualifying him as a candidate,
therefore making the resolution disqualifying him final and executory, which had the effect of making Gonzalez subsequent
proclamation invalid and illegal. However, mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically
make a motion for reconsiderationpro forma. Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to bepro
forma,the motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule
that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or
(3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5)
the adverse party was not given notice thereof. In the case at bar, the motion for reconsiderationfiled by Gonzalez failed to
show that it suffers from the foregoing defects, since it substantiated the arguments contained therein. Not being pro forma,
the MR should have suspended the execution of the COMELEC resolution, and validated the proclamation of Gonzalez.
Third issue: Under Article VI, Section 17 of the1987 Constitution, the HRET is thesole judgeof all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.Here, subsequent events showed that
Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the
House of Representatives. The HRET therefore has jurisdiction.

Petition is GRANTED, and the COMELEC decision is SET ASIDE.

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mbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)

Imbong v Comelec   September 11, 1970        

RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar

RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district
who shall be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned
among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive
office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire
law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is
constitutional.

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific
provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:

- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution

-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:

Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by
votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4

- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is
reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less
population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this
disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to
allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since
candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create
discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if the provision of the Section 5 Article
XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: “The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992,” refers
to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the winners, Aquino and Laurel were
installed into the position last February 25, 1986 after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for
the President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-President, or the previously elected President
and Vice-President.

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Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief. Rules of Court states that it is the RTC
(Regional Trial Courts) who has the jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to use, and his allegation was manifestly
gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people of the Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment.
Lambino vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153             October 25, 2006
FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
Initiative and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its
registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory
Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments
to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:
1.       The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by
the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready and
shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents
must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on
its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures – that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006.
2.       A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this
Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover
the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with
the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
Occena v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox

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aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the
contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:

                What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be exercised? More
specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the
validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper submission?

Held:

                The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: “The Interim
Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights,
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members
thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions
vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a
vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent
body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now
being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7
of Article X of the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from
sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and has
been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot,
therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.

Issue:

                Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority
conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly? Was there revision rather than
amendment?

Held:

                Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of
no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can
be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced
with a new one is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’ includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul
of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed
would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

Issue:

                What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission?

Held:

                The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a
legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the
assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed
that Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign
country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing
with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be
viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained
that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter
should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the applicable provision: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after
the approval of such amendment or revision.” The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting
as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for
April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Sanidad Vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,  vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. G.R. No. L-44684. October
12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October
7
12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,  vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN,
J,:

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on
the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise
and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured
Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are
neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19
of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of
expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's
freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's
right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an
unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should
not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and
Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the
public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times
Santiago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No, 127325, March 19, 1997
September 16, 2018
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin (President of the People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action or
PIRMA) filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials (Delfin
Petition) through Peoples’ Initiative based on Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, where Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order:
 fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
 causing the necessary publications of the said Order in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
 instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all regions to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations at the time and dates designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC through its Chairman issued an Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition; and setting
the case for hearing.
At the hearing, the petitioner-intervenors appeared and on the same day, Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioner filed the special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
 The constitutional provision on people’s initiatives to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by a law to
be passed by Congress.
 RA No. 6735 provides for 3 systems of initiative (Constitution, statutes, local legislation) but it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution.
 RA 6735 only covers laws and not constitutional amendments.
 COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (1991) to govern the conduct of initiative is ultra vires (beyond legal capacity)
because only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass implementing law.
 People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution and not revision.
 Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiatives.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether RA No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution – NO.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid – NO.
3. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order – NO.
4. Whether the lifting of term limits as proposed in the Delfin Petition would constitute a revision or an amendment to
the Constitution – MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

8
 5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before
the COMELEC – YES.
RATIO:
1. Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executor and RA 6735 cannot be the implementing
legislation.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executory. The details for carrying out the provision are left to the
legislature. The interpellations which ensued on the modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative
act which must implement the exercise of the right. Furthermore, the modified amendment confines initiative to amendments
to and not revision of the Constitution. However, RA 6735 does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution because there was no subtitle provided for it. Hence, RA 6735 is not sufficient to be the implementing
legislation for Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution.
2. The COMELEC Resolution is not valid.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority under the rule that what has been delegated cannot be delegated. It will only be valid if the law a) is
complete in itself; and b) fixes a standard. However, these requirements were not met.
3. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition solely intended to obtain an order.
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing and thus, becomes the initiatory pleading.
The Delfin petition is not an initiatory pleading since it does not contain signatures of the required number of voters (under
Sec 2 of Article XVII), COMELEC has no jurisdiction before its filing.
4. There is no need to discuss whether the petition presents an amendment or revision of the Constitution.
The discussion on the issue of whether it is an amendment or a revision is unnecessary if not academic since COMELEC has
no jurisdiction.
5. The Supreme Court can take cognizance of the present petition for prohibition.
COMELEC has no jurisdiction so it must be stopped from proceeding further. Moreover, petition for prohibition is the proper
remedy. In this case, the writ is necessary in view of the highly divisive consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Order. This political instability and legal confusion climate begs for judicial statesmanship because only the SC can save the
nation in peril and uphold the majesty of the Constitution when the system of constitutional law is threatened.
Tanada vs Cuenco
Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests Vol. 2
April 13, 2015Gi LiteLeave a comment
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS:
1 Abueva vs Wood, 2 US vs Bull
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY:
1 Marbury vs Madison, 2 Angara vs Electoral Commision, 3 Tanada vs Cuenco
 ABUEVA vs WOOD G.R. No. L-21327 January 14, 1924
JOHNSON, J
 The parties:
Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was ratified and adopted by the
Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of the petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives and  four are members of the Senate of the Philippine Islands and they all belong to the democratic party;
Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas,
Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary  and the Secretary
of the Independence Commission.
This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their
possession, showing the disbursements and expenditures made out of the funds of the Independence Commission.
FACTS:
By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided  for a standing appropriation of one million
pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the
expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of
its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of
Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any
specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular
Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act
Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds from
being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes of the law.
Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other
documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the
Independence Commission.
Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and documentary
proofs.
ISSUE:  Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners
HELD:
1. Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive department of the
Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts.
2. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere agents of the
Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
3. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of the Jones Law
provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all
vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence should be shown to the
plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable.
9
The United States vs. H.N. Bull GR L-5270Jan 15, 1910
 Facts:
On the 2nd of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Standard commanded by H.N.
Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of
cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the
animals to get hurt and others to have died while in transit. This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and
No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the
court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships not licensed under
Philippine laws, like the ship involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while inside the territorial waters
of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would have no jurisdiction, continued until it
reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of the Philippines. Defendant is thereby found guilty, and
sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the high seas, but the moment it
entered into territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. Every state has complete
control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade would subject themselves to the laws which
govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain.
Marbury v. Madison,  5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices
for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the
federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s
term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not
been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to
deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues: Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and
therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the
Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
 Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been
performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who
considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of
State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right
to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for
which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and
therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the
operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of
the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and
is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate,
the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

10
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary
to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted,
and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an
officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter
of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior jurisdiction that
commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a
particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by law as an obligation.
 Marbury v. Madison,  5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices
for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the
federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s
term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not
been delivered by the end of Adams’s term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to
deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues
Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and
therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the
Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been
performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who
considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission, appointed
Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of
State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right
to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for
which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and
therefore void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the
operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of
the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and
is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate,
the distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary
to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted,
and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an
officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter
of original jurisdiction.
Disposition: Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
 WRIT OF MANDAMUS [Latin, We comand.] A writ or order that is issued from a court of superior jurisdiction that
commands an inferior tribunal, corporation, Municipal Corporation, or individual to perform, or refrain from performing, a
particular act, the performance or omission of which is required by law as an obligation.
JOSE A. ANGARA vs THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

11
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo
and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly
for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest”
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions N0.8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filedo.  Praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the
foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
HELD:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision
but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on
the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a
bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as
the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session
whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its
consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts
other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of
trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
Conclusion:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.
 (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation
of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute
and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried
with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing
protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass
upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe
rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also
section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior
to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time
within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative
in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner

12
Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for
filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
Tanada vs Cuenco,  103 Phil. 1051 
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The
lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand
was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority
were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if
the SET would be  dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his
election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance
of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the
Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it
before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the
official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET
are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from
the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the
minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the
SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like
this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
TOLENTINO & MOJICA vs. COMELEC, RECTO & HONASAN
G.R. No. 148334
January 21, 2004

This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-005”) and
Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of respondent Commission on Elections
(“COMELEC”). Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while
Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.

Facts:

Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate on February 8,
2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators, with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in
that election. The resolution further provides that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall
serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators, with
the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to serve the full term of 3 years of Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, praying for
the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005. They contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction
because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of
RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election
under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as
purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add that because of these omissions,
COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such
that “there were no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective
of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the petition. Honasan
questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim
that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of
Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue:

13
WON the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified:
(1) for failure to give notice by the body empowered to and
(2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Ratio Decidendi:

(1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time
and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is
whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of special election.
If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to
fill vacancy, a choice by small percentage of voters would be void.
(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the special Senatorial
election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass
separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under
Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to
be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of said resolution as
introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator
Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by
providing as it now appears, that “the senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.
STATE IMMUNITY
ATO v. David (G.R. No. 159402; February 23, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS

FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The
respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the
amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the
ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President
Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of
sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being the
value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of
12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral
damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing the moral and
exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.
ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from
suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot
prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.
The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it
has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating the
pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it
being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was
created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of
14
the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than
the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim
to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the
taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs
property.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991. DENIED.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, et al.,  Respondents
Facts
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented by its
chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation
(Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line
from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the Philippines (DOF)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to
the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender,
while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an
amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate
of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of
the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price
for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement – Buyer
Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the
construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for
Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued
an Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006, CNMEG
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br. 145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to
Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the
Chinese government, making it immune from suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an
executive agreement.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and setting the case for
summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued.  CNMEG then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG filed before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. Subsequently,
CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5 December 2008.
Issue
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
Ruling
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether
the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It
does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was conducted not
because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government but was plainly a
business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a government-owned and/or -
controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the
performance of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese
corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as performing governmental activities, even if they are
clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.

15
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest it with
immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine National Railways, in which this Court held that “immunity from
suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.”
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs
governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term
“implementing agency” has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although
CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued
under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it
has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
 An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity.
In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit waiver of
immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply the legal reasoning behind
the waiver in this case.
BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO
March 30, 2013 ~ vbdiaz
Bayan Muna vs Romulo
G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the marginalized sectors of society.
Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case.
Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.
On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,
is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out
of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is
not among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and
the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then
DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put
in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as
“persons” of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries.
As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors),
or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the
purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not
agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent to
terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any
allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement,
Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally
binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent
of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for contracting obligations that are
either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

16
Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot
be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons––is
untenable. One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls “into the
category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form of international agreement. The
United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its
assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of
exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process of
legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange
of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand,
executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’” As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines
Francis B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether denominated
executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03––be it viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself,
or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally
binding international written contract among nations.
Agreement Not Immoral/Not at Variance
with Principles of International Law
Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at
variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that
the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x
x x.”63
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioner’s earlier position, which, as already discussed, contends that the RP,
by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its treaty obligations under
the Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x The
agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national
criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines
or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually
prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the
other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing
immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to
the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

17
 G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE
BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY
GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the
Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup
assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has
the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the
sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio,
and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on
sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by
18
private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its
petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official
representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87).
This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the
classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign.
According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22).
This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon
made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and
are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in
its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law
and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to
espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See.
Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the
Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on
Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is
DISMISSED
G.R. No. 198457
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are Decision Nos. 2010-
051[2] and 2011-045,[3] dated April 8, 2010 and August 8, 2011, respectively, of respondent Commission on Audit (CoA)
which affirmed Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2008-09-01 (SAT)[4] dated September 8, 2008 for the amount of
P3,386,697.10 and thereby held petitioners Filomena G. Delos Santos, Josefa A. Bacaltos, Nelanie A. Antoni, and Maureen
A. Bien (petitioners), inter alia, solidarily liable therefor.
The Facts

Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu City entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement[5] (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented
by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of
P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients
under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). [6] It was agreed, inter alia, that: (a) Cuenco shall identify
and recommend the indigent patients who may avail of the benefits of the TNT Program for an amount not exceeding
P5,000.00 per patient, except those with major illnesses for whom a separate limit may be specified; (b) an indigent patient
who has been a beneficiary will be subsequently disqualified from seeking further medical assistance; and (c) the hospital
shall purchase medicines intended for the indigent patients from outside sources if the same are not available in its pharmacy,
subject to reimbursement when such expenses are supported by official receipts and other documents. [7] In line with this, Ma.
Isabel Cuenco, Project Director of the TNT Program, wrote [8] petitioner Nelanie Antoni (Antoni), Pharmacist V of VSMMC,
requesting the latter to purchase needed medicines not available at the hospital pharmacy from Sacred Heart Pharmacy or
Dell Pharmacy which were supposedly accredited suppliers of the Department of Health. The said request was approved. [9]
The Audit Proceedings

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the
availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos
(Delos Santos), who succeeded[10] Dr. Alquizalas, created, through Hospital Order No. 1112, [11] a fact-finding committee to
investigate the matter.

Within the same month, Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the hospital, came up with her

19
own review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco. She furnished Delos Santos the results
of her review as contained in Audit Observation Memoranda (AOM) Nos. 2004-21, [12] 2004-21B,[13] and 2004-21C,[14] all
dated December 29, 2004, recommending the investigation of the following irregularities:
a. AOM No. 2004-21 x x x involving fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies and drugs
costing P3,290,083.29;
b. AOM No. 2004-21B x x x involving issuance of vitamins worth P138,964.80 mostly to the staff of
VSMMC and TNT Office covering the period January to April 2004; and
c. AOM No. 2004-21C x x x covering fictitious patients and falsified prescriptions for other drugs and
medicines worth P552,853.85 and unpaid falsified prescriptions and referral letters for drugs and
medicines costing P602,063.50.[15]
Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee created by Delos Santos submitted its Report [16] dated January 18, 2005 essentially
affirming the "unseen and unnoticeable" irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out,
however, that: (a) VSMMC was made an "unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds"; [17] (b) the
VSMMC management was completely "blinded" as its participation involved merely "a routinary ministerial duty" in issuing
the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and
complete;[18] and (c) the detection of the falsification and forgeries "could not be attained even in the exercise of the highest
degree or form of diligence"[19] as the VSMMC personnel were not handwriting experts.

In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, the results of which were reflected in AOM No. 2005-001 [20] dated October
26, 2005, it was found that: (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines for anti-rabies allegedly dispensed by
Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; [21]
(b) 46 prescriptions for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P705,750.50, and already
paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco likewise appeared to be falsified; [22] and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and
medicines allegedly issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified and have not been
paid by VSMMC.[23]

In her Comment/Reply[24] to the aforementioned AOM No. 2005-001 addressed to Leonor D. Boado (Boado), Director of the
CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City, Delos Santos explained that during the initial stage of the implementation of the
MOA (i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened, interviewed, and determined the qualifications of the patients-
beneficiaries through the hospital's social worker. [25] However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in
VSMMC, which was run by his own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the
Medical Center Chief, as well as the logbook. [26] From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program and
was relegated to a mere "bag keeper."[27] Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the sole supplier, anti-
rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by practice, no public bidding was anymore required. [28]

Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led by Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., State Auditor V, was formed
pursuant to Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO) Order Nos. 2005-019-A dated August 17, 2005 and 2005-019-B dated
March 10, 2006 to conduct a special audit investigation with respect to the findings of Booc and her team. [29] Due to time
constraints, however, AOM No. 2005-001 was no longer included in the SAT focus. [30] On October 15, 2007, the SAT
reported[31] the following findings and observations:
1. The provision of National Budget Circular No. 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines
on the release of funds for the PDAF authorized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8760, as Reenacted
(GAA for CY 2001) were not followed;[32]
2. Existing auditing law, rules and regulations governing procurement of medicines were not followed in
the [program's] implementation;[33]
3. The [program's] implementation did not follow the provisions of the MOA by and between
[Congressman Cuenco] and the Hospital;[34] and
4. Acts committed in the implementation of the project were as follows:
a.
b. There were [one hundred thirty-three (133)] falsified prescriptions for anti-rabies vaccines,
drugs and medicines [costing] P3,345,515.75 [allegedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy [were]
paid by VSMMC from the [PDAF of Congressman Cuenco];
c. [Forty-six (46) falsified prescriptions] for other drugs and medicines costing P695,410.10 [were
likewise reportedly] dispensed by Dell Pharmacy and paid by VSMMC from the [said PDAF] x
x x; and
d. [Twenty-five (25) prescriptions worth] P602,063.50 [were also claimed to have been] served by
Dell Pharmacy but still unpaid x x x.[35]
Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-
beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere
preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified as evidenced by the following:
1. Thirteen (13) hospital surgeons disowned the signatures on the prescriptions supporting the claims.
Surgeons do not prescribe anti-rabies vaccines; they operate on patients.
2. Almost all of the patients named in the prescriptions were not treated or admitted at the Hospital or in its
Out-patient Department. Those whose names appeared on Hospital records were treated at different dates
than those appearing on the prescriptions:
PATIENT TREATED BILL DATE OF PRESCRIPTION
Leah Clamon   Nov. 12, 2003 11/11/03 11/03/03
Jean Cañacao  Nov. 30, 2003 11/25/03 11/18/03
Felipe Sumalinog Dec. 17, 2004 12/10/03 12/08/03
Vicente Perez  Mar. 12, 2004 11/26/03 11/17/03
Vincent Rabaya Sept. 8, 2003 12/12/03 11/28/03
Rodulfo Cañete July 24, 2004 01/16/04 01/12/04

20
 3. Full dosages of anti-rabies vaccines were allegedly given to the patients although it is gross error to do so
for these medicines are highly perishable. These should be refrigerated and injected immediately and
periodically. For instance:
a. Mr. Vicente Perez received the full dosage on November 26, 2003 and again on
November 27, 2003. (Hospital records showed that Mr. Perez was admitted in March
2003 for surgery.)
b. Mr. Maximo Buaya received the full dosage on January 25 and on February 29, 2004.
c. Mr. Gregorio Rabago received his full dosage on December 6, 2003.
4. The dates of 80 prescriptions for anti-rabies and 45 for other drugs and medicines are earlier than the
dates of the corresponding delivery receipts. The gaps in the dates ranged from 1 to 47 days. On the other
hand, 33 prescriptions for anti-rabies had later dates than the dates of the delivery receipts. The difference
in the dates ranged from 1 to 22 days.
5. The Pharmacy Unit still prepared Purchase Request [PR] for the claims Dell [Pharmacy] submitted to
that office when the PR is no longer necessary as the medicines have already been taken by the patients.
6. Of the three South District residents personally interviewed by the Team, two denied having sought or
received help from the [TNT] Program or being hospitalized at VSMMC for dog bite.
7. The hospital social worker, Ms. Mergin Acido, declared that she was bypassed in the evaluation of the
alleged patients for the TNT Office has clerks who "evaluate" the eligibility of the patients. The
prescriptions and referral slips were directly forwarded to the Pharmacy Unit for stamping and
submission to the Dell Pharmacy. She had no opportunity then to see the patients personally.
8. Mr. Louies James S. Yrastorza has stated under oath the falsity of the claims for payment. He stated that
he was ordered to submit to the Pharmacy Unit falsified prescriptions accompanied by referral slips
signed by Mr. James Cuenco for non-existing patients. Subsequently, sometime in September 2007 Mr.
Yrastorza "clarified" his statements effectively recanting his first oath.
9. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor certified that out of the 30 names of the patients
randomly selected, only 15 were found listed in the registered voters' database.
10. Prescriptions were stamped "VSMMC" signed/initialed by the Pharmacist who is off duty as shown by
the attendance record, e.g. Mesdames Arly Capuyan, Norma Chiong, Corazon Quiao, Rowena Rabillas,
and Riza Sei[s]mundo.[36]
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND No. 2008-09-01, [37] disallowing the
amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents,
and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor. [38] Petitioners' respective
participations were detailed as follows: (a) for Delos Santos, in her capacity as Medical Center Chief, for signing and
approving the disbursement vouchers and checks; (b) for petitioner Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, in her capacity as Chief
Administrative Officer, for certifying in Box A that the expenses were lawful, necessary and incurred in her direct
supervision; (c) for Antoni, in her capacity as Chief of the Pharmacy Unit, for approving the supporting documents when the
imputed delivery of the medicines had already been consummated; (d) for petitioner Maureen A. Bien, in her capacity as
Hospital Accountant, for certifying in Box B of the disbursement voucher that the supporting documents for the payment to
Dell Pharmacy were complete and proper.[39]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective appeals [40] before the CoA which were denied through Decision No. 2010-051[41]
dated April 8, 2010, maintaining their solidary liability, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal[s] of Dr. Filomena [G]. Delos Santos, Dr. Josefa A. Bacaltos, Ms. Nelanie
A. Antoni and Ms. Maureen A. Bien [are] hereby DENIED for lack of merit. However, the appeal of Ms. Corazon Quiao,
Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas and Ms. Riza Seismundo is hereby given due course. Likewise, Ms. Arly Capuyan
who is similarly situated is excluded although she did not file her appeal. ND No. 2008-09-01 (SAT) dated September 8,
2008 involving the amount of P3,386,697.10 is hereby affirmed with the modification by excluding therein the names
[of[ Ms. Corazon Quiao, Ms. Norma Chiong, Ms. Rowena Rabillas, Ms. Riza Seismundo, and Ms. Arly Capuyan as persons
liable. The other persons named liable therein, i.e., Ma. Isabel Cuenco and Mr. James R. Cuenco, TNT Health Program
Directors, and Mr. Sisinio Villacin, Jr., proprietor of Dell Pharmacy, and herein appellants Delos Santos, Bacaltos, Antoni
and Bien remain solidarily liable for the disallowance.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration[43] of the foregoing decision was further denied in Decision No. 2011-045[44] dated August 8,
2011. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners
solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant
and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of
its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.[45]

Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only
respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or

21
to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and
despotism.[46] In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed
Decisions as will be discussed below.

The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the implementation
of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of
Cuenco's PDAF.[47] Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital represented itself as
"willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of a Medical Indigent Support Program." [48] More
importantly, it undertook to ascertain that "[a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in accordance
with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations." [49] It is a standing rule that public officers who are
custodians of government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or
damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations,
and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records. [50] However, as pointed out by the SAT, provisions of the
National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476[51] dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the guidelines on the release of funds for a
congressman's PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 8760[52] were not followed in the implementation of the TNT
Program, as well as other existing auditing laws, rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.

In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the Department of
Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the medicines purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go through the
required public bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws and rules. [53] Similarly, specific provisions of the
MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of the same program were not observed. For instance, only seven of the
133 prescriptions served and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient can avail of from
Cuenco's PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits more than once, again in violation of the provisions of
the MOA.[54] Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of the
benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control safeguards, the hospital and its
accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to "cooperate/coordinate and monitor" the implementation
of the said health program. They likewise violated paragraph 5 [55] of NBC 476 which requires a "regular monitoring activity"
of all programs and projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 123 [56] and 124[57] of Presidential Decree No. 1445,[58]
otherwise known as the "Government Auditing Code of the Philippines" (Auditing Code), which mandates the installation,
implementation, and monitoring of a "sound system of internal control" to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and
reliability of the accounting data.

By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a passive entity in the disbursement of funds
under the TNT Program and, thus, invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on the failure
of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the implementation of the TNT Program were attended by
malice or bad faith.

The Court is not persuaded.

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. [59] For instance, in
Reyna v. CoA[60] (Reyna), the Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims
of good faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines' Manual on Lending Operations.
[61]
In similar regard, the Court, in Casal v. CoA[62] (Casal), sustained the liability of certain officers of the National Museum
who again, notwithstanding their good faith participated in approving and authorizing the incentive award granted to its
officials and employees in violation of Administrative Order Nos. 268 and 29 which prohibit the grant of productivity
incentive benefits or other allowances of similar nature unless authorized by the Office of the President. [63] In Casal, it was
held that, even if the grant of the incentive award was not for a dishonest purpose, the patent disregard of the issuances of the
President and the directives of the CoA amounts to gross negligence, making the ["approving officers"] liable for the refund
[of the disallowed incentive award].[64]

Just as the foregoing public officers in Reyna and Casal were not able to dispute their respective violations of the applicable
rules in those cases, the Court finds that the petitioners herein have equally failed to make a case justifying their non-
observance of existing auditing rules and regulations, and of their duties under the MOA. Evidently, petitioners' neglect to
properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified
prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the
patent irregularities borne out by the referral slips and prescriptions related thereto. [65] Had there been an internal control
system installed by petitioners, the irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from
processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability
for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them that
it was his money.[66] Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the
VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-beneficiaries, [67] be justified as "a welcome relief to the already
overworked and undermanned section of the hospital."[68]

In this relation, it bears stating that Delos Santos' argument that the practices of the TNT Office were already pre-existing
when she assumed her post and that she found no reason to change the same [69] remains highly untenable. Records clearly
reveal that she, in fact, admitted that when she was installed as the new Medical Center Chief of VSMMC sometime "in the
late 2003," Antoni disclosed to her the irregularities occurring in the hospital specifically on pre-signed and forged
prescriptions.[70] Hence, having known this significant information, she and Antoni should have probed into the matter
further, and, likewise, have taken more stringent measures to correct the situation. Instead, Delos Santos contented herself
with giving oral instructions to resident doctors, training officers, and Chiefs of Clinics not to leave pre-signed prescriptions
pads, which Antoni allegedly followed during the orientations for new doctors. [71] But, just the same, the falsification and

22
forgeries continued, and it was only a year after, or in December 2004, that Delos Santos ordered a formal investigation of
the attendant irregularities. By then, too much damage had already been done.

All told, petitioners' acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA issuances [72] and as aforedescribed reasonably
figure into the finding that they failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuenco's PDAF. In this light, their liability pursuant to Sections 104 [73]
and 105[74] of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16 of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, [75] as
prescribed in CoA Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in handling Cuenco's
PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be
loosely protected and even rendered illusory.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO,
Union President, JPFCEA, respondents.
Juan, Luces, Luna and Associates for petitioner.
Galutera & Aguilar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:
The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-
Philippines) is the pivotal issue in the case at bench.
JUSMAG assails the January 29, 1993 Resolution of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (public
respondent), in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-03-02092-92, reversing the July 30, 1991 Order of the Labor Arbiter, and
ordering the latter to assume jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO
(private respondent) against petitioner.
First, the undisputed facts.
Private respondent was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG-
Philippines. 1 He had been with JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal on April 27, 1992. When dismissed,
he held the position of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position.2 He was also advised that he was
under administrative leave until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged against his leave.
On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that
he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. 3 He asked for his reinstatement.
JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States. It further alleged
lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no juridical personality to sue and be sued.4
In an Order dated July 30, 1991, Labor Arbiter Daniel C. Cueto dismissed the subject complaint " for want of jurisdiction."5
Private respondent appealed6 to the National Labor Relations Commission (public respondent), assailing the ruling that
petitioner is immune from suit for alleged violation of our labor laws. JUSMAG filed its Opposition, 7 reiterating its
immunity from suit for its non-contractual, governmental and/or public acts.
In a Resolution, dated January 29, 1993, the NLRC8 reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter as it held that petitioner had lost
its right not to be sued. The resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that JUSMAG failed to
refute the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to
immunity from suit when it hired the services of private respondent on December 18, 1969.
The NLRC relied on the case of Harry Lyons vs. United States of America,9 where the "United States Government (was
considered to have) waived its immunity from suit by entering into (a) contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the local courts."
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to the issue on illegal dismissal.
Hence, this petition, JUSMAG contends:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
A. IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND IN NOT
AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT IT BEING A SUIT
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH HAD NOT GIVEN ITS
CONSENT TO BE SUED; AND
B. IN FINDING WAIVER BY JUSMAG OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT;
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION —
A. WHEN IT FOUND AN EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN JUSMAG AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT; AND
B. WHEN IT CONSIDERED JUSMAG ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ITS EMPLOYEE FOR FAILURE TO PRESENT
PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is meet to discuss the historical background of the JUSMAG to determine its immunity from suit.
JUSMAG was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement 10 dated March 21, 1947, between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. As agreed upon, JUSMAG shall consist

23
of Air, Naval and Army group, and its primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines, on air force, army and naval
matters. 11
Article 14 of the 1947 Agreement provides, inter alia, that "the cost of all services required by the Group, including
compensation of locally employed interpreters, clerks, laborers, and other personnel, except personal servants, shall be borne
by the Republic of the Philippines."
This set-up was to change in 1991. In Note No 22, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines,
dated January 23, 1991, the United States Government, thru its Embassy, manifested its preparedness "to provide funds to
cover the salaries of security assistance support personnel" and security guards, the rent of JUSMAG occupied buildings and
housing, and the cost of utilities. 12 This offer was accepted by our Government, thru the DFA, in Note No. 911725, dated
April 18, 1991.13
Consequently, a Memorandum of Agreement 14 was forged between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and JUSMAG-
Philippines, thru General Lisandro C. Abadia and U.S. Brigadier General Robert G. Sausser. The Agreement delineated the
terms of the assistance-in-kind of JUSMAG for 1991, the relevant parts of which read:
a. The term salaries as used in this agreement include those for the security guards currently contracted
between JUSMAG and A' Prime Security Services Inc., and the Security Assistance Support Personnel
(SASP). . . . .
b. The term Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) does not include active duty uniformed
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines performing duty at JUSMAG.
c. It is understood that SASP are employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Therefore, the
AFP agrees to appoint, for service with JUSMAG, no more than 74 personnel to designated positions
with JUSMAG.
d. SASP are under the total operational control of the Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines. The term
"Operational Control" includes, but is not limited to, all personnel administrative actions, such as: hiring
recommendations; firing recommendations; position classification; discipline; nomination and approval
of incentive awards; and payroll computation. Personnel administration will be guided by Annex E of
JUSMAG-Philippines Memo 10-2. For the period of time that there is an exceptional funding agreement
between the government of the Philippines and the United States Government (USG), JUSMAG will pay
the total payroll costs for the SASP employees. Payroll costs include only regular salary; approved
overtime, costs of living allowance; medical insurance; regular contributions to the Philippine Social
Security System, PAG-IBIG Fund and Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA); and the
thirteenth-month bonus. Payroll costs do not include gifts or other bonus payments in addition to those
previously defined above. Entitlements not considered payroll costs under this agreement will be funded
and paid by the AFP.
e. All SASP employed as of July 1, 1990 will continue their service with JUSMAG at their current rate
of pay and benefits up to 30 June 1991, with an annual renewal of employment thereafter subject to
renewal of their appointment with the AFP (employees and rates of pay are indicated at Enclosure 3). No
promotion or transfer internal to JUSMAG of the listed personnel will result in the reduction of their pay
and benefits.
f. All SASP will, after proper classification, be paid salaries and benefits at established AFP civilian
rates. Rules for computation of pay and allowances will be made available to the Comptroller, JUSMAG,
by the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP. Additionally, any legally mandated changes in salary levels or methods
of computation shall be transmitted within 48 hours of receipt by Comptroller, GHQ to Comptroller,
JUSMAG.
g. The AFP agrees not to terminate SASP without 60 days prior written notice to Chief, JUSMAG-
Philippines. Any termination of these personnel thought to be necessary because of budgetary restrictions
or manpower ceiling will be subject to consultations between AFP and JUSMAG to ensure that
JUSMAG's mission of dedicated support to the AFP will not be degraded or harmed in any way.
h. The AFP agrees to assume the severance pay/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP.
(Enclosure 3 lists the severance pay liability date for current SASP). Any termination of services, other
than voluntary resignations or termination for cause, will result in immediate payments of AFP of all
termination pay to the entitled employee. Vouchers for severance/retirement pay and accrued bonuses
and annual leave will be presented to the Comptroller, GHQ, AFP, not later than 14 calendar days prior
to required date of payment.
i. All SASP listed in Enclosure 3 will continue to participate in the Philippine Social Security System.
A year later, or in 1992, the United States Embassy sent another note of similar import to the Department of Foreign Affairs
(No. 227, dated April 8, 1992), extending the funding agreement for the salaries of SASP and security guards until December
31, 1992.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947.
Hence, we agree with petitioner that the suit is, in effect, one against the United States Government, albeit it was not
impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the United States has not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
In this jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. 15 Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is
commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. 16 This is
anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in
violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).17
Under the traditional rule of State immunity, a state cannot be sued in the courts of another State, without its consent or
waiver. However, in Santos, et al., vs. Santos, et al., 18 we recognized an exception to the doctrine of immunity from suit by
a state, thus:
. . . . Nevertheless, if, where and when the state or its government enters into a contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative

24
 authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, and if
the law granting the authority to enter into such contract does not provide for or name the officer against
whom action may be brought in the event of a breach thereof, the state itself may be sued, even without
its consent, because by entering into a contract, the sovereign state has descended to the level of the
citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract. . . . .
(emphasis ours)
It was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons, Inc., vs. United States of America 19 was decided.
In the case of Harry Lyons, Inc., the petitioner entered into a contract with the United States Government for stevedoring
services at the U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines. It then sought to collect from the US government sums of money
arising from the contract. One of the issues posed in the case was whether or not the defunct Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction over the defendant United States, a sovereign state which cannot be sued without its consent. This Court upheld
the contention of Harry Lyons, Inc., that "when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be
sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its
consent to be sued under the contract."
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a
contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships
between sovereign states, brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of
the doctrine. 20 Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, 21 we clarified that our pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra,
with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter and "has no value as an imperative authority."
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities ( jure imperii). 22 The mantle of state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts
( jure gestionis). As aptly stated by this Court (En banc) in US vs. Ruiz, supra:
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and thus can be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be used only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (emphasis ours)
We held further, that the application of the doctrine of state immunity depends on the legal nature of the act. Ergo, since a
governmental function was involved — the transaction dealt with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at
Subic Bay — it was held that the United States was not deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Then came the case of United States vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al. 23 In said case, Genove was employed as a cook in the Main
Club located at U.S. Air Force Recreation Center, John Hay Air Station. He was dismissed from service after he was found to
have polluted the stock of soup with urine. Genove countered with a complaint for damages. Apparently, the restaurant
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity. The Court then noted that the restaurant is well known and available to the general
public, thus, the services are operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Speaking through
Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, the Court (En Banc) said:
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to
justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper even if it
be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and later
dismissed Genove. For the matter, not even the United States government itself can claim such immunity.
The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (emphasis ours)
Conversely, if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign state cannot be
deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. 24 Such is the case at bench. Prescinding from this premise, we need not
determine whether JUSMAG controls the employment conditions of the private respondent.
We also hold that there appears to be no basis for public respondent to rule that JUSMAG is stopped from denying the
existence of employer-employee relationship with private respondent. On the contrary, in its Opposition before the public
respondent, JUSMAG consistently contended that the (74) SASP, including private respondent, working in JUSMAG, are
employees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This can be gleaned from: (1) the Military Assistance Agreement, supra,
(2) the exchange of notes between our Government, thru Department of Foreign Affairs, and the United States, thru the US
Embassy to the Philippines, and (3) the Agreement on May 21, 1991, supra between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
JUSMAG.
We symphatize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more than twenty (20) years. Considering
his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. Nonetheless, the Executive branch, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, can take the cudgel for private respondent and the other SASP working for JUSMAG, pursuant to
the aforestated Military Assistance Agreement.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the impugned Resolution dated
January 29, 1993 of the National Labor Relations Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER
CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1
dated July 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 77997. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)2 Decision3 dated March 22, 2002 in Civil Case No. 208-M-95.
The case stemmed from the following factual and procedural antecedents:

25
Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson (respondents) are co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 7,268
square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43006 4 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government sometime in 1940
without the owners’ consent and without the necessary expropriation proceedings and used for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway.5
In a letter6 dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of
land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras (petitioner Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District
of petitioner Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), offered to pay the subject land at the rate of ₱0.70 per
square meter per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. 7 Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value. 8
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint 9 for recovery of possession with damages against
petitioners, praying that they be restored to the possession of the subject parcel of land and that they be paid attorney’s fees. 10
Respondents claimed that the subject parcel of land was assessed at ₱2,543,800.00.11
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the suit
is against the State which may not be sued without its consent; (2) that the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents
have no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents are entitled to compensation,
they should be paid only the value of the property in 1940 or 1941. 12
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order13 granting respondents’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. As respondents’ claim includes the recovery of damages, there is no doubt that the suit is against the
State for which prior waiver of immunity is required. When elevated to the CA, 14 the appellate court did not agree with the
RTC and found instead that the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable, because the recovery of compensation
is the only relief available to the landowner. To deny such relief would undeniably cause injustice to the landowner. Besides,
petitioner Contreras, in fact, had earlier offered the payment of compensation although at a lower rate.Thus, the CA reversed
and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and, consequently, remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of
determining the just compensation to which respondents are entitled to recover from the government. 15 With the finality of
the aforesaid decision, trial proceeded in the RTC.
The Branch Clerk of Court was initially appointed as the Commissioner and designated as the Chairman of the Committee
that would determine just compensation,16 but the case was later referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation
report on the value of the subject property.17 In PAC Resolution No. 99-007,18 the PAC recommended the amount of
₱1,500.00 per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Department of Public Works and Highways or its duly assigned agencies are hereby
directed to pay said Complainants/Appellants the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter
for the lot subject matter of this case in accordance with the Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee dated
December 19, 2001.
SO ORDERED.20
On appeal, the CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation stated above should earn
interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the filing of the action on March 17, 1995 until full payment. 21
In its appeal before the CA, petitioners raised the issues of prescription and laches, which the CA brushed aside on two
grounds: first, that the issue had already been raised by petitioners when the case was elevated before the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51454. Although it was not squarely ruled upon by the appellate court as it did not find any reason to delve further on
such issues, petitioners did not assail said decision barring them now from raising exactly the same issues; and second, the
issues proper for resolution had been laid down in the pre-trial order which did not include the issues of prescription and
laches. Thus, the same can no longer be further considered. As to the propriety of the property’s valuation as determined by
the PAC and adopted by the RTC, while recognizing the rule that the just compensation should be the reasonable value at the
time of taking which is 1940, the CA found it necessary to deviate from the general rule. It opined that it would be obviously
unjust and inequitable if respondents would be compensated based on the value of the property in 1940 which is ₱0.70 per sq
m, but the compensation would be paid only today. Thus, the appellate court found it just to award compensation based on
the value of the property at the time of payment. It, therefore, adopted the RTC’s determination of just compensation of
₱1,500.00 per sq m as recommended by the PAC. The CA further ordered the payment of interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum reckoned from the time of taking, which is the filing of the complaint on March 17, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court assailing the CA decision based on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THE HIGHLY DUBIOUS AND QUESTIONABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR ALLEGED
OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING JUST COMPENSATION TO RESPONDENTS
BECAUSE THEIR COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES IS ALREADY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ORDERING THE
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION BASED ON THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF THE ALLEGED
PROPERTY OF RESPONDENTS.22
Petitioners insist that the action is barred by prescription having been filed fifty-four (54) years after the accrual of the action
in 1940. They explain that the court can motu proprio dismiss the complaint if it shows on its face that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners likewise aver that respondents slept on their rights for more than fifty years; hence, they are guilty of
laches. Lastly, petitioners claim that the just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking
in 1940 and not at the time of payment.23
The petition is partly meritorious.
The instant case stemmed from an action for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents against petitioners. It,
however, revolves around the taking of the subject lot by petitioners for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. There is

26
taking when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a permanent duration, or for the
purpose of devoting the property to public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.24
It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the
construction of the MacArthur Highway. After the lapse of more than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the
possession of their property. Is the action barred by prescription or laches? If not, are the property owners entitled to recover
possession or just compensation?
As aptly noted by the CA, the issues of prescription and laches are not proper issues for resolution as they were not included
in the pre-trial order. We quote with approval the CA’s ratiocination in this wise:
Procedurally, too, prescription and laches are no longer proper issues in this appeal. In the pre-trial order issued on May 17,
2001, the RTC summarized the issues raised by the defendants, to wit: (a) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to just
compensation; (b) whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking or at the
time of the filing of the action; and (c) whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to damages. Nowhere did the pre-trial order
indicate that prescription and laches were to be considered in the adjudication of the RTC. 25
To be sure, the pre-trial order explicitly defines and limits the issues to be tried and controls the subsequent course of the
action unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. 26
Even if we squarely deal with the issues of laches and prescription, the same must still fail. Laches is principally a doctrine of
equity which is applied to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation or in an
injustice.27 This doctrine finds no application in this case, since there is nothing inequitable in giving due course to
respondents’ claim. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is taken for
public use.28 Neither shall prescription bar respondents’ claim following the long-standing rule "that where private property is
taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale,
the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe." 29
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a
landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken. 30 For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the
government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of
compensation.31 The trial and appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left for
determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Just compensation is "the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government." This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an
expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. 32
The issue in this case is not novel.
In Forfom Development Corporation [Forfom] v. Philippine National Railways [PNR], 33 PNR entered the property of Forfom
in January 1973 for public use, that is, for railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter
Service without initiating expropriation proceedings. 34 In 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real
property and/or damages against PNR. In Eusebio v. Luis, 35 respondent’s parcel of land was taken in 1980 by the City of
Pasig and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City without the appropriate expropriation
proceedings. In 1994, respondent demanded payment of the value of the property, but they could not agree on its valuation
prompting respondent to file a complaint for reconveyance and/or damages against the city government and the mayor. In
Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez,36 in the early 1970s, petitioner implemented expansion programs for its
runway necessitating the acquisition and occupation of some of the properties surrounding its premises. As to respondent’s
property, no expropriation proceedings were initiated.1âwphi1 In 1997, respondent demanded the payment of the value of the
property, but the demand remained unheeded prompting him to institute a case for accion reivindicatoria with damages
against petitioner. In Republic v. Sarabia, 37 sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and
control of a portion of a lot situated in Aklan, registered in the name of respondent, without initiating expropriation
proceedings. Several structures were erected thereon including the control tower, the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the
Kalibo airport terminal and the headquarters of the PNP Aviation Security Group. In 1995, several stores and restaurants
were constructed on the remaining portion of the lot. In 1997, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against the storeowners where ATO intervened claiming that the storeowners were its lessees.
The Court in the above-mentioned cases was confronted with common factual circumstances where the government took
control and possession of the subject properties for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and without
payment of just compensation, while the landowners failed for a long period of time to question such government act and
later instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages. The Court thus determined the landowners’ right to the
payment of just compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just compensation. The Court has uniformly ruled that
just compensation is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation. In
Forfom, the payment of just compensation was reckoned from the time of taking in 1973; in Eusebio, the Court fixed the just
compensation by determining the value of the property at the time of taking in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot at the time
of taking in 1972 served as basis for the award of compensation to the owner; and in Republic, the Court was convinced that
the taking occurred in 1956 and was thus the basis in fixing just compensation. As in said cases, just compensation due
respondents in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking, that is, in 1940.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in Republic v. Lara, et al., 38 and repeatedly held by the Court in recent
cases, thus:
x x x "The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings." For where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have depreciated its
value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the
complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for what
he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is taken x x x. 39

27
Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was ₱0.70/sq m.40 Hence, it
should, therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of the higher value which is ₱1,500.00. While
disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be receiving such
outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel effects of
belated claim. The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be
just not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. 41
Clearly, petitioners had been occupying the subject property for more than fifty years without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings. In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just
compensation, petitioners clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights which cannot be countenanced by
the Court.42 For said illegal taking, respondents are entitled to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory
damages which in this case should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the value of the land at the time of
taking in 1940 until full payment.43 This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the
right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the pet1t10n is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July
31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation of the subject property owned by respondents shall
be F0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from the date of taking in 1940
instead of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012
FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction of extension
building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3 rd was not paid due to disallowance of
COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal
during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3, 2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002,
RTC denied it and issued a writ of execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise denied. On
December 21, 2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files for
certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC directs sheriff to
receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is pending.
On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On
January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC
which was granted. UP files petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.

ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application

HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of retroactivity or is not
subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by the
nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its application.
USA vs Ruiz
Doctrine of Immunity from Suit
 
 
 
Caption:       USA VS RUIZ
G.R. No. L-35645       136 scra 487   May 22, 1985
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO.,
INC., respondents.
 
 
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
 
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission
of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the
name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests.
The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also
one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a
suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
 
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state
immunity.
 
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It
28
has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
 
 
 
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are
an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a
function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
 
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and
can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated September 3, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (Manila RTC) in Civil Case No. 09-122643 which declared null and void the results of the re-bidding for the
supply of water pipes conducted by the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the City Government of Iligan due to the use
of bidding documents outside of the rules and procedures prescribed under Republic Act No. (RA) 9184,3 otherwise known
as the "Government Procurement Act."
The Facts
On October 3, 2006, Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development4 (IBRD) entered into Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH5 for the implementation. of the IBRD's "Support for
Strategic Local Development and Investment . Project" (S2LDIP). The loan facility in the amount of JP¥11,710,000,000.00
was fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines and conditioned upon the participation of at least two (2) local
government units by way of a Subsidiary Loan Agreement (SLA) with Land Bank.6
On February 22, 2007, Land Bank entered into an SLA7 with the City Government of Iligan to finance the development and
expansion of the city's water supply system, which had two (2) components, namely: (a) the procurement of civil works; and
( b) the procurement of goods for the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings.8 The SLA
expressly provided that the goods, works, and services to be financed out of the proceeds of the loan with Land Bank were to
be "procured in accordance with the provisions of Section I of the 'Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA
Credits' x x x, and with the provisions of [the] Schedule 4."9 Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its BAC,
conducted a public bidding for the supply and delivery of various sizes of PE 100 HDPE pipes and fittings using the IBRD
Procurement Guidelines.10
Respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) participated in the said bidding and came up with the second to the lowest bid in
the amount of ₱193,959,354.34.11
However, in a letter12 dated July 27, 2009, the BAC informed Atlanta that the bidding was declared a failure upon the
recommendation of Land "Bank due to the IBRD 's non-concurrence with the Bid Evaluation Report. Moreover, in a letter13
dated August 28, 2009, the BAC informed Atlanta of its disqualification from the bidding because it lacked several
documentary requirements.
In response, Atlanta, through a letter14 dated September 8, 2009, sought to correct the BAC's erroneous assumption that it
failed to submit the necessary documents and to have its disqualification reconsidered. It expressed its objection against the
BAC's declaration of a failure of bidding, asserting that had it not been improperly disqualified there would have also been no
need to declare the bidding a failure because its tender would be the sole responsive bid necessary to save the bid process.15
However, in a Resolution16 dated September 25, 2009, the BAC deemed it futile to reconsider Atlanta's disqualification in
view of the fact that the bidding had already been declared a failure because of noted violations of the IBRD Procurement
Guidelines and that, unless the BAC conducts a new bidding on the project, it would not be able to obtain a "no objection"
from .the World Bank. Atlanta did not pursue the matter further with the BAC and opted, instead, to participate in the re-
bidding of the project, the notice of which was published anew on October 30, 2009.17
This notwithstanding, Atlanta, in a letter18 dated November 16, 2009, called the BAC's attention to its use of Bidding
Documents19 which, as it purported, not only failed to conform with the Third Edition of the Philippine Bidding Documents
for the Procurement of Goods (PBDs)20 prescribed by the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) but also contained
numerous provisions that were not in accordance with RA 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). During
the pre-bid conference, the BAC declared that the project was not covered by RA 9184 or by any of the GPPB 's issuances. It
further announced that the bid opening would be conducted on December 14, 2009.21
Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that appeared to be in contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR, Atlanta
filed on December 10, 2009 a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus22 with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the re-bidding .of the project against the City
Government of Iligan, the BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-122643 (Petition for
Prohibition).
In their separate comments on the said petition, Land Bank and the BAC asserted that the case was dismissible for improper.
venue, mootness, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, failure to implead an indispensable party, and the
inapplicability of RA 918.4.23
In the meantime, with Atlanta's Urgent Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a 72-Hour TRO and Special Raffle24 having
been denied,25 the re-bidding of the project was conducted (as scheduled on December 14, 2009), with four .C 4) bidders
participating and submitting the following bids:
1. Atlanta Industries, Inc. ₱141,289,680.50

29
 2. Moldex Products, Inc. ₱172,727,052.49
3. Dong Won Plastics, Inc. ₱189,184,599.74
4. Thai-Asia/Junnie Industries ₱191,900.020.0026
Thereupon, the case proceeded with the parties' submission of their respective memoranda27 and the denial of Atlanta's
prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ.28
The Manila RTC Ruling
In a Decision29 dated September 3, 2010, the Manila RTC declared the subject bidding null and void on the ground that it
was done contrary to the rules and procedure prescribed in RA 9184 and its IRR. Consequently, it enjoined the City
Government of Iligan and. its BAC from entering into and/or implementing the contract for the supply of water pipes with
Moldex Products, Inc.30
The Manila RTC also ruled that the City Government of Iligan cannot claim exemption from the application of RA 9184 and
its IRR by virtue of Loan Agreement No. 48~3-PH with the IBRD because it was Land Bank, and not the City Government
of Iligan, which was the party to the same. Moreover, it .held that the IBRD could not have passed on its status as an
international institution exempt from RA 9184 simply because it loaned money to Land Bank.31 It added that the SLA
subsequently executed by Land Bank with the City Government of Iligan cannot validly provide for the use of bidding
procedures different from those provided under RA 9184 because the said SLA is not in the nature of an international
agreement similar to the Loan Agreement with the IBRD.32
The Manila RTC finally concluded that in view of GPPB Resolution No. 05-2009 (September 30, 2009) which requires "all
branches, agencies, departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the Government, including x x x local government
units x x x to use the Philippine Bidding Documents Third Edition for all their procurement activities," the City Government
of Iligan and its BAC exceeded their jurisdiction in conducting the public bidding using the questioned bidding documents.33
Dissatisfied, Land Bank elevated the matter directly to the Court, vigorously asserting, among others, that: (a) venue was
improperly laid; and (b) the public bidding for the supply of water pipes to the City of Iligan's Water Supply System
Development and Expansion Project is exempt from the application of RA 9184 and its IRR by virtue of the SLA being .a
related and subordinate covenant to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH.34
The Issues Before the Court
The main issues presented for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the instant
prohibition case and eventually issue the writ prayed for; and (b) whether or not the SLA between the Land Bank and the
City Government of Iligan is an executive agreement similar to Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH such that the procurement of
water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan should be deemed exempt from the application of RA 9184.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The Court first resolves the procedural issues of this case, then proceeds to its substantive aspects.
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES:
The Manila RTC's Lack of Jurisdiction to
Issue the Writ of Prohibition Subject of
this Case; and Atlanta's Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Preliminarily, Land Bank asserts that the Petition for Prohibition was improperly filed before the Manila RTC considering
that the acts sought to be enjoined, i.e., the public bidding for the supply of water pipes, are beyond the said court's territorial
jurisdiction.35 Atlanta, for its part, counter-argues that the acts of Land Bank are as much to be enjoined for causing the City
Government of Iligan and its BAC to continuously violate the provisions of RA 9184, its IRR, and the PBDs in the conduct
of the public bidding36 and that the filing of the prohibition case in the City of Manila was in accordance with the rules on
venue given that Land Bank's main office is in the City of Manila.37
The Court finds for Land Bank.
A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment ordering the respondent to desist from continuing
with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) reads:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer
or person," the petition must be filed "in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by
the Court." Section 4 of the same Rules provides that:
Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition. -The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it
shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
H may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is .in aid of the court's
appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule corresponds to Section 21 ( 1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,38 otherwise known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP 129), which gives Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of certiorari,
30
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction but lays down the limitation that the writs issued therein
are enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari: prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Costaño v. Lobingier,39 that the power to
administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be
exercised within the limits of their respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying
previous legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its complementary provision, i.e., Section 4, Rule 65 of
the Rules, the Court held in said case that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of injunction and certiorari against the
Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining
Co., Inc. v. Arnado,40 a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in the CFI of Manila to
question the authority of the Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department of Labor in Cebu City to hear a
complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to enjoin said respondents from conducting further
proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the dismissal . of the case on the ground of improper venue, holding that the CFI of
Manila had no authority to issue writs of injunction, certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial
boundaries. Further, in both Cudiamat v. Torres (Cudiamat)41 and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Reyes42
(NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to . restrain, in
Cudiamat, the implementation of an award on a public bidding for the supply of a police call and signal box system for the
City of Manila, and, in NAWASA, the conduct of the public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for its Manila and Suburbs
Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases that the injunction issued by the CFI of Rizal purporting to restrain acts
outside the province of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the instant case, the writ of prohibition issued by
the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is
null and void.
Also on a matter of procedure, the Court further discerns that the Manila RTC should have dismissed the case outright for
failure of Atlanta to exhaust administrative remedies. Under RA 9184, the decisions of the BAC in all stages of procurement
may be protested. to the head of the procuring entity through a verified position paper and upon payment of a protest fee.43
The necessity for the complaining bid participant to complete the protest process before resorting to court action cannot be
overemphasized. It is a condition precedent to the court's taking cognizance of an action that assails a bid process.44 When
precipitately taken prior to the completion of the protest process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.45
While Atlanta may have written the BAC a letter objecting to some of the terms and conditions contained in the bidding
documents to be used for the re-bidding, its action fell short of the required protest. It failed to follow through with' its protest
and opted instead to participate in the re-bidding with full knowledge that the IBRD Procurement Guidelines were to be
followed throughout the conduct of the bid. Having failed to observe the protest procedure required by law, Atlanta's case
should not have prospered with the RTC altogether.
With the procedural matters having been resolved, the Court now proceeds to discuss the substantive aspect of this case
concerning the SLA and Land Bank's claimed exemption from the provisions of RA 9184.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Applicability of the Bidding
Procedure under RA 9184; and the
Nature of Loan No. 4833-PH · and its
Relation to the SLA.
While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts for the procurement of civil works or
supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only after competitive public bidding, RA 9184 recognizes the country's
commitment to abide by its obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement. This is pertinently provided
in Section 4 of RA 9184 which reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Scope and Application. - This Act shall apply to the Procurement of Infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting
Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of the government, its
department, offices and agencies, including government owned and/or -controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138.1âwphi1 Any treaty or international or executive agreement
affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed. (Emphasis
supplied)
The IRR of RA 9184 further supplements the law's treatment of treaties and international or executive agreements as follows:
Section 4. Scope and Application of the IRR
4.1 This IRR shall apply to all procurement of any branch, agency, department, bureau, office or instrumentality of
the GOP, including government-owned and/or -controlled corporations (GOCCs), government financial institutions
(GFis), state universities and colleges (SUCs) and local government units (LGUs).
4.2 Any Treaty or International or Executive Agreement to which the GOP is a signatory affecting the subject
matter of the Act and this IRR shall be observed. In case of conflict between the terms of the Treaty or International
or Executive Agreement and this IRR, the former shall prevail.
4.3 Unless the Treaty or International or Executive Agreement expressly provides use of foreign
government/foreign or international financing institution procurement procedures and guidelines, this IRR shall
apply to Foreign-funded Procurement for goods, infrastructure projects, and consulting services by the GOP.
Consistent with the policies and principles set forth in Sections 2 and 3 of this IRR, the GOP negotiating panels shall adopt,
as its default position, use of this IRR, or at the very least, selection through competitive bidding, in all Foreign-funded
Procurement. If the Treaty or International or Executive Agreement states otherwise, then the negotiating panels shall explain
in writing the reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
While Atlanta admits that there are exceptions to the application of RA 9184, it posits that the City Government of Iligan
could not claim to be exempt under any of the enumerated instances because it is not a party to the IBRD Loan Agreement.46
It further asserts that a provision in the SLA between Larid Bank and the City Government of Iligan providing for

31
procurement procedures different from that required under RA 9184 would not be valid since it is not a treaty or an executive
agreement in the way that Loan Agreement, No. 4833-PH is.
The argument lacks merit.
As the parties have correctly discerned, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH is in the nature of an executive agreement. In Bayan
Muna v. Romulo47 (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international agreement as one concluded between states in written
form and governed by international law, "whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation,"48 and further expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require
legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or ( b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they
do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than
treaties.49 Examining its features, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral
component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international law
possessed of a treaty-making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world
governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign state, is likewise
regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states.
Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH - following the
definition given in the Bayan Muna case - is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law. Owing to
this classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and conditions under the rule
of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good
faith.50 It bears pointing out that the pacta sunt servanda rule has become part of the law of the land through the
incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." Keeping in mind the foregoing attributions, the .Court
now examines the SLA and its relation with Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH.
As may be palpably observed, the terms and conditions of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH, being a project-based and
government-guaranteed loan facility, were incorporated and made part of the SLA that was subsequently entered into by
Land Bank with the City Government of Iligan.51 Consequently, this means that the SLA cannot be treated as an
independent and unrelated contract but as a conjunct of, or having a joint and simultaneous occurrence with, Loan Agreement
No. 4833-PH. Its nature and consideration, being a mere accessory contract of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH, are thus the
same as that of its principal contract from which it receives life and without which it cannot exist as an independent
contract.52 Indeed, the accessory follows the principal;53 and, concomitantly, accessory contracts should not be read
independently of the main contract.54 Hence, as Land Bank correctly puts it, the SLA has attained indivisibility with the
Loan Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement through the incorporation of each other's terms and conditions such that the
character of one has likewise become the character of the other.
Considering that Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH expressly provides that the procurement of the goods to be financed from the
loan proceeds shall be in accordance with the IBRD Guidelines and the provisions of Schedule 4, and that the accessory SLA
contract merely follows its principal 's terms and conditions, the procedure for competitive public bidding prescribed under
RA 9184 therefore finds no application to the procurement of goods for the Iligan City Water Supply System Development
and Expansion Project. The validity of similar stipulations in foreign loan agreements requiring the observance of IBRD
Procurement Guidelines in the procurement process has, in fact, been previously upheld by the Court in the case of
Department of Budget and Management Procurement Service (DBMPS) v. Kolonwel Trading,55 viz.:
The question as to whether or not foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions, such as Loan No. 7118-
PH, partake of an executive or international agreement within the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184, has been answered
by the Court in the affirmative in [Abaya v. Sec. Ebdane, Jr., 544 Phil. 645 (2007)]. Significantly, Abaya declared that the
RP-JBIC loan agreement was to be of governing application over the CP I project and that the JBIC · Procurement
Guidelines, as stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the procurement of goods necessary to implement the
main project.
Under the fundamental international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact embodied in the afore-quoted
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9184, the RP, as borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith its duties and obligation under Loan
No. 7118-PH. Applying this postulate in the concrete to this case, the IABAC was legally obliged to comply with, or accord,
primacy to, the WB Guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the bidding/procurement process in question.56
With the nature and treatment of Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH as well as its accessory SLA herein explained, the Court thus
holds that the RTC committed reversible error in ruling that the provisions of RA 9184 were to be applied in this case. Quite
the contrary, it is the IBRD Guidelines and the provisions of Schedule 4 which should govern. As such, the procurement of
water pipes by the BAC of the City Government of Iligan -as Land Bank meritoriously submits in its petition - is beyond the
purview of RA 9184, yielding as it should to the express stipulations found in the executive agreement, to which the latter's
accessory merely follows.
In view of all these errors, both on procedural and substantive counts, the Court is hereby bound to reverse the trial court's
decision and accordingly grant the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 3, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (Manila RTC) in Civil Case No. 09-122643 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus filed before the Manila RTC is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
SOCIAL JUSTICE
Calalang vs Williams
GR 47800
December 2, 1940

Social Justice as the aim of Labor Laws

CRUZ, J.:

32
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works
and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along
Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30
p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7
a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which
authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the
Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to
the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the
modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending
from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director
of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before
the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.

Issue:

Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people.

Held:

The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is
"neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its
IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the

33
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to
the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same. 

Magalona vs Ermita
Archipelagic Doctrine
 
 
 
MAGALONA  VS ERMITA
G.R. No. 187167         16Aug2011
Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners,
vs
Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.
 
 
 
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
 
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased
the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
 
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
 
Issues:
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
 
Discussions:
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost points of
our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters. RA 9522, as a
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less
than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
 
 
 
Rulings:
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the country’s
maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones
and continental shelf.
 
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as
affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed
by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of
archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters
and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.
 
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe the
delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any effect
like enlargement or diminution of territories.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

34
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art
III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject
only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors
of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of
an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution
to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the

35
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of
the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to
the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an
unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to
any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.
The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent
powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically
defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of
the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the
pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive
process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional,
for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

36
Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out
of wedlock  and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more  capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child.”
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that
even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any
express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if
the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten
instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1)      Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be
strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2)      Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the
claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely
corroborative of such other evidence.

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA of the Philippine Military Academy, represented by his father
RENATO P. CUDIA, who also acts on his own behalf, and BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE
(HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA and HC MEMBERS, and the CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB),
Respondents.

x-----------------------x

FILIPINA P. CUDIA, in behalf of CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA, and on her own behalf,
Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The true test of a cadet's character as a leader rests on his personal commitment to uphold what is morally and ethically
righteous at the most critical and trying times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a dilemma
between what is true and right as against his security, well-being, pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his
honor and those that [define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and chooses the fore. This is
the essence of and. the Spirit of the Honor Code - it is championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender
of one's basic rights and privileges.1

The Procedural Antecedents

Six days prior to the March 16, 2014 graduation ceremonies of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), petitioners Renato
P. Cudia, acting for himself and in behalf of his son, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia (Cadet JCL Cudia), and Berteni
Catalufta Causing filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for extremely urgent
temporary restraining order (TRO).2

In a Resolution dated March 1 7, 2014, the Court denied the prayer for TRO and instead, required respondents to file their
comment on the petition.3

37
On March 25, 2014, Filipina P. Cudia, acting for herself and in behalf of her son Cadet 1 CL Cudia, filed a motion for leave
to intervene, attaching thereto the petition-in-intervention.4 Per Resolution dated March 31, 2014, the Court granted the
motion and resolved to await respondents' comment on the petition.5

A manifestation was then filed by petitioners on April 3, 2014, recommending the admission of the petition-in-intervention
and adopting it as an integral part of their petition.6 On May 20, 2014, petitioner-intervenor filed a manifestation with motion
for leave to admit the Final Investigation Report of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) dated April 25, 2014.7 The
Report8 was relative to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029 filed by the spouses Renato and Filipina Cudia (Spouses Cudia), for
themselves and in behalf of their son, against the PMA Honor Committee (HC) members and Major Vladimir P. Gracilla
(Maj. Gracilla)9 for violation of Cadet lCL Cudia's rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.
Subsequently, on June 3, 2014, petitioners filed a motion for leave to adopt the submission of the CHR Report.10 The
manifestation was granted and the motion was noted by the Court in its Resolution dated July 7, 2014.

After filing three motions for extension of time,11 respondents filed their Consolidated Comment12 on June 19, 2014. In a
motion, petitioner-intervenor filed a Reply, which was later adopted by petitioners.13 Submitted as Annex "A" of the Reply
was a copy of the CHR Resolution dated May 22, 2014 regarding CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029.14 We noted and granted
the same on August 11, 2014 and October 13, 2014.

Petitioner-intervenor twice filed a manifestation with motion to submit the case for early resolution,15 which the Court noted
in a Resolution dated August 11, 2014 and October 3, 2014.16

The Facts

Cadet 1 CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the country's premiere military academy located
at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. He belonged to the "A" Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As
claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called "petitioners," unless otherwise indicated), he
was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy cadet
graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1 CL cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on
Operations Research (OR432) under Dr. Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales) at the PMAFI Room. Per published
schedule from the Headquarters Academic Group, the 4th period class in OR432 was from 1 :30-3:00 p.m. (1330H-1500H),
while the 5th period class in ENG412 was from 3:05-4:05 p.m. (1505H-1605H).

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against
Cadet 1 CL Cudia because he was "[/]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x. "17 Cadets 1 CL Narciso, Arcangel,
Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for five minutes.18

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They were logged and transmitted to the
Company Tactical Officers ( CTO) for explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet lCL Cudia received his
DR.

In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet lCL Cudia reasoned out that: "I came directly from OR432
Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir."19

On December 19, 2013, Major Rommel Dennis Hindang (Maj. Hindang), the CTO of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, meted out to him
the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Immediately, Cadet lCL Cudia clarified with Maj. Hindang his alleged
violation. The latter told him that the basis of the punishment was the result of his conversation with Dr. Costales, who
responded that she never dismissed her class late, and the protocol to dismiss the class 10-15 minutes earlier than scheduled.
When he expressed his intention to appeal and seek reconsideration of the punishment, he was · advised to put the request in
writing. Hence, that same day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia addressed his Request for Reconsideration of Meted Punishment to Maj.
Benjamin L. Leander, Senior Tactical Officer (STO), asserting:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class,
which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
being late Sir.20

A day after, Maj. Leander instructed Maj. Hindang to give his comments on the request of Cadet 1 CL Cudia and to indicate
if there were other cadets belonging to the same section who were also late.

On December 28, 2013, Maj. Hindang submitted his reply to Maj. Leander pointing out that, based on his investigation, the
4th period class was not dismissed late. As a result, Maj. Leander sustained the penalty imposed. Petitioners alleged that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia came to know of the denial of his request only on January 24, 2014 upon inquiry with Maj. Leander.

Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia was informed that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for
violation of the Honor Code. The Honor Report stated:

38
Lying that is giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his 4th period class ended at l 500H that
made him late in the succeeding class.22

Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1 CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1 CL Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in
his Report, Cadet lCL Cudia learned that it was based on Maj. Hindang's conversations with their instructors and classmates
as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj. Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an
extension of time to answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on the matter, was on
emergency leave.

On January 13, 2014, Dr. Costales sent text messages to Cadet lCL Cudia, conveying:

Gud pm cdt cudia. Mam belandres gave me bkground na. She told me its a report dated november. When maj hindang ask
me, no time referens. (04:25:11 P.M.)

All the while I thot he was refering to dismisal during last day last december. Whc i told, i wud presume they wil finish early
bee its grp work. (04:29:21 P.M.)23

The next day, Cadets lCL Cudia and Arcangel approached Dr. Costales, who reaffirmed that she and Maj. Hindang were not
in the same time reference when the latter asked her.

Later, Cadet 1 CL Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the Honor Report. He averred:

Sir, We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my
paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. After which, I and Cadet lcl Arcangel asked for some query with
regards (sic) to the deductions of our previous LE. Our instructor gladly answered our question. She then told me that she
will give the copy of our section grade, so I waited at the hallway outside the ACAD5 office, and then she came out of the
room and gave me a copy of the grades. Cadet Arcangel, Cadet Narciso and I immediately went to our 5ti period class which
is ENG412.

With these statements, I would like to clarify the following:

1. How could this be lying?

2. What is wrong with the side of Maj. Hindang (why did he come up to that honor report)?

3. What are his assumptions?

I appeal, in the name of clarity, fairness and truth[,] that my case be reopened and carefully reviewed for I did not violate the
honor code/system, I can answer NO to both questions (Did I intend to deceive? Did I intend to take undue advantage?) and
for the following reasons:

1. The honor report of Maj. Hindang was already settled and finalized given the fact that no face-to-face personal
conversation with Ms. Costales was conducted to clarify what and when exactly was the issue at hand.

2. Statements of the respondents support my explanation.

3. My explanation to my appeal to my DR (Request for reconsideration of meted punishment) further supports my

explanation in my delinquency report.

4. My understanding of the duration of the "CLASS" covers not just a lecture in a typical classroom instruction but
includes every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students, especially that in our case some
cadets asked for queries, and I am given instruction by which (sic) were directly related to our CLASS. Her
transaction and communication with our other classmates may have already ended but ours extended for a little bit.

I agree and consider that because Cadet CUDIA is under my instruction to wait, and the other cadets still have
business with me, it is reasonable enough for him to say that "Our class was dismissed a bit late" (dealing with
matter of seconds or a minute particularly 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds)

And with concern to (sic) OR432 class, I can say it ended on time (1500H).

(signed)
M COSTALES

w/ attached certification

39
 5. I was transparent and honest in explaining the 2-minute delay and did not attempt to conceal anything that
happened or I did.

6. Furthermore, CPT DULA WAN PA, the Tactical Officer of Hawk Company[,] and I had a conversation with
regards (sic) to the same matter for which he can give important points of my case.

7. Cadet lcl DIAZ "D" Co can also stand as a witness that I waited for Ms. Costales. 24

On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary investigation on the reported honor violation of
Cadet 1 CL Cudia. The Foxtrot Company was designated as the investigating team and was composed of Cadet 1 CL
Hasigan as Presiding Officer, and Cadets 1 CL Mogol, lCL Raguindin, 2CL Gumilab, 2CL Saldua, 3CL Espejo, and 3CL
Poncardas as members.25 Soon after, the team submitted its Preliminary Investigation Report recommending that the case be
formalized.

The formal investigation against Cadet 1 CL Cu di a then ensued. The Presiding Officer was Cadet 1 CL Rhona K. Salvacion,
while the nine (9) voting members were Cadets lCL Jairus 0. Fantin, lCL Bryan Sonny S. Arlegui, 1 CL Kim Adrian R.
Martal, 1 CL J eanelyn P. Cabrido, 1 CL ShuAydan G. Ayada, 1 CL Dalton John G. Lagura, 2CL Renato A. Carifio, Jr., 2CL
Arwi C. Martinez, and 2CL Niko Angelo C. Tarayao.26 Acting as recorders tasked to document the entire proceedings were
4CL Jennifer A. Cuarteron and 3CL Leoncio Nico A. de Jesus 11.27 Those who observed the trial were Cadets 1 CL Balmeo,
Dag-uman, Hasigan, Raguindin, Paulino, Arcangel, and Narciso; Cadets 2CL Jocson and Saldua, Jr.; and Cadet 3CL
Umaguing.28

The first formal hearing started late evening of January 20, 2014 and lasted until early morning the next day. Cadet lCL
Cudia was informed of the charge against him, as to which he pleaded "Not Guilty." Among those who testified were Cadet 1
CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and Cadets 1 CL Arcangel and Narciso. On the second night of the hearing held on January 21,
2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia again appeared and was called to the witness stand along with Cadets Brit and Barrawed. Dr.
Costales also testified under oath via phone on a loudspeaker. Deliberation among the HC voting members followed. After
that, the ballot sheets were distributed. The members cast their votes through secret balloting and submitted their
accomplished ballot sheets together with their written justification. The result was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict. Cadet lCL
Dalton John G. Lagura (Cadet lCL Lagura) was the lone dissenter. Allegedly, upon the order ofHC Chairman Cadet 1 CL
Mogol, the Presiding Officer and voting members went inside a chamber adjoining the court room for further deliberation.
After several minutes, they went out and the Presiding Officer announced the 9-0 guilty verdict. Cadet 1 CL Cudia, who
already served nine (9) touring hours, was then informed of the unanimous votes finding him guilty of violating the Honor
Code. He was immediately placed in the PMA Holding Center until the resolution of his appeal.

On January 24, 2014, Cadet ICL Cudia filed a written appeal addressed to the HC Chairman, the full text of which stated:

WRITTEN APPEAL

14 NOVEMBER 2013

This is when I was reported for "Late for two (2) minutes in Eng412 class", my explanation on this delinquency report when I
received it, is that "Our class was dismissed a (little) bit late and I came directly from 4th period class ... etc". Knowing the
fact that in my delinquency report, it is stated that ENG412 classes started 1500H and I am late for two minutes, it is logical
enough for I (sic) to interpret it as "I came 1502H during that class". This is the explanation that came into my mind that
time. (I just cannot recall the exact words I used in explaining that delinquency report, but what I want to say is that I have no
intention to be late). In my statements, I convey my message as "since I was not the only one left in that class, and the
instructor is with us, I used the term "CLASS", I used the word "DISMISSED" because I was under instruction (to wait for
her to give the section grade) by the instructor, Ms. Costales. The other cadets (lCL MIRANDA, lCL ARCANGEL) still have
queries and business with her that made me decide to use the word "CLASS", while the others who don't have queries and
business with her (ex: lCL NARCISO and 1 CL DIAZ) were also around.

Note:

The four named cadets were also reported late.

Reference: Para 171. 0. (Leaving the Classroom Prior to Dismissal Time)(Sec XVII, CCAFPR s2008)

It is stated in this reference that "Cadets shall not linger in the place of instruction after the section has been dismissed.
EXCEPT when told or allowed to do so by the instructor or by any competent authority for official purposes. "

The instruction by Ms. Costales was given to me before the two bells rang (indicating the end of class hour, 1500H). I waited
for her for about 45 seconds to 1 minute and 30 seconds, that made me to decide to write "a little bit late" in my explanation.
Truly, the class ENDED 1500H but due to official purpose (instruction by Ms. Costales to wait) and the conflict in academic
schedule (to which I am not in control of the circumstances, 4th PD class 1330H-1500H and 5th PD class 1500H-1 600H),
and since Ms. Costales, my other classmates, and I were there, I used the word "CLASS".

40
19 December 2013

I was informed that my delinquency report was awarded, 11 Demerits and 13 Touring hours. Not because I don't want to
serve punishment, but because I know I did nothing wrong, I obeyed instruction, and believing that my reason is justifiable
and valid, that is why I approached our tactical officer, MAJ HINDANG PAF, to clarify and ask why it was awarded that
day.

In our conversation, he said that he had a phone call to my instructor and he even added that they have a protocol to dismiss
the class, 15 minutes or 10 minutes before 1500H. I explained:

Sir, I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period
class, which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4th period class, I went to my next class without any intention
of being late Sir.

These statements are supplementary to my explanation in my delinquency report, in here, I specified the conflict in the
schedule and again, I have no intention to be late. After explaining it further with these statements, my tactical officer said
that since I was reported in a written form, I should make an appeal in a written form. Thinking that he already understood
what I want to say, I immediately made an appeal that day stating the words that I used in having conversation with him.29

Attached to the written appeal was a Certification dated January 24, 2014, wherein Dr. Costales attested:

1. That Cadet MIRANDA, ARCANGEL, [and] NARCISO was (sic) with Cadet CUDIA in making query about
their latest grades in OR432 and/or results of UEl outside the ACADS office. The following facts may explain their
queries on 14 November 2013:

a. That I held my class in the PMAFI room instead of room 104.

b. That OR432 releases grades every Wednesday and cadets are informed during Thursday, either in class
or posted grades in the bulletin board (grades released was [sic J based on the previous LEs: latest LE
before UE was Decision Trees).

c. That UE papers were already checked but not yet recorded due to (sic) other cadets have not taken the
UE. Cadets were allowed to verify scores but not to look at the papers.

d. Last 23 January 2014, Captain Dulawan clarified if indeed Cadet NARCISO and ARCANGEL verified
grades. The two cadets said that they verified something with me after the OR432 class and they were
with Cadet CUD IA. That the statements of the three (3) cadets are all the same and consistent, thus[,] I
honor that as true.

2. As to the aspect of dismissing late, I could not really account for the specific time that I dismissed the class. To
this date, I [cannot] really recall an account that is more than two (2) months earlier. According to my records,
there was a lecture followed by an LE during (sic) on 14 November 2013. To determine the time of my dismissal,
maybe it can be verified with the other members of class I was handling on that said date.30

Respondents contend that the HC denied the appeal the same day, January · 24, as it found no reason to conduct a re-trial
based on the arguments and evidence presented.31 Petitioners, however, claim that the written appeal was not acted upon
until the filing of the petition-in-intervention.32

From January 25 to February 7, 2014, respondents allege that the Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted an informal
review to check the findings of the HC. During the course of the investigation, Prof. Berong was said to have confirmed with
the Officer-in-Charge of the HC that classes started as scheduled (i.e., 3:05 p.m. or 1505H), and that Cadet lCL Barrawed, the
acting class marcher of ENG412, verified before the Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and STO that the class started not
earlier than scheduled.

Meantime, on February 4, 2014, the OIC of the HC forwarded the Formal Investigation Report to the Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA) for review. The next day, the SJA found the report to be legally in order.

On February 8, 2014, Colonel Rozzano D. Briguez (Col. Briguez), the Commandant of Cadets, affirmed the HC findings and
recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then PMA Superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet lCL Cudia
for violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code (Lying, pursuant to Sec. VII.12.b of the CCAFPR S-2008). On the same
date, Special Orders No. 26 was issued by the PMA Headquarters placing Cadet 1 CL Cudia on indefinite leave of absence
without pay and allowances effective February 10, 2014 pending approval of his separation by the AFPGHQ, barring him
from future appointment and/or admission as cadet, and not permitting him to qualify for any entrance requirements to the
PMA. 33

Two days later, Vice Admiral Abogado approved the recommendation to dismiss Cadet 1 CL Cudia.

41
On February 13, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting for
reinstatement by the PMA of his status as a cadet.34

Four days passed, Annavee P. Cudia (Annavee ), the sister of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, posted his plight in her Face book account.
The day after, the Spouses Cudia gave a letter to Major General Oscar Lopez (Maj. Gen. Lopez), the new PMA
Superintendent, asking to recognize the 8-1 voting of the HC.35 Copies of which were furnished to the AFP Chief of Staff
and other concerned military officials. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Lopez was directed to review Cadet lCL Cudia's case. The
latter, in turn, referred the matter to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB).

On February 19, 2014, Cadet lCL Cudia made his personal appeal letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez. On even date, the AFP Chief of
Staff ordered a reinvestigation following the viral Facebook post of Annavee demanding the intervention of the military
leadership.

Petitioners claim that, on February 21, 2014, Special Order No. 1 was issued directing all PMA cadets to ostracize Cadet 1
CL Cudia by not talking to him and by separating him from all activities/functions of the cadets. It is said that any violation
shall be a "Class 1" offense entailing 45 demerits, 90 hours touring, and 90 hours confinement. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not
given a copy of the order and learned about it only from the media.36 According to an alleged news report, PMA
Spokesperson Major Agnes Lynette Flores (Maj. Flores) confirmed the HC order to ostracize Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Among his
offenses were: breach of confidentiality by putting documents in the social media, violation of the PMA Honor Code, lack of
initiative to resign, and smearing the name of the PMA.37

On February 24, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia requested the CRAB for additional time, until March 4, 2014, to file an appeal on
the ground that his intended witnesses are in on-the-job training ( OJT).38 As additional evidence to support his appeal, he
also requested for copies of the Minutes of the HC proceedings, relevant documents pertaining to the case, and video
footages and recordings of the HC hearings.

The next day, Cadet 1 CL Cudia and his family engaged the services of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Baguio City.

The CRAB conducted a review of the case based on the following: (a) letter of appeal of the Spouses Cudia dated February
18, 2014; (b) directive from the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case; and ( c) guidance from Maj. Gen. Lopez.

On February 26, 2014, Brigadier General Andre M. Costales, Jr. (Brig. Gen. Costales, Jr.), the CRAB Chairman, informed
Cadet lCL Cudia that, pending approval of the latter's request for extension, the CRAB would continue to review the case and
submit its recommendations based on whatever evidence and testimonies received, and that it could not favorably consider
his request for copies of the HC minutes, relevant documents, and video footages and recordings of the HC hearings since it
was neither the appropriate nor the authorized body to take action thereon.39 Subsequently, upon verbal advice, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia wrote a letter to Maj. Gen. Lopez reiterating his request.40

Two days after, the Spouses Cudia filed a letter-complaint before the CHR-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Office
against the HC members and Maj. Gracilla for alleged violation of the human rights of Cadet lCL Cudia, particularly his
rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.41

On March 4, 2014, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, through the PAO, moved for additional time, until March 19, 2014, to file his appeal
and submit evidence. PAO also wrote a letter to AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista (Gen. Bautista) seeking
for immediate directive to the PMA to expeditiously and favorably act on Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests.42

Exactly a week prior to the commencement exercises of Siklab Diwa Class, the following events transpired:

On March 10, 2014, Annavee sought the assistance of PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta.43 On the other
hand, the CRAB submitted a report to the AFP-GHQ upholding the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia.44

On March 11, 2014, PAO received a letter from Maj. Gen. Lopez stating the denial of Cadet 1CL Cudia's requests for
extension of time to file an Appeal Memorandum in view of the ample time already given, and to be furnished with a copy of
relevant documents because of confidentiality and presumption of regularity of the HC proceedings.45 Cadet 1CL Cudia,
through PAO, then filed an Appeal Memorandum46 before the CRAB.

On March 12, 2014, Spouses Cudia wrote a letter to President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III (Pres. Aquino), who is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, attaching thereto the Appeal Memorandum.47 On the same day, Special Orders No. 48 was
issued by the PMA constituting a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and PMA senior
officers to conduct a deliberate investigation pertaining to Cadet 1CL Cudia's Appeal Memorandum.48 The focus of the
inquiry was not just to find out whether the appeal has merit or may be considered but also to investigate possible
involvement of other cadets and members of the command related to the incident and to establish specific violation of policy
or regulations that had been violated by other cadets and members of the HC.49

On March 13, 2014, the Cudia family and the Chief Public Attorney had a dialogue with Maj. Gen. Lopez. On March 14,
2014, the CHR-CAR came out with its preliminary findings, which recommended the following:

42
 a. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty - 1 Not guilty vote;

b. For the PMA and the Honor Committee to officially pronounce Cdt Cudia as Not Guilty of the charge filed
against him before the Honor Committee;

c. For the PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledge graduating cadet and allow him to
graduate on Sunday, 16 March 2014;

d. For the PMA to fully cooperate with the CHR in the investigation of Cudia's Case.50

On March 15, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia and his family had a meeting with Pres. Aquino and Department of National Defense
(DND) Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin. The President recommended that they put in writing their appeal, requests, and other
concerns. According to respondents, the parties agreed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia would not join the graduation but it was
without prejudice to the result of the appeal, which was elevated to the AFP Chief of Staff. The President then tasked Gen.
Bautista to handle the reinvestigation of the case, with Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez supervising the group conducting the review.

Four days after Siklab Diwa Class' graduation day, petitioner Renato S. Cudia received a letter dated March 11, 2014 from
the Office of the AFP Adjutant General and signed by Brig. Gen. Ronald N. Albano for the AFP Chief of Staff, affirming the
CRAB' s denial of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s appeal. It held:

After review, The Judge Advocate General, APP finds that the action of the PMA CRAB in denying the appeal for
reinvestigation is legally in order. There was enough evidence to sustain the finding of guilt and the proprietary (sic) of the
punishment imposed. Also, your son was afforded sufficient time to file his appeal from the date he was informed of the final
verdict on January 21, 2014, when the decision of the Honor Committee was read to him in person, until the time the PMA
CRAB conducted its review on the case. Moreover, the continued stay of your son at the Academy was voluntary. As such,
he remained subject to the Academy's policy regarding visitation. Further, there was no violation of his right to due process
considering that the procedure undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing policy.
Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee finding your son, subject Cadet guilty of "Lying"
and recommending his separation from the Academy is sustained.

In view of the foregoing, this Headquarters resolved to deny your appeal for lack of merit.51 Thereafter, the Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body issued its Final Investigation Report on March 23, 2014 denying Cadet 1 CL Cudia's appeal.52
Subsequently, on April 28, 2014, the special investigation board tasked to probe the case submitted its final report to the
President.53 Pursuant to the administrative appeals process, the DND issued a Memorandum dated May 23, 2014, directing
the Office of AFP Chief of Staff to submit the complete records of the case for purposes of DND review and
recommendation for disposition by the President.54

Meanwhile, on May 22, 2014, the CHR-CAR issued its Resolution with respect to CHR-CAR Case No. 2014-0029,
concluding and recommending as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission on Human Rights-CAR Office finds PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS against the officers and members of the PMA Honor Committee and .. certain PMA
officials, specifically for violations of the rights of CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA to dignity, due process, education,
privacy/privacy of communication, and good life.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the CHR-CAR Office RESOLVED to indorse to competent authorities for their
immediate appropriate action on the following recommendations:

1. The Philippine Military Academy must set aside the "9-Guilty, 0-Not Guilty" verdict against Cadet Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia, for being null and void; to uphold and respect the "8-Guilty, 1-Not Guilty" voting result and make an
official pronouncement of NOT GUILTY in favor of Cadet Cudia;

2. The PMA, the AFP Chief of Staff, and the President in whose hands rest the ends of justice and fate of Cadet
Cudia, to:

2.1 officially proclaim Cadet Cudia a graduate and alumnus of the Philippine Military Academy;

2.2 issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding Diploma for the degree of Bachelors of Science; and

2.3 Issue to Cadet Cudia the corresponding official transcript 'of his academic records for his BS degree,
without conditions therein as to his status as a PMA cadet.

3. The Public Attorneys' Office to provide legal services to Cadet Cudia in pursuing administrative, criminal and
civil suits against the officers and members of the Honor Committee named hereunder, for violation of the Honor
Code and System and the Procedure in Formal Investigation, dishonesty, violation of the secrecy of the ballot,
tampering the true result of the voting, perjury, intentional omission in the Minutes of substantive part of the formal

43
 trial proceedings which are prejudicial to the interest of justice and Cadet Cudia's fundamental rights to dignity,
non-discrimination and due process, which led to the infringement of his right to education and even transgressing
his right to a good life.

3.1 Cdt lCL MIKE ANTHONY MOGUL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.2 Cdt lCL RHONA K. SALVACION, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.3 Cdt 2CL ARWI C. MARTINEZ

3.4 Cdt 2CL RENATO A. CARINO, JR.

3.5 Cdt 2CL NIKOANGELOC. TARAYAO

3.6 Cdt lCL JEANEL YN P. CABRIDO, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.7 Cdt lCL KIM ADRIAN R. MARTAL, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.8 Cdt lCL JAIRUS 0. FANTIN, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.9 Cdt lCL BRYAN SONNY S. ARLEGUI, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.10 Cdt lCL DALTON JOHN G. LAGURA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.11 Cdt 1 CL BIANCHIHEIMER L. EDRA, now 2nd Lt. of the AFP

3.12 Cdt 4CL JENNIFER A. CUARTERON (recorder)

3.13 Cdt 3CL LEONCIO NICO A. DE JESUS II (record)

4. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA competent authorities should investigate and file appropriate
charges against Maj. VLADIMIR P. GRACILLA, for violation of the right to privacy of Cadet Cudia and/or
failure, as intelligence officer, to ensure the protection of the right to privacy of Cudia who was then billeted at the
PMA Holding Center;

5. The Office of the AFP Chief of Staff and PMA competent authorities should investigate Maj. DENNIS
ROMMEL HINDANG for his failure and ineptness to exercise his responsibility as a competent Tactical Officer
and a good father of his cadets, in this case, to Cadet Cudia; for failure to respect exhaustion of administrative
remedies;

6. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philppines, the PMA
Superintendent, to immediately cause the comprehensive review of all rules of procedures, regulations, policies,
including the so-called practices in the implementation of the Honor Code; and, thereafter, adopt new policies,
rules of procedures and relevant regulations which are human-rights based and consistent with the Constitution and
other applicable laws;

7. The Congress of the Philippines to consider the enactment of a law defining and penalizing ostracism and
discrimination, which is apparently being practiced in the PMA, as a criminal offense in this jurisdiction;

8. His Excellency The President of the Philippines to certify as priority, the passage of an anti-ostracism and/or
anti-discrimination law; and

9. Finally, for the AFP Chief of Staff and the PMA authorities to ensure respect and protection of the rights of those
who testified for the cause of justice and truth as well as human rights of Cadet Cudia.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to monitor the actions by the competent authorities on the foregoing CHR recommendations.

Let copy of this resolution be served by personal service or by substituted service to the complainants (the spouses Renato
and Filipina Cudia; and Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia), and all the respondents. Also, to the PMA Superintendent, the AFP Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, His Excellency The President of the Philippines, The Public Attorneys' Office.

SO RESOLVED.55

44
On June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP Chief of Staff and the CRAB. The letter,
which was addressed to the Spouses Cudia and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., stated in whole:

This refers to your letters to the President dated 12 March 2014 and 26 March 2014 appealing for a reconsideration of the
decision of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Honor Committee on the case of your son, Cadet 1 CL Aldrin Jeff
Cudia.

After carefully studying the records of the case of Cadet Cudia, the decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Honor Code System of the AFP Cadet Corps, this Office has found no substantial basis to disturb
the findings of the AFP and the PMA Cadet Review Appeals Board (CRAB). There is no competent evidence to support the
claim that the decision of the Honor Committee members was initially at 8 "Guilty" votes and 1 "Not Guilty" vote. The lone
affidavit of an officer, based on his purported conversation with one Honor Committee member, lacks personal knowledge on
the deliberations of the said Committee and is hearsay at best.

Similarly, the initial recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights cannot be adopted as basis that Cadet Cudia's
due process rights were violated. Apart from being explicitly preliminary in nature, such recommendations are anchored on a
finding that there was an 8-1 vote which, as discussed above, is not supported by competent evidence.

In the evaluation of Cadet Cudia's case, this Office has been guided by the precept that military law is regarded to be in a
class of its own, "applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a
system of discipline separate from that of civilians" (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, 10 August 2005 citing Calley v.
Callaway, 519 F. 2d 184 [1975] and Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 US 83 [1953]). Thus, this Office regarded the findings of the
AFP Chief, particularly his conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the proceedings that ensued, as carrying great
weight.

Accordingly, please be informed that the President has sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the PMA CRAB.56

The Issues

To petitioners, the issues for resolution are:

I.

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
CONSIDERING THAT:

A. Despite repeated requests for relevant documents regarding his case, Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was
deprived of his right to have access to evidence which would have proven his defense, would have totally belied the
charge against him, and more importantly, would have shown the irregularity in the Honor Committee's hearing
and rendition of decision

B. Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was vaguely informed of the decisions arrived at by the Honor Committee,
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy

C. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy have
afforded Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia nothing but a sham trial

D. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy violated
their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code

E. The Honor Committee, the Cadet Review and Appeals Board and the Philippine Military Academy, in deciding
Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia's case, grossly and in bad faith, misapplied the Honor Code so as to defy the
1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the unquestionable fact that the former should yield to the latter.

II

WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE AND THE CADET REVIEW AND
APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT CADET FIRST CLASS
ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA LIED, THEREBY VIOLATING THE HONOR CODE

III

45
WHETHER THE RESULT OF THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION INDEPENDENTLY CONDUCTED BY THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS OF SUCH GREAT WEIGHT AND PERSUASIVE NATURE THAT THIS
HONORABLE COURT MAY HONOR, UPHOLD AND RESPECT57

On the other hand, in support of their prayer to dismiss the petition, respondents presented the issues below:

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

I.

THE MANDAMUS PETITION PRAYING THAT CADET CUDIA BE INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF GRADUATES OF
SIKLAB DIWA CLASS OF 2014 AND BE ALLOWED TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES HAS
ALREADY BEEN RENDERED MOOT.

II.

THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITIONS ARE ACTUALLY FACTUAL WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS.

III.

MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL RESPONDENTS TO GRANT THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. IV. IT IS
PREMATURE TO INVOKE JUDICIAL REDRESS PENDING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT ON CADET
CUDIA'S APPEAL.

V.

WITH UTMOST DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT MUST EXERCISE CAREFUL RESTRAINT AND
REFRAIN FROM UNDULY OR PREMATURELY INTERFERING WITH LEGITIMATE MILITARY MATTERS.

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

VI.

CADET CUDIA HAS NECESSARILY AND VOLUNTARILY RELINQUISHED CERTAIN CIVIL LIBERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF HIS ENTRY INTO THE PMA.

VII.

THE PMA ENJOYS THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM WHICH AUTHORIZES IT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY
MEASURES AND PUNISHMENT AS IT DEEMS FIT AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PECULIAR NEEDS OF THE
ACADEMY.

VIII.

CADET CUDIA WAS PROPERLY AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the absence of statutory authority.

Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.

Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful statements in the explanation for his tardiness.

The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor Committee.

The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to Cadet Cudia.

The subtle evolution in the voting process of the Honor Committee, by incorporating executive session/chambering, was
adopted to further strengthen the voting procedure of the Honor Committee. Cadet Lagura voluntarily changed his vote
without any pressure from the other voting members of the Honor Committee.

Ostracism is not a sanctioned practice of the PMA.

46
The findings of the Commission on Human Rights are not binding on the Honorable Court, and are, at best, recommendatory.

Cadet Cudia was not effectively deprived of his future when he was dismissed from the PMA.58

The Ruling of the Court

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

Propriety of a petition for mandamus

Respondents argue that the mandamus aspect of the petition praying that Cadet 1 CL Cudia be included in the list of
graduating cadets and for him to take part in the commencement exercises was already rendered moot and academic when the
graduation ceremonies of the PMA Siklab Diwa Class took place on March 16, 2014. Also, a petition for mandamus is
improper since it does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Invoking Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,59 respondents assert that a mandamus petition could not be availed of to compel an
academic institution to allow a student to continue studying therein because it is merely a privilege and not a right. In this
case, there is a clear failure on petitioners' part to establish that the PMA has the, ministerial duty to include Cadet 1 CL
Cudia in the list, much less award him with academic honors and commission him to the Philippine Navy. Similar to the case
of University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60 it is submitted that the PMA may rightfully exercise its
discretionary power on who may be admitted to study pursuant to its academic freedom.

In response, petitioners contend that while the plea to allow Cadet 1 CL Cudia to participate in the PMA 2014
commencement exercises could no longer be had, the Court may still grant the other reliefs prayed for. They add that Garcia
enunciated that a respondent can be ordered to act in a particular manner when there is a violation of a constitutional right,
and that the certiorari aspect of the petition must still be considered because it is within the province of the Court to
determine whether a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof.

We agree that a petition for mandamus is improper.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.

For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be
performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."
The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law.
This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.61

In this case, petitioners pray for, among others: Also, after due notice and hearing, it is prayed of the Court to issue a Writ of
Mandamus to:

1. direct the PMA to include Cadet Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA,
including inclusion in the yearbook;

2. direct the PMA to allow Cadet Cudia to take part in the commencement exercises if he completed all the
requirements for his baccalaureate degree;

3. direct the PMA to award unto Cadet Cudia the academic honors he deserves, and the commission as a new
Philippine Navy ensign;

4. direct the Honor Committee to submit to the CRAB of the PMA all its records of the proceedings taken against
Cadet Cudia, including the video footage and audio recordings of the deliberations and voting, for the purpose of
allowing the CRAB to conduct intelligent review of the case of Cadet Cudia;

5. direct the PMA's CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all the records without requiring Cadet Cudia to submit
new evidence if it was physically impossible to do so;

6. direct the PMA's CRAB to take into account the certification signed by Dr. Costales, the new evidence
consisting of the affidavit of a military officer declaring under oath that the cadet who voted "not guilty" revealed
to this officer that this cadet was coerced into changing his vote, and other new evidence if there is any;

47
 7. direct the PMA's CRAB to give Cadet Cudia the right to a counsel who is allowed to participate actively in the
proceedings as well as in the cross-examinations during the exercise of the right to confront witnesses against him;
and

8. direct the Honor Committee in case of remand of the case by the CRAB to allow Cadet Cudia a representation of
a counsel.62

Similarly, petitioner-intervenor seeks for the following reliefs:

A. xxx

B. a Writ of Mandamus be issued commanding:

a.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to respect and uphold the 8 Guilty -1 Not Guilty vote;

b.) The PMA, Honor Committee, and CRAB to officially pronounce Cadet Cudia as Not Guilty of the
charge filed against him before the Honor Committee;

c.) The PMA to restore Cadet Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged graduating cadet, including
his diploma and awards.63

Anent the plea to direct the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to
allow him to take part in the commencement exercises, the same was rendered moot and academic when the graduation
ceremonies pushed through on March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.

With respect to the prayer directing the PMA to restore Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights and entitlements as a full-fledged
graduating cadet, including his diploma, awards, and commission as a new Philippine Navy ensign, the same cannot be
granted in a petition for mandamus on the basis of academic freedom, which We shall discuss in more detail below. Suffice it
to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic freedom; therefore,
beyond the province of the Court to decide.64 The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant awards, and commission
officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. Borrowing
the words of Garcia:

There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She [in this
case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia] cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.65

Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose
duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.66 For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the
thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be
mandated.67

The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the CRAB
proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to require
anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to compel an official
to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not
entitled by law.68

The foregoing notwithstanding, the resolution of the case must proceed since, as argued by petitioners, the Court is
empowered to settle via petition for certiorari whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents in
dismissing Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA.

Factual nature of the issues

According to respondents, the petition raises issues that actually require the Court to make findings of fact because it sets
forth several factual disputes which include, among others: the tardiness of Cadet 1 CL Cudia in , his ENG412 class and his
explanation thereto, the circumstances that transpired in the investigation of his Honor Code violation, the proceedings before
the HC, and the allegation that Cadet 1 CL Lagura was forced to change his vote during the executive session/"chambering."

In opposition, petitioners claim that the instant controversy presents legal issues. Rather than determining which between the
two conflicting versions of the parties is true, the case allegedly centers on the application, appreciation, and interpretation of
a person's rights to due process, to education, and to property; the interpretation of the PMA Honor Code and Honor System;
and the conclusion on whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia's explanation constitutes lying. Even if the instant case involves questions
of fact, petitioners still hold that the Court is empowered to settle mixed questions of fact and law. Petitioners are correct.

48
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is
a question of law.69 The petition does not exclusively present factual matters for the Court to decide. As pointed out, the all-
encompassing issue of more importance is the determination of whether a PMA cadet has rights to due process, to education,
and to property in the context of the Honor Code and the Honor System, and, if in the affirmative, the extent or limit thereof.
Notably, even respondents themselves raise substantive grounds that We have to resolve. In support of their contention that
the Court must exercise careful restraint and should refrain from unduly or prematurely interfering in legitimate military
matters, they argue that Cadet 1 CL Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his
entry into the PMA, and that the Academy enjoys academic freedom authorizing the imposition of disciplinary measures and
punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the PMA. These issues, aside from being purely legal
being purely legal questions, are of first impression; hence, the Court must not hesitate to make a categorical ruling.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents assert that the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending President Aquino’s resolution of Cadet
1 CL Cudia' appeal. They say that there is an obvious non-exhaustion of the full administrative process. While Cadet 1 CL
Cudia underwent the review procedures of his guilty verdict at the Academy level - the determination by the SJA of whether
the HC acted according to the established procedures of the Honor System, the assessment by the Commandant of Cadets of
the procedural and legal correctness of the guilty verdict, the evaluation of the PMA Superintendent to warrant the
administrative separation of the guilty cadet, and the appellate review proceedings before the CRAB - he still appealed to the
President, who has the utmost latitude in making decisions affecting the military. It is contended that the President's power
over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces is recognized in B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga70
and in Section 3171 of Commonwealth Act (CA.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act''). As such, the President
could still overturn the decision of the PMA. In respondents' view, the filing of this petition while the case is pending
resolution of the President is an irresponsible defiance, if not a personal affront. For them, comity dictates that courts of
justice should shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

From the unfolding of events, petitioners, however, consider that President Aquino effectively denied the appeal of Cadet 1
CL Cudia. They claim that his family exerted insurmountable efforts to seek reconsideration of the HC recommendation from
the APP officials and the President, but was in vain. The circumstances prior to, during, and after the PMA 2014 graduation
rites, which was attended by President Aquino after he talked to Cadet lCL Cudia's family the night before, foreclose the
possibility that the challenged findings would still be overturned. In any case, petitioners insist that the· rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute based on the Corsiga v. Defensor72 and Verceles v. BLR-DOLE73 rulings.

We rule for petitioners.

In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted. The rationale behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that "courts, for reasons of
law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted
to and the proper authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum."74 In the U.S. case of
Ringgold v. United States,75 which was cited by respondents, it was specifically held that in a typical case involving a
decision by military authorities, the plaintiff must exhaust his remedies within the military before appealing to the court, the
doctrine being designed both to preserve the balance between military and civilian authorities and to conserve judicial
resources.

Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the
following is present:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied and
assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

49
 9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.76

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a
ground to give due course to the petition despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the
fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President finally issued its ruling,
which sustained the findings of the AFP Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars any
objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Court's interference within military affairs

Respondents cite the U.S. cases of Bois v. Marsh77 and Schlesinger v. Councilman78 to support their contention that judicial
intervention would pose substantial threat to military discipline and that there should be a deferential review of military
statutes and regulations since political branches have particular expertise and competence in assessing military needs.
Likewise, in Orloff v. Willoughby79 and Parker v. Levy,80 it was allegedly opined by the U.S. Supreme Court that the
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. According to
respondents, the U.S. courts' respect to the military recognizes that constitutional rights may apply differently in the military
context than in civilian society as a whole. Such military deference is exercised either by refusing to apply due process and
equal protection doctrines in military cases or applying them but with leniency.

In respondents' view, although Philippine courts have the power of judicial review in cases attended with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to
military affairs. Such respect is exercised by the court where the issues to be resolved entail a substantial consideration of
legitimate governmental interest. They suppose that allowing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case to prosper will set an institutionally
dangerous precedent, opening a Pandora's box of other challenges against the specialized system of discipline of the PMA.
They state that with the PMA's mandate to train cadets for permanent commission in the AFP, its disciplinary rules and
procedure necessarily must impose h different standard of conduct compared with civilian institutions.

Petitioners, on the other hand, consider that this Court is part of the State's check-and-balance machinery, specifically
mandated by Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to ensure that no branch of the government or any of its officials acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of, discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They assert
that judicial non-interference in military affairs is not deemed as absolute even in the U.S. They cite Schlesinger and Parker,
which were invoked by respondents, as well as Burns v. Wilson81 and Harmon v. Brucker,82 wherein the U.S. Supreme
Court reviewed the proceedings of military tribunals on account of issues posed concerning due process and violations of
constitutional rights. Also, in Magno v. De Villa83 decided by this Court, petitioners note that We, in fact, exercised the
judicial power to determine whether the APP and the members of the court martial acted with grave abuse o.f discretion in
their military investigation.

Petitioners' contentions are tenable.

Admittedly, the Constitution entrusts the political branches of the government, not the courts, with superintendence and
control over the military because the courts generally lack the competence and expertise necessary to evaluate military
decisions and they are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have.84 Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, We rule that the facts as well as the legal issues in the U.S.
cases cited by respondents are not on all fours with the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Instead, what applies is the 1975 U.S. case
of Andrews v. Knowlton,85 which similarly involved cadets who were separated from the United States Military Academy
due to Honor Code violations. Following Wasson v. Trowbridge86 and Hagopian v. Knowlton,87 Andrews re-affirmed the
power of the district courts to review procedures used at the service academies in the separation or dismissal of cadets and
midshipmen. While it recognized the "constitutional permissibility of the military to set and enforce uncommonly high
standards of conduct and ethics," it said that the courts "have expanded at an accelerated pace the scope of judicial access for
review of military determinations." Later, in Kolesa v. Lehman,88 it was opined that it has been well settled that federal
courts have jurisdiction "where there is a substantial claim that prescribed military procedures violates one's constitutional
rights." By 1983, the U.S. Congress eventually made major revisions to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by
expressly providing, among others; for a direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court of decisions by the military's highest
appellate authority.89

Even without referring to U.S. cases, the position of petitioners is still formidable. In this jurisdiction, Section 1 Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government" even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.90
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.91

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The proceedings of the Cadet Honor Committee can, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, be considered a governmental
activity. As ruled in Andrews:

The relationship between the Cadet Honor Committee and the separation process at the Academy has been sufficiently
formalized, and is sufficiently interdependent, so as to bring that committee's activities within the definition of governmental
activity for the purposes of our review. While the Academy has long had the informal practice of referring all alleged
violations to the Cadet Honor Committee, the relationship between that committee and the separation process has to a degree
been formalized. x x x

Regardless of whether the relationship be deemed formal or informal, the Honor Committee under its own procedures
provides that a single "not guilty" vote by a member ends the matter, while a "guilty" finding confronts a cadet with the hard
choice of either resigning or electing to go before a Board of Officers. An adverse finding there results not only in formal
separation from the Academy but also in a damaging record that will follow the cadet through life. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Cadet Honor Committee, acting not unlike a grand jury, is clearly part of the process whereby a cadet can ultimately
be adjudged to have violated the Cadet Honor Code and be separated from the Academy. Therefore, the effect of the
committee's procedures and determinations on the separation process is sufficiently intertwined with the formal governmental
activity which may follow as to bring it properly under judicial review92

No one is above the law, including the military. In fact, the present Constitution declares it as a matter of principle that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.93 Consistent with the republican system of checks and balances,
the Court has been entrusted, expressly or by necessary implication, with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in
appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action.94

SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS

Cadet's relinquishment of certain civil liberties

Respondents assert that the standard of rights applicable to a cadet is not the same as that of a civilian because the former' s
rights have already been recalibrated to best serve the military purpose and necessity. They claim that both Gudani and Lt.
Col. Kapunan, Jr. v. Gen. De Villa95 recognized that, to a certain degree, individual rights of persons in the military service
may be curtailed by the rules of military discipline in order to ensure its effectiveness in fulfilling the duties required to be
discharged under the law. Respondents remind that, as a military student aspiring to a commissioned post in the military
service, Cadet 1 CL Cudia voluntarily gave up certain civil and political rights which the rest of the civilian population
enjoys. The deliberate surrender of certain freedoms on his part is embodied in the cadets' Honor Code Handbook. It is noted
that at the beginning of their academic life in the PMA, Cadet 1 CL Cudia, along with the rest of Cadet Corps, took an oath
and undertaking to stand by the Honor Code and the Honor System.

To say that a PMA cadet surrenders his fundamental human rights, including the right to due process, is, for petitioners,
contrary to the provisions of Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution,96 Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17897 (as amended
by E.O. No. 100598), AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military
professionalism, and, in general, military culture. They maintain that the HC, the CRAB, and the PMA, grossly and in bad
faith misapplied the Honor Code and the Honor System in deciding Cadet lCL Cudia's case considering that these should not
be implemented at the expense of human rights, due process, and fair play. Further, under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, they can never overpower or defy the 1987 Constitution since the former should yield to the latter. Petitioners
stress that the statement that "a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and
System to be implemented" simply pertains to what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of
integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the right to freely choose what they want to say or do. In the
context of disciplinary investigation, it does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to the
cadets' rights to privacy and to remain silent.

We concur with the stand of petitioners.

Of course, a student at a military academy must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of
the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a student at a civilian public school.99 In fact,
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook of the PMA expresses that, "[as] a training environment, the Cadet Corps is a
society which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be
part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the group."100

It is clear, however, from the teachings of Wasson and Hagopian, which were adopted by Andrews, that a cadet facing
dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property);
hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a must.101 For that reason, the
PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied.102
Likewise, the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college instruction which he or she has
pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of probably

being forever denied that career.103

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The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet
in a military academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that sought to annul the directive from
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which' enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her
consent. We ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief
of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for
his "house arrest" (particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during the period of
his detention) are justified by the requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional rights to
information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to free speech - not to due process clause - were restricted to
better serve the greater military purpose. Academic freedom of the PMA

Petitioners posit that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA. They argue that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as
justifications for the attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System do not state that a guilty cadet
is automatically terminated or dismissed from service. To them, the Honor Code and Honor System are "gentleman's
agreement" that cannot take precedence over public interest - in the defense of the nation and in view of the taxpayer's money
spent for each cadet. Petitioners contend that, based on the Civil Code, all written or verbal agreements are null and void if
they violate the law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and public safety.

In opposition, respondents claim that the PMA may impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and
consistent with the peculiar needs of the Academy. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory
authority to administratively dismiss erring cadets since it is deemed reasonably written into C.A. No. 1. Moreover, although
said law grants to the President the authority of terminating a cadet's appointment, such power may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the cadets.

Respondents likewise contend that, as an academic institution, the PMA has the inherent right to promulgate reasonable
norms, rules and regulations that it may deem necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, which is specifically
mandated by Section 3 (2),104 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. As the premiere military educational institution of the
AFP in accordance with Section 30,105 Article III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59,106 Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title
VIII, Book IV of E.O. No. 292 ("Administrative Code of 1987"), the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom
guaranteed by Section 5 (2),107 Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,108 it was held that concomitant with such freedom is the right and duty to instill and impose discipline upon its
students. Also, consistent with lsabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.109 and Ateneo de Manila University v.
Capulong,110 the PMA has the freedom on who to admit (and, conversely, to expel) given the high degree of discipline and
honor expected from its students who are to form part of the AFP.

For respondents, Cadet 1 CL Cudia cannot, therefore, belatedly assail the Honor Code as basis of the HC' s decision to
recommend his dismissal from the PMA. When he enlisted for enrolment and studied in the PMA for four years, he knew or
should have been fully aware of the standards of discipline imposed on all cadets and the corresponding penalty for failing to
abide by these standards.

In their Reply, petitioners counter that, as shown in lsabelo, Jr. and Ateneo, academic freedom is not absolute and cannot be
exercised in blatant disregard of the right to due process and the 1987 Constitution. Although schools have the prerogative to
choose what to teach, how to teach, and who to teach, the same does not go so far as to deprive a student of the right to
graduate when there is clear evidence that he is entitled to the same since, in such a case, the right to graduate becomes a
vested right which takes precedence over the limited and restricted right of the educational institution.

While both parties have valid points to consider, the arguments of respondents are more in line with the facts of this case. We
have ruled that the school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Once admitted, a student's enrolment is not only
semestral in duration but for the entire period he or she is expected to complete it.111 An institution of learning has an
obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.112 Such contract is imbued
with public interest because of the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of
supervisory and regulatory powers over a educational institutions.113

The school-student relationship has also been held as reciprocal. "[It] has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind -it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and obligations. The school undertakes to provide students
with education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the students agree to
abide by the academic requirements of the school and to observe its rules and regulations."114

Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning,115 has
been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.116 In Garcia, this Court espoused the concurring opinion of
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,117 which enumerated "the four essential
freedoms" of a university: To determine for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study.118 An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such
rules as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college.119 It can decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them, free from outside coercion or interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for
some restraint.120 Indeed, "academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well

52
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every 'person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."'121

The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment of
rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."122 As a Bohemian proverb puts it:
"A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary
power assure its right to survive and continue operating.123 In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of
schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary
rules.124 In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,125 this Court elucidated:

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A
school certainly cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution requires rules and regulations necessary for
the maintenance of an orderly educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning.
Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty, and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach." Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its
students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights,
appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of
citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and
creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carry out its responsibility to help its students
"grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." If a
school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or
expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.126

The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act done by the student prior
thereto. In University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,127 We upheld the university's withdrawal of a
doctorate degree already conferred on a student who was found to have committed intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation.
Thus:

Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."
This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more
precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher
learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of
higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the
honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to
revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the
"graduation" of a student, .as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation" of such a student that is in
question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent's case began before her graduation. If she was able to
join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of
Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic
freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, "is not to be construed in
a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion."

Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the
power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is
founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw
what it has granted without violating a student's rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers
that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a
university's highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of
academic excellence is the university's concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect
itself from serious threats to its integrity.

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While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also
entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not
jeopardized.128

It must be borne in mind that schools are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to
inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.129 Essentially,
education must ultimately be religious, i.e., one which inculcates duty and reverence.130 Under the rubric of "right to
education," students have a concomitant duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.131 Every citizen has a right to
select a profession or, course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.132
The PMA is not different. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System
in particular.

The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior
and serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet's action. It is the cadet's responsibility to maintain the highest standard of
honor. Throughout a cadet's stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet
Corps from its alumni or the member of the so-called "Long Gray Line."

Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the cadets' character development. It defines the desirable values
they must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and
it makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character building, it should not only be kept within the society
of cadets. It is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it outside as an officer of the AFP and as a
product of the PMA.134

The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary means of achieving the cadets' character development and as
ways by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical
standards of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that graduates have strong character, unimpeachable
integrity, and moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is
characterized as "correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the
cadets "to be prepared to accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to place loyalty to the service above
self-interest or loyalty to friends or associates. "137 Procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case

Respondents stress that Guzman v. National University138 is more appropriate in determining the minimum standards for the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. Similarly, with the guideposts set in Andrews, they believe that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was accorded due process.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the HC, the CRAB and the PMA fell short in observing the important safeguards
laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR139 and Non v. Judge Dames II,140 which set the minimum standards to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. For them, Guzman did not entirely do away with the
due process requirements outlined in Ang Tibay as the Court merely stated that the minimum requirements in the Guzman
case are more apropos.

Respondents rightly argued.

Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong141 already settled the issue as it held that although both Ang Tibay and Guzman
essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the latter case is more apropos since it specifically deals with the
minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. That Guzman is the
authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases was reaffirmed by the Court in the fairly recent case of Go
v. Colegio De San Juan De Letran.142

In Guzman, the Court held that there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process, to wit:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; ( 4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.143

We have been consistent in reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings
and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice;144 that the proceedings may be
summary;145 that cross-examination is not an essential part of the investigation or hearing;146 and that the required proof in
a student disciplinary action, which is an administrative case, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."147

What is crucial is that official action must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, which generally encompass
the right of adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.148 As held in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:149
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Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course,
it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence
on which a fair decision can be based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of due process.150

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet's honor
violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. It articulates that – The Spirit of the Honor Code
guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases involving
Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify
questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.

The Spirit of the Honor Code is a way for the cadets to internalize Honor in a substantive way. Technical and procedural
misgivings of the legal systems may avert the true essence of imparting the Spirit of the Code for the reason that it can be
used to make unlawful attempt to get into the truth of matters especially when a cadet can be compelled to surrender some
civil rights and liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented. By virtue of being a cadet, a member of the
CCAFP becomes a subject of the Honor Code and System. Cadet's actions are bound by the existing norms that are logically
applied through the Code and System in order to realize the Academy's mission to produce leaders of character - men of
integrity and honor.151

One of the fundamental principles of the Honor System also states:

2. The Honor System correlates with legal procedures of the state's Justice System but it does not demean its Spirit by
reducing the Code to a systematic list of externally observed rules. Where misinterpretations and loopholes arise through
legalism and its technicalities, the objective of building the character of the cadets becomes futile. While, generally, Public
Law penalizes only the faulty acts, the Honor System tries to examine both the action and the intention.152

Like in other institutions of higher learning, there is aversion towards undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in
the military academy. It has been said that the mission of the military is unique in the sense that its primary business is to
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, and that over-proceduralizing military determinations necessarily
gives soldiers less time to accomplish this task.153 Extensive cadet investigations and complex due process hearing could
sacrifice simplicity, practicality, and timeliness. Investigations that last for several days or weeks, sessions that become
increasingly involved with legal and procedural' points, and legal motions and evidentiary objections that are irrelevant and
inconsequential tend to disrupt, delay, and confuse the dismissal proceedings and make them unmanageable. Excessive
delays cannot be tolerated since it is unfair to the accused, to his or her fellow cadets, to the Academy, and, generally, to the
Armed Forces. A good balance should, therefore, be struck to achieve fairness, thoroughness, and efficiency.154 Considering
that the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia is one of first impression in the sense that this Court has not previously dealt with the
particular issue of a dismissed cadet's right to due process, it is necessary for Us to refer to U.S. jurisprudence for some
guidance. Notably, our armed forces have been patterned after the U.S. Army and the U.S. military code produced a salutary
effect in the military justice system of the Philippines.155 Hence, pertinent case laws interpreting the U.S. military code and
practices have persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.

We begin by stating that U.S. courts have uniformly viewed that "due process" is a flexible concept, requiring consideration
in each case of a variety of circumstances and calling for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.156
Hagopian opined:

In approaching the question of what process is due before governmental action adversely affecting private interests may
properly be taken, it must be recognized that due process is not a rigid formula or simple rule of thumb to be applied
undeviatingly to any given set of facts. On the contrary, it is a flexible concept which depends upon the balancing of various
factors, including the nature of the private right or interest that is threatened, the extent to which the proceeding is adversarial
in character, the severity and consequences of any action that might be taken, the burden that would be imposed by requiring
use of all or part of the full panoply of trial-type procedures, and the existence of other overriding interests, such as the
necessity for prompt action in the conduct of crucial military operations. The full context must therefore be considered in
each case.157 (Emphasis supplied)

Wasson, which was cited by Hagopian, broadly outlined the minimum standards of due process required in the dismissal of a
cadet. Thus:

[W]hen the government affects the private interests of individuals, it may not proceed arbitrarily but must observe due
process of law. x x x Nevertheless, the flexibility which is inherent in the concept of due process of law precludes the
dogmatic application of specific rules developed in one context to entirely distinct forms of government action. "For, though
'due process of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings, * * * yet, this is not universally true." x x x Thus, to determine in
55
any given case what procedures due process requires, the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private
interest affected and of the government interest involved, taking account of history and the precise circumstances surrounding
the case at hand.

While the government must always have a legitimate concern with the subject matter before it may validly affect private
interests, in particularly vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security and military affairs, the
private interest must yield to a greater degree to the governmental. x x x Few decisions properly rest so exclusively within the
discretion of the appropriate government officials than the selection, training, discipline and dismissal of the future officers of
the military and Merchant Marine. Instilling and maintaining discipline and morale in these young men who will be required
to bear weighty responsibility in the face of adversity -- at times extreme -- is a matter of substantial national importance
scarcely within the competence of the judiciary. And it cannot be doubted that because of these factors historically the
military has been permitted greater freedom to fashion its disciplinary procedures than the civilian authorities.

We conclude, therefore, that due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from the Merchant Marine Academy that
he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance
of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific
charges against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of time and
the use of witnesses and other evidence. We do not suggest, however, that the Cadet must be given this opportunity both
when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be
adversarial.158 (Emphasis supplied)

In Andrews, the U.S. Court of Appeals held that Wasson and Hagopian are equally controlling in cases where cadets were
separated from the military academy for violation of the Honor Code. Following the two previous cases, it was ruled that in
order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to be dismissed or separated from the
academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to
present his or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other evidence.159
Conspicuously, these vital conditions are not too far from what We have already set in Guzman and the subsequent rulings in
Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration160 and De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.161

In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1 CL Cudia' s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing
practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain
the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The
preliminary investigation immediately followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion,
the investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter
reviewed the findings and recommendations. When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and
given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found to have violated the ' Honor
Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at the Academy level - from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA,
to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG.
Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct
a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings.

It is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling
under their respective jurisdictions, the factual findings of administrative tribunals are ordinarily accorded respect if not
finality by the Court, unless such findings are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where
the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.162 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, We find no reason to deviate from the
general rule. The grounds therefor are discussed below seriatim:

As to the right to be represented by a counsel –

For petitioners, respondents must be compelled to give Cadet 1 CL Cudia the right to be represented by a counsel who could
actively participate in the proceedings like in the cross-examination of the witnesses against him before the CRAB or HC, if
remanded. This is because while the CRAB allowed him to be represented by a PAO lawyer, the counsel was only made an
observer without any right to intervene and demand respect of Cadet 1 CL Cudia's rights.163 According to them, he was not
sufficiently given the opportunity to seek a counsel and was not even asked if he would like to have one. He was only
properly represented when it was already nearing graduation day after his family sought the assistance of the PAO.
Petitioners assert that Guzman is specific in stating that the erring student has the right to answer the charges against him or
her with the assistance of counsel, if desired.

On the other hand, respondents cited Lumiqued v. Exevea164 and Nera v. The Auditor General165 in asserting that the right
to a counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations or non-criminal proceedings. Also, based on Cadet lCL Cudia's
academic standing, he is said to be obviously not untutored to fully understand his rights and express himself. Moreover, the
confidentiality of the HC proceedings worked against his right to be represented by a counsel. In any event, respondents
claim that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not precluded from seeking a counsel's advice in preparing his defense prior to the HC
hearing.

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Essentially, petitioners claim .. that Cadet lCL Cudia is guaranteed the right to have his counsel not just in assisting him in
the preparation for the investigative hearing before the HC and the CRAB but in participating fully in said hearings. The
Court disagrees.

Consistent with Lumiqued and Nera, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. Further,
in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,166 the Court held that "a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no
duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel." Hence, the administrative body is under no
duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement.

More in point is the opinion in Wasson, which We adopt. Thus:

The requirement of counsel as an ingredient of fairness is a function of all of the other aspects of the hearing. Where the
proceeding is non-criminal in nature, where the hearing is investigative and not adversarial and the government does not
proceed through counsel, where the individual concerned is mature and educated, where his knowledge of the events x x x
should enable him to develop the facts adequately through available sources, and where the other aspects of the hearing taken
as a whole are fair, due process does not require representation by counsel.167

To note, U.S. courts, in general, have declined to recognize a right to representation by counsel, as a function of due process,
in military academy disciplinary proceedings.168 This rule is principally motivated by the policy of "treading lightly on the
military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military establishment to govern its own affairs
within the broad confines of constitutional due process" and the courts' views that disciplinary proceedings are not judicial in
nature and should be kept informal, and that literate and educated cadets should be able to defend themselves.169 In
Hagopian, it was ruled that the importance of informality in the proceeding militates against a requirement that the cadet be
accorded the right to representation by counsel before the Academic Board and that unlike the welfare recipient who lacks the
training and education needed to understand his rights and express himself, the cadet should be capable of doing so.170 In the
subsequent case of Wimmer v. Lehman,171 the issue was not access to counsel but the opportunity to have counsel, instead
of oneself, examine and cross-examine witnesses, make objections, and argue the case during the hearing. Disposing of the
case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the argument that an individual of a
midshipman's presumed intelligence, selected because he is expected to be able to care for himself and others, often under
difficult circumstances, and who has full awareness of what he is facing, with counsel's advice, was deprived of due process
by being required to present his defense in person at an investigatory hearing.

In the case before Us, while the records are bereft of evidence that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was given the option or was able to
seek legal advice prior to and/or during the HC hearing, it is indubitable that he was assisted by a counsel, a PAO lawyer to
be exact, when the CRAB reviewed and reinvestigated the case. The requirement of due process is already satisfied since, at
the very least, the counsel aided him in the drafting and filing of the Appeal Memorandum and even acted as an observer who
had no right to actively participate in the proceedings (such as conducting the cross-examination). Moreover, not to be missed
out are the facts that the offense committed by Cadet 1 CL Cudia is not criminal in nature; that the hearings before the HC
and the CRAB were investigative and not adversarial; and that Cadet lCL Cudia's excellent-academic standing puts him in
the best position to look after his own vested interest in the Academy.

As to the confidentiality of records of the proceedings –

Petitioners allege that when Maj. Gen. Lopez denied in his March 11, 2014 letter Cadet lCL Cudia's request for documents,
footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings, the vital evidence negating the regularity of the HC trial and supporting
his defense have been surely overlooked by the CRAB in its case review. Indeed, for them, the answers on whether Cadet 1
CL Cudia was deprived of due process and whether he lied could easily be unearthed from the video and other records of the
HC investigation. Respondents did not deny their existence but they refused to present them for the parties and the Court to
peruse. In particular, they note that the Minutes of the HC dated January 21, 2014 and the HC Formal Investigation Report
dated January 20, 2014 were considered by the CRAB but were not furnished to petitioners and the Court; hence, there is no
way to confirm the truth of the alleged statements therein. In their view, failure to furnish these documents could only mean
that it would be adverse if produced pursuant to Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.172

For lack of legal basis on PMA' s claim of confidentiality of records, petitioners contend that it is the ministerial duty of the
HC to submit to the CRAB, for the conduct of intelligent review of the case, all its records of the proceedings, including
video footages of the deliberations and voting. They likewise argue that PMA' s refusal to release relevant documents to
Cadet 1 CL Cudia under the guise of confidentiality reveals another misapplication of the Honor Code, which merely
provides: "A cadet who becomes part of any investigation is subject to the existing regulations pertaining to rules of
confidentiality and, therefore, must abide to the creed of secrecy. Nothing shall be disclosed without proper guidance from
those with authority" (IV. The Honor System, Honor Committee, Cadet Observer). This provision, they say, does not deprive
Cadet 1 CL Cudia of his right to obtain copies and examine relevant documents pertaining to his case.

Basically, petitioners want Us to assume that the documents, footages, and recordings relevant to the HC hearings are
favorable to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's cause, and, consequently, to rule that respondents' refusal to produce and have them
examined is tantamount to the denial of his right to procedural due process. They are mistaken.

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In this case, petitioners have not particularly identified any documents, witness testimony, or oral or written presentation of
facts submitted at the hearing that would support Cadet 1 CL Cudia's defense. The Court may require that an administrative
record be supplemented, but only "where there is a 'strong showing or bad faith or improper behavior' on the part of the
agency,"173 both of which are not present here. Petitioners have not specifically indicated the nature of the concealed
evidence, if any, and the reason for withholding it. What they did was simply supposing that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's guilty
verdict would be overturned with the production and examination of such documents, footages, and recordings. As will be
further shown in the discussions below, the requested matters, even if denied, would not relieve Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
predicament. If at all, such denial was a harmless procedural error since he was not seriously prejudiced thereby.

As to the ostracism in the PMA –

To petitioners, the CRAB considered only biased testimonies and evidence because Special Order No. 1 issued on February
21, 2014, which directed the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, left him without any opportunity, to secure statements of his
own witnesses. He could not have access to or approach the cadets who were present during the trial and who saw the 8-1
voting result. It is argued that the Order directing Cadet 1 CL Cudia's ostracism is of doubtful legal validity because the
Honor Code unequivocally announced: "x x x But by wholeheartedly dismissing the cruel method of ostracizing Honor Code
violators, PMA will not have to resort to other humiliating means and shall only have the option to make known among its
alumni the names of those who have not sincerely felt remorse for violating the Honor Code."

On their part, respondents assert that neither the petition nor the petition-in-intervention attached a full text copy of the
alleged Special Order No. 1. In any case, attributing its issuance to PMA is improper and misplaced because of petitioners'
admission that ostracism has been absolutely dismissed as an Academy-sanctioned activity consistent with the trend in
International Humanitarian Law that the PMA has included in its curriculum. Assuming that said Order was issued,
respondents contend that it purely originated from the cadets themselves, the sole purpose of which was to give a strong
voice to the Cadet Corps by declaring that they did not tolerate Cadet 1 CL Cudia's honor violation and breach of
confindentiality of the HC proceedings.

More importantly, respondents add that it is highly improbable and unlikely that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was ostracized by his
fellow cadets. They manifest that as early as January 22, 2014, he was already transferred to the Holding Center. The practice
of billeting an accused cadet at the Holding Center is provided for in the Honor Code Handbook. Although within the PMA
compound, the Holding Center is off-limits to cadets who do not have any business to conduct therein. The cadets could not
also ostracize him during mess times since Cadet 1 CL Cudia opted to take his meals at the Holding Center. The
circumstances obtaining when Special Order No. 1 was issued clearly foreclose the possibility that he was ostracized in
common areas accessible to other cadets. He remained in the Holding Center until March 16, 2014 when he voluntarily left
the PMA. Contrary to his claim, guests were also free to visit him in the Holding Center.

However, petitioners swear that Cadet 1 CL Cudia suffered from ostracism in the PMA. The practice was somehow
recognized by respondents in their Consolidated Comment and by PMA Spokesperson Maj. Flores in a news report. The
CHR likewise confirmed the same in its Resolution dated May 22, 2014. For them, it does not matter where the ostracism
order originated from because the PMA appeared to sanction it even if it came from the cadets themselves. There was a tacit
approval of an illegal act. If not, those cadets responsible for ostracism would have been charged by the PMA officials.
Finally, it is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not choose to take his meals at the Holding Center as he was not allowed to
leave the place. Petitioners opine that placing the accused cadet in the Holding Center is inconsistent with his or her
presumed innocence and certainly gives the implication of ostracism.

We agree with respondents. Neither the petition nor the petition-inintervention attached a full text copy or even a pertinent
portion of the alleged Special Order No. 1, which authorized the ostracism of Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Being hearsay, its existence
and contents are of doubtful veracity. Hence, a definite ruling on the matter can never be granted in this case.

The Court cannot close its eyes though on what appears to be an admission of Cadet 1 CL Mogol during the CHR hearing
that, upon consultation with the entire class, the baron, and the Cadet Conduct Policy Board, they issued an ostracism order
against Cadet 1 CL Cudia.174 While not something new in a military academy,175 ostracism's continued existence in the
modem times should no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the
loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the possibility of vindication
by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC.176 Furthermore, in Our mind, ostracism practically denies the accused
cadet's protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be presumed innocent until finally proven
otherwise in a proper proceeding.

As to Cadet 1 CL Cudia's stay in the Holding Center, the Court upholds the same. The Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to
resign, he or she may stay and wait for the disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall
be billeted at the HTG Holding Center.177 Similarly, in the U.S., the purpose of "Boarders Ward" is to quarter those cadets
who are undergoing separation actions. Permitted to attend classes, the cadet is sequestered , therein until final disposition of
the case. In Andrews, it was opined that the segregation of cadets in the Ward was a proper exercise of the discretionary
authority of Academy officials. It relied on the traditional doctrine that "with respect to decisions made by Army authorities,
'orderly government requires us to tread lightly on the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of
the military establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.'" Also, in
Birdwell v. Schlesinger,178 the "administrative segregation" was held to be a reasonable exercise of military discipline and
could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association.

58
Late and vague decisions –

It is claimed that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was kept in the dark as to the charge against him and the decisions arrived at by the HC,
the CRAB, and the PMA. No written decision was furnished to him, and if any, the information was unjustly belated and the
justifications for the decisions were vague. He had to constantly seek clarification and queries just to be apprised of what he
was confronted with.

Petitioners relate that upon being informed of the "guilty" verdict, Cadet 1 CL Cudia immediately inquired as to the grounds
therefor, but Cadet 1 CL Mogol answered that it is confidential since he would still appeal the same. By March 11, 2014,
Maj. Gen. Lopez informed Cadet 1 CL Cudia that the CRAB already forwarded their recommendation for his dismissal to the
General Headquarters sometime in February-March 2014. Even then, he received no decision/recommendation on his case,
verbally or in writing. The PMA commencement exercises pushed through with no written decision from the CRAB or the
PMA on his appeal. The letter from the Office of the Adjutant General of the AFP was suspiciously delayed when the Cudia
family received the same only on March 20, 2014. Moreover, it fell short in laying down with specificity the factual and legal
bases used by the CRAB and even by the Office of the Adjutant General. There remains no proof that the CRAB and the
PMA considered the evidence presented by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it being uncertain as to what evidence was weighed by the
CRAB, whether the same is substantial, and whether the new evidence submitted by him was ever taken into account.

In refutation, respondents allege the existence of PMA's· practice of orally declaring the HC finding, not putting it in a
written document so as to protect the integrity of the erring cadet and guard the confidentiality of the HC proceedings
pursuant to the Honor System. Further, they aver that a copy of the report of the CRAB, dated March 10, 2014, was not
furnished to Cadet 1 CL Cudia because it was his parents who filed the appeal, hence, were the ones who were given a copy
thereof.

Petitioners' contentions have no leg to stand on. While there is a constitutional mandate stating that "[no] decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"179 such
provision does not apply in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require a specific form and content of a
decision issued in disciplinary proceedings. The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook also has no written rule on the
matter. Even if the provision applies, nowhere does it demand that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues
raised by the parties are necessary.180 What counts is that, albeit furnished to him late, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the reviewing body,
assuring that it went through the processes of legal reasoning. He was not left in the dark as to how it was reached and he
knows exactly the reasons why he lost, and is able to pinpoint the possible errors for review.

As to the blind adoption of the HC findings –

Petitioners assert that, conformably with Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-
Chief has the power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC as the sole
body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA to adopt the guilty findings of the HC
as a basis for recommending the cadet's dismissal. In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly
followed the HC's finding of guilt in terminating his military service.

Further, it is the ministerial duty of the CRAB to conduct a review de nova of all records without requiring Cadet 1 CL Cudia
to submit new evidence if it is physically impossible for him to do so. In their minds, respondents cannot claim that the
CRAB and the PMA thoroughly reviewed the HC recommendation and heard Cadet lCL Cudia's side. As clearly stated in the
letter from the Office of the AFP Adjutant General, "[in] its report dated March 10, 2014, PMA CRAB sustained the findings
and recommendations of the Honor Committee x x x It also resolved the appeal filed by the subject Cadet." However, the
Final Investigation Report of the CRAB was dated March 23, 2014. While such report states that a report was submitted to
the AFP General Headquarters on March 10, 2014 and that it was only on March 12, 2014 that it was designated as a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigating Body, it is unusual that the CRAB would do the same things twice. This raised a valid and well-
grounded suspicion that the CRAB never undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report,
and the Final Investigation Report was drafted merely as an afterthought when the lack of written decision was pointed out by
petitioners so as to remedy the apparent lack of due process during the CRAB investigation and review.

Despite the arguments, respondents assure that there was a proper assessment of the procedural and legal correctness of the
guilty verdict against Cadet 1 CL Cudia. They assert that the higher authorities of the PMA did not merely rely on the
findings of the HC, noting that there was also a separate investigation conducted by the HTG from January 25 to February 7,
2014. Likewise, contrary to the contention of petitioners that the CRAB continued with the review of the case despite the
absence of necessary documents, the CRAB conducted its own review of the case and even conducted another investigation
by constituting the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body. For respondents, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proof in showing bad faith on the part of the PMA. In the absence of evidence to the contrary and considering further that
petitioners' allegations are merely self-serving and baseless, good faith on the part of the PMA' s higher authorities is
presumed and should, therefore, prevail.

We agree with respondents.

The Honor Committee, acting on behalf of the Cadet Corps, has a limited role of investigating and determining whether or
not the alleged offender has actually violated the Honor Code.181 It is given the responsibility of administering the Honor
Code and, in case of breach, its task is entirely investigative, examining in the first instance a suspected violation. As a means
59
of encouraging self-discipline, without ceding to it any authority to make final adjudications, the Academy has assigned it the
function of identifying suspected violators.182 Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the HC does not have the authority to order
the separation of a cadet from the Academy. The results of its proceedings are purely recommendatory and have no binding
effect. The HC determination is somewhat like an indictment, an allegation, which, in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case, the PMA-
CRAB investigated de novo.183 In the U.S., it was even opined that due process safeguards do not actually apply at the
Honor Committee level because it is only a "charging body whose decisions had no effect other than to initiate de nova
proceedings before a Board of Officers."184

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC is covered by the due process clause and that irregularities in its proceedings were
in fact committed, still, We cannot rule for petitioners. It is not required that procedural due process be afforded at every
stage of developing disciplinary action. What is required is that an adequate hearing be held before the final act of dismissing
a cadet from the military academy.185 In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the OIC of HC, the SJA, the Commandant of Cadets,
and the PMA Superintendent reviewed the HC findings. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then,
upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Finally, a Fact-Finding
Board/Investigating Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. The Board/Body actually held hearings on March 12, 13, 14 and 20, 2014. Instead of
commendation, petitioners find it "unusual" that the CRAB would do the same things twice and suspect that it never
undertook an in-depth investigation/review the first time it came out with its report. Such assertion is mere conjecture that
deserves scant consideration.

As to the dismissal proceedings as sham trial –

According to petitioners, the proceedings before the HC were a sham. The people behind Cadet ICL Cudia's charge,
investigation, and conviction were actually the ones who had the intent to deceive and who took advantage of the situation.
Cadet 1 CL Raguindin, who was a senior HC member and was the second in rank to Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the Navy cadet 1
CL, was part of the team which conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, Cadet I CL Mogol, the HC Chairman,
previously charged Cadet 1 CL Cudia with honor violation allegedly for cheating (particularly, conniving with and tutoring
his fellow cadets on a difficult topic by giving solutions to a retake exam) but the charge was dismissed for lack of merit.
Even if he was a non-voting member, he was in a position of influence and authority. Thus, it would be a futile exercise for
Cadet 1 CL Cudia to resort to the procedure for the removal of HC members.186

Further, no sufficient prior notice of the scheduled CRAB hearing was given to Cadet I CL Cudia, his family, or his PAO
counsel. During one of her visits to him in the Holding Center, petitioner-intervenor was advised to convince his son to resign
and immediately leave the PMA. Brig. Gen. Costales, who later became the CRAB Head, also categorically uttered to
Annavee: "Your brother, he lied!" The CRAB conferences were merely used to formalize his dismissal and the PMA never
really intended to hear his side. For petitioners, these are manifestations of PMA's clear resolve to dismiss him no matter
what.

For their part, respondents contend that the CllR's allegation that Maj. Hindang acted in obvious bad faith and that he failed
to discharge his duty to be a good father of cadets when he "paved the road to [Cadet 1 CL Cudia's] sham trial by the Honor
Committee" is an unfounded accusation. They note that when Maj. Hindang was given the DR of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, he
revoked the penalty awarded because of his explanation. However, all revocations of awarded penalties are subject to the
review of the STO. Therefore, it was at the instance of Maj. Leander and the established procedure followed at the PMA that
Maj. Hindang was prompted to investigate the circumstances surrounding Cadet 1 CL Cudia's tardiness. Respondents add
that bad faith cannot likewise be imputed against Maj. Hindang by referring to the actions taken by Maj. Jekyll Dulawan, the
CTO of Cadets 1 CL Narciso and Arcangel who also arrived late for their next class. Unlike the other cadets, Cadet 1 CL
Cudia did not admit his being late and effectively evaded responsibility by ascribing his tardiness to Dr. Costales.

As to the CHR' s finding that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was likewise "in bad faith and determined to destroy [Cadet 1 CL] Cudia,
for reasons of his own" because the former previously reported the latter for an honor violation in November 2013,
respondents argue that the bias ascribed against him is groundless as there is failure to note that Cadet 1 CL Mogol was a
non-voting member of the HC. Further, he cannot be faulted for reporting a possible honor violation since he is the HC
Chairman and nothing less is expected of him. Respondents emphasize that the representatives of the HC are elected from
each company, while the HC Chairman is elected by secret ballot from the incoming first class representatives. Thus, if Cadet
1 CL Cu'dia believed that there was bias against him, he should have resorted to the procedure for the removal of HC
members provided for in the Honor Code Handbook.

Finally, respondents declare that there is no reason or ill-motive on the part of the PMA to prevent Cadet 1 CL Cudia from
graduating because the Academy does not stand to gain anything from his dismissal. On the contrary, in view of his academic
standing, the separation militates against PMA' s mission to produce outstanding, honorable, and exceptional cadets.

The Court differs with petitioners.

Partiality, like fraudulent intent, can never be presumed. Absent some showing of actual bias, petitioners' allegations do not
hold water. The mere imputation of ill-motive without proof is speculative at best. Kolesa teaches us that to sustain the
challenge, specific evidence must be presented to overcome

a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individual
60
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
implemented.187

Although a CTO like Maj. Hindang must decide whether demerits are to be awarded, he is not an adversary of the cadet but
an educator who shares an identity of interest with the cadet, whom he counsels from time to time as a future leader.188
When the occasion calls for it, cadets may be questioned as to the accuracy or completeness of a submitted work. A particular
point or issue may be clarified. In this case, the question asked of Cadet 1 CL Cudia concerning his being late in class is
proper, since there is evidence indicating that a breach of regulation may have occurred and there is reasonable cause to
believe that he was involved in the breach of regulations.189

For lack of actual proof of bad faith or ill-motive, the Court shall rely on the non-toleration clause of the Honor Code, i.e.,
"We do not tolerate those who violate the Code." Cadets are reminded that they are charged with a tremendous duty far more
superior to their personal feeling or friendship.190 They must learn to help others by guiding them to accept the truth and do
what is right, rather than tolerating actions against truth and justice.191 Likewise, cadets are presumed to be characteristically
honorable; they cannot overlook or arbitrarily ignore the dishonorable action of their peers, seniors, or subordinates.192
These are what Cadet 1 CL Mogol exactly did, although he was later proven to have erred in his accusation. Note that even
the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook recognizes that interpretation of one's honor is generally subjective.193

Moreover, assuming, for the sake of argument, that Cadets 1 CL' Raguindin and Mogol as well as Brig. Gen. Costales have
an axe to grind against Cadet 1 CL Cudia and were bent on causing, no matter what, the latter's downfall, their nefarious
conduct would still be insignificant. This is so since the HC (both the preliminary and formal investigation), the CRAB, and
the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body are collegial bodies. Hence, the claim that the proceedings/hearings conducted
were merely a farce because the three personalities participated therein is tantamount to implying the existence of a
conspiracy, distrusting the competence, independence, and integrity of the other members who constituted the majority.
Again, in the absence of specifics and substantial evidence, the Court cannot easily give credence to this baseless insinuation.

As to the HC executive session/chambering –

Petitioners narrate that there was an irregular administrative hearing in the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia because two voting
rounds took place. After the result of the secret balloting, Cadet 1 CL Mogol ordered the voting members to go to a room
without the cadet recorders. Therein, the lone dissenter, Cadet lCL Lagura, was asked to explain his "not guilty" vote.
Pressured to change his vote, he was made to cast a new one finding Cadet 1 CL Cudia guilty. The original ballot was
discarded and replaced. There was no record of the change in vote from 8-1 to 9-0 that was mentioned in the HC formal
report.

The Affidavit of Commander Junjie B. Tabuada executed on March 6, 2014 was submitted by petitioners since he
purportedly recalled Cadet 1 CL Lagura telling him that he was pressured to change his "not guilty" vote after the voting
members were "chambered." In the sworn statement, Commander Tabuada said:

1. That after CDT lCL CUDIA [was] convicted for honor violation, I [cannot] remember exactly the date but
sometime in the morning of 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I was in my office filling up forms for the renewal of my
passport, CDT 1CL LAGURA entered and had business with my staff;

2. When he was about to leave I called him. "Lags, halika muna dito," and he approached me and I let him sit down
on the chair in front of my table. I told and asked him, "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah ... ano ha ang nangyari? Mag-
Tagalog or mag-Bisaya ka." He replied, "Talagang NOT GUILTY ang vote ko sa kanya sir", and I asked him, "Oh,
bakit naging guilty di ha pag may isang nag NOT GUILTY, abswelto na? He replied "Chinamber ako sir, bale
pinapa-justify kung bakit NOT GUILTY vote ko, at na-pressure din ako sir kaya binago ko, sir." So, I told him,
"Sayang sya, matalino at mabait pa naman" and he replied "oo nga sir". After that conversation, I let him go.194

It is claimed that the HC gravely abused its discretion when it committed voting manipulation since, under the rules, it is
required to have a unanimous nine (9) votes finding an accused cadet guilty. There is nothing in the procedure that permits
the HC Chairman to order the "chambering" of a member who voted contrary to the majority and subjects him or her to
reconsider in order to reflect a unanimous vote. Neither is there an order from the Chief of Staff or the President sanctioning
the HC procedure or approving any change therein pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1. The HC, the CRAB, and the
PMA violated their own rules and principles as embodied in the Honor Code. Being a clear deviation from the established
procedures, the second deliberation should be considered null and void.

Petitioners further contend that the requirement of unanimous vote involves a substantive right which cannot be
unceremoniously changed without a corresponding amendment/revision in the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. In
their view, "chambering" totally defeats the purpose of voting by secret ballot as it glaringly destroys the very essence and
philosophy behind the provisions of the Honor System, which is to ensure that the voting member is free to vote what is in
his or her heart and mind and that no one can pressure or persuade another to change his or her vote. They suggest that if one
voting member acquits an accused cadet who is obviously guilty of the offense, the solution is to remove him or her from the
HC through the vote of non-confidence as provided for in the Honor Code.195 Anent the above arguments, respondents
contend that a distinction must be made between the concepts of the Honor Code and the Honor System. According to them,
the former sets the standard for a cadet's, minimum ethical and moral behavior and does not change, while the latter is a set of
rules for the conduct of the observance and implementation of the· Honor Code and may undergo necessary adjustments as
may be warranted by the incumbent members of the HC in order to be more responsive to the moral training and character
61
development of the cadets. The HC may provide guidelines when the Honor System can be used to supplement regulations.
This being so, the voting process is continuously subject to change.

Respondents note that, historically, a non-unanimous guilty verdict automatically acquits a cadet from the charge of Honor
violation. The voting members only write either "guilty" or "not guilty" in the voting sheets without stating their name or
their justification. However, this situation drew criticisms since there were instances where a reported cadet already admitted
his honor violation but was acquitted due to the lone vote of a sympathetic voting member.

In the case of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, the HC adopted an existing practice that should the voting result in 7-2 or 8-1 the HC would
automatically sanction a jury type of discussion called "executive session" or "chambering," which is intended to elicit the
explanation and insights of the voting member/s. This prevents the tyranny of the minority or lone dissenter from prevailing
over the manifest proof of guilt. The assailed voting practice has been adopted and widely accepted by the PMA Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 since their first year in the Academy. The allegations of conspiracy and sham trial are, therefore, negated by
the fact that such practice was in place and applied to all cases of honor violations, not solely to the case of Cadet 1CL Cudia.

It is emphasized by respondents that any decision to change vote rests solely on the personal conviction of the dissenter/s,
without any compulsion from the other voting members. There can also be no pressuring to change one's vote to speak of
since a vote may only be considered as final when the Presiding Officer has affixed his signature.

To debunk Commander Tabuada's statements, respondents raise the argument that the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body
summoned Cadet 1 CL Lagura for inquiry. Aside from his oral testimony made under oath, he submitted to the Board/Body
an affidavit explaining that:

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to ask permission if it is possible
not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE B T ABU
ADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he said: "Talagang nadali
si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the confidentiality of the Honor
Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam ko naman na bawal magsabi." Then I
answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung] Presiding Officer nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamber. Nung
nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung
pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan ako. Pinalitan ko yung boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir." He replied: "Sayang si Cudia
ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino."196

Cadet 1 CL Lagura restated the above in the Counter-Affidavit executed on March 12, 2014, which he submitted before the
CHR wherein he attested to the following:

3. I was chosen to be a voting member of the Honor Committee for Honor Code violation committed by Cadet
Cudia, for "lying". As a voting member, we are the one who assess or investigate the case whether the reported
Cadet is Guilty for his actions or not.

4. I was the only one who INITIALLY voted "NOT GUILTY" among the nine (9) voting members of the Honor
Committee in the case of Cdt Cudia for Lying.

5. I initially voted "NOT GUILTY" for the reason that after the proceedings and before the presiding Officer told
the members to vote, I was confused of the case of Cadet Cudia. I have gathered some facts from the investigation
to make my decision but for me it is not yet enough to give my verdict of guilty to Cdt Cudia so I decided to vote
"NOT GUILTY" with a reservation in my mind that we will still be discussing our verdicts if we will arrive at 8-1
or 7-2. Thus, I can still change my vote if I may be enlightened with the other's justifications.

6. After the votes were collected, the Presiding Officer told us that the vote is 8 for guilty and 1 for not guilty. By
way of practice and as I predicted, we were told to go inside the anteroom for executive meeting and to discuss our
respective justifications. I have been a member for two (2) years and the voting committee will always go for
executive meeting whenever it will meet 8-1 or 7-2 votes.

7. I listened to them and they listened to me, then I saw things that enlightened my confusions that time. I gave a
thumbs-up sign and asked for another sheet of voting paper. I then changed my vote from "NOT GUILTY" to
"GUILTY" and the voting members of the Honor Committee came up with the final vote of nine (9) votes for
guilty and zero (0) votes for not guilty.

9. Cdt Cudia was called inside the courtroom and told that the verdict was GUILTY of LYING. After that, all
persons inside the courtroom went back to barracks.

10. Right after I changed to sleeping uniform, I was approached by Cdt Jocson and Cdt Cudia, inquiring and said:
"Bakit ka naman nagpalit ng boto? ., I answered: "Nasa process yan, may mali talaga sa rason mo." They also asked

62
 who were inside the Chamber and I mentioned only Cdt Arlegui and Cdt Mogol. That was the last time that Cdt
Cudia and Cdt Jocson talked to me.

11. Sometime on 23rd or 24th of January 2014, I went to the Department of Naval Warfare to asked (sic)
permission if it is possible not to attend the Navy duty for the reason that I will be attending our baseball game
outside the Academy.

12. After I was permitted not to attend my Navy Duty and when I was about to exit out of the Office, CDR JUNJIE
B TABUADA PN, our Head Department Naval Warfare Officer, called my attention. I approached him and he
said: "Talagang nadali si Cudia ah. Ano ba talaga ang nangyari?" At first, I was hesitant to answer because of the
confidentiality of the Honor Committee proceedings. He again said: "Wag kang mag-alala, atin, atin lang ito, alam
ko naman na bawal magsabi. " Then I answered: "Ako yung isang not guilty Sir. Kaya [yung} Presiding Officer
nagsabi na pumunta muna kami sa Chamher. Nung nasa chamber kami, nagsalita [yung] mga nagvote ng Guilty
tapos isa-isa nagsabi kung bakit ang boto nila Guilty. Nung pakinggan ko, eh naliwanagan aka. Pinalitan ko yung
boto ko from Not Guilty to Guilty Sir. " He replied: "Sayang si Cudia ano?" And I said: "Oo nga sir, [s]ayang si
Cudia, mabait pa naman at matalino. "197

Still not to be outdone, petitioners argue that the very fact that Cadet 1 CL Lagura, as the lone dissenter, was made to explain
in the presence of other HC members, who were in disagreement with him, gives a semblance of intimidation, force, or
pressure. For them, the records of the HC proceedings, which were not presented assuming they actually exist, could have
been the best way to ensure that he was free to express his views, reject the opinion of the majority, and stick to his decision.
Also, it was pointed out that Cadet 1 CL Lagura failed to clearly explain in his affidavit why he initially found Cadet 1 CL
Cudia "not guilty" and what made him change his mind. His use of general statements like he "was confused of the case " and
"saw things that enlightened my confusions " could hardly suffice to establish why he changed his vote. Finally, petitioners
note the admission of ·Cadet 1 CL Lagura during the CHR investigation that he was the only one who was given another
ballot sheet while in the chamber and that he accomplished it in the barracks which he only submitted the following day.
However, as the CHR found, the announcement of the 9-0 vote was done immediately after the HC came out from the
chamber and before Cadet 1 CL Lagura submitted his accomplished ballot sheet.

We rule for respondents.

As to the manner of voting by the HC members, the Honor Code tersely provides:

After a thorough discussion and deliberation, the presiding member of the Board will call for the members to vote whether
the accused is GUILTY or NOT GUILTY. A unanimous vote (9 votes) of GUILTY decides that a cadet is found guilty of
violating the Honor Code.198

From the above-quoted provision, it readily appears that the HC practice of conducting "executive session" or "chambering"
is not at all prohibited. The HC is given leeway on the voting procedures in' actual cases taking into account the exigency of
the times. What is important is that, in the end, there must be a unanimous nine votes in order to hold a cadet guilty of
violating the Honor Code.

Granting, for argument's sake, that the HC violated its written procedure,199 We still rule that there is nothing inherently
wrong with the practice of "chambering" considering that the presence of intimidation or force cannot automatically be
inferred therefrom. The essence of secret balloting and the freedom to vote based on what is in the heart and mind of the
voting member is not necessarily diluted by the fact that a second/final voting was conducted. As explained by Cadet 1CL
Mogol before the CRAB:

13. x x x [The] dissenting voter would have to explain his side and insights regarding the case at hand. The other members,
on the other hand, would be given the chance to explain their votes as well as their insights to the dissenting voter. The
decision to change the vote of the dissenting voter rests solely on his personal conviction. Thus, if he [or she] opted not to
change his/her vote despite the discussion, his [or her] vote is accorded respect by the Honor Committee.200

It is elementary that intimidation or force is never presumed. Mere allegation is definitely not evidence.1âwphi1 It must be
substantiated and proved because a person is presumed to be innocent of a crime or wrong and that official duty has been
regularly performed.201

The oral and written statements of Cadet 1 CL Lagura should settle the issue. Before the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating
Body and the CHR, he consistently denied that he was pressured by the other voting members of the HC. His representation
must be accepted as it is regardless of whether he has satisfactorily elaborated his decision to change his vote. Being the one
who was "chambered," he is more credible to clarify the issue. In case of doubt, We have to rely on the faith that Cadet 1 CL
Lagura observed the Honor Code, which clearly states that every cadet must be his or her own Final' Authority in honor; that
he or she should not let other cadets dictate on him or her their sense of honor.202 Moreover, the Code implies that any
person can have confidence that a cadet and any graduate of the PMA will be fair and just in dealing with him; that his
actions, words and ways are sincere and true.203

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As to the other alleged "irregularities" committed such as not putting on record the initial/first voting and Cadet 1CL Lagura's
bringing of his ballot sheet to and accomplishing it in the barracks, the Court shall no longer dwell on the same for being
harmless procedural errors that do not materially affect the validity of the HC proceedings.

Cadet 1 CL Cudia 's alleged untruthful statements

Petitioners insist that Cadet 1 CL Cudia did not lie. According to them, there is no clear time reference as to when was the
actual dismissal or what was the exact time of dismissal - whether it should be the dismissal inside the room or the dismissal
after the section grade was given by Dr. Costales -in the minds of Cadet 1 CL Cudia, Maj. Hindang, and the HC investigators
and voting members. They claim that during long examinations, the time of dismissal was usually five minutes before the
class was set to end and the protocol of dismissing the class 15 minutes earlier was not observed. When Maj. Hindang stated
in accusatory language that Cadet 1 CL Cudia perverted the truth by stating that OR432 class ended at 1500H, he did not
state what was the true time of dismissal. He did not mention whether the truth he was relying on was 5 or 15 minutes before
the scheduled end of class.

It is also averred that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's only business was to ask Dr. Costales a query such that his business was already
finished as soon as she gave an answer. However, a new business was initiated by Dr. Costales, which is, Cadet 1 CL Cudia
must stay and wait for the section grade. At that point in time, he was no longer in control of the circumstances. Petitioners
claim that Dr. Costales never categorically stated that Cadet lCL Cudia was lying. She recognized the confusion. Her text
messages to him clarified his alleged violation. Also, the CHR noted during its investigation that she could not exactly recall
what happened in her class on November 14, 2013.

Furthermore, petitioners reasoned out that when respondents stated that ENG412 class started at 3:05 p.m., it proves that
Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously not late. If, as indicated in his Delinquency Report, he was late two (2) minutes in his 1500-
1600H class in ENG 412, he must have arrived 3:02 p.m. Respondents, however, claim that the class started at 3:05 p.m.
Thus, Cadet 1 CL Cudia was not late.

Relative to his explanation to the delinquency report, petitioners were of the view that what appears to have caused confusion
in the minds of respondents is just a matter of semantics; that the entire incident was a product of inaccuracy, not lying. It is
malicious for them to insinuate that Cadet 1 CL Cudia purposely used incorrect language to hide the truth. Citing Merriam
Webster's Dictionary, petitioners argue that "dismiss" means to permit or cause to leave, while "class" refers to a body of
students meeting regularly to study the same subject. According to them, these two words do not have definite and precise
meanings but are generic terms. Other than the words "class" and "dismiss" used by Cadet 1 CL Cudia, which may actually
be used in their generic sense, there is nothing deceiving about what he said. Thus, the answer he chose might be wrong or
not correct, but it is not false or not true.

For petitioners, Cadet lCL Cudia's explanations are evidently truthful and with no intent to deceive or mislead. He did not
manipulate any fact and was truthful of his explanation. His .. statements were clear and unambiguous but were given a
narrow-minded interpretation. Even the Honor Code acknowledges that "[e]xperience demonstrates that human
communication is imperfect at best, and some actions are often misinterpreted."

Lastly, petitioners contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia's transcript of records reflects not only his outstanding academic
performance but proves his good conduct during his four-year stay in the Academy. He has above-average grades in Conduct,
with grades ranging from 96 to 100 in Conduct I to XI. His propensity to lie is, therefore, far from the truth.

On the other hand, respondents were equally adamant to contend that Cadet 1 CL Cudia was obviously quibbling, which, in
the military parlance, is tantamount to lying. He fell short in telling a simple truth. He lied by making untruthful statements in
his written explanation. Respondents want Us to consider the following:

First, their OR432 class was not dismissed late. During the formal investigation, Dr. Costales testified that a class is
dismissed as long as the instructor is not there and the bell has rung. In cases of lesson examinations (LE), cadets are
dismissed from the time they have answered their respective LEs. Here, as Cadet Cudia stated in his Request for
Reconsideration of Meted Punishment, "We had an LE that day (14 November 2013) in OR432 class. When the first bell
rang (1455), I stood up, reviewed my paper and submitted it to my instructor, Ms. Costales. xxx" Clearly, at the time Cadet
Cudia submitted his papers, he was already considered dismissed. Thus, he cannot claim that his [OR432] class ended at 3:00
in the afternoon (1500H) or "a bit late."

Second, Cadet Cudia was in control of the circumstances leading to his tardiness. After submitting his paper, Cadet Cudia is
free to leave and attend his next class. However, he initiated a conversation with Dr. Costales regarding their grades. He was
not under instruction by Dr. Costales to stay beyond the period of her class.

Furthermore, during the investigation of the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, Dr. Costales clarified her statements in
her written explanation. She explained that the "instruction to wait" is a response to Cadet Cudia' s request and that it was not
her initiated instruction. Clearly, there was no directive from Dr. Costales for Cadet Cudia and the other cadets to stay. On
the contrary, it was them who wanted to meet with the instructor. Third, contrary to Cadet Cudia's explanation, his
subsequent class, ENG412, did not exactly start at 3:00 in the afternoon (1500H). In the informal review conducted by the
HTG to check the findings of the HC, Professor Berong confirmed that her English class started as scheduled (3:05 in the

64
afternoon, or 1505H) and not earlier. Cadet 1 CL Barrawed, the acting class marcher of ENG412 also testified that their class
started as scheduled (3 :05 in the afternoon, or 1505) and not earlier.204

Respondents were unimpressed with the excuse that Cadet 1 CL Cudia had no intention to mislead or deceive but merely
used wrong and unfitting words in his explanations. For them, considering his academic standing, it is highly improbable that
he used incorrect language to justify his mistake. Respondents' arguments are tenable.

The issue of whether Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed lying is an issue of fact. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court, not being
a trier of facts, cannot pass upon factual matters as it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in
the proceedings below. Moreover, We reiterate the long standing rule that factual findings of administrative tribunals are
ordinarily accorded respect if not finality by the Court. In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence
that the findings of the investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable errors were committed; or that
a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. With respect to the core issue of whether lying is
present in this case, all investigating and reviewing bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in
fact lied.

For purposes of emphasis though, We shall supplement some points.

As succinctly worded, the Honor Code of the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines (CCAFP) states: "We, the
Cadets, do not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate among us those who do. "

The First Tenet of the Honor-Code is "We do not lie. " Cadets violate the Honor Code by lying if they make an oral or
written statement which is contrary to what is true or use doubtful information with the intent to deceive or mislead.205 It is
expected that every cadet's word is accepted without challenge on its truthfulness; that it is true without qualification; and that
the cadets must answer directly, completely and truthfully even though the answer may result in punitive action under the
CCPB and CCAFPR.206

To refresh, in his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1 CL Cudia justified that: "I came directly from
OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late by our instructor Sir." Subsequently, in his Request for Reconsideration of Meted
Punishment to Maj. Leander, he reasoned out as follows:

I strongly believe that I am not in control of the circumstances, our 4th period class ended 1500H and our 5th period class,
which is ENG412, started 1500H also. Immediately after 4t period class, I went to my next class without any intention of
being late Sir.207

In this case, the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1 CL Cudia committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the
Honor Code.

Following an Honor Reference Handbook, the term "Quibbling" has been defined in one U.S. case as follows:

A person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly wording what he says, omitting relevant
facts, or telling a partial truth. When he knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because it is
an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying.208

The above definition can be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the cause of his being
late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1 CL Cudia chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a half-truth.

The two elements that must be presented for a cadet to have committed an honor violation are:

1. The act and/or omission, and

2. The intent pertinent to it.

Intent does not only refer to the intent to violate the Honor Code, but intent to commit or omit the act itself.209

The basic questions a cadet must always seek to answer unequivocally are:

1. Do I intend to deceive?

2. Do I intend to take undue advantage?

If a cadet can answer NO to BOTH questions, he or she is doing the honorable thing.210

65
Intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred from the facts, and therefore,
can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances generally.211 In this case, Cadet 1 CL Cudia's
intent to deceive is manifested from the very act of capitalizing on the use of the words "dismiss" and "class." The truth of the
matter is that the ordinary usage of these two terms, in the context of an educational institution, does not correspond to what
Cadet 1 CL Cudia is trying to make it appear. In that sense, the words are not generic and have definite and precise meaning.

By no stretch of the imagination can Cadets 1 CL Cudia, Miranda, Arcangel, and Narciso already constitute a "class." The
Court cannot agree that such term includes "every transaction and communication a teacher does with her students." Clearly,
it does not take too much intelligence to conclude that Cadet 1 CL Cudia should have been accurate by pinpointing who were
with him when he was late in the next class. His deceptive explanation is made more obvious when compared with what
Cadets 1 CL Archangel and Narciso wrote in their DR explanation, which was: "We approached our instructor after our
class."212

Further, it is unimportant whether the time of dismissal on November 14, 2013 was five or fifteen minutes ahead of the
scheduled end of class. Worth noting is that even Dr. Costales, who stood as a witness for Cadet 1 CL Cudia, consistently
admitted before the HC, the Fact-Finding Board/Investigating Body, and the CHR that he was already dismissed when he
passed his LE paper.213 During the hearing of the Board/Body, she also declared that she merely responded to his request to
see the results of the UE 1 and that she had reservations on the phrases "under my instruction" and "dismissed a bit late" used
in his letter of explanation to the HC. In addition, Dr. Costales manifested her view before the CHR that the act of Cadet 1
CL Cudia of inquiring about his grade outside their classroom after he submitted his LE paper is not part of the class time
because the consultation, being cadet-initiated, is voluntary.214 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that a new business was
initiated by Dr. Costales when Cadet 1 CL Cudia was asked to stay and wait for the section grade, still, this does not acquit
him. Given such situation, a responsible cadet who is fully aware of the time constraint has the last say, that is, to politely
decline the invitation and immediately go to the next class. This was not done by Cadet 1 CL Cudia. Thus, it cannot be said
that he already lost control over the circumstances.

It is apparent, therefore, that Cadet 1 CL Cudia cunningly chose words which led to confusion in the minds of respondents
and eventually commenced the HC inquiry. His case is not just a matter of semantics and a product of plain and simple
inaccuracy. There is manipulation of facts and presentation of untruthful explanation constitutive of Honor Code violation.

Evidence of prior good conduct cannot clear Cadet 1 CL Cudia .. While his Transcript of Records (TOR) may reflect not only
his outstanding academic performance but his excellent grade in subjects on Conduct during his four-year stay in the
PMA,215 it does not necessarily follow that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is enough to say that "evidence that one
did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time."216 While the TOR may be received to prove his identity or habit as an exceptional PMA student, it does not
show his specific intent, plan, or scheme as cadet accused of committing a specific Honor Code violation.

Dismissal from the PMA as unjust and cruel punishment

Respondents insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet corps. Under the
Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation (CCAFPR), a violation of the Cadet Honor Code is considered
Grave (Class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for a cadet's dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same
is likewise clear from the Honor Code and Honor System Handbook. Cadet 1 CL Cudia is, therefore, presumed to know that
the Honor Code does not accommodate a gradation or degree of offenses. There is no difference between a little lie and a
huge falsehood. Respondents emphasize that the Honor Code has always been considered as an absolute yardstick against
which cadets have measured themselves ever since the PMA began and that the Honor Code and System seek to assure that
only those who are able to meet the high standards of integrity and honor are produced by the PMA. As held in Andrews, it is
constitutionally permissible for the military "to set and enforce uncommonly high standards of conduct and ethics. " Thus, in
violating the Honor Code, Cadet 1 CL Cudia forfeits his privilege to graduate from the PMA.

On their part, petitioners concede that if it is proven that a cadet breached the Honor Code, the offense warrants his or her
dismissal since such a policy may be the only means to maintain and uphold the spirit of integrity in the military.217 They
maintain though that in Cadet 1 CL Cudia's case there is no need to distinguish between a "little lie" and a "huge falsehood"
since he did not lie at all. Absent any intent to deceive and to take undue advantage, the penalty imposed on him is
considered as unjust and cruel. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate
to the fact that he is a graduating cadet with honors and what he allegedly committed does not amount to an academic
deficiency or an intentional and flagrant violation of the PMA non-academic rules and regulations. Citing Non, petitioners
argue that the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense. Further, lsabelo, Jr. is squarely applicable to the facts of
the case. Cadet 1 CL Cudia was deprived of his right to education, the only means by which he may have a secure life and
future.

Considering Our finding that Cadet 1 CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied and his acceptance that violation of the Honor Code
warrants the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the PMA, there is actually no more dispute to resolve. Indeed, the sanction is
clearly set forth and Cadet 1 CL Cudia, by contract, risked this when he entered the Academy.218 We adopt the ruling in
Andrews219 wherein it was held that, while the penalty is severe, it is nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process. It quoted the disposition of the district court, thus:

The fact that a cadet will be separated from the Academy upon a finding that he has violated the Honor Code is known to all
cadets even prior to the beginning of their careers there. The finding of a Code violation by hypothesis includes a finding of
66
scienter on the part of the offender. While separation is admittedly a drastic and tragic consequence of a cadet's transgression,
it is not an unconstitutionally arbitrary one, but rather a reasonable albeit severe method of preventing men who have suffered
ethical lapses from becoming career officers. That a policy of admonitions or lesser penalties for single violations might be
more compassionate --or even more effective in achieving the intended result --is quite immaterial to the question of whether
the harsher penalty violates due process.220

Nature of the CHR Findings

Petitioners contend that the PMA turned a blind eye on the CHR's recommendations. The CHR, they note, is a constitutional
body mandated by the 1987 Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights, and to conduct investigative monitoring of economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly of vulnerable sectors of
society. Further, it was contended that the results of CHR's investigation and recommendations are so persuasive that this
Court, on several occasions like in the cases of Cruz v. Sec. of Environment & Natural Resources221 and Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party v. Commission on Elections,222 gave its findings serious consideration. It is not, therefore, too late for the Court to
hear what an independent and unbiased fact-finding body has to say on the case.

In opposition, respondents assert that Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights223 ruled that the CHR is merely a
recommendatory body that is not empowered to arrive at a conclusive determination of any controversy.

We are in accord with respondents.

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this
Court. The reason is that the CHR's constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights.224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights225 and a number of
subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not
empowered to adjudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate is not the same
as adjudication:

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

xxxx

[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate, "commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x
x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover,
to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; xx x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a
judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.1âwphi1 To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or
to sentence or condemn. xx Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment. "226

All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of Cadet 1 CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a future. Cliche though
it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the "be-all and end-all" of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may

67
still continue to pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached to his or her dismissal. For
one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and reenlistment in the
APP Regular Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among others, the ex-PMA or
PAFFFS cadets.227 If the positions open does not appeal to his interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved
as a PMA graduate, Cadet 1 CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble profession or calling that is best suited to his
credentials, competence, and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the Philippine Military
Academy is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012

FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction of extension
building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3 rd was not paid due to disallowance of
COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So Stern Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal
during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3, 2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002,
RTC denied it and issued a writ of execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise denied. On
December 21, 2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files for
certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC directs sheriff to
receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check because the certiorari is pending.
On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On
January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC
which was granted. UP files petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.

ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application

HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of retroactivity or is not
subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its retroactivity is already given since by the
nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its application.

MANOLITO AGRA, EDMUNDO P. AGUILAR, IMELDA I. AMERICA, EVELYN R. CONCEPCION, DIOSDADO

A. CORSIGA, PERCIVAL G. CRISOSTOMO, CESAR E. FAELDON, MA. REGINA C. FILOTEO, ZARINA O.
HIPOLITO, JANICE F. MABILOG, ROBERTO MARTINEZ, JONATHAN MENDROS, NORMAN MIRASOL,
EDRICK V. MOZO, LORENZO A. PENOLIAR, LOURDES QUINTERO, GLORIA GUDELIA SAMBO,
DEMOSTHENES V. ERENO, RHONEIL LIBUNAO, ILUGEN P. MABANSAG, JOSEPHINE MAGBOO,
MADELEINE ANN B. BAUTISTA, ULYSSES C. BIBON, ANGELINA RAMOS, EDUARDO M. SUMAYOD,
DOMINGO TAMAYO, HERACLEA M. AFABLE, ANNA LISSA CREENCIA, CHONA O. DELA CRUZ, MERCY
NANETTE C. IBOY, JEAN A. LUPANGO, MARIE DELA O. NA-OBRE, PERLA LUZ OCAMPO,
ROUCHELLEJANE PAYURAN, ABIGAIL E. PORMENTO, THERESITA A. RIVERA, MILAGROS ROBLES,
JOSEPHINE ROSILLO, ARSENIA M. SACDALAN, PRECILA TUBIO, IRENE H. VIRAY, WILFREDO O.
BUCSIT, BONIFACIO DAVID, ROSARIO P. DIZON, EXEQUIEL EVALE, JR., RONALD M. MANALO,
HENRIETTA A. MARAMOT, FELICISIMO U. PULA, JONAS F. SALVADOR, ERNESTO SILVANO, JR.,
ENRICO G. VELGADO, FEDERICO VILLAR, JR., ARNEL C. ABEN, ABDULMALIK BACARAMAN,
VIRGINIA BORJA, ANTONIO CARANDANG, JR., RINA RIEL DOLINA, MANOLITO FAJARDO, ARVIN B.
GARDUQUE, CAYETANO JUAREZ, MA. SHERYL LABONETE, HERCONIDA T. LAZARO, MARITESS
MARTINEZ, AURELIO L. MENDOZA, ARNEL M. NOGOT, GERARDO G. POMOY, DENCIO RAMOS,
CORAZON TAGUDIN, ANAFEL B. TIO, AGATONA S. ZALATAR, MARGIE EULALIA CALMA, RENEE D.
MELLA, ARLIQUIN AMERICA, DEANNA B. AYSON, GERALDINE J. CALICA, CHESTER FERNANDEZ,
LUISA I. HERNANDEZ, CYNTHIA E. LISONDRA, ALONA S. LLVATA, CLAIRE P. QUETUA, ROSEMARIE S.
QUINTOS, RUTH S. RAMIREZ, LINO VERMUDO, JR., ROLANDO R. APOLONIO, CELIA I. ACCAD, MA.
ALMA AYOS, PAMELA CASTILLO, ARNOLD DUPA, LAURENCE FELICIANO, LEANDRO P. LIBRANDO,
MARILOU B. LOPEZ, AMELITA P. LUCERO, ESTERBELLE T. SIBALA, JONA ANDAL, ANDRES RATIO,
MA. THERESA Q. MALLANO, DANILO P. LIGUA, JOY ABOGADO, VIRGINIA C. STA. ANA, ALBERNARD
BAUTISTA, JUBANE DE PEDRO, PAUL DINDO C. DELA CRUZ, ALEJO B. INCISO, SHERWIN MAÑADA,
JESUS T. OBIDOS, JOEL B. ARELLANO, ALFREDO CABRERA, MARY LYNN E. GELLOR, JOHN JOSEPH M.
MAGTULOY, MICHELLE MONTEMAYOR, RHINA ANGUE, NORBERTO BAYAGA, JR., JUSTINO CALVEZ,
EDWIN CONCEPCION, ALAN JOSEPH IBE, CESAR JACINTO, JOSERITA MADRID, IRENE MARTIN, GINA
T. QUINDO, RENATO SUBIJANO, NIELMA E. VERZOSA, ALL NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION EMPLOYEES, REPRESENTED BY REGINA FILOTEO, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a special civil action via certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
from the Decision [1] of the Commission on Audit (COA) No. 2003-134 dated October 9, 2003, which denied the grant of
rice allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) who were hired after June 30, 1989
(petitioners) and COA's Resolution [2] No. 2005-010 dated February 24, 2005, which likewise denied petitioners' Motion for
68
Reconsideration.

On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12
of which provides:

Sec.  12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. ” All allowances, except for representation and transportation
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the
standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be
authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local
government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National
Government.  (Emphasis ours.)

Pursuant to its authority to implement Republic Act No. 6758 under Section 23 thereof, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) on October 2, 1989 issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), otherwise
known as the œImplementing Rules and Regulations of  R.A. No. 6758.  Paragraph 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 reads:

5.5 The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant to the aforementioned issuances are
not likewise to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of
June 30, 1989 who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date, at the same terms and
conditions prescribed in said issuances[:]

5.5.1  Rice Subsidy;

5.5.2  Sugar Subsidy;
5.5.3  Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
5.5.4  Medical/dental/optical allowances/benefits;
5.5.5  Children™s Allowance;
5.5.6  Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
5.5.7  Meal Subsidy;
5.5.8  Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9  Teller™s Allowance. (Emphasis added.)

A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 1989 [3] claimed that they did not receive meal, rice, and
children™s allowances. Thus, on July 23, 1999, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA and its Board of
Administrators before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88, Quezon City, docketed as SP. Civil Action No. Q-99-
38275, alleging violation of their right to the equal protection clause under the Constitution.

On December 15, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision [4] in their favor, disposing of the case in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED directing the respondent NEA, its Board of
Administrators to forthwith settle the claims of the petitioners and other employees similarly situated and extend to them the
benefits and allowances to which they are entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under
Section 5 of DBM CCC No. 10 and their inclusion in the Provident Funds Membership, retroactive from the date of their
appointments up to the present or until their separation from the service. [5]

At the instance of the complainants, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 88, Quezon City, Lily D. Labarda, issued a
CERTIFICATION [6] dated January 24, 2000, which states:

This is to certify that the Decision dated December 16, 1999 [7] of the above-entitled case which reads the dispositive portion:

xxxx

is now final and executory.

This certification [is] issued upon the request of Ms. Blesilda B. Aguilar for whatever legal purpose/s it may serve. [8]

Afterwards, the Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 88, Quezon City issued a Writ of Execution [9] in SP. Civil Action No. Q-99-
38275 on February 22, 2000. [10]  Thereafter, the RTC issued a Notice of Garnishment against the funds of NEA with
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the extent of P16,581,429.00. [11]

NEA questioned before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court, and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
62919. On July 4, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [12] declaring null and void the December 11, 2000
Resolution as well as the January 8, 2001 Order of the RTC, and ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against
the funds of NEA.  Thus, NEA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 154200. 
Meanwhile, the RTC held in abeyance the execution of its December 15, 1999 Decision pending resolution of this Court of

69
the review on certiorari in National Electrification Administration v. Morales. [13]

On July 24, 2007, this Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals decision and described the subsequent events
relating to the case in this manner [14]:

Meanwhile, in a letter dated June 28, 2000, former DBM Secretary Benjamin E. Diokno informed NEA Administrator
Conrado M. Estrella III of the denial of the NEA request for a supplemental budget on the ground that the claims under R.A.
No. 6758 which the RTC had ordered to be settled cannot be paid because Morales, et al. are not œincumbents of positions as
of July 1, 1989 who are actually receiving and enjoying such benefits.

Moreover, in an Indorsement dated March 23, 2000, the Commission on Audit (COA) advised NEA against making further
payments in settlement of the claims of Morales, et al.  Apparently, COA had already passed upon claims similar to those of
Morales, et al. in its earlier œDecision No. 95-074 dated January 25, 1995.  Portions of the Indorsement read as follows:

This Office concurs with the above view. The court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for
the entitlement of the after-hired employees which had already been passed upon by this Commission in COA Decision
No. 95-074 dated January 25, 1995.  There, it was held that: œthe adverse action of this Commission sustaining the
disallowance made by the Auditor, NEA, on the payment of fringe benefits granted to NEA employees hired from July 1,
1989 to October 31, 1989 is hereby reconsidered.  Accordingly, subject disallowance is lifted.

Thus, employees hired after the extended date of October 31, 1989, pursuant to the above COA decision cannot defy that
decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court.  Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the 1987 Constitution
prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of this Commission is on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the
manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.  Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the
subject case of mandamus.  And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much less be executed.
Moreover, COA was not made a party thereto, hence, it cannot be compelled to allow the payment of claims on the basis
of the questioned decision.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the auditor of NEA should post-audit the disbursement vouchers on the bases of this
Commission's decision particularly the above-cited COA Decision No. 94-074 [sic] and existing rules and regulations, as if
there is no decision of the court in the subject special civil action for mandamus.  At the same time, management should be
informed of the intention of this Office to question the validity of the court decision before the Supreme Court through the
Office of the Solicitor General.

Parenthetically, the records at hand do not indicate when Morales, et al. were appointed.  Even the December [15], 1999 RTC
Decision is vague for it merely states that they were appointed after June 30, 1989, which could mean that they were
appointed either before the cut-off date of October 31, 1989 or after.  Thus, there is not enough basis for this Court to
determine that the foregoing COA Decision No.  95-074 adversely affects Morales, et al..  Moreover, the records do not show
whether COA actually questioned the December 16, 1999 RTC Decision before this Court. [15]

The Court ruled that respondents therein could not proceed against the funds of NEA œbecause the December [15], 1999 RTC
Decision sought to be satisfied is not a judgment for a specific sum of money susceptible of execution by garnishment; it is a
special judgment requiring petitioners to settle the claims of respondents in accordance with existing regulations of the
COA. [16]  The Court further held as follows:

In its plain text, the December [15], 1999 RTC Decision merely directs petitioners to œsettle the claims of [respondents] and
other employees similarly situated. It does not require petitioners to pay a certain sum of money to respondents.  The
judgment is only for the performance of an act other than the payment of money, implementation of which is governed by
Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 11. Execution of special judgments. - When a judgment requires the performance of any act other than those
mentioned in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall
be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by
law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.

xxxx

Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is  one for payment of a sum of money.

The RTC exceeded the scope of its judgment when, in its February 22, 2000 Writ of Execution, it directed petitioners to
œextend to [respondents] the benefits and allowances to which they are entitled but which until now they have been deprived
of as enumerated under Sec. 5 of DBM CCC No. 10 and x x x to cause their inclusion in the Provident Fund Membership.
Worse, it countenanced the issuance of a notice of garnishment against the funds of petitioners with DBP to the extent of 
P16,581,429.00 even when no such amount was awarded in its December 16, 1999 Decision.

However, in its subsequent Orders dated May 17, 2000 and January 8, 2001, the RTC attempted to set matters right by
directing the parties to now await the outcome of the legal processes for the settlement of respondents' claims.

That is only right.

Without question, petitioner NEA is a GOCC -- a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government,
70
with capacity to sue and be sued.  As such GOCC, petitioner NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be garnished
or levied upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it.  However, before execution may proceed against it, a
claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of P.D. No. 1445, it is the COA which has primary
jurisdiction to examine, audit and settle œall debts and claims of any sort due from or owing the Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or
disallowance is for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to this Court.

All told, the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to
the processes of the COA. It may be that the tenor of the March 23, 2000 Indorsement issued by COA already spells
doom for respondents™ claims; but it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be
conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.

In fine, it was grave error for the CA to reverse the RTC and direct immediate implementation of the writ of execution
through garnishment of the funds of petitioners,

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The July 4, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.  The Resolution dated December 11, 2000 and Order dated January 8, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Quezon City in Special Civil Action No. Q-99-38275 are REINSTATED. [17]

Meantime, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 001295 dated June 1, 2001 [18] and interpreted Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758 in this manner:

Material to the resolution of this instant request is Section 12 of SSL x x x.

xxxx

The Commission, x x x is of the view that this provision of law does not imply that such other additional compensation not
integrated into the salary rates shall not be received by employees appointed after July 1, 1989. The word œonly before the
phrase œas of July 1, 1989 does not refer to incumbents but qualifies what additional compensation can be continued
together with the qualifying words œnot integrated into the standardized rates shall continue to be authorized.  The
correct interpretation therefore is that, additional compensation being received by employees not integrated into the
standardized rates as of July 1, 1989 shall continue to be authorized and received/enjoyed by said employees, whether
or not said employee was appointed prior to or after July 1, 1989.

A different interpretation will result in the creation of two classes of employees, i.e., one class receiving less pay than another
class for substantially equal work. Said interpretation will violate Section 2 of the SSL which provides, thus:

xxxx

Additionally, this interpretation will also violate the constitutional precept that no person shall be denied the equal protection
of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). Applying this precept the Supreme Court declared that œequal
protection of the law is against unde favor on an individual or class (Tiu vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127410, January 20,
1999). [19]

The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), in response to the request of then NEA Administrator Manuel
Luis S. Sanchez, issued on August 14, 2001 its Opinion No. 157, s. 2001 [20] declaring that the RTC decision, not having
been appealed, had become the law of the case which must now be applied.  The pertinent portion of such opinion reads:

HON. MANUEL LUIS S. SANCHEZ

Administrator
National Electrification Administration
NEA Road, Diliman, Quezon City

Re: Request for legal opinion on the propriety and applicability to NEA employees hired after July 1, 1989 of OGCC
Opinion NO. 086, s. 2001

xxxx

Pursuant to law, subject Decision became final and executory fifteen (15) days after its rendition, there being no appeal or
motion for reconsideration filed in the interim, as certified to by Atty. Lily D. Labarda, Branch 88, Quezon City, on January
24, 2000.

The foregoing considered, this Office therefore cannot opine otherwise save to uphold the supremacy and finality of the
aforequoted Decision of the Court on the matter. Its judgment is now res judicata, hence, the controlling legal rule, as far as
Petitioners NEA employees are concerned, is that they must be extended the benefits and allowances œto which they are
entitled but which until now they have been deprived of as enumerated under Section 5 of DBM CCC No. 101 x x x,
retroactive from the date of their appointments up to the present or until their separation from the service.  This is the law of

71
the case which must now be applied. At any rate, we have stated in OGCC Opinion No. 086, S. 2001 that even employees
hired after July 1, 1989 may receive the subject benefits provided there is determination by the DBM that the same have not
been actually integrated into their basic salaries.

Hence, your query is therefore answered in the affirmative. [21]

Pursuant to the above opinion in its favor, the NEA Board of Administrators issued Resolution No. 29 on August 9, 2001 [22]
approving the entitlement to rice, medical, children, meal, and other related allowances to NEA employees hired after
October 31, 1989, [23] and the payment of these benefits, chargeable to its Personnel Services Savings.  This resolution was
the outcome of the meeting of the NEA Board of Administrators on the same date, and reads:

RESOLUTION NO. 29

xxxx

RESOLVED THEREFORE TO APPROVE, as it hereby approves, the entitlement to rice, medical, children, meal and other
related allowances of NEA employees hired after October 31, 1989 and payment of these benefits;

RESOLVED FURTHER TO CONFIRM, as it hereby confirms, the initial appropriation and payment of One Million Six
Hundred Forty Six Thousand One Hundred Twenty Seven Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P1,646,127.30) for this purpose
chargeable against the Personnel Services Savings. [24]

Thus, NEA granted the questioned allowances to its employees who were not receiving these benefits/allowances, including
rice allowance amounting to P1,865,811.84 covering the period January to August 2001. [25]

However, the resident auditor of COA, Carmelita M. Agullana (Agullana), did not allow the payment of rice allowance for
the period January to August 2001 to NEA employees who were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989, under Notice of
Disallowance [26] No. 2001-004-101 dated September 6, 2001.  Agullana indicated the œFacts and/or Reasons for
Disallowance as follows:

Payment of Rice Allowance for the period January, 2001 to August, 2001 to employees who were not incumbents as of June
30, 1989 not allowed pursuant to RA #6758 as implemented by Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 prescribing the
Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System for
Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Financial Institutions (GFIs) specifically Sections 5.4 and
5.5 thereof. x x x. [27]

NEA, through then Acting Administrator Francisco G. Silva, and assisted by counsel, appealed Agullana™s disallowance to
the COA on September 27, 2001, [28] arguing that the disallowance had no basis in law and in fact, and that the subject
disbursement was anchored on a court decision that had become final and executory.

The COA denied the appeal from the disallowance in a Decision [29] dated October 9, 2003 (Decision No. 2003-134).  The
COA stated that:

The Director of x x x Corporate Audit Office II recommended the affirmance of the subject disallowance contending that
Section 12 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) x x x remains applicable on the matter since
Department of Budget and Management-Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, s. 1989 (DBM-CCC No. 10) was declared
ineffective by the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus, et al. vs. COA, et al. (G.R. No. 109023, August 13, 1998) due to its
non-publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. She pointed out that the alleged
discriminatory effect and violation of the policy to provide equal pay for substantially equal work in the above-quoted
provision have been sufficiently considered in Philippine Ports Authority vs. COA, 214 SCRA 653 and later confirmed in
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. COA, G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, wherein the Supreme Court ruled
that:

œx x x we must mention that this Court has confirmed in Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on Audit the legislative
intent to protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and allowances over and above those authorized by RA 6758 to
continue to receive the same even after RA 6758 took effect. In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has
manifested its intent to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay and
consistent with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fair play.

She also conformed to the OGCC Opinion No. 52, s. 1999 dated March 22, 1999, edifying the implication of the De Jesus
Case which enunciated thusly:

œNotwithstanding the ruling in the De Jesus Case, the applicable law is still Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 which allows
additional compensation being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standard rates to continue.
The recent nullification of DBM-CCC No. 10 applies favorably only to those incumbent employees (hired prior to July 1,
1989) and does not in any way change the position or situation of those employees hired after the cut-off date. With the
issuance of R.A. 6758, employees hired after July 1, 1989 must follow the revised and unified compensation and position
classification system in the government, for which the DBM was directed to establish and administer and which shall be
applied for all government entities.

72
xxxx

The new hirees having accepted their employment, aware of such a condition that they are not entitled to additional benefits
and allowances, they would be estopped from complaining.

Moreover, the Director noted that when the rice allowance to the claimants was granted in the year 2001, the DBM had
already published CCC No. 10.

Anent the contention that the subject decision of the RTC has become the law of the case which must be applied, she stressed
that the said doctrine is one of the policies only and will be disregarded when compelling circumstances call for a
redetermination of the point of law. As cited in Black™s Law Dictionary, 6 th Edition, 1990, œthe doctrine is merely a rule of
procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in unjust
decision.

xxxx

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the disallowance in the total amount of P1,865,811.84
is accordingly affirmed. [30]

NEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision, but this was denied in COA Decision No. 2005-010 [31]
dated
February 24, 2005, the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful re-evaluation, this Commission finds herein motion devoid of merit, the issues raised therein being a mere
reiteration of the previous arguments of the movant in his appeal and which were already considered and passed upon by this
Commission in the assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, there being no new and material evidence adduced as would warrant a reversal or modification of the
decision herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant motion for reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby, denied with
finality. [32]

Thus, petitioners came to this Court questioning the COA™s decision and resolution on the disallowance of their rice
subsidy.

Petitioners claim that the COA™s reliance on DBM-CCC No. 10 is totally misplaced, alleging that this interpretation had
been œsquarely debunked by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, including Cruz v. Commission on Audit. [33] 
Furthermore, petitioners claim that in a similar case involving Opinion No. 086, s. 2001 of the OGCC, it wrote: œ[It] is our
considered opinion that employees of COA, whether appointed before or after July 1, 1989, are entitled to the benefits
enumerated under Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 x x x. [34]

We quote portions of Opinion No. 086, s. 2001 of the OGCC below:

Please be informed that our Office had previously rendered legal opinions involving the same issue upon the request of some
of our client corporations similarly situated. In our Opinion No. 55, Series of 2000, we stated:

œAt the outset we would like to clarify that the amount of the standardized salary vis-Ã -vis the pre-SSL salary (plus
allowance) is not conclusively determinant of whether or not a certain allowance is deemed integrated into the former.
Section 12 of R.A. 6758 expressly provides:

xxxx

The law is thus clear. The general rule is that all allowances are deemed included in the standardized rates set forth in R.A.
6758. This is consistent with the primary intent of the Act to eliminate wage inequities. The law, however, admits of certain
exceptions and as stated in the second sentence of the aforecited provision, such other additional compensation in cash or in
kind not integrated into the standardized rates being received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 shall continue to be
authorized. It is our view, however, that a government agency, in this case NDC, does not have discretion to determine what
allowances received by incumbent employees prior to SSL are deemed included or integrated in the standardized rates. It is
the DBM which has the mandate and authority under the SSL to determine what additional compensation shall be integrated
and it is precisely why it issued NCC No. 10.

The foregoing opinion is consistent with our Opinion No. 52, Series of 1999, wherein we opined:

œx x x Nonetheless, as Section 12 of RA 6758 expressly provides that such additional compensation, whether in cash or in
kind, being received by incumbent employees as of July 1, 1989 not integrated to the standardized salary rates as may be
determined by the DBM shall continue to be authorized, the question becomes a matter of fact, on whether or not the
aforementioned allowances have been integrated into the salaries of employees. [35] (Emphases in the quoted text.)

Petitioners claim that œthe Civil Service Commission, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the highest court
of the land, the Supreme Court, chose not to distinguish the entitlement of benefits to those hired before and after October 31,
1989 (or in this case, July [1], 1989), while œthe COA sweepingly does so by just a wave of the hand. [36]  To support this
73
claim, petitioners erroneously cite Javier v. Philippine Ports Authority, CA-G.R. No. 67937, March 12, 2002, as a decision
by this Court, but said decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners argue that assuming that they are not entitled to the rice allowance in question, they should not be required to
refund the amounts received, on grounds of fairness and equity.  In connection with this, petitioners allege as follows:

Prior to December 31, 2003, NEA consists of 720 employees more or less who received the rice allowance. Upon [the]
restructuring of NEA in December 2003, all NEA employees were legally terminated. Out of 720 employees, only 320
employees are now left with to operate NEA. Most of the (sic) them are rehired while minority of them are newly hired.
Thus, the refund of P1,865,811.84, shall be shouldered by those who remained as NEA employees. Secondly, those who
received the said rice allowance accepted it in good faith believing that they are entitled to it as a matter of law. [37]

In its Comment [38] dated September 21, 2005, COA™s lone argument is that œ[t]he assailed COA decision is not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.  The disallowance of payment for the rice [subsidy] by the COA is in accord with the law and
the rules.  COA maintains that the law on the matter, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, is clear, as its last sentence
provides reservation of certain allowances to incumbents.  COA argues in this wise:

The Supreme Court in Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on Audit confirmed the legislative intent to protect
incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and above those authorized by R.A. 6758 to continue to
receive the same even after the law took effect. In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its
intent to gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay and consistent with
the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of fairness and justice.

Thus, pursuant to its authority under Section 23 of R.A. No. 6758, the DBM x x x issued on October 2, 1989, DBM-CCC No.
10. Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 enumerated the various allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs which
are not to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989
who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date. Among these was the rice
subsidy/allowance.

Hence, in light of the effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10 on March 16, 1999 following its reissuance (in its entirety on February
15, 1999) and publication in the Official Gazette on March 1, 1999, the disallowance by the COA of the rice allowance for
the period beginning January 2001 up to August 2001 is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion but in accord with the law
and the rules. [39]

Petitioners, in their Reply, [40] anchor their petition on their allegation that the RTC Decision had already become final and
executory, could no longer be disturbed, and must be respected by the parties.  To support their claim, they cite Arcenas v.
Court of Appeals [41] wherein this Court held:

For, it is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable.
The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the judgment is void.
Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. [42] (Emphasis ours.)

Petitioners likewise cite Panado v. Court of Appeals [43]wherein the Court held that œ[i]t is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of
the land. [44]  From the foregoing jurisprudence, petitioners conclude that the acts of COA in disallowing the claims and
ordering refund of benefits already received clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
inasmuch as said acts frustrated the final and executory decision of the trial court.

The pivotal issues as determined by the COA are:

1. Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over the exclusive jurisdiction of
[the COA] to audit and settle disbursements of funds; and

2. Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled to rice allowance. [45]

The COA resolved these issues in this manner:

As to the first issue, the immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of this Commission. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of
cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular 10-2000
dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent œpossible circumvention of
the rules and procedures of the Commission on Audit and reiterating the basic rule that: œAll money claims against the
Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim

74
will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and exclusive jurisdiction,
courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of
the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the
cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the
Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.

Anent the issue of entitlement to rice allowance by employees hired after June 30, 1989, this Commission is left with no
option but to affirm the disallowance in the face of the explicit provisions of DBM-CCC No. 10. After its publication on
March 9, 1999 in the Official Gazette, rice allowance was allowed only for incumbents as of July 1, 1989. Obviously, there is
no violation of the equal protection clause as cited in the PITC case, supra, because whatever increments the incumbents are
enjoying over those of non-incumbents are transitory, for the same law provides that such difference shall be deducted from
the salary increase the former should receive under Section 17. Thus, the equalization or standardization of what the two
categories of employees will be receiving in terms of benefits is ensured.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the disallowance in the total amount of P1,865,811.84
is accordingly affirmed. [46]

We agree with the findings of the COA.

In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC
Decision was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of
money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758.  We observed therein that œthe RTC acted
prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to the processes of the COA.
[47]
  In fact, we even stated there that œit is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be
conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000. [48]

We find that the COA had ruled in accordance with law and jurisprudence, and we see no reason to reverse its decision.

Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is clear that rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted to employees of GOCCs
[49]
or GFIs [50] only if they are œincumbents as of July 1, 1989.  We reproduce the first paragraph of Section 5.5 below:

5.5 The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant to the aforementioned issuances are
not likewise to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of
June 30, 1989 who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date, at the same terms and
conditions prescribed in said issuances[:]

5.5.1  Rice Subsidy; x x x. [51]

We have defined an incumbent as œa person who is in present possession of an office; one who is legally authorized to
discharge the duties of an office. [52]  There is no question that petitioners were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989.  We
have likewise characterized NEA as a GOCC in National Electrification Administration v. Morales.  Thus, Section 5.5
quoted above, issued pursuant to the authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, was correctly
applied by the COA.

We find our pronouncements in Philippine National Bank v. Palma [53] to be applicable and conclusive on this issue now
before us:

During these tough economic times, this Court understands, and in fact sympathizes with, the plight of ordinary government
employees. Whenever legally possible, it has bent over backwards to protect labor and favor it with additional economic
advantages. In the present case, however, the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall
continue to be granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. Hence, much to its regret, the Court has
no authority to reinvent or modify the law to extend those benefits even to employees hired after that date.

xxxx

Stare Decisis

The doctrine œstare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled) is firmly
entrenched in our jurisprudence. Once this Court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
would adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the earlier
controversy.

The precise interpretation and application of the assailed provisions of RA 6758, namely those in Section 12, have long been
established in Philippine Ports Authority v. COA.  The essential pronouncements in that case have further been fortified by
Manila International Airport Authority v. COA, Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, and Social Security
System v. COA.

This Court has consistently held in those cases that allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated into the
standardized salaries prescribed by RA 6758, should continue to be enjoyed by employees who (1) were incumbents and (2)
75
were receiving those benefits as of July 1, 1989.

In Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, the x x x Court said that the intention of the framers of that law was to phase out
certain allowances and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle of non-diminution of pay.  The intention of
Section 12 to protect incumbents who were already receiving those allowances on July 1, 1989, when RA 6758 took effect
was emphasized thus:

œAn incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.

œThe consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is promoted to a higher position,
his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessor™s RATA privilege x x x or to the transition allowance.

Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the same case as follows:

œx x x.  The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an incumbent and was
receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its continued grant.  x x x.

In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, this Court confirmed the legislative intention in this wise:

œx x x [T]here was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of
government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof.  x x x.

The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone,  the  legislature™s  intention was not only to
adhere to the policy of non-diminution of pay, but also to be consistent with the prospective application of laws and
the spirit of fairness and justice.

xxxx

In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper application of Section 12.  In
the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law
clearly mandated that those benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before
its enactment.  Withholding them from the others ensured that the compensation of the incumbents would not be
diminished in the course of the latter™s continued employment with the government agency. [54] (Emphasis ours,
citations omitted.)

As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing the grant of the benefit to them, as they
were clearly not entitled to it.  As quoted above, we have repeatedly held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, the
only requirements for the continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for
employees of GOCCs and GFIs are as follows: (1) the employee must be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) the
allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the standardized salary rate as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758. [55]

We hereby reiterate our ruling in Philippine National Bank v. Palma as regards Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, as
follows:

In sum, we rule thus:

1.  Under Section 12 of RA 6758, additional compensation already being received by the employees of petitioner, but not
integrated into the standardized salary rates -- enumerated in Section 5.5 of DBM-CC[C] No. 10, like "rice subsidy, sugar
subsidy, death benefits other than those granted by the GSIS," and so on -- shall continue to be given.

2.  However, the continuation of the grant shall be available only to those "incumbents" already receiving it on July 1,
1989.

3.  Thus, in PPA v. COA, this Court held that PPA employees already receiving the RATA granted by LOI No. 97 should
continue to receive them, provided they were already "incumbents" on or before July 1, 1989.

4.  PITC v. COA held that in enacting RA 6758, Congress was adhering to the policy of non-diminution of existing pay.
Hence, if a benefit was not yet existing when the law took effect on July 1, 1989, there was nothing to continue and no basis
for applying the policy.

5.  Neither would Cruz v. COA be applicable. In those cases, the COA arbitrarily set a specific date, October 31, 1989; RA
6758 had not made a distinction between those hired before and those after that date. In the present case, the law itself set
July 1, 1989, as the date when employees should be "incumbents," because that was when RA 6758 took effect. It was not an
arbitrarily chosen date; there was sufficient reason for setting it as the cutoff point. [56]

Notwithstanding our ruling above, however, we take up as another matter the refund ordered by the COA on the rice subsidy
that petitioners had already received.  As regards the refund, we rule in favor of petitioners and will not require them to return
the amounts anymore.

This is because, to begin with, the officials and administrators of NEA themselves had believed that their employees were
entitled to the allowances, and this was covered by Resolution No. 29 of the NEA Board of Administrators.  The petitioners
76
thus received in good faith the rice subsidy together with other allowances provided in said Resolution.  For reasons of equity
and fairness, therefore, and considering their long wait for this matter to be resolved with finality, we will no longer require a
refund from these public servants.

Our pronouncements on refund in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, [57] wherein we cited Blaquera v. Hon. Alcala, [58] are
applicable:

Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive
benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be
detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive
benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude,
confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good
faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received
the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District. Petitioners had no knowledge
that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses
they received but disallowed by the COA. [59] (Emphasis supplied.)

As in the cases above quoted, we cannot countenance the refund of the rice subsidies given to petitioners by NEA for the
period January to August 2001 at this late time, especially since they were given by the government agency to its employees
in good faith.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.  COA Decision No. 2003-134
dated October 9, 2003 and COA Resolution No. 2005-010 dated February 24, 2005 are hereby AFFIRMED with the
CLARIFICATION that the petitioners shall no longer be required to refund the rice subsidies for the period January to
August 2001, which they had received from NEA but were later disallowed by the COA.

SO ORDERED

BANAHAW BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. CAYETANO PACANA III, NOE U. DACER,

JOHNNY B. RACAZA, LEONARDO S. OREVILLO, ARACELI T. LIBRE, GENOVEVO E. ROMITMAN,
PORFERIA M. VALMORES, MENELEO G. LACTUAN, DIONISIO G. BANGGA, FRANCISCO D. MANGA,
NESTOR A. AMPLAYO, LEILANI B. GASATAYA, LORETA G. LACTUAN, RICARDO B. PIDO, RESIGOLO M.
NACUA and ANACLETO C. REMEDIO, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision [1] dated
April 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and its Resolution[2] dated January 27, 2006 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Respondents in the case at bar, Cayetano Pacana III, Noe U. Dacer, Johnny B. Racaza, Leonardo S. Orevillo, Araceli T.
Libre, Genovevo E. Romitman, Porferia M. Valmores, Meneleo G. Lactuan, Dionisio G. Bangga, Francisco D. Manga,
Nestor A. Amplayo, Leilani B. Gasataya, Loreta G. Lactuan, Ricardo B. Pido, Resigolo M. Nacua and Anacleto C. Remedio
(collectively, the DXWG personnel), are supervisory and rank and file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City radio station
which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), a corporation managed by Intercontinental
Broadcasting Corporation (IBC).

On August 29, 1995, the DXWG personnel filed with the Sub-regional Arbitration Branch No. XI, Iligan City a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits, and
attorney’s fees against IBC and BBC.

On June 21, 1996, Labor Arbiter Abdullah L. Alug rendered his Decision [3] awarding the DXWG personnel a total of
P12,002,157.28 as unpaid CBA benefits consisting of unpaid wages and increases, 13 th month pay, longevity pay, sick leave
cash conversion, rice and sugar subsidy, retirement pay, loyalty reward and separation pay. [4] The Labor Arbiter denied the
other claims of the DXWG personnel for Christmas bonus, educational assistance, medical check-up and optical expenses.
Both sets of parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

On May 15, 1997, a Motion to Dismiss, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, [5] was jointly filed by IBC and the DXWG personnel
based on the latter’s admission that IBC is not their employer as it does not own DXWG-Iligan City. On April 21, 1997, the
NLRC granted the Motion and dismissed the case with respect to IBC. [6]

77
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that (1) neither BBC nor its duly authorized representatives or officers were
served with summons and/or a copy of the complaint when the case was pending before the Labor Arbiter or a copy of the
Decision therein; (2) since the liability of IBC and BBC is solidary, the release and quitclaim issued by the DXWG personnel
in favor of IBC totally extinguished BBC’s liability; (3) it was IBC that effected the termination of the DXWG personnel’s
employment; (4) the DXWG personnel are members of the IBC union and are not employees of BBC; and (5) the sequestered
properties of BBC cannot be levied upon.

On December 12, 1997, the NLRC issued a Resolution vacating the Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug and remanding the case
to the arbitration branch of origin on the ground that while the complaint was filed against both IBC and BBC, only IBC was
served with summons, ordered to submit a position paper, and furnished a copy of the assailed decision. [7]

On October 15, 1998, Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan rendered a Decision adjudging BBC to be liable for the same
amount discussed in the vacated Decision of Labor Arbiter Alug:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation to pay complainants the following:

1. Cayetano Pacana III P 1,730,535.75

2. Noe U. Dacer 886,776.43
3. Johnny B. Racaza 1,271,739.34
4. Leonardo S. Orevillo 1,097,752.70
5. Araceli T. Libre 543,467.22
6. Genovevo E. Romitman 716,455.72
7. Porferia M. Valmores 562,564.78
8. Meneleo G. Lactuan 678,995.91
9. Dionisio G. Bangga 580,873.78
10. Francisco D. Manga 29,286.65
11. Nestor A. Amplayo 583,798.51
12. Leilani B. Gasataya 42,669.75
13. Loreta G. Lactuan 757,252.52
14. Ricardo B. Pido 756,835.64
15. Resigolo M. Nacua 887,344.75
16. Anacleto C. Remedio 887,345.39
  ___________________________

GRAND TOTAL P 12,002,157.28

Respondent is likewise ordered to pay 10% of the total award as attorney’s fee. [8]

Both BBC and respondents appealed to the NLRC anew. The appeal was docketed as NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In their
appeal, the DXWG personnel reasserted their claim for the remaining CBA benefits not awarded to them, and alleged error in
the reckoning date of the computation of the monetary award. BBC, in its own Memorandum of Appeal, challenged the
monetary award itself, claiming that such benefits were only due to IBC, not BBC, employees. [9] In the same Memorandum
of Appeal, BBC incorporated a Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award (of the Labor Arbiter), [10] in order that
the appeal bond may be reduced.

On September 16, 1999, the NLRC issued an Order[11] denying the Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award.
According to the NLRC, such recomputation would result in the premature resolution of the issue raised on appeal. The
NLRC ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance
will cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. [12] Instead of complying with the Order to post the required bond,
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] alleging this time that since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond.

On November 22, 1999, the NLRC rendered its Decision[14] in NLRC CA No. M-004419-98. In said Decision, the NLRC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BBC on its September 16, 1999 Order and accordingly dismissed the appeal of
BBC for non-perfection. The NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the DXWG personnel for lack of merit in the same
Decision.

78
BBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Decision. On January 13, 2000, the NLRC issued a Resolution [15]
denying the Motion.

BBC filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the above
dispositions by the NLRC. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57847.

On April 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying BBC’s Petition for Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals held that BBC, though owned by the government, is a corporation with a personality distinct from the Republic or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore do not partake in the latter’s exemption from the posting of appeal
bonds. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents, We DENY the petition. The
challenged decision of public respondent dated November 22, 1999, as well as its subsequent resolution dated January 13,
2000, in NLRC Case No. M-004419-98 are hereby AFFIRMED. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated October 15, 1998 in
RAB Case No. 12-09-00309-95 is hereby declared FINAL AND EXECUTORY. [16]

On January 27, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this Petition for Review.

As stated above, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals dealt with only one issue – whether BBC is exempt from posting
an appeal bond. To recall, the NLRC issued an Order denying BBC’s Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award
and ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance
will cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. [17] However, instead of heeding the warning, BBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that it need not post an appeal bond since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines.

There is no dispute as regards the history of the ownership of BBC and IBC. Both BBC and IBC, together with Radio
Philippines Network (RPN-9), were formerly owned by Roberto S. Benedicto (Benedicto). In the aftermath of the 1986
people power revolution, the three companies, collectively denominated as Broadcast City, were sequestered and placed
under the control and management of the Board of Administrators (BOA). [18] The BOA was tasked to operate and manage its
business and affairs subject to the control and supervision of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). [19]
In December 1986, Benedicto and PCGG allegedly executed a Management Agreement whereby the Boards of Directors of
BBC, IBC and RPN-9 were agreed to be reconstituted. Under the agreement, 2/3 of the membership of the Boards of
Directors will be PCGG nominees, and 1/3 will be Benedicto nominees. A reorganized Board of Directors was thus elected
for each of the three corporations. The BOA, however, refused to relinquish its function, paving for the filing by Benedicto of
a Petition for Prohibition with this Court in 1989, which was docketed as G.R. No. 87710.

In the meantime, it was in 1987 when the Republic, represented by the PCGG, filed the case for
recovery/reconveyance/reversion and damages against Benedicto. Following our ruling in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering
Co., Inc. (BASECO) v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[20] the institution of this suit necessarily placed BBC,
IBC and RPN-9 under custodia legis of the Sandiganbayan.

On November 3, 1990, Benedicto and the Republic executed a Compromise Agreement whereby Benedicto, in exchange
for immunity from civil and criminal actions, “ceded to the government certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of the
agreement and assigned or transferred whatever rights he may have, if any, to the government over all corporate assets listed
in Annex B of the agreement.”[21] BBC is one of the properties listed in Annex B.[22] Annex A, on the other hand, includes the
following entry:

CESSION TO THE GOVERNMENT:

I.     PHILIPPINE ASSETS:

xxxx

7. Inter-Continental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC), 100% of total assets estimated at P450 million, consisting of 41,000
sq.mtrs. of land, more or less, located at Broadcast City Quezon City, other land and buildings in various Provinces, and
operates the following TV stations:

a.   TV 13 (Manila)

b. DY/TV 13 (Cebu)

c.   DX/TV 13 (Davao)

d. DYOB/TV 12 (Iloilo)

e.   DWLW/TV 13 (Laoag)

79
as well as the following Radio Stations

a.   DZMZ-FM Manila

b. DYBQ Iloilo

c.   DYOO Roxas

d. DYRG Kalibo

e.   DWLW Laoag

f.   DWGW Legaspi

g. DWDW Dagupan

h. DWNW Naga

i.    DXWG Iligan . . . . . . . . . . P352,455,286.00[23] (Emphasis supplied.)

Then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to invalidate the Compromise
Agreement, which was docketed as G.R. No. 96087. The Petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 87710.

On March 31, 1992, this Court, in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC,[24]
promulgated its Decision on the consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 87710 and G.R. No. 96087. Holding that the authority of
the BOA had become functus oficio, we granted the Petition in G.R. No. 87710, ordering the BOA to “cease and desist from
further exercising management, operation and control of Broadcast City and is hereby directed to surrender the management,
operation and control of Broadcast City to the reorganized Board of Directors of each of the Broadcast City television
stations.”[25] We denied the Petition in G.R. No. 96087 for being premature, since the approval of the Compromise Agreement
was still pending in the Sandiganbayan.[26]

The Sandiganbayan subsequently approved the Compromise Agreement on October 31, 1992, and the approval was affirmed
by this Court on September 10, 1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[27] Thus, both BBC and IBC were government-owned
and controlled during the time the DXWG personnel filed their original complaint on August 29, 1995.

In the present Petition, BBC reiterates its argument that since it is now wholly and solely owned by the government, the
posting of the appeal bond was unnecessary on account of the fact that it is presumed that the government is always solvent.
[28]
Citing the 1975 case of Republic (Bureau of Forestry) v. Court of Appeals,[29] BBC adds before us that it is not even
necessary for BBC to raise its exempt status as the NLRC should have taken cognizance of the same. [30]

When the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of BBC’s appeal for failure of the latter to post an appeal
bond, it relied to the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Presiding Judge, Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal.[31] The
appellate court, noting that BBC’s primary purpose as stated in its Articles of Incorporation is to engage in commercial radio
and television broadcasting, held that BBC did not meet the criteria enunciated in Republic v. Presiding Judge for exemption
from the appeal bond.[32]

We pertinently held in Republic v. Presiding Judge:

The sole issue implicit in this petition is whether or not the RCA is exempt from paying the legal fees and from posting an
appeal bond.

We find merit in the petition.

To begin with, We have to determine whether the RCA is a governmental agency of the Republic of the Philippines without a
separate, distinct and independent legal personality from the latter. We maintain the affirmative. The legal character of the
RCA as a governmental agency had already been passed upon in the case of Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations wherein
this Court held:

“Congress, by said Republic Act 3452 approved on June 14, 1962, created RCA, in pursuance of its declared policy, viz:

‘SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government that in order to stabilize the price of palay, rice and
corn, it shall engage in the 'purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and
landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their produce at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for
their labor and capital investment and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so

80
require, shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers at areas of consumption at a price that is within their
reach.’

“RCA is, therefore, a government machinery to carry out a declared government policy just noted, and not for profit.

“And more. By law, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriations yearly set aside by the General
Appropriations Act. So says Section 14 of Republic Act 3452:

‘SECTION 14. The sum of one hundred million pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the capitalization of the Administration: Provided, That the annual operational expenses of the
Administration shall not exceed three million pesos of the said amount: Provided further, That the budget of the Rice and
Corn Administration for the fiscal year nineteen hundred and sixty-three to nineteen hundred and sixty-four and the years
thereafter shall be included in the General appropriations submitted to Congress.’

“RCA is not possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence. On the contrary, by the law of its creation, it is an office
directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines.”

Respondent, however, contends that the RCA has been created to succeed to the corporate assets, liabilities, functions and
powers of the abolished National Rice & Corn Corporation which is a government-owned and controlled corporation separate
and distinct from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. He further contends that the RCA, being a duly
capitalized entity doing mercantile activity engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn cannot be the same as
the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity separate and distinct from the Republic of the Philippines. These
contentions are patently erroneous.

xxxx

The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn is only incident to its primary governmental
function which is to carry out its declared policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to
make it well within the reach of average consumers, an object obviously identified with the primary function of government
to serve the well-being of the people.

As a governmental agency under the Office of the President the RCA is thus exempt from the payment of legal fees as well
as the posting of an appeal bond. Under the decisional laws which form part of the legal system of the Philippines the
Republic of the Philippines is exempt from the requirement of filing an appeal bond on taking an appeal from an adverse
judgment, since there could be no doubt, as to the solvency of the Government. This well-settled doctrine of the
Government's exemption from the requirement of posting an appeal bond was first enunciated as early as March 7, 1916 in
Government of the Philippine Island vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and has since been so consistently
enforced that it has become practically a matter of public knowledge and certainly a matter of judicial notice on the part of
the courts of the land.[33]

In the subsequent case of Badillo v. Tayag,[34] we further discussed that:

Created by virtue of PD No. 757, the NHA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter. As a
general rule, however, such corporations -- with or without independent charters -- are required to pay legal fees under
Section 21 of Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

“SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities, are exempt from paying
the legal fees provided in this rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.”

On the other hand, the NHA contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges, because it performs
governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which holds that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a
government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its
governmental functions.

We agree. x x x.[35]

We can infer from the foregoing jurisprudential precedents that, as a general rule, the government and all the attached
agencies with no legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds, whereas government-
owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) are not similarly exempted. This distinction is brought about by the very reason
of the appeal bond itself: to protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive judgment
debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always solvent. [36]
This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to GOCCs for the reason that the latter has a personality distinct
from its shareholders. Thus, while a GOCC’s majority stockholder, the State, will always be presumed solvent, the
presumption does not necessarily extend to the GOCC itself. However, when a GOCC becomes a “government machinery to
carry out a declared government policy,”[37] it becomes similarly situated as its majority stockholder as there is the assurance

81
that the government will necessarily fund its primary functions. Thus, a GOCC that is sued in relation to its governmental
functions may be, under appropriate circumstances, exempted from the payment of appeal fees.

In the case at bar, BBC was organized as a private corporation, sequestered in the 1980’s and the ownership of which was
subsequently transferred to the government in a compromise agreement. Further, it is stated in its Amended Articles of
Incorporation that BBC has the following primary function:

To engage in commercial radio and television broadcasting, and for this purpose, to establish, operate and maintain such
stations, both terrestrial and satellite or interplanetary, as may be necessary for broadcasting on a network wide or
international basis.[38]

It is therefore crystal clear that BBC’s function is purely commercial or proprietary and not governmental. As such, BBC
cannot be deemed entitled to an exemption from the posting of an appeal bond.

Consequently, the NLRC did not commit an error, and much less grave abuse of discretion, in dismissing the appeal of BBC
on account of non-perfection of the same. In doing so, the NLRC was merely applying Article 223 of the Labor Code, which
provides:

ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;

(c) If made purely on questions of law; and

(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Italization supplied.)

The posting of the appeal bond within the period provided by law is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional. The failure on
the part of BBC to perfect the appeal thus had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. [39]

Neither was there an interruption of the period to perfect the appeal when BBC filed (1) its Motion for the Recomputation of
the Monetary Award in order to reduce the appeal bond, and (2) its Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of the same. In
Lamzon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[40] where the petitioner argued that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
in dismissing her appeal on the ground of non-perfection despite the fact that she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
an Appeal Bond, we held:

The pertinent provision of Rule VI, NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides as follows:

xxxx

Section 6. Bond. - In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter, POEA Administrator and Regional Director or his duly authorized
hearing officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The employer as well as counsel shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine
and that it shall be in effect until final disposition of the case.

The Commission may, in meritorious cases and upon Motion of the Appellant, reduce the amount of the bond. The filing,
however, of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.

Section 7. No Extension of Period. - No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall
be allowed."

As correctly observed by the NLRC, petitioner is presumptuous in assuming that the 10-day period for perfecting an appeal,
during which she was to post her appeal bond, could be easily extended by the mere filing of an appropriate motion for
extension to file the bond and even without the said motion being granted. It bears emphasizing that an appeal is only a

82
statutory privilege and it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law. Nevertheless, in certain cases, we had
occasion to declare that while the rule treats the filing of a cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from, as a jurisdictional requirement to perfect an appeal, the bond requirement on appeals
involving monetary awards is sometimes given a liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits. However, we find no cogent reason to apply this same liberal interpretation in this case.
Considering that the motion for extension to file appeal bond remained unacted upon, petitioner, pursuant to the NLRC rules,
should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten (10) day reglementary period following receipt of the order,
resolution or decision of the NLRC to forestall the finality of such order, resolution or decision. Besides, the rule mandates
that no motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed. The motion filed by
petitioner in this case is tantamount to an extension of the period for perfecting an appeal. As payment of the appeal bond is
an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law or procedure, we find the challenged NLRC
Resolution of October 26, 1993 and Order dated January 11, 1994 in accordance with law. The appeal filed by petitioner was
not perfected within the reglementary period because the appeal bond was filed out of time. Consequently, the decision
sought to be reconsidered became final and executory. Unless there is a clear and patent grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the NLRC's denial of the appeal and the motion for reconsideration may not be disturbed. [41]
(Underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, BBC already took a risk when it filed its Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award without
posting the bond itself. The Motion for the Recomputation of the Monetary Award filed by BBC, like the Motion for
Extension to File the Appeal Bond in Lamzon, was itself tantamount to a motion for extension to perfect the appeal, which is
prohibited by the rules. The NLRC already exhibited leniency when, instead of dismissing the appeal outright, it merely
ordered BBC to post the required bond within 10 days from receipt of said Order, with a warning that noncompliance will
cause the dismissal of the appeal for non-perfection. When BBC further demonstrated its unwillingness by completely
ignoring this warning and by filing a Motion for Reconsideration on an entirely new ground, the NLRC cannot be said to
have committed grave abuse of discretion by making good its warning to dismiss the appeal. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
committed no error when it upheld the NLRC’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
15, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 57847, and its Resolution dated January 27, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA
NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of
respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. This,
after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and
other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.

The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39
weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

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 BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., Petitioner, v. DANTE ANDO, ABENIGO AUGIS, EDGAR
CARDONES, ZACARIAS GUTIERREZ, CORNELIO IBARRA, JR., ZENAIDA IBARRA, TEOFILOI LIRASAN,
EUNICE LIRASAN, RUTH MISSION, DOLLY ROSALES & EUNICE TAMBANGAN, IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH COUNCIL MEMBERS; MANDAUE BRADFORD CHURCH; AND
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the pendency of an action for
recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to
forum-shopping.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 and its January 26, 2011 Resolution 3 which denied petitioner's

Motion for Reconsideration thereon.4

Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)

Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones,
Zacarias Gutierrez, Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission, Dolly Resales and
Eunice Tambangan, in their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford Church
(MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint was docketed thereat as Civil Case
No. 4936.5

In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its Complaint should not be dismissed
for its failure to comply with the requirement on the certification against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.6 According to the MTCC, BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a
complete statement of the present status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of land
earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI. (Civil Case No. MAN-1669,
captioned "United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and Mandaue Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford United
Church of Christ in the Philippines, Defendant, for Recovery of Ownership with Preliminary Injunction".)7

The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land subject of the unlawful detainer case, and yet
another parcel of land, denominated simply as Lot 3-C. On October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-rendered its
judgment in the recovery of ownership case against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of therein defendant
BUCCI. On November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but their
motion was denied by Order of March 10, 2005.8

Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order 9 dated March 31,2005 dismissing the unlawful detainer
case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to
the RTC which was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5126-A.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, affirmed the
MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice. The RTC held that BUCCI was guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to
certify under oath that there was another action involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending before another
court.

BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order 11 of June 23,2006.

Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR. SP No. 01935.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer
case. The CA opined that whatever decision mat would be rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the parcels of
land in question would amount to res judicata in the unlawful detainer case. The CA ruled that identity of the causes of
action does not mean absolute identity, and that the test lies not in the form of action but in whether the same set of facts or
evidence would support both causes of action. Furthermore, the CA found that BUCCI indeed failed to state in the
certification against forum-shopping in the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the land ownership
recovery case; and that such failure impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the CA dismissed
BUCCI's Petition for Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated January
26, 2011.14

Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.15

84
 Issue

Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration

WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF
FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER (CIVIL CASE NO.
4936) DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP XXX (CIVIL CASE NO.
MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO [DISCLOSE] THE PENDENCY OF THE [LATTER CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-
1669] IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-] FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE [FORMER CIVIL CASE NO. 4936]. 16

The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed forum-shopping when it failed to disclose in
the certification on non-forum shopping of the unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the action for
recovery of ownership of property then pending before the RTC of Mandaue City. The unlawful detainer suit involved Lot 3-
F which was also involved in the complaint for recovery of ownership.

Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to the instant Petition, stated that
UCCP had also filed an appeal with the CA pertaining to the recovery of ownership suit; and this appeal was docketed as
CA-GR. No. 00983, then still pending adjudication before the CA. In the same verification and certification against forum-
shopping, BUCCI stressed that the case for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land was entirely different from
the unlawful detainer case, because the first case does not involve at all the issue of material/ physical possession of Lot 3-
F.17

Petitioner's arguments

BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the presence of all the elements
of litis pendentia, namely, (1) identity of parties or representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for; (3) the reliefs are founded on the same facts; and (4) the identity of the preceding particulars should be such that
any judgment which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata
in the action under consideration.

BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the unlawful detainer case and the case for recovery
of ownership; and that the other three essential elements are absent, to wit: that mere be identity of cause/s of action; that the
reliefs sought are founded on the same facts; and that the identity of the two preceding particulars be such that any judgment
which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. Specifically, BUCCI maintains that the cause of action in Civil Case No. MAN-1669 is for recovery of
ownership of the parcels of land in dispute, whereas the cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary action of
unlawful detainer, is the determination of who has the better or superior right to the material/physical possession (or
possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the prayer that they be declared the lawful owners of the disputed lots in said Civil Case
No. MAN-1669 is entirely different or dissimilar from the reliefs prayed for in the summary action of unlawful detainer
(Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI, which is that BUCCI be given or awarded the material or physical possession (or
possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F.

Respondents' arguments

Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two cases are dissimilar or different is of no moment
or consequence because the latter's deliberate non-disclosure in the certificate against non-forum shopping in the summaiy
action of unlawful detainer of the pendency-in-fact of the action for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land,
which involved the same parties and the same property, in the action for recovery of ownership, is an irremissibly fatal defect
that cannot be cured by mere amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission, of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum[-]shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, (n)

85
The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the non-commission of forum-shopping itself, and
the submission of the certification against forum-shopping. 18

xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.19

Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the land ownership recovery case.
However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party
is entitled to, or should be awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession thereof
as a fact); whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has the right to be recognized as lawful
owner of the disputed parcels of land.

With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution of a subsequent action: "(1) the former
judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of
parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action." 20 It bears notice that in its certification against non-
forum shopping, now attached to this instant Petition, BUCCI mentioned that the decision in the land ownership recovery
case was still pending appeal before the CA, a claim that was not controverted at all by respondents. Simply put, this means
that the former judgment is not yet final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two cases are not identical or similar. To
repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the question to be resolved is which party has the better or superior right
to the physical/material possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises.  Whereas in the action for recovery of
ownership, the question to be resolved is which party has the lawful title or dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the
disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc.21 the petitioner therein asserted, among others, that
the complaint for unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed on grounds of litis pendencia and forum-shopping in view
of the pending case for annulment of an action for dacion en pago and for the transfer certificate of title in another case, this
Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a pending action involving ownership neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in
the summary action for ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or differences in the reliefs
prayed for.

Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The issue of ownership was likewise
being contended, with same set of evidence being presented in both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in
the ejectment case would amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.

The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the principle that a judgment rendered in an
ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be
conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be
provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional
determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.

Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate an ejectment suit must be resolved in
the negative.

A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, nor
suspend the proceedings. This is so because an ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of
a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of
the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. 22

The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of ownership case would constitute an
adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful detainer case, such that the court handling the latter case would be bound
thereby and could not render a contrary ruling in the issue of physical or material possession." 23 It bears belaboring that
BUCCI alleged in the instant Petition that although the RTC dismissed the complaint against it in the ownership recovery
case, it still filed the unlawful detainer case because there was never a ruling in the former case as to who between the parties
had the better right to the material or physical possession (or possession de facto) of the subject property. Of course, no less
significant is the assertion by BUCCI that although it had previously tolerated or put up with the lawful occupation of the
disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an end to such tolerance or forbearance, because all possible
avenues for reconciliation or compromise between the parties in this case had already been closed. 24 Thus, a favorable ruling
for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership would not at all compel or constrain the other court (here the MTCC of
Mandaue City) to also obligatorily rule in the summary action of ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to the material or physical
possession, (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F because even if it be proved that it has the lawful title to, or the
ownership of, the disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity to resolve in the summary action of unlawful
86
detainer whether there are valid or unexpired agreements between the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the
actual occupants of the disputed property. Indeed, in a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel of
land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or superior right to the material or physical
(or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease or leasehold right thereto.

In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case because, among others, the summary action
of ejectment was different from the case for recovery of possession and ownership. There, we expounded that:

There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. xxx

xxxx

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of
the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory
action (action publiciand) and from a reinvindicatory action (action reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two fonns of an
ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, action
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and action reinvindicatoria or the action to recover
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.

Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstance obtaining in this case is far
from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, we held that a judgment in a case for
forcible entry which involved only the issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a suit to recover
possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no identity of causes of action between the two. 26

This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 26,
2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Mandaue City, Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages,
docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936, instituted therein by petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. against
therein respondents.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

G.R. No. 187298               July 03, 2012

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1
SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO
CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of
the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police, respectively, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga
City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the
Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail.
News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then organized a
parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee.3 The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management
Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed
forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP
component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations
of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).4

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different
municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.5 The organization of the CEF was embodied in a
"Memorandum of Understanding"6 entered into

87
between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the
Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal
mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of the hostages may be achieved."7

This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of each of the party
signatories, as follows:

Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:

1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation of the CEF;

2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall participate in the operations
and to propose them for the approval of the parties to this agreement;

3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the CEF without the
knowledge and approval by both parties.

Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):

1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and law enforcement;

2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of their assigned task(s);

3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of operation(s);

4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the course of
operation(s)/movements of the CEF.8

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, announced to the media that
government troops had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3)
hostages.9 However, the ASG made

contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area.10 The government
troops yielded and went back to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian
forces pulled back from the terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10) to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one of the hostages
will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps and bases in the different barangays in
Jolo.11 The authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply.12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of
emergency in the province of Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a
terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security

Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and
to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct
general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the
proclamation states:

NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN,
GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE
PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT THE
FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper
authorities;

3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
supporters; and

88
 4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety.

DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS

31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.14

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim.15
Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who
were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours,
former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3
Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested.16 The
affidavit17 of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under
Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.

On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the
Implementation of Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."18 These
Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry

Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from the
gun ban only by applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines
also allowed general searches and seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal
H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,19 claiming that Proclamation 1-
09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void,
for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.20 Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed
forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they filed the
instant petition directly in the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts
(RTC) possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the

Supreme Court under Rule 65.21 This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan. Respondents Gen. Juancho
Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective
Comments.1âwphi1

On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted
pursuant to Sections 16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out
emergency measures during calamities and disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu
authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by Resolution No. 4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009
during its regular session.23

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government
Code authorizes the respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of
whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the said provisions.

We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by
this Court in the present case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang
Association, Inc. v. Yuipco.24 Simply put, the

doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in
either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought
unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court is a
court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial
tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance.25

89
The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,26 the Court stated:

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of
hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the
instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.27

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses original
jurisdiction.28 More crucially, this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus
impressed with transcendental public importance that would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be
remiss in its constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely due to claims of judicial hierarchy.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,29 the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that concern
restrictive custody, because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians ‘in
police power’ cases due to the diminution of their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."30 Otherwise, the
importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put to naught, considering the nature of "emergency"
cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of the claim that the issue had
become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public importance as an exception, stating:

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at
pagmonitor ng galaw (monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na
interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.

…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to
freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly,
the petitions are subject to judicial review.

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad,
unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to
them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners
themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to
crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the
education and guidance of all concerned.31 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,32 it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers,
and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else.33 As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle
that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines
is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.34

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section
23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.
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ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by
their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the
bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency
Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of
Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:

Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.35

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours
from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.36

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. 37
By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed
upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, "(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law x x x.38

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of
Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,

Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution
does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the
power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.40 As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he
may deem most effectual.41

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,42 the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers
belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of
the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the
President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.43 (Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers
of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.44

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission:
91
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-
Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment
is subject to review. We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National
Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both
of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.45 (Emphasis Supplied)

In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,46 the Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the President,
precisely because they are of exceptional import:

These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential
powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning
power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.47

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s police
forces, under the mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." During
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the
word "control," employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as the only Executive under the
presidential form of government.48

Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The State shall establish and
maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law."49

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police,50 and may
exercise control only in day-to-day operations, viz:

Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law full control of the police by
the local chief executive and local executives, the mayors. By our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and
sanctuaries for vices and abuses. If the national government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500 legally,
technically separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented police system, we will have a lot of difficulty in
presenting a modern professional police force. So that a certain amount of supervision and control will have to be exercised
by the national government.

For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police problems, such as riots,
conflagrations or organized crime, the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local executives.
Under that situation, if they come in under such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day
business of police investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities, traffic control, is all lodged in the mayors, and if they
are in complete operational control of the day-to-day business of police service, what the national government would control
would be the administrative aspect.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the ordinary
policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives?

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Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the National Police
Commission?

Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments.51 (Emphases supplied)

Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the
police, through the National Police Commission:

Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of the President of the
Philippines.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.

Mr. Natividad: He is the President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the President is the Commander-in-
Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The

President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which does the
police fall, under control or under supervision?

Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President.52

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended
for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to
their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the
police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the
government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of
the power of executive control.53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency
and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is
ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code, as will be discussed
subsequently.

Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt
squarely with the issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone.
Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition
which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local government units.54 This claim is belied
by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As
reflected in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission:
93
Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of "invasion or rebellion."
Mr. Sumulong stated that the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the
President may call out and make use of the armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion
or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by deleting "invasion or rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC
DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can make use of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.

Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some lawless
violence in a small portion of the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can be called to
prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that the Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also
exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words "invasion or rebellion" to be eliminated on line 14 are covered
by the following sentence which provides for "invasion or rebellion." He maintained that the proposed amendment does not
mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress the same.55
(Emphasis supplied)

III. Section 465 of the Local

Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09

Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to
justify the exercise of the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16,
of the Local Government Code, which purportedly allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer look at the said proclamation shows that there is no
provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and unwarranted powers granted to the Governor
may be based.

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their
supporters,"57 as being violative of the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general seizures.
Petitioners rightly assert that this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures
are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, particularly:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.58

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President,
because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of
the writ."59

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said
Proclamation. Not even Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16, which states:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government,
and in this connection, shall:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters
and calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the appropriate corporate
powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:

x x x           x x x          x x x

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(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or
sedition or to apprehend violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or
municipality where the disorder or violation is happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphases supplied)

Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to
calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly
empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at
bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to
justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines does not fall under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.

Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory.60

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the
situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law
enforcement agencies.

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National
Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and
defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature.1âwphi1 The
Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents,61 and
should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.

In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a step towards the autonomy
of local government units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose success heavily relies on the power of taxation of the
LGUs. The underpinnings of the Code can be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed LGUs to
create their own sources of revenue.62 During the interpellation made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter
emphasized that "Decentralization is an administrative concept and the process of shifting and delegating power from a
central point to subordinate levels to promote independence, responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does not
involve any transfer of final authority from the national to field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and
responsibilities. Certain government agencies, including the police force, are exempted from the decentralization process
because their functions are not inherent in local government units."63

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF

Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section
24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:

Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary
forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this
Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.

Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with
applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government."

Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private
armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves
wary of armed citizens’ groups, as shown in the following proceedings:

95
MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force operating under the cloak, under
the mantle of legality is creating a lot of problems precisely by being able to operate as an independent private army for many
regional warlords. And at the same time, this I think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the discussions and objections
to the paramilitary units and the armed groups.

MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other armed torces not recognized
by constituted authority which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses
committed by the CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not know
whether a particular CHDF is approved or authorized by competent authority. If it is not authorized, then the CHDF will have
to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National Defense, if they are recognized and authorized, then they
will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical answer to any specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are
armed forces which are not authorized, then they should be dismantled. 64 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) in
the present case, is also invalid.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from further
proceedings m implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation
and guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay  

GR No. 171947-48 

December 18, 2008  

FACTS:

The  complaint by the residents  alleged  that  the  water  quality  of  the  Manila  Bay  had  fallen  way below  the  allowable
standards   set  by  law,  specifically  Presidential   Decree  No.  (PD)  1152  or the  Philippine  Environment  Code and that
ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and
to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.  

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and  20 of  PD 1152  under the headings, Upgrading  of  Water  Quality  and  Clean-up  Operations,
envisage  a  cleanup  in general   or  are  they  limited only  to  the  cleanup  of  specific  pollution  incidents; 

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay. 

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section   17.  Upgrading  of   Water  Quality.–– Where  the  quality   of   water  has
deteriorated  t o  a degree  where it s  state will   adversely  affect   its  best  u sage,  the government   agencies concerned
shall take  such   measures  as  may   be  necessary   to  upgrade  the  quality   of   such   water  to  meet   the prescribed water
quality  standards. Section  20. Clean-up Operations.––It   shall  be  the responsibility   of  the  polluter to  contain , remove
and  clean - up  water  pollution   incidents  at   his  own   expense.  In case  of   his  failure  to  do  so,  the government
agencies  concerned shall   undertake  containment, removal and clean-up  operations and expenses incurred in  said
operation shall  be  charged against  the persons and/ or entities responsible for  such  pollution.      

HELD:

96
(1) Sec.  17  does   not  in  any  way  state  that the  government  agencies concerned  ought  to  confine  themselves   to  the
containment, removal,  and cleaning operations   when a  specific  pollution incident  occurs.  On the  contrary, Sec.  17
requires   them  to  act  even  in  the  absence  of  a  specific  pollution  incident,  as   long  as water quality “has  deteriorated
to a degree where its  state will  adversely affect its  best usage.”  Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact  that the pollution of  the Manila Bay  is   of  such magnitude  and  scope  that  it  is
well -nigh impossible  to  draw  the line  between  a  specific  and  a  general   pollution  incident. 

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.  While the implementation of  the
MMDA's   mandated  tasks   may  entail a decision-making  process, the enforcement  of  the law or the very  act  of  doing
what  the  law exacts   to  be  done  is   ministerial   in  nature and  may be  compelled  by  mandamus.  Under  what  other
judicial   discipline  describes   as   “continuing mandamus ,” the Court  may,  under  extraordinary circumstances,  issue
directives  with  the end in view  of ensuring that its  decision  would not be set to naught  by administrative inaction or
indifference. 

NOTE:  This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases. 

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS VINZON

G.R. No. 154705     405 SCRA  126 June 26, 2003

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR
AZHARI KASIM, petitioners,

vs.

JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON TRADE AND SERVICES, respondent.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic of Indonesia gave its
consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement with
respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance
Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he allegedly found
respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.
Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.

The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed a complaint against the
petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

97
Issues:

1. Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit.
2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their
private capacities.

Discussions:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of
nations”.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to
enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about
a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the government of a  state), but not with regard
to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial activities of a state.)

Rulings:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The
mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of
whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute
that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was
entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
2. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
o a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless
he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
o an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir
or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
o an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to
a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is
not the case herein.

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE
AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY.
CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

98
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN,
JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL
AFFAIRS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration of our September 4, 2012 Decision1 which ruled
on the petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. Their
petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.2

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President
has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP
ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust;
and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.

Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely
questioned the jurisdiction of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed the continuation of the
proceedings against her after upholding the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 1 O-J-460 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to
the period of suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-
DC Case No. ll-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act
of 1989.3

In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion for reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).

We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the present motion for reconsideration.

I. ANTECEDENTS

A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

a. Factual antecedents

On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-
IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and
four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.4

On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct
with the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza, et al. based on the same allegations
made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.5

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO), directed the
NAPOLCOM to turn over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office. The Office of the Regional Director of the
NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24, 2008.6 Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in compliance with
his Order.7

Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008), the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila City
dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17,
2008, the PNP-IAS recommended the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against Mendoza, et al. for
Kalaw’s failure to prosecute.9

On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the
Office of then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review.10 In his draft decision, Gonzales found Mendoza, et al.
guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.11

99
Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that approved Gonzales’ recommendation on October 30,
2009. Mendoza, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration12 on November 5, 2009, followed by a Supplement to the Motion
for Reconsideration.13

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded Mendoza, et al.’s case records to the Criminal
Investigation, Prosecution and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14, 2009, the case was assigned to Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO) Dennis Garcia for review and recommendation.14

GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, for appropriate action on April
5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’ office on April 27, 2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft
and endorsed the order, together with the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the Ombudsman.16

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and
held the 21 foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages. While the government exerted earnest
attempts to peacefully resolve the hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and several others on
board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and
Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint Department
Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence
and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza."17 The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure
to promptly resolve Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas" xxx
"precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."18 The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for
further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.19

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or
Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.20

b. The OP ruling

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service.21 According to the OP,
"the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9)
long months’] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman’s
own Rules of Procedure."22

c. The Petition

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under
Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy
Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order from GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010,
he completed his review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the Ombudsman for final approval. Since
the draft order on Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation, review and approval,
the period it took to resolve the motion could not be unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9)
calendars days from his receipt of the order.23

B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the
Sandiganbayan, with plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent Petition for Bail which the
prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the strength
of the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.

On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining
agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder
and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of
money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would
convey to the government his ownership, rights and other interests over the real and personal properties enumerated in the
Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the information.25

The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on the parties’ submitted Joint Motion for
Approval.27

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The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that Sulit, her deputies and assistants
committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust – grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770.28 The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing of
appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate government office.

Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding against Sulit.29 On March 24, 2011, Sulit filed her
Written Explanation, questioning the OP’s jurisdiction.30 The question of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP set the case
for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.

II. COURT’S RULING

On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. (As the full explanation of the Court’s vote
describes below, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of
the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution. The prevailing ruling on
this latter point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Marvic Mario Victor Leonen).

A. Preliminary considerations:

a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners

At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s September 4,
2012 Decision; only the OP, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional
question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the presidential action. If the
President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the
first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one.

In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and
correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s
consideration on motion for reconsideration.

b. The justiciability of the constitutional

issue raised in the petitions

We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question. A
justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law,31 as where the
court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the
government.32

In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary
authority to the President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant violates the Constitution, particularly
whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.

To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power that Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 grants where the
Constitution confers none. When exercised authority is drawn from a vacuum, more so when the authority runs counter to a
core constitutional principle and constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the powers and duties
granted and imposed on it by Article VIII of the Constitution.

B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

a. The Philippine Ombudsman

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium
for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these
agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of
their function as government critic.33

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it
political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand
Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the

101
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any
administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office
of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the
Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.34

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the
1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state
policy in Section 27, Article II35 and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the
people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
RA No. 6770 provides:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [emphasis
ours, italics supplied]

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely
falling under the broad powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with
its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.38

The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance
of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these
broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of
officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office. Section 5,

Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed. [emphasis ours]

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional
agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies."39 It has powers, both constitutional
and statutory, that are commensurate with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.40

b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s independence

Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as "independent."41 The extent of the
independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant
considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any
allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.

Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics – they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
"independent" bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of "independence" would result in the
impairment of their core functions.

In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we ruled against the interference that the President
may bring and maintained that the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions and the
Office of the Ombudsman are crucial to our legal system.

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The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in
the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence
and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.

The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions’ need for independence. In the deliberations of the
1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from
the tentacles of politics.43 In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit
highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from political
pressure.44

Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of
independence since it is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to the constitutional
commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed their
desire to keep the Commission independent from the executive branch and other political leaders:

MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner Rodrigo. If we explain to him our concept, he can
advise us on how to reconcile his position with ours. The position of the committee is that we need a body that would be able
to work and cooperate with the executive because the Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this
commission would need not only the cooperation of the executive branch of the government but also of the judicial branch of
government. This is going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also want a commission to function
even under the worst circumstance when the executive may not be very cooperative. However, the question in our mind is:
Can it still function during that time? Hence, we are willing to accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to
reconcile this. We realize the need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like to build in some safeguards that it
will not be rendered useless by an uncooperative executive.

xxxx

MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or organizations on human rights go to a country, the most
credible organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often these are private organizations, many of which are
prosecuted, such as those we find in many countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are proposing is an independent body
on human rights, which would provide governments with credibility precisely because it is independent of the present
administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be credible because it is not subject to pressure or control
from the present political leadership.

Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are in power yesterday are in opposition today and
those who are in power today may be in the opposition tomorrow. Therefore, if we have a Commission on Human Rights that
would investigate and make sure that the rights of each one is protected, then we shall have a body that could stand up to any
power, to defend the rights of individuals against arrest, unfair trial, and so on.45

These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been consistently
intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least
insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents
presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have been characterized under the
Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that are executive
in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President’s act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as
Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however well-meaning"47 it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the independent
Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President:

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the Constitution to be
independent – as the Commission on Human Rights – and vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating
violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor,
can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made
dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of
independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.

Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,49 the Court considered even the mere review of the rules of the Commission on
Elections by Congress a "trampling" of the constitutional mandate of independence of this body. Obviously, the mere review
of rules places considerably less pressure on a constitutional body than the Executive’s power to discipline and remove key
officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.

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The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior – but is similar in degree and
kind – to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices
fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.50

c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770

vesting disciplinary authority
in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates
the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional

Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution against presidential interference with the constitutional
commissions, on one hand, and those expressed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, on the other, in protecting the
independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 for violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose
own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express
constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By
so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman
in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft
and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that
the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence of the Ombudsman fully support this position.
Commissioner Florenz Regalado of the Constitutional Commission expressed his apprehension that any form of presidential
control over the Office of the Ombudsman would diminish its independence.51 The following exchanges between
Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod further reveal the constitutional intent to keep the Office of the Ombudsman
independent from the President:

MR. OPLE. xxx

May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee consider later an amendment xxx, by way of
designating the office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good government, efficiency of the public service and
the integrity of the President of the Philippines, instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which
would be accountable to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional body?

MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee deliberations and when we prepared the report, it was
the opinion of the Committee — and I believe it still is — that it may not contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the
Ombudsman precisely because many of the culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive department.
Therefore, as we saw the wrong implementation of the Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous influence of the
President, it was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a special fiscal. The whole purpose of our proposal is
precisely to separate those functions and to produce a vehicle that will give true meaning to the concept of Ombudsman.
Therefore, we regret that we cannot accept the proposition.52

The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power to remove and
discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd
situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very
persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given to the public if the
rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy
the President’s favor, would be discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s
impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be
sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as champion of the
people against corruption and bureaucracy.

d. The mutual-protection argument for

crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770

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In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed the concern that a lack of an external check against
the Deputy Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the Ombudsman and her Deputies.

While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it should be added that this concern stands on shaky
grounds since it ignores the existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the Ombudsman’s Deputies
cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari.
The same attempt can likewise subject her to impeachment.

The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the Supreme Court as a non-political independent body
mandated by the Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial disputes, whose judges and employees are not subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less questionable. The Members of the Court
themselves may be subjected to the impeachment power of Congress.

In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument becomes distinctly implausible. At the same time, the
Court remains consistent with its established rulings - that the independence granted to the Constitutional Commissions bars
any undue interference from either the Executive or Congress – and is in full accord with constitutional intent.

e. Congress’ power determines the

manner and causes for the removal
of non-impeachable officers is not a
carte blanch authority

Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,53 Congress is empowered to determine the modes of removal from
office of all public officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent
Congress from extending the more stringent rule of "removal only by impeachment" to favored public officers.54
Understandably so, impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is,
by its nature, a sui generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the
process required to initiate the proceeding;56 the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation;57 the limited grounds for
impeachment;58 the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases;59 and the number of votes required
for a finding of guilt.60 All these argue against the extension of this removal mechanism beyond those mentioned in the
Constitution.

On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment proceeding entails, thus
justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the highest echelons of responsibility in our government. To
name a few, some of the negative practical effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive process in
terms of the cost of prosecution alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation.61 Thus, in a cost-benefit
analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting Congress’ power to otherwise legislate on the matter is far more
advantageous to the country.

It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution should be read. Contrary to the
implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to provide for any
ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still
be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle of checks and
balances.62

In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other
public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and precepts established by the
Constitution.

In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the disciplinary authority is not a blanket authority for
Congress to repose it on whomsoever Congress chooses without running afoul of the independence enjoyed by the Office of
the Ombudsman and without disrupting the delicate check and balance mechanism under the Constitution. Properly viewed
from this perspective, the core constitutional principle of independence is observed and any possible absurdity resulting from
a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other words, while the Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to determine
the manner and cause of removal of all non-impeachable officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Our observation in Macalintal v. Comelec63 is apt:

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One
such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC shall be "independent."

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While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 is intended as a measure of
protection for the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor – since these grounds are not intended to cover all kinds of
official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman that it creates. The mere fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles hangs over the Deputy
Ombudsman’s head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
politics. The fear of external reprisal from the very office he is to check for excesses and abuses defeats the very purpose of
granting independence to the Office of the Ombudsman.

That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high standard required in determining
whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of removal is limited to
specified grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing
of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their
suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution.
With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President,
can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to
avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman, its decision finding Gonzales
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust is patently erroneous. The OP’s
decision perfectly illustrates why the requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 cannot be
considered, even at a minimum, a measure of protection of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue

a. The Office of the President’s

finding of gross negligence
has no legal and factual leg to
stand on

The OP’s decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of Grave Misconduct. The assailed Decision of the
OP reads:

Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of respondent Deputy Ombudsman himself, and other
documentary evidence gathered, this Office finds that the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of Captain
Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration timely filed on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency in the performance of official duty.64

b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency

Let us again briefly recall the facts.

1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman,65 which
was followed by a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration;66

2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned to review these motions and make his recommendation
for the appropriate action, received the records of the case;

3. April 5, 2010 – GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be reviewed by his immediate superior, Dir. Cecilio;68

4. April 27, 2010 – Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to Gonzales this draft order;69

5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were forwarded to Gonzales) – Gonzales endorsed the draft order for
the final approval of the Ombudsman.70

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the records of the case were already pending before
Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach
of duty is flagrant and palpable.71

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within
nine days. In finding Gonzales guilty, the OP72 relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7 (or the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on
Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days:

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Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds – Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation may only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision or order by the party on the
basis of any of the following grounds:

a) New evidence had been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed, and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the same
within five (5) days from the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours]

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy
Ombudsman whose obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked with the initial resolution of
the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed decision,
the period for resolving the case does not cover the period within which it should be reviewed:

Section 6. Rendition of decision. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared submitted for resolution, the
Hearing Officer shall submit a proposed decision containing his findings and recommendation for the approval of the
Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be reviewed by the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen
concerned. With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving authority.
Upon approval, copies thereof shall be served upon the parties and the head of the office or agency of which the respondent is
an official or employee for his information and compliance with the appropriate directive contained therein. [italics and
emphases supplied]

Thus, the OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days, to review a case
was totally baseless.

c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates

The OP’s claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to promptly act on Mendoza’s motion and apprised
the Tanodbayan of the urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It handles numerous cases that involve the potential
loss of employment of many other public employees. We cannot conclusively state, as the OP appears to suggest, that
Mendoza’s case should have been prioritized over other similar cases.

The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.73 This
consideration certainly militates against the OSG’s observation that there was "a grossly inordinate and inexcusable delay"74
on the part of Gonzales.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases" before, among others, quasi-judicial
bodies,75 like the Office of the Ombudsman, is itself a relative concept.76 Thus, the delay, if any, must be measured in this
objective constitutional sense. Unfortunately, because of the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in dismissing
Gonzales, the political and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what is legal and constitutional.

The facts do not show that Gonzales’ subordinates had in any way been grossly negligent in their work. While GIPO Garcia
reviewed the case and drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy that he had not drafted the initial
decision and, therefore, had to review the case for the first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for
acting on a case within four months, given the amount of cases that her office handles.

The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work involved: examination of the records, research on the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion. If this Court rules that these periods per se
constitute gross neglect of duty, the Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials of this country
would be subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that these periods per se
constitute gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this with the established concept of the right of speedy
disposition of cases – something the Court may be hard put to justify.

d. No undue interest

The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in Mendoza’s case by having the case endorsed to the Office of
the Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim,
Kalaw.

The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies within his mandate, even if it were based merely on the
request of the alleged victim’s father. The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and her Deputies to act promptly on

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complaints filed in any form or manner against any public official or employee of the government.78 This provision is
echoed by Section 13 of RA No. 6770,79 and by Section 3, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as
amended.80

Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint only on the basis of the unverified affidavit of Kalaw.
Based on the prosecution officer’s recommendations, the finding of guilt on the part of Mendoza, et al. was based on their
admissions as well. Mendoza, et al. admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and allowed him to
stay the whole night until the following morning in the police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was allowed to leave the
precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his promise to return with the proper documents.81
These admissions led Gonzales and his staff to conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in apprehending Kalaw, since
the proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when
appropriate.82

Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales’ decision differs from the decision of the PNP-IAS (which
dismissed the complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we cannot tie the hands of any judicial or quasi-judicial body by
ruling that it should always concur with the decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have also taken
cognizance of the case. To do so in the case of a Deputy Ombudsman would be repugnant to the independence that our
Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify the very purpose for which it was created.

e. Penalty of dismissal totally

incommensurate with established facts

Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the penalty of removal imposed by the OP necessarily
suffers grave infirmity. Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our own misdeeds; we can be
made to account only for lapses in our responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who took the least
time — nine days — followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days; Garcia — the writer of the draft — took less than four months,
and the Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping incident rendered Mendoza’s motion moot.

In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This conclusion, however, does not preclude the
Ombudsman from looking into any other possible administrative liability of Gonzales under existing Civil Service laws, rules
and regulations.

D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue

The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the Ombudsman. The existing Tanodbayan at the time83 became
the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution. While the composition of the independent Office of the
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing
discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to the

Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as expounded in jurisprudence.

Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the Office of the Ombudsman, known as the
Tanodbayan, with investigative and prosecutorial powers. Accordingly, on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos
enacted PD No. 1487.85

Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was given the "exclusive authority" to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute cases that are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.87 PD No. 1486
expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control and supervision over the Special Prosecutor.88 Consistent with
this grant of power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail to the Office of the CSP "any officer
or employee of Department of Justice or any Bureau or Office under the executive supervision thereof" to assist the Office of
the CSP.

In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the Tanodbayan the powers taken away from it by the Office of
the CSP. The law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor" under the
Tanodbayan’s control,90 with the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan. Unlike the earlier decree, the law also empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint Special Investigators
and subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public officer or employees who "shall be under the
supervision and control of the Chief Special Prosecutor."91 In 1979, PD No. 1630 further amended the earlier decrees by
transferring the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan himself.92

This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified. Under the 1987 Constitution, an "independent
Office of the Ombudsman" is created.93 The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "who shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now94 or hereafter may be provided by law."95

Other than the Ombudsman’s Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all other officials and employees of the Office of the
Ombudsman.96 Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman may exercise "such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command, Congress

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enacted RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and the extent
of its disciplinary authority.

In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, including in
this Office not only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but the Office of the Special Prosecutor as well. In terms
of appointment, the law gave the President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the Special Prosecutor,
from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law requires that
the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence.97

The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it imposes on the Ombudsman himself/herself and
his/her deputies.98 Their terms of office,99 prohibitions and qualifications,100 rank and salary are likewise the same.101 The
requirement on disclosure102 is imposed on the Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of
vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President
may designate any of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman.103 The power of the Ombudsman and
his or her deputies to require other government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman is likewise
enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor.104

Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the Office of the Ombudsman, both under the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that would insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the
disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the
Office of the Ombudsman was designed for.

Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or
her deputies, by making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by
granting the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office.105 This power of control and supervision includes vesting
the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem fit.1âwphi1
Thus, by constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and
directly aids the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the
Executive Department.

Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan and this prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking executive officials. For emphasis, subjecting the
Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive
Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between
the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the Ombudsman
must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of
the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.

In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and distinct from the
latter. In debunking that argument, the Court said:

Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as authority to advocate that the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the President. Xxx

In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided
by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers,
except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution, the Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or duties as may be provided by
law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman.107

Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's
deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of
independence under the Constitution.

III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

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In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision
insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by
granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as
Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of
the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders
any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the
power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.

CASE 2012-0070: EMILIO A. GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL.
(G.R. No. 196231) WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT VS. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA ET AL. (G.R. NO. 196232)
(04 SEPTEMBER 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) SUBJECT/S: DISMISSAL OF DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  (BRIEF TITLES: GONZALES VS. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT; SULIT VS. OCHOA)

======================

 DISPOSITIVE:

      “WHEREFORE,  in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio  A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages
corresponding to the period of suspension effective immediately) even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to
proceed  with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.

In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-1 B-003 against  Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public
trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman  Act is hereby DENIED.

         SO ORDERED.”

======================

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

DOES THE OFFICE OF THE  PRESIDENT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR?

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YES. THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER A DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IS NOT EXCLUSIVE. SECTION 8 OF RA 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989)
GRANTS THE PRESIDENT THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR FROM OFFICE AFTER DUE PROCESS.

Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy. —

xxxx

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

WAS THE DISMISSAL OF GONZALES AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CORRECT?

NO. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE FOR ANY OF THE GROUNDS PROVIDED IN THE REMOVAL OF THE
OMBUDSMAN. THE ALLEGED GROUND OF BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WAS NOT PRESENT IN HIS
CASE.

PETITIONER GONZALES MAY NOT BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE WHERE THE QUESTIONED ACTS,
FALLING SHORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS, DO NOT CONSTITUTE BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Congress laid down two restrictions on the President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman,
namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process.

.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

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 NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3)
other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and
other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the
Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional,
and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued
restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of
separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of
powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits

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of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE
ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE
BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO
DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY
GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

quino vs. Comelec

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino
stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year
and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the
district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
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This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just
residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception
as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin
(obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his
claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by
the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the
May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the
adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its
own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to
evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a
loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a

114
qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President (BOCEA
National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L.
MORALES, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335, 2 otherwise known as the Attrition Act of
2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations3 (IRR) unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined
permanently.

The Facts

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on
February 11, 2005.

In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:

RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund
(Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year, as determined
by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax
revenue.

The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director
General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners
of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a
representative from the officials nominated by their recognized organization.

Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2)
set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the
target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
for such purpose.5

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was
published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila Standard, and
became effective fifteen (15) days later. 6

Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of
the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an association of
rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President, Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan
(Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity
as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). In its
petition, BOCEA made the following averments:

115
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to
comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance Contracts 7 (Performance
Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-and-file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently
provided:

xxxx

WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act
of 2005, that provides for the setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and Employees whose
revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.

xxxx

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so
agreed to perform the following:

xxxx

2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection Target and further accepts/commits to meet the
said target under the following conditions:

a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself
that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR,
he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and

b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section
the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept
their individual target. The Performance Contract executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees
shall be submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.

x x x x8

BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates
and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other economic factors. BOCEA
claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them,
however, did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign the Performance Contracts but
they also refused. To ease the brewing tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several dialogues
with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.

In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal
Entry Divisions, Principal Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during command conferences
to make them sign their Performance Contracts. Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy
Commissioner Umali) individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said contracts. Said personnel were
threatened that if they do not sign their respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling,
or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of the Collection
District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.

BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy
Commissioner Umali to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter merely said that he would look
into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through counsel wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to
desist from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file employees of the BOC and BIR to
sign Performance Contracts.9 In his letter-reply10 dated February 12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having
coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He also defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely
implementing the law. Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions, requested for a certified true copy of
the Performance Contract from Deputy Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy. 11

This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort
to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of
losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional
right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families’ prejudice.

In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR do not violate the right to due process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG stressed that
the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR provided a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is germane to the purpose of the

116
law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality.

In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that
the law is unduly oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon their shoulders when the
Government itself has adopted measures that make collection difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and
tax exemption of big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and BOC employees. BOCEA manifested that
only the high-ranking officials of the BOC benefited largely from the reward system under R.A. No. 9335 despite the fact
that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue. Moreover, despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests, 14 BOC
continually refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on how such reward was distributed.

Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a
Motion to Consolidate15 the present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However, pending action on said motion, the Court
rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008. Thus, the consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no
longer possible.16

In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, declared Section 12 17 of R.A.
No. 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional and violative of the
principle of separation of powers. However, the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld
pursuant to Section 1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is
presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. 19

Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our Resolution 20 dated February 10, 2009, requiring them
to submit their respective Memoranda.

The Issues

BOCEA raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE
COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335, AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS[;]

III.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS
ENSHRINED UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION[; AND]

V.

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER AND HENCE[,]
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT INFLICTS PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A
PARTICULAR GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL. 21

BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its petition, events unfolded showing the patent
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No. 9335, BOC
employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue target of ₱196 billion which they surpassed by as much as ₱2
billion for that year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made advance tax payments to BOC.
Moreover, BOC employees were given their "reward" for surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they

117
described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the
employees, who did the hard task of collecting, received a mere pittance of around ₱8,500.00. In the same manner, the Bonds
Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated target but the higher management gave out to the employees a
measly sum of ₱8,500.00 while the top level officials partook of millions of the excess collections. BOCEA relies on a piece
of information revealed by a newspaper showing the list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of money by
way of reward.22 It claims that the recipients thereof included lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a
dentist, who performed no collection functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection, distribution and allocation of
rewards was due to the failure of R.A. No. 9335 to set out clear guidelines. 23

In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five
BOC officials from the Port of Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of these officials for attrition without proper investigation
was nothing less than arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of issuances and the
Government’s accession to regional trade agreements have caused a significant diminution of the tariff rates, thus, decreasing
over-all collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR and BOC employees tasked with the
burden of collection, and worse, subjected them to attrition. 24

BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the following grounds:

1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due process because the termination of
employees who had not attained their revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not comply with
the requirements under CSC rules and regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the remedies available to an employee as provided
under the CSC rules.

2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to equal protection of the law because
R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of
other revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
Department of Transportation and Communication, the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office,
and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to attrition.

3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to security of tenure because R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR effectively removed remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure
afforded to government employees. The law likewise created another ground for dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of
revenue collection target, which is not provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.

4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress granted to the Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of
allocating targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors affecting the targets of
collection, which is tantamount to undue delegation of legislative power.

5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the benefit of
hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public officer. 25

On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR are constitutional, as per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the classification of BIR and BOC
employees as public officers under R.A. No. 9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction since the revenue generated
by the BIR and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the lifeblood of the State, while the revenue produced by
other agencies is merely incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that in view of their mandate, and for
purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis; that R.A. No. 9335 complies with the "completeness" and
"sufficient standard" tests for the permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the Board exercises its
delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order that the Board may identify the officials and employees
subject to attrition, and the proper procedure for their removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the Performance
Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR and BOC employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly
accorded by R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that there was no encroachment of judicial power in the enactment
of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and provided
for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC
employee under R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the
level of collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, and in compliance with substantive and procedural
due process. The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due
process, actually serves as a notice of the revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to meet
the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved party from appealing the unfavorable decision of
dismissal.26

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In essence, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;

2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b)
security of tenure and (c) due process; and

3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has locus standi. BOCEA impugns the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are
actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR. 27

However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.

It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are being challenged. The
Court already settled the majority of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which attained finality on
September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy of reiteration in this case.

We resolve the first issue in the negative.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance
of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. 28 Necessarily imbedded in this doctrine
is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which
means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another.29 However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions,30 one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies like the Board
in this case.

The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 31 to
wit:

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of
everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields — the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. 32

Thus, in Abakada, we held,

Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard
test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:

"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies
for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets."

Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated power to the President to fix revenue targets:

"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby
created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets of the year,
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:

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 Excess of Collection [Over] the Revenue   Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to
Targets Accrue to the Fund

30% or below — 15%

More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess

The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the revenue collection
target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.

Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal
year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The
BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue
districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC.

x x x           x x x          x x x"

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and identifies the conditions under which officials
and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:

"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short
of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall
apply:

1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, and has no
historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and

2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of
revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or customs
officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure
or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and
proper review by the Board.

(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision
shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the separation of an official or
employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of
public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;

x x x           x x x          x x x"

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest", "justice and equity", "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.33

We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as
evident from the aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 5 34 of R.A. No. 9335 also provides for the
incentives due to District Collection Offices. While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he
allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the
Revenue Performance and Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a) 35 of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and sets the parameters for
the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in
accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No. 9335, read and appreciated in its
entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s
supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.

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Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.

Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. 361awphil

Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the
said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary
function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

The BIR performs the following functions:

"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:

(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;

(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;

(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;

(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and

(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

x x x           x x x          x x x"

On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:

"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the management and
control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary
[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:

(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;

(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;

(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;

(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;

(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;

(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;

(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;

(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

x x x           x x x          x x x"

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Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such
substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37

As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues on the security of tenure of affected BIR and
BOC officials and employees and their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:

Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable
yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The action for removal is also subject
to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.38

In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in
Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target
revenue collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due consideration to all
relevant factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner, exemptions 42 were set, contravening BOCEA’s
claim that its members may be removed for unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control.
Moreover, an employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him. 43 In fine, a
BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his
constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.

We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised
by BOCEA, that is, whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, 44 Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a
specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack
of judicial trial.451avvphi1

In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City, 46 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of
a Bill of Attainder, to wit:

Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills
or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte
Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial
power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life or liberty or
property — not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation,
a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal
judgment visited upon an identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a prior charge
or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards
of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.
Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965].
Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. x x x 47

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial
trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for
the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee
are amply protected.

A final note.

We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution and receipt of
rewards. While BOCEA intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular and in the government
in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions do not actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR, but rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not tolerate these pernicious acts of graft and
corruption.48 As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies
are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain
of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof. 49 Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. 50 We have so declared in Abakada, and we now
reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

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WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency
Power]

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take
over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is
a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and
“unlawful search” committed by police operatives  pursuant to PP 1017. 

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity
of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017  and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision:   “and to enforce obedience to all the laws  and  to  all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President
may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code.  Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.  In these cases, PP
1017 is more than that.  In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  She
also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public
utility and business affected with public interest.   Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.  Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.  It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-
out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  This is
based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: 
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.

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 This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate “decrees.”  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. 

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

 Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers.  To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised.  But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.  This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.  Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1)   There must be a war or other emergency.
(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only. 
(3)  The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. 
         Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.  The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,”
it refers to Congress, not the President.  Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court
rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. 
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a   state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.  Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.   In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers
act passed by Congress. 

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement
PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.”  Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

Sema v COMELEC G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008.

7/13/2010

0 Comments

Facts: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.  MMA
Act 201 provides:
    
     Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province
of Maguindanao.

     On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province” under MMA Act 201.

     Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum
dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:

     Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as
part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.  

     On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-
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0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue: The petitions raise the following issues:

     I. In G.R. No. 177597:
         (A) Preliminarily –
           (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902; and
           (2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.

        (B) On the merits –

           (1)  whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
           (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant
to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such province.

     II. In G.R No.  177597 and G.R No.  178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status
quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district
(excluding Cotabato City).

Held: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.  
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.  
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution.  Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.

     There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.  In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.   However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.

     However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter.  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides,
“Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative”
in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province
that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”  

     Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population
of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.

     This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law.  It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body.  

In view of certiorari and mandamus

     The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation,
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board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”

In view of mootness
     There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern
respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well
as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054.  Admittedly, the outcome of this petition,
one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of ballots.   However, this incidental
consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here.  The Court’s ruling in these
petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question,
as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

In view of the Felwa case

As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide
otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”  

     First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.”

     Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because  (1) it validly created legislative districts “indirectly”
through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution.   Felwa does not apply to the
present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself.  Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.  

     What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power
to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a
legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because
the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.

     Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this
will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao.  However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.  

     Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or
without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely:  minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and
minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.  The following scenarios thus
become distinct possibilities:

     It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution.  Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.”  The Preamble of the ARMM Organic
Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.”   This
follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”  

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Purisima

undue delegation of power; separation of power

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715             August 14, 2008

126
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT
S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted
to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of
such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated
duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a
sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix
the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval
of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and
enforcement of the law.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.
3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight
committee.

Discussions:

1. The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.

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The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

2. To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
3. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:

1. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the
law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions
provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the
BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State
exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335
fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

2. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the
Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” 33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization
of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.
3. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created
for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA,
BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and
ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., v. COMELEC, ET. AL., G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
Political Law; The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a disqualification to run for an
elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus has its complicated
side.

In the instant case, the Court revisited and analyzed the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on the
matter.

The Supreme Court further held that there has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official
after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
128
was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term
limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

Limkaichong vs COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:32 PM

G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who
sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and
garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and
responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were
Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy,
her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in accordance with Section
18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the representative
designated by statute, that may question in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was
allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no
longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship,
because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.

Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec
Posted by kaye lee on 5:06 PM

G.R. No. 162759, 4 Aug 2006 [Citizenship Reacquisition Act of 2003 RA 9189; Dual Citizenship ]

FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act or RA
No. 9189. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No. 9225, or Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground that they fail to meet the
qualification of 1-year residency required by the Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of 1-year residency
requirement.

RULING:
Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. Congress enacted RA 9189 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V of the Constitution, identifying in its Section 4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the
Section 5(d) of the same Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to actual residency
requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitution, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they do not fulfill the residency requirement of
said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.

129
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board,
Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to
declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and
Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive
Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from administratively
proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.

The Facts

On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12 provide:

Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. –

(a) x x x           x x x          x x x

(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or instrumentalities xxx

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x           x x x          x x x

Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. – After completing its investigation or hearing, the Commission en
banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations shall state, among
others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action
that may be taken."

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full text of the assailed executive
order reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13

ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE,

ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the different
departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and
efficiency in government;

WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices;

WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provides for
the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President;

130
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines to
Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the President of the Philippines shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government and may, at his discretion, create,
abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of the National Government, as
well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities;

WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act of 2010)
authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or
agency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, do hereby order the following:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and corruption in the
different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities.

The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency in the
government.

SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the President (OP) to
directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive Department including heads of
government-owned and controlled corporations, the

Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and their vital functions and other powers and functions
inherent or incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP
in accordance with the provisions of this Executive Order.

SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to the Legal
and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall be created.

The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and duties mentioned in Section
2 hereof, of PAGC.

The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the President, thru the
Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and recommendations of the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.

SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be affected by the
abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under existing laws if applicable. The Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the necessary funds for the benefits of the employees.

SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets and Liabilities of
PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition or transfer of their functions, positions,
personnel, assets and liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the applicable provision(s) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of the President) dated March
15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later than 31 December 2010.

The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and Management, shall ensure the
smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and winding-up of the activities of PAGC.

SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.

SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for
grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco,
Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA
of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank,
Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his
co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave

131
misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has
resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:

I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A

PUBLIC OFFICE.

II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO

APPROPRIATE FUNDS.

III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.

VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

Our Ruling

In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any existing law
to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-
ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not
only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to
administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the
unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.

The contentions are unavailing.

The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:

(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.4

In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O.
292, thus:

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch
does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in this wise:

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in

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the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of
the President. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own
office pursuant to E.O. 292.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the
Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.7

Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the President
Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic
move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President
can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions
from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices
outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies,
and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3)
on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When
the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other
hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him to reorganize
the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition of an office but the creation of
one as well. He argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court in several cases does a reorganization
include the act of creating an office.

The contention is misplaced.

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that
pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office
of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which
ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12
We ruled that –

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein,
including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good faith. A
reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.13 It appears in this
case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind.

In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the
government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization
is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual
budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC
functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain its personnel
would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under the General Appropriations Act of
2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the
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Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to
an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention is without legal basis.

There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.

In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the budget necessary
for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the
structure that each government agency in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and
efficient manner.17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010
of the President’s authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The
aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the
President’s power to reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose."18

And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given constitutional authority
to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items of the appropriation for his office.19
In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.20

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated by
Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly
sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation
of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated
by Congress for his office.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.

Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the Judicial
Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out
that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.

The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its
appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform
powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints against all
presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."24 The IAD-
ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and
adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission:26

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot be
doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of
the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the President to conduct
investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.27

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it
took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative
cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the

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investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989, empowers the Ombudsman to –

(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not
invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In
any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it
may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.28

While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the
merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding
investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no
usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws.

Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the
IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government. The equal
protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.29 It is embraced
under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is
not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated
differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that –

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled
principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which
the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.33 Petitioner is a presidential
appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed
decision.

There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government from
non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of the
Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public
officials, thus:

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

xxxx

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people.1âwphi1 It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded to the will of the
electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no
such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of
the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by
Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process,35 which simply means
having the opportunity to explain one’s side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and
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 present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written
explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his
explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending that both
the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere suspicion of partiality will
not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality

cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided
against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of
regularity m the performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden
of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize
the Office of the President.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

DECISION

BRION, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to
November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on  August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional
offices to be elected.  But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153.

II.   THE ISSUES:

1.    Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?

2.    Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution?

3.    Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?  

III. THE RULING

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 [The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]

1.    YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which
show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of
the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the elections to
be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including
the ARMM elections.

2.    NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through
three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having
to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 

3.    YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem
on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the
[incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire
when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1.    1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials

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 We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.  This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

                                                                      

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the  extension of the elective
term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that
would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the
position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an
available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover
rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly
within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse
of discretion results.

3.2.    2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special
elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature.  [N]o elections may be held on any other
date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and
setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections.  By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not
call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.  This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting
the legislative decision and effectively legislating.  To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion.  But our power
rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. 

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term
cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands.   This
is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization
is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 

138
   

3.3.    3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by
the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law
– as the only measure that Congress can make.  This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant
constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.  He shall also
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. 

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No.
10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and
representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in
the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. 

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged  constitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions.  RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.  What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”  This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054.  RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.   And this is how RA No. 10153
should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires. 

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 JARDELEZA v. SERENO
G.R. No. 213181
August 19, 2014
733 SCRA 279

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening
for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of
the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule
against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. 
Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and
he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the
grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a
sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or
opposition to an application is raised.

RULING: Yes.  While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s
entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.  Notwithstanding being “a class of its
own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. 
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the
fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant,
who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection
against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the
only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its
own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the
minimum requirements of due process.
raullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015

POLITICAL LAW; POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL REVIEW. We have already said that the Legislature
under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and
different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor
desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; STRICT CONSTRUCTION ON THE ACCUMULATION AND UTILIZATION OF

SAVINGS. The decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by
virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress
for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding
the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget
implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing
Congress’ power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of whether
the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the
relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used
to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as
well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by

140
laws, even the best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law. Laudable
purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; POWER TO AUGMENT; CANNOT BE USED TO FUND NON-EXISTENT PROVISION IN

THE GAA. Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or
object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation.
Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund,
savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution
and the GAAs, but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in responding to
unforeseeable contingencies.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, GR No. 191618, 2010-11-23

Facts:

Confronting us is an undesignated petition[1] filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section

4,[2] Article VII of the Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the
"appointment of additional personnel."

Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC[4] which peripherally declared that "contests involving the
President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET,

Issues:

whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4,
Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Ruling:

Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004.

His failure... to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunal's authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Court's power of... judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.

Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed... revived under the
present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical:

The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction.It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson andValdezpetitions.Petitioners cannot
invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides:

"The Supreme Court, sittingen bancshall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of a President or Vice President.There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed

Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez

I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for prematurity.The Court has no...
jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said petitions.

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The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction
by the Constitution to act respectively... as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of
the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives.

this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election... contests only after a
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election.

Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on

Elections[19] is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests
while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.

Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat - the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any... reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it
preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do
not include his restrictive view

 one which really does not offer a solution.

Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of judicial power mapped out in
the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Supreme Court's constitutional mandate to act as sole judgeof election
contests involving... our country's highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not
restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.

For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power;... and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government."

The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction
of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last
paragraph of Section 4,... Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.

We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because this is strictly an
adversarial and judicial proceeding.

FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only
by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral
tribunal for... the House, normally, as composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests.

So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to... constitutionalize what was
statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a
judicial power.[31]

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it.

Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests
and our rule-making power connected thereto.

To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was
statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied

To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an independent PET to
try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court... were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended
to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill,
absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.
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R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bicameral legislature
under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary government.

With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not directly chosen by the
people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while the position of Vice-President was
constitutionally non-existent.

In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was restored to the President
who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was formed to assist the President in the performance of his
functions and duties. Eventually,... the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed
anew.

These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Election Contests in the Office of the

President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." This tribunal was
composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices
designated by him, while the six were... divided equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the
Batasang Pambansa.

Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend the
prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity
connected with the canvassing and/or... accomplishing of election returns.

After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon Aquino as President, civil
liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed.

With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a
constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:

FR. BERNAS.  x x x.

x x x.  So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was
statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a
judicial... power.[

Clearly, petitioner's bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and "Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal;
(3) the Chairman is... authorized to appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in
order to bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further attention by the
Court.

Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the
Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the
process outlined by former Chief Justice

Roberto Concepcion

This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget...
allocation of the PET.

Doctrine of necessary implication - “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that
which is expressed”.

The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes
the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.[36] We cannot overemphasize that
the... abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.

A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of... power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's exercise thereof... he Supreme Court's
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the... aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose."

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The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives

Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET.
The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as
the PET, are... constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government - Executive, Legislative, and
Judiciary - but not separate therefrom.

MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive
and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna

Regalado E. Maambong

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793... has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the
election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office involved in the
litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that... he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may
be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office.

And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten

Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an
exclusive character

Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions
of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be
distinct and, even, separate.

n other words, there is only one... court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each
having some characteristics different from those of the others.

So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to... the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the
functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary
functions.

It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only
to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and
it faithfully complies

 not unlawfully defies - the constitutional directive.

The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the... singularity and exclusivity of
the Tribunal's functions as a special electoral court.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power.

It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise
of judicial power inherent in all courts,[48] the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with...
full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct
line between the PET... and the Supreme Court.

In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting
the PET, from the same prohibition.

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We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department,... i.e., the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Principles:

Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.

MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme Court was able to dispose
of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I
do not know how the present Supreme

Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the election protests

MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme Court this matter of
resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests?

MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.

MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme
Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or
election returns, Madam

President.

MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before teams of three,
generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the "protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams
are organized. Of course, that... can be expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were
times that the Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections, the kind of
problems, and the court would only go over the objected votes on... which the parties could not agree. So it is not as awesome
as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because each
party would have to appoint one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big... amount.

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

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In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the
aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance
with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the
Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of
Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like
her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.No member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import
of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly
of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or
its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives. 2

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity
and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of
the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy
purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is
well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech
and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency
and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."

The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have
taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the
result.1avvp

146
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the
judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional
Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law
textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the
court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. 7Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This
allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once
more:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. Iam
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but
not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and
frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her
official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities
are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or
Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive
personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC
had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court’s
supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no
official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art.
VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

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(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
(Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises
specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will,
among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics
and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

xxxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with
all good fidelity x x x to the courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that
profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties,
unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. 14

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects
their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of
law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
"conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of
lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest
in them.16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently
exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the
orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who
compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in
Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang 17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in
a most insolent manner.

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The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would
have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances
of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended
to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts
of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members
of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using,
under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as
to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be
undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senator’s use of
intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers
owe to the courts.21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question.
Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally
said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to
Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Funa vs Agra (G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013)

Funa vs Agra
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in
Quezon Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this
suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III
appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on
January 12, 2010, he was then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed as the Secretary of Justice; that on March
5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had
meanwhile tendered her resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May 2010
elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel; and that pending the appointment of
his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the
versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled,
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein.

Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

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Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore,
Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read.
Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because
the Constitution has not otherwise so provided.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text of Section 13, supra, plainly
indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the
Members of his Cabinet in so far as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office,
or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office. Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature
of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be
construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the
avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe
differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in
the Executive Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations
of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.

It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was not covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic
Act No. 9417, he nonetheless remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent
designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this regard, the Court aptly
pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more than one
office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled
that, “[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions
of both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the
right to interfere with the other.

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