Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Script For Reporting
Script For Reporting
Script For Reporting
Reported Hostage-Taking incidents in the country, the motives and their eventual outcomes
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2007 Manila City Hall hostage-taking incident involving children
A man identified as Jun Ducat and another man held hostage 32 children and at least 3 teachers
inside a bus parked in front of the Manila City Hall on March 28, 2007. According to a report by
Reuters, Ducat was armed with a submachine gun, revolver, and grenades.
The children, all aged between 4 to 6 years old, were from the Musmos Day Care Center
– owned by Ducat himself. Using a loudspeaker, Ducat aired his grievances against government
corruption and the dire situation of poor families in the Philippines.
The negotiations took over 10 hours, involving Senator Bong Revilla and various other
government officials.
Ducat eventually released all the children and teachers.
He was detained for one year and 9 months and was freed on bail in December 2008.
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The 10-hour negotiation ended with Aton killing Condonuevo, after he reportedly became
agitated over what he thought was a siren from additional police force. The siren was from a
nearby firetruck that was stationed due to the annual Wattah-Wattah Festival, according to
a PDI report.
During the hostage taking, Paray maintained contact with local authorities and the media
through his mobile phone and a walkie-talkie.[4]
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Members of the SWAT division of the Philippine National Police taking position at the hostage
taking site.
The hostage crisis began when Paray, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, entered the employees'
entrance of the Virra Mall at around 11:14 am. Paray was confronted by a security officer, who
he promptly shot twice. The wounded officer was immediately rushed to a hospital as Paray
took people at the finance office as hostages. At 11:22 am, the Greenhill management
contacted the San Juan city police and within three minutes city police chief Colonel Jimmy
Santos, a SWAT team, and other officials arrived at the scene.[5]
Paray threatened to kill the hostages and made his first demand: to have all security guards of
the mall gather outside the mall. He later demanded to be given media presence. At around
12:30 pm, the police set up a command post inside the Greenhills chapel. The mall was placed
under lock down at around 1 pm. At that time the incident was being reported as a shooting
incident with the police not yet officially confirming that a hostage taking was underway. San
Juan Mayor Francis Zamora and National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) chief Debold
Sinas arrived at the hostage taking site. At 2:30 pm, the Greenhills management issued a
statement publicly confirming the then-ongoing hostage taking.[5] Despite the closure, several
onlookers still managed to gather at the site to film the incident live and give updates about the
situation online.[2]
The police began setting up a press conference at 4 pm as part of fulfilling one of the demands
of the hostage taker. An hour later, the media was brought in the Greenhills shopping mall
complex for a briefing with the police. A video call was made by a police officer to confirm the
attendance of representatives of the media including reporters from CNN, GMA, ABS-CBN, and
TV5, and representatives from Paray's former employer, SASCOR.[5]
At 6 pm, six SASCOR officials publicly announced their intention to resign from their post in a
bid to appease Paray. In response, Paray demanded that two of them eat ₱2,500 in front of the
media. He offered one condition that must be fulfilled to drop that particular demand: for the
police to plead with him via the media to not force the act on his two former bosses, a demand
with which the police complied.[5]
The hostages were freed at around 8:16 pm.[6] Paray, initially thought to be unarmed, exited
with the hostages. Paray then proceeded to air his grievances against his former employers on
national television for 20 minutes before the police managed to arrest him at around 8:45 pm.
[5]
Victims
The only injury was the security guard who confronted Paray at the start of the incident. The
guard, who was shot twice, was rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Center, and was
reported to be in stable condition. The 55 hostages were all released unharmed with some
expressing the ordeals they've confronted in online social media.
4
It is very important to note that there shall only be ONE Ground Commander. Why so? It is to
avoid chaos and misunderstanding in the command chain and decisions relative to the
negotiation procedure.
SECTION 3. Negotiators
Negotiators shall be designated by the Ground Commander. No one shall be allowed to talk
to the hostage-taker without clearance from the negotiator or Ground Commander.
SECTION 7. Coordination
Proper coordination with all participating elements shall be done to consolidate efforts in
solving the crisis.
In the previous slide, in the hostage-taking incident in 2007 at Manila City Hall, where Senator
Bong Revilla and various other government officials were involved in the negotiation process.
c. Police officers without proper training shall not be allowed to participate in hostage
negotiations.
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2.7. Negotiation involves an exchange of ideas between individuals. Its success depends on the
participants’ understanding of human nature and the ability to empathize with and
anticipate each other’s needs;
2.8. Every negotiator must have a high stress threshold and knowledge of human psychology.
He/She must have an open mind that will allow him/her to change his/her appraisal of a
situation whenever necessary;
2.9. It is a must that before entering any negotiation, the negotiator must have the background
information vital to negotiating with the concerned parties;
2.10. All options must be weighed before agreeing to enter into negotiation;
2.11. All negotiators must have the determination to take calculated risks to avoid manipulation
by the other party;
2.12. When negotiating as a team, always get the commitment of every team member before
entering the meeting. Team members must be involved in every action;
2.13. In all negotiations, always look beyond what the other party is openly demanding.
Oftentimes, their real needs and wants are hidden behind their words and actions;
2.14. All lines of communication between parties must be open;
2.15. Maintain a positive attitude in cases when the negotiation did not work. Reevaluate your
choices and pursue another path; and
2.16. Negotiators must be alert and always ready to spot and resolve tactics such as deadline
and deadlock pressure, as well as lingering concerns and other potential barriers to the
successful execution of a negotiated agreement. If left unattended, these could lead to a
breakdown in the agreement.
3.1. Preparation
All relevant tools and information that can strengthen a negotiator’s position and create a
favorable climate for a successful negotiation must be prepared.
1) Facts and figures relevant to the situation. If it is a business or sales negotiation, the
negotiator must make sure that he/she has all the important details about the product,
as well as all other pertinent information such as discounts, rebates, credit terms,
transport, warranties, promos, etc.;
2) Strengths and weaknesses of the other party in both financial and non-financial terms;
3) The issues and concerns of the other party; and,
4) All the players in the negotiation, including influencers, endorsers, and terminal
decision makers. Find out the interest and stances of each, because they are certain to
play a significant role in the outcome of a negotiation.
b. Setting of goals. A negotiator must not be afraid to aim for the best results while
negotiating. It is important that he/she must have confidence in the negotiation process.
Furthermore, he/she must have a well-defined objective that is quantifiable and
measurable over time.
c. Planning of initial stance. This should be flexible because the other party is sure to challenge
this initial position. They will try to convince the negotiator to lessen the requirements or
demands. Thus, the initial stance should be that which offers the best and most benefits
possible, within justifiable limits. If the negotiator is a buyer, this should be the lowest price
possible. Results of the initial research must be used to formulate the initial stance.
d. Prepare backup and bottom-line positions. Expect the other party to reject your initial
stance. Your backup position should be more reasonable but still flexible. Your bottom-
line position, on the other hand, will be your last offer or last acceptable position, so it
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should be clear and specific and should set the limit to what you are willing to give. You
can still change both positions during the course of the actual negotiation, based on the
other party’s stance.
e. Lastly, ready answers and solutions to the expected issues or concerns of the other party
must be prepared. Not doing so can result in getting stuck in the negotiation and not
knowing what to do next.
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This refers to the written form duly signed by both parties as formal proof of what
has been agreed upon. This is only applicable for formal negotiations. Otherwise, a
mutual agreement between those involved is enough.
The preamble to the Hostages Convention declares that “the taking of hostages is an offence of
grave concern to the international community”. It also highlights the Convention’s role in
furthering the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations in maintaining
international peace and security and promoting friendly relations and co-operation among
States; and in securing the rights to life, liberty and security of person as recognised in the
UDHR and ICCPR. While the preamble also describes “all acts of taking of hostages as
manifestations of international terrorism”, it is clear from the definition of offences in article 1
that hostage-taking is an offence even if it involves compulsion for private rather than political
purposes.
The prohibition of hostage-taking is recognized as a fundamental guarantee for civilians and persons
hors de combat in Additional Protocols I and II.[4] Under the Statute of the International Criminal Court,
the “taking of hostages” constitutes a war crime in both international and non-international armed
conflicts.[5] Hostage-taking is also listed as a war crime under the Statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.[6]
Numerous military manuals prohibit the taking of hostages.[7] This prohibition is also set forth in the
legislation of numerous States.
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The UN Commission on Human Rights has stated that hostage-taking, wherever and by whoever
committed, is an illegal act aimed at the destruction of human rights and is never justifiable.[15] In its
General Comment on Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (concerning
states of emergency), the UN Human Rights Committee stated that States parties may “in no
circumstances” invoke a state of emergency “as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law
or peremptory norms of international law, for instance by taking hostages”.
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