Jnl Publ. Pol.

, 3, 3, 301-30

Policy Change in Direct Government Responses

to UK Unemployment
J E R E M Y M O O N Department of Politics,
University of Strathclyde*

ABSTRACT
This article examines the patterns of policy change in the field of direct
responses to unemployment in the UK. After discussing the nature of the
policy area, the article proceeds to identify instances of policy innovation,
persistence, succession and termination under the headings of Job Creation,
Employment Subsidy, Training, and Youth. As this is a relatively new
problem for British government there are several cases of policy innovation,
but the most striking finding is of a high number of policy successions.
Discussion is then focused upon the relevance of a range of factors which
might explain the patterns of policy change deduced, suggesting that the
most important of these have been (i) 'symbolic pay offs' of policy change;
(ii) the in-built terminators in most special employment measures; (iii) the
nature and strategic position of the unemployment policy community; (iv)
changing cabinet objectives. It is concluded, despite the several problems of
this form of analysis pin-pointed, that in this study programme changes were
generally good indicators of policy change, providing a useful over-view of
this important sphere of government policy.

/. Introduction
The focus of this paper is upon the patterns of policy changes in the direct
government responses to rising UK unemployment. The framework for
approaching policy change advanced by Hogwood and Peters (1982 and
1983) is adopted. Thus we will be endeavouring to discriminate between
instances of policy innovation, maintenance, succession and termination, and
further, trying to account both for individual instances of policy change and
any broader patterns identified.
• This study is part of a much wider research project, conducted in collaboration with
Professor J. J. Richardson and financed by the Leverhulme Trust, on unemployment
and new technology policies in Western Europe. An earlier version of this paper was
presented to the 'Policy Succession' Workshop of the European Consortium for Political
Research, University of Freiburg, March 1983. The author is grateful for comments
made during the workshop, particularly by Dr Brian Hogwood.
302 Jeremy Moon
The study of policies in the unemployment field is especially suitable for
such a task as many responses are, unlike for most British policy areas, in
the form of specific programmes, as in the USA. Programmes appear to be
better indicators of policy change than policies which are not identified with
a particular programme: 'changes in program normally involve some
changes in policy if only at the margin' (Hogwood and Peters, 1982, 231).
This distinctive feature of the unemployment policy area alone suggests
.that any extrapolations of findings of this paper for any understanding of
the overall nature of policy change in the UK should only be made with
caution.
The title of this paper refers to direct responses to unemployment. This
signifies an attempt to distinguish such measures as job creation schemes,
work experience schemes, and labour subsidy schemes from other measures
which may be genuinely aimed at the unemployment problem, but constitute
more indirect means; e.g. regional policies, fiscal policies, and ad hoc
government interventions to forestall redundancies. Inevitably, grey areas
remain, most notably in respect of training policies. Intuitively, we might
exclude these from the direct responses category, but, as shall be demonstrated
in the paper, one of the most significant changes has been the 'drawing in' of
the training policy area into that of responses to unemployment. This has
extended to a distinct merging of training and work experience for the
unemployed young in the form of the Youth Training Scheme. Thus, whilst
the main emphasis of this paper is upon policy changes in job creation,
work experience and labour subsidy programmes, reference will be made to
developments in the training policy area, as and when relevant.
One final caveat should be made. Whilst patterns of change in the
implementation of policies are clearly of great significance, this paper is
primarily concerned with the patterns of change in the content of the
policies themselves. Some reference will be made to the relevance of
evaluation of implementation of schemes to subsequent policy changes.

2. The nature of the policy area

The policy area which is used in this paper as a focus for the study of policy
change can be described as 'hectic' and 'complex'. Doubtless there are
few policy areas in Western industrialised societies which could be called
stable and simple, but there are special reasons why responses to the problem
of unemployment take place in a hectic and complex context, and it is
expected that these would raise peculiar considerations for students of
policy change.
This policy area is hectic for several related reasons. The first and most
obvious is the dramatic change in the scale and character of the problem
over the last decade (see Table 1). Although there have been disputes as to
 s-

. 3

S'
T A B L E I . Average annual numbers and percentages of British workforce fcj
registered as unemployed igjo-82 £
April g
1970 1971 197s 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 §
Percentage 2-6 3-4 3-8 2-6 2-6 4-1 5-6 6-o 6-0 5-6 7-4 11-3 13-8 13-3 2
Numbers (000s) 603-4 755'4 844-1 597-9 599-7 935-6 i,3°4'6 1,422-7 i,4°97 ',325'5 «>794'7 2,733-8 3,295-1 3,169-9 §
Source: Department of Employment, various. ~
a
3

00
o
03
304 Jeremy Moon
the exact magnitude of the problem (compounded by recent changes in the
system, from counting those registered as unemployed, to counting those
receiving benefits for being unemployed), even the official figures, which
tend to minimise the scale of the problem, have shown that by the end of
1982 unemployment had increased by five times since 1974. This multi-
plication included a doubling of the numbers unemployed between 1974
and 1976, and again between 1979 and 1981, Within this overall increase
there has been an even more dramatic increase in the proportions of young
people without work and of long-term unemployment.
This has been a hectic policy-making area also because unemployment,
and particularly youth unemployment, has become a politically sensitive
issue. Public opinion polls have indicated that the public have been sensitive
to increases in the overall levels of unemployment. For example, it was
estimated that between June 1980 and April 1982, at least half the popu-
lation considered unemployment to be the most urgent problem facing the
country, and this rose to 75 per cent in October 1981. Whilst public
perceptions of the importance of the issue dwindled during the Falklands
crisis, soon after the end of hostilities unemployment was perceived as by
far and away the most important issue. In December 1982, 82 per cent of
respondents thought it to be the most urgent problem facing the country
(Social Surveys Ltd). These popular perceptions have been fed by - and
have fed back to - press coverage of the issue, and attention to it by political
spokesmen, in Parliament and on other public occasions. Collectively these
factors put pressures upon government which then feels the need to be seen
to be doing something, at least about the most sensitive aspects of the
problem.
Superficially, the policy area may seem simple: it is often thought that a
problem-orientated policy area, in this case the combatting of unemploy-
ment, makes for greater simplicity at the policy-making and delivery stages.
Inevitably, perhaps, the real world is never so simple, and the unemployment
policy area is complex in two respects. Firstly, as with most policy areas there
are overlaps which impinge upon the conceptualisation of the problem,
responsibility for policy-making and responsibility for the implementation
of programmes. The unemployment issue relates particularly to the policy-
making areas of industrial training, work preparation, regional policy and
industrial aid, retirement and leisure policies. The problem of meeting
unemployment is not, however, solely characterised by overlaps with
adjacent policy-making areas. The unemployment question contaminates
almost every sector which there was, is, or is potential for employment. Thus,
decisions in most spheres of the economy and society have impact upon
unemployment and upon the policy-making area in response to the problem:
it is thus multi-dimensional (see Moon, 1983).
Brief reference should be made here to the organisations with responsibility
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 305
for direct responses to unemployment. The Department of Employment (and
its predecessor the Ministry of Labour) has traditionally had responsibility
for labour market policies (in addition to industrial relations) by which we
mean all policies relating to the training, mobility and subsidy of labour, the
provision of sheltered employment for the handicapped, the payment of
unemployment benefits and the provision of Employment Exchanges. In
1974 the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) was created to run the
public employment and training services previously provided by the
Department of Employment. Its original brief also included the planning of
a job creation programme. The MSC has been accorded an unusual position
of having most of its budget voted via the Department of Employment, yet
enjoying considerable autonomy from the Department, being directly
responsible to the Secretary of State for Employment (see Howells, 1980).
The Commission consists of representatives of business, trade unions, and
local authorities, a member with professional education interests and the
chairman appointed by the government.
The policies which provide the main material for analysis are illustrated
in Figure 1, which also indicates links between policies where some form of
policy succession has taken place, and where policies either continue or have
been terminated. Assessment of the overall patterns of policy change depicted
in Figure 1 and of their broader implications for the nature of policy change
will be conducted in the final section of the paper. We will now proceed to
examine policy changes under the following sub-headings: Job creation,
Employment subsidies, Training and Youth.

3. Job creation
The main feature of this policy area has been the succession of programmes
from the Job Creation Programme (JCP), to the Special Temporary
Employment Programme (STEP), to the Community Enterprise Programme
(CEP), to the Community Programme (CP) (see Figure 1 and Table 2).
When the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) was created, one of its
major tasks was to prepare for a job creation programme. Whilst in Britain
this was certainly innovative in terms of scale and coverage (Community
Industry being so small and restricted by age and area), the MSC made no
bones about the usefulness of the study of the Canadian Job Creation
Programme in drawing up its own scheme (MSC, 1975-6, 23). The JCP
was administered through a network of local MSC offices, and policy
decisions were made by local committees (representing local employers, trade
unions and local authorities). The schemes, which lasted for an average of
32 weeks, had little or no training element: the objective was simply to
provide worthwhile jobs. The termination of the scheme was pre-fixed:
the last date for applications being 31 December 1977, and all projects had
306 Jeremy Moon
FIGURE I. Policy change in job creation, work experience, training and
employment subsidy schemes
ITBs REP
(1964) (1967)

1972 CI TOPS

1973

\
TSI

1975 JCP TES RSSL

197G AVEP UVP

1
YES

1977 Sl'ES JRS

STEP YOP
[\STVVG • AES
1978

1979
V
TSTVVG

1980

19O1 CEP EA

1982 CP VPP OT YVVS

1983 YTS JSS

—— Continuing Policy
- > - Succession of Policy
— I Policy Termination
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 307

Key to identity of schemes in Fig. 1

CI Community Industry
JCP Job Creation Programme
STEP Special Temporary Employment Programme
CEP Community Enterprise Programme
CP Community Programme
VPP Voluntary Projects Programme
WEP Work Experience Programme
YOP Youth Opportunities Programme
YTS Youth Training Scheme
UVP United Vocational Programme
TOPS Training Opportunities Programme
ITBs Industrial Training Boards
TSI Training Services to Industry
REP Regional Employment Premium
TES Temporary Employment Subsidy
TSTWC Temporary Short Time Working Compensation
STWC Short Time Working Compensation
RSSL Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers
YES Youth Employment Subsidy
YWS Young Workers Scheme
SFES Small Firms Employment Subsidy
AES Adult Employment Subsidy
JRS Job Release Scheme
JSS Job Splitting Scheme
EA Enterprise Allowance

to finish by 31 December 1978. The numbers of participants and the

expenditure on the programme were increased during the period of the
JCP's operation as the numbers of unemployed continued to rise (see
Table 3).
In 1978 JCP was succeeded by STEP. The main reason for this succession
was that youth and adult schemes were formally divided (see YOP below).
Thus STEP was an 'adults-only' JCP. Preference was still given to the
younger members of this cohort, who were eligible after six months unem-
ployment. The type of project undertaken, and the sponsorship and
organisational arrangements were broadly in line with those operating under
the JCP.
In 1979 STEP was threatened by greater substantial changes than had
occurred in the succession from the JCP to STEP. These changes arose
from Treasury cutbacks consequent upon the change of government in May
1979. The planned provision of places for 1979-80 had originally been
30,000-35,000, but this was reduced to about 12,000. The budget target
was cut from £84 million to £54 million and the scheme limited to certain
assisted areas. In the event, almost twice the new target number of partici-
pants (22,400) took part in STEP in 1979-80 and this was achieved with
only a slightly higher spending than was budgeted for (see Table 3).
The changes in the succession from STEP to CEP were more significant
than in JCP to STEP. The changes were mainly the result of employer
308 Jeremy Moon

TABLE 2. Job creation schemes

Starting
date Scheme Aims Eligibility1 Sponsorship

Oct Job Creation To enable the 16-24 yrs ° ^ Any sponsor.

•975 Programme (JCP) unemployed to 50 yrs + Reimbursed for
do temporary work approved wages,
of community employers N. Insur-
benefit ance and running
costs (up to 10% of
total wages involved)
April Special Temporary As J C P 19-24 yr olds who As J C P
•978 Employment had been unemployed
Programme (STEP) for 6 months & 25
yrs+ who had been
unemployed for
1 year+
July Special Temporary As JCP Limited to Special As J C P
'979 Employment Development Areas,
Programme (STEP) Development Areas
and designated inner
cities
April Community As J C P plus a small 18-24 yrs who had As J C P though
1981 Enterprise training component been unemployed for encouragement given
Programme (CEP) 6 months & 25 yrs+ for more private and
who had been nationalised industry
unemployed for participation.
1 year+ Reimbursement for
training element
Oct Community As JCP As CEP, but it As CEP, but training
1982 Programme (CP) encourages part-time at discretion of
participation sponsors: no extra
finance provided for it
Oct Voluntary Projects As CP, but No restrictions of As J C P , reimbursed
1982 Programme (VPP) participants do not age, duration of only for certain
get paid unemployment material costs and
overheads

Note 1 National coverage unless otherwise specified.

dissatisfaction with STEP and continued increases in long-term (i.e. over 12

months) adult unemployment. CEP was designed to be a national scheme
(STEP having been restricted). Also, the scheme was widened in terms of
participant eligibility and by encouraging more sponsors, and a more
conscious effort was made to introduce some training element into the
programme. The scheme was designed to take 25,000 places, though in fact
there were 34,000 participants in 1981-2, and it was designed to last for at
least three years. In the event it was replaced after one year by the CP. The
main difference between this scheme and its predecessor was that the CP
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 309

TABLE 3. Participation and expenditure rates on Job Creation schemes

Index of Costs Index of costs

Financial No. of participants (gross) at constant prices
Scheme year participants1 {1976-7=100) £m (i976-7='OO)

JCP Oct. 1975-62 14,100 133 30 0 60-6

1976-7 79,320 1 oo-o 37' ioo-o
1977-8 106,120 134-0 7'7 172-2
s
STEP 1978-9 34,700 44-0 870 1875
1979-80 22,400 280 57-' 108-5
1980-1 18,400 23-0 48-2 77-3
CEP 1981-2 34.3OO 43 0 897 129-4
CP Oct. 1982-3* (200,000) 4 (25a) 4
(575) 4

Notes: 1 To be distinguished from the number of places.

2
Six-month period.
3
Includes 15,000 on J C P terminating in December 1978.
* Projected.

was designed for a large number of part-time participants, thus enabling the
government to make a bigger impact on the unemployment figures at a
lower cost per head than was possible under CEP.
In summary the main features of the policy development from JCP to CP
have been as follows:
(1) JCP was innovative with respect to the scope and scale of operation,
though it drew on Canadian experience, and resembled the much
smaller Community Industry scheme (below) which was inspired and
administered by a non-governmental organisation.
(2) The succession of STEP in 1978-9 was primarily a function of a
decision to give concentrated attention to youth unemployment by way
of the YOP: thus STEP provided for the residual adult component
within the JCP.
(3) STEP was considerably reduced in the spring of 1979 (although
initial targets were exceeded in that year in terms of expenditure and
participation). The changes not only involved aggregate reductions,
but also the parameters of the scheme. No new policy was announced
to reflect these changes, however.
(4) CEP retained the broad policy characteristics of JCP and STEP, on
a national scale. In addition to providing more places, it also reflected
criticisms made of earlier schemes (notably regarding the absence of
training and employers' complaints at excessive restrictions).
(5) CP enabled the government to remove a greater number of people
from the unemployment register by providing part-time places. The
training element in CEP was diminished.
310 Jeremy Moon
(6) These schemes have been characterised by central common features:
work for the long-term unemployed for the benefit of the community.
The schemes have been the responsibility of the MSC throughout and
administered at regional and local levels.
(7) The distinguishing features of the schemes have not been solely in
terms of scale and expenditure. They have also reflected differences in
application (youth and adult, 18+ and 19+) and coverage (national
or designated area). Greater incentives for sponsorship (especially in
the private sector) have been provided in the more recent schemes. A
more conscious effort was made to incorporate a training element
within CEP, but this was dropped in the CP.
One further minor stage in this policy development should be mentioned;
that of the Voluntary Projects Programme, launched at the same time as CP
in October 1982. This also attempts to provide the unemployed with con-
structive activity for the community benefit. The administration of the
scheme is identical to that of CP. The main difference is that VPP partici-
pants do not normally get paid: they continue to draw benefit. The scheme
does not however have any restrictions on qualifying age, or duration of
unemployment and only 24 hours notice is required if participants want to
take up another job. As in CP, the MSC will pay certain material costs and
overheads. The scheme was given a small budget at the outset (£8 million)
and the take-up has been very small. It is likely that the policy will not be
extended, in its present form at least, beyond the initial termination date of
October 1984.

4. Employment subsidy
4.1 Policies to defer redundancies
This section deals with the policy changes from the Temporary Employment
Subsidy (TES) to the Short-Time Working Compensation Scheme (STWCS)
and the Temporary Short-Time Working Compensation Scheme (TSTWC)
(see Figure 1 and Table 4). National schemes to defer redundancies closely
resembled the Regional Employment Premium (REP), which had departed
from previous regional aids by subsidising labour as opposed to capital and
other non-labour resources. Indeed TES itself was originally to apply to
assisted areas only, though within two months it was extended to apply
nationally.
TES was also introduced for a trial period of one year. However, the
scheme was extended on several occasions, and the last applications were
received in March 1979. Similarly, qualifications for the subsidy were
gradually eased. Further, a TES supplement was introduced in March 1979
to allow firms to receive a subsidy of £ 10 a week for six months (on top of the
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 311
TABLE 4. Adult employment subsidies to defer redundancies

Starting
date Scheme Aims Eligibility Subsidy

Aug Temporary To subsidise jobs For first two months £10 per week for up
•975 Employment which would in assisted areas to 6 months
Subsidy (TES) otherwise be only. Employers
terminated who could
demonstrate that
they would make at
least 50 workers
redundant without
the subsidy
Jan Temporary To subsidise jobs 25 workers to be £10 per week for up
"976 Employment which would made redundant to 6 months
Subsidy (TES) otherwise be
terminated
May Temporary To subsidise jobs 10 workers to be £25 per week for up
1976 Employment which would made redundant to 12 months
Subsidy (TES) otherwise be
terminated
May Short-Time Working To defer Employees in textile 75% of wages
•978 Compensation redundancies by and footwear reimbursed for each
Scheme (STWCS) subsidising wages of industries complete working day
workers put on lost
short-time working
April Temporary Short- To defer Employees had to be 75% of wages
'979 Time Working redundancies by given one days work reimbursed for each
Compensation subsidising wages of after maximum of 7 complete working day
Scheme (TSTWC) workers put on consecutive days lost, for up to 12
short-time working without work months
May Temporary Short- To defer Employees had to be For up to 6 months
'979 Time Working redundancies by given one days work
Compensation subsidising wages of after maximum of
Scheme (TSTWC) workers put on 7 consecutive days
short-time working without work
Nov Temporary Short- To defer Employees had to be For up to 9 months
1980 Time Working redundancies by given one days work 50% of wages
Compensation subsidising wages after maximum of 7
Scheme (TSTWC) of workers put on consecutive days
short-time working without work

July Temporary Short- To defer Employees had to be For up to 6 months

1982 Time Working redundancies by given one days work
Compensation subsidising wages of after maximum of 7
Scheme (TSTWC) workers put on consecutive days
short-time working without work

initial twelve months) if redundancies would otherwise be unavoidable. Over

half a million jobs were subsidised under TES over the period from August
1975 to September 1979.
Thus, under the heading of TES several important policy changes took
312 Jeremy Moon
place: it changed from having a regional to a national application, the terms
under which employers might benefit from the scheme were eased, and the
benefits of the scheme were increased. Termination dates were successively
over-ridden until 1979. During 1978 several objections were made to the
scheme by the EEC Commission regarding the impact of TES upon
competition. In response to the subsequent restrictions to the scheme (mainly
in terms of the percentage of a firm's workforce who could be subsidised),
a Short Time Working Compensation Scheme (STWCS) was introduced
for the textile clothing and footwear industries in May 1978. This scheme
closed with TES at the end of March 1979.
The Temporary Short-Time Working Compensation Scheme was re-
garded by the Department of Employment as the direct successor of TES
and STWCS, and indeed a substantial proportion of the firms using
TSTWC had used TES. It began in April 1979 and was scheduled to close
for applications a year later. The scheme did not terminate when scheduled
to do so, but has been renewed (the present closing date for applications
being the end of March 1984). Some changes have been made in the par-
ameters of the scheme since the Conservatives took office.
There have only been a small number of policy changes in this field of
employment subsidy, but they do betray a coherent train of succession.

(1) The initial TES package drew upon REP not only in its regional
orientation, but, more importantly, in the substance of the policy.
(2) Important policy successions did take place within TES, notably
regarding its application.
(3) The short-lived and comparatively small STWCS provided a bridge
between the two more significant schemes, TES and TSTWC.
(4) The policy changes noted in (3) were largely the consequence of EEC
Commission intervention; though it should be added that some qualms
were expressed among employers that TES had an unfair displacement
effect on the output of other British producers.
(5) The TES and the TSTWC were both used by the same employers
- notably in the textile and engineering and manufacturing industries.
(6) Whilst emphasis has been placed on the similarities of the aims and
beneficiaries of the TES and TSTWC, the succession also marked
the point of significant policy departures. Neither scheme could solve
the main problem faced by firms, i.e. falling demand, but TSTWC
avoided unfair competition which arose in the case of TES for British
non-beneficiaries. Secondly, the size of the government subsidy per
employee was much larger in the case of TSTWC than TES.
(Exact comparison is not possible due to the use of a percentage
system in the case of the former.) Thirdly, TSTWC has had an
impact on a much larger number of people.
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 313
(7) Whilst amendments have been made to the policies of subsidising
labour to prevent redundancies, the schemes have so far been
continued - being renewed intermittently.

4.2 Policies to create jobs

There have also been schemes devised to create rather than simply maintain
jobs (see Table 5). The innovatory Small Firms Employment Subsidy (SFES)
was introduced in July 1977 to this end. In November 1977 (before the first
evaluation report), it was decided to extend the scheme for another six
months. The evaluation report (Department of Employment, May 1978,
549-54) considered the scheme to be successful in that about two out of
five jobs created by the SFES would not have been created otherwise (i.e.
there was no displacement effect in 40 per cent of the cases), and the scheme
was duly extended. (Though it could be argued that the scheme was a
failure because a displacement effect did occur in 60 per cent of cases.) After
the alternation of government in 1979, the scope of the programme was
once again reduced. A termination date was set for last applications at the
end of March 1980, which was not exceeded on this occasion.
The Adult Employment Subsidy was set up on an experimental basis for
nine months from August 1978. Although the initial termination date was
extended for another two months, the scheme did not proceed beyond June
1979. The main reason for this was the disappointing response of employers.
Thus, simple adult employment subsidy schemes to create jobs have been
shortlived. This contrasts with a relatively longer lasting succession of policies
in job-preserving adult employment subsidy schemes (above in section 4.1)
and youth employment creating subsidy schemes (below in section 6).
The Department of Employment has introduced two rather more sophisti-
cated employment subsidy schemes in order to reduce unemployment. These
could be described as being from the same stable as SFES, but without
direct lineage! The first of these, the Job Release Scheme, which was first
introduced in January 1977, has continued since with certain periodic
changes in eligibility.
The second such scheme is the experimental Job Splitting Scheme
launched in January 1983. It is available nationally, and provides employ-
ment protection and employment creation subsidy.
The Chancellor announced in his 1983 Budget speech that the govern-
ment intended to introduce a Part-Time Job Release Scheme which clearly
draws directly upon the JRS, but also, notionally, upon the JSS. This comes
into operation later in 1983.
The pattern of succession in employment subsidies to create employment
has been less clear than has been the case for job preserving subsidies. The
initial simple subsidy schemes have been terminated, and replaced by the
314 Jeremy Moon

TABLE 5. Adult employment subsidies to create jobs

Starting
date Scheme Aims Eligibility1 Subsidy

July Small Firms To create jobs in Firms employing £20 per week for
1977 Employment small manufacturing under 50 workers in each additional job
Subsidy (SFES) firms Special Development created. For up to
Areas 26 weeks
Jan Small Firms To create jobs in Special Development £20 per week for
ig7g Employment small manufacturing Areas, Development each additional job
Subsidy (SFES) firms Areas, Inner City created. For up to
Partnership Areas 26 weeks
May Small Firms To create jobs in Special Development £20 per week for
1979 Employment small manufacturing Areas, Development each additional job
Subsidy (SFES) firms Areas created. For up to
26 weeks
Aug Adult Employment To create jobs for Employees having £20 per week for up
1978 Subsidy (AES) the long-term been unemployed to 26 weeks
unemployed for at least 12 months
in Merseyside,
Tyneside and Leeds
Jan Job Release Scheme To encourage older Retirees to be within Weekly allowance
•977 (JRS) workers to retire one year of (varying according
who would be retirement (Men: 64, to marital status and
replaced by Women: 59); only in income )for retirees
unemployed workers Assisted Areas
Apr Job Release Scheme To encourage older National application Weekly allowance
1978 (JRS) workers to retire who (varying according to
would be replaced by marital status and
unemployed workers income) for retirees
May Job Release Scheme To encourage older Eligibility for men Weekly allowance
•979 workers to retire who reduced to 62 years (varying according to
would be replaced by (60 if disabled) marital status and
unemployed workers income) for retirees
Nov Enterprise To help the Unemployed for 13 £40 per week
1981 Allowance (EA) unemployed set up weeks with £1,000 to (taxable) for up to
businesses invest. In designated one year
areas
Aug Enterprise To help the National application £40 per week
1982 Allowance (EA) unemployed set up (taxable) for up to
businesses one year
Jan Job Splitting To create part-time For each split new £750 grant (paid in
1983 Scheme (JSS) jobs for current recruit must have 4 installments) to
employees and the been unemployed or employees who split
unemployed threatened with jobs
redundancy

Note: 1 National unless otherwise specified.

 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 315
more 'sophisticated schemes'. These have other labour market implications.
In the case of JRS this ensures that there is a flow of older workers out of
the labour market to make way for younger ones and in the case of JRS, of
reducing demand for employment.
A third type of employment creation subsidy has been introduced: the
Employment Allowance. This was originally set up in 1981 as a pilot, but
became nationally available from August 1983. It provides a weekly taxable
allowance for those setting up their own businesses, and in the first year of
full operation is planned to offer 25,000 places. The logic of the scheme is
not simply that the subsidised jobs are created, but that the businesses
established may grow to take on further employees.

5. Training
Although prior to the marked increases in unemployment over the last
decade training policies bore little relation to policies designed to combat
unemployment, one of the most interesting features of policy change in this
field since 1972 has been the drawing of training policies into the unemploy-
ment policy area. This has been for two broad reasons: firstly it has been
thought that if the unemployed were equipped with suitable skills, they
would more easily find work, and secondly, that the provision of training
courses removes participants thereon from the register of unemployed. (It
also creates a small number of jobs in the training professions.) The purpose
of this section of the paper is to outline the major policy developments in the
training field. Where these overlap with schemes more clearly designed as
to create labour or provide work experience, they are dealt with in the other
sections of the paper; primarily in the Youth Scheme section (section 6).
Industrial training first came within the ambit of government as a result
of the Industrial Training Act of 1964. Prior to that, such training had been
left to companies to provide. The 1964 Act created a number of Industrial
Training Boards (ITBs). These consisted of employer, trade union, and
educational interests. They were oriented around broad industrial sectors,
and were responsible for ensuring the provision of adequate training for the
respective industries, being empowered to give grants to those employers
providing the training. The costs incurred were paid out of an industrial
training levy. With the advent of some disquiet over the effectiveness of the
system during the late 1960s, a review led to the 1973 Employment and
Training Act. Apart from bringing about important organisational change
in giving overall control of the ITBs to the new Manpower Services Com-
mission, the Act signalled an important policy innovation. This was the
Training Opportunities Scheme, which was designed to enable those in
employment who wished to change their jobs to train for the required
skills, and also for those out of work to learn new skills in order to find
316 Jeremy Moon
employment. (It should be noted that a small pilot scheme - Vocational
Training - had been operated since 1971 by the Department of Employ-
ment.) This marked the first linkage between the industrial training policy
area and that of unemployment. The former had previously been concerned
with the maintenance of skills and attempted to contribute to industrial
regeneration: the latter is concerned with directly dealing with a product of
industrial decline - unemployment. Whilst ITB apprenticeships have con-
tinued to exist, they have been pared down in number, as the MSC has
increased its direct training services to industry.
A small United Vocational Preparation Scheme was introduced in 1976
which was designed for employed young people with little or no chance for
training or further education. This started as a pilot scheme, but was con-
tinually extended until 1983 when it was absorbed by the Youth Training
Scheme (see section 6).
Since 1978, a training element has been included in youth schemes (see
section 6), and indeed, the training element in YOP was directly deducted
from the youth training component of TOPS. The latter has persisted for
adults only, though the number of participants has decreased. A further
development for the training and retraining of adults has been the launching
of the Open Tech. This differs from TOPS in that no grants are available
for trainees, but the emphasis on providing training in technical skills reflects
a shift already in progress within TOPS.

6. Youth schemes
This section will deal with all schemes directed specifically at youth unem-
ployment. The definition of youth by the responsible government bodies has
been subject to some fluctuation, but usually applies to sixteen and seventeen
year olds, and occasionally to those a year or two older. Any scheme,
whether training, job creation, work experience, employment subsidy or a
hybrid, which applies specifically to youth will be dealt with herein. The
schemes are dealt with under this distinct heading because, as youth
unemployment has been perceived as a 'problem within a problem', the
means to combat it have drawn on, and on occasions, integrated policy
responses dealt with under the headings expanded upon in the paper thus
far (see Figure 1).
As mentioned above, the Community Industry scheme was introduced
several years prior to the JCP, and was not solely as a panacea for unem-
ployment, but as a contribution towards solving the problems of dis-
advantaged young people (see Table 6). It is at first sight surprising that CI
has not become consolidated within larger similar schemes. The answer to
this probably lies in the fact that, not only was the scheme devised by the
National Association of Youth Clubs, but also the NAYC continues to
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 317
administer it. Community Industry will continue to exist mainly for seven-
teen year olds who are not able to find work having completed the Youth
Training Scheme (YTS) (see below), and as it thus helps the MSC in its
work, the Commission can be expected to continue to fund CI in its present
form. CI was certainly innovative, though the initiative was not from the
government. Unlike most other schemes in thisfield,it has persisted.

TABLE 6. Job creation, work experience and training schemes for

unemployed youth
Starting
date Scheme Aims Eligibility Sponsorship

April Community To help solve 16-18 year old Allowances funded

1972 Industry (CI) difficulties of unemployed in by Dept Empl. and
disadvantaged young selected depressed since 1977 by MSC.
people by offering areas. Gradual Premises and
work for community expansion of these, equipment by local
benefit from 8 areas in 1972 authorities
to 56 areas in 1980
Sept Work Experience Providing young 16-18 year olds. Any Flat rate weekly
1976 Programme (WEP) people with positive employing allowance paid to
alternative to organisation could participants for up to
unemployment, i.e. offer facilities 6 months. Initially
learning new skills £16 per week, from
by doing them Sept. 1977, i£8 per
week and from April
1978, £i9-5O P «
week
April Youth Opportunities To improve the 16-18 year olds. Any Flat rate weekly
1978 Programme (YOP) employability of organisation or allowance paid to
unemployed young individual could participants for
people by means of sponsor scheme varying periods of up
work experience and to 12 months. From
work preparation April 1978 allowance
=£20.55, from Nov

Jan 1982=£25 (plus

travelling expenses of
over £4 per week).
Sept Youth Training To provide a bridge 16 year old school- Flat rate weekly
1983 Scheme (YTS) between school and leavers and allowance paid to
work in the form of unemployed 17 year participants (to be
a year's training and olds. Any based on YOP
work experience organisation or rates)
individual can
sponsor scheme

6.1 Work experience and training schemes

As indicated in the adult job creation schemes section, the Youth Oppor-
tunities Programme, derived largely from the JCP, in as far as it was a large
318 Jeremy Moon
scale programme designed to remove comparatively large numbers from the
unemployment register. However, the YOP also directly succeeded two other
policies, namely the Work Experience Programme and the young people's
element of TOPS.
WEP was introduced in September 1976 with the object of easing the
transition between school and work (see Table 6). Any employer was invited
to offer facilities for trainees, which were to include:
(1) Induction into the scheme and sponsoring organisation;
(2) Planned work experience in a range of activities;
(3) Further education and off the job training;
(4) Counselling in liaison with the Careers Service and the MSC's
Employment Services Agency.
When YOP (see Table 6) was introduced, the central feature of WEP
simply became a component of YOP — the Work Experience on Employers
Premises component. The training element of YOP also drew upon WEP,
but more importantly from TOPS courses. Thus, the largest training com-
ponent of YOP - the Short Industrial Courses - replaced the courses which
had been provided at colleges of Further Education and MSC Skillcentres
under TOPS.
YOP was designed as a scheme on a much larger scale than its pre-
decessors (see Table 7), offering the following opportunities: (1) Work
experience: On employers premises; on community projects; at training
workshops; (2) Work preparation: Assessment and employment induction
courses; short training courses; remedial and preparatory courses.

TABLE 7. Participation rates on youth job creation and work experience

schemes

Job Creation Work Youth

Financial Community Programme Experience Opportunities
year Industry (youth element) Programme Programme

'972-3 800
'973-4 1,700
•974-5 2,000
"975-6 3.500 7,200
"976-7 4.500 22,254
•977-8 5.500 59.725
'978-9 7,000 162,000
1979-80 6,000 216,000
1980-1 7,000 360,000
1981-2 7,000 553.ooo
1982-3 7,000 (630,000)'

Notes: x Excludes training through the Direct Training Services to Industry.

2
Includes those to be transferred to YTS in September 1983.
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 319
YOP was not just a major policy change in terms of the scale of the
scheme, but it also marked a further significant entry of the MSC into the
training area, building upon the administrative territory gained by way of
TOPS, the Direct Training Service to firms and the responsibility for the
ITBs.
The Youth Training Scheme which will come into operation in September
1983 is a direct successor to YOPS, although it too constitutes a consolidation
of other schemes, particularly within the training sector. Further recent
reductions in the number of ITBs have created gaps in the training provision
which YTS is designed to fill (although it argued in some quarters that YTS
is no substitute for the apprenticeship system). Also, the YTS directly
succeeds the only recently expanded UVP.
The stated aim of the YTS is to provide a bridge between school and
work: its claim to have nothing to do with unemployment is a little dis-
ingenuous. Features of the succession of policies from JCP, and the ITBs
and TOPS to the YTS are summarised below:

(1) The special provision for youth participation in JCP and TOPS was
consolidated within YOP. This signified the promotion of youth
unemployment to a policy area in its own right.
(2) WEP, which had provided a scheme exclusively for youth was directly
absorbed by YOP.
(3) Whilst YOP continued to mushroom in the late 1970s and early
1980s, it did remain detached from other schemes designed to provide
solely training, e.g. Training for Skills and UVP. YTS however,
consolidated YOP, UVP and the Training for Skills schemes within
the MSC's Direct Training Service to industry.
(4) Whilst unemployment remains the key motive force for the provision
of YTS, the scheme also constitutes a conscious effort to change
expectations of employment patterns for sixteen year old school
leavers, or more precisely, that they do not necessarily seek work
immediately. This relieves the pressure on the MSC to find work for
the school leaving cohort. Also, it has even more clearly identified the
MSC with training and education.

6.2 Youth employment subsidy schemes

The Young Workers' Scheme introduced in 1982 was not the direct successor
of any other programme. It did partly resemble the Recruitment Subsidy
for School Leavers and the Youth Employment Subsidy scheme which had
been terminated in 1978, in that it subsidised employers for taking on
young people (see Table 8). However, in another respect, it constituted a
policy innovation. This was because the twelve month subsidy was only
320 Jeremy Moon
payable if the wages of the young people were under certain levels. Thus
the policy is also an attempt to reduce labour costs in industry: a declared
priority of the Thatcher Government. YWS has so far been operating on a
much larger scale than either RSSL or YES (see Table 9), and offers sub-
sidies for up to one year rather than just for up to six months.

TABLE 8. Youth employment subsidy schemes

Starting
date Scheme Aims Eligibility Subsidy

Oct Recruitment Subsidy• To subsidise the School-leavers with £5 per week for each
"975 for School-Leavers employment of no full time work recruit for 6 months
(RSSL) school-leavers experience recruited
to firms
Oct Youth Employment To subsidise the Under 20 year olds £10 per week for
•976 Subsidy (YES) employment of the who had been each recruit for
least advantaged unemployed for at 6 months
young peopled least 6 months
Jan Young Workers' To subsidise the Under 18 year olds £15 per week in
1982 Scheme (YWS) employment of going into their respect of wages of
young people at first employment under £40 per week,
'realistic' wage rates £7.50 per week in
respect of wages of
under £45 per week
for up to 1 year

TABLE 9. Participation rates on youth employment subsidy schemes

Average no. of
Scheme Mo. of participants participants per month

RSSL 29,000 (Oct 1975-June 1976) 3,222

YES 38,000 (Oct 1976-Feb 1978) 2,375
YWS 100,000 (Jan-Oct 1982) 11,in

The first of the youth employment subsidies was the RSSL, which, as
its title suggests, was exclusively for school leavers. It was also the first direct
response to the emerging distinct problem of youth unemployment. A survey
of firms participating in the scheme indicated that 76 per cent of them would
have recruited as many school leavers without the subsidy. (Dept. of
Employment, 1977, 696). Nevertheless, it was thought that special help in
the form of subsidies could continue to be made available to the least
advantaged young people. Hence YES directly replaced RSSL in October
1976, giving employment subsidies not only to school leavers, but to any
recruit under twenty years old who have been unemployed for six months
or more.
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 321
It was again found that about 75 per cent of participating firms would
have employed the young people anyway, and the scheme was terminated
in March 1978. However, the fact that YOP started in this very month
suggests that a form of succession took place here across policy types, but in
respect of the same client group.

7. Discussion

7./ Patterns of policy change: Explanations and implications

On examining Figure 1, one is struck by the high number of policy changes
in the fields of job creation, employment subsidy, training and youth
schemes. Excluding the TOPS, OT, and TSI, (which may not strictly fall
within this category), there have been twenty-one special employment
measures introduced since 1972, of which nine are currently (mid 1983) in
operation. This is not to suggest that all of the remaining schemes have been
terminated. Of the programmes introduced during or since 1972, only
three have been terminated. Rather, there has been distinct evidence of
policy successions (twenty) though this is much more marked with respect
to job creation, work experience, training and job protection subsidy
schemes than for labour creation subsidy schemes. Certain policy innovations
have been evident, though one would expect these to decrease as existing
programmes types become established and as the range of alternative options
decreases.
The question which arises from the foregoing analysis of patterns of
policy-making in this field is 'Why?'. What factors have accounted for
instances of policy innovation, persistence, succession and termination?
Why, for instance, were existing schemes not simply expanded to cope with
the growing problem, why have some schemes continued for many years,
and others been extremely short-lived? There is no one explanation for the
policy changes outlined, and often several factors were significant at any
one time.
Clearly the nature and growing scale of the problem, backed up by
increasing public attention to unemployment created an imperative for
successive governments to be seen to be doing something about it. New
programmes at least provide a cosmetic function, and much was made, by
the Labour and Conservative Governments respectively, of YOP and YTS,
in response to concern at rising youth unemployment with its encumbent
political costs. Indeed, mounting unemployment figures created pressures
upon the responsible bureaucracies to cope with the problem. As one senior
MSC official put it 'the figures are in the driving seat'. An official from the
Department of Employment described some of the early job creating
employment subsidies as 'fire fighting measures'.
322 Jeremy Moon
Dealing with unemployment on this scale is clearly a new challenge by
post-war standards, for governments and officials alike. This is reflected in
the fact that most schemes are introduced initially either as pilot projects
(e.g. UVP and EA) or else with built-in termination dates. YTS is the first
of the special measures (as opposed to the straight training policies embodied
in the ITBs and TSI) to be introduced as a permanent programme. How-
ever, the temporary design of most of the schemes is not sufficient expla-
nation for the patterns of policy change: some termination dates have been
over-ridden - others have not. The fact that most were designed as sunset
programmes is of course a predisposing factor here: it is 'easier' for such
programmes to be succeeded or terminated than programmes or policies
introduced as permanent.
Programmes may also be terminated due to their being exhausted within
existing terms of reference. The scheduled closing of Temporary Short-Time
Working Compensation (TSTWC) in March 1984 and the termination of
Small Firms Employment Subsidy (SFES) were both in part due to the
actual inability of firms who had enjoyed the support of the schemes to
make further claims upon them unless the rubric of the programmes was
fundamentally changed. The Adult Employment Subsidy (AES) was
terminated because of a virtual lack of response on the part of employers.
What role has programme evaluation played in accounting for policy
changes and termination? Certainly, much evaluation has been conducted
by the Department of Employment, the Manpower Services Commission
and other organisations sponsored by the aforementioned government
bodies. This of course does not mean that such evaluation is either rel-
evant or taken account of. Alternatively, evaluation can be used as a justifi-
cation for the introduction of a policy that would have been introduced in
any case. Evaluations of Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers (RSSL)
and Youth Employment Subsidy (YES) clearly indicated that a high pro-
portion of participants would have been taken on by their employers had
the schemes not been in operation (the 'deadweight' effect) (Department of
Employment, 1978, 42). Although these findings did lead to the eventual
termination of YES in 1978, it is significant that this form of subsidy lasted
as long as it did. Despite the inadequacies of this subsidy, it persisted until
Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) provided more direct help for the
young unemployed. Similarly, known high levels of displacement were
tolerated in the SFES (Department of Employment, 1978, 551).
A survey of participants of Community Enterprise Programme (CEP)
indicated that a clear majority found the programme very rewarding, and
indeed, most found it more enjoyable work than they had experienced in
previous employment: the impact of this finding upon the policy-making
process is difficult to assess (MSC, 1981b).
The conclusion to be drawn from the various surveys of YOP participants
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 323
is that their attitudes to the programme were directly related to their
subsequent success or failure in the job market (e.g. MSC, 1981c). Whilst
one cannot blame the young people for holding this attitude, it is of little
help in assessing the scheme whilst youth unemployment continues to grow.
Given that most of the special measures are comparatively 'young' when
evaluated, doubt might be cast on the validity of the findings. Further,
evidence suggests that job creation, work experience and youth training
schemes are highly characterised by local conditions, local delivery organi-
sations, and the role and attitudes of local and regional MSC offices and
committees. This would suggest that macro-evaluations are unlikely to
identify accurately the operation of the schemes: alternatively a handful of
micro-evaluations are of little help in national policy-making.
Mention should also be made of cross-national evaluation. The study of
the Canadian job creation programme has been referred to in describing
the emergence of the JCP. Also studies were made of the French and
German vocational preparation schemes prior to the YTS. Thirdly, the
Belgian and French job release schemes for the steel and coal industries were
examined prior to the announcement of JRS. In none of these cases was
the evaluation the motive force for the policy innovation or succession: once
a policy change had been broadly conceived, cross national evaluations were
made to refine the end-products. Thus programme evaluations seem to play
a subsidiary role in accounting for policy changes, though even this is very
variable.
Policy succession may also result from pressures inside the policy com-
munity. This is particularly likely in the case of schemes which come
under MSC rather than direct Department of Employment responsibility.
Although the latter engages in consultation as part of the policy-making
process, the MSC is founded upon the precept of tripartism (though in fact
representation on the MSC extends beyond that of government, business and
trade unions). Thus, not only do non-governmental organisations possess an
effective veto on proposals for policy change, but they also may positively
contribute to policy succession. The succession of YTS from YOP was in part
a result of TUC pressure within the Commission for a greater opportunity
for unemployed young people to train in new skills (though this does conflict
with the views of many voluntary organisations providing opportunities
through YOP). There are also examples of policy innovations first established
outside the governmental sphere. As indicated above, Community Industry
(CI) is entirely the product of the National Association of Youth Clubs.
Similarly the Job Splitting Scheme (JSS) was modelled on job splitting
schemes run in private industry, and indeed the Department of Employment
benefited from the help of GEC in setting up the programme.
Instances of policy innovation and succession may also arise from changes
in government priorities. This has clearly been the case with regard to the
324 Jeremy Moon
increasing emphasis on meeting the problem of youth unemployment -
notably in the consolidating successions of YOP and YTS. The innovations
of JRS and JSS (though as mentioned these both have antecedents outside
the scope of British government) are both the result of a new emphasis: the
attempt to reduce the demand for jobs, rather than increase the number of
work opportunities.
There was no evidence of the alternation of government having a marked
effect on the pattern of policy change in this field. It was noted, however,
that significant changes within programmes were made immediately after
the May 1979 General Election. Even these new reduced targets were
over-ridden, though some later policy innovations do reflect changing
government priorities which are themselves reflections of aspects of the
'Thatcher approach'. The YWS, despite the deadweight effect noted above,
attempts to bring down wage levels, which the government sees as essential
for Britain's economic recovery. Similarly, the Enterprise Allowance (EA)
attempts to reward individual business initiative; also seen as part of the
cure for Britain's economic ills.
What role have organisational factors played in the pattern of policy
changes outlined? One striking feature of this policy area is the growth in
responsibility of the MSC. Having initially been created to operate the
employment services of the Department of Employment, to administer
TOPS and make proposals for a job creation programme, it has now
assumed a pivotal position in policy-making and policy delivery of schemes
of high public profile affecting literally hundreds of thousands of citizens.
Its growth is illustrated in Table 10. The MSC now provides the unemploy-
ment issue with a stable organisational basis such that it has been able to
make inroads into the training policy area. (This has been most recently
illustrated by its responsibility for the Technical and Vocational Education
Initiative - a scheme for those still attending school.) The creation by the
MSC of local and regional delivery systems for JCP and YOP have been
easily adapted to accommodate later policy successions. The Department of
Employment has retained responsibility for the various types of labour
subsidy schemes, which has perhaps allowed for the greater levels of in-
novation evident in this field. Although consultations proceed with sectional
groups regarding these policies, the CBI and TUC hold a less effective veto
power here than over policies within the MSC portfolio.
What effects has this pattern of fairly rapid policy change (mainly in the
form of succession) had on the unemployment policy area? One might
expect that this has had a destabilising effect, with adverse implications for
programme delivery. Clearly some patterns exist in the transfer from one
policy to another, and discussions with those working in the field suggest
that a considerable amount of flexibility at the local and regional levels
enables adaptation to take place. Indeed, it is instructive that large numbers
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 325
of CP and YTS schemes are simply transfers (with appropriate adjustments)
from CEP and YOP respectively. Thus, despite changes in the definitions
and parameters of policies, a continuity of delivery environments (including
local policy committees, local MSC personnel, training centres, and sponsor-
ing bodies) provides an element of stability. This has also been the case for
job-saving employment subsidy schemes (REP, TES, STWC and TSTWC)
(see section 4.1).

TABLE 10. Total MSC expenditure compared with total public expenditure

MSC expenditure incl. that on

MSC expenditure1 behalf of Dept. of Employment * Index of total
public
Financial Index at Index at expenditure at
Year £m constant prices £m constant prices constant prices*

'974-5 '254 ioo-o 1254 100-0 1 oo-o

'975-6 249 3 '56-3 249-3 156-3 1033
'976-7 37'-4 204-0 43°-4 236-4 102-7
'977-8 432-5 211-8 543-5 266-1 96-8
'978-9 5O7-4 222-4 641-3 281-5 100-9
1979-80 610-7 236-5 727-1 281-6 '05-5
1980-1 747-8 244-5 8693 284-2 1087
1981-2 947 0 2796 11186 330-1 110-3
1
Source: Annual Reports of the MSC.
a
Calculated from Summary Account of General Government Expenditure, National Income
and Expenditure, 1982, CSO, 59.

This policy area has been described as hectic and, in terms of the scale of
the problem, novel. Thus large numbers of policy changes in the field may
not simply be 'coping' mechanisms, but also opportunities to test different
ideas, and adapt them accordingly with the benefit of experience. An
appearance of instability, with accompanying potential problems of im-
plementation, is also an indication that the policy area has not become
stagnant.

J.2 The value of the analysis of policy change

As mentioned at the outset, the focus upon government programmes as
indicators of policy change is not usually possible within the British political
system, and indeed, even in this study there have been problems when the
unemployment policy area has overlapped with that of training, which is
characterised by policies (e.g. industrial training) as well as programmes
(e.g. TOPS). Problems do remain, however, in analysis of the special
employment and associated measures. This is particularly apparent in the
cases where significant changes were made within persisting policy headings.
For instance, it was indicated above that the changes within STEP and TES
326 Jeremy Moon
were at times as significant as examples of policy succession. Hogwood and
Peters (1983, 37) have taken account of this within their schema, though it
is often difficult to apply the abstract categories to individual cases. This is
especially so when there has been more than one type of change, e.g. the
'removal of category of clientele' and the addition of a 'program element'.
Equally, a new programme may emerge which only differs from its pre-
decessor in terms of the categories of clientele (e.g. STEP). A third type of
problem is that whilst attention to programmes might suggest that a scheme
is in full operation, it may not be. The author was told by officers at more
than one MSC office that they had never heard of the VPP.
Another difficulty arises when studying a set of programmes which exist
in an environment also characterised by policies without programmes. In
other words, as well as introducing special employment measures in pro-
gramme form, governments may also address the problem by means of other
policies, including regional policies, fiscal policies, or cosmetic policies of
altering the qualifications for being counted as unemployed. Thus the pro-
grammes analysed do not necessarily indicate the full extent of government
activity in the policy area.
This study has generally confirmed Hogwood and Peters (1982, 226)
expectation that policy succession would be an 'increasingly common
feature of policy formulation in contemporary Western political systems',
though the precise reasons for this are complex. They cited three reasons
for this; firstly the crowding of the policy space. It would appear that over
the last decade of responding to high levels of unemployment, British
governments have reduced the theoretical alternatives available, and suc-
cessions have tended to multiply. It is perhaps too early to assert that the
'frontiers of policy' have reached 'the horizon' (Heidenheimer et al. 1975),
as the Conservative Government has made recent innovations in the shape
of the Young Workers' Scheme, the Job Splitting Scheme and the Enterprise
Allowance, and there may remain more 'sophisticated' innovatory policies
which will be introduced.
Secondly, Hogwood and Peters (1982, 226) suggested that 'existing policies
themselves may create conditions requiring changes in policies or programs'.
The field of direct UK government responses to unemployment does not
however bear this out, other than that perhaps existing policies create
expectations as to what governments should be doing.1 Even the Thatcher
Administration, initially committed to reducing special employment
measures, had great difficulty after the 1979 General Election in lowering
the level of provision (see Moon 1983; Richardson, 1982). This, however,
only explains policy maintenance as opposed to termination, rather than
policy succession as opposed to maintenance or termination.
The third reason Hogwood and Peters (1982, 226-7) offered for the
expectation of increasing policy succession is 'as a consequence of the
 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 327
relationship between the rate of sustainable economic growth and the
financial implications of existing policy commitments'. Again, this does not
seem wholly appropriate in the present case study. Reference to Table 10
indicates that increases of expenditure on these measures has far outstripped
the rate of overall public expenditure increases.
Thus, while the finding of a high incidence of policy succession matches
Hogwood and Peters' expectation, there may be other reasons for it in this
field, as raised in the foregoing discussion. Firstly, governments have an
interest in being seen to be doing something, and several policy successions
(notably YOP and YTS) have been charged with greater symbolic value
than simple expansions of previous schemes would have been. Secondly,
in agreement with one of Hogwood and Peters' conclusions (1982, 224),
built-in terminators proved 'useful at producing policy succession'. The
temporary nature of almost all of these measures not only reflects a politically
expedient (but misplaced) hope that they would not be 'needed' for very
long, but also a genuine attempt to try out different schemes, and adapt
them according to their performance or other pressures for programme
'improvements'.
Two sources of pressure for programme changes were noted: the non-
governmental interests (e.g. sectional, professional and voluntary bodies), and
the Cabinet. The strength of the non-governmental interests in this field is
enhanced by their pivotal position within the MSC policy-making process,
and their essential role in programme delivery.
In this respect our findings correspond with Richardson and Jordan's
(1983, 256) description of the British policy style, characterised by 'sectori-
sation; clientelism; consultation; institutionalisation of compromise; and
the development of exchange relationship', which, they argued, reduces the
likelihood of sudden policy change. Examination of this policy area does
not, however, indicate that the converse of sudden policy change — policy
maintenance - has prevailed. Rather, succession has taken place, whereby
elements of old programmes are adopted in succeeding schemes. Thus, the
key role of the policy community (i.e. the involved representatives of the
bureaucracy, lower levels of government and the non-governmental interests)
appears not to be in preventing any policy change. Rather, it is in defining
the parameters within which more medium-level policy changes take place.
The second source of pressure for programme change identified was that
of the government, who may provoke policy succession in order to achieve
a new objective such as reducing wage levels, evident in the Young Workers
Scheme. It is interesting to note that among the policy innovations many
are more directly associated with Cabinet initiative than other policy
changes (e.g. JRS, YWS and EA). Whilst conceptually the Cabinet and the
policy community are distinct, in reality of course none of the policy changes
outlined were made independent of both these parties.
328 Jeremy Moon
What virtues does this form of analysis possess? The study of job creation,
work experience, training and employment subsidy schemes has enabled
several insights into the style of government activity in this field. It is clear
that in the case of adult job creation schemes a continuity of policy has been
established, which has been adjusted (not superseded) in order to accom-
modate other objectives. It is also apparent that as the problem of youth
unemployment has continued to grow, policy successions, in the form of
consolidations, have taken place in YOP and YTS, producing 'grand
designs' for youth. Related to this feature, the study has highlighted suc-
cession between what were once distinct policy areas of unemployment and
training. Policy succession has been more disjointed with respect to employ-
ment subsidies with more terminations and innovations as a broader range
of ideas are tried and exhausted/discarded.
In conclusion, notwithstanding problems noted above, programme changes
were normally accurate indicators of policy change. New policies were
generally good indicators of innovation (although note has been made of
international and private/public succession). Similarly, the indications of
policy succession were usually confirmed by closer analysis of policy content.
Indeed, in most of the cases identified as succession, the respective policy-
makers and implementers have described succeeding programmes as
descendants of the former schemes. Given that the programmes were
generally considered to be good indicators, this study has firstly provided a
fairly detailed over-view of patterns of policy change in the field of responses
to unemployment. Secondly, it has discussed alternative explanatory factors
for individual policy changes and for the overall pattern depicted.

NOTE
It could, of course, be argued that other policies of successive governments (whether
economic, industrial or trading etc.) have created the need for this range and variety
of special employment measures, though it is impossible to accurately assess the relative
impact of these, or indeed of the structural features of the British economy and world
economic trends.

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Heidenheimer, A. J., H. Heclo and C. T. Adams (1975) Comparative Public Policy: The
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Hogwood, Brian W. and B. Guy Peters (1982) The dynamics of policy change: Policy
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Hogwood, Brian W. and B. Guy Peters (1983) Policy Dynamics. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.
Howells, David J. (1980) The Manpower Services Commission: The first five years,
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 Policy Change in Direct Government Responses 329
House of Commons 235-i (1983) Memorandum by the Comptroller and Auditor General
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Social Surveys Ltd (various) Gallup Poll. London: Gallup.
Ageing and
Society
Editor
MALCOLM L JOHNSON Policy Studies Institute, London
Review Editor
REX TAYLOR M.R.C. Medical Sociology Unit, Aberdeen
The Journal of the Centre for Policy on Ageing and the British Society of
Gerontology
Ageing and Society is an international journal devoted to publishing
contributions to the understanding of human ageing, particularly from the
social and behavioural sciences and humanitiea
Its interpretation of ageing as a subject is wide and includes all aspects of
the human condition whether they relate to individuals, groups, institutions
or societies
In addition to original articles the journal also carries a review section
comprising book reviews and shorter notes, review articles and symposia
and an abstracts service intended to draw readers' attention to relevant
articles in other journals.
Contents of Volume 2 Number 3 November 1982 include
ANNE D. M. DAVIES Research with Elderly People in Long-Term Care
ROSE WHEELER Staying Put: A New Development in Policy?
I. T. JOLLIFFE, B. JONES, M. R. J. KNAPP and B. J. T. MORGAN
Classifications of the Elderly Population
JAMES C. ROMEIS and MARVIN a SUSSMAN Cross Cultural Differences
on the Facts on Aging Quiz
ABSTRACTS 'REVIEW SYMPOSIUM REVIEWS SHORTER NOTICES
i

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