People vs Corpuz GR no.
208013 - July 3, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR ALLAN
CORPUZ
G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017  PRUNA) for having succeeded to have sexual intercourse with
LEONEN, J.:
Facts: Allan was charged with four counts of rape in RTC,
Pangasinan when accused, by means of force, feloniously
have sexual intercourse with AAA, 14 years old, with a mental
age of a 5 year old child, against her will and without her
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
During trial, Dr. Araos-Liberato issued the Medico Legal
Certificate, which stated that AAA was 14 years old when she
was examined. Her findings provided: Healed hymenal
lacerations at 11:00, 5:00 and 2:00 o'clock position; Hymenal
orifice admits two fingertips; Pregnancy test corresponds to 3
to 4 months age of gestation.
Allan denied the accusations and insisted that all the charges
against him were merely fabricated by AAA's father, FFF. He
allegedly sacked FFF as a truck driver in his sand and gravel
business for allowing his son to drive the truck that led to an
accident.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of rape under Article
266-A 1(d), RPC.
Ruling: Yes, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA
were clearly established by the victim's testimony.
To warrant a rape conviction under Article 266-A 1(d), it
should be shown that "a man had carnal knowledge with a
woman, or a person sexually assaulted another who is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented.
In this case, AAA was 14 years old when she had her
neuropsychiatric examination with Tablizo. The examination
revealed that at the time of examination, AAA's Intelligence
Quotient was 42 and her level of intelligence was equal to
Moderate Mental Retardation. Also, she had a mental age of a
five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child. Further, the
defense did not even contest her condition.
Ratio Decidendi: Sexual intercourse with an intellectually
disabled person is rape since proof of force or intimidation
becomes needless as the victim is incapable of giving consent
to the act.
Gist: This Court resolves this appeal filed by Edgar Allan
from the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Which affirmed
the RTC’s ruling that Allan was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of Simple Rape of AAA, a mental
retardate.
-child witness
KMC | 1
Evidence ; Garvida
( Rule on the Examination of a
Child Witness )
People vs. Pruna, GR no. 138471 - Oct 10, 2002
FACTS: An information for rape was filed against the accused
Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez (hereafter
the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old
minor girl. The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose
testimonies can be summed up as follows:
Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that
she was fetching water from the artesian well located ten
meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was defecating
at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria Tolentino.
Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her
house. Since LIZETTE was not home yet, Jacqueline headed
toward the place where the former was moving her bowel. She
looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when
Jacqueline was already returning to her house that she saw
LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and appeared to be
very frightened. When asked where she came from, LIZETTE
answered that she was brought by a certain “Boy” to the
grassy area at the back of Gloria’s house where she was
sexually molested. LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led
her to the house of PRUNA, which was about eight meters
away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their
community as “Boy,” was not there. Jacqueline forthwith
requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to the police,
while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial
Hospital. Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the
alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old, but at the time
Jacqueline testified on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4
years old. LIZETTE’s last birthday was on 19 April 1995.
LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called
“Boy.” She pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to
her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his
penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her
whether she knew that it is a sin to tell a lie, she answered in
the affirmative. Dr. Emelita Quiroz, conducted a complete
physical examination on LIZETTE in which she explained
that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified
that sexual intercourse and ejaculation had occurred on the
person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was
hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the
vaginal opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the
insertion of a hard object like penis and finger. Teresita
Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the lab
exam and prepared the corresponding report, testified that
sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine
taken from LIZETTE. SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, conducted an
ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the
incident and caused the place to be photographed, which
showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the
people in the neighborhood, and one of them answered that he
saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where
the minor was found. On the part of the defense, Carlito
Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand. Carlito testified
that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because he was
in his house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her
bowel up to the time that her mother went to the house of
PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home because the
former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee. PRUNA
denied having raped LIZETTE. Appellant disputes the
competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender
age, the hearsay testimony of Jacqueline as to the alleged rape
of her daughter, and in convicting him on dubious evidence.
Trial court convicted PRUNA of the crime of rape in its
qualified form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.
ISSUES:
1. Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness
considering that she was allegedly only 3 years old when the
alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified;
2. Whether Jacqueline’s testimony as to the declarations of
LIZETTE is hearsay;
3. Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria
Tolentino as a witness is fatal;
4. Whether appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
5. Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been
duly proved as to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
RULING:
1. LIZETTE’s Competency and Credibility as a Witness
As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness
stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes
that he is competent. The court cannot reject the
witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency.
The burden is, therefore, upon the party objecting to
the competency of a witness to establish the ground
of incompetency. Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence enumerates the persons who are
disqualified to be witnesses. No precise minimum
age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded
from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a
young child is the test of the competency as a
witness. It is settled that a child, regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in
perceiving, can make known his perception to others
and that he is capable of relating truthfully the facts
for which he is examined.
In determining the competency of a child witness, the
court must consider his capacity
(a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that
he could receive correct impressions thereof;
(b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and
(c) to relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is
offered as a witness. The examination should show that
the child has some understanding of the punishment
which may result from false swearing.
The requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed
where the child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell
a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that
KMC | 2
Evidence ; Garvida
he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he
would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be
disqualified only if it can be shown that his mental
maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts
respecting which he is being examined and of relating
them truthfully. The question of competency of a child-
witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial
court.
This is so because the trial judge sees the proposed
witness and observes his manner of testifying, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his
understanding of the obligation of an oath. In this case,
appellant failed to discharge the burden of showing her
mental immaturity. It can be gleaned that LIZETTE had
the capacity of observation, recollection, and
communication and that she could discern the
consequence of telling a lie. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow
the examination of her private parts; and undergo the
expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a
public trial unless she was in fact raped.
2. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline
Gonzales Contrary to appellant’s contention,
Jacqueline’s testimony that LIZETTE told her that
appellant laid her in the grassy area and inserted his
penis into her vagina is not covered by the hearsay
evidence rule. In the instant case, the declarant was
sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by
Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her.
Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to
observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s
testimony on the incident related to her by her
daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of
Jacqueline is hearsay, its nonadmission would not
save the day for the appellant. Such testimony is not
indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate
LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA laid her down in
the grass and inserted his private organ into hers.
Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victim’s
conduct immediately after the rape. It shows that
LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the
rape incident and the identity of her defiler.
3. Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness It
is undisputed that at the time the case was called for
trial, Gloria had already moved out of her residence
and could not be found anymore. Her intended
testimony could be dispensed with, as it would only
be corroborative of LIZETTE’s testimony that Pruna
brought her to a grassy area. 4. Sufficiency of the
Prosecution’s Evidence Against Appellant
The following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the
charge of rape:
(a) the spontaneity of the identification by LIZETTE of
PRUNA as the rapist;
(b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard
act committed against her;
 (c) her act of leading her mother to appellant’s house right
after the incident;
(d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the
authorities;
(e) LIZETTE’s submission to medical examination;
(f) the hyperemia in her private part; and
(g) the presence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and
urine.
5. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority and
Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty In order
to remove any confusion, the following are the guidelines
in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as
a qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove
the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In
the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or
authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified
to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact
age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b.
If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the
complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.[78] 5. It is
the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to
the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him. In the present case, no birth certificate or any
similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate
of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. For
PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and
meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established
with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime In view of the
uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative
evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of
“below seven (7) years old” is appreciated against the
appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense
as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from
discharging its burden. That the defense invoked
LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that
KMC | 3
Evidence ; Garvida
she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on
3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be
convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty
cannot be imposed on him. WHEREFORE, RTC decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused
Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Lizette
Arabelle Gonzales the sum of P50,000 as moral damages
in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.
People vs. Baring Jr., GR no. 137933 - Jan 28
2002
Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted
for statutory rape committed against a seven-year-old girl in
an information that reads-
"That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several
occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas,
Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, by means of force, violence and
intimidation taking advantage of his superior strength
over the person of the victim who is only seven (7)
years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one
Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a
decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting accused-appellant
of rape, to wit –
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accused-
Valentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal
injection and to pay the victim an indemnity
of P50,000.00 plus moral damages of
another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED."2
In a sworn complaint,3 Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin
Baring, Jr., her grandmother’s common–law husband, of
raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was
living with her grandmother in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She does
not know her real father since her mother and father were
separated.4 Since 1990, when she was about 8 months
old5 until 1997, she was left under her grandmother’s care and
custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as "Papa."6
According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened
when she was about 6 years old whenever she was left alone
in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her private parts,
and on such occasions, accused-appellant would remove her
panty, mount on her and violate her. She informed her
grandmother that accused-appellant sexually abused her.7
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her
daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmariñas, Cavite. She
learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused
by accused-appellant. Acting on her daughter’s accounts of
sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National Bureau of
Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer
underwent a medical examination at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer at
Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in "non-virgin state
physically." The examination disclosed a "congested, fleshy-
type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9 o’clock
position and the external vaginal orifice admits tip of the
examiner’s smallest finger."8
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations
against him.9 According to accused-appellant, he has been
living with Jennifer’s grandmother for ten (10)10 or eighteen
(18) years.11 Accused-appellant claimed that Jennifer was not
living with them during the time the alleged rape
occurred.12 Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997,
Jennifer was living with them since 1990.13 However, Jennifer
was taken from them sometime in July 1997, but he does not
know why.14
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the
basis of the victim’s clear, trustworthy and positive testimony
that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.
Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us on
automatic review.
On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel,
filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that is
subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page
double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of material
facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the medico-legal
certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the physician who
conducted the examination was not presented as a witness that
deprived accused-appellant of his right to cross-
examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by the
victim’s grandmother against accused-appellant was
provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was
merely a "fall guy" and that another person is responsible for
the commission of the crime charged against him.15
In the appellant’s brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-
appellant assigns the following errors-
"The lower court erred:
KMC | 4
Evidence ; Garvida
"I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with
material facts that have been omitted with no
allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of
tenses and grammar jotted by the Court
Stenographer.
"II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a
DNA Test to determine that the blood found in the
panty of the victim is not his but of another man,
Venancio Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn,
mother of Jennifer Donayre, the victim.
"III. In not finding the accused as a ‘fall guy’ framed
up to take the place of Venancio Mendoza, live-in
husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose
behavior in the courtroom as a witness has been
beyond normal."16
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.17 This vital requirement is not only demanded from the
courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give
basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to
the Administrative Code18 whose roots may also be traced to
the Constitutional mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence
presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly
and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in
order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is
imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the
dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case,
summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain
a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the
tribunal’s assessments and conclusions on the case. This
practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate
consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the
judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings
of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that
rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will
sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved
but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether
the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the
law.
In the case at bar, the trial court’s decision may cast doubt as
to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be
engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-
appellant but by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the
correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the
evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments
made from the evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn
therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the
decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecution’s
failure to present the examining physician to appear in court
depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness
against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of
stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel
waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus, was
not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said
witness, to wit-
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the
private complainant that the doctor is no longer
connected with the Crime Laboratory Service at
Camp Crame, Quezon City but was reassigned to the
Eastern Police District at Mandaluyong City.
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask
for the postponement.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We can dispense with the testimony.
"COURT:
Provided this is admitted.
"COURT:
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of
the report of the doctor?
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We admit everything written here because (sic)
doctor says.
"COURT:
Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?
ATTY. ABUBAKAR
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT:
No need to present the doctor
"PROS. ORQUIEZA:
KMC | 5
Evidence ; Garvida
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have here
the xerox copy of the medico legal report no. M-
2831-97.
"COURT:
Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.
"ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT:
Admitted.
You dispense the testimony of the doctor.21
A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the
commission of rape.22 It is well entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
the accused of the crime.23 Besides, testimonies of rape
victims who are of tender age are credible,24 and the
testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.25
Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the
victim by pointing out that the rape was filed one year after its
commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real
identity of the culprit.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any
doubt over the credibility of the complainant nor can it be
taken against her.26 The following realities justified the delay
in the filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1) the
victim was merely six years old when she was sexually
abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and
was left under her grandmother’s care; and, (3) the victim’s
sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.
According to accused-appellant, he was simply ‘framed-up’
and that another person also raped the victim.27 He avers that
his allegation is supported by the testimony of the victim’s
mother Jenelyn that the victim was likewise abused by the
latter’s husband.
The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by
accused-appellant cannot be overturned by the bare denial and
defense of being ‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-appellant.
The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration
pointing to accused-appellant as the person who sexually
ravaged her-
 "Q: Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private
complainant against the accused Valentin Baring, Jr.?
"A: Yes, sir.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q: Who is your father?
"A: I do not know the name of my father because my
father and mother are separated.
"Q: If your father is in the courtroom can you point to
him?
"A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this
courtroom when asked given [sic] his name as
Valentin Baring.)
"Q: Is he your true father?
"A: No sir. He is my stepfather.
"Q: You were pointing to your stepfather, do you
know what things or particular things, if any, he did
to you?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: What were those particular things your stepfather
had done to you?
"A: He raped me.
"Q: When your stepfather raped you, what actually
did your stepfather do to you?
"A: He removed my panty.
"Q: What did your stepfather do after removing your
panty?
"A: He placed himself on top of me.
"Q: Was he naked when he placed himself on top of
you?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: When he was on top of you, did he place his
penis inside your private parts?
"A: Yes, sir.
KMC | 6
Evidence ; Garvida
"Q: What did you feel when his penis was inside your
private parts, if any?
"A: I felt pain.
"Q: Was your private part bleeding as a result of the
insertion of the penis of your stepfather into your
private parts?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: What parts of your body or face was kissed?
"A: My cheek.
"Q: Where did this happen?
"A: Dasmariñas, Cavite.
"Q: In whose house or place?
"A: In the house of my grandmother.
"Q: Who are the residents of that house at that time?
"A: At that time nobody was in the house because
they were working.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Q: Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us
happened while you were 7 years old, 6 years old?
What was your age then if you can recall?
"A: 6 years old.
"Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you
these things you mentioned to us that is by placing
(sic) on top of you and inserting his penis into your
private parts and kissing you?
"A: 10 times.
"Q: Do you know how to count?
"A: Yes, sir.
"Q: How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two
fingers)
"A: Two, sir.
 "Q: How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is
depicting five fingers).
"A: Five, sir.
"Q: How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10
fingers)
"A: Ten, sir.28
Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the
prosecution to establish the dates when the other alleged rapes
were committed justifies the outright dismissal of the case.29
Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes
occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective
on its face.30 When all the essential elements of the crime of
rape are stated in the information, an accused is sufficiently
apprised of the charged against him. Moreover, the precise
time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential
element of rape.31 Neither is the exact date of commission of
rape an element of the crime32 for the gravamen of the offense
of rape is sexual intercourse without consent.33
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his
right to subject the blood found on the victim’s panty for DNA
testing.
The records reveal that accused-appellant’s counsel initially
asked the court to subject the alleged blood found in the
victim’s panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused-
appellant’s blood.34 However, he voluntarily withdrew his
proposition.35 Obviously, accused-appellant’s counsel is
misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellant’s counsel
who recalled the submission for DNA testing. The alleged
denial of accused’s right to avail of the DNA tests is a futile
attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the categorical
testimony of the victim pinning him down as the perpetrator. It
would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging
evidence directly. It must be noted that in the prosecution of
rape cases, the presentation of the bloodstained panty is not
even essential.36 The victim’s credible testimony, standing
alone, is sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-
appellant.
Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of
child sexual abuse, often involve victims of tender years. On
account of the increased number of children coming into the
realm of the judicial system, we adopted the "Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness" to govern the examination of
child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or
witnesses to a crime.37 This rule ensures an environment that
allows children to give reliable and complete evidence,
minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal
proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth.38
KMC | 7
Evidence ; Garvida
In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we
observed the peculiar physical examination performed by the
doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise-
"GENITAL
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full,
convex and slightly gaping with the pinkish brown
labia minora presenting in between. On separating,
the same disclosed a congested, fleshy-type hymen
with shallow healing laceration at 9 o'clock
position. External vaginal orifice admits tip of the
examiner’s smallest finger."39 (emphasis ours)
This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination
done on the seven-year-old victim. We noticed that in the
examiner’s effort to show the existence of abuse, the
examining physician inserted his smallest finger, as shown in
the medico-legal report that the ‘external vaginal orifice
admits tip of the examiner's finger.’
It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing
evidence – by determining the diameter/hymenal opening in
rape cases – was a common practice in the past. With the
passage of R.A. 7610, this Court has nonetheless allowed the
utilization of the same kind of evidence in the prosecution of
Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical
developments and findings, specifically as to the
determination of the existence of child sexual abuse, this
Court deems it necessary to firmly adopt a more "child
sensitive" approach in dealing with this specie or genre of
crime.
In the international scientific community, recent medical
studies have shown that measurement of hymenal opening is
unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual abuse –
"The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has
been used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More
recent studies have shown this to be
undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors affecting
hymenal and anal diameter include the examination
position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and
the degree of relaxation of the child. The anal
diameter is also affected by the presence of stool in
the ampulla. Hymenal diameter may increase with
age and with the onset of pubertal development."40
In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies
which show that enlarged hymenal opening diameter is any
more common in abused than in non-abused children."41 Thus
-
"In the latest revision of the classification system,
‘enlarged hymenal opening’ is also removed as a
criterion that should be considered suspicious for
abuse. With labial traction, the hymenal opening may
appear quite large, especially to the less experienced
 clinician, and internal structures such as vaginal
ridges, rugae, and vaginal columns may be
visualized. This is purely a matter of how much
traction is applied, and the degree of patient
relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past
sexual abuse. Likewise, it is not possible to obtain
accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal
opening, unless photographs are taken at the point of
maximal dilation and measurements are taken from
the photographs using a calibrated measuring device.
Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces
of certain types of colposcopes can be used to
estimate diameter size but not to obtain exact
measurements."42
Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the
hymenal opening under the pretext of determining abuse is
unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial
Academy [PHILJA] training program for family court
judges,43 through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H. Child
Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls44 without
active bleeding, all that is needed is an external examination
with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it may,
the physical findings alone will not be conclusive of child
sexual abuse, for a child who gives a clear, consistent,
detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested
may still have normal genital examination. Despite the
physical or laboratory findings, however, a child’s clear and
convincing description of the abuse has a high rate of
probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a
plethora of cases, have consistently upheld the full weight of a
young victim’s unwavering testimony.45 Also, there is Section
22 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which
categorically states:
Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not
be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony,
if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a
finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the
standard proof required in criminal and non-criminal
cases.
What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to
reiterate, is that forensic examination – inclusive of physical
examination and forensic interview – of sexually assaulted
children [adolescents included] must be conducted with
maximum sensitivity to the young victim’s feelings of
vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must be observed
in order to make the examination less stressful lest they be
more traumatic to the victim than the very assault itself. The
value of collecting evidence should always be weighed against
the emotional cost of the procedure and examination of the
child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by
the trial court. The single information filed against accused-
KMC | 8
Evidence ; Garvida
appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged
him with the crime of "Multiple Statutory Rape."46 Even then,
accused-appellant cannot be held answerable for the other
incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape is
a separate and distinct crime so that each of the other rapes
charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.47
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code,
imposes death penalty when the victim is a child below seven
(7) years old. The allegation in the information specifically
stated that "xxx the victim xxx is only seven years old" which
clearly rules out the application of this specific provision that
can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph
No. 1 of the same article which warrants the imposition of the
death penalty if the crime of rape is committed where the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common–law spouse of the parent of the victim,48 will not
apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years old, the
accused-appellant is not the common-law husband of the
victim’s mother. The trial court therefore erred in meting out
the death penalty upon accused-appellant for qualified rape.
Thus, accused-appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In line with our prevailing jurisprudence,49 we sustain the trial
court’s award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00
moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. 6334-98,
finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
People vs Esugon, GR no 195244 - June 22, 2015
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party
challenging the child's competency as a witness has the burden
of substantiating his challenge.
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23,
2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the conviction of the appellant for the composite
crime of robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through
its judgment rendered on January 27, 2006.2
Antecedents
The information charged the appellant with robbery with
homicide, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and
violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to ₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y
BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO
y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries
which directly caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of the evidence of the
Prosecution, to wit:
Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on
the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche, and his
mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their
house. He saw appellant, whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their
house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped
through a chair. Although there was no light at the ground
floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got stabbed,
his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his
mother’s lower chest. His father then brought her to the
hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor
who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed his
mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant
took money from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted
that he did not see very well the perpetra tor because there was
no light (TSN, February 24, 2004, pp. 3, 11-23, 28, 30-32).
Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although
there was no light when his mother was stabbed, he was sure
of what he saw since there was light at their second floor,
which illumined the ground floor through the stairway (TSN,
February 24, 2004, pp. 33-34).
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause
of the victim’s death was hemorrhagic shock due to stab
wound. The wound was located at the epigastric region,
measuring 2.8 x 0.5 cm, 4 cm from left of the anterior midline,
13 cm deep, directed posterior and upward, piercing the right
ventricle of the hear t, thoracic aorta and lower lobe of the left
lung (TSN, April 21, 2004, pp. 1, 6; Exh. "I," Records, p.
103).
Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated
that he and the victim were married for nine years before the
incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years
old; Mary Joy, 9 years old; Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann,
7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his
wife were sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby,
while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala measures 3
by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying
KMC | 9
Evidence ; Garvida
and went downstairs to sleep with them. Fifteen to thirty
minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" [H]e
turned on the light and saw that their door was open. He got
their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he
returned and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and
carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help
and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the
hospital where she eventually died. He spent ₱23,000.00 for
the funeral and ₱44,500.00 for the wake and burial. On cross-
examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge
as to who stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the
perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant
(TSN, August 25, 2004, pp. 3 12; October 6, 2004, pp. 5-6;
November 17, 2004, pp. 3-4).
Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her
husband were sleeping upstairs when they were roused from
their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’
cry for help. She saw that there was blood on the victim’s
chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed
that the victim’s children were trembling in fear and were
crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in front
of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then
Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin" pointing to someone
but she did not see who it was since there were many people
passing by. Later, the police asked Carl whether he saw
somebody enter their house and he answered yes and
demonstrated how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that
the person who stabbed his mother was present in the vicinity.
He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k
sa bahay namin." As a resident there, appellant often goes to
the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the
house of the victim (TSN, February 9, 2005, pp. 3-14).
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that
there was a stabbing incident, he went to the hospital then to
the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later,
Carl pinpointed and positively identified the appellant as the
one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money.
Appellant was arrested and brought to the police station (TSN,
March 16, 2005, pp. 2, 5-6).
PO2 Sazon meanwhile testified that while he was questioning
people in the area, Carl pointed to them the suspect who was
one of the bystanders. They were asking Carl questions when
he suddenly blurted out that it was appellant who entered their
house and stabbed his mother. They invited the appellant to
the police station but the latter denied having committed the
crime. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that their
basis in arresting appellant was the information relayed by
Carl (TSN, April 27, 2005, pp. 2, 12-17; June 15, 2005, p. 5).4
In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. According to him,
he had frequented the victim’s billiard hall, which was situated
only four houses away from where he lived, and, on the
evening in question, he had been the last to leave the billiard
hall at 11 o’ clock p.m. and had then gone home. He recalled
that he had been roused from slumber by screams for help
around two o’clock a.m., prompting him to ask his mother for
the key to the door; that he had then gone outside where he
learned of the killing of the victim; that police officers had
later on approached him to inquire what he knew about the
killing because they told him that Carl, the young son of the
victim, had pointed to him as the perpetrator, making him the
primary suspect; that he had replied that he had had nothing to
do with the crime; and that he had assured the police officers
that he had never been involved in any wrongdoing in his
years of living in the neighborhood.
The appellant’s mother corroborated his version.5
Judgment of the RTC
As mentioned, the RTC pronounced the appellant guilty of the
crime charged under its judgment rendered on January 27,
2006,6 disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused
ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA @ "NONOY" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE under Article 293 and punished under Article 294
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences him
to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA as follows:
1) ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity;
2) ₱57,500.00 as actual damages;
3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.7
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite crime of
robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a
5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the
product of his imagination.8
On July 23, 2010, however, the CA, giving credence to the
child witness, and opining that his inconsistencies did not
discredit his testimony, affirmed the conviction of the
appellant,9 ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated January 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 211 of Mandaluyong City in Crim. Case No. MC03-
7597, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in
that the award of ₱57,500.00 as actual damages should be
DELETED and in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 should be AWARDED the heirs of
Josephine Castro y Barrera.
KMC | 10
Evidence ; Garvida
SO ORDERED.10
Issues
In this appeal, the appellant posits that the adverse testimony
of the 5-year old Carl, being filled with inconsistencies, was
not credible, but doubtful; that unlike him, his sisters, who
were then at the second floor of the house, were not roused
from sleep; that contrary to Carl’s recollection, the place was
not even dark when the stabbing attack on the victim occurred
because his father said that he had turned the light on upon
hearing somebody shouting " Magnanakaw!;" and that his
father had then gotten his bolo, and gone outside the house.11
Moreover, the appellant maintains that the Prosecution did not
prove that violence or intimidation was employed in the
course of the robbery. He argues that he could not be held
liable for robbery by using force upon things considering that
the culprit had neither broken any wall, roof, floor, door or
window to gain entry in the house nor entered the house
through an opening not intended for entrance. If at all, he
could be liable only for the separate crimes of theft and
homicide, not of the composite crime of robbery with
homicide.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the
evidence showed that the appellant’s principal intent had been
to rob the victim’s house, with the homicide being perpetrated
as a mere incident of the robbery; and that Carl positively
identified the appellant as the person who had stabbed the
victim, his identification bearing "all the earmarks of
credibility especially when he has no motive for lying about
the identity of the accused."13
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The most important task of the St ate in the successful
prosecution of the accused is his credible and competent
identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, this
appeal turns on whether or not the identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide was
credible and competent considering that the identifying
witness was Carl, a 5-year old lad, whose sole testimony
positively pointed to and incriminated the appellant as the
person who had entered their home, robbed the family, and
killed his mother.
The qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to
relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards that
end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and
may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwis e provided by
law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)
Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. - The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their
perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating
them truthfully. (19a)
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a
relevant event or incident, and can communicate such
awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational
attainment, or social stat us are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of
the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with
which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent,
for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not
grounds for disqualification.14
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for
disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long
been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every
child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging
the child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate
the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a
child.15
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the
province of the trial court.16 All questions bearing on the
credibility of witnesses are best addressed by the trial court by
virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial and often
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment while
testifying, something which is denied to the appellate court
because of the nature and function of its office. The trial judge
has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and
testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the
witnesses. Hence, the trial judge’s assessment of the
KMC | 11
Evidence ; Garvida
witnesses’ testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great
respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to
justify the reversal of the trial court’s assessment and
conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings.
The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court
has concurred with the trial court.17
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a
witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to challenge
such competency by showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his perceptions, or
that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent
witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct
examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested his direct
testimony on cross-examination. All that the Defense did was
to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once
did the Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right
from wrong, or to perceive, or to communicate his perception
to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably
determined the competency of Carl to testify against the
appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly incurred by
Carl. That is apparently not disputed. However, it seems clear
that whatever inconsistencies the child incurred in his
testimony did not concern the principal occurrence or the
elements of the composite crime charged but related only to
minor and peripheral matters. As such, their effect on his
testimony was negligible, if not nil, because the
inconsistencies did not negate the positive identification of the
appellant as the perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to
seek help upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his
mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure, he
could not be expected to act and to react to what happened like
an adult. Although children have different levels of
intelligence and different degrees of perception, the
determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability
to communicate their perception to the courts still pertained to
the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing
of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial court.18
It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this one opens
the record of the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of
facts by the trial court are still entitled to great respect
especially when affirmed on appeal by the CA.19This great
respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court’s direct
and personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its
presence, giving them the unique opportunity to observe their
manner and decorum during intensive grilling by the counsel
for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and
prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy. With both the RTC
and the CA sharing the conviction on Carl’s credibility, his
capacity to perceive and his ability to communicate his
perception, we cannot depart from their common conclusion.
Moreover, according credence to Carl’s testimony despite his
tender age would not be unprecedented. In People v.
Mendiola,20 the Court considered a 6-y ear-old victim
competent, and regarded her testimony against the accused
credible. In Dulla v. Court of Appeals,21 the testimony of the
three-year-old victim was deemed acceptable. As such, Carl’s
testimony was entitled to full probative weight.
Carl positively identified the appellant as the culprit during the
investigation and during the trial. Worthy to note is that the
child could not have been mistaken about his identification of
him in view of his obvious familiarity with the appellant as a
daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the child’s
family. Verily, the evidence on record overwhelmingly
showed that the appellant, and no other, had robbed and
stabbed the victim.
The appellant contends that robbery was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as
the other essential element of the crime; and that it was not
established that the taking of personal property was achieved
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or
by using force upon things.
The contention lacks persuasion.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use
of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime
of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery.22 A conviction
requires certitude that the robbery is the main objective of the
malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery.23
The CA has indicated that the appellant carried a long-bladed
weapon. The fact that the appellant was armed with the long-
bladed weapon, which was undoubtedly a deadly weapon,
competently proved the presence of violence or intimidation
against persons that qualified the offense as robbery instead of
theft. For sure, too, the patent intent of the appellant was
originally to commit robbery, with the homicide being
committed only in the course or on the occasion of the
perpetration of the robbery. As the records show, Dennis was
awakened by someone shouting " Magnanakaw!" The shout
was most probably made by the victim, whom the appellant
then stabbed in order to facilitate his escape. Considering that
the original criminal design to rob had been consummated
with the taking of the money amounting to ₱13,000.00, the
killing of the victim under the circumstances rendered the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a
special complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes
but is treated by law as a single indivisible and unique offense
for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific
KMC | 12
Evidence ; Garvida
crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and is to be
distinguished from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.24 A composite crime is
truly distinct and different from a complex or compound
crime. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is
fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized,
that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the
necessary means to commit the other. In a composite crime,
the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific,
but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. A light felony that accompanies the
commission of a complex or compound crime may be made
the subject of a separate information, but a light felony that
accompanies a composite crime is absorbed.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime are
not appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the
information did not specifically allege them. But they should
be appreciated in order to justify the grant of exemplary
damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
₱30,000.00 in accordance with relevant
jurisprudence.25 Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The
aggravating circumstance for this purpose need not be
specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a
qualifying or attendant circumstance. As expounded in People
v. Catubig:26
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code,
the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in
its broad or generic sense.1âwphi1 The commission of an
offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim
as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim.
The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony
underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying,
in its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is
basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld
when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of
the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
2230 of the Civil Code.27
In line with current jurisprudence, 28 we increase the civil
indemnity to
₱75,000.00, and the moral damages to ₱75,000.00.
In addition to the damages awarded by the CA, the appellant
should be liable to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for
damages from the date of the finality of this decision until the
awards are fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on July 23, 2010 subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that then accused-appellant ALVIN
ESUGON y AVILA shall pay to the heirs of the late Josephine
Castro y Barrera civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00; moral
damages of ₱75,000.00; exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00;
temperate damages of ₱25,000.00; and interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum on all monetary awards for damages
reckoned from the date of the finality of this decision until the
awards are fully paid, plus the costs of suit.
The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the costs of suit.
Firsthand Knowledge (sec 22, previously sec 36, Rule 130)
People vs Reynaldo, GR no 116305 - July 2,
1998
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Sixth Judicial Region,
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding accused
Endriquito Reynaldo alias Quito guilty of the crime of Rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the complainant Anacyl Barrera in the sum of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and to pay
costs.1cräläwvirtualibräry
On the basis of a complaint dated May 29, 19872 filed by the
victim Anacyl Barrera, an Information dated October 23,
1987,3 was filed against accused-appellant, as follows:
That on or about May 28, 1987, in the Municipality of
Miagao, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with the use of a
knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge with Anacyl Barrera, a girl 16
years of age, against her will and/or consent.
CONTARY TO LAW.
KMC | 13
Evidence ; Garvida
At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court summarized the testimony of sixteen-year old
Anacyl Barrera as follows:
She knows the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo already before
May 28, 1987, as the wife of her uncle is the sister of the wife
of the accused. Accused had been living in Barangay
Bambana, Miag-ao, Iloilo, for a long time already. She knows
the accused for about 7 years before May 28, 1987.
On the evening of May 28, 1987, she was inside their house at
Barangay Bambanan, Miag-ao, Iloilo. She was together with
her two brothers, eleven and eight years old, and a nine year
old sister. She was then fifteen years old going sixteen.
At about 10:30 that evening, while her brothers and her sister
were already asleep, she was awakened because a knife was
pointed at her. They were then sleeping at the sala of the
house. Aside from the knife pointed at her, she felt her breast
being mashed. While the knife was being pointed at her and
her breast being mashed, she was told that if she makes any
noise or if she told anybody they would all be killed including
her aunt. She recognized the person to be the accused,
Endriquito Reynaldo, as she was familiar with his voice and
his two hands which were hairy. After having mashed her
breast, still pointing the knife at her, he dragged her to their
room and ordered her to take off her clothes. He was pointing
the knife at the right side of her body somewhere on the right
waistline. When she was inside the bedroom and was ordered
to take off her clothes, she was very much frightened and did
not seem to know what to do. She was lying down when she
was told to take off her clothes. Then the accused laid on top
of her while pointing the knife at her. He was then naked.
While he was on top of her he inserted his penis inside her
vagina. She lost track of what was happening and she became
unconscious. When she regained her consciousness the
accused was gone. She noticed a whitish and sticky substance
at the side of her vagina. She felt her body aching including
her breast, stomach and vagina. She went to sleep after that.
The following morning she washed her clothes, took a bath
and cleaned the house.
At about 12:00 oclock while they were having lunch, her aunt
Josefina Nobleza, who was looking after them since their
parents were in Manila came over. She was crying and her
aunt asked her what it was about and she told her aunt about
what happened to her and the person responsible for it, naming
the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo. After she informed her aunt
about it, her aunt went to the Police that May 29, 1987, while
she went to her grandmothers place as she had a very bad
headache from her failure to sleep the night before. Her aunt
returned from the Poblacion with policemen and arrested the
accused who was living with her sister a house away. The
accused was brought to town while she was brought to the
hospital for medical examination and later brought home.
She filed a complaint in connection with the said incident
against the accused in the Municipality of Miag-ao
specifically with the Municipal Court (Exh. A and A-l). She
gave a written statement when investigated (Exh. B and B-1
and Exh. B-2).
Three days after the incident her parents from Manila arrived
as they were notified. She told them of the incident and
informed them that it was the accused who raped her. She was
examined at the Guimbal General Hospital, Gimbal, Iloilo.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that the accused
is single as it is the wife of Bernardo Mondana who is the
sister of the wife of her uncle. Their house at Barangay
Bambanan is one story, a one-room bamboo and nipa house
surrounded by a bamboo pole. Before they went to sleep that
night she inspected all the doors and windows and they were
locked and they slept on the sala with her brothers and sisters.
She was on the outer-most portion near the door, also near her
brothers and sisters. They were under a mosquito net. She was
able to identify the accused because she touched his hand and
his face when she was told to take off her clothes. The room
where she was brought was very near the place where they
slept and she did not resist because the accused was constantly
pointing the knife about a foot long at her. She was inside the
room when she was required to take off her clothes without
resistance as the four of them would be killed.
He laid on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina
which was able to penetrate her. She felt pain in her vagina at
the inner part and she lost consciousness because of pain.
When she regained consciousness accused was seated by the
side telling her not to tell anybody or else he would kill all
four of them. The following morning she felt the pains on the
inner part of her thighs and on both sides of her vagina. She,
her sister and two brothers were the only occupants of the
house. Her aunt, Josefina Nobleza looked after them who
usually comes in the morning. On that morning of May 29,
1987 she came over but she stayed for a short time only. She
did not inform her aunt of what happened to her that morning,
neither her brothers and sister. Her aunt came back about
lunch time because her brother informed her aunt about it. Her
aunt changed clothes and went to the Poblacion. She later
came back with four policemen who went around the house to
find out the damaged portion. Her aunt informed them of the
identity of the rapist to be the accused, Endriquito Reynaldo,
so that the accused was arrested because she had already told
the policemen when she went to the Poblacion. She was
investigated by the Policemen and confirmed the statement of
her aunt that it was Endriquito Reynaldo who raped
her.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Alberto G. Gatusang conducted the physical examination
of the complainant on May 29, 1987 and made the following
findings:
Internal Examination
KMC | 14
Evidence ; Garvida
= No laceration or hematomas noted at the vaginal opening.
= Presence of whitish discharge at the vaginal canal.
= Admits 1 finger inside the vaginal canal with resistance.
xxx
REMARKS: Vaginal smear for presence of sperm =
(-) negative findings.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Gatusang testified in court that the fact that the vagina of
the victim bore no lacerations or hematomas did not discount
the possibility of the rape having occurred. The whitish
discharge found on the victims vaginal canal may either be
semen or the victimss natural discharge. The fact that the
victim complained of pain and her vaginal canal offered
resistance when a finger was inserted into it could mean that
there was partial or full penetration of the labia minora. 7 Dr.
Gatusang further testified that the absence of sperm in the
victims vaginal canal may be due to the victims having
cleaned herself after the incident or the possibility that
ejaculation happened outside the vaginal
canal.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed
the defense of alibi. He alleged that at the time of the incident,
he was with a certain Rogelio Norada at the latters house in
Barangay Kirayan, and slept there for the night, leaving only
the following morning to peddle fish in Barangay
Tikdalan.9 He arrived at his house at two oclock in the
afternoon, where he was later arrested by policemen bearing a
warrant.10cräläwvirtualibräry
The defense also presented Rogelio Norada to corroborate
appellants alibi.
In a Decision dated October 29, 1991, the trial court convicted
appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ENDRIQUITO
REYNALDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape defined and punished under Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided
for by law. Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the
complainant Anacyl Barrera the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay costs. Accused
is credited in full of the period while undergoing preventive
imprisonment provided he agrees in writing to conform with
prison regulations regarding convicted prisoners laid down by
prison authorities.11cräläwvirtualibräry
In the instant appeal, appellant contends that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS
BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant points to alleged contradictions in the testimony of
the complainant regarding her identification of the appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant asserts that while the
complainant testified on direct examination and cross-
examination that she was able to identify her attacker by his
voice and seeing his hairy arms as well as the beard on his
face, on further cross-examination, the complainant testified
that she was able to recognize her assailant as she touched his
hand and his face.
Complainant testified on direct examination as follows:
Q Because you were awakened at that time, did you recognize
the man?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that man?
A Enriquito Reynaldo.13cräläwvirtualibräry
Q You said Enriquito Reynaldo. The one whom you identified
a fe(w) moments ago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you again point to where he is inside the courtroom?
A (Witness pointing again to the same person inside the
Courtroom who upon being asked identify [sic] himself as
Enriquito Reynaldo.)
Q Because that was already ten oclock in the evening, can you
tell the Court how were you able to identify him?
A Through his voice.
Q You are familiar with his voice?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from his voice, (by) what other means were you able
to identify him?
A Through his two hands which were hairy. (Underscoring
supplied.)14cräläwvirtualibräry
On cross-examination, the complainant made the same
identification as follows:
KMC | 15
Evidence ; Garvida
Q And you testified that on May 28, 1987 at around 10:30 in
the evening, somebody awakened you and pointed a knife at
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because of that, you did not shout?
A I did not shout because a knife was pointed at me.
Q And, you were able to identify the rapist by his beard in the
face?
A Yes, sir, and because of his voice also.
Q And, likewise, because of his hairy arms?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, that is your only identification of the rapist?
A Yes, sir, and because there was a light I was able to see him.
(Underscoring supplied.)15cräläwvirtualibräry
On further cross-examination, the complainant testified, thus:
Q And, were you able to identify that the accused was the one
who pointed that knife?
A Because he told me to take off my clothes at the same time
pointing the knife at me. I was able to recognize him because I
touched his hand and his face.
Q And that was the only identity you make that the accused
was the one who executed the act?
A Yes, sir. (Underscoring supplied.)16cräläwvirtualibräry
We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged
contradictions in the testimony of the complainant pointed to
by appellant are more imaginary than real17 and do not detract
from the credibility and trustworthiness of the complainants
positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime. As discussed by the Solicitor General:
x x x The testimony of private complainant as to how she was
able to identify appellant on that fateful evening of May 28,
1987 must be taken according to the particular stage or
sequence of the incident to which it relates.
When private complainant claimed on direct examination that
she was able to identify appellant through his voice and hairy
hands, she was referring to the initial stage of the incident
when she was awakened because of the knife that was pointed
at her body by somebody whom she was able to recognize at
that time through his voice and hairy hands (TSN, December
2, 1988, pp. 5 6).
Her testimony on cross-examination that she was able to
recognize appellant only because she was able to recognize
appellant only because she was already asked by appellant to
remove her clothes with the knife pointed at her (pp. 9 10,
TSN, Ibid.). On the other hand, her testimony that she was
able to see appellant because of the light is uncertain as to the
particular stage of the incident to which it pertains.
But even assuming that there were some contradictions in the
manner by which private complainant had been able to
recognize appellant, they do not detract from her positive
identification of appellant as the person who raped her since
they all point to the fact that private complainant was able to
recognize the person who raped her that fateful
evening.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Appellant further faults the identification made by the victim
on the ground that the victims basis of identifying her attacker
is the fact that she touched the latters hairy hand and bearded
face.19cräläwvirtualibräry
It is not necessary that the witnesss knowledge of the fact to
which he testifies should have been obtained in any particular
manner, and he may testify to what he hears, feels, tastes,
smells, or sees.20cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, identification by the sound of the voice of the person
identified has been held sufficient, and it is an acceptable
means of identification where it is established that the witness
and the accused had known each other personally and closely
for a number of years. 21 Here, the complainant testified that
she had known appellant for seven years prior to the incident
because he lived only a house away from theirs.22 Appellant
himself admitted having known the complainant by name in
the three to four years that he had stayed in Barangay
Bambanan.23 As observed by the trial court, the complainant
and appellant were familiar with each other since they lived
together in the same barangay [and] x x x the house of the
complainant is barely ten armslength away from the house
where the accused lived.24 Indeed, people in rural communities
generally know each other both by face and by name,25 and
may be expected to know each others distinct and particular
features and characteristics.
We have consistently held that the matter of assigning values
to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in
the light of his demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified,
and is thereby placed in a more competent position to
KMC | 16
Evidence ; Garvida
discriminate between the true and the false.26 In the instant
case, the trial court considered the testimony of the
complainant, the sole witness to the crime, as worthy of faith,
thus:
The Court has meticulously examined and scrutinized the
testimonial evidence presented as well as the observations of
the demeanor of the complainant and the accused while they
were giving their testimony in Court. The testimony of the
complainant was straightforward, natural and candid which
are earmarks of truth. It leaves not a scintilla of doubt
regarding the veracity of her statements. It was clear, logical
and conclusive.27cräläwvirtualibräry
We find no reason to disturb such conclusion. Indeed, it is
highly inconceivable that a young barrio lass like the
complainant, who is inexperienced with the ways of the world,
would fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical
examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial
and tarnish her familys honor and reputation unless she was
motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong
committed against her.28 Furthermore, as pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the spontaneity of the complainants
reactions subsequent to the crime she had unflinchingly named
and pointed out appellant, then roaming in the vicinity of her
house, as the offender, when her aunt asked her why she was
crying at around noon of the day following the incident29 as
well as the failure of appellant to impute upon her an improper
motive to accuse him of the crime bolster her
credibility.30cräläwvirtualibräry
In the light of the victims positive identification of appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime, appellants defense of alibi must
fail. We note besides that the defense failed to prove physical
impossibilty of appellant being at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. Defense witness Rogelio Norada
testified that Barangay Kirayan Norte where appellant claimed
he was at the night of May 28, 1987, was a mere ten
kilometers away31 from Barangay Bambanan, and access
between the two barangays was easy with transport such as
jeepneys, trucks, triycles and even
trisicads.32cräläwvirtualibräry
The trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. Article 335 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines provides that carnal
knowledge of a woman may be committed when force or
intimidation is used. The act of holding a knife by itself is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and
threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a
woman to submission.33cräläwvirtualibräry
The absence of spermatozoa in the victims vagina does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape.34 Neither is the
existence of lacerations on the victims sexual organ
indispensable.35 What is essential is that there be penetration
of the sexual organ no matter how slight.36cräläwvirtualibräry
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime
of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
not having found neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, the
proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.37 And in conformity with
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the
offended party shall be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).38cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Sixth Judicial Region, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 31084 finding appellant Endriquito
Reynaldo alias Quito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape is hereby AFFIRMED, with the sole
modification that the civil indemnity awarded the victim,
Anacyl Barrera, is increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Disqualifications
a. By reason of marriage ( sec. 23 ) – Marital
Disqualification Rule
-reason for the rule
People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 - July 16, 1947
Hilado, J.
FACTS: Convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court of
First Instance of Mindoro, Juan Francisco appeals to this
Court and asks us to reverse the decision of the trial court and
to acquit him of the crime charged. Defendant, who had been
previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as
detention prisoner in the municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro.
On that date he requested permission from the chief of police,
and he was allowed to go with Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel,
who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house,
the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at
the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained
at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel heard
the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's
wife running out of the room and holding her right breast
which was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw
defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year
and a half, on his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to
have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the
back. Pimentel found the child dead. The prosecution, in
recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the
accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit, Exhibit C
(translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a virtual confession of the
accused; (2) Exhibit D, which is the record made by the justice
of the peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the defendant
upon which the latter entered a plea of guilty; and (3) the
rebuttal testimony of Emilia Taladtad, wife of the appellant.
KMC | 17
Evidence ; Garvida
ISSUE: Whether or not the rebuttal testimony of the wife is
disqualified.
HELD: NO. The reasons given by law text-writers and courts
why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime
committed by one against the other have been stated thus:
First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of
perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary
to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such
evidence because its admission would lead to domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and fourth, because, where a want
of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one
spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. However, as
all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in
the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general
rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor
peace and tranquility of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-
existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting
will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. At any rate, in the
instant case the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for
the prosecution but under circumstances presently to be stated.
It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband
after the latter, testifying in his own defense, imputed upon her
the killing of their son. It has been aptly said that the law of
evidence is the law of common sense. Presuming the husband
who so testified against his wife to be endowed with common
sense, he must be taken to have expected that the most natural
reaction which the said testimony would give rise to on the
part of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to deny
upon rebuttal the new matter which was involved in the same
testimony, namely, the imputation that it was his wife who
killed their little son. Judgment Affirmed.
People vs. Castaneda, GR no
L46306 - Feb 27, 1979
Facts:
Victoria filed a complaint for Falsification of Public
Document against her husband, Benjamin. Victoria alleged
that Benjamin falsified her signature in a deed of sale of a
house belonging to the conjugal partnership, making it appear
that she gave her marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the
prosecution called to the witness stand Victoria, but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking the rule
that a spouse cannot be examined without the consent of the
other spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
another. The prosecution opposed the motion on the ground
that the case falls under the exception, contending that it is a
criminal case committed by one against the other. The trial
court granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria from
testifying against Benjamin. Their motion for reconsideration
denied, the prosecution elevated the case to the Supreme Court
on pure question of law
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime
committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an
exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held:
Yes. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification
rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-
husband against the witness-wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of
Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused
of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it
appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house
and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact
and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of
the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by
her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of
the wife, no crime could have been charged against said
husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his
wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And
it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to
make the necessary complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid
criminal case. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not
one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is
to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the
factual antecedents of the instant case
It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is
apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging
her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also
in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition,
which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the
actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which
may be disturbed. In such a case, the "identity of interests
disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidence of private life which the law aims at
protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there
KMC | 18
Evidence ; Garvida
is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule. (People
vs. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-46306, February 27, 1979)
-when it applies
Lezama, et al. vs. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA
FACTS:
Jose S. Dineros, acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant &
Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N. Hodges and
Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the CFI of Iloilo for the
annulment of a judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant
by the CFI of Manila. Named as defendants were Marciano C.
Roque, in whose favor judgment was rendered, and the
spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama. The complaint
alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the
La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros;
that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C.
Roque brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the collection of
P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses
Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through the
collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to obtain judgment
by default against the company. At the hearing Dineros asked
the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama to testify as "a
witness summoned by the plaintiffs in accordance with the
Rules of Court." The request was granted over the objection of
the petitioners who invoked the following provision of the
Rules of Court: A husband cannot be examined for or against
his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her
husband without his consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed
by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other.
ISSUE: Whether or not a wife, who is a co-defendant of her
husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile witness by
the adverse party.
HELD:
NO. This provision deals with two different matters which rest
on different grounds of policy: the disqualification of husband
and wife to testify in each other's behalf, as well as their
privilege not to testify against each other. The fundamental
theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the
spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the
disqualification. Indeed section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled
"Disqualification by reason of ... relationship.” On the other
hand, while a shelter of emotional reasons has been offered for
the privilege, the "true explanation [which] is after all the
simplest" and which constitutes "the real and sole strength of
the opposition to abolishing the privilege," is the natural
repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife
or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation and to
subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned
by the words of his intimate life partner. Paquita Lezama will
be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the
meeting and will be asked questions on the matter of the
veracity or falsity of the entry in the books of the corporation.
Whether her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial
to her own interest, the inevitable result would be to pit her
against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this
case are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse to the
wife's own interests would tend to show the existence of
collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work
havoc upon their common defense that the loan was not
fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in order to
soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in
a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule which
provides merely that the wife cannot be examined "for or
against her husband without his consent," it is further argued
that "when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is
no reason why either may not be examined as a witness for or
against himself or herself alone," and his or her testimony
could operate only against himself or herself.
People vs. Quidano, 297 SCRA 1 - Oct. 1,
1998
Romero, J.
FACTS:
Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of accused-appellant
Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a widower,
Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy.
Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned sixteen hectares of
coconut land in the area. According to Gina Quidato, on the
evening of the next day, accused-appellant and the Malita
brothers were drinking tuba at their house. She overheard the
trio planning to go to her father-in-laws house to get money
from the latter. She had no idea, however, as to what later
transpired because she had fallen asleep. Accused-appellant
objected to Gina Quidatos testimony on the ground that the
same was prohibited by the marital disqualification rule found
in Section 22 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The Malita
brothers confessed to their participation in the crime,
executing affidavits detailing how Bernardo was killed. The
body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by accused-
appellants son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for
breakfast. The cause of death, as stated in Bernardos death
certificate was hypovolemic shock secondary to fatal hacking
wound on the posterior neck area. The trial court found
Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
principal in the offense of Parricide.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gina Quidato can testify against her
husband without violating the marital disqualification rule.
HELD:
NO. With regard to Gina Quidatos testimony, the same must
also be disregarded, accusedappellant having timely objected
thereto under the marital disqualification rule. As correctly
observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between
husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from
KMC | 19
Evidence ; Garvida
testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence,
Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case against
Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-
appellants case. This testimony cannot, however, be used
against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of
taking judicial notice of the proceedings in the murder case
without violating the marital disqualification rule. What
cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule
familiar even to law students. Given the inadmissibility in
evidence of Gina Quidatos testimony, as well as of Reynaldo
and Eddies extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on
record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to
accused-appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellants defense, to
put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged acquiescence to the
demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his
fathers house on the strength of the latter’s verbal threats, his
incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his
inexplicable failure to return home immediately, his failure to
seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed
with him immediately after the incident, and the nine-day
lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita
brothers as the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that
of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion, no matter how
strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom
that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the
defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond
reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of
the accused. Petition Granted.
Alvarez vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72- Oct. 14, 2005
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness
in a Criminal Case for arson pending before the RTC. The
accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the
husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. The
private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. In the course of
Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter
showed uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to
suspend the proceedings. Petitioner, through counsel, filed a
motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification. The trial court issued the questioned Order
disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and
deleting her testimony from the records. The Appellate Court
rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed
Orders issued by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against
her husband in the criminal case for arson.
HELD:
YES. The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is
consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional
failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger
of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification
rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the
spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance,
where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing
but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in
the unhappy home. The act of private respondent in setting fire
to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully
well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent
of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and
confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect.
The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and
vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact
that the marital and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no
more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The
Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-
existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but
ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply
the Marital Disqualification Rule. Decision Affirmed.
a. By reason of privileged communication
-Husband-Wife Privilege (sec. 24 (a) )
-purpose
US vs. Antipolo, 37 Phil 726 - March
6, 1918
Fisher, J.
FACTS:
The appellant was prosecuted in the CFI of Batangas, charged
with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal. The trial court
convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was
KMC | 20
Evidence ; Garvida
appealed. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal
of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the
man whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to
testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations. The witness was called to the stand
and having stated that she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was
asked: "On what occasion did your husband die?" To this
question the fiscal objected upon the following ground: I
object to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified
that she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and
that being so I believe that she is not competent to testify
under the rules and procedure in either civil or criminal cases,
unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead
and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this witness is
disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband
is the injured party. Counsel for defendant insisted that the
witness was competent, arguing that the disqualification which
the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which
a husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is
called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a
criminal case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been
dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no longer his
wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising
from the status of marriage. These propositions were rejected
by the trial judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to the
testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained. To this
objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove
by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to
establish by her testimony. Concerning these facts it is
sufficient at this time to say that some of them would be both
material and relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the
satisfaction of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal
of the accused, as they purported to relate to the dying
declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his
death, the general purport being that his injuries were due to
fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in excluding the
testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason
of such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his
essential rights.
HELD:
YES. On grounds of public policy the wife can not testify
against her husband as to what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this
rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the
husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The
declaration of the deceased made in extremes in such cases is
a thing to be proven, and this proof may be made by any
competent witness who heard the statement. The wife may
testify for the state in cases of this character as to any other
fact known to her. . . . It can not be contended that the dying
declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential
communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently
made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that
it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant.
Decision Set Aside. New trial is granted at which the
testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted.
People vs. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 - March
17, 1925
Ostrand, J.
FACTS:
The victim of the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, in Mary
Chiles Hospital, performed a surgical operation upon the
defendant's wife for appendicitis and certain other ailments.
She remained in the hospital until the 18th of the same month,
but after her release therefrom she was required to go several
times to the clinic of Doctor Sityar for the purpose of dressing
the wounds caused by the operation. On these occasions she
was accompanied by her husband, the defendant. The
defendant admits that he killed the deceased but maintains that
he did so in self-defense. He explains that he went to Doctor
Sityar's office to protest against the amount of the fee charged
by the doctor and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the
time of payment; that during the conversation upon that
subject the deceased insulted him by telling him that inasmuch
as he could not pay the amount demanded he could send his
wife to the office as she was the one treated, and that she
could then talk the matter over with the decease; that this
statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous
manner that the defendant became greatly incensed and
remembering the outrage committed upon his wife, he
assumed a threatening attitude and challenged the deceased to
go downstairs with him and there settle the matter; that the
deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife from the center
drawer of his desk and attacked the defendant, endeavoring to
force him out of the office; that the defendant, making use of
his knowledge of fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away
from the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him first in the
right side of the breast and then in the epigastric region, and
fearing that the deceased might secure some other weapon or
receive assistance from the people in the adjoining room, he
again stabbed him, this time in the back. The court below
found that the crime was committed with premeditation and
therefore constituted murder. This finding can only be
sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L, a letter
written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in
searching his effects on the day of his arrest. Counsel for the
defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO. The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded
for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter was written
by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial
the letter might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the
letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his
assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also
KMC | 21
Evidence ; Garvida
have been admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact
that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of
acquiescence or assent on his part. The letter is therefore
nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence
violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal
case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution
and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary
communication and one originally privileged. The question is
radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony
of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and
wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is
admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in
which both spouses took part and on the further ground that
where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement
made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence
implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is
contained in an unanswered letter. Already seen by third
parties. The Defendant is Guilty of Simple Homicide.
-can be waived
-
Attorney-Client Privilege ( sec. 24 (b) ) – Purpose
Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 -
September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation
and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. After
graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank.
Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as
a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for
the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia
Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the partylist system for the House of
Representative.
ISSUE: Whether or not the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court.
HELD:
NO. The nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-
making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. Practice of law under modem conditions
consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration
of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys.
Regala vs. Sandigangbayan, 262
KMC | 22
Evidence ; Garvida
SCRA 122
- September 20, 1996
FACTS:
The PCGG filed its third amended complaint, stating that the
defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A.
Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul
Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed. conspired and
confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of
the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework
and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than
twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of the
coconut monopoly. Through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly
3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB. This
ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the
top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares. The Sandiganbayan held that the
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing
the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have
begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s)
and the other information requested by the PCGG.
HELD:
NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not
be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule
in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the
general rule are well established. First, the court has a right to
know that the client whose privileged information is sought to
be protected is flesh and blood. Second, the privilege begins to
exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorneyclient privilege does not attach until
there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the
subject matter of the relationship. Notwithstanding these
considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions. 1. Client identity is privileged where a
strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought
the lawyers advice. 2. Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3. Where the
governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client
unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name
is privileged. It is clear then that the case against petitioners
should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the
effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their
inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-
client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose
the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue
with respect to them when this Court could nip the problem in
the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an
unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The
case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of
Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.
People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 275
SCRA 505
- July 16, 1997
FACTS:
Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of
the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-
Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was
successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney
who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances
pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present
recourse. Respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over a
Lot of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent
granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his
favor for that lot which is situated in Agusan del Sur. The
Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of
respondent Paredes patent and certificate of title since the land
had been designated and reserved as a school site in the
aforementioned subdivision survey.
The trial court rendered judgment nullifying said patent and
title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the
same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application.
Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes
in that civil case. The Tanodbayan, issued a resolution
recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent
Paredes.
Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed corespondent,
moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal
significance in this case. Unfortunately for the prosecution,
respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorneyclient privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and
KMC | 23
Evidence ; Garvida
invoked by the two other private respondents in their
opposition to the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination: From the evidence
adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and
lawyer relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and
Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period
alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the
facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must
have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused
Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity.
Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts
surrounding the offense charged in the information is
privileged. As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled
that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed
between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the
relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other
confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent
Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer.
Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since
Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the
facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is
privileged.
HELD: NO. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in
these cases, as the facts thereof and the actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a
clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first
sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter
stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the
client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention
of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent
Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and
consummated. Having been made for purposes of a future
offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege. Decision Set Aside.
Mercado vs. Vitriolo, 459 SCRA 1 - May 26, 2005
FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint
against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from
the practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent
maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential
information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV
of the CHED. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of
complainant, died. Respondent entered his appearance before
the trial court as collaborating counsel for complainant.
Respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City. Respondent
alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates
of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne.
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for
falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts
and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then
handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted
complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent.
She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification,
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and
confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be
disbarred. The IBP Board of Governors approved the report of
investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent
guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client, and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client when
he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against his former client.
HELD:
YES. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment.
The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to
discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him,
and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client.
The client made the communication in confidence. The mere
relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to
be confidential. The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not
be intended for mere information, but for the purpose of
seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or
obligations. The communication must have been transmitted
by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal
advice. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that
the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants
KMC | 24
Evidence ; Garvida
allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent.
All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity.
She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against
her for falsification of public documents because the criminal
complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for
annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however,
spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game
as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
The complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Hadjula vs. Madianda AC no. 6711 - July 3,
2007
FACTS:
[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to
be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached
respondent for some legal advice and further alleged that
in the course of their conversation which was supposed
to be kept confidential she disclosed personal secrets
only to be informed later by the respondent  that she
(respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer
friend.  It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after
she had already heard her secrets.
[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them.
Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed
confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to
are in fact  matters of common knowledge in the BFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of
preserving the confidence of a client and violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.
RATIO:
The moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship
imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions
circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among
the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the
lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate
confidential information acquired or revealed
during legal consultations.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense
notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that
the respondent acted with ill-will.  Without meaning to
condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom
is before the Court is two former friends becoming bitter
enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against
each other using whatever convenient tools and data
were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal
information respondent gathered from her conversation
with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court
that respondent was actuated by the urge to retaliate
without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving
vent to a negative sentiment, she was violating the rule
on confidentiality.
-Physician-Patient Privilege ( sec. 24 (c) )- purpose
Lim vs. CA, 214 SCRA 273 - in evidence before the trial court in a petition for annulment of
September 25, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with the RTC a petition for annulment
of such marriage on the ground that petitioner has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia
"before, during and after the marriage and until the present.”
Private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present
as his next witness the Chief of the Female Services of the
National Mental Hospital, Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel
forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify. Petitioner’s
counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony
sought to be elicited from the witness is privileged since the
latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.
Petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent omnibus motion to quash
the subpoena and suspend the proceedings pending resolution
of the motion. Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being
presented as an expert witness and that she will not testify on
any information she acquired in (sic) attending to Nelly Lim in
her professional capacity. The omnibus motion was denied by
KMC | 25
Evidence ; Garvida
the lower court, the CA held that the respondent Judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not all the essential elements of the rule on
physician-patient privileged communication exists in the case
at bar.
HELD:
NO. This rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to
facilitate and make safe full and confidential disclosure by the
patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent
and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand,
to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and
be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests
in public policy and is for the general interest of the
community. The physician may be considered to be acting in
his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for
curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only
disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the
tenor only of the communication that is privileged. The mere
fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated.” Petition Denied.
Krohn vs. CA, 233 SCRA 146 - June 14,
1994
FACTS:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented
marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness
testifying on the report is the husband who initiated the
annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the
report. The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin
her husband from disclosing the contents of the report. After
failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she
is now before us on a petition for review on certiorari. Edgar
Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint
Vincent de Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union
produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship
between the couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971, Ma.
Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort
to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile. In
1973, they finally separated in fact. Edgar was able to secure a
copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz
prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and
Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report
among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying
his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of
"incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due
discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter.”
The CFI issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. In his petition, he cited the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz
merely denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or
irrelevant." Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on
the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report.
This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her
"continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary,
"that would thwart the physician-patient privileged
communication rule,” and thereafter submitted a Statement for
the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or
legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground
being completely false, fabricated and merely an
afterthought.” The trial court issued an Order admitting the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence. The
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in the presentation and
disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and prays
for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part
of the records of the case.
HELD:
NO. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites
in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the
privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against
whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary
to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information
was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient. In the instant
case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a
circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician
who examined the patient and executed the report. Petition
Denied.
Gonzales vs. CA, 298 SCRA 322 - October
30, 1998
FACTS:
Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of
their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then CFI.
Petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de
KMC | 26
Evidence ; Garvida
Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real
properties covered by the TCTs, listed therein as belonging to
the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the
true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. The trial
court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. Petitioners executed
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother
Lucila de Mesa. Private respondents later discovered that
petitioners had managed to cancel the TCTs through the
stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mothers estate.
The lower court held that the acknowledged natural children,
namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S.
Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo
M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of
said deceased. The CA denied the two appeals filed by the
petitioners. Petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro
Arenas,Ricardo Abad’s physician, declaring that in 1935, he
had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected
with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Arenas’ affidavit is a privileged
communication.
HELD:
YES. In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance
Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: The privilege of
secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as
stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that
the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death
removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and
disclosures which a patient should make to his physician.
After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to
impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the
statute. Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that
petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the quantum
of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence
presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that
they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.
We quote with approval the trial courts decision. Petition
Denied.
De La Llana v Biong, GR no. 182356 - Dec 4,
2013
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions
of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are the parties
and their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts
the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion
from the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking
because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court
can only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack
of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela
Llana’s(petitioner) petition for review on
certorari1 challenging the February 11, 2008 Decision 2 and the
March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana
was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue,
Quezon City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger
seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital
when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car
halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly
rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward.
Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear
windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing
Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela
Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.6
The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000
identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel
was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck.7
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca
Biong, doing business under the name and style of "Pongkay
Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel
mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and
shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the
extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9,
2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation
medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told
her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused
by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and
hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to
alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not
improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez,
Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr.
Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a
cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve.
On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and
neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10
KMC | 27
Evidence ; Garvida
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but
incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her
profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from
Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to
pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a
result of the vehicular accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for
her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an
average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She
further prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees.13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no
cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury.
She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest
one month and one week from the date of the vehicular
accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary
witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm
because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she
identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated
November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical
certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash
injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical
examinations.17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the
truck’s brakes got stuck.18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was
physically fit and strong when they met several days after the
vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required Joel to
submit a certification of good moral character as well as
barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior to his employment.
She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by
Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he
checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He
affirmed that the truck was in good condition prior to the
vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of the vehicular
accident was a damaged compressor. According to him, the
absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be
Joel’s reckless driving.21
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the
sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that
the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck
was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven
at a slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He
should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake
was stuck and could have prevented the collision by swerving
the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably
sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving
for fifteen hours on that fateful day. The RTC further declared
that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in Joel's selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was
vicariously liable because she was the employer and she
personally chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the
collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz
Market, Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three
elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were
present: (1) that the employee was chosen by the employer,
personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer had
the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of
the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the
functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela
Llana the amounts of ₱570,000.00 as actual damages,
₱250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.22
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the
RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Citing
Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23 it declared that
courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if
there is no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant an
inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the
interval between the date of the collision and the date when
Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness
was lengthy. It concluded that this interval raised doubts on
whether Joel’s reckless driving and the resulting collision in
fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also declared that
courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents
cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana did
not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained
internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to
present expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no
weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did
not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24
The Petition
KMC | 28
Evidence ; Garvida
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that
Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She stresses that
Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of
the Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects.
Furthermore, there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix
that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the
respondents in that case. As opposed to the respondents in
Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by
preponderance of evidence that Joel’s egligent act was the
proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her
damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits
that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the
massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr.
Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra.
dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her
testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is
credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has
probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if
uncontroverted.25
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the
opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She
maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine
the causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash
injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries
are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondent’s Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana
raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
She maintains that the CA’s findings of fact are final and
conclusive. Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s
arguments are not substantial to merit this Court’s
consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether
Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’s whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition
for review on certiorari when the findings of fact by the lower
courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court
is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CA’s findings of
fact are final and conclusive and this Court will not review
them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine,
review or evaluate the evidence in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can
only review the presented evidence, by way of exception,
when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly
examine the relevant evidence presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance
of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision,
the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant
or by some person for whose acts the defendant must
respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-
delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that
civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise
from non-contractual relations of certain members of society
to others.29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish
by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-
delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s
employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s
reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption -
that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are
established, this Court can then proceed with the application
and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an
employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the
employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is
essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
KMC | 29
Evidence ; Garvida
which creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual
obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate
causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish
by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without
which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three
pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000,
and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these
pieces of evidence show the causal relation between
the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum
probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum
probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully
discussed below.37
A. The pictures of the damaged
car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car
show that the massive impact of the collision caused her
whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her
insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies
common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact
of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that
the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B. The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H"
during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for
the reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in
an order dated September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary
evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that
evidence which has not been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the
disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no
probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that
evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the
witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on
the witness stand.39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence40 except in very unusual circumstance that is not
found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the
reason why you were feeling that pain in your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she
stated that my condition was due to a compression of the
nerve, which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a
Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty. Yusingco: You
mentioned that this Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a
medical certificate. What relation does this medical certificate,
marked as Exhibit H have to do with that certificate, you said
was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made
out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit
H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on
you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain that
you felt in your left arm?
KMC | 30
Evidence ; Garvida
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical
therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three months
indicated that I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck,
on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical
operation?
Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression
on my nerve, which did not resolve by the extensive and
prolonged physical therapy that I underwent for more than
three months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of
the contents of the medical certificate.1âwphi1 However, she
was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to
identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate.
Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her
findings. We also point out in this respect that the medical
certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in
fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash
injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A perusal of the
medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical
condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury.
However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate
the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury.
Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled her medical
history and physical examinations.
C. Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that
Joel’s negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra.
dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the
lone physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely
testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela
Llana essentially claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless
driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra.
dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an
expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that
Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without
violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court,
there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness
and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may
be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge;
 (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the
witness may also testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person.43
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to
an admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected
ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason
is that the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie
in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its
weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford
the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis
for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his
conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot
be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she
was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and
effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a
medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and
effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the
parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela Llana did
not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that
directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s
negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established
because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during
trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries.
This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in
the field of medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to
apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties’ pieces
of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause
by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with
her, our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess
the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s
favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence,
is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
KMC | 31
Evidence ; Garvida
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision
dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Chan v Chan 2013
Abad, J.
FACTS:
Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the RTC a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of
their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to
care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking
and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had
convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for
detoxification and rehabilitation. During the pre-trial
conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form
that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was
forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The
form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny
suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse."
Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he
was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion
to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum. Johnny opposed the motion, arguing
that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege. The RTC sustained the opposition and denied
Josielene’s motion. The CA ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left
with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they may
have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits,
certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that,
although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in
this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the
limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition covers not only
testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent
hospital records.
HELD:
YES. The above right to compel the production of documents
has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not
privileged.” Josielene of course claims that the hospital
records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded
as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined" regarding their professional
conversation.

The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital
records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure
of the hospital records—the results of tests that the physician
ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice
or treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to
evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s
records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior
consent. Decision Affirmed.
-Priest-Penitent Privilege ( sec. 24 (d) )- purpose
Note the requirements for the privilege to apply
-Public Officer’s Privilege ( sec. 24
(e) )
Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 - May 23,
1995
FACTS:
Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB,
while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and
Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation
of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally
disbursed. The Graft Investigation Officer of the
Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on
generalizations without meeting specifically the points raised
by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies.” He,
therefore, asked for authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
subpoena to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to
submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their
witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the Chief of
the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year
1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988.” Petitioners Almonte and Perez
moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum.
In his Order respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to
quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no
affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion
to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners
were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves,
since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief
Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the
Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the
EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the
investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service
Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers
KMC | 32
Evidence ; Garvida
for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof."
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can be ordered to produce
documents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of
EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are
classified.
HELD:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing
on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is
based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private
citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff
cannot enforce his legal rights. In the case at bar, there is no
claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the
EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation
of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it
may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege
resting on other considerations. Nor has our attention been
called to any law or regulation which considers personnel
records of the EIIB as classified information.
To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners
invoke to support their contention that there is adequate
safeguard against misuse of public funds, provides that the
"only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly
confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of
information and payment of rewards.” Petition Dismissed.
Chavez vs. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 -
December 9, 1998
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Francisco I. Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to
information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,
demands that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of
recovering the Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of illgotten wealth
involves an issue of paramount public interest, since it has a
debilitating effect on the country's economy that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the
transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the
government. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny
forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They
claim, though, that petitioners action is premature, because
there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose
the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has,
PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure,
since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding. In seeking the public
disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a
compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their
alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes several provisions
of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to

disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected
or not, with the Marcoses.

HELD: YES. At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the

common law holding that there is a governmental privilege
against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic and other national security matters. But
where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information, provided that they are examined in strict
confidence and given scrupulous protection. Likewise,
information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be
subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG
and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence
and other classified information. The PCGG, as the
government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot
guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the
Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not
within its sole power and discretion. Petition Granted.

KMC | 33
Evidence ; Garvida