(Brad Inwood) Oxford Studies in APXLV

OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
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OXFORD STUDIES
IN ANCIENT
PHILOSOPHY
EDITOR: BRAD INWOOD
V O L U M E X L V
W I N T E R 2 0 I 3
OXFORD
U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS
OXFORD
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ADVISORY BOARD
Professor Julia Annas, University of Arizona
Professor Susanne B o b z i e n , Yale University and All Souls College,

University of Oxford
Professor D o r o t h e a Frede, University of Hamburg
Professor A . A . L o n g , University of California, Berkeley
Professor M a r t h a N u s s b a u m , University of Chicago
Professor D a v i d Sedley, University of Cambridge
Professor R i c h a r d Sorabji, King's College, University of London, and

Wolf son College, Oxford
Professor Gisela Striker, Harvard University
Professor C h r i s t o p h e r T a y l o r , Corpus Christi College, Oxford
C o n t r i b u t i o n s and books for review s h o u l d be sent to the E d i t o r ,

Professor B r a d I n w o o d , D e p a r t m e n t o f Classics, U n i v e r s i t y o f
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CONTENTS
Plato o n the I m p o r t a n c e o f ' T h i s ' a n d ' T h a t ' : T h e T h e o r y

o f F l u x a n d its R e f u t a t i o n i n the Theaetetus i
NALY THALER
T h e Greatest D i f f i c u l t y at Parmenides 133 C - 1 3 4 E and

Plato's Relative T e r m s 43
MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
M o r a l E d u c a t i o n a n d the S p i r i t e d Part o f the S o u l i n

Plato's Laws 63
JOSHUA WILBURN
F o u n d i n T r a n s l a t i o n : A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Ethics 3.5,

11 i 3 7 - 8 , a n d its R e c e p t i o n
b
103
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
A r i s t o t l e o n P r i m a r y T i m e i n Physics 6 149
BENJAMIN MORISON
E l e m e n t a l S t r u c t u r e a n d the T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the
E l e m e n t s i n On Generation and Corruption 2. 4 195
MARY KRIZAN
O p t i m a l i t y Reasoning i n A r i s t o t l e ' s N a t u r a l T e l e o l o g y 225

DEVIN HENRY
Aristotelian Responsibility 265

JOHN M . COOPER
M a k i n g Sense o f Arcesilaus 313

CASEY PERIN
Essence a n d B e i n g : A D i s c u s s i o n o f M i c h a i l Peramatzis,
Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics 341
MARKO MALINK
Index Locorum 363

PLATO ON T H E IMPORTANCE
OF 'THIS' A N D 'THAT': T H E
THEORY OF F L U X A N D ITS
REFUTATION I N T H E THEAETETUS
NALY THALER
THEAETETUS I 79 c signals the b e g i n n i n g o f the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the

t h e o r y o f flux w h i c h was i n t r o d u c e d earlier as p a r t o f the a t t e m p t to
u n d e r s t a n d Protagoras' m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e . B y this p o i n t i n the
dialogue the b r o a d c o n s t r u a l o f Protagoras' d o c t r i n e , a c c o r d i n g to
w h i c h m a n is the measure o f t r u t h i n regard to a l l his j u d g e m e n t s ,
h a d p r o v e d untenable. A t 179 c, w h a t is left s t a n d i n g o f the o r i g i n a l
Protagorean d i c t u m is the l i m i t e d suggestion that each m a n is the
standard o f t r u t h r e g a r d i n g his present affections, the perceptions
that they give rise to, and the j u d g e m e n t s that correspond to these
perceptions (179 c 2 - 5 ) . These, Socrates claims, c o u l d s t i l l t u r n
1
o u t to be irrefutable, thus l e n d i n g s u p p o r t to Theaetetus' o r i g i n a l

suggestion that k n o w l e d g e and p e r c e p t i o n are one and the same
( 7 9 C 5—D 1). I t is w i t h this l i m i t e d v e r s i o n o f the m a n - m e a s u r e
:
d o c t r i n e that Socrates n o w identifies w h a t he calls 'the m o v i n g be

i n g ' , i.e. the H e r a c l i t e a n t h e o r y o f flux, w h i c h he proposes to exa
mine.
T h e r e is general agreement a m o n g c o m m e n t a t o r s that the exa
m i n a t i o n o f the flux t h e o r y takes the f o r m o f a reductio w h i c h
© Naly Thaler 2013

I wish to thank Jozef Miiller and M a t t Strohl for helpful comments on previous ver
sions of this paper, Dalia Drai and G i l Gambash for discussion of specific points,
and an anonymous reader and Brad Inwood for many detailed comments and queries
which helped clarify my thoughts on the issues presented here.
Socrates' precise phrasing here, which seems to distinguish perceptions from
1
perceptual judgements, has been the cause of some puzzlement. Since such a dis
tinction seems absent from the theory of perception, commentators usually treat
it as merely a manner of speech devoid of any real philosophical significance. One
exception is M . Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, w i t h a revised translation by
M . J. Levett [Theaetetus] (Indianapolis, 1990), 42—52, who claims that the phras
ing is intentional and provides the key to understanding the motivation behind the
subsequent radicalization of flux at 181 D 8—182 A 2. I n the course of my discussion,
I shall argue that Burnyeat is right to attach significance to the precise phrasing of
Socrates' claim, but that his own interpretation of it is mistaken.
2 Naly Thaler
p u r p o r t s to show that the H e r a c l i t e a n p o s i t i o n carries l i n g u i s t i c

consequences t h a t vitiate the p o s s i b i l i t y o f coherently stating any
p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , i n c l u d i n g b o t h Theaetetus' suggestion t h a t
k n o w l e d g e is p e r c e p t i o n and the flux hypothesis itself. B u t inter
pretations diverge r e g a r d i n g h o w precisely, or even w h e t h e r at a l l ,
the r e f u t a t i o n succeeds i n achieving this outcome. One p r o b l e m
is t h a t the flux t h e o r y seems to be a t h e o r y about the nature o f
p a r t i c u l a r perceptions and perceptible properties. T h e c o n c l u s i o n
of the reductio is, o n the other h a n d , o f a general, abstract nature.
T h a t is, the statements w h i c h a c c o r d i n g to the r e f u t a t i o n w i l l
u l t i m a t e l y lack any determinate sense (specifically, ' p e r c e p t i o n
is k n o w l e d g e ' and ' e v e r y t h i n g is i n change') p u r p o r t to describe
h i g h l y general a n d abstract t r u t h s . B u t i t is n o t easy to see w h y
the fact t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s are i n flux entails t h a t statements o f this
sort lack determinate sense. I t seems t h a t i f perceptual objects and
p e r c e i v i n g agents are i n constant flux, i t is they that w i l l cease f r o m
b e i n g p r o p e r objects o f speech. N o m a t t e r h o w radical the flux
w h i c h afflicts the w o r l d o f p a r t i c u l a r s is, there seems to be n o direct
e n t a i l m e n t f r o m the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e f e r r i n g to p a r t i c u l a r s to the
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f asserting general t r u t h s . O n the face o f i t , t h e n ,
2
the r e f u t a t i o n contains a significant gap i n its a r g u m e n t , one w h i c h

c o u l d vitiate Socrates' c l a i m to have refuted the t h e o r y o f flux.
One w a y o f s o l v i n g this p r o b l e m is to deny t h a t the flux t h e o r y
is i n fact restricted to p a r t i c u l a r s , and argue t h a t claims w h i c h i t
makes, such as ' n o t h i n g is itself one t h i n g ' (152 D 2 - 3 ) or 'every
t h i n g is change' (156 A 5), u l t i m a t e l y i n c l u d e abstract properties
as w e l l . Read this way, the r e f u t a t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y becomes m u c h
3
m o r e cogent: the m u t a b i l i t y o f general properties entails t h a t the

general concepts w h i c h signify t h e m lack determinate sense. A n d
this i n t u r n i m p l i e s t h a t the sense o f any assertion about general
3
A sustained argument that flux which is limited to the realm of particulars w i l l
not lead to a collapse of the meaningfulness of general statements is the core of A .
Silverman, 'Flux and Language i n the Theaetetus' [ ' F l u x ' ] , Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy,18 (2000), 109—52. I t seems that a similar worry lies behind J. M c D o w
ell's decision {Plato: Theaetetus [Theaetetus] (Oxford, 1973), 183—4) to treat 'white
ness' in 182 D 3 as referring to the general property, rather than to a particular i n
stance of it.
3
The most recent and forceful argument for this interpretation is Silverman,
'Flux'. I t has as its precursor F. M . Cornford's Plato's Theory of Knowledge [Know
ledge] (London, 1935). Silverman's argument is the one relevant for this paper, since
it explicitly raises the difficulty of getting from flux i n the realm of particulars to a
general collapse of language in order to reinstate Cornford's currently unpopular
broad reading of flux.
Plato on the Importance of 'This' and 'That' 3
facts w h i c h is composed o f these abstract terms is e q u a l l y indeter
m i n a t e . U n d e r such a b r o a d r e a d i n g o f flux, t h e n , Socrates' refu
t a t i o n is v i n d i c a t e d and the H e r a c l i t e a n doctrine loses its c l a i m to
p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e as percep
tion.
I n w h a t follows I shall c l a i m t h a t w h i l e the idea o f e x p a n d i n g the
theory's flux so as to i n c l u d e abstract properties a n d general terms
is m i s t a k e n , the p r o b l e m i t attempts to solve is n o t o n l y real, b u t
4
i n fact touches at the heart o f the issues Plato i n t e n d e d his read

ers to come to grips w i t h i n these passages. W e saw t h a t flux w h i c h
is l i m i t e d to p a r t i c u l a r s w i l l o n l y lead to the collapse o f assertions
about perceptual p a r t i c u l a r s , and so leaves r o o m for determinate
statements about general t r u t h s , such as ' p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e '
a n d ' e v e r y t h i n g is i n f l u x ' . T h i s , I shall c l a i m , is n o t a p r o b l e m that
m a r s o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h o w the r e f u t a t i o n o f flux u l t i m a t e l y
achieves its i n t e n d e d result. Rather, i t accurately describes an i m
p o r t a n t facet o f the p o s i t i o n Plato attributes to the flux t h e o r y i n the
first place. T h i s is because, as I shall show, i t is the theory's e x p l i
cit v i e w t h a t w h i l e n o determinate assertions are applicable to the
w o r l d o f perceptual p a r t i c u l a r s , this has n o adverse effects o n o u r
a b i l i t y to frame determinate assertions about general t r u t h s such as
' p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e ' a n d ' e v e r y t h i n g is i n f l u x ' .
M o r e specifically, I shall c l a i m t h a t an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f the flux
theory's s u p p o r t for Theaetetus' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h
p e r c e p t i o n (and for the m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e w i t h w h i c h i t is i d e n
tified) comes i n the f o r m o f the c l a i m that assertions about p a r t i c u l a r
p e r c e p t u a l experiences, those w h i c h a t t r i b u t e a perceptual p r o p e r t y
to a determinate object u s i n g a demonstrative a n d the verb 'to be',
such as 'this stone is w h i t e ' , are i n h e r e n t l y fallacious. T h i s p r o v i d e s
5
s u p p o r t for b o t h Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n a n d the m a n - m e a s u r e doc

t r i n e i n t h a t once language is p u r g e d o f such determinate assertions
about p e r c e p t u a l experience, there remains n o w a y for speakers to
c o m m i t themselves to c o n f l i c t i n g descriptions o f i t . B u t along w i t h
this v i e w o f the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f determinate assertions to percep
t u a l experience, the t h e o r y also holds t h a t one can none the less
4
For the claim that the theory's ontology cannot include Form-like entities or ge
neral properties see also D. Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus [Theaetetus] (Oxford, 1988),
104—5; D- Sedley, The Midwife ofPlatonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus
[Midwife] (Oxford, 2004), 92—3.
5
I shall argue that this includes relativized assertions such as 'this stone is white
for me'.
4 Naly Thaler
frame a p e r f e c t l y coherent a n d v e r i d i c a l scientific t h e o r y about the

6
nature o f p e r c e p t i o n i n general, i n c o r p o r a t i n g i n i t abstract concepts

such as 'whiteness', ' c o l o u r ' , ' p e r c e p t i o n ' , ' q u a l i t y ' , etc. I t denies
that such an e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y about perceptual experience p r e
supposes the a b i l i t y to make determinate j u d g e m e n t s about p a r t i
cular instances o f experience.
A s a c o m p l e m e n t to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the gist o f the flux the
o r y I shall show that the a r g u m e n t Socrates uses to refute i t is m e a n t
to attack precisely such a c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n between the
language o f science a n d that o f everyday experience. A c c o r d i n g to
m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the a r g u m e n t attempts to prove that abstract or
h i g h e r - o r d e r t r u t h s , such as those used to reveal the nature o f per
c e p t i o n i n general, depend o n the p r i o r a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f everyday,
non-scientific, assertions to the w o r l d o f perceptual experience. U l
timately, we are m e a n t to see that i f we cannot express o u r p a r t i c u l a r
perceptual experiences b y u s i n g determinate assertions, i.e. those
w h i c h relate a perceived p r o p e r t y to a specific object a n d that can
be c o n t r a d i c t e d b y other such assertions, we w i l l have no general
concepts a n d n o e x p l a n a t o r y theories w i t h w h i c h t o make the w o r l d
of experience i n t e l l i g i b l e .
M y a r g u m e n t proceeds as follows. I n Section I , I p r o v i d e a close
reading o f Socrates' three expositions o f the secret d o c t r i n e , at
152 D 2 - E 1, 153 D 8-154 A 4, a n d 156 A 2-157 C 1, c o n c e n t r a t i n g
especially o n the last o f these, where we f i n d the fullest a n d m o s t
detailed account o f the flux theory's o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d
l i n g u i s t i c i n n o v a t i o n s . I n Section I I , I d r a w o u t the i m p l i c a t i o n s
of this r e a d i n g for Protagoras' m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e a n d for
Theaetetus' o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f knowledge. I n Section I I I , I
p r o v i d e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the theory's r e f u t a t i o n w h i c h shows
precisely h o w i t maps onto, a n d is m e a n t to attack, the l i n g u i s t i c
t h e o r y espoused b y the flux d o c t r i n e . I n Section I V , I discuss
the significance o f the theory's r e f u t a t i o n for the first p a r t o f the
Theaetetus.
6
I n what follows I shall repeatedly use the expression 'scientific theory' to refer
to the flux doctrine and to theories which are relevantly similar to it. While there
are notable differences between the kind of account provided by the flux theory and
'science' in the modern sense of the word, my insistence on the use of the term 'sci
entific' i n the present context is motivated by the need to bring to the fore the fact
that the general and abstract terminological apparatus introduced by the flux doc
trine is intended as an explanation of the world of everyday experience.
Socrates provides three accounts o f the secret d o c t r i n e , o f increas

i n g specificity, at 152 D 2 - E 1, 153 D 8-154 A 4, a n d 156 A 2-157 c 1,
w h i c h I designate ( A ) , ( B ) , a n d ( C ) respectively. H e opens ( A ) b y
a n n o u n c i n g that (1) n o t h i n g itself is one t h i n g ; (2) i t is impossible
7
to c o r r e c t l y say about a n y t h i n g w h a t i t is or h o w i t is qualified; (3) i f

y o u call a n y t h i n g large, i t w i l l also appear s m a l l , and i f heavy i t w i l l
appear l i g h t ; this is so because (4) n o t h i n g is one t h i n g , n e i t h e r some
one k i n d o f t h i n g , n o r qualified i n one p a r t i c u l a r way.
A convenient w a y to b e g i n to examine h o w the claims made i n
( A ) relate to each other is to see that they fall i n t o three d i s t i n c t cat
egories: theoretical, descriptive, and n o r m a t i v e . (3) is a d e s c r i p t i o n
of a familiar p h e n o m e n o n a n d seems meant to j u s t i f y (1), w h i c h
constitutes a novel theoretical c l a i m . T h e t r u t h o f that theoretical
c l a i m functions as the g r o u n d for (2), w h i c h is a n o r m a t i v e c l a i m
about correct language use. C l a i m (4) appears to be a restatement
8
of (1), w h i c h is n o w presented as a t h e o r y w h i c h can e x p l a i n the

same p h e n o m e n o n that was used as evidence for i t . Socrates c o n
cludes this i n i t i a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e w i t h t w o m o r e claims:
(5) all t h i n g s come to be as a result o f m o t i o n a n d m i x t u r e w i t h one
another; a n d (6) c o n t r a r y to o u r usual h a b i t , we s h o u l d n o t say about
any o f the things m e n t i o n e d earlier that they are. (5) is clearly an
other theoretical c l a i m , p r o b a b l y meant as an elaboration o f (1). (6)
is another n o r m a t i v e c l a i m about language, a n d seems j u s t i f i e d b y
the theoretical c l a i m i n (5). I n fact, (6) seems to be an elaboration o f
the n o r m a t i v e l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m i n (2): there we were t o l d somewhat
generally that i t is impossible to c o r r e c t l y say about a n y t h i n g that i t
has a certain character or property. W e n o w l e a r n that the mistake
i n q u e s t i o n is somehow specifically t i e d to an i n j u d i c i o u s use o f the
verb 'to be'.
These claims raise m o r e questions t h a n they answer: w h y s h o u l d
7
Silverman, ' F l u x ' , 115, claims that it is significant that this claim is unrestricted
in scope. But, since the claim that nothing is itself one thing immediately receives
further elaboration, we should not attempt to understand it on its own, but rather
look to that elaboration i n order to determine its scope.
8
By itself, (3) cannot justify (2): we all know that things are liable to appear differ
ently to different people, yet we do not take this as sufficient reason to suppose that
all statements describing what and how things are are mistaken. What is required to
justify (2) is some theoretical explanation of (3) which w i l l begin to make (2) seem
plausible.
6 Naly Thaler
we take the f a m i l i a r p h e n o m e n o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e
ments i n (3) (either y o u say 'this stone is large/heavy' w h i l e I say
'this stone is s m a l l / l i g h t ' o n the same occasion r e f e r r i n g to the same
object, or I m y s e l f p r o n o u n c e these c o n f l i c t i n g j u d g e m e n t s about
the same object o n different occasions) as evidence for a n o v e l the
9
o r y about the nature o f reality ( 1 , 5), a t h e o r y whose t r u t h entails a

radical r e v i s i o n o f the language used to refer to perceptual p h e n o
mena (2, 6)? T h e secret d o c t r i n e expects us to believe that the best
e x p l a n a t i o n for the p h e n o m e n o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e
ments is t h a t they are n o t , after a l l , about one a n d the same t h i n g
(since n o t h i n g is itself one t h i n g ) ; a n d i t t h e n asks us to accept a
surprising entailment of that explanatory theory: i n their current
l i n g u i s t i c f o r m b o t h c o n f l i c t i n g j u d g e m e n t s are i n h e r e n t l y m i s t a k e n
since b o t h c o n t a i n some c o m m i t m e n t to stable, i n d e p e n d e n t b e i n g ,
where i n fact there is o n l y m o t i o n a n d m i x t u r e .
Some o f these questions b e g i n to be answered i n Socrates' se
c o n d e x p o s i t i o n o f the secret d o c t r i n e ( B ) . T h i s f u r t h e r elaboration
achieves t w o basic feats. T h e first p a r t o f the passage reveals t h a t
the p r e v i o u s o n t o l o g i c a l claims ( 1 , 5 ) are g r o u n d e d i n a t h e o r y about
the nature o f p e r c e p t i o n . T h i s t h e o r y shows t h a t the folk o n t o l o g y
b e h i n d perceptual experience, the one w h i c h posits the existence
of qualified objects as causes o f p e r c e p t u a l experience, is m i s t a k e n .
B u t the account i n ( B ) also reveals s o m e t h i n g n e w about the ex
tent o f the p h e n o m e n o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g appearances w h i c h served
as the basic m o t i v a t i o n for the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the theory. T h e se
c o n d p a r t o f the passage reveals t h a t a conflict o f appearances is
substantially m o r e w i d e s p r e a d t h a n was p r e v i o u s l y t h o u g h t , thus
m a k i n g the r a d i c a l account i n t r o d u c e d i n the first p a r t o f the pas
sage the o n l y viable e x p l a n a t i o n for the p h e n o m e n o n o f percep
tion.
A c c o r d i n g to (B)'s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the basic tenets o f the the
ory's account o f p e r c e p t i o n (153 D 8-154 A 3), w h a t is n a m e d
b y a g i v e n c o l o u r t e r m is n o t a n y t h i n g external to the eye, n o r
9
Strictly speaking, the text does not say that there is a conflict between two state
ments about perceptual appearances, but that if you make one such statement the
object w i l l also appear differently. But the emphasis throughout the passage on
speaking about perceptual experience makes it quite clear that the conflict is between
two incompatible ways of referring to what, on the face of it, is one and the same ob
ject. Moreover, i f Socrates' description of the phenomenon of conflicting appear
ances is to cover all its familiar instances, it should include those where distinct
perceivers have conflicting appearances, and identifying such cases depends on per-
ceivers giving linguistic expression to these appearances.
is i t s o m e t h i n g i n the eye itself. I n fact, i t has no determinate
location. C o l o u r comes about as a result o f the approach o f the
eyes towards some appropriate m o t i o n , a n d is i d e n t i c a l n e i t h e r to
the t h i n g w h i c h approaches n o r to the t h i n g b e i n g approached.
Rather i t is s o m e t h i n g i n between t h e m , w h i c h is p a r t i c u l a r to each
perceiver.
N o t e that b y itself this rather sketchy d e s c r i p t i o n is undeter
m i n e d as to w h e t h e r each i n d i v i d u a l perceptual quality, w h i c h , as
we are t o l d , is u n i q u e to the ( i n t e r a c t i o n between) perceived object
a n d the p e r c e i v i n g organ, is also q u a l i t a t i v e l y u n i q u e . T h e mere
fact that p a r t i c u l a r colours do n o t inhere i n either the perceiver or
the perceived object does n o t determine w h e t h e r each o f t h e i r oc
currences is q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t . T h e secret d o c t r i n e clearly goes
against the folk o n t o l o g y o f p e r c e p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h percep
tions are caused by, a n d reflect the i d e n t i t y of, qualified objects.
B u t does i t entail a n e w perspective o n the p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h i t
is i n t e n d e d to explain? O u r usual v i e w o f p e r c e p t i o n includes the
idea that there are m a n y q u a l i t a t i v e l y repeatable instances o f i t . T h i s
v i e w is g r o u n d e d i n l i n g u i s t i c practice, w h i c h allows one perceiver
to allocate the name o f one a n d the same perceptible p r o p e r t y to an
object over t i m e , and also allows t w o d i s t i n c t perceivers to use the
name o f one a n d the same p r o p e r t y to describe t h e i r simultaneous
i n d i v i d u a l perceptions o f the same object. Is the t h e o r y asking us to
abandon n o t o n l y o u r naive f o r m u l a t i o n o f the m e c h a n i s m b e h i n d
the p h e n o m e n o n o f p e r c e p t i o n b u t also this c o m m o n v i e w o f the
appearances themselves?
T h e second p a r t o f ( B ) , at 154 A 3-9, w h i c h attempts to j u s t i f y
the account i n t r o d u c e d i n its first p a r t , clearly answers this ques
1 0
t i o n i n the affirmative. T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n begins f r o m the seemingly

common-sense suggestion that d i s t i n c t a n i m a l species have q u a l i
tatively d i s t i n c t impressions o f the same objects (154 A 3 - 4 ) . T h i s
suggestion helps make the subsequent, somewhat m o r e controver
sial c l a i m m o r e palatable: different i n d i v i d u a l s o f the same species
also have d i s t i n c t impressions o f whatever c o m m o n object they hap
p e n to be p e r c e i v i n g (154 A 6 - 7 ) . A n d the agreement to this leads
to a t h i r d , even m o r e radical c l a i m : even the same i n d i v i d u a l does
n o t have q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l perceptions r e g a r d i n g the same o b -
10
rj ov Siioxvpioaio av at 154 A 3 introduces a counterfactual whose truth would be
implied by the rejection of the theory's account of perception. I f Theaetetus accepts
the t r u t h of what follows he w i l l be bound to accept the truth of the theory.
8 Naly Thaler
j e c t at different times, since at n o t w o instants does he ever r e m a i n

i d e n t i c a l to h i m s e l f .
11
I t is i m p o r t a n t to note t h a t the agreement to these three claims

substantially radicalizes the p h e n o m e n o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g appear
ances. W h i l e Socrates' p h r a s i n g o f his i n i t i a l c l a i m t h a t different
colours appear differently to different species o f animals c o u l d
be taken to m e a n m e r e l y t h a t there are some cases i n w h i c h such
variations o c c u r , the second c l a i m , t h a t different people w i l l have
12
q u a l i t a t i v e l y different impressions o f one and the same object,

actually suggests t h a t appearances always v a r y i n such cases. 13
A n d the final c l a i m , t h a t one and the same i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have

q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t impressions o f the same object o n different
occasions o w i n g to his constant p h y s i c a l alteration, is phrased i n
a w a y t h a t seems to leave n o d o u b t o f its t r u t h . B u t Theaetetus'
1 4
agreement to this t h i r d c l a i m i m m e d i a t e l y secures the t r u t h o f the

two previous claims, a n d resolves any d o u b t about the scope o f the
first one. I f we agree w i t h the t h i r d c l a i m , that the same object w i l l
always appear differently to the same perceiver at different times
due to the fact t h a t his physical c o n s t i t u t i o n is i n a constant process
of change, the suggestion made i n the second c l a i m , t h a t different
people always have q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t impressions o f the same
things, n o w becomes c e r t a i n since t w o discernible i n d i v i d u a l s a l
ways have d i s t i n c t physical c o n s t i t u t i o n s . A n d Socrates' first c l a i m
about the q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t impressions o f different species
m u s t n o w t u r n o u t to be a necessary general t r u t h : since the p h y s i
cal c o n s t i t u t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s b e l o n g i n g to d i s t i n c t species clearly
differs, they cannot ever have q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l impressions o f
the same objects.
T h e i m m e d i a t e effect o f this series o f claims is to make the p h e n o

m e n o n o f c o n f l i c t i n g appearances seem u b i q u i t o u s . Whereas p r e
15
v i o u s l y we t h o u g h t t h a t this p h e n o m e n o n represents an exception
Theatetus' agreement to the claim that he does not stay the same over time
11
might follow from his previous agreement in 153 B that life requires constant change.
EKOIOTOV -£P<X>ILO, i n 154 A 4 could be taken as part of the innocuous suggestion
1 3
that not all colours appear the same to people and animals, or of the substantially
stronger one that no colour appears to them the same.
T h i s is the force of OTIOVV at 154 A 7.
13
Since Theaetetus is said never (laiySeVore) to be the same as himself, Socrates'

14
claim must be that his perceptions are always qualitatively distinct.

For the claim that the argument i n B supports the idea that no two colour ap
15
pearances are alike see also M . Burnyeat, 'Conflicting Appearances' ['Appearances'],

Proceedings of the British Academy, 65 (1979), 69—111 at 78.
to the r u l e (since people's p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e m e n t s u s u a l l y t e n d to

agree), we n o w discover t h a t even i n cases o f o v e r t l i n g u i s t i c agree
m e n t (we b o t h say o n the same occasion a b o u t the same object ' t h i s
stone is w h i t e ' , or y o u say the same o n t w o different occasions) n u
m e r i c a l l y d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i o n s o f the same o b j e c t are nevertheless
always q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t .
With the phenomenon of conflicting appearances thoroughly
r a d i c a l i z e d so as to c o n s t i t u t e the r u l e o f p e r c e p t i o n r a t h e r t h a n
an e x c e p t i o n to i t , Socrates can go back to the m a i n tenets o f the
t h e o r y he has i n t r o d u c e d i n the f i r s t p a r t o f ( B ) a n d s h o w t h a t t h e y
c o n s t i t u t e the o n l y possible e x p l a n a t i o n o f the p h e n o m e n a . W e saw
t h a t a c c o r d i n g to the theory, p e r c e p t u a l q u a l i t i e s do n o t belong
e i t h e r to perceivers or to p e r c e p t i b l e objects. Socrates n o w claims
(154 B 1-3) t h a t i f the o b j e c t w h i c h we come across i n p e r c e p t i o n
were itself large or w h i t e or h o t , we c o u l d n o t a c c o u n t for the fact
t h a t i t (as we n o w k n o w , always) appears d i f f e r e n t l y to different
perceivers. 16
A n d , conversely, i f i t were o u r p e r c e i v i n g o r g a n w h i c h
were i t s e l f so q u a l i f i e d , we c o u l d n o t e x p l a i n w h y i t (again, always)
p r o d u c e s a q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t u a l experience w i t h each
n e w e n c o u n t e r (154 B 3 - 6 ) . 1 7
1 6
While Burnyeat sees that the preceding argument actually concludes that no two
perceptions are qualitatively identical (see n. 15 above), he ignores this i n his analysis
of the connection between the argument and the theory it is meant to support (i.e.
that nothing has any property i n itself). According to Burnyeat, 'Appearances', 78—
9, the connection between the argument and the theory relies on the premiss that if
it ever happens that an object appears F and not-F to different perceivers, it cannot
be F/not-F i n itself. T h i s premiss, as Burnyeat shows, translates into the blatantly
un-commonsensical condition that i f an object really is F it must always appear F to
all perceivers, a condition which, Burnyeat claims, makes an explicit appearance i n
154 B 2—3. Against Burnyeat's interpretation I would like to suggest that i f we take
seriously the conclusion that an object never appears the same to any two perceivers,
the connection w i t h the theory could be made on the basis of the much weaker and
more commonsensical condition that i f an object really is F it must at least sometimes
appear F to distinct perceivers. Note that my suggestion depends on understanding
OVKOVV el [X€v cb napafxerpov^xeOa r) ov icfxiTTTOfxeOa / x e y a r) XevKov r) Oepfxov r\v, OVK av ITOTE
aXXqj TTpooneoov aXXo av eyeyovei i n 154 B 2—3 as meaning roughly ' i f that which we
measure ourselves against or that which we touch were large or white or hot, it would
never have become different when bumping into different perceivers', where the ge
nerality of the phenomenon i n question is read into this claim due to the conclusion
of the previous argument. Burnyeat's reading takes this sentence more literally as
meaning that i f an object really were large etc. it would never (i.e. even once) become
different by bumping into a different perceiver. T h i s more literal reading of 154 B
2—3 has the detriment of making the preceding argument in 154 A 3—8 redundant.
1 7
For an analysis showing that the option being presented and dismissed i n this
second part of the argument is that the eye itself is white (rather than merely seeing
the colour white), see Burnyeat, Appearances', 80.
IO Naly Thaler
W e s h o u l d note that the account i n ( B ) justifies the c o n n e c t i o n

made i n ( A ) between c l a i m (2) about the p h e n o m e n o n o f conflict
i n g appearances and (1) the o n t o l o g i c a l c l a i m that n o t h i n g is itself
any one t h i n g (i.e. p a r t i c u l a r l y qualified or b e l o n g i n g to a p a r t i
cular k i n d ) . Since c o n f l i c t i n g appearances are n o w seen to be an
i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the basic p h e n o m e n o n o f p e r c e p t i o n , a plausible ex
p l a n a t i o n o f that p h e n o m e n o n m u s t give u p the n o t i o n o f i n h e r e n t
properties. A n d the alternative e x p l a n a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y the t h e o r y
clarifies w h a t was m e a n t b y c l a i m (5) o f passage ( A ) , that e v e r y t h i n g
comes to be f r o m m o t i o n a n d m i x t u r e . B u t the account o f percep
t i o n i n ( B ) is s t i l l m e r e l y a r o u g h sketch o f a theory. I t s t i l l does
n o t p r o v i d e a clear a n d precise account o f the m e c h a n i s m o f per
c e p t i o n . M o r e o v e r , we have n o t yet h a d any elaboration o f w h a t the
l i n g u i s t i c p r e s c r i p t i o n s a l l u d e d to i n claims (2) a n d (6) o f passage
( A ) a m o u n t to, n o r o f h o w they are j u s t i f i e d b y the t h e o r y o f per
c e p t i o n . These s h o r t c o m i n g s are r e m e d i e d i n Socrates' elaboration
of the secret d o c t r i n e i n ( C ) .
Passage ( C ) p r o v i d e s the m o s t sustained a n d elaborate r e p o r t o f
the c o m m i t m e n t s o f the t h e o r y o f flux. I t includes b o t h a detailed
account o f the general theoretical m e c h a n i s m w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g to
the theory, s h o u l d be used to e x p l a i n p a r t i c u l a r instances o f percep
t i o n , a n d also a precise d e s c r i p t i o n o f the actual experience o f these
i n d i v i d u a l instances. I m p o r t a n t l y , Socrates' d e s c r i p t i o n o f the flux
t h e o r y i n ( C ) also contains repeated observations about the r e l a t i o n
of perceptual experience to l i n g u i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n , c u l m i n a t i n g i n a
clear statement as to w h i c h o f these conventions m u s t be abandoned
o w i n g to t h e i r i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h the u n d e r l y i n g facts about per
c e p t i o n w h i c h the t h e o r y has revealed. T h e passage lends itself na
t u r a l l y to a t h r e e f o l d d i v i s i o n , whose parts I shall designate as ( C i ) =
156 A 2 - c 5; ( C 2 ) = i s 6 c 7-157 A 7; a n d ( C 3 ) = i s 7 A 7 - c 3.
T h e first t h i n g I w i s h to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to i n ( C i ) is the r e c u r r e n t
m o t i f a r o u n d w h i c h i t is s t r u c t u r e d . T h i s is the d i s t i n c t i o n between
a determinate highest k i n d , the m u l t i t u d e o f its determinate, name-
able, subtypes, and the i n f i n i t e m u l t i t u d e o f i n d e t e r m i n a t e , name
less instances o f these subtypes. T h u s , after c l a i m i n g that the so
p h i s t i c a t e d v i e w o f the w o r l d construes i t as b e i n g essentially and
exclusively change, Socrates claims that change itself is d i v i d e d i n t o
t w o general kinds, namely, active a n d passive change, b o t h o f w h i c h
are i n f i n i t e i n n u m b e r (156 A 5-7). F r o m the interactions o f the
things that fall u n d e r these t w o highest categories, offspring are
p r o d u c e d w h i c h are again u n l i m i t e d i n n u m b e r (156 A 8 - B I ) a n d
w h i c h also fall u n d e r t w o general categories, that o f ' p e r c e p t i o n '
a n d that o f ' t h i n g s perceived' (156 B 1-2). Each o f these t w o cat
egories is subject to the same treatment: there is a large n u m b e r o f
determinate, identifiable k i n d s w h i c h fall u n d e r p e r c e p t i o n , such as
seeings, hearings, smellings, chillings, b u r n i n g s , pleasures, pains,
desires, fears, a n d an infinite n u m b e r o f nameless ones (156 B 2 -
7). A c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i v i s i o n applies to the m a t c h i n g genus o f the
' t h i n g perceived': i t too is a general category divisible i n t o m o r e spe
cific k i n d s w h i c h m i r r o r those o f p e r c e p t i o n : colours o f every k i n d
w h i c h correspond to each sort o f seeing, sounds w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d
to the different k i n d s o f hearing, etc. (156 B 7 - c 3).
W e can see that the flux t h e o r y is e m b e d d e d i n an o r d e r e d hier
archy o f concepts e x t e n d i n g f r o m the general to the particular,
g r o u n d e d i n experience and commensurate w i t h its basic o n t o l o g i -
cal c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e secret d o c t r i n e endorses the sophisticated
a n d c o n t r o v e r s i a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l c l a i m that e v e r y t h i n g that exists is
change. A r e d e e m i n g feature o f this t h e o r y w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y
18
makes i t m o r e palatable is that the seemingly contentious highest

genus u n d e r w h i c h a l l r e a l i t y is s u b s u m e d forms p a r t o f a coherent
conceptual system that reaches as far d o w n as the w o r l d o f e x p e r i
ence a n d incorporates various levels o f i n t e r m e d i a t e concepts w h i c h
seem applicable to and e x p l a n a t o r y o f that w o r l d . I m p o r t a n t l y for
o u r purposes, this system contains a c o m m i t m e n t to an o r d e r e d
tree o f concepts, some m o r e p a r t i c u l a r a n d closer to perceptual
experience, a n d others m o r e abstract, w h i c h i n c o r p o r a t e the m o r e
p a r t i c u l a r concepts a n d constitute the genera o f w h i c h they are the
species.
Since Theaetetus professes n o t to see h o w the p o i n t s made i n
( C i ) relate to the subject at h a n d , Socrates offers f u r t h e r elaboration
i n ( C 2 ) i n the f o r m o f a t h e o r y c o n n e c t i n g the parents o f percep
t i o n w i t h t h e i r offspring. H e begins b y i n t r o d u c i n g a n e w d i s t i n c
t i o n between changes: w h a t were f o r m e r l y described as passive a n d
active changes (i.e. the 'parents' o f perception) are n o w s u b s u m e d
together u n d e r the category o f slow change (156 c 9 - D 1), whereas
w h a t were f o r m e r l y described as the offspring o f these changes are
1 8
A possible justification for the shift from the previous claims about things be
ing in change to the current one that everything is change is that it is only here, i n
(C), that Socrates exposes the theory's complete ontological scheme that makes all
things species and subspecies of change. T h i s terminological shift from the previous
passages need not imply a change in doctrine.
12 Naly Thaler
n o w s u b s u m e d u n d e r the category o f q u i c k change ( i 56 D 1-3). Per

c e p t i o n , we are t o l d , occurs w h e n the eye a n d one o f the t h i n g s t h a t
are commensurate w i t h i t have come i n t o each other's v i c i n i t y : t o
gether they p r o d u c e whiteness a n d the p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h corres
ponds to i t (a process w h i c h is also described as the m o v e m e n t o f
sight i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the eye and o f whiteness towards the o b
j e c t w h i c h is its c o - p r o d u c e r ) . A t t h a t m o m e n t , the eye becomes
filled w i t h sight a n d sees, a n d comes to be ' n o t sight b u t a seeing
eye' (156 E 2 - 4 ) T h e object w h i c h co-operates i n p r o d u c i n g c o l o u r
comes to be filled w i t h whiteness a n d becomes ' n o t whiteness b u t
a w h i t e t h i n g ' , w h e t h e r a stick or stone or whatever object happens
to be c o l o u r e d b y the c o l o u r (156 E 4 - 7 ) .
T h e r e is a l o n g - s t a n d i n g d i f f i c u l t y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g (C2)'s expla
n a t o r y account, w h i c h lies i n the fact t h a t the fast changes w h i c h are
caused b y the i n t e r a c t i o n o f active and passive slow changes are also
treated as the factors w h i c h d e t e r m i n e the i d e n t i t y o f the v e r y same
slow changes. T h a t is, perceptible objects a n d p e r c e i v i n g agents, re
ferred to as the parents o f p e r c e p t i o n , acquire t h e i r i d e n t i t y o n l y as
a result o f the genesis o f the perceptual qualities and c o r r e s p o n d i n g
perceptions w h i c h are referred to as t h e i r offspring. T h i s fact makes
i t v e r y h a r d to treat the account i n ( C 2 ) as 'causal' i n any straight
f o r w a r d sense o f the w o r d a n d raises the s u s p i c i o n t h a t Plato never
i n t e n d e d i t to be taken as s u c h . I f either parents or offspring are
19
to take the role o f causal agents i n the theory's account, we w o u l d

expect some i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i r p r i o r i t y to, a n d independence f r o m ,
t h e i r effects. A s i t is, the t h e o r y gives every i n d i c a t i o n t h a t parents
and offspring are i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , a n d t h a t neither pair can have de
t e r m i n a t e existence i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the other.
B u t despite the inadequacy o f the account i n ( C 2 ) as a causal the
ory, the passage nevertheless makes a determinate c o n t r i b u t i o n to
o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the secret d o c t r i n e . F i r s t , ( C 2 ) contains a cla
r i f i c a t i o n o f w h a t sort o f t h i n g s the parents o f p e r c e p t i o n are w h i c h
was m i s s i n g i n ( C i ) . Whereas i n ( C i ) the parents were described
rather c r y p t i c a l l y as passive or active changes, ( C 2 ) tells us t h a t they
are i n fact the same familiar objects, such as eyes a n d visible things,
m e n t i o n e d i n ( B ) . I n a d d i t i o n to this added i n f o r m a t i o n about the
parents o f p e r c e p t i o n , ( C 2 ) also i n f o r m s us o f a l i n g u i s t i c d i s t i n c -
1 9
For a clear account of the incoherence of the causal account see J. M . Day, ' T h e
Theory of Perception i n Plato's Theaetetus 152—183' ['Perception'], Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, 15 (1997), 51—80 at 65—70.
t i o n w h i c h corresponds to the n e w l y i n t r o d u c e d clarification o f the
d i s t i n c t i o n between parents a n d offspring. T h e t h e o r y claims that
offspring are referred to b y the names o f abstract properties such as
'whiteness', 'hardness', 'hotness', etc., w h i l e t h e i r parents are qua
lified b y the adjectival cognates o f these names, and are spoken o f as
' w h i t e ' , ' h a r d ' , or ' h o t ' things. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , w h i c h , as we shall
presently see, plays a p i v o t a l role i n the theory, b e t w e e n abstract
qualities a n d the t h i n g s qualified b y t h e m , i n effect corresponds to
the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o r y a n d experience. I n t h a t sense at least,
the m e c h a n i s m described i n ( C 2 ) is u n a m b i g u o u s . T h e w o r l d as we
encounter i t i n experience consists o f qualified objects whose p r o
perties, a c c o r d i n g to the theory, are i n constant flux. T h e i n t e n t o f
(C2) is to p r o v i d e some f o r m o f account o f the genesis o f this ever-
s h i f t i n g experience. T h e use o f abstract nouns ('whiteness', ' h a r d
ness') to refer to perceptual properties is an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f that
account, and is m e a n t to p r o v i d e a coherent e x p l a n a t i o n o f h o w per
ceptual experience comes about. B u t w h e n i t comes to the descrip
t i o n (rather t h a n the e x p l a n a t i o n ) o f people's actual experiences,
Socrates takes care to use o n l y adjectives. I n this way, parents,20
w h i c h are f a m i l i a r objects encountered i n experience, are e x p l a i n e d

b y t h e i r offspring, w h i c h are abstract and theoretical.
T h e l i n g u i s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n adjectives a n d t h e i r cognate
abstract nouns helps signal the line d r a w n between e x p l a n a n d u m
(parents) a n d explanans (offspring). T h e t h e o r y is v e r y clear about
this d i s t i n c t i o n : w h a t we i n fact see or feel are w h a t are u s u a l l y re
ferred to as w h i t e or h a r d objects; the t h e o r y seeks to e x p l a i n a n d
make i n t e l l i g i b l e this perceptual experience b y abstracting its re
levant aspects and r e f e r r i n g to these u s i n g n o t i o n s such as ' w h i t e
ness' or 'hardness'. A large p a r t o f the e x p l a n a t o r y force o f these
abstract n o t i o n s comes f r o m the fact that, as we have seen i n ( C i ) ,
they can t h e n be placed i n determinate relations w i t h other, m o r e
general notions, as 'whiteness' can be placed u n d e r ' c o l o u r ' a n d that
concept, i n t u r n , u n d e r ' t h i n g perceived'. Despite w h a t q u a l m s we
m i g h t have about its coherence as a causal account, ( C 2 ) does after
all offer a scientific t h e o r y o f a sort. I t is a t h e o r y w h i c h , o n the one
h a n d , seems to take abstracted aspects o f perceptual experience as
h a v i n g e x p l a n a t o r y force i n r e l a t i o n to t h a t experience b u t , at the
3 0
For the claim that the use of adjectives in Socrates' description of the theory is
confined to the world of perceptual experience, see also M . Burnyeat, 'Plato on the
Grammar of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly, NS 26 (1976), 29—51 at 44.
14 Naly Thaler
same time, does n o t lose sight o f the fact that they are n o t o n t o l o -
gically p r i o r to i t . 2 1
Before p r o c e e d i n g to ( C 3 ) Socrates takes care to generalize his

c l a i m about the genesis o f w h i t e objects so as to i n c l u d e a l l other
perceptual qualifications (156 E 7 - 9 ) . H e t h e n expands the idea
2 2
that a l l qualifications are relative so as to i n c l u d e n o t o n l y perceptual

properties b u t also the m o r e abstract 'active' a n d 'passive' (157 A 2 -
7). N o p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , we learn, is itself a perceiver or a perceptible
object. These qualifications, like a l l others, are a f u n c t i o n o f the re
l a t i o n i n w h i c h one object happens to stand to another.
Socrates n o w begins his account i n (C3) b y c l a i m i n g (157 A 7 -
B 2) that since i t has been s h o w n that n o t h i n g is itself one t h i n g ,
b u t rather always comes to be for someone, the verb 'to be' m u s t
be c o m p l e t e l y done away w i t h . T a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n , this i n i t i a l de
s c r i p t i o n o f the theory's l i n g u i s t i c ramifications m i g h t give the i m
pression that t h e i r scope is as w i d e as the uses o f the verb itself,
and encompasses b o t h statements about perceptual p a r t i c u l a r s and
claims about general t r u t h s . B u t this w o u l d be a mistake. T h e doc
t r i n e o f constant change is l i m i t e d to perceptual p a r t i c u l a r s . A t no
p o i n t does the t h e o r y say or i m p l y that the e x p l a n a t o r y abstract
concepts w h i c h i t uses, such as ' c o l o u r ' , ' p e r c e p t i o n ' , ' a c t i v i t y ' , etc.,
are themselves i n constant flux. W h i l e we are repeatedly t o l d that
no individual instantiates any one p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t y rather t h a n
another, i t is never i m p l i e d that, say, the concept o f ' c o l o u r ' c o u l d
3 1
T h i s view is, I believe, close i n spirit to the one suggested by Burnyeat
{Theaetetus, 17—18). I n order to alleviate somewhat the misgivings one might have
about the theory's casting of what we today would regard as abstractions i n the
role of explanatory entities, I should like to point out the following: one might
be committed to the use of abstraction as a method of discovery without holding
that the results of this method are 'mere' abstractions, i.e. that they have no added
epistemic value. We can see a good example of this elsewhere i n the Theaetetus:
the discussion of the Dream Theory m 201 D 8—206 B 11, which takes phonemes
as paradigms for the elements of perceptual reality, shows that phonemes are
explanatory of syllabic sounds but are nevertheless not ontologically distinct from
their explananda. While phonemes are treated as inherent aspects of voiced sound,
their discovery is considered a real scientific advance which allows one to attain
a knowledgeable outlook on that particular sphere of perceptual experience (for
this interpretation of the Dream Theory see my 'Taking the Syllable Apart: The
Theaetetus on Elements and Knowledge', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 41
(2012), 201-28).
3 3
Note how careful Socrates is to remain faithful to the distinction between nouns
and adjectives in his generalization. Since he is generalizing over a fact relevant to
the world of perceptual experience, he confines himself to the use of adjectives such
as 'hard' and 'hot' (156 E 8).
5
sometimes change its i d e n t i t y a n d come to b e l o n g to the genus o f
' p e r c e p t i o n ' instead o f ' t h i n g perceived'. Since the l i n g u i s t i c re
strictions are supposed to f o l l o w d i r e c t l y f r o m the theory's c o m
m i t m e n t s , they s h o u l d be l i m i t e d to the w o r l d o f particulars. I f the
l i n g u i s t i c restrictions are o f a w i d e r scope t h a n this there is no es
c a p i n g the conclusion that they are s i m p l y u n f o u n d e d . 23
I n fact, the subsequent vocabulary the t h e o r y seeks to expunge

fits w e l l w i t h the idea that the l i n g u i s t i c restrictions are l i m i t e d to
p a r t i c u l a r s . T h e list o f f o r b i d d e n terms consists o f demonstratives
a n d possessives such as ' s o m e t h i n g ' , ' o f [ s o m e t h i n g ] ' , ' m i n e ' , ' t h i s ' ,
a n d ' t h a t ' (157 B 4-5)—precisely the terms one w o u l d use to desig
nate a p a r t i c u l a r object o f e x p e r i e n c e to w h i c h some p r o p e r t y is
24
a t t r i b u t e d , rather t h a n to denote the r e l a t i o n between abstract c o n

cepts. I t makes good sense, then, to read that list as l i m i t i n g the
scope o f the p r e c e d i n g r e s t r i c t i o n o n the verb 'to be' a n d specifying
the sort o f statements i n w h i c h i t s h o u l d n o t be used. I t is the l a n
guage o f particulars, o f qualified things and definite 'thises', that
the t h e o r y seeks to expunge, based o n the idea that such expres
sions c o n t a i n i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h are necessarily c o n t r a r y to fact.
We have seen i n (C2) that the e n d result o f the m e c h a n i s m o f per
c e p t i o n is the appearance o f p a r t i c u l a r qualified objects to w h i c h
we h a b i t u a l l y refer b y c o u p l i n g a demonstrative w i t h a p r o p e r t y
adjective via the verb 'to be'. N o w , i n (C3) we are meant to realize
that the insights expressed i n ( C i ) and (C2) i m p l y that o u r o r d i
n a r y ways o f r e f e r r i n g to these experiences are suspect. T h e l i n
guistic expressions that c o n v e n t i o n has t a i l o r e d for speaking about
perceptual p h e n o m e n a b r i n g w i t h t h e m c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h dis
t o r t the nature o f the p h e n o m e n a they p u r p o r t to describe. T h e use
of demonstratives carries the erroneous c o m m i t m e n t that the p r o
p e r t y m e n t i o n e d b y the adjective i n the assertion resides i n a p a r t i
cular l o c a t i o n , namely, i n the object i t is taken to qualify. T h e use o f
3 3
Sedley, Midwife, who advocates an unrestricted scope for the linguistic re
strictions i n (C3), does not explain why the theory's commitment to a limited flux
should lead it to such an extreme view about language. He appeals instead (93—4) to
Theodorus' description of the Heraclitean philosophers' modes of speech i n 179 E—
180 c, which, he claims, supports an unrestricted reading of the theory's linguistic
claims. But regardless of the question whether Plato introduced the erratic speech of
the Heracliteans as a joke or as having direct bearing on the discussion, Theodorus'
description of them cannot serve as a substitute for some account of why the flux
theory can legitimately endorse their radical linguistic practices.
3 4
I f we take TOV as co-ordinate w i t h ejiov, it too w i l l signify a restriction on speak
ing of a property as belonging to a determinate particular.
i6 Naly Thaler
the verb 'to be' solidifies this c o m m i t m e n t . I t creates the erroneous

i m p r e s s i o n that the perceived p r o p e r t y m e n t i o n e d b y the adjective
belongs to some object i n a w a y that s h o u l d exclude i t f r o m receiv
i n g at the same t i m e other, i n c o m p a t i b l e properties.
So far, the l i n g u i s t i c restrictions i n (C3) i m p l y that i t is always
m i s t a k e n to a t t r i b u t e a p r o p e r t y to a determinate object. B u t , as was
clear f r o m the theory's account o f the m e c h a n i s m o f p e r c e p t i o n i n
( C 2 ) , the w o r l d we experience includes n o t o n l y perceptual proper
ties b u t also objects o f various k i n d s w h i c h seem to be the bearers
of those properties (the sticks a n d stones referred to i n 156 E 6 - 7 ) .
N o w , i n ( C 3 ) , w h e n stating its p r o p o s e d revisions to c o m m o n par
lance, the t h e o r y takes care to m e n t i o n these objects as w e l l (157 B
8 - C 1). T h i s is done b y c l a i m i n g that the l i n g u i s t i c revisions per
t a i n n o t m e r e l y to i n d i v i d u a l properties, b u t to t h e i r various collec
tions w h i c h are c o m m o n l y referred to as ' m a n ' , 'stone', a n d gener
ally each sort o f t h i n g . Just as i n the case o f i n d i v i d u a l properties,
2 5
the r e s t r i c t i o n i n v o l v e d here pertains to the act o f r e f e r r i n g to some

p a r t i c u l a r perceptual p h e n o m e n o n and c l a i m i n g that i t has a defi
nite i d e n t i t y , o n l y this t i m e as a specific kind o f t h i n g . T h e reason
for a v o i d i n g statements such as 'this stone is w h i t e ' lies n o t o n l y i n
the fact that they seek to connect a perceptible p r o p e r t y to a specific
object v i a a copula w h i c h i m p l i e s that the p r o p e r t y belongs to i t . W e
n o w see that the idea o f the existence o f some determinate object (to
w h i c h we were t e m p t e d to attach the p r o p e r t y i n question) is also
misguided.
I n fact, b y e x t e n d i n g the l i n g u i s t i c restrictions so as to i n c l u d e
expressions w h i c h connect objects to determinate k i n d s , Socrates
is m e r e l y m a k i n g good o n c l a i m (2) i n passage ( A ) . T h e r e we were
t o l d that i t is i m p r o p e r to a t t r i b u t e to a n y t h i n g a determinate p r o
p e r t y or i d e n t i t y . D u r i n g his e x p o s i t i o n o f the t h e o r y Socrates h a d
26
concentrated exclusively o n properties. H e n o w shows w h y the l i n

guistic restrictions also i n c l u d e , as he h a d said earlier, a b a n o n say-
35
The collections 'man' and 'stone' are commonly, and in my opinion rightly, i n
terpreted as individual men and stones, which are bundles of individual perceptual
properties, and not as the general kind 'man' and 'stone', which are collections of
individual men and stones. For the particularist interpretation see Cornford, Know
ledge, 48; Bostock, Theaetetus, 68—78; Day, 'Perception', 60—1. For the opposing
view see L . Campbell, The Theaetetus of Plato, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1883), 62, and
L. Brown, 'Understanding the Theaetetus' ['Understanding'], Oxford Studies in An
cient Philosophy, 11 (1993), 199—224 at 207—8.
36
ouS' av TrpooeiTTOis 6p9cos ouS'
TL r t (152 D 2—3).
OTTOIOVOVV
i n g w h a t k i n d a t h i n g i s . W e can n o w u n d e r s t a n d precisely w h a t
27
was i m p l i e d i n claims (2) a n d (6) o f passage ( A ) a n d h o w they relate

to each other. I t is impossible to say o f w h a t sort a t h i n g is or w h a t
q u a l i t y i t has precisely because i t is i m p r o p e r to a p p l y the verb 'to
be' to any determinate perceptual object (picked o u t b y one o f the
f o r b i d d e n demonstratives) and couple i t w i t h a p r o p e r t y adjective
or a k i n d - t e r m .
T h e t h e o r y follows its l i n g u i s t i c restrictions w i t h the suggestion
t h a t other terms whose c o m b i n a t i o n carries n o adverse m e t a p h y s i
cal i m p l i c a t i o n s m i g h t be used as replacements for the t r a d i t i o n a l
a n d n o w b a n n e d vocabulary. W e have been t o l d that the appearance
to us o f s o m e t h i n g w h i t e i n no w a y i m p l i e s t h a t there is anywhere i n
p a r t i c u l a r some determinate object w h i c h is qualified b y this p r o
p e r t y and so warrants the assertion 'this (e.g. stone) is w h i t e ' . W h i l e
the t h e o r y seems to have n o q u a l m about the use o f the p r o p e r t y
adjective ' w h i t e ' o n such occasions, i t r e c o m m e n d s t h a t we replace
'is' w i t h 'comes to be' or 'changes' (157 B 6 - 7 ) , and p r e s u m a b l y i n
tends us to leave a l l demonstratives o u t o f the r e s u l t i n g expression.
T h e i n t e n d e d result o f these l i n g u i s t i c changes is to capture an i n
stance o f perceptual experience w i t h o u t m a k i n g any metaphysical
c o m m i t m e n t s as to the existence o f specifically locatable properties
w h i c h inhere i n p a r t i c u l a r objects. A t this stage o f his account o f the
theory, Socrates leaves i t unclear precisely w h a t f o r m the r e s u l t i n g
' l e g i t i m a t e ' assertions w h i c h c o n f o r m to the theory's metaphysics
w i l l take. Specifically, we do n o t k n o w w h a t terms w i l l designate
the subjects w h i c h w o u l d p r e v i o u s l y have been p i c k e d o u t b y either
a demonstrative or a k i n d - n a m e . T h i s o m i s s i o n , I show i n w h a t f o l
lows, is r e m e d i e d i n Socrates' e x a m i n a t i o n a n d r e f u t a t i o n o f the
theory, where he w i l l e x p l i c i t l y invoke the theory's alternative ex
pressions and a t t e m p t to cast d o u b t o n t h e i r v i a b i l i t y .
I n order to acquire a sufficient grasp o f the theory's l i n g u i s t i c re
strictions i t is crucial, t h e n , to r e m a i n clear about w h a t they do a n d
do n o t p e r t a i n to. W h i l e assertions p u r p o r t i n g to i d e n t i f y a n d l o
cate p a r t i c u l a r perceptual experiences are r u l e d out, the t h e o r y has
n o c o m p l a i n t w i t h assertions p u r p o r t i n g to describe general facts
about the relations o f abstract concepts. F o r example, i n c o n t r a d i s
t i n c t i o n to its c l a i m that n o t h i n g is itself active rather t h a n passive
(157 A 2-7)—a c l a i m w h i c h clearly pertains to p a r t i c u l a r qualified
37
Contra Day, 'Perception', 60—1: ' I t must be admitted that on any interpretation
the aggregates burst i n rather unexpectedly'
i8 Naly Thaler
o b j e c t s — t h e t h e o r y does n o t object to the idea t h a t a c t i v i t y or

28
passivity as such are d i s t i n c t and determinate concepts. N o r does

the i n h e r e n t falsity o f the expression 'this is a w h i t e t h i n g ' i m p l y
that 'whiteness' is n o t one o f the determinate species o f the genus
' t h i n g p e r c e i v e d ' . T h e flux t h e o r y is n o t , as some recent c o m m e n
29
tators have suggested, c o m m i t t e d to a f u l l - b l o w n denial o f language

b y means o f a general b a n o n the use o f subjects and p r e d i c a t e s . 30
I t also q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y has n o t h i n g against the v i a b i l i t y o f analytic

statements. A s l o n g as we r e m a i n i n the sphere o f abstract t r u t h s ,
31
there is n o t h i n g i n w h a t the t h e o r y says to p r o h i b i t the use o f the

verb 'to be', e.g. i n assertions such as 'whiteness is a t h i n g perceived'
or 'seeing is a p e r c e p t i o n ' . T h i s means t h a t the t h e o r y ' s tree o f ex
p l a n a t o r y concepts i n t r o d u c e d i n ( C i ) is c o m p l e t e l y unaffected b y
the revisions to language p r o p o s e d i n ( C 3 ) . W h a t is m e a n t to be u n
d e r m i n e d b y these restrictions is n o t the a b i l i t y to frame a t h e o r y
about the nature o f experience, b u t the substantially m o r e l i m i t e d
practice o f d e s c r i b i n g t h a t experience b y a t t r i b u t i n g determinate
properties a n d qualifications to specific o b j e c t s . 32
I n fact, the o n l y case where a determinate concept w h i c h belongs

to the t h e o r y ' s scientific apparatus can safely be used to q u a l i f y a
perceived p a r t i c u l a r is t h a t o f the highest genus, change. W e have
seen t h a t n o t o n l y p e r c e p t u a l p r o p e r t i e s such as whiteness b u t also
the m o r e abstract concepts ' a c t i v i t y ' and 'passivity' cannot be at-
3 8
T h e indeterminacy i n regard to being active or passive is said to stem from the
contingency of meeting different objects at different times, which is relevant strictly
to particulars.
3 9
Burnyeat, 'Appearances', 78, fails to recognize this important feature of the the
ory. He claims that 'there is no unqualified predicate "white" to be abstracted from
its predicative position and made the subject of the definitional question "what is
white?". There is no such thing as being white simpliciter, only white for you and
white for me.' As I have shown, the theory does attempt to place 'whiteness' (not
'white' as Burnyeat has it) i n a determinate web of conceptual relations which allow
it to be denned. For this claim see Sedley, Midwife, 93.
3 0
3 1
Contra Silverman, 'Flux', 139, who claims that i f the theory does not ban such
statements Socrates' refutation w i l l not succeed. Silverman's claims pertain to flux
after its radicalization i n 181 c—182 A. But, as I shall show in what follows, at no time
is a ban on abstract concepts included i n the theory's linguistic commitments.
3 3
One should note that i f the linguistic restrictions espoused by the theory were
meant to apply to assertions about general concepts and were not limited to per
ceptual particulars as I am suggesting, the result would have been a straightforward
and immediately apparent refutation of Theaetetus' definition of knowledge. A l l that
would be required to achieve this would be to point out that the metaphysical theory
his definition accepts as a support undermines the possibility of framing that same
definition. Consequently, there would be no real need for the elaborate multi-step
argument Socrates introduces at 182c 1—183 B 5.
t r i b u t e d to any perceived particular. B u t this m e r e l y reinforces the
idea t h a t change itself is always applicable to i t . I f n o p a r t i c u l a r has
any determinate p r o p e r t y or i d e n t i t y o f its o w n , this e n d u r i n g fact
about i t can be c a p t u r e d b y saying t h a t i t is i n h e r e n t l y a c h a n g i n g
thing. 3 3
II
I t s h o u l d n o w be possible to see t h a t the r e f o r m o f language p r o

posed b y the flux t h e o r y is itself h i g h l y conducive to the v i a b i l i t y
of Theaetetus' o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n . T h i s is because the s t r i n g e n t re
strictions i m p o s e d b y the t h e o r y o n expressions p e r t a i n i n g to the
w o r l d o f p a r t i c u l a r s are a g o o d w a y o f e l i m i n a t i n g any c o n t e n t i o n
f r o m the field o f p e r c e p t i o n . T h e l i n g u i s t i c restrictions are m e a n t
to discourage us f r o m c o u c h i n g o u r perceptions i n l i n g u i s t i c as
sertions w h i c h are determinate e n o u g h to be refuted b y other such
assertions. W e were t o l d that the basic b u i l d i n g blocks o f f a m i l i a r
assertions about p a r t i c u l a r s (terms such as ' t h i s ' , ' t h a t ' , ' i s ' , etc.) are
i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the nature o f the p h e n o m e n a they are m e a n t to
express since they i m p l y s t a b i l i t y and determinate i d e n t i t y where
i n fact there is o n l y flux. Consequently, the v e r y use o f t h e m to
express a perceptual experience necessarily produces a falsehood.
B u t d e v o i d o f these f a m i l i a r terms, assertions about perceptual ex
perience w i l l lack the sort o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d specification w h i c h
w o u l d a l l o w t h e m to stand i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to other such assertions.
A n d i f the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e w a y to give l i n g u i s t i c expression to per
ceptual experience is b y p r o d u c i n g assertions about i t w h i c h cannot
be c o n t r a d i c t e d , the t h e o r y has f o u n d a w a y o f s h o w i n g t h a t per
ceptions are i n fact irrefutable, thus p r o m o t i n g t h e m to the status
of k n o w l e d g e .34
3 3
This, I believe, reinforces my suggestion (n. 18) as to why Socrates' account i n
(C) reverts from the earlier 'everything is i n change' to 'everything is change'. The
former description still takes for granted the folk ontology of identifiable particular
objects and their inherent properties. But since according to the detailed account
in (C) no particular object stably belongs to any general category other than that of
change, it is i n some sense more appropriate to say that everything that exists is (a
form of) change than that it is some determinate thing which undergoes change.
3 4
Note that immediately after introducing the restrictions, Socrates claims on be
half of the theory that anyone who does not follow the restrictions, and instead makes
things stand still in speech, is easily refuted (o>? i d v r t rt? orr/ay TCU Adyaj, eveXeyKros
6 TOVTO 7roicov, 157 B 7—8). What he means, I think, is not that it w i l l be easy to refute
20 Naly Thaler
I f this analysis o f the flux theory's l i n g u i s t i c claims is correct, i t

s h o u l d also be clear that the t h e o r y does n o t p r o v i d e direct s u p p o r t
for the b r o a d construal o f the m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e . E n t e r t a i n
35
i n g the idea that Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n is equivalent to an u n r e s t r i c

ted version o f Protagoras' m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e meant e x t e n d i n g
the n o t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n so as to i n c l u d e a n y t h i n g w h i c h 'seems' to
one to be the case. B u t i t s h o u l d n o w be clear that the secret d o c t r i n e
itself assigns i n f a l l i b i l i t y o n l y to bare perceptions. J u d g m e n t s about
general matters o f fact, or h o w these 'seem' to one to be, do n o t have
t h e i r t r u t h guaranteed b y the t h e o r y i n any w a y whatsoever. 36
B u t one m i g h t be w o r r i e d b y the fact that the l i n g u i s t i c restric

tions o f the secret d o c t r i n e seem to make i t i n c o m p a t i b l e n o t o n l y
w i t h b r o a d Protagoreanism, b u t also w i t h a n a r r o w version o f the
m a n - m e a s u r e doctrine. A f t e r a l l , a n a r r o w m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e
seems to be c o m m i t t e d to the simultaneous t r u t h o f t w o appar
e n t l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y perceptual j u d g e m e n t s ( y o u say 'the w i n d is
c o l d ' , I say 'the w i n d is w a r m ' ) , whereas the flux t h e o r y abolishes
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n the sphere o f p e r c e p t i o n b y p u r
g i n g language o f the means to express i t . Rather t h a n accepting
the simultaneous t r u t h o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y perceptual j u d g e m e n t s , the
secret d o c t r i n e e x p l i c i t l y claims that any statement w h i c h can i n
p r i n c i p l e be c o n t r a d i c t e d is false since i t necessarily contains c o m
m i t m e n t s about s t a b i l i t y a n d determinateness w h i c h are c o n t r a r y
to fact. A n d i t w i l l n o t help to q u a l i f y the simultaneously true per
ceptual j u d g e m e n t s i n q u e s t i o n b y a d d i n g to t h e m 'for m e ' and 'for
y o u ' respectively, as m i g h t be suggested f r o m Socrates' earlier de
s c r i p t i o n o f the m a n - m e a s u r e d o c t r i n e i n 152 A 6 - C 3: the theory's
l i n g u i s t i c restrictions also i n c l u d e an e x p l i c i t b a n o n precisely such
'definite' p r o n o u n s (157B 4). O n the face o f i t , then, Protagoras'
p o p u l a r d o c t r i n e a n d his esoteric one are i n c o m p a t i b l e .
T h i s w o r r y q u i c k l y disappears once we note that Socrates d i d
n o t a t t r i b u t e to Protagoras the c l a i m that o n each occasion w h e n
t w o people say 'this w i n d is w a r m (for m e ) ' a n d 'this w i n d is c o l d
h i m from a theoretical standpoint (by showing that his ontological presuppositions

are defunct), but rather that i n saying 'this stone is white' he immediately exposes
himself to the threat of contradiction by someone saying 'this stone is not white'.
35
Contra Silverman, ' F l u x ' , 122.
3 6
That the flux theory's scope is narrower than that of broad Protagoreanism
should come as no surprise when we consider the fact that its refutation is carried
out only after the broad-scoped man—measure doctrine has been refuted.
(for m e ) ' t h e y are b o t h c o r r e c t . W h a t he says is t h a t o n each occa

s i o n w h e n the w i n d appears to t h e m w a r m a n d c o l d respectively,
i t is so for t h e m . I n fact, each t i m e Socrates describes the man-
measure d o c t r i n e i n t e r m s w h i c h m i g h t be t h o u g h t to be later for
b i d d e n i n ( C 3 ) , w h a t he a c t u a l l y does is describe t r u t h s p e r t a i n i n g
to perceivers i n general, a n d n o t statements m a d e by perceivers o n
the occasion o f p e r c e p t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I have
suggested, such general, t h e o r e t i c a l statements are n o t f o r b i d d e n b y
the theory. Socrates can say t h a t t h i n g s are for each p e r s o n as t h e y
appear to h i m and, at the same t i m e , w a r n against u s i n g a s t a t e m e n t
such as ' t h i s x is y for m e ' to express one's p e r c e p t u a l experience o n
any g i v e n o c c a s i o n . 37
I n fact, i t is p r e c i s e l y because t h i n g s are w h a t
t h e y are o n l y relative to each i n d i v i d u a l t h a t assertions such as ' t h i s
x is y for m e ' are i n h e r e n t l y false: as we have seen, ' t h i s ' , ' i s ' , a n d u l
t i m a t e l y even ' f o r m e ' i m p l y the i n h e r e n c e o f p r o p e r t i e s a n d hence
c a n n o t be used to convey the t r u t h a b o u t the experience o f p e r c e p
t i o n on the particular occasion when that experience occurs. 38
U l t i m a t e l y , the secret d o c t r i n e ' s l i n g u i s t i c r e s t r i c t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e

an a t t e m p t to guarantee the t r u t h o f T h e a e t e t u s ' o r i g i n a l definition
b y e x t r e m e means: detach the c o n t e n t o f p e r c e p t i o n f r o m any de
t e r m i n a t e l i n g u i s t i c expression o f i t , a n d c l a i m t h a t w h a t seem l i k e
3 7
So while I agree w i t h Burnyeat's view ('Appearances', 77) that the flux theory's
support for the man—measure doctrine lies i n showing that objects are qualified only
relative to perceivers, my claim is that this constitutes only part of its intended sup
port. Its complement comes in the form of the claim that because such is the nature
of perceptual properties, one must refrain from making determinate assertions about
them (even ones which specify the perceiver i n relation to w h o m the property ap
pears).
3 8
Fine, 'Conflicting Appearances', in her Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected
Essays [Plato] (Oxford, 2003), 161—83 7 > claims that the flux theory is meant to
a t I I — 2
support a Protagorean position according to which objects really are as they seem to
each perceiver (a position she labels 'infallibilism'). She claims (against Burnyeat's
view) that the theory does not object to the idea that an object perceived as white
really is so, but only to the idea that it is so i n itself (which, according to Fine, means
something like 'is stably white'). But this interpretation stands i n flat contradiction
to the theory's proposed linguistic restrictions, which ban all statements such as 'this
stone is white'. I n fact, these restrictions show that, contrary to Fine's claims, there is
no real difference for the theory between an object's being white and its being white
in itself. T h e theory's claim, which was made in (A) and (B), that nothing has any
property i n itself is just the theoretical corollary to the claim i n (C3) that one cannot
use the verb 'to be' on any specific occasion to describe the contents of one's percep
tual experience. For a similar misconstrual of the theory's linguistic restrictions see
L . Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation {Refutation] (Cambridge, 2010), 211—12, who
claims that 'on that theory [i.e. the original secret doctrine] whenever I was seeing
the stone as white I was entitled to say . . . "The stone is white", and my utterance
would have been incorrigible for me.'
22 Naly Thaler
c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d r e f u t a t i o n i n the sphere o f perceptual experience

( I say 'this is h o t ' , y o u say 'this is c o l d ' ) are a l l due to the fact t h a t
the usual f o r m s o f expression i n w h i c h perceptual experiences are
couched are i l l - s u i t e d for t h e i r representation. Once the familiar
and m i s l e a d i n g v o c a b u l a r y o f p e r c e p t i o n ( ' t h i s ' , 'is') is discarded,
we are left w i t h innocuous assertions w h i c h c a r r y no determinate
c o m m i t m e n t s ( w h i c h another perceptual statement m a y c o n t r a d i c t )
that some specific t h i n g is qualified b y the perceived quality. T h e
theory's restrictions confine such use o f determinate language to the
expression o f general or theoretical t r u t h s about the w o r l d . Since
the interrelations between abstract concepts are i n p r i n c i p l e stable,
one can f o r m u l a t e determinate assertions (using the verb 'to be',
t h o u g h n a t u r a l l y n o t demonstratives) w h i c h t r u l y describe t h e m .
A c c o r d i n g to the theory, t h e n , p r o p e r use o f language robs us o f the
means to c o n t r a d i c t each other's assertions about p a r t i c u l a r percep
tual experiences, a n d this makes these experiences irrefutable, thus
p r o m o t i n g t h e m to the status o f k n o w l e d g e . A t the same t i m e , the
39
t h e o r y allows us the l i n g u i s t i c means to express this e p i s t e m o l o g i -

cal i n s i g h t b y f r a m i n g the determinate theoretical statement 'per
c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e ' .
40
I f this is the gist o f the secret d o c t r i n e , we s h o u l d be i n a good

p o s i t i o n to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w i l l be at stake i n its r e f u t a t i o n . I f the
r e f u t a t i o n is to t o u c h the substance o f the theory, i t m u s t show t h a t
the idea t h a t determinate, i.e. p o t e n t i a l l y refutable, assertions be
l o n g o n l y i n the sphere o f abstract t r u t h b u t are inapplicable to par
ticular perceptible experience is untenable. Socrates m u s t show t h a t
there is some incoherence i n the idea t h a t we can assert a d e t e r m i
nate t r u t h about general matters o f fact, such as the c l a i m that per
c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e (a c l a i m w h i c h can be c o n t r a d i c t e d b y several
other c o m p a r a b l y general claims), i f we cannot make c o r r e s p o n d
i n g l y determinate assertions about any o f o u r p a r t i c u l a r perceptual
experiences.
3 9
Remember that in this first part of the dialogue, knowledge is mainly tied to the
idea of irrefutability (152c 5-6; 179 c I - D 1).
4 0
One of the benefits of the interpretation I am offering is that it dissolves the
difficulty of seeing how the flux theory, which is meant to support the idea that per
ceptions are true only relative to each perceiver, can itself be presented as an absolute
truth about perception. For statements of the difficulty see Silverman, 'Flux', 120;
G. Fine, 'Protagorean Relativisms' i n ead., Plato, 132—59 at 142—3.
III
T h e p r o p e r s t a r t i n g p o i n t for an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the t h e o r y o f flux,

Socrates claims, is to disambiguate its basic c l a i m that e v e r y t h i n g
is i n change. Since i t is possible to recognize t w o d i s t i n c t k i n d s o f
change, i t is unclear w h e t h e r the flux theorists mean to say that
e v e r y t h i n g always partakes o f o n l y one k i n d or o f b o t h . Socrates
describes the first k i n d o f change as the s h i f t i n g f r o m one place
to another, or a t u r n i n g a r o u n d i n one place (181 c 6 - 7 ) , whereas
the second k i n d consists o f an a l t e r a t i o n i n quality, such as g r o w
i n g older, t u r n i n g black f r o m b e i n g w h i t e , or h a r d f r o m b e i n g soft,
w h i l e staying i n the same place (181 c 9—D 3). I n the l i g h t o f this
d i s t i n c t i o n , Socrates asks, w h a t precisely do the flux theorists m e a n
b y p o s i t i n g u n i v e r s a l change? A r e they c o m m i t t e d to the idea that
e v e r y t h i n g always changes i n b o t h ways, or do they c l a i m that some
t h i n g s move i n b o t h these ways w h i l e others i n o n l y one o f them?
T h e r e p l y g i v e n o n behalf o f the flux theorists, that e v e r y t h i n g
b o t h moves a n d alters, has been a s t i c k i n g p o i n t i n the a t t e m p t to
present the ensuing a r g u m e n t as a cogent r e f u t a t i o n o f the flux doc
t r i n e . Since there seems to be n o apparent reason for the t h e o r y
to accept this radical r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f its u n d e r l y i n g thesis about
change, and since the r e f u t a t i o n seems to require precisely this re
f o r m u l a t i o n o f flux i n order to reach its c o n c l u s i o n , readers are left
w i t h the u n c o m f o r t a b l e feeling that the o r i g i n a l , less radical flux
t h e o r y remains u n t o u c h e d b y Socrates' p u r p o r t e d r e f u t a t i o n o f i t . 4 1
Recently, attempts have been made to save the r e f u t a t i o n f r o m

this charge b y a r g u i n g that the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f flux is i n fact re
q u i r e d i f the t h e o r y is to achieve its i n t e n d e d f u n c t i o n o f securing
the epistemological thesis r e g a r d i n g the i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f p e r c e p t i o n .42
A c c o r d i n g to this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b y c o n s t r u i n g b o t h perceptions
a n d t h e i r p r o p e r objects as essentially p r i v a t e affairs, the o r i g i n a l
f o r m u l a t i o n o f the flux t h e o r y was able to show that n o external
c r i t e r i a c o u l d ever be used i n order to cast d o u b t o n the veracity
o f one's perceptions. B u t now, i n the course o f the e x a m i n a t i o n o f
the flux theory, Socrates a n d T h e o d o r u s come to realize that the
41
For an argument against the validity of foisting on the flux theorists a radical
version of flux see McDowell, Theaetetus, 180.
4 3
The interpretation was first suggested by Burnyeat, Theaetetus, 49—51, and has
been supported by N . Denyer, Language, Thought and Falsehood in Greek Philosophy
(London, 1991), 102—3; Sedley Midwife, 92—3; and, Day, 'Perception', 77.
24 Naly Thaler
r e l a t i v i z a t i o n a n d p r i v a t i z a t i o n o f perceptual properties are insuffi

cient to secure the i n f a l l i b i l i t y o f t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g perceptions.
T h e r e is s t i l l the p o s s i b i l i t y that a perceiver w i l l m i s i d e n t i f y his o w n
private perceptual content, a n d so p r o d u c e a false j u d g e m e n t as to
w h i c h p e r c e p t i o n he (and he alone) is c u r r e n t l y experiencing. I n
order to close this gap i n the theory, Socrates radicalizes flux so
that i n a d d i t i o n to b e i n g p r i v a t e , perceptions are n o w agreed to
shift i n q u a l i t y as they are b e i n g experienced. A c c o r d i n g to this
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f flux is achieved b y e n d o w i n g
perceptible properties, whose essence f o r m e r l y consisted i n spatial
m o t i o n , w i t h q u a l i t a t i v e a l t e r a t i o n as w e l l . Once this n e w f o r m o f
change has been added to t h e m , there remains n o t h i n g sufficiently
determinate for perceivers to be w r o n g about i n t h e i r j u d g e m e n t s
about t h e i r p r i v a t e sphere o f experience, a n d the i n f a l l i b i l i t y thesis
is thus v i n d i c a t e d .
T h e r e are several reasons to d o u b t this a d m i t t e d l y ingenious i n
t e r p r e t a t i o n . F i r s t , the m o t i v a t i o n i t attributes to the Heracliteans
for accepting radical flux is conspicuously absent f r o m the text. I n
fact, o n the t w o separate occasions where the m o t i v a t i o n for incor
p o r a t i n g b o t h k i n d s o f change i n t o the t h e o r y is m e n t i o n e d ( 1 8 1 E
5-7; 182 c 8), e n s u r i n g the comprehensiveness o f flux is presented
as an end i n itself a n d n o t as a device for securing some f u r t h e r
r e s u l t . Since there seems to be n o p a r t i c u l a r reason i n this c o n
43
text for Plato to h i d e the real m o t i v a t i o n for accepting b o t h k i n d s

of change (indeed, i f this was the theory's m o t i v a t i o n , there w o u l d
clearly be good reasons for m a k i n g i t e x p l i c i t ) , i t seems better to take
seriously the reason we are actually g i v e n , a n d a t t e m p t to under
stand w h y the flux t h e o r y w o u l d abhor a v a c u u m o f one k i n d o f
change.
M o r e o v e r , i n the l i g h t o f the flux theory's l i n g u i s t i c restrictions,
i t is unclear w h a t perceptual j u d g e m e n t s one c o u l d make i n p r i v a t e
that w o u l d be susceptible to the threat o f error. A f t e r a l l , the flux
t h e o r y d i d n o t c l a i m that one s h o u l d m e r e l y r e f r a i n f r o m d i s p l a y i n g
i n p u b l i c the sorts o f assertions about p a r t i c u l a r s w h i c h , i t h a d ar
gued, were necessarily fallacious. These f o r b i d d e n assertions were
presented as i n h e r e n t l y erroneous ways o f c o n s t r u i n g the nature o f
4 3
See Brown, 'Understanding', 212, and M . - K . Lee, Epistemology after
Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus [Episte
mology] (Oxford, 2005), 116—17, for the same worry about the 'epistemological'
solution.
p a r t i c u l a r s . A f a i t h f u l disciple o f the t h e o r y o f change w i l l there
fore n o t even u t t e r to himself, u p o n an instance o f p e r c e p t i o n , an
expression such as 'this stick is w h i t e ' . So the p u r p o r t e d p r o b l e m
4 4
of ' i n t e r n a l error' o n w h i c h this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n

of flux is based never really arises. 45
I believe the m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d the theory's acceptance o f b o t h

k i n d s o f change is m o r e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t h a n i t has been made o u t to
be. I t is to be f o u n d h a l f a page p r i o r to the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the dis
t i n c t i o n between k i n d s o f change. I n 180 D 7—E 5, before b e g i n n i n g
the detailed r e f u t a t i o n o f the theory, Socrates r e m i n d s T h e o d o r u s
of the c o n t e n d i n g d o c t r i n e — d e s c r i b e d as the c o n t r a r y o f flux a n d
a t t r i b u t e d to the followers o f Melissus and Parmenides—according
to w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g is at rest. N o w , i t s h o u l d be n o t e d that the t w o
forms o f m o t i o n i n t r o d u c e d at 181 c 3 - D 3 a n d later embraced b y
the flux t h e o r y correspond to the t w o forms o f rest associated w i t h
b o t h these t h i n k e r s . W h i l e the succinct e x p l a n a t i o n o f their p o s i t i o n
i n 180 E 3-4 emphasizes the M e l i s s i a n n o t i o n o f spatial i m m o b i l i t y ,
the q u o t a t i o n w h i c h introduces i t p r e s u m a b l y comes f r o m Parme
nides, whose o w n n o t i o n o f 'changelessness' includes a b a n o n b o t h
spatial m o t i o n a n d qualitative alteration. I n fact, i n B 8. 38-41 Par
menides e x p l i c i t l y contrasts his o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f the changeless
ness o f w h a t is (ovXov aKiv-qrov T ' e/xerat, B 8. 38) w i t h the names
'to shift place and to exchange b r i g h t c o l o u r ' (jonov aWdaamv Sid
re xP° a
4 °
>av v
o-fieifieiv, B 8. 41) w h i c h m o r t a l s use to speak about
being. N o w , presumably, this v i e w w h i c h Parmenides attributes to
the o r d i n a r y r u n o f h u m a n i t y , that b o t h spatial m o t i o n a n d q u a l i t a
tive a l t e r a t i o n occur i n the w o r l d , does n o t i n c l u d e the c o m m i t m e n t
that they occur everywhere at once. So, i f the flux theorists' p o s i -
4 4
Remember also that according to the argument i n (B) (154 A 7—8), an i n d i v i
dual is wrong to suppose that he is experiencing the same perception on two distinct
occasions. This means that the correctives which the theory proposes to ordinary
speech about perception also pertain to determinate assertions (i.e. ones using 'this'
and 'is') made i n private about the nature of a particular perceptual experience. The
linguistic restrictions imply that the assertion a perceiver uses to express his percep
tual experience ('this stone is white') is false even when he utters it once and only to
himself.
4 5
T h i s is one strong reason to doubt Burnyeat's interpretation of 179 c 2—5,
which I mentioned at the outset of this paper (see n. 1 above). Burnyeat claims
that the distinction alluded to i n those lines between perceptions and perceptual
judgements provides the basis for the alleged later worry about private judgements
about perceptual experience being erroneous. As should now be clear, the construal
of Theaetetus' definition according to the secret doctrine makes any such distinction
impossible.
26 Naly Thaler
t i o n is to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h a t o f the o r d i n a r y m a n , they m u s t
go one better, and c l a i m t h a t b o t h f o r m s o f change are constant and
u b i q u i t o u s . T h e t u g o f war between the c h a m p i o n s o f rest and
46
the Heracliteans (181 A 1-4) i m p l i e s t h a t a certain logical r e l a t i o n

holds between t h e i r positions. Since the p o s i t i o n o f the advocates o f
rest includes lack o f b o t h m o t i o n a n d alteration, and since the v i e w
that m o t i o n a n d a l t e r a t i o n exist i n t e r m i t t e n t l y is already spoken for
by the o r d i n a r y m a n , the H e r a c l i t e a n d o c t r i n e w h i c h is defined as
the c o n t r a r y o f the P a r m e n i d e a n p o s i t i o n m u s t carry a c o m m i t m e n t
to the all-prevalence o f b o t h f o r m s o f change. T h i s explains w h y
T h e o d o r u s treats the comprehensiveness o f change as i f i t were a
c o n d i t i o n w h i c h the flux theorists themselves w o u l d accept as ne
cessary for m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r u n i q u e p o s i t i o n .
A f t e r securing the agreement t h a t flux encompasses b o t h f o r m s o f
change, and before the actual a r g u m e n t against i t , Plato has Socra
tes restate the theory's m a i n tenets, at 182 A 4 - B 7. C o m m e n t a t o r s
are u n a n i m o u s i n t r e a t i n g this restatement as c o n t a i n i n g n o n e w
i n f o r m a t i o n apart f r o m the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the t e r m ' q u a l i t y ' (77010-
T-qs), whose significance is carefully e x p l a i n e d to T h e o d o r u s at 182 A
8 - B 3. B u t the fact t h a t these lines constitute the c h r i s t e n i n g o f a
t e r m w h i c h has since become an inseparable p a r t o f o u r p h i l o s o p h i
cal (and everyday) v o c a b u l a r y has obscured the fact t h a t its i n t r o
d u c t i o n is n o t i n t e n d e d b y Plato as an isolated n o v e l t y b u t is m e a n t
to i m p o r t a premiss w h i c h goes o n to play a significant role i n the
i m m e d i a t e l y subsequent a r g u m e n t . T o see this, notice t h a t Soc
47
rates does rather m o r e t h a n m e r e l y elucidate the m e a n i n g o f a n e w

t e r m he has i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the discussion. H e claims t h a t the t e r m
4 6
This, I think, constitutes good reason to suppose that the quotation in 180 E i
is some version or perversion of Parmenides B 8. 38. I f we do, we get the satisfying
result of seeing the immediate origin of the contrast in our passage between the com
mitment to changelessness and the flux theorists' commitment to change i n respect
of both space and quality. M y speculative conjecture is that Plato chose to quote or
paraphrase B 8. 38 at 180 E 1 precisely because he remembered that it formed part of
a cluster of lines in which being changeless was contrasted w i t h the ordinary man's
view of the world, which takes it to include both movement i n space and alteration
in quality. But even if this suggestion about the direct origin of Plato's quotation is
dismissed as merely speculative, it remains a fact that Parmenides' B 8. 38—41 con
tains the precise contrast that is also found i n our passages, between being aKivr/Tov
and change i n respect of space and quality.
4 7
Silverman, ' F l u x ' , 140, sees the significance of the introduction of the term
'quality' i n its highlighting the importance of the offspring (which are species of
qualities) of perception for the proof that follows. According to Silverman, it w i l l be
the theory's concession that abstract qualities are i n flux that w i l l enable Socrates to
refute it.
' q u a l i t y ' seems o d d a n d u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to T h e o d o r u s since i t s i g n i

fies m a n y t h i n g s collected together (lows ovv 17 TTOIOTTJS dfia OLXXOKOTOV
T€ (f>aiV€Tai ovojia KCLI ov jiavBdveis dBpoov Xeyojievov, 182 A 8—B i ) . T h e
way to make T h e o d o r u s u n d e r s t a n d this n e w t e r m , he claims, is to
cite familiar m o r e specific examples (Kara i^pi] ovv aKovc, 182 B I )
o f the k i n d s o f t h i n g s w h i c h fall u n d e r i t , such as 'heat' and ' w h i t e
ness'. I t is o n l y b y t h i n k i n g about these f a m i l i a r cases one b y one
a n d t h e n t a k i n g t h e m together t h a t T h e o d o r u s can make the cog
n i t i v e leap necessary for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m o r e abstract concept
u n d e r w h i c h they are s u b s u m e d .
T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l or c o g n i t i v e c o m m i t m e n t r e g a r d i n g the
m a n n e r i n w h i c h general abstract terms can become i n t e l l i g i b l e to
us is h i g h l y significant i n the c o n t e x t o f the flux theory. Recall that
the t h e o r y was c o m m i t t e d i n ( C i ) to an ordered h i e r a r c h y o f c o n
cepts whose span extends f r o m the o v e r a r c h i n g concept 'change' to
the lowest nameable species o f perceptions a n d perceptible p r o p e r
ties. B u t at the t i m e o f expressing its c o m m i t m e n t to the existence
o f t h a t hierarchy, the flux t h e o r y p u t f o r t h n o p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m as to
h o w these concepts o f v a r y i n g generality are a c q u i r e d . N o w , w i t h
the i n t r o d u c t i o n a n d i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f a new technical t e r m i n t o
the flux t h e o r y ' s o w n h i e r a r c h y o f concepts, Socrates makes, a n d
T h e o d o r u s accepts, precisely such a c o m m i t m e n t . O u r a b i l i t y to
make use o f general m o r e theoretical a n d abstract concepts depends
o n a p r i o r f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the m o r e p a r t i c u l a r species w h i c h fall
u n d e r t h e m . I n the course o f the o r i g i n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the c o n
ceptual tree w h i c h underlies the flux t h e o r y Socrates d i d n o t press
the q u e s t i o n o f epistemic p r i o r i t y . N o w , unless T h e o d o r u s objects
t h a t there are other ways o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the t e r m ' q u a l i t y ' w h i c h
do n o t involve an appeal to its m o r e p a r t i c u l a r species such as
heat a n d whiteness, Socrates has i n effect secured an i m p o r t a n t
concession f r o m the theory, a concession w h i c h he w i l l presently
use against i t : o u r a b i l i t y to access the c o n t e n t o f the m o r e abstract
terms i n a conceptual system depends o n a p r i o r acquaintance w i t h
the m o r e p a r t i c u l a r ones w h i c h fall u n d e r them. " 4 8
W i t h the a d m i s s i o n t h a t the i n i t i a l c o g n i t i v e access to general a n d

4 8
I t is important to emphasize what Socrates does not claim here. T h e idea of
the cognitive priority of the particular pertains to the relation of abstract properties
of varying specificity, such as 'whiteness' and 'quality'. I t says nothing about the
relation between perceptual judgements (e.g. 'this stone is white') and the abstract
concept 'whiteness'. I t also says and implies nothing regarding the relation between
raw sense data and either perceptual judgements or abstract perceptual concepts.
28 Naly Thaler
abstract concepts occurs v i a t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r species n o w secured,

Socrates proceeds to present the e x p l i c i t o p e n i n g moves o f refuta
t i o n . H e claims (182 C 9—11) that i f flux h a d i n c l u d e d o n l y spatial
m o t i o n , i t w o u l d have been possible to specify i n some w a y w i t h
w h a t q u a l i t y the m o v i n g t h i n g s flow (eixofiev av TTOV elireiv oia arret
P<EL ra. êpo/xera). B u t since the change w h i c h afflicts e v e r y t h i n g c o n
sists o f alteration as w e l l as m o t i o n , he n o w says:
(1) since not even this remains, that the flowing thing flows white, but i t
changes, so that (2) there is a flow of this thing also, of whiteness, and a
change of it into another colour, lest i t be convicted of staying still i n this
respect, (3) is i t ever possible to call anything by the name colour, so that
this naming w i l l also be correct? (182D 1-5)
These o p e n i n g lines o f the r e f u t a t i o n , w h i c h I have d i v i d e d i n t o

three separate claims, raise several issues whose r e s o l u t i o n is c r u
cial for a p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the a r g u m e n t . C o m m e n t a t o r s are
i n agreement that c l a i m (2) is s i m p l y a r e i t e r a t i o n o f (1), so t h a t 'the
f l o w i n g t h i n g ' (TO piov) w h i c h does n o t abide as w h i t e is the p r o
p e r t y whiteness m e n t i o n e d i n (2). T h e y disagree, however, about
w h e t h e r w h a t is referred to is the general p r o p e r t y w h i t e n e s s or a 49
p a r t i c u l a r instance o f i t .5 0
As a first step towards i d e n t i f y i n g 'the f l o w i n g t h i n g ' , I w o u l d like

to p o i n t o u t that this disagreement rests o n a mistake. ' T h e f l o w
ing t h i n g ' i n 182D 1-2, whose flow does n o t abide as w h i t e (and
w h i c h is an instance o f ra êpo/xera, 'the m o v i n g t h i n g s ' m e n t i o n e d
earlier i n 182 c 10 whose flow q u a l i t y c o u l d n o t be specified), can
not be the p r o p e r t y whiteness, i n either its p a r t i c u l a r or general
m a n i f e s t a t i o n . T h i s is because the flux t h e o r y consistently avoids
51
4 9
M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 181—4; Silverman, 'Flux', 141.
5 0
Bostock, Theaetetus, 104; Burnyeat, Theaetetus, 51; Sedley, Midwife, 92; Casta-
gnoli, Refutation, 210, 211.
51
A common corollary of the interpretation of the flowing thing as the property
whiteness is the idea that the distinction between spatial motion and qualitative al
teration is meant to be understood as equivalent to the earlier distinction between
fast and slow changes which had accounted for the difference between offspring and
parents (see e.g. M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 181; Sedley, Midwife, 92—3; Castagnoli, Re
futation, 209—10). According to this line of thought, by accepting that everything
both moves and alters the theory must now accept that qualities (i.e. fast changes)
such as whiteness do not only travel i n space but also alter qualitatively. But, as has
been noted in the past (see Campbell, Theaetetus, 58—9, 147; Day, 'Perception', 64),
the identification of slow change w i t h qualitative alteration and of fast change w i t h
spatial motion is unlikely because of the verbal inconsistencies it creates (spatial mo
tion is described i n terms which echo the earlier description of the slow motion of the
r e f e r r i n g to a p r o p e r t y such as 'whiteness' as i f i t were s o m e t h i n g

q u a l i f i e d b y t h a t p r o p e r t y A s we have r e p e a t e d l y seen, expressions
u s i n g the adjectival f o r m o f a p r o p e r t y n o u n c o u p l e d w i t h a s u b
j e c t , such as 'the w h i t e t h i n g ' , are reserved for objects o f p e r c e p t i o n
such as w h i t e sticks and stones, w h i c h are c a r e f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m whiteness i t s e l f . 52
Since Socrates takes care to reiterate t h i s
d i s t i n c t i o n i n his s u m m a r y o f the f l u x d o c t r i n e w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y
precedes the r e f u t a t i o n (182 A 7 - B 3), i t seems i m p l a u s i b l e t h a t he
w o u l d t h e n p r o c e e d to i g n o r e i t and i n t e n d the subject o f the phrase
'the f l o w i n g t h i n g flows w h i t e ' to refer to w h i t e n e s s . 53
B u t i f the expression i n q u e s t i o n refers to p a r t i c u l a r qualified

t h i n g s a n d n o t to p r o p e r t y m o t i o n s , w h y does Socrates n o w insist
o n r e f e r r i n g to t h e m so c r y p t i c a l l y i n s t e a d o f u s i n g t h e i r m o r e f a m i
liar designations, e.g. 'a w h i t e stick' or 'a w h i t e stone'? T h e reason is
t h a t he is here i n v o k i n g and t h e n d i s m i s s i n g the t h e o r y ' s a t t e m p t s ,
w h i c h we e n c o u n t e r e d i n ( C 3 ) , to replace the o r d i n a r y language o f
p e r c e p t i o n w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e expressions t h a t are i n n o c u o u s w i t h re
spect to t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e t h e o r y h a d p r e v i o u s l y
parents). I n addition, as I have argued, the distinction between motion and alteration
does not refer to any internal feature of the original theory, but rather to the logical
requirements of a position which is the contrary of that espoused by Parmenides and
Melissus.
5 3
M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 183, who is aware of the discrepancy between his inter
pretation and the theory's repeated insistence that we use colour adjectives to refer to
qualified objects and not to their properties, nevertheless claims that since whiteness
is described by the theory as an efflux of colour ' i t would seem quite natural to say
that such an efflux is white'. This, I believe, is seriously mistaken. First, the efflux
of colour does not deserve to be designated 'white' since it is not anything which
is perceived by anyone. As we have seen, property adjectives are used by the the
ory to designate phenomena that are always perceiver-dependent. T h e efflux which
constitutes whiteness is a scientific construct meant to explain these phenomena and
which need not have any colour at all in order to fulfil that function. I n fact, i f the
efflux is itself white, we must now ask how it came to be so qualified. Answering
this question would necessitate positing another set of motions, and then of course
(assuming the new colour efflux between them can legitimately be called 'white' as
well) another, ad infinitum.
5 3
I n fact, there is positive evidence that Socrates does remain true to the distinc
tion in these opening lines of the refutation. I n his claim, at 182 c 9—10, that if things
only moved but did not also alter we would have been able to say i n some way w i t h
what quality they flow, the expression ' w i t h what quality they flow' (ota arret pel ra
(jyepofAeva) fairly clearly picks up the earlier 'they become qualified in some way' (ra
\xlv ITOI arra yiyveoQai) i n 182 B 6—7, which forms part of the reiteration of the flux
theory's basic principles. T h i s earlier expression clearly refers to one of the parents
of perception (i.e. to perceptible objects). Moreover, it immediately follows the ex
plicit distinction between qualities and qualified things made in 182 A 8—B 3, which
is used to differentiate between offspring and parents.
30 Naly Thaler
suggested that b y a v o i d i n g several m i s l e a d i n g forms o f l o c u t i o n

w h i c h i m p l y s t a b i l i t y a n d c o i n i n g others i n t h e i r stead, we c o u l d
adhere to its o n t o l o g i c a l tenets and s t i l l somehow refer i n speech to
the w o r l d o f perceptual experience. T h e t h e o r y h a d o r i g i n a l l y ad
vised us to steer clear o f terms such as 'is', ' t h i s ' , ' t h a t ' , and others
of t h e i r i l k w h i c h specify w h a t p a r t i c u l a r object a g i v e n q u a l i f i c a t i o n
belongs to. I t was suggested we f i n d alternative forms o f l o c u t i o n
w h i c h describe the appearance o f a p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t m a k i n g the
i n h e r e n t l y false c o m m i t m e n t that i t belongs to any object i n p a r t i
cular. A s we h a d seen earlier, w h e n m a k i n g this suggestion i n (C3)
the t h e o r y d i d n o t specify w h a t f o r m the r e s u l t i n g ' l e g i t i m a t e ' ex
pressions w o u l d take. H e r e , i n 182 C - D , f o l l o w i n g the acceptance
of b o t h forms o f change, Socrates invokes these p r e v i o u s l y unspe
cified alternative expressions and claims that even they are i n a p
plicable to p a r t i c u l a r perceptual experiences. A reference to these
alternative expressions w h i c h were a l l u d e d to i n (C3) is precisely
the gist o f the q u a l i f i c a t i o n ' i n some w a y ' (77011) i n the c l a i m that i f
things were m e r e l y m o v i n g w i t h o u t also a l t e r i n g q u a l i t a t i v e l y 'we
c o u l d say, in some way, w i t h w h a t q u a l i t y the m o v i n g t h i n g s flow'
i n 182 c 10. T h i s back-reference to the p r o p o s e d innocuous alter
native locutions is t h e n cashed o u t i n 182 D 1-2 w i t h the n e o l o g i s m
'the f l o w i n g t h i n g flows w h i t e ' .
I n order to see this m o r e clearly note h o w closely the expres
sion 'the f l o w i n g t h i n g flows w h i t e ' adheres to the s p i r i t o f the
theory's l i n g u i s t i c restrictions i n t r o d u c e d i n ( C 3 ) : w h i l e i t retains
the syntactic f o r m o f an assertion, its content prevents i t f r o m ever
b e i n g subject to dispute. F i r s t , i t carries n o c o m m i t m e n t as to
w h i c h determinate k i n d o f object is i n flow. Since, as we have seen,
the p r o p e r t y o f flux is the o n l y one w h i c h s t r i c t l y pertains, as a
k i n d - t e r m , to any perceived particular, the n e o l o g i s m replaces w h a t
w o u l d c o m m o n l y take the place o f a subject (the stick or stone) w i t h
the substantive cognate o f the p r o p e r t y o f flux ('the f l o w i n g t h i n g ' ) .
Second, there is n o a t t e m p t to i d e n t i f y the l o c a t i o n i n w h i c h the
p a r t i c u l a r w h i t e flow occurs (no use o f ' t h i s ' or ' t h a t ' ) . T h i r d , the
perceptual predicate ' w h i t e ' is connected to its subject via the n o v e l
copula 'flows', w h i c h is meant to replace the definite 'is' o f o u r p r e
vious unreflective expression. T h e result is a statement that carries
no c o m m i t m e n t to the existence o f a state o f affairs w h i c h c o u l d
at any t i m e be d i s p u t e d . B u t as Socrates n o w p o i n t s o u t , once we
clarify the n o t i o n o f change and see that i t includes b o t h constant
Plato on the Importance of 'This' and 'That' 3i
m o t i o n a n d alteration, we m u s t realize t h a t such neologisms are as
i l l e g i t i m a t e as the p r e v i o u s f o r m s o f expression w h i c h the t h e o r y
was v i g i l a n t about e l i m i n a t i n g f r o m discourse.
These o p e n i n g lines o f the r e f u t a t i o n are m e a n t to sharpen fur
ther the theory's earlier d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the d o m a i n to w h i c h
language is f u l l y applicable a n d t h a t o n w h i c h i t has a l i m i t e d c l a i m .
A l l we are left w i t h n o w is a v o c a b u l a r y for expressing general, i.e.
n o n - p e r c e p t i b l e , t r u t h s about the w o r l d . C o n t r a r y to w h a t the the
o r y h a d earlier suggested, there is n o p r o p e r use o f language w i t h
w h i c h we m i g h t express o u r personal encounter w i t h ever-changing
experience. Perceptual experience n o w t u r n s o u t to be ineffable,
a n d we are n o w l i m i t e d i n o u r use o f language to d e s c r i b i n g o u r
consequent general a n d abstract ideas about the nature o f percep
t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . A n d i t is precisely this v i e w o f language a n d its
54
repercussions, w h i c h the t h e o r y has been c o r n e r e d i n t o accepting,

t h a t Socrates n o w t u r n s to refute.
B y itself, the r a d i c a l i z a t i o n o f its o r i g i n a l c l a i m r e g a r d i n g the l a n
guage o f p e r c e p t i o n is n o t yet l e t h a l for the theory's basic tenability,
since i t seems to leave u n t o u c h e d the p o s s i b i l i t y o f expressing ge
n e r a l t r u t h s such as Theaetetus' c l a i m about the i d e n t i t y o f percep
t i o n a n d k n o w l e d g e . T h e s t i n g o f the a r g u m e n t begins to be felt at
182 D 2-5 w h e n we learn t h a t the i n a b i l i t y to use p r o p e r t y adjectives
to refer to perceptual p h e n o m e n a has adverse effects o n the m o r e
abstract parts o f o u r vocabulary—precisely those parts (consisting
o f nouns o f v a r y i n g levels o f abstraction) w h i c h a c c o r d i n g to the flux
t h e o r y are unsusceptible to p e r t u r b a t i o n . Socrates continues i n o u r
passage b y c l a i m i n g t h a t the fact that:
( 1 ) T h e r e is a constant change to c o l o u r e d p h e n o m e n a (we can

n o t even say t h a t the f l o w i n g t h i n g flows w h i t e )
5 4
I t seems to me that when viewed from a pragmatic perspective, the radica
lization of the linguistic commitments of flux is actually m i l d , to the point of be
ing almost an entailment of these original commitments. This is because assertions
which would previously have been sanctioned by the theory ('the flowing thing flows
white') are, from a pragmatic point of view, mere pseudo-assertions. While they re
tain a proper syntactic structure, their inherent indefiniteness makes asserting them
an exercise in futility. The idea underlying the radicalization of the linguistic i m p l i
cations of flux might be that i f we ban determinate terms such as 'this' and 'is', and
so confine ourselves to locutions which cannot in principle be contradicted, we u n
wittingly deprive ourselves of the assertive force that statements usually carry. Seen
this way, the radicalization of the theory merely crystallizes an inherent feature of
its original commitments.
32 Naly Thaler
has the direct consequence 55

that
(2) T h e r e w i l l also be a change to whiteness itself, and an altera

t i o n o f i t i n t o another colour. (182 D 2-3)
C l a i m (2), t h e n , is n o t m e a n t as a mere r e i t e r a t i o n o f (1) b u t as an en

t a i l m e n t o f i t . I n order to u n d e r s t a n d w h y (1) entails (2), recall the
i n h e r e n t i n d e t e r m i n a c y i n (C2)'s account o f the r e l a t i o n between
parents a n d offspring. W h i l e i t was clear that offspring (qualities
and perceptions) were p a r t o f a w i d e r e x p l a n a t o r y m e c h a n i s m t h a t
was m e a n t to account for the appearance o f t h e i r parents ( q u a l i
fied objects a n d t h e i r perceivers), they nevertheless enjoyed n o o n -
tological p r i o r i t y over these parents. ' W h i t e n e s s ' and 'a sight o f
whiteness' were n o t i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g m o t i o n s whose r e l a t i o n
to sticks or stones and to eyes caused the f o r m e r to become w h i t e
and the latter seeing. Rather, 'whiteness' a n d 'a sight o f whiteness'
were scientific constructs whose purpose was to e x p l a i n and l e n d
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y (largely t h r o u g h t h e i r stable relations to other i n t e l l i
gible concepts such as c o l o u r / s i g h t , p e r c e p t i o n / t h i n g perceived, de
scribed i n C i ) to the s h i f t i n g appearances o f qualified objects. B u t ,
as such, they are as dependent o n w h i t e objects a n d seeing eyes as
the latter are dependent o n t h e m , at least i n the sense t h a t there can
be n o instances o f whiteness or sightings o f i t i n d e p e n d e n t o f the
c o r r e s p o n d i n g instances o f qualified objects a n d seeing eyes. T h i s
o n t o l o g i c a l interdependence requires t h a t whatever befalls the par
ents o f p e r c e p t i o n w i l l i m m e d i a t e l y affect t h e i r o f f s p r i n g . I n the
56
o p e n i n g lines o f the r e f u t a t i o n Socrates stays t r u e to this i n t e r d e

pendence b y c l a i m i n g t h a t i f i t is agreed t h a t n o t h i n g at a l l ( n o t even
55
I take the ware kcu i n 182 D 2 as introducing a consequence of the fact, men
tioned i n 182 D 1—2, that the flowing thing does not abide as white. As I have claimed,
commentators on this passage take what follows the conjunction as merely explica
tive of that fact, apparently taking avrov TOVTOV m 182 D 2 as referring back to the
flowing thing which does not abide as white, and then elucidating it i n 182 D 3 as
TTJS XevKorr/Tos. But this reading downplays or even disregards the /eat which makes
it natural to take avrov TOVTOV as forward-looking and as introducing something new

(namely, TTJS XEVKOTT/TOS i n 182 D 3). I n fact, both M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 62, and
Sedley, Midwife, 95 simply drop the /eat from their translations, which read 'so that
there's flux of that very thing, whiteness' and 'so that there is flux of this very thing,
whiteness' respectively. Levett's translation, 'so that there is flux of this very thing
also, the whiteness', is more indicative of the Greek. (While I do not take this con
sideration as conclusive i n favour of my reading, it seems to me, as I have indicated,
that we have an overwhelming reason to avoid identifying 'the flowing thing' w i t h
the property whiteness.)
5 6
The ware i n 182 D 2 then signifies an immediate logical consequence.
'a f l o w i n g t h i n g ' ) can i n any w a y accept ( n o t even loosely v i a the

c o p u l a ' f l o w s ' ) the q u a l i f i c a t i o n ' w h i t e ' , t h e n w h a t was s u p p o s e d to
be its p a r t i c u l a r c o r r e s p o n d i n g o f f s p r i n g , i.e. ' w h i t e n e s s ' , i m m e d i
ately loses its d e t e r m i n a t e character as w e l l . 5 7
T h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m ( i ) to (2), t h e n , f o l l o w s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y
from the t h e o r y ' s explanatory scheme i n t r o d u c e d i n ( C 2 ) . A n d
since the r e l a t i o n o f w h i t e t h i n g s t o the p r o p e r t y w h i t e n e s s is
m e r e l y one instance o f a general r u l e r e g a r d i n g the r e l a t i o n o f
c o l o u r e d objects t o t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o l o u r - p r o p e r t y o f f s p r i n g ,
Socrates can take h i m s e l f t o have s h o w n t h a t now, after the r a d i -
c a l i z a t i o n o f f l u x , we have lost the r i g h t to speak n o t o n l y o f a l l
p a r t i c u l a r l y c o l o u r e d ( f l o w i n g ) t h i n g s , b u t also o f a l l t h e i r corres
p o n d i n g colour properties i n abstraction f r o m them. I r e t u r n n o w
t o o u r passage. F r o m (2) Socrates n o w derives:
(3) I t w i l l n o t be possible ' t o call a n y t h i n g " c o l o u r " i n a w a y t h a t

t h i s n a m i n g w i l l also be c o r r e c t ' . (182 D 4 - s ) 5 8
I n m a k i n g t h i s latter c l a i m , we s h o u l d note, Socrates does n o t m e a n

t h a t i t w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e to say a b o u t any p a r t i c u l a r object t h a t i t is
w h i t e or r e d . 5 9
T h a t , as we saw, is a c o m m i t m e n t w h i c h b y t h i s p o i n t
is i n t e g r a l to the f l u x d o c t r i n e itself, since i t is i m m e d i a t e l y e n t a i l e d
by its r a d i c a l i z a t i o n . B u t nor, I believe, does he m e a n m e r e l y t h a t
i t is i m p o s s i b l e to p r o p e r l y call whiteness, redness, o r any species
I take it that this change of the basic character of whiteness is what is meant by
5 7
the claim i n 183 D 3 that it w i l l change into a different colour.

A word about dpd irore olov re TI TTpooenreiv~£p<j)\xa ujare Kal 6p9cos Trpooayopev-
5 8
}
eiv, which I take to mean ' w i l l i t be possible to call anything "colour" in a way that
this naming w i l l also be correct?': Cornford has 'can we ever give i t [the white thing]
the name of any colour and be sure that we are naming it rightly?', a translation
which makes this stage of the argument completely redundant, since its conclusion
is now identical to what is i n fact its premiss. M c D o w e l l and Burnyeat/Levett, who
take Socrates' question as extending the problem of naming whiteness to all colour
species, have 'can i t ever be possible to refer to any colour m such a way as to be
speaking of i t rightly?' and 'is i t possible to give any name to a colour which w i l l
properly apply to it?' respectively, both taking TI as qualifying xp^^- While their
construal is possible, my reading, which takes the TI as the object of -npoaei-neiv, re
ceives some support from what immediately follows at 182 E 4: there we read o u r e
apa opdv 7Tpoopr/T€ov TI jiaXXov rj [iri opdv, which clearly means 'one should not then
also call anything "seeing" rather than "not seeing"', and in which the TI functions as
the object of 7Tpoopr/T€ov, corresponding to how I take i t i n the present phrase. One
should also note that L S J (who presumably have no preconceptions about which
translation is required to make sense of the argument) translate this phrase precisely
as I have in their entry on •npoaei-nu).
Contra Campbell, Theaetetus, 133; Bostock, Theaetetus, 105; Cornford,
5 9
Know
ledge, 96.
34 Naly Thaler
of c o l o u r b y any n a m e . Socrates is m a k i n g the m o r e radical c l a i m

60
that i f there is n o t h i n g w h i c h can specifically be called 'whiteness',

or 'redness' etc., t h e n the general t e r m ' c o l o u r ' also cannot p r o p e r l y
be a p p l i e d to a n y t h i n g .
W h a t justifies Socrates' t r a n s i t i o n f r o m (2) to (3) is the p r i n c i p l e
of the c o g n i t i v e p r i o r i t y o f the p a r t i c u l a r (henceforth T P ' ) to w h i c h
T h e o d o r u s , a c t i n g as the spokesman for the theory, h a d assented i n
the course o f the earlier e x p l a n a t i o n o f the t e r m ' q u a l i t y ' . R e m e m b e r
that the t h e o r y was o r i g i n a l l y c o m m i t t e d i n (C1) to a h i e r a r c h i c a l re
l a t i o n o f genus to species b e t w e e n the general concept o f c o l o u r and
p a r t i c u l a r nameable c o l o u r k i n d s . I n the first lines o f the r e f u t a t i o n
Socrates has s h o w n , b y appealing to the e x p l a n a t o r y m e c h a n i s m o f
(C2), t h a t since n o t h i n g can receive the predicate ' w h i t e ' , p a r t i c u l a r
colours such as 'whiteness' also have n o determinate character.
N o w , u s i n g PP he can l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m t h a t w i t h o u t the a b i l i t y to
a p p l y determinate i n d i v i d u a l c o l o u r concepts such as 'whiteness',
'redness', etc., there w i l l be n o t h i n g to l e n d i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y to the
genus ' c o l o u r ' . I f there is n o determinate use o f the terms 'whiteness'
or 'redness', there is n o t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r w h i c h we can designate b y
the m o r e general a n d abstract name ' c o l o u r ' .
As we shall see, this result constitutes the first step i n the g r a d u a l
erosion o f the flux theory's tree o f concepts. I t w i l l be i m p o r t a n t
to see t h a t the f o l l o w i n g steps o f the r e f u t a t i o n f o r m p a r t o f a u n i
fied strategy: use PP to u n d e r m i n e the theory's conceptual appa
ratus i n t r o d u c e d i n ( C i ) . T h e theory's conceptual tree has at its
roots, o n one side, p a r t i c u l a r species o f each k i n d o f p r o p e r t y , such
as whiteness, an F# s o u n d , a n d so f o r t h , where c o r r e s p o n d i n g to
each o f these there are instances o f p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s o f perceptions,
such as 'a seeing o f whiteness', 'a h e a r i n g o f F#' etc. These are a l l
g r o u p e d u n d e r h i g h e r n o t i o n s such as ' c o l o u r ' , ' s o u n d ' , a n d 'see
i n g ' , ' h e a r i n g ' respectively, w h i c h are i n t u r n also s u b s u m e d u n d e r
the m o r e general concepts ' t h i n g perceived' (or ' q u a l i t y ' ) a n d 'per
c e p t i o n ' . Socrates' strategy w i l l be to use PP to show t h a t i f the
lowest concept o n one side o f the tree (i.e. whiteness as a species)
falls, so w i l l the highest concept o n the side o f its t w i n ( p e r c e p t i o n as
a genus). H e w i l l t h e n show t h a t i f there is n o determinate sense to
the general n o t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n , there can be n o determinate t r u t h
stated about i t .
Contra M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 63, 181; Burnyeat, Theaetetus, 312; Sedley,

6 0
Midwife, 95.
T h e a r g u m e n t proceeds as follows. Socrates generalizes c l a i m
(3), that the concept ' c o l o u r ' has n o definite sense so as to a p p l y
to a l l perceptible p r o p e r t y k i n d s , so that:
(4) T h e species names o f a l l sensible qualities have no definite

sense. (182 D 6-7)
N o w , a c c o r d i n g to the conceptual apparatus o f the flux theory, for

each perceptible q u a l i t y there is a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h
is its inseparable t w i n . So that i f there is n o sense to the n o t i o n o f
c o l o u r or sound, there w i l l be n o t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r for seeing a n d
h e a r i n g to be of, so that:
(5) T h e names o f species o f p e r c e p t i o n , such as 'seeing' or 'hear

i n g ' , have n o determinate sense, so that i t w i l l never be m o r e
p r o p e r to designate a n y t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r b y the name 'see
i n g ' rather t h a n ' n o t seeing', a n d the same goes for a l l other
species o f p e r c e p t i o n . (182 D 8 - E 6)
N o t i c e that w i t h o u t r e l y i n g o n the conceptual h i e r a r c h y i n t r o d u c e d

i n ( C i ) together w i t h PP, the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m (2) the idea that n o t h
i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r corresponds to the name ' w h i t e ' to (5) the c l a i m
that 'seeing' is itself i n d e t e r m i n a t e is s i m p l y i n v a l i d . A f t e r a l l , w h y
not accept that sight j u s t is the a b i l i t y to register a c o n t i n u o u s flood
of s t i m u l i w h i c h are never determinate e n o u g h to be i d e n t i f i e d as
colours o f such-and-such a type? T h i s w o u l d give us a determinate
n o t i o n o f sight c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i n d e t e r m i n a c y i n the field o f visible
properties. T h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the first c l a i m to the latter is made
possible o n l y i f we assume (as the flux t h e o r y does) that sight is a
concept w h i c h is s t r i c t l y co-ordinate w i t h that o f colour, that they
b o t h constitute the genera o f t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r species, a n d (as is en
tailed b y PP) that they are made i n t e l l i g i b l e to us o n l y i n v i r t u e o f
the fact that we have some previous f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h these species. 61
6 1
The alternative to my interpretation, adopted by most commentators, is simply
to claim that the attack on 'seeing' is warranted by the fact that the theory has by this
point admitted that everything is in radical flux, and this should include not only
qualities but also modalities of perception ( M c D o w e l l , Theaetetus, 181; Bostock,
Theaetetus, 100; Sedley, Midwife, 95—6; Castagnoli, Refutation, 212). But this i n
terpretation takes 182 D 1—E 3 and 182 E 4—12 as two disconnected bits of argumen
tation, the first having no relevance for the second, both merely providing parallel
instances or entailments of radical flux. T h i s result seems to me undesired, since it
makes 182 D 1—E 3 completely redundant for securing the conclusion i n 182 E 11—12,
whereas the text gives every impression that a continuous argument is being dis
played i n 182 D 1—E 12.
36 Naly Thaler
F r o m (5) Socrates n o w derives the f o l l o w i n g refutation of

Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n :
(6) T h e c l a i m that k n o w l e d g e is i d e n t i c a l w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , no
m o r e affirms this i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h a n denies i t . (182 E 8-12)
W h a t Socrates m u s t mean here is that since there is n o t h i n g i n p a r t i

cular w h i c h can be designated ' p e r c e p t i o n ' rather t h a n ' n o t percep
t i o n ' and since (by s t i p u l a t i o n ) p e r c e p t i o n is i d e n t i c a l w i t h k n o w
ledge, the p h e n o m e n o n o f p e r c e p t i o n does n o t deserve to be called
' k n o w l e d g e ' any m o r e t h a n ' n o t - k n o w l e d g e ' . A g a i n , i t is i m p o r t a n t
to recognize the w o r k done b y PP i n this inference. W i t h o u t appeal
i n g to i t , there w o u l d be n o e n t a i l m e n t f r o m the c l a i m i n (5) that
n o t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r can be called 'seeing' or ' h e a r i n g ' rather t h a n
'not-seeing' or ' n o t - h e a r i n g ' to the c l a i m that p e r c e p t i o n is itself
i n d e t e r m i n a t e . Once we realize that Socrates is appealing to PP,
62
and r e m e m b e r the theory's o w n c o m m i t m e n t i n ( C i ) to the genus/

species r e l a t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n to sight and hearing, the t r a n s i t i o n
becomes v a l i d .
Socrates concludes the r e f u t a t i o n b y c l a i m i n g that the thesis that
e v e r y t h i n g is i n m o t i o n , w h i c h was i n t r o d u c e d i n order to account
for the t r u t h o f Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n , has the result that any an
swer about any m a t t e r t u r n s o u t to be equally true, since i t is b o t h
correct to affirm i t b y saying ' [ i t is] so' and, at the same t i m e , deny
i t b y saying ' [ i t is] n o t so' (183 A 2 - 8 ) . Socrates is r e f e r r i n g here n o t
to answers g i v e n to questions about p a r t i c u l a r states o f affairs i n
the sphere o f perceptual experience, b u t specifically to those that
p e r t a i n to general, abstract matters o f fact, e.g. w h e t h e r p e r c e p t i o n
is k n o w l e d g e or w h e t h e r e v e r y t h i n g is stable or i n f l u x . H i s c l a i m
63
6 3
Sedley, Midwife, 97, is aware of this problem. His proposed solution is that the
actual argumentation ends at (4), and that we are meant simply to assume that i f no
specific kind of perception endures, neither can the genus 'perception'. But Sedley
himself raises a good objection to this interpretation: i f seeing constantly changes to
hearing or touching and so forth, why should we not be entitled to say that percep
tion as such does endure, albeit not as seeing, hearing, touching, etc.? His answer
to this objection is that the flux ontology does not recognize the existence of inde
pendent genera. But surely, this correct observation about the theory's ontology is
irrelevant to the suggestion that we can speak about perception as the determinate
genus of a certain limited number of more specific though non-enduring indeter
minate activities. The only solution to the problem of the transition from (4) to the
conclusion that we cannot mean anything determinate by saying 'perception' is to
accept the central role PP plays i n the argument, and bear in mind that it is being
applied to a hierarchic conceptual field to which the flux theory is committed.
6 3
I n this I am in agreement w i t h Sedley, Midwife, 98, who points out that all i n -
is t h a t the theory's v i e w about p a r t i c u l a r s u n d e r m i n e s n o t o n l y its
a b i l i t y to l e n d s u p p o r t to Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n , b u t also the pos
s i b i l i t y o f its o w n statement as a determinate dialectical p o s i t i o n .
B u t i n fact, Socrates continues, to be even m o r e precise, even
such simultaneous affirmations a n d denials o f general assertions
m u s t be f o r b i d d e n u n d e r the a s s u m p t i o n o f flux (183 A I O - B 4 ) .
T h i s is apparently because these affirmations a n d denials presup
pose t h a t the assertion to w h i c h they a p p l y has some determinate
sense—precisely w h a t the a r g u m e n t denies t h e m . W h a t is b e i n g
p r e - e m p t e d here is, I t h i n k , a possible r e p l y b y the Heracliteans to
the c l a i m t h a t t h e i r t h e o r y entails its o w n c o n t r a d i c t o r y . T h i s r e p l y
w o u l d concede (as t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n does n o t ) t h a t n o t o n l y
i n d i v i d u a l perceptions b u t c o n f l i c t i n g general assertions too are s i
m u l t a n e o u s l y t r u e . Socrates takes care to t h w a r t such a r e p l y b y
6 4
c l a i m i n g t h a t i f a l l statements e n t a i l t h e i r contradictories we cannot

treat each statement i n such a c o n t r a d i c t o r y pair as h a v i n g any de
t e r m i n a t e sense. I f , as the t h e o r y m i g h t n o w w i s h to concede, the
law o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n is generally i n v a l i d (rather t h a n m e r e l y i n
applicable to p e r c e p t u a l experience), there w i l l be n o determinate
assertions for us to simultaneously affirm a n d deny. I n this case,
Socrates claims, the n o t i o n s o f affirmation and denial themselves
lose any possible sense.
IV
I w o u l d like to conclude b y d r a w i n g o u t some o f the i m p l i c a t i o n s

of the discussion o f the flux theory. W e saw t h a t the flux t h e o r y
entertained the idea t h a t i t is possible to m a i n t a i n its scientific ter
m i n o l o g y w h i l e d e p r i v i n g objects i n the w o r l d o f experience o f any
determinate p r o p e r t y or identity. T h e w o r l d o f perceptual e x p e r i
ence was construed as p r i v a t e to each perceiver, to the extent that i t
c o u l d n o t be c a p t u r e d b y assertions o f the k i n d w h i c h w o u l d i n any
way conflict w i t h other perceivers' assertions about t h e i r e x p e r i -
stances of 'answer' i n the dialogue refer to dialectical question and answering which
is centred on the investigation of general truths.
6 4
Castagnoli, Refutation, 214—15, also takes this as a response to Heracliteans, who
might not be bothered by the idea of making simultaneously contradictory state
ments. But he thinks that these contradictory assertions w i l l be about perceptual
particulars, not about general matters of fact, taking O U T O J as 'a place-holder for qua
litative attributes like "white"'.
38 Naly Thaler
ence. I n r e f u t i n g the t h e o r y Plato shows that this v i e w is u n t e n

able. Readers are m e a n t to see t h a t the process o f abstraction (and
scientific discovery) w h i c h connects the w o r l d o f experience w i t h
whatever determinate conceptual apparatus is i n t e n d e d to e x p l a i n
i t can never get off the g r o u n d i f the w o r l d o f experience lacks suf
ficient determinateness. T h e t h r e s h o l d o f determinateness w h i c h
perceptual experience m u s t pass i n order for any e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y
about i t to become viable is clearly d r a w n for us: i t m u s t be suscep
tible to assertions w h i c h specify a determinate subject b y means o f
a demonstrative, a n d a p p l y a p r o p e r t y to i t b y means o f the verb 'to
be'—precisely the sort o f assertions w h i c h a l l o w one p e r c e p t i o n to
c o n t r a d i c t another. W h e n c o m b i n e d w i t h PP, w h i c h lays d o w n t h a t
the higher, m o r e abstract concepts (such as ' q u a l i t y ' ) i n a scientific
system depend o n the p r i o r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f the m o r e specific ones
(such as 'heat' and 'whiteness') w h i c h are closer to the w o r l d o f ex
perience, these insights a m o u n t to the v i e w that a scientific t h e o r y
proceeds f r o m the g r o u n d up. B u t , as we have seen, this ' g r o u n d '
does n o t consist o f raw sensory experience b u t o f determinate per
ceptual j u d g e m e n t s . O n l y such j u d g e m e n t s l e n d themselves to the
process o f abstraction w h i c h t h e n opens the door to the construc
t i o n o f a complete conceptual apparatus, an apparatus w h i c h can
t h e n be a p p l i e d back to p e r c e p t u a l experience i n order to l e n d to i t
full intelligibility.
I n a d d i t i o n to t h e i r o w n significance as a statement r e g a r d i n g
the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o r y a n d perceptual experience, these i m
plications make the discussion o f flux i m m e d i a t e l y relevant for the
subsequent ' d i r e c t ' r e f u t a t i o n o f Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n at 184 B 2 -
186 E 12. A f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n o f the a r g u m e n t i n 184 B 2-186 E 12,
w h i c h has recently been subjected to substantial scholarly debate,
falls outside the scope o f this paper. I shall confine m y s e l f to stating
its basic o u t l i n e i n order to elucidate its c o n n e c t i o n to the r e f u t a t i o n
of the flux t h e o r y . T h e a r g u m e n t begins b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g speci
65
fic p e r c e p t u a l attributes o f objects, such as ' h o t ' , ' h a r d ' , ' l i g h t ' , and
'sweet', whose grasp i t is reasonable to refer to one o f the b o d i l y
senses (184 E 5 - 7 ) , f r o m ' c o m m o n ' properties (i.e. those w h i c h ap
p l y i n c o m m o n to objects o f d i s t i n c t senses) such as ' i s ' , 'are', ' d i f
ferent', ' i d e n t i c a l ' , ' t w o ' , 'one', whose grasp cannot be traced to any
6 5
M y reading of 184 B 2—186 E 12 agrees in its fundamental points w i t h the i n
terpretation given i n H . Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and
Aristotle [Brute] (Oxford, 2006).
p a r t i c u l a r b o d i l y sense, and m u s t be a t t r i b u t e d to the soul w o r k i n g
t h r o u g h itself (185 A 8—E 2 ) . I t t h e n t u r n s o u t , o n closer examina
6 6
t i o n , t h a t even the a t t r i b u t i o n o f p e r c e p t u a l predicates w h i c h was

i n i t i a l l y traced to the b o d i l y senses is dependent o n the a t t r i b u t i o n
o f the ' c o m m o n ' predicates w h i c h were agreed to be grasped b y the
soul w o r k i n g t h r o u g h i t s e l f . ' F o r example, the a t t r i b u t i o n o f a per
6
ceptual q u a l i f i c a t i o n such as 'soft' to any object presupposes the

a b i l i t y to a t t r i b u t e b e i n g to softness i n r e l a t i o n to t h a t object, i n
the f o r m o f a statement c o n n e c t i n g the t w o v i a the verb 'to b e ' . 68
W h a t appeared at the i n i t i a l stage o f the a r g u m e n t to be the p r o p e r

w o r k o f the faculties o f p e r c e p t i o n is n o w seen to be the result o f the
c o m b i n e d effort o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h o u g h t . T h e a r g u m e n t clinches
its i n t e n d e d c o n c l u s i o n w h e n Socrates secures Theaetetus' agree
m e n t to t w o f u r t h e r claims. T h e first is t h a t a grasp o f the t r u t h
about a n y t h i n g presupposes a grasp o f the c o m m o n predicate 'be
i n g ' w h i c h , i t was agreed, cannot be grasped b y any one o f the p a r t i
cular sense organs (186 c 7 - 8 ) . T h e second is t h a t h a v i n g k n o w l e d g e
o f a n y t h i n g presupposes a grasp o f the t r u t h about i t (186 c 9 - D 1).
Since i t is agreed t h a t the w o r k i n g o f sense p e r c e p t i o n o n its o w n
falls b e l o w the t h r e s h o l d o f t r u t h , a n d t h a t t r u t h is necessary for
k n o w l e d g e , Theaetetus m u s t n o w a d m i t t h a t his d e f i n i t i o n , w h i c h
i d e n t i f i e d k n o w l e d g e w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , cannot be correct.
I w a n t to emphasize t w o p o i n t s o f c o n n e c t i o n between this
a r g u m e n t a n d the r e f u t a t i o n o f the flux theory. F i r s t , note that
w i t h o u t the p r e c e d i n g r e f u t a t i o n o f flux, i t w o u l d have been open
to Theaetetus to deny the leading premiss o f the present a r g u
m e n t a n d c l a i m that perceptual experience cannot be couched i n
determinate j u d g e m e n t s , i.e. those w h i c h , m i n i m a l l y , make use o f
the verb 'to be'. Theaetetus c o u l d have c l a i m e d t h a t the t r u t h o f
p e r c e p t i o n lies precisely i n its i n s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to such j u d g e m e n t s .
A s i t is, Theaetetus accepts w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n t h a t properties such
as 'likeness', 'unlikeness', 'sameness', 'difference', a n d 'oneness'
6 6
J. Cooper, 'Plato on Sense Perception and Knowledge: Theaetetus 184—6' ['Per
ception'], Phronesis, 15 (1970), 123—46, has conclusively shown that the 'common'
concepts are taken to be properties of perceptual objects, and not (as was previously
supposed by Cornford) independently existing items.
6 7
This is convincingly argued for by Lorenz, Brute, 86-7. For the opposite view,
that perception itself supplies a limited range of beliefs, see Cooper, 'Perception',
131—4, and D. Modrak, 'Perception and Judgment in the Theaetetus', Phronesis, 26
(1981), 35-54, especially 43-4.
6 8
For a more detailed interpretation of the role of 'being' i n 186 B 6—9 see Lorenz,
Brute, 86.
40 Naly Thaler
a p p l y to p e r c e p t u a l objects v i a the verb 'to be'. I n this, he shows

he has learnt the lesson Socrates t o o k such care to teach i n the
r e f u t a t i o n o f f l u x . N o w , r e m e m b e r t h a t i n m a k i n g this admission,
6 9
Theaetetus is s t i l l i n t e n t o n r e t a i n i n g his i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f k n o w
ledge w i t h p e r c e p t i o n . F o l l o w i n g the r e f u t a t i o n o f flux, the n o t i o n
of p e r c e p t i o n i n v o l v e d i n this d e f i n i t i o n m u s t be taken to m e a n a
f u l l y specific perceptual j u d g e m e n t w h i c h attributes a p r o p e r t y to
a determinate object. B u t now, a l l t h a t is left for Socrates to do is to
show t h a t c o n s t r u e d i n this way, whatever t r u t h there is i n percep
t i o n w i l l t u r n o u t to be a f u n c t i o n o f the r a t i o n a l , n o n - p e r c e p t u a l ,
element w h i c h always accompanies j u d g e m e n t s o f any k i n d .
I n the l i g h t o f this i t is profitable, I believe, to read the t w o c o n
secutive refutations o f Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n , i n 181 B 8-183 B 5
and 184 B 2-186 E 12, as t w o h o r n s o f a u n i f i e d a r g u m e n t . T o g e t h e r
they are m e a n t to refute the c l a i m t h a t p e r c e p t i o n is k n o w l e d g e b y
s h o w i n g t h a t i t is untenable u n d e r t w o alternative conceptions o f
w h a t p e r c e p t i o n is. T h e a r g u m e n t against flux shows t h a t i t is u n
tenable i f p e r c e p t i o n is taken to fall b e l o w the t h r e s h o l d o f deter
m i n a t e j u d g e m e n t s . T h e a r g u m e n t i n 184 B 2-186 E 12 shows i t is
70
untenable w h e n p e r c e p t i o n is a l t e r n a t i v e l y c o n s t r u e d i n the f o r m o f
a determinate p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e m e n t . 71
B u t 184 B 2-186 E 12 also p r o v i d e s an added t w i s t to the speci

fic m o r a l o f the r e f u t a t i o n o f flux. T h e r e f u t a t i o n o f the flux t h e o r y
6 9
I therefore disagree w i t h Lorenz's description of the initial stage of the argu
ment {Brute, 78), as one i n which Theaetetus holds an unreflective view that percep
tion can yield all sorts of beliefs. There is nothing unreflective about this supposition.
On the contrary, Theaetetus, who still claims that perception is knowledge, has been
cornered into accepting it by the refutation of flux.
7 0
Lorenz, Brute, ch. 7, argues that even though i n the later dialogues {Theaetetus,
Timaeus, Philebus) belief formation is exclusively the province of the rational part of
the soul, Plato none the less preserves some degree of independent, non-conceptual
cognitive capacity (and hence also goal-directed activity) for the lower parts by
means of perceptual memory operating m its various modes. M y reading of the re
futation of the flux theory is compatible w i t h this view, since however rich the visual
content we attribute to the lower parts of the soul turns out to be (and however
complex the desire or activity it w i l l stimulate), it w i l l not constitute the sort of ex
perience from which scientific concepts can subsequently be abstracted. As we saw,
the ability to abstract from everyday experience requires this experience to come
in the form of full-fledged judgements, which make at least an implicit appeal to
the notion of being. As long as the lower parts of the soul cannot supply this, not
only w i l l they not provide us w i t h abstract concepts, they w i l l also not contain the
necessary material for their subsequent formation.
71
Consequently, I would suggest taking Socrates' distinction between perceptions
and perceptual judgements at 179 c 2—5 as a forward-looking remark which alludes
to the two horns of the dilemma soon to be introduced.
Plato on the Importance of 'This' and 'That' 4i
s h o w e d t h a t the use o f abstract scientific concepts i n order to l e n d
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y to the w o r l d o f p e r c e p t u a l experience depends o n the
p r i o r a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e determinate assertions about p a r t i c u l a r s i n
t h a t w o r l d . I n this, the r e f u t a t i o n s h o w e d t h a t scientific t h e o r y be
gins w i t h experience, where this n o t i o n is cashed o u t b y the idea
o f determinate perceptual j u d g e m e n t s . B u t the a r g u m e n t i n 184B
2-186 E 12 places an i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n o n this idea. I t shows
t h a t the basic a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e such determinate assertions about
the w o r l d o f experience is itself dependent o n the p r i o r a p p l i c a t i o n
o f c e r t a i n n o n - e m p i r i c a l concepts. These concepts are significantly
w i d e r t h a n the ones w h i c h make u p the theoretical apparatus o f any
specific scientific t h e o r y about observable phenomena. T h e refuta
t i o n o f flux p r o v e d t h a t any scientific t h e o r y m u s t be c o m m i t t e d to
the sort o f d e t e r m i n a c y i n the w o r l d o f perceptual experience w h i c h
is c o n s t i t u t e d b y assertions t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e demonstratives a n d the
verb 'to be'. T h e a r g u m e n t i n 184 B 2-186 E 12 t h e n shows that
such d e t e r m i n a c y i n the field o f experience is itself dependent o n
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f concepts such as ' b e i n g ' , 'sameness', 'difference',
' u n i t y ' , etc. w h i c h are p r i o r to any possible determinate j u d g e m e n t
about experience. I n this, 184 B 2-186 E 12 together w i t h the earlier
r e f u t a t i o n o f flux p r o v i d e s a g l i m p s e o f the c o m p l e x i t y o f Plato's
views r e g a r d i n g the r e l a t i o n between the language o f everyday ex
perience a n d t h a t i n w h i c h k n o w l e d g e is couched.
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bostock, D., Plato's Theaetetus [Theaetetus] (Oxford, 1988).

Brown, L . , 'Understandingthe Theaetetus' ['Understanding'], Oxford Stu
dies in Ancient Philosophy, 11 (1993), 199-224.
Burnyeat, M . , 'Conflicting Appearances' [Appearances'], Proceedings of
the British Academy, 65 (1979), 69-111.
'Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly, NS 26
(1976), 29-51.
The Theaetetus of Plato, w i t h a revised translation by M . J. Levett
[Theaetetus] (Indianapolis, 1990).
Campbell, L . , The Theaetetus of Plato [Theaetetus], 2nd edn. (Oxford,
1883).
Castagnoli, L . , Ancient Self-Refutation [Refutation] (Cambridge, 2010).
42 Naly Thaler
Cooper, J., 'Plato on Sense Perception and Knowledge: Theaetetus 184-6'

['Perception'], Phronesis, 15 (1970), 123-46.
Cornford, F. M . , Plato's Theory of Knowledge [Knowledge] (London, 1935).
Day, J. M . , 'The Theory of Perception i n Plato's Theaetetus 152-183'
['Perception'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 15 (1997), 51-80.
Denyer, N . , Language, Thought and Falsehood in Greek Philosophy ( L o n
don, 1991).
Fine, G., 'Conflicting Appearances', i n ead., Plato, 161-83.
Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays [Plato], (Oxford,
2003).
'Protagorean Relativisms', in ead., Plato, 132-59.
Lee. M . - K . , Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato,
Aristotle, and Democritus [Epistemology] (Oxford, 2005).
Lorenz, H . , The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle
[Brute] (Oxford, 2006).
McDowell, J., Plato: Theaetetus [Theaetetus] (Oxford, 1973).
Modrak, D., 'Perception and Judgment i n the Theaetetus', Phronesis, 26
(1981), 35-54-
Sedley, D., The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's
Theaetetus [Midwife] (Oxford, 2004).
Silverman, A., 'Flux and Language i n the Theaetetus' ['Flux'], Oxford Stu
Thaler, N . , 'Taking the Syllable Apart: T h e Theaetetus on Elements and
Knowledge', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 41 (2012), 201-28.
T H E GREATEST D I F F I C U L T Y
AT PARMENIDES 133 c-134 E AND
PLATO'S RELATIVE TERMS
MATTHEW DUNCOMBE
T H E first p a r t o f Plato's Parmenides b o m b a r d s the t h e o r y o f

F o r m s w i t h objections. Parmenides singles o u t one c r i t i c i s m as the
'Greatest D i f f i c u l t y ' (hereafter ' G D ' ) a n d presents i t at Parmenides
133 c-134 E. T h e a r g u m e n t has received some a t t e n t i o n , b u t scho
lars generally t h i n k that i t does n o t pose a threat to the t h e o r y o f
F o r m s , either because i t is n o t f o r m a l l y v a l i d or, i f i t is f o r m a l l y
v a l i d , because i t begs the q u e s t i o n against the Platonist. T h i s paper
aims to show that the G D is a serious challenge to the t h e o r y o f
F o r m s , neither i n v a l i d , at least for the reasons usually g i v e n , n o r
question-begging.
T o u n d e r s t a n d h o w the G D poses a threat, we need to under
stand h o w Plato t h i n k s o f relative terms, w i t h w h i c h the G D is
concerned. W e discover that the F o r m s are otiose w h e n saying i n
v i r t u e o f w h a t a relative comes to be the relative that i t is. R o u g h l y
1
p u t : for Plato each relative t e r m , such as master, has a correlative to

w h i c h i t exclusively a n d exhaustively relates. So w h e n we come to
say i n v i r t u e o f w h a t a relative is the relative i t is, we need to m e n
t i o n o n l y its correlative and n o t a F o r m . F o r example, i f A c h i l l e s
© Matthew Duncombe 2013

I would like to thank warmly David Sedley, James Warren, and Tamer Nawar for
comments on earlier drafts, and the Editor of this journal for suggesting improve
ments to the final version.
1
I use the expression ' i n virtue o f to reflect an important distinction here between
causal explanations and non-causal explanations. Causal explanations answer a 'why'
question by pointing to a world-level causal relationship between items. The w i n
dow broke because a ball h i t it. But explanations need not point to a relationship like
this. W h y are all biologists scientists? I t seems that it is in virtue of the non-causal
relationship between biologists and scientists, not because of any causal relationship
between them. T h e present article is primarily concerned w i t h an explanation of
this latter sort. I n virtue of what is a relative the relative that it is? Answering this
question is independent of explaining how, for example, the Form Master may cause
a participant master to be a master. I t is often thought that the Forms offer causal
explanations of the properties of their participants, but I do not rely on that claim
and w i l l not argue for it here.
44 Matthew Duncombe
is a master, he is a master i n v i r t u e o f his relationship to Briseis,

not to the F o r m Master. Because o f a p e c u l i a r i t y i n Plato's v i e w o f
relatives, relatives relate o n l y to t h e i r correlative; for Plato, relative
terms have a special a n d u n i q u e relationship to a correlative t e r m .
T h u s , A c h i l l e s can o n l y be master o f things i n this r e a l m . W i t h ap
p r o p r i a t e changes, the same considerations isolate the F o r m M a s t e r
as master o n l y o f the F o r m Slave. So the G D rules o u t the r e l a t i o n
of relative terms to correlatives i n another r e a l m . T h e d i f f i c u l t y is
serious because i t entails that we cannot k n o w the F o r m s , a n d that
the gods cannot k n o w o u r affairs or be o u r masters.
I n Section i I w i l l o u t l i n e the m a i n approaches to the G D i n the
literature. T h e first approach, s t y l e d 'the radical separation read
i n g ' , takes i t that the G D assumes t o t a l separation o f the F o r m s
f r o m p a r t i c i p a n t s . I reject this r e a d i n g as b e g g i n g the q u e s t i o n
against the Platonist. I reject an older view, that the G D is an a r g u
m e n t f r o m analogy, because that reading makes the G D an obvious
fallacy. I n Section z I w i l l i n t r o d u c e m y o w n reading, w h i c h v i n
dicates the a r g u m e n t b u t avoids the p r o b l e m s that dog the e x i s t i n g
readings. I develop a m u c h r i c h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Plato's n o t i o n
of relative terms a n d show h o w that supports m y view.
i . E x i s t i n g approaches to the G D
I f Socrates is correct that there are F o r m s , t h e n his proposal m u s t

account for the relationship between F o r m s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s . T w o
candidates for the relationship, sharing a n d resembling, are ex
a m i n e d at 131 A - E a n d 1 3 2 D - 1 3 3 B respectively. B o t h accounts o f
the relationship fail. T h e n , at 133 c-134 E, Parmenides presents the
y o u n g Socrates' t h e o r y o f F o r m s w i t h the 'Greatest D i f f i c u l t y ' .
T h i s d i f f i c u l t y focuses o n the separation o f F o r m s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s .
Parmenides invokes t w o pairs o f relative terms: the master-slave
pair (133 D 7-134 A 1) a n d the k n o w l e d g e - t r u t h p a i r (134 A 3 - B 1).
H e concludes, so I w i l l argue, that we cannot be masters o f the F o r m
Slave, we cannot k n o w the F o r m T r u t h , a n d the gods cannot master
us or k n o w o u r affairs. T h e text o f the a r g u m e n t is as follows:
(Pi) Because, Socrates, I think that you, and anyone else who posits that
there is some essence of each thing itself by itself [Sons avrrjv riva
KO.6' avrrjv IKCLOTOV ova'uxv rWnrai nhai], would agree, first, that none
of them is among us [ev rj/iiv]. (133 c 3-5).
Plato's Relative Terms 45
(P2) Therefore, all the Ideas which are what they are i n relation to each
other [ooxu TCOV l&eaiv -rrpos dAAijAay elalv ai elaiv\ have their essence
[oucrtav] i n relation to themselves [npos avras], not i n relation to the
things among us, by partaking i n which we are called after each of
them, whether one posits these as likenesses or i n some other way.
(133 c 8-D 2)
(P3) But these things among us [TO 8e Trap'rjiiiv ravra] which have the same
names as each of those are, again, themselves i n relation to themselves
but not i n relation to the Forms [npos avra eanv dAA' 01! npos TO. eiS-q],
and all the things which are named i n this way are of themselves and
not of those things. (133 D 2-5)
T h e c o n s t r u a l o f t h i s h i g h l y compressed a r g u m e n t is c o n t e n t i o u s .
I n d e e d , there is n o a g r e e m e n t as to w h a t the p r i n c i p a l c o n c l u s i o n
is s u p p o s e d to be, let alone w h e t h e r the G D v a l i d l y derives its c o n
c l u s i o n . O n e answer is t h a t the G D aims t o s h o w t h a t there is r a
d i c a l separation o f F o r m s f r o m p a r t i c i p a n t s : the u n k n o w a b i l i t y o f
the F o r m s w o u l d f o l l o w as a c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s r a d i c a l separation. I
reject t h i s ' r a d i c a l separation' r e a d i n g because i f i t were c o r r e c t the
G D w o u l d become an u n e x p l a i n e d p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i . A n o t h e r answer
I d i s c o u n t is t h a t the G D aims to s h o w t h a t the F o r m s are u n k n o w
able b y an a r g u m e n t f r o m analogy. I t fails because the G D a c t u a l l y
has f o u r s i g n i f i c a n t consequences, n o t j u s t one. B u t let us b e g i n w i t h
the r a d i c a l separation reading.
1.1. Radical separation
T h e k e y issue c o n c e r n i n g v a l i d i t y is p r e c i s e l y h o w we take the ' p r i n

ciple o f separation' w h i c h is, arguably, r e l i e d u p o n b y the G D . 2
3
Even i f I am correct and the argument relies on a principle of separation between
Forms and participants, there is no agreement on which of several possible principles
of separation is relied upon i n the argument. T o see the diversity of approach, com
pare F. M . Cornford, Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of T r u t h and Plato's
Parmenides. Translated with an Introduction and with a Running Commentary ( L o n
don, 1939), 99; H . F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy [Cri
ticism], 2 vols. (London, 1962), i . 284; W. G. Runciman, Plato's Later Epistemo-
logy [Epistemology] (Cambridge, 1962), 159; W. J. Prior, Unity and Development in
Plato's Metaphysics [Unity] (LaSalle, 1985), 75—6; M . M . McCabe Plato's Individu
als [Individuals] (Princeton, 1999), 91; M . L . G i l l and P. Ryan. Plato: Parmenides
[Parmenides] (Indianapolis, 1996), 46; R. E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides (Newhaven,
1998), 193; S. Peterson, ' T h e Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms:
The Unknowability Argument of Parmenides 133 c—134 c' ['Greatest'], Archiv fur
Geschichte der Philosophic, 63 (1981), 1—16; and S. C. Rickless, Plato's Forms in
Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides [Transition] (Cambridge, 2007), 85—93.
46 Matthew Duncombe
T h o s e w h o t h i n k that the a r g u m e n t is v a l i d t y p i c a l l y t h i n k that (P i )

and (P2) a m o u n t to the c l a i m that 'separation is r a d i c a l ' : 3
(RS) F o r a l l X, for a l l Y, X is a F o r m a n d X bears a r e l a t i o n to Y

iff Y is a F o r m . 4
T h i s radical separation o f F o r m s f r o m p a r t i c i p a n t s is the strongest

possible r e a d i n g o f the separation premiss. T h e premiss proves the
conclusion that we cannot k n o w the F o r m s , as l o n g as we h o l d that
' k n o w s ' is a r e l a t i o n . S u c h a p r o o f is as follows: (i) the k n o w l e d g e we
have is n o t a F o r m , ( i i ) the k n o w l e d g e we have k n o w s (or is k n o w
ledge of) s o m e t h i n g , Y. So, b y R S , ( i i i ) Y m u s t be a n o n - F o r m .
T h e r e f o r e , ( i v ) a n y t h i n g that we k n o w m u s t be a n o n - F o r m . T h e
G D is v a l i d , p r o v i d e d we accept that there is an object to w h i c h
k n o w l e d g e relates. 5
But R S exacts too great a p r i c e for a v a l i d c o n s t r u a l o f the a r g u

m e n t . A Platonist w o u l d n o t accept a premiss that denies a l l rela
tions between F o r m s a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s . I f the a r g u m e n t relies o n
6
such a s t r o n g premiss, t h e n i t begs the question. One m a y w i s h to

retain R S a n d e x p l a i n w h y Parmenides says that an off-target at
tack is the greatest difficulty w i t h the t h e o r y o f F o r m s . Perhaps one
c o u l d appeal to the several passages i n the first p a r t o f the Parme
nides where Socrates m a y accept premisses w h i c h a m o r e m a t u r e
theorist w o u l d n o t (for example, at 130 B; 1 3 0 E - 1 3 1 E , esp. 131 B ;
132 A ) .
E v e n i f we f o u n d some w a y to satisfy ourselves that the G D d e l i
berately begs the question, we o u g h t to reject the radical separation
reading o n the basis o f the t e x t alone. L i n e s 133 D 1-2 m e n t i o n three
k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n that m a y h o l d between F o r m s a n d participants,
namely, the relations '. . . participates i n . . . ' , ' . . . is like . . .', and
3
Allen, Plato's Parmenides, 193. A similar line on separation, if not validity, is
taken by Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 99; Cherniss, Criticism, i . 284; Runci-
man, Epistemology, 159; McCabe, Individuals, 91; Prior, Unity, 75—6; and G i l l and
Ryan, Parmenides, 46.
4
This is a biconditional, which is not explicitly formulated i n the text. A closer
reflection of what is taken as the source for these remarks, 133 c 3—5, would be two
conditionals: (RSi) For all X, for all Y, if X is a Form and X bears a relation to
Y then Y is a Form; and (RS2) For all X, for all Y, if X is among us and X bears
a relation to Y then Y is among us. Assuming that every item is either a Form or
among us, the biconditional (RS) follows from the conjunction of (RSi) and (RS2).
5
There is a non-relational sense of euioTrnxri i n Greek, meaning something like a
field of expertise. But this is obviously not the sense at stake in the GD.
6
See Prior, Unity, 75.
'. . . i s n a m e d after . . .' ? I f , as is i m p l i e d b y t h a t sentence, some
relations can o b t a i n across the realms, t h e n separation is n o t r a d i
cal. I n short, the r a d i c a l separation reading validates the G D , b u t
also makes i t an off-target attack t h a t does n o t respect the specific
details o f the a r g u m e n t i n the text.
i .2. The argument-from-analogy reading
I f the radical separation r e a d i n g is n o t persuasive, we m i g h t have

recourse to an older construal o f the a r g u m e n t . M a n y c o n c u r w i t h
C o r n f o r d ' s r e m a r k that the G D is 'almost grossly fallacious'. T h e y 8
u s u a l l y f o l l o w Forrester's c o n s t r u a l o f the a r g u m e n t as an a r g u m e n t
f r o m analogy: 9
( 1 ) T h e F o r m M a s t e r is a master, the F o r m Slave is a slave.

(2) O f w h a t is the F o r m M a s t e r a master? T h e r e are three possi
bilities:
(a) p a r t i c u l a r slaves;
(b) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the F o r m Master;
(c) the F o r m Slave.
(3) T h e F o r m M a s t e r cannot master (a), since (a) are slaves o f
p a r t i c u l a r masters.
(4) T h e F o r m M a s t e r cannot master (b), since (b) are masters,
n o t slaves.
(5) So, the F o r m M a s t e r m u s t be master o f ( o n l y ) the F o r m
Slave.
(6) Just as the F o r m M a s t e r m u s t be M a s t e r o f the F o r m Slave, so
too the F o r m K n o w l e d g e m u s t k n o w o n l y the F o r m T r u t h . 1 0
(7) F r o m (5), h u m a n s cannot master the F o r m Slavery.

(8) F r o m (6) and (7), h u m a n s cannot k n o w the F o r m T r u t h .
(9) T h e r e f o r e , h u m a n s cannot k n o w the F o r m s .
etre
7
etre
O\LOIUI\LO.TO. r t ? a u r a Ttderai, dw rj[j.et? ^lerexovres etvcu e/caara €7ro-
OTTTJ OTJ
vojjLaôiJLeda (Parm. 133 D 1—2).

Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, 98. See also J. W. Forrester, 'Arguments and
8
(sic) Able Man Colud (sic) Refute: Parmenides 133 B—134 E ' [Arguments'], Pkronesis,
19 (1974), 233—7; F- A . Lewis, 'Parmenides on Separation and the Knowability
of the Forms: Plato Parmenides 133 A ff.' ['Separation'], Philosophical Studies, 35
( 979)> 5 2 7 ; I - Mueller, 'Parmenides 133 A—134 E: Some Suggestions', Ancient
: io —
Philosophy, 3 (1983), 3—7. Forrester, Arguments', 234.

9
T r u t h is the Form which Parmenides specifies as the correlative of the Form

10
Knoweldge. Forrester, Arguments', 235, glosses this as the Form Object-of-

Knowledge.
48 Matthew Duncombe
F o r this a r g u m e n t f r o m analogy to h o l d , the master-slave case

needs to be relevantly s i m i l a r to the k n o w l e d g e - t r u t h case i n such a
way as to show that, j u s t as a h u m a n master cannot master the F o r m
Slave, so h u m a n k n o w l e d g e cannot k n o w the F o r m T r u t h . B u t ,
according to those w h o f o l l o w this reading, the analogy between
the master-slave case a n d the k n o w l e d g e - t r u t h case breaks d o w n . 1 1
I t is clear a priori that a master m u s t be master o f a slave, w h o has

certain characteristics that the F o r m Slave cannot have, e.g. b e i n g
m o r t a l . A h u m a n master m u s t be master o f s o m e t h i n g m o r t a l . B u t
the categorical properties o f the F o r m s i n c l u d e b e i n g n o n - m o r t a l .
So the categorical properties o f the F o r m Slave prevent i t f r o m be
i n g mastered b y a h u m a n master. H o w e v e r , the t e r m ' k n o w l e d g e '
12
does n o t have such restrictions: there is n o reason w h y k n o w l e d g e

cannot h o l d between a h u m a n a n d a F o r m , since b e i n g k n o w a b l e is
a categorical p r o p e r t y o f the F o r m s . T h e a r g u m e n t i n v a l i d l y moves
f r o m a case where the categorical properties prevent a cross-realm
relation to a case where the categorical properties do n o t do so.
T h e r e f o r e , the G D is i n v a l i d .
T h i s cannot be the correct w a y to read the a r g u m e n t , since,
as I w i l l n o w argue, there are four p h i l o s o p h i c a l conclusions to
the a r g u m e n t , each d e r i v e d i n the same way, n o t one c o n c l u s i o n
c o n c e r n i n g masters a n d slaves w h i c h p r o v i d e s the m o d e l for the
conclusion c o n c e r n i n g knowledge. O v e r w h e l m i n g l y , scholars have
t h o u g h t that the m a i n c o n c l u s i o n is an epistemic difficulty: that
the F o r m s cannot be k n o w n (133 B 4 - 6 ; 134 B I I - C 2 ) . Some have
1 3
also emphasized that there is a second epistemic c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h

m a y be p r o b l e m a t i c for a Platonist, namely, that the d i v i n e , or
the gods, w o u l d n o t be able to k n o w h u m a n matters (134 E 5 - 6 ) . 1 4
Parmenides calls this c o n c l u s i o n 'astonishing' {daviiaaros, 134 E

7). I argue that these epistemic conclusions do n o t exhaust the
p r o b l e m s generated b y the G D a n d that a Platonist w o u l d f i n d
the c o n c l u s i o n c o n c e r n i n g vassalage, that the d i v i n e cannot be o u r
master, e q u a l l y p r o b l e m a t i c . W e w i l l read the a r g u m e n t differently
i f we recognize that i t has four consequences: (i) that the d i v i n e
11
Forrester, 'Arguments', 236—7; Lewis, 'Separation', 112.
13
Categorical properties of Forms are those which a Form has simply i n virtue
of being a Form, rather than being the Form it happens to be. See G. E. L . Owen,
Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment ofthe Forms (Oxford, 1968).
13
Forrester, Arguments', 233; Peterson, 'Greatest', 1; Rickless, Transition, 90.
14
Lewis, 'Separation', 120—3; M . L . McPherran, A n Argument "Too Strange":
Parmenides 134 c 4—E 8', Apeiron, 32 (1999), 55—71; Rickless, Transition, 90—3.
cannot master the h u m a n ; ( i i ) that the h u m a n cannot master the
d i v i n e ; ( i i i ) that the d i v i n e cannot k n o w the h u m a n ; ( i v ) that the
h u m a n cannot k n o w the d i v i n e . I f the a r g u m e n t were an a r g u
15
m e n t f r o m analogy, t h e n o n l y the epistemic conclusions w o u l d

be p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y interesting. B u t i t cannot be an a r g u m e n t f r o m
analogy i f b o t h sorts o f c o n c l u s i o n are i m p o r t a n t .
W h i l e i t is agreed o n a l l sides that c o n c l u s i o n ( i v ) w o u l d be unac
ceptable to Plato, (i) w o u l d also be p r o b l e m a t i c for h i m . A t Phaedo1 6
62 D 2-3 a c o n c e p t i o n o f the d i v i n e is f o u n d such that we are its

possessions (KTrifiara) and i t is o u r manager (TO 9e6v re eivai TOV ITTI-
/xeAou/xeror -q^wv). Platonic piety, i t seems, w o u l d be o u t r a g e d b y
c o n c l u s i o n ( i ) . Since conclusions ( i ) , ( i i i ) , a n d ( i v ) are a l l p h i l o s o
p h i c a l l y threatening, the master-slave example is n o t i n t r o d u c e d
s i m p l y o n the w a y to the d a m a g i n g conclusions ( i i i ) and ( i v ) .
T e x t u a l evidence f r o m the Parmenides supports this. 134 D 9 - E 6
summarizes the overall conclusions o f the G D . T h e sentence begins
w i t h OVKOVV, Plato's usual t e r m for d r a w i n g a conclusion, a n d p r o
ceeds to give the c o n d i t i o n a l ' i f this m o s t accurate mastery and this
m o s t accurate k n o w l e d g e are i n the d i v i n e r e a l m , t h e n t h e i r mas
t e r y c o u l d n o t master us, n o r t h e i r k n o w l e d g e k n o w us n o r a n y t h i n g
else a m o n g us' (134 D 9 - E 1). N o t h i n g g r a m m a t i c a l indicates that an
analogy is b e i n g d r a w n between the example o f m a s t e r y a n d the ex
ample o f k n o w l e d g e : i n fact, the c o n j u n c t i o n KOLI at 134 D 1 o is m o s t
n a t u r a l l y taken as b a l a n c i n g the t w o examples, n o t s u b o r d i n a t i n g
one to the other.
Plato does m o v e o n to d r a w an analogy, u s i n g the t e r m SfioCws, at
134 E 2. B u t the analogy d r a w n is n o t between the examples o f mas
t e r y a n d k n o w l e d g e , b u t rather between the d i v i n e and the h u m a n :
'just as we do n o t c o m m a n d t h e m (sc. the gods) w i t h o u r leadership,
nor k n o w the d i v i n e w i t h o u r k n o w l e d g e , so they, i n t u r n , accord
i n g to the a r g u m e n t , are n o t masters o f us, n o r do they k n o w h u m a n
affairs, because they are gods' (134 E 2 - 6 ) . T h e language Plato uses
suggests that the analogy h o l d s between the abilities o f the h u m a n
a n d d i v i n e , n o t between the examples o f mastery a n d k n o w l e d g e .
T h e r e f o r e , conclusions ( i ) , ( i i i ) , a n d ( i v ) each seem p h i l o s o p h i c
ally i m p o r t a n t a n d o u g h t to be read as d e r i v i n g f r o m i s o m o r p h i c
15
Plato would surely hold that (ii) is an obvious truth and so, although the G D
entails (ii), we should perhaps avoid calling it a conclusion: Plato would see no need
to argue for (ii).
1 6
I owe to David Sedley the parallel w i t h Phaedo 62 D . Although it seems obvious,
no literature I am aware of says that (i) would be problematic for the Platonist.
So Matthew Duncombe
r e a s o n i n g . T h e G D is n o t an a r g u m e n t f r o m analogy, so is n o t
17
i n v a l i d , at least for the reasons Forrester gives.

T h e t w o d o m i n a n t readings b o t h have serious drawbacks. I f we
take separation as a premiss i n the G D , as we m u s t , separation can
n o t be radical. M o r e o v e r , the G D s h o u l d be v a l i d , c o n t r a r y to the
a r g u m e n t - f r o m - a n a l o g y reading, w i t h four p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y signifi
cant consequences. I n Section 2 I show that such a r e a d i n g is n o t
o n l y possible, b u t also h i g h l y plausible.
2. Relative terms a n d the G D
W e saw above that the e x i s t i n g readings o f the G D are unsatisfac

tory, a n d we m i g h t w i s h to r e m i n d ourselves o f the c r i t e r i a for a suc
cessful reading o f the G D . M y discussion o f the radical separation
reading showed that separation m u s t be s t r o n g e n o u g h to m o t i v a t e
the c o n c l u s i o n that the F o r m M a s t e r can relate o n l y to the F o r m
Slave, n o t to some p a r t i c i p a n t slave, a n d vice versa. T h e same ap
plies, mutatis, mutandis, to K n o w l e d g e and T r u t h . B u t the premiss
m u s t also n o t be so s t r o n g as to r u l e o u t a priori a l l relations between
F o r m s and p a r t i c i p a n t s , as this w o u l d beg the q u e s t i o n against the
Platonist. T h e failure o f the a r g u m e n t - f r o m - a n a l o g y r e a d i n g t a u g h t
us to u n d e r s t a n d the a r g u m e n t as a v a l i d d e r i v a t i o n o f a l l four c o n
sequences, n o t j u s t the epistemic consequences.
A p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f (P2), a n d the n o t i o n o f relative terms
c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n i t , allows us to navigate the waters between these
requirements. I take the G D as a reductio o f a separation assump
t i o n that ( P i ) and (P2) express: such a separation a s s u m p t i o n leads
to consequences, three o f w h i c h are unacceptable, w h e n c o m b i n e d
w i t h various assumptions about relatives. ( P i ) asserts that (a) each
t h i n g has an essence that is 'itself b y i t s e l f and (b) none o f those
essences is a m o n g us. (P2) applies this t h i n k i n g to a class o f F o r m s :
those that 'are w h a t they are i n r e l a t i o n to each other'. I t asserts that
1 7
I f conclusions (i), (iii), and (iv) are philosophically important, Plato is not pick
ing his examples of relatives at random, or deriving them from another source. This
is significant because i f Plato's examples are deliberate, Aristotle's use of 'master'
and 'slave' as examples of relatives in Cat. 7 indicates that he was influenced d i
rectly by this passage in his thinking about relatives. If, contrary to fact, Plato had
picked the example of 'master' and 'slave' without a philosophical point, it might
have suggested that Plato and Aristotle were both following an existing (perhaps
shared) tradition.
Plato's Relative Terms Si
(c) m e m b e r s o f this class have their essence i n r e l a t i o n to themselves
a n d n o t i n r e l a t i o n to things a m o n g us. Parmenides t h e n repeats, i n
(P3), the c o m p l e m e n t a r y p o i n t for the things a m o n g us. F o r m a l l y ,
I c l a i m that texts (P1 ) - ( P 3 ) reflect the f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e s , and that
the G D targets t h e m for reductio:
( A ) F o r all X, for all Y, ( i f (X is a F o r m a n d X has Y as its

r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative) t h e n Y is a F o r m ) .
As suggested b y (P3), there is an equivalent p r i n c i p l e g o v e r n i n g

participants:
(B) F o r all X, for all Y, ( i f (X is a m o n g us and X has Y as a

r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative) t h e n Y is a m o n g us).
G i v e n the a s s u m p t i o n that F o r m s and things a m o n g us exhaust the

ontology, these t w o p r i n c i p l e s y i e l d the f o l l o w i n g b i c o n d i t i o n a l :
(AB) F o r all X, for all Y, ((X is a F o r m and X has Y as its re

c i p r o c a t i n g correlative) i f f Y is a F o r m ) .
N o t e that ( A B ) does n o t bar all relations between F o r m s a n d

p a r t i c i p a n t s : specifically, i t does n o t r u l e o u t every version o f the
p a r t i c i p a t i o n relation. T h e o n l y t h i n g that i t blocks is h a v i n g a
r e c i p r o c a t i n g c o r r e l a t i o n between F o r m s a n d participants. W e w i l l
see b e l o w w h a t a r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative is, for Plato. B u t , taken
w i t h certain assumptions about relative terms, ( A B ) yields the four
consequences, three o f w h i c h are unacceptable to the Platonist: one
c o n c e r n i n g vassalage a n d t w o c o n c e r n i n g epistemology. R o u g h l y
this is because Plato's c o n c e p t i o n o f relative terms entails that a
g i v e n relative is that relative i n v i r t u e o f its correlative. I t is o n l y
i n v i r t u e o f the relationship a master has to a correlative slave that
a master is a master. B y ( A B ) , the relative-correlative relationship
cannot h o l d across realms, w h i c h , as we w i l l see below, leads to the
four conclusions.
F o r m y reading to succeed, I m u s t first establish that A a n d B
best reflect the text o f ( P i ) - ( P 3 ) . A close reading o f (P2) helps to
do this. (P2) tells us w h a t characteristics those F o r m s that are to
be isolated f r o m p a r t i c i p a n t s s h o u l d have. T h e s e characteristics are
precisely the ones r e q u i r e d for ( A ) a n d ( B ) . (P2) specifies a restric
ted class o f F o r m s a n d asserts things about those F o r m s . T h e class
p i c k e d o u t is ' a l l the Ideas w h i c h are w h a t they are i n r e l a t i o n to
52 Matthew Duncombe
each Other' {oaai TWV ISCOJV rrpos aXXrjXas eloiv ai (Eiaiv). Contrary
to the r a d i c a l separation reading, w h i c h takes this as a delineation
of a l l the F o r m s , m y r e a d i n g recognizes t h a t o n l y some F o r m s can
be p i c k e d o u t this way: F o r m s for relative terms. T h i s is w h a t the
oaai indicates. 18
B u t w h a t are the characteristics o f the F o r m s for
relatives t h a t are thus identified?
T h e first t h i n g that is clear is t h a t relatives are n o t singletons. N o
one c o u l d be a slave i f they were the o n l y i t e m i n the universe. O b
viously, i t is necessary b u t n o t sufficient for b e i n g a slave t h a t there
are other items i n the universe. Someone is n o t a slave i f the other
i t e m t h a t exists is m e r e l y a m a n , for example. A special relationship
to another i t e m is necessary. T o be a slave is to bear a special rela
t i o n s h i p to a master. I f a master exists, t h e n there m u s t be a slave
and vice versa. T h i s does n o t h o l d w i t h other terms, such as ' m a n ' :
i f a m a n exists, i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t there m u s t be a slave, or any
t h i n g else. One m i g h t t h i n k that relative terms come i n pairs. T h i s
fits w i t h the examples c i t e d i n the G D : Master/Slave a n d K n o w
l e d g e / T r u t h . W e have already seen t h a t the first t e r m i n this p a i r is
u s u a l l y called a relative t e r m , the other its correlative.
N o t o n l y do relatives a n d t h e i r correlatives come i n pairs, b u t also
the p a i r is o f a special sort. T h i s is a f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t ( A ) and
(B) are the correct r e a d i n g o f (P2). Parmenides tells us, at 133 c 8,
that the terms i n the p a i r are i n r e l a t i o n to each other (77730? aXX-q-
Xas). W e m i g h t call the p a i r ' r e c i p r o c a l ' . Just as a master is master
of a slave, so a slave is slave o f a m a s t e r . W e c o u l d p u t the p o i n t ,
19
somewhat anachronistically, b y u s i n g the n o t i o n o f a r e l a t i o n and
1 8
Lewis, 'Separation', 107, also holds that a restricted class of Forms are picked
out here.
1 9
Cf. Arist. Cat. 7, 6 28—7 2i. Aristotle is very clear that relatives reciprocate
b a
(6 28—35) and even uses as examples master and slave (6 2g—30) and knowledge
b b
(6 34—5), which, as I mentioned above, are taken directly from this passage. Here
b
and i n what follows I draw illustrative comparisons w i t h Aristotle's discussion of

relatives i n Categories 7. Although none of my arguments relies on Aristotle's texts
as evidence, such comparisons are pertinent because Plato and Aristotle seem to
handle relatives i n much the same way. Both conceive of relatives as having a cor
relative which it is exclusively relative to. Both think of relatives reciprocating w i t h
their correaltive. Both pick many of the same examples. Compare Charm. 167 c—
168 c, Rep. 438 B - E , and Theaet. 152 A - c w i t h Cat. 6 36-8 24 to see double and half,
a b
larger and smaller, knowledge and perception used by both philosophers as examples
of relatives, i n addition to master and slave, which we have been discussing. While
there are some differences (for example, for Aristotle relatives admit of contraries,
Cat. 7, 6 i5—18, a point not discussed by Plato), the similarities are strong enough
b
to make the comparisons illuminating.

its converse i n m o d e r n l o g i c . T h e d o m a i n o f a r e l a t i o n , R, is the
20
set o f a l l o f the items t h a t bear R to s o m e t h i n g . W e can say t h a t the

c o - d o m a i n o f R is the set o f a l l items w h i c h have R b o r n e to t h e m .
These n o t i o n s also a l l o w us to define the converse o f a r e l a t i o n , R.
T h e converse o f R is R~ , defined as the r e l a t i o n w h i c h takes the
z
c o - d o m a i n o f R as its d o m a i n a n d w h i c h has the d o m a i n o f R as

its c o - d o m a i n . T h i s allows us to describe i n m o r e detailed language
w h a t Parmenides is saying here: the c o - d o m a i n o f the 'is a mas
ter o f r e l a t i o n consists exclusively o f slaves. So the terms 'master'
21
a n d 'slave' reciprocate because the d o m a i n o f the 'is a master o f re

l a t i o n is the c o - d o m a i n o f the 'is a slave o f r e l a t i o n a n d vice v e r s a .
22
Plato holds, r i g h t across his corpus, t h a t each relative t e r m has a

r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative to w h i c h i t is related. Republic 4 gives us a
r i c h selection o f examples i n the context o f a discussion o f relative
terms:
s o c . Don't you understand that the greater is the sort of thing to be of or

than something?
G L A U C O N . Of course,
s o c . Surely, greater than the smaller?
G L A U C O N . Yes.
s o c . A n d , perhaps, the much greater than the much smaller: isn't that
right?
G L A U C O N . Yes.
s o c . So is the at-a-time [7ro-nf] greater than the at-a-time smaller and the
going-to-be [eao/ievov] greater than the going-to-be smaller?
G L A U C O N . Certainly.
s o c . A n d similarly the more i n relation to the fewer, and the double i n re
lation to the half and all like cases; again, the heavier i n relation to the
lighter, the faster i n relation to the slower and moreover, perhaps, the hot
in relation to the cold: surely i t is also like that for all similar cases? But
what about knowledges? Isn't i t the same way? Knowledge itself is know
ledge of learning [/xaS-tj/xa-j-oy] itself—or of whatever we ought to posit that
knowledge is of . . . (438 B 4-c 9)
3 0
Although the analogy is useful, there are, I believe very important differences
in the way Plato and Aristotle conceive of relative terms and the way modern logic
does. Principally, Plato and Aristotle lack the idea of a dyadic relation.
3 1
Lewis, 'Separation', 110, also invokes these modern notions, but in an analysis
quite different from mine.
3 3
Note the difference between 'symmetrical' relations and reciprocal relations.
'Symmetry' is a property of first-order relations, while reciprocity is a relation
between first-order relations. I t is easy to see the difference when we look at cases
such as 'larger'. 'Larger' is not symmetrical, because if x is larger than y, it is not
the case that y is larger than x. But'larger' does have a reciprocal, i.e. 'smaller'.
54 Matthew Duncombe
I n each case, Socrates gives the relative t e r m as relative to its r e c i p

r o c a t i n g partner: j u s t as the relative relates to its correlative, so the
correlative relates to the relative. N o r is this way o f presenting rela
tives and correlatives confined to the Republic: greater a n d smaller
are g i v e n i n this w a y i n the Charmides ( i 6 8 B 5-8) and Categories
7 ( 6 3 6 - i o ) . D o u b l e and h a l f are so g i v e n i n the Charmides (168 c
a b
4 - 5 ) and Categories 7 ( 7 i 5 - i 7 ) . H e a v i e r and l i g h t e r feature thus

a
i n the Charmides (168 c 9-10). Desire is a relative i n Symposium

(200 A 5) as w e l l as the Charmides (167 E 1-2). Finally, knowledge is
m e n t i o n e d as a relative w i t h a correlative i n Charmides (168 B 2 - 3 ) ,
Categories 7 ( 6 3 6 - i o ; 6 2 8 - 3 5 ; 7 i 5 f f . ) , a n d Parmenides (134 A - B ) ,
a b b b
a l t h o u g h i n each case ' k n o w l e d g e ' has a different r e c i p r o c a t i n g cor

relative. So each relative t e r m has a r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative. T h i s
is reflected b y ( A ) a n d ( B ) , s h o w i n g t h e m to be a g o o d reading o f
(P2) a n d (P3).
( A B ) is a good reading o f the premiss targeted for reductio b y the
G D . B u t to prove m y reading o f the G D , I need to show that rela
tive terms, for Plato, do n o t j u s t have a r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative,
b u t also that the r e c i p r o c a t i n g correlative is the object o f the rela
tive. Plato asserts this i n the case o f ' k n o w l e d g e ' at Republic 438 c
9. T h e ' k n o w l e d g e ' r e l a t i o n takes an i t e m i n the d o m a i n , a knower,
and l i n k s i t to an i t e m i n the c o - d o m a i n o f the relation. Each i t e m i n
the c o - d o m a i n is an object o f k n o w l e d g e : each is s o m e t h i n g k n o w n .
T h e special object is w h a t can be a p p l i e d to the w h o l e c o - d o m a i n
of a given relative: where the relative is ' k n o w l e d g e ' the object is
all the k n o w n things. Plato changes the expression he uses for ' o b
j e c t o f k n o w l e d g e ' , b u t the n o t i o n is stable enough: n o t o n l y is the
k n o w n the correlative o f knowledge, b u t i t is also its object. T h e
same applies, mutatis mutandis, to other relative-correlative pairs.
I n the Parmenides Socrates' i n t e r r o g a t o r has m o r e to say about
the F o r m s that come i n r e c i p r o c a t i n g relative a n d correlative pairs.
A s w e l l as c o m i n g i n such a pair, they eisin hai eisin ('are w h a t they
are') i n r e l a t i o n to each other. F o r some scholars this indicates that
F o r m s o f relative terms feature other F o r m s i n t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n . 23
However, I t h i n k that the expression eisin hai eisin means some

t h i n g rather specific i n the context o f relative terms. Eisin hai ei
sin serves as the f e m i n i n e p l u r a l f o r m o f a neuter singular expres
sion often f o u n d i n Plato's discussions o f relative terms: hoper estin,
w h i c h l i t e r a l l y means ' w h a t i t is'. T h e expression occurs at Parm.
3 3
See Peterson, 'Greatest', and Rickless, Transition, 85—93.
133 C 8 i n the f e m i n i n e p l u r a l , rather t h a n the usual neuter singular,
because i t agrees w i t h the f e m i n i n e p l u r a l ton ideon ( ' o f the Ideas') i n
the same line. L o o k i n g at some comparable uses o f this expression
i n Plato w i l l reveal that i t is used to specify that a relative reciproc
ates w i t h its correlative w h e n the relative is p r o p e r l y specified a n d
that the correlative is the object o f the relative.
T h e Symposium contains an a p p a r e n t l y technical use o f hoper estin
i n the c o n t e x t o f relative terms. T h e elenchus o f A g a t h o n includes
a discussion where Socrates argues, o n the basis o f the r e l a t i v i t y o f
'desire', that love is n o t b e a u t i f u l : love is the desire for beauty; we
o n l y desire w h a t we lack; so, love m u s t lack beauty and, therefore,
is n o t b e a u t i f u l . I n the course o f that a r g u m e n t , Socrates discusses
the defining characteristics o f relative terms a n d some examples.
H e puts a f o r m u l a for w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g is a relative as a question:
'Is Eros o f such a k i n d as to be o f s o m e t h i n g or o f n o t h i n g ? ' (199 D
1 - 2 ) . H e continues w i t h an analogous case: 'is the father father o f
24
s o m e t h i n g or not?' (199 D 5 ) . Socrates supplies the answer that the

2 5
father is father o f a son or d a u g h t e r . I n this way, he p u t s the t e r m

26
'father' i n t o the same class as the t e r m ' E r o s ' .

Socrates continues w i t h the case o f ' b r o t h e r ' , another relative
t e r m , a n d specifies i t i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: adelphos, auto touth'
hoper estin (199 E 3 - 4 ) . L i t e r a l l y , the expression means 'brother, the
actual t h i n g that i t is' a n d is glossed as ' b r o t h e r qua b r o t h e r ' b y
D o v e r . T h e gloss can be used, b u t w i t h care: qua is a t e r m o f art
27
i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y o f language and epistemology, w h i c h speci

fies the aspect u n d e r w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is c o n s i d e r e d . One m i g h t
28
say that H u m e ' s dialogues qua p h i l o s o p h y are l u c i d , b u t qua l i t e r a

t u r e are obscure. T h e qua qualifier allows us to specify h o w we are
t h i n k i n g o f an object, a n d different ways o f t h i n k i n g o f an object
m a y result i n i n c o m p a t i b l e descriptions b e i n g true o f an i t e m . I n
2 9
3 4
eon TOLOVTOS oto? etvat Tivos 6 'Epojs epojs, r] ovoevos;
3 5
dpa o TraTTjp eon TraTT/p TWOS Tj ov;
36
6 TraTT/p, the Greek formula w i t h a definite article, is a way of speaking generally
about fathers. I have retained the definite article i n English for the sake of literalism,
even though it sounds archaic.
3 7
K . J. Dover et at., Plato: Symposium (Cambridge, 1980), 134.
3 8
Aristotle is often thought to be the originator of this use of TJ, from which we
derive the qua qualifier, but see Empedocles B 17. 9 D K . This line is also line 8 of
Empedocles B 26 D K .
3 9
Alternatively, it may be that the descriptions are true of the ordered pair of the
item and way of thinking, i.e. the properties being lucid and being obscure apply
respectively to the ordered pairs (Hume's dialogues, philosophy) and (Hume's dia-
56 Matthew Duncombe
none o f the uses I can f i n d i n Plato does he use the qualifier i n this
' m u l t i p l e aspect' way, so we m u s t handle D o v e r ' s gloss carefully.
Whereas i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y qua is used to i n t r o d u c e and to ex
clude aspects u n d e r w h i c h s o m e t h i n g m a y be considered, Plato, as
we w i l l see, uses the expression o n l y to exclude aspects f r o m consi
deration, never to i n t r o d u c e t h e m . T h e o n l y use Plato w o u l d a l l o w
is: ' H u m e ' s dialogues qua dialogues are thus-and-so.' T h i s state
m e n t w a r n s us n o t to t h i n k o f H u m e ' s dialogues as literature, n o r
as philosophy, b u t o n l y as dialogues.
T o prove the p o i n t about hoper estin let us look at its occurrence
at Theaet. 204 E 11. Socrates is t r y i n g , i n the face o f d e t e r m i n e d
resistance, to force Theaetetus to accept that the ' w h o l e ' (TO SXOV)
and the ' s u m ' (TT&V) m e a n the same. Socrates says that i f a w h o l e
consisted o f parts, i t w o u l d be a l l the parts. S o m e t h i n g that is a l l
the parts is a s u m . So the ' w h o l e ' a n d ' s u m ' m e a n the same. ' O r is
a p a r t w h a t i t is o f a n y t h i n g other t h a n the w h o l e ? ' Socrates here 30
moves to exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y that the p a r t s h o u l d be considered

u n d e r another aspect, say, the aspect o f b e i n g a f u n c t i o n a l p a r t o f a
s t r u c t u r e d w h o l e , such as a h a n d o f someone. U n d e r that aspect, the
' p a r t ' m i g h t be relative to a body, as w e l l as relative to a w h o l e . B u t
Socrates' p o i n t is to exclude the other possible aspects o f the i t e m ,
and consider i t j u s t qua p a r t . N o t e also that hoper estin is again used
i n the c o n t e x t o f relative terms: the p a r t is p a r t o f the w h o l e .
T h i s suggests that, for Plato, a relative is always relative to some
correlative. T h e p a r t is always relative to the w h o l e , p r o p e r l y c o n
strued, and, to r e t u r n to the Republic 4 examples, the larger is always
larger t h a n the smaller. B u t is the relationship between relative and
correlative exclusive? T h a t is, is the relative only relative to the re
c i p r o c a t i n g correlative, or c o u l d i t be relative to s o m e t h i n g else as
well? T h i s is n o t obvious: i t seems that a larger t h i n g is n o t o n l y lar
ger t h a n a smaller t h i n g , b u t also larger t h a n a m i d d l e - s i z e d t h i n g .
T h e hoper estin m o v e can help us here as w e l l . Plato is concerned
w i t h the p r o p e r correlative o f the larger. W h a t e v e r the larger is lar
ger t h a n w i l l be smaller t h a n the larger. I n other words, i f we p r o
p e r l y specify the larger qua larger, n o t larger qua a larger thing, we
see that i t is relative o n l y to the smaller. I n d e e d , this qua indicates
logues, literature). I n this case the descriptions would be true or false of different
ordered pairs and so not incompatible.
3 0
[J.epos S' eo9' OTOV dXXov e a r l v oirep e a r l v rj r o v oXov; ( T h e a e t . 204 E 11).
that the necessary and sufficient c o n d i t i o n o n b e i n g larger is b e i n g
larger t h a n the smaller. A n y relationships i n a d d i t i o n to the rela
t i o n s h i p to the smaller, such as to a m i d d l e - s i z e d t h i n g , are r e d u n
dant w h e n e x p l a i n i n g w h y the larger is larger.
We can see f r o m l o o k i n g at other passages where Plato uses this
t e r m i n o l o g y that i t r e g u l a r l y specifies that s o m e t h i n g s h o u l d be
v i e w e d qua itself; i t is used to exclude other i n c i d e n t a l ways o f l o o k
i n g at the relative—for example, u n d e r a non-relative d e s c r i p t i o n .
I n the c o n t e x t o f the Parmenides, we s h o u l d be alive to the sense
i n w h i c h Parmenides uses i t . I n so far as someone is a slave, he
m u s t be slave o f something. T h e p o i n t is to differentiate a relative
d e s c r i p t i o n such as 'slave' f r o m another, n o n - r e l a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n
w h i c h w i l l a p p l y to a l l slaves—for example, ' b e i n g h u m a n ' . I f this
is the t h o u g h t , i t prefigures A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion at Cat. 7, 7 3 i - a
h
g. T h e r e A r i s t o t l e remarks that w h e n a l l the possible 'accidental'
(CTu/x/3e/3iiKOTa) descriptions are excluded, or ' s t r i p p e d away' f r o m a
master, such as ' b e i n g a b i p e d ' , ' b e i n g capable o f reason', we w i l l
say that a slave is a slave o f a master. H i s p o i n t is that i t is, i f n o t
exactly false, n o t ideal to say that 'a slave is slave o f a b i p e d ' ; he
w o u l d prefer a m o r e perspicuous designation o f the c o r r e l a t i v e . 31
T h e Parmenides' use o f eisin hai eisin c o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d to make

the same p o i n t : a master, qua master, is master o f a slave, a n d a
slave, qua slave, is slave o f a master. W h e n p r o p e r l y specified, mas
ter a n d slave are reciprocal correlatives, w h i c h means that a master
is always a n d o n l y o f a slave a n d the relative-correlative relationship
is necessary a n d sufficient for b e i n g a master.
So m y broader v i e w h i g h l i g h t s t w o elements o f Plato's account o f
relatives. F i r s t , w h e n p r o p e r l y specified, a relative w i l l relate to a
correlative. A master, w h e n specified as such, w i l l relate to a slave.
T h e relationship between a relative and correlative is exclusive a n d
exhaustive. Second, the correlative w i l l be the object o f the relative
ov[j.fiefiriK6s has a range of uses in Aristotle, but Pkys. 2. 3, I95 33— 6 may be
3 1 a b
the closest parallel. There Aristotle is discussing, not kinds of cause, but the ways i n
which a cause may be given: 'some [are causes] as accident [OJ? TO ovê^r/Ko?] and
some the genera of these' (i95 3i—3). He then gives the example of a sculptor caus
a
ing a sculpture. The cause of a sculpture can be given as 'a sculptor', 'Polyclitus',
or even 'a man' or 'an animal'. The cause can be picked out i n various 'accidental'
ways. T h i s closely reflects the thought i n Cat. 7 3 1—g that a relative can be specified
a b
in various ways. Moreover, the Physics tells us that there is a hierarchy of ways of
specifying the cause w i t h respect to the caused (i95 i—2). Similarly, the Categories
b
says that there is a privileged description of the relative w i t h respect to the correla
tive.
58 Matthew Duncombe
t e r m . I n the example horn Republic 4, the relative t e r m , k n o w l e d g e ,

is relative to the object o f k n o w l e d g e , the knowable.
U n d e r s t a n d i n g (P2) w i t h the help o f a richer grasp o f r e l a t i v i t y i n
Plato allows us p r o p e r l y to u n d e r s t a n d the p r i n c i p l e s that I labelled
above as ( A ) and ( B ) . ( A ) asserts that, for any pair o f reciprocal cor
relatives, i f one is a F o r m , b o t h are Forms, a n d ( B ) asserts that,
for any p a i r o f reciprocal correlatives, i f one is a p a r t i c i p a n t , b o t h
are participants. I f this is the correct way to construe the p r i n c i p l e s
of separation as they appear i n the G D , the a r g u m e n t o f the G D
w o r k s i n the f o l l o w i n g manner.
F i r s t , ( P i ) makes the general p o i n t that the F o r m s are separate, i n
some sense, f r o m participants. T h i s c l a i m has been i n p l a y f r o m as
far back as 128 E 6, w h e n Socrates posited F o r m s that, u n l i k e par
ticipants, are n o t themselves subject to b e i n g alike a n d n o t alike,
or one a n d many. Second, (P2) picks o u t a restricted class o f the
Forms, n a m e l y the F o r m s o f relative terms. Each o f such terms has
a reciprocal correlative: relative terms a n d t h e i r correlatives come
i n pairs. T h i r d , as I have argued above, (P2) is best characterized
as asserting that separation amounts to ( A B ) , i.e. that b o t h items i n
a relative-correlative p a i r are isolated together either i n the F o r m
r e a l m or i n o u r r e a l m .
W i t h these three premisses i n place, Parmenides can derive the
four consequences w h e n he t u r n s to his example relative-correlative
pairs: master/slave and k n o w l e d g e / t r u t h . Parmenides says:
I f one of us is somebody's master or somebody's slave, surely he is not [a

slave] of Master itself, of what a master is, nor is the master a master of
Slave itself, of what a slave is. On the contrary, because he is a human be
ing he is i t [viz. a master or a slave] of a human being; Mastery itself is
what i t is of Slavery itself [avrrj hio-nonux avrrjs SovXeias larlv 0 lari],
and similarly Slavery itself [is what i t is] of Mastery itself. (133 D 7—E 4)
Parmenides tells Socrates that a h u m a n master can o n l y be master

of a h u m a n slave, a n d the equivalent is true for the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
F o r m s . I t is irrelevant, for example, to A c h i l l e s ' p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g a
master that he bears any other relationships: these can be ' s t r i p p e d
away', to use A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphor. I t is necessary and sufficient for
b e i n g a master that A c h i l l e s bears the appropriate relationship to
some slave.
But, according to Plato's c o n c e p t i o n o f relatives, the correlative
is n o t j u s t that i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is a master; the correla-
tive is also the object o f the r e l a t i o n . A n d b y ( A B ) any c o r r e l a t i o n
holds o n l y between items i n the same r e a l m . So the correlative o b
j e c t o f any relative t e r m cannot be i n a different r e a l m f r o m the
subject o f the relative. F r o m here, the four consequences f o l l o w d i
rectly: a d i v i n e master cannot be master o f a h u m a n slave; the F o r m
Slave cannot be the object o f h u m a n mastery. T h e same is true for
k n o w l e d g e : for a state o f m i n d to be k n o w l e d g e , i t is necessary a n d
sufficient that i t bear a relationship to the correlative o f k n o w l e d g e .
B u t , because the correlative o f a relative a n d the object o f a rela
tive are i d e n t i c a l for Plato, a n d ( A B ) , k n o w l e d g e i n the F o r m r e a l m
can o n l y be k n o w l e d g e o f things i n that realm; similarly, we cannot
k n o w the F o r m T r u t h . 3 2
T h e above construal o f the a r g u m e n t shows that separation, c o n

s t r u e d as A B , along w i t h Plato's usual n o t i o n o f relative terms, j e o
pardizes three key Platonic propositions. T h i s invites us to read
Parmenides' attack as a reductio ad absurdum o f A B , c o m b i n e d w i t h
c e r t a i n assumptions about relatives, w h i c h Parmenides is sure the
y o u n g Socrates w i l l a c c e p t . T h i s account does n o t make G D beg
33
the question, u n l i k e the radical separation reading. M y reading does

n o t assume that n o relations are possible across realms, b u t rather
shows w h y relative a n d correlative pairs cannot relate across the
realms. I f Plato t h i n k s o f relative terms i n the G D as he usually
t h i n k s o f relatives, t h e n there cannot be cross-realm correlations.
I f there cannot be cross-realm correlations, the four consequences
listed above follow. A t least three o f these consequences threaten
f u n d a m e n t a l Platonic tenets: that the F o r m s are knowable, that the
d i v i n e can master us, a n d that the d i v i n e can k n o w o u r affairs. 34
3 3
This way of reading the argument owes a great deal to conversations w i t h James
Warren. However, he cannot be held responsible for the results!
3 3
I f we read the argument this way, there is still a question over which claim or
claims Socrates might reject: would he reject A B , or his (assumed) views of relatives?
A full answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper, but it seems that
Plato has the Parmenides conception of relatives in the (probably later) Sophist, at
255 c 14. T h i s may suggest that he would retain his conception of relative terms.
See M . Duncombe, 'Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255 c 14'
['Categories'], Ancient Philosophy, 32 (2012), 77—86.
3 4
There is one possible objection to my reading of the G D . On the face of it,
'knowledge' and ' t r u t h ' are not related as 'master' is to 'slave': although it is i m
possible to know without knowing truths, it is perfectly possible for there to be a
truth that is not known. Put another way, to be a reciprocal pair, these should be
'knowledge' (r/ euioTrnxri) and the 'knowable' (TO l-nioTr^Tov), which are the terms
Aristotle uses {Cat. 6 34). Briefly, I think that ' t r u t h ' should be understood here
b
as 'object of knowledge' or 'the knowable', which would be a proper correlative for

6o Matthew Duncombe
T h e a i m o f this paper was to show, c o n t r a r y to the v i e w o f many,

that the G D is c o r r e c t l y targeted and is n o t f o r m a l l y i n v a l i d , at least
for the reasons usually given. I argued i n Section i . i that the radical
separation reading s h o u l d be rejected as i t makes the G D a petitio
principii a n d fails to e x p l a i n w h y Parmenides w o u l d beg the ques
t i o n . Section 1.2 showed that the a r g u m e n t is n o t f o r m a l l y i n v a l i d ,
because i t is best read as h a v i n g four consequences, t w o c o n c e r n i n g
vassalage a n d t w o epistemological. I t is n o t the case that the episte-
m o l o g i c a l conclusions are a r r i v e d at b y analogy w i t h the arguments
c o n c e r n i n g vassalage. So i t is n o t an a r g u m e n t f r o m analogy and
does n o t fall to the objections levelled at i t w h e n u n d e r s t o o d that
way. Finally, i n Section 2 I used an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Plato's w i d e r
v i e w o f relatives to argue that the G D is a legitimate reductio, show
i n g that certain assumptions lead to P l a t o n i c a l l y unacceptable c o n
sequences c o n c e r n i n g the relationship o f us to the d i v i n e a n d o f the
d i v i n e to us.
University of Groningen
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allen, R. E., Plato's Parmenides (Newhaven, 1998).

Cherniss, H . F., Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy [Criticism],
2 vols. (London, 1962).
Cornford, F. M . , Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of T r u t h and
Plato's Parmenides. Translated with an Introduction and with a Running
Commentary (London, 1939).
Dover, K . J., etal., Plato: Symposium (Cambridge, 1980).
Duncombe, M.,'Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255 c
14' ['Categories'], Ancient Philosophy, 32 (2012), 77-86.
Forrester, J. W., Arguments and (sic) Able M a n Colud (sic) Refute: Par
menides 133 B-134E' [Arguments'], Phronesis, 19 (1974), 233-7.
G i l l , M . L . , and Ryan, P., Plato: Parmenides [Parmenides] (Indianapolis,
1996).
Lewis, F. A., 'Parmenides on Separation and the Knowability of the
Forms: Plato Parmenides 133 Aff' ['Separation'], Philosophical Studies,
35 (i979), 105-27.
McCabe, M . M . , Plato's Individuals [Individuals] (Princeton, 1999).
'knowledge'. Theaet. 201 D 2—3 and Rep. 438 c 6—9 and 438 E 5 all show that Plato is
developing a vocabulary for 'object of knowledge' while avoiding TO emorr/rov. For
further argument on this point see Duncombe, 'Categories', 84—5.
McPherran, M . U , 'An Argument "Too Strange": Parmenides 134 c 4—E

8', Apeiron, 32 (1999), 55-71.
Mueller, I . , 'Parmenides 133A-134E: Some Suggestions', Ancient Philo
sophy, 3 (1983), 3-7.
Owen, G. E. U , Dialectic and Eristic in the Treatment of the Forms (Oxford,
1968).
Peterson, S., 'The Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms:
The Unknowability Argument of Parmenides 133C-134C' ['Greatest'],
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 63 (1981), 1—16.
Prior, W. J., Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics [Unity]
(LaSalle, 1985).
Rickless, S. C , Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides
[Transition] (Cambridge, 2007).
Runciman, W. G , Plato's Later Epistemology [Epistemology] (Cambridge,
1962).
MORAL E D U C A T I O N A N D
T H E SPIRITED PART OF T H E
SOUL I N PLATO'S LAWS
JOSHUA W I L B U R N
I N the t r i p a r t i t e psychological t h e o r y o f Plato's Republic, the spir

i t e d p a r t o f the soul, or the thumoeides, is granted a p r o m i n e n t role
i n m o r a l development: its ' j o b ' i n the soul is to s u p p o r t a n d de
fend the practical j u d g e m e n t s issued b y the reasoning p a r t (par
t i c u l a r l y against the deleterious influence o f the appetitive p a r t ) ,
a n d its effective c a r r y i n g o u t o f that j o b is i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the v i r
tue o f courage (442 B - C ) . E a r l y m o r a l education, consequently, is
largely concerned w i t h p r e p a r i n g the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul for
this role as reason's ' a l l y ' . I n Plato's later w o r k the Laws, the the
o r y o f t r i p a r t i t i o n is never e x p l i c i t l y advocated: there is n o m e n t i o n
o f a d i v i s i o n o f the soul i n t o parts, and hence n o discussion o f a
' s p i r i t e d ' p a r t o f the soul w i t h a positive role to p l a y i n m o r a l deve
l o p m e n t . N o t o n l y that, b u t some o f the m o s t conspicuous passages
about s p i r i t e d m o t i v a t i o n i n the text emphasize its negative i m p a c t
o n o u r p s y c h o l o g y a n d behaviour. T h e s p i r i t e d e m o t i o n o f anger,
for example, is i d e n t i f i e d as one o f the p r i m a r y causes o f c r i m i n a l
b e h a v i o u r (863 B). A l l this has l e d m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s to conclude
that i n the Laws Plato rejects the t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y o f the soul as we
k n o w i t f r o m the Republic and adopts a n e w psychological m o d e l i n
its place. C h r i s t o p h e r B o b o n i c h , for example, has argued that Plato
abandoned the idea o f a p a r t i t i o n e d soul altogether i n the Laws,
o p t i n g instead for a u n i t a r y c o n c e p t i o n o f the s o u l . A c c o r d i n g to
1
B o b o n i c h , b y the t i m e Plato w r o t e the Laws, he h a d come to believe

that all h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n s d r a w o n the resources o f reasoning, a n d
hence that there can n o longer be p u r e l y ' n o n - r a t i o n a l ' soul-parts
© Joshua W i l b u r n 2013
I would like to thank the audience at the First Canadian Colloquium for Ancient
Philosophy and the Editor for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
1
C. Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics [ Utopia] (Ox
ford, 2002), 261 ff.
64 Joshua Wilburn
that act as i n d e p e n d e n t sources o f m o t i v a t i o n . O t h e r c o m m e n t a

2
tors have argued that Plato shifted towards a b i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n o f the

soul i n t o a r a t i o n a l a n d a n o n - r a t i o n a l p a r t . A c c o r d i n g to a recent
3
version o f this line o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n defended b y M a r i a Sassi, the

m a i n i n n o v a t i o n i n Plato's m o r a l p s y c h o l o g y i n the Laws is that the
i n t e r m e d i a t e psychological element, the thumoeides, is m i s s i n g . O n 4
her view, Plato n o longer endorses the idea o f an educable s p i r i t e d

p a r t o f the soul that can be u t i l i z e d for m o r a l development. Spir
i t e d m o t i v a t i o n s are present i n the soul, b u t they n o longer p l a y the
elevated role that they d i d i n the Republic: they are s i m p l y so m a n y
a m o n g o u r i r r a t i o n a l desires a n d emotions, alongside o u r appetitive
urges.
I w i l l argue, against these developmentalist views, that the t r i p a r
tite t h e o r y o f the soul remains i n t a c t i n the Laws, a n d that a l t h o u g h
t r i p a r t i t i o n is n o t e x p l i c i t l y endorsed, i t i n f o r m s m u c h o f the c o n
tent o f the t e x t f r o m beneath the surface. I n particular, I w i l l argue
that the thumoeides continues to act as a d i s t i n c t psychic source o f
e m o t i o n , desire, a n d m o t i v a t i o n , a n d that m o r a l education i n the
Laws s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as a i m i n g p r i m a r i l y at the s p i r i t e d p a r t
of the soul. I n Section i I w i l l clear the w a y for m y account b y
addressing some o f the m a i n arguments offered b y B o b o n i c h and
Sassi. I n Sections z a n d 3 I w i l l examine the m u s i c a l a n d g y m
nastic p r o g r a m m e s o f the Laws a n d w i l l h i g h l i g h t parallels to the
accounts o f the thumoeides a n d its role i n the p s y c h o l o g y o f m o r a l
education that are offered i n Republic and Timaeus (where t r i p a r t i
t i o n is also advocated). Finally, i n Sections 4 and 5 I w i l l examine
the educational role g i v e n to the laws themselves i n Magnesia, and
w i l l suggest that the education p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h t h e m is largely dir
ected at the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul as w e l l . M y c o n c l u s i o n w i l l be
that, despite i n i t i a l appearances, the thumoeides continues to p l a y an
3
Utopia, 261, 331. What makes 'non-rational' desires and emotions non-rational,
according to Bobonich, is that, although they all involve applications of reasoning,
they involve partial or incomplete applications of it. Impetuous anger, for example,
involves a sensitivity to some, but not all, relevant rational considerations about a
perceived injustice (ibid. 340—1).
3
See W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (London, 1975), 23—5; T. M .
Robinson, Plato's Psychology (Toronto, 1995), 145; M . M . Sassi, 'The Self, the Soul,
and the Individual in the City of the Laws' ['Self'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philo
sophy, 35 (2008), 125—48; D. A. Rees, 'Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy',
Journal of Hellenic Studies, ~]~] (1957), 112—18; and perhaps A. Laks, 'Legislation and
Demiurgy: O n the Relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws', Classical An
tiquity, 9 (1990), 209—29 at 221. 'Self, 133. 4
Moral Education in Plato's Laws 65
i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i v e r o l e — i n d e e d , an e x p a n d e d r o l e — i n m o r a l deve
l o p m e n t : i n the Laws, i t is no longer s i m p l y the ally o f reason, b u t
also the ally o f law itself.
1. T r i p a r t i t i o n i n the Laws
One o f the key passages to w h i c h c o m m e n t a t o r s such as B o b o n i c h

a n d Sassi appeal i n a r g u i n g for Plato's a b a n d o n m e n t o f t r i p a r t i t i o n
is the image o f the p u p p e t t h a t is offered at Laws 644 D - 6 4 5 B . 5
The
passage occurs i n the course o f the A t h e n i a n V i s i t o r ' s a t t e m p t to
e x p l a i n the n o t i o n o f b e i n g ' s t r o n g e r ' or 'weaker' t h a n oneself—a
n o t i o n t h a t he takes to be c e n t r a l to his discussion o f e d u c a t i o n . W e
are all like d i v i n e p u p p e t s , he suggests, p u l l e d i n opposite d i r e c t i o n s
b y the 'cords' w i t h i n us: we are p u l l e d t o w a r d s vice b y o u r 'iron'
c o r d s — w h i c h are associated w i t h pleasure and p a i n , feelings o f an
ger (thunioi), sexual desires, a n d o t h e r n o n - r a t i o n a l i m p u l s e s — a n d
6
we are p u l l e d t o w a r d s v i r t u e b y the ' g o l d e n ' c o r d associated w i t h

reasoning a n d law (644 D - 6 4 5 A ) . M a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s have em
p h a s i z e d the fact t h a t i n t h i s passage n o q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n is
m a d e a m o n g the various types o f n o n - r a t i o n a l i m p u l s e s . 7
There
are s i m p l y i r o n cords o n the one h a n d a n d the g o l d e n c o r d o n the
other, and, as B o b o n i c h p u t s i t , 'Plato makes no r o o m here for s i l -
5
The issue of whether Plato abandons the theory of tripartition in the Laws is
highly contentious. Against the developmentalists, L . Brisson, 'Soul and State i n
Plato's Laws' ['Soul'], in R. Barney, T. Brennan, and C. Brittain (eds.), Plato and the
Divided Self [Divided] (Cambridge, 2012), 281—307 (and cf. L . Brisson, 'Ethics and
Politics i n Plato's Laws' ['Ethics'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 28 (2005),
93—121 at 95); M . M . Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment [Punishment] (Berkeley, 1981),
175; and T. J. Saunders, 'The Structure of the Soul and the State i n Plato's Laws',
Eranos, 60 (1962), 37—55, argue that tripartition is still present in the Laws. C. Kahn,
' F r o m Republic to Laws' ['Laws'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 26 (2004),
337—62 at 361—2; and R. Kamtekar, 'Psychology and the Inculcation of Virtue i n
Plato's Laws' ['Psychology'], i n C. Bobonich (ed.), Plato's Laws: A Critical Guide
[Guide] (Cambridge, 2010), 127—48 at 141—2, argue, somewhat more neutrally, that
tripartition is compatible w i t h the puppet passage and the moral psychology of the
Laws, even if it is not explicitly advocated i n the text.
6
Or at least (so as not to beg the question against Bobonich), impulses that were
attributed to non-rational parts of the soul i n earlier dialogues.
7
D. Frede, 'Puppets on Strings: M o r a l Psychology in Laws Books 1 and 2', i n
Bobonich (ed.), Guide, 108—26 at 118, for example, remarks: 'There is no functional
distinction between the two unreasoning strings of pleasure and pain, as there is
between the two lower parts/horses, w i t h the better part acting as an ally of reason
against the powerful pull of the appetites.' Cf. Sassi, ' S e l f , 133.
66 Joshua Wilburn
ver c o r d s ' . 8
I n the p u p p e t passage, thumos is i n c l u d e d i n d i s c r i m i
n a t e l y a m o n g the r e c a l c i t r a n t a n d d i s r u p t i v e i r r a t i o n a l forces t h a t
p u l l against reasoning. G i v e n the e m p h a t i c c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n spir
ited e m o t i o n and a p p e t i t i v e desire i n Republic and Timaeus, and
g i v e n the i m p o r t a n t m o r a l role g r a n t e d to the thumoeides i n those
texts, t h i s seems s u r p r i s i n g . M o r e o v e r , as Sassi r i g h t l y p o i n t s o u t ,
c o m m e n t s o n s p i r i t e d anger t h r o u g h o u t the Laws c o n f i r m its l o w
status: thumos is t r e a t e d as a ' t y r a n n i c a l ' force t h a t can motivate
c r i m i n a l b e h a v i o u r (863 B ) a n d even p a r r i c i d e (869 A ) , i t can lead
to i g n o r a n c e (934 A ) or madness (934 D ) , and i t is a force t h a t needs
to be m i n i m i z e d or e x t i n g u i s h e d (731 D ) . I n s h o r t , s p i r i t e d anger,
9
or thumos, is far f r o m m a k i n g a reliable c o n t r i b u t i o n to i n d i v i d u a l

v i r t u e i n the Laws. O n the c o n t r a r y , i t is t r e a t e d as a p o t e n t i a l l y
s i g n i f i c a n t threat to v i r t u e . ' A l t h o u g h i n the Laws Plato continues
to a t t r i b u t e to thumos an i m p o r t a n t role i n m o r a l p s y c h o l o g y / Sassi
concludes, ' i n t h i s t e x t his a t t e n t i o n is focused m o r e o n its i r r a t i o n a l
and u n c o n t r o l l a b l e manifestations, w h i c h m a k e i t a d e c i d e d l y u n
l i k e l y candidate for t h a t alliance w i t h reason w h i c h is h i n t e d at i n
b o t h the Republic and Timaeus! 10
8
Utopia, 264. I n Utopia, 260—82, and i n C. Bobonich, 'Akrasia and Agency i n
Plato's Laws and Republic' ['Agency'], Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophic, 76
(1994), 3—36 at 17—28, Bobonich offers a detailed interpretation of the puppet pas
sage i n support of his developmentalist thesis about Plato's moral psychology. Bo
bonich emphasizes the fact that none of the puppet's affections is described as being
'agent-like': the iron cords are not described as soul-parts w i t h their own psycho
logical lives, but rather they all seem to be occurrent mental states of some kind
('Agency', 20). I confront Bobonich's interpretation of the passage i n J. W i l b u r n ,
'Akrasia and Self-Rule i n Plato's Laws', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 43
(2012), 25—53, d offer my own alternative reading of it.
a n
' S e l f , 135.
9
1 0
I b i d . 137. R. F. Stalley, 'Justice in Plato's Laws', in L . Brisson and S. Scolnicov
(eds.), Plato's Laws: From Theory into Practice (Proceedings of the V I Symposium
Platonicum; Sankt Augustin, 2003), 174—85 at 181 n. 6, agrees that in the Laws spir
ited motivation does not have the same psychological role that it had i n the Republic:
' I n the Republic it is the positive role of spirit that is emphasized; its task is to come
to the aid of reason and help it overcome the temptations of appetite. I n the Laws,
on the other hand, it appears i n a negative role as the source of irrational passions
which oppose the reason.' Cf. Bobonich, Utopia, 288. Brisson, who argues that the
Laws accepts tripartition, none the less agrees that ' i n the Laws, spirit displays a
primarily negative role . . . Anger is a source of vicious behaviour, a negative force
that needs to be moderated by gentleness' ('Soul', 298—9). He also remarks that 'we
hear so little' of thumos in the Laws (ibid. 289). While Brisson does acknowledge two
limited, positive uses of spirit in the Laws—first, when entering into a competition i n
the practice of virtue (cf. comments i n sect. 4 below), and second, when channelling
one's anger towards punishing the incurably unjust—he does not acknowledge the
important role that ( I w i l l argue) the thumoeides plays in early education and moral
development.
T h e r e are several p o i n t s to make i n response to this line o f inter

p r e t a t i o n . T h e first is that, despite w h a t m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s sug
gest, the p u p p e t passage is n o t i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e an account o f
the h u m a n soul. I n d e e d , the w o r d ' s o u l ' , psuche, despite b e i n g used
f r e q u e n t l y t h r o u g h o u t the rest o f Book 1, does n o t occur anywhere
either i n the p u p p e t passage itself or i n the passage i m m e d i a t e l y
leading u p to i t . T h a t is n o t to say that the A t h e n i a n is n o t c o n
1 1
cerned w i t h the soul at a l l i n the passage, o f course, b u t o n l y that

he is n o t a t t e m p t i n g to i l l u s t r a t e a general t h e o r y o f h u m a n psycho
logy. Rather, his express purpose is to shed some l i g h t o n a spe
cific n o t i o n w i t h i n m o r a l psychology—namely, the n o t i o n o f b e i n g
'stronger' or 'weaker' t h a n oneself. T h i s has t w o i m p o r t a n t i m p l i
cations. F i r s t , given t h a t Plato's focus is relatively n a r r o w i n the
p u p p e t passage, we s h o u l d be cautious about d r a w i n g any c o n c l u
sions about his overall t h e o r y o f the soul o n its basis. Second, i f 12
we take the a i m o f the passage i n t o account, we can r e a d i l y see w h y

Plato w o u l d n o t have been i n c l i n e d to d i s t i n g u i s h a m o n g o u r v a r i
ous n o n - r a t i o n a l impulses: because the passage is designed to i l l u s
trate the n o t i o n o f b e i n g stronger or weaker t h a n oneself, i t makes
sense t h a t i t s h o u l d focus o n n o n - r a t i o n a l impulses t h a n w h i c h we
need to be stronger. I n t h a t context, there is n o dialectical need to
i n t r o d u c e an i n t e r m e d i a t e class o f u n p r o b l e m a t i c n o n - r a t i o n a l m o
tivations.
T h e n e x t p o i n t to make is t h a t a l t h o u g h Plato's t r e a t m e n t o f
thumos i n the Laws emphasizes its negative a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y
dangerous aspects, Plato c r u c i a l l y does n o t i d e n t i f y thumos w i t h the
s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul. Plato's usage i n the w o r k s that feature t r i -
p a r t i t i o n c o n f i r m s this. W h e n Plato wants to refer to the e m o t i o n a l
state o f s p i r i t e d anger, he t y p i c a l l y uses thumos (as a s y n o n y m for
orge). W h e n he wants to refer to the p a r t o f the soul responsible for
s p i r i t e d desires a n d emotions, o n the other h a n d , he t y p i c a l l y e m
ploys either the s u b s t a n t i v i z e d t e r m to thumoeides or a p e r i p h r a s t i c
expression such as 'the m i d d l e p a r t that loves v i c t o r y a n d is s p i r i t e d '
(TO) fieaqj re xal (fiiXoviKW xal OvfioeiSei, Rep. 550 B 6 ) . T h e d i s t i n c - 1 3
11
Psuche occurs at 643 D 1 and 645 E 5, but it is conspicuously absent from 643 D
2 to 645 E 4.
13
Kahn, 'Laws', 361—2, notes this point, and he rightly argues that the absence
of tripartition i n the Laws reflects more about the aims and context of the dialogue
than it does about Plato's moral psychological theory.
13
See A. Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good
[Hero] (Cambridge, 2000), 6—7, for a discussion of this issue.
68 Joshua Wilburn
t i o n is clearest i n the Timaeus, where Plato uses thumos to refer to an

affective state a m o n g m a n y others b u t refers to the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f
the soul itself as 'the p a r t t h a t has a share i n courage and thumos' ( T O
fi(ET(Exov TTJS l>vx>)s dvSpeias Kai Bvfiov, 70 A 2—3). Plato's characteriza-
l
t i o n o f s p i r i t e d anger i n the Laws, therefore, cannot be taken as a

characterization o f the p a r t o f the soul responsible for t h a t anger.
M o r e o v e r — a n d this is the m o s t i m p o r t a n t p o i n t — e v e n i n the
w o r k s t h a t feature t r i p a r t i t i o n , s p i r i t e d anger is always treated war
i l y a n d is often characterized as i r r a t i o n a l a n d p o t e n t i a l l y vicious.
I n d e e d , the v e r y case t h a t Plato uses i n Republic 4 to argue for the
d i s t i n c t i o n between the reasoning a n d s p i r i t e d parts o f the soul p r e
supposes a negative side o f thumos: Odysseus m u s t restrain his an
ger precisely because i t is ' i r r a t i o n a l ' a n d p u l l s h i m c o n t r a r y to 'the
p a r t t h a t has reasoned about better and worse' (441 B 3-c 2). S i m i
larly, i n Republic 10 thumos is i n c l u d e d w i t h pleasure a n d p a i n i n
a generic list o f i r r a t i o n a l states t h a t lead us (just as they do i n the
p u p p e t passage) c o n t r a r y to reasoning and law (606 D I ) . F i n a l l y ,
i n the Timaeus Plato twice includes thumos i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y a m o n g
the i r r a t i o n a l affections o f the m o r t a l soul (42 A 7; 69 D 3), and he
even emphasizes the u n r u l i n e s s o f thumos b y c a l l i n g i t ' d i f f i c u l t to
soothe' (ovairapaiivdrirov, 69 D 3). N o n e the less, the u n r u l y nature o f
s p i r i t e d anger does n o t h i n g to u n d e r m i n e the positive p s y c h o l o g i c a l
role o f the thumoeides i n the Timaeus: the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul is
considered ' n a t u r a l l y superior' to the appetitive p a r t , and i t is loca
ted i n the chest, near the head, 'so t h a t i t m i g h t l i s t e n to reason and
together w i t h i t restrain b y force the p a r t consisting o f appetites'
(69 E 5-70 A 6). T h e s e passages make i t clear t h a t Plato's charac
t e r i z a t i o n o f s p i r i t e d anger as a dangerous i r r a t i o n a l i m p u l s e can
sit c o m f o r t a b l y alongside his characterization o f the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f
the soul as reason's psychic ' a l l y ' . T h e fact t h a t anger is treated w i t h
c a u t i o n i n the Laws, therefore, cannot be taken as a sign o f a change
i n Plato's a t t i t u d e towards the thumoeides itself, a n d a fortiori can
n o t be taken as a sign o f Plato's a b a n d o n m e n t o f t r i p a r t i t i o n .
I t w i l l be apposite here to specify w h a t I m e a n i n speaking o f

Plato's ' t h e o r y o f t r i p a r t i t i o n ' , and i n a r g u i n g that he continues to
recognize the thumoeides as a d i s t i n c t ' p a r t ' o f the soul, g i v e n t h a t
there is significant scholarly debate about w h a t Plato's v i e w t h a t the
soul consists o f three 'parts' a m o u n t s to. W h a t I take to be essential
to the t h e o r y o f t r i p a r t i t i o n , a n d w h a t I take the Laws to be c o m m i t
ted to (at a m i n i m u m ) , is (1) the v i e w t h a t there are three d i s t i n c t
sources of motivation i n the s o u l , each o f w h i c h is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y

the d i s t i n c t i v e objects t h a t a t t r a c t or repel i t , a n d each o f w h i c h can
p r o d u c e a c t i o n a l l b y itself, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the o t h e r p a r t s . 14
To
say t h a t there exists a s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the s o u l , t h e n , means t h a t
there is a d i s t i n c t source o f desires a n d e m o t i o n s i n the s o u l t h a t
can cause a p e r s o n to act i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f his reasoning a n d i n d e
p e n d e n t l y o f any a p p e t i t i v e i m p u l s e s he m a y have. (2) T h e three
sources o f m o t i v a t i o n i n the s o u l , moreover, have d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c
t i o n s or roles i n o u r p s y c h o l o g y (see esp. Rep. 441 E - 4 4 2 D a n d Tim.
69 D - 7 1 E ) . R o u g h l y p u t , the thumoeides is responsible f o r p r o v i d i n g
the s o u l w i t h c o u r a g e — w h i c h means ( i n a b r o a d sense) s u p p l y i n g
m o t i v a t i o n s , e m o t i o n s , a n d a t t i t u d e s (ones c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a cer
t a i n k i n d o f object; see S e c t i o n 2 b e l o w ) t h a t effectively s u p p o r t
reasoning a n d g o o d j u d g e m e n t against v i c i o u s i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l
resistance.
N o t e that this 'motivational' interpretation of tripartite the

o r y represents a ( r e l a t i v e l y ) n e u t r a l k i n d o f m i d d l e w a y b e t w e e n
' l i t e r a l i s t s ' — w h o , d r a w i n g o n the p e r s o n i f y i n g language t h a t Plato
often uses t o characterize the t r i p a r t i t e s o u l , take the three parts
o f the s o u l to be r o b u s t l y ' p e r s o n ' - l i k e , each b e i n g the subject o f
its o w n desires, beliefs, t h o u g h t s , a n d even (for some i n t e r p r e t
ers) r e a s o n i n g — a n d ' d e f l a t i o n i s t s ' — w h o d o w n p l a y Plato's use o f
p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n a n d offer v a r i o u s weak readings o f Plato's t a l k o f
'parts'. 15
I t s h o u l d be f u r t h e r n o t e d , however, t h a t m y a r g u m e n t s
1 4
Brisson's defence of the claim that the Laws remains committed to tripartite
psychology evidently presupposes a similarly 'motivational' conception of triparti-
tion. I n the course of arguing that the Laws acknowledges the existence of the three
soul-parts, he concludes that 'appetite is a part of the soul that is one of the causes of
human action', that 'thumos, or spirit, is indeed considered as a distinct part of the
human soul that is one of the causes of human action', and that 'the spirit of anger
is obviously the cause of specific actions' ('Soul', 296—8).
1 5
Commentators who incline towards more or less 'literalist' views include: J.
Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1981), 130—1 and 138—45; Bo
bonich, Utopia, 216—35; T. Brickhouse and N . Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology
(Cambridge, 2010), 203; E. Brown, ' T h e U n i t y of the Soul i n Plato's Republic', i n
Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 53—73 at 62; M . Burnyeat, 'Lecture
I : Couches, Song, and Civic Tradition', i n Culture and Society in Plato's Republic
(G. Peterson (ed.), T h e Tanner Lectures on H u m a n Values, 20: 215—324; Salt Lake
City, 1999), 217—55 at 227—8; G. R. Carone, 'Akrasia in the Republic: Does Plato
Change his Mind?', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 20 (2001), 107—48 at 124—
5; ead., 'Plato's Stoic View of Motivation', i n R. Salles (ed.), Metaphysics, Soul, and
Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji (Oxford, 2005),
365—82 at 366; ead., 'Akrasia and the Structure of the Passions i n Plato's Timaeus',
in C. Bobonich and P. Destree (eds.), Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates
7o Joshua Wilburn
are somewhat flexible, i n that m a n y o f t h e m do n o t depend o n any

p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y Because I a m m a k i n g
to Plotinus [Akrasia] (Leiden, 2007), 101—18 at 108—13; T. Ganson, 'The Rational/

Non-Rational Distinction i n Plato's Republic', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
36 (2009), 179—97 a t
185—6; Hobbs, Hero, 58; C. Kahn, 'Plato's Theory of Desire',
Review of Metaphysics, 41 (1987), 77—103 at 85—6; G. Lesses, 'Weakness, Reason,
and the Divided Soul in Plato's Republic', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4 (1987),
147—61 at 149—51; H . Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aris
totle [Brute] (Oxford, 2006); i d . , 'The Cognition of Appetite in Plato's Timaeus', i n
Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 238—58 at 238—9; J. Moline, 'Plato
on the Complexity of the Psyche', Archiv filr Geschichte der Philosophic, 60 (1978),
1— 26 at 10—11; M . Morris, 'Akrasia i n the Protagoras and the Republic', Phronesis,
51 (2006), 195—229 at 218—19; J. Moss, 'Appearances and Calculations: Plato's D i v i
sion of the Soul', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34(2008), 35—68 at 64—5; ead.,
'Pictures and Passions i n the Timaeus and Philebus', in Barney, Brennan, and Brittain
(eds.), Divided, 259—80 at 274—5; C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument
of Plato's Republic (Princeton, 1988), 138—40; and M . Woods, 'Plato's Division of
the Soul', Proceedings of the British Academy, 73 (1987), 23—48 at 24. Barney, Bren
nan, and Brittain, i n their introduction to the recent volume Plato and the Divided
Self, refer to 'what seems to be a growing consensus' that the three parts of the soul
are robustly agent-like: 'For each seems to comprise an integrated system of capa
cities for cognition, volition, affect, and agency vis-a-vis the other parts . . . A l l this
evidence suggests that we are to understand the parts as real agents, having some
thing of the completeness and autonomy of different kinds of organism' (Divided,
2— 3). There are, however, dissenters: M . Anagnostopolous, 'The Divided Soul and
the Desire for Good i n Plato's Republic', in G. Santas (ed.), The Blackwell Guide
to Plato's Republic (Maiden, Mass., 2006), 166—88; F. Cornford, 'The Division of
the Soul' ['Division'], Hibbert Journal, 28 (1929), 206—19 at 214; A . W. Price, A r e
Plato's Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?', Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2009), 1—15; R.
Robinson, 'Plato's Separation of Reason from Desire', Phronesis, 16 (1971), 38—48
at 44—7; C. Shields, 'Simple Souls', in E. Wagner (ed.), Essays on Plato's Psycho
logy (Lanham, M d . , 2001), 137—56 at 141 and 148; i d . , 'Unified Agency and Akrasia
in Plato's Republic', in Bobonich and Destree (eds.), Akrasia, 61—86 at 61—2 and
78—83; and J. L . Stocks, 'Plato and the Tripartite Soul', Mind, 24 (1915), 207—21.
Cornford, for example, suggests that tripartition is not really about a division into
parts, but rather into three types of life and human character (213), while Price ar
gues that the soul-parts are simply 'aspects of ourselves' (1). C. G i l l , 'Plato and the
Education of Character', Archiv filr Geschichte der Philosophic, 67 (1985), 1—26 at 6;
R. Kamtekar, 'Speaking w i t h the Same Voice as Reason: Personification i n Plato's
Psychology' ['Speaking'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 31 (2006), 167—202;
R. F. Stalley, 'Persuasion and the Tripartite Soul in Plato's Republic' ['Tripartite'],
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 32 (2007), 63—90; and R. Woolf, ' H o w to See
an Unencrusted Soul', i n Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 150—73 at
155—6, all remain somewhat more neutral regarding the agent-like status of the parts.
Finally, J. W h i t i n g , 'Psychic Contingency i n the Republic', in Barney, Brennan, and
Brittain (eds.), Divided, 174—208, is distinct in offering a 'hybrid' interpretation of
Plato's theory: it is contingent not only how 'agent-like' the parts are in a given
person's soul, on her reading, but even how many parts each person's soul actually
has. Because of this contingency, there is variation i n Plato's account: whereas de
flationists provide the correct interpretation of Republic 4's presentation of the soul,
literalists provide the better interpretation of Republic 8 and 9's presentation of it.
Moral Education in Plato's Laws 7i
a case for continuity o f Plato's views o n the soul, m a n y o f m y ar
guments s h o u l d stand regardless o f one's preferred u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of Platonic psychological theory. C o m m e n t a t o r s w h o read the
Republic's c o m m i t m e n t to a t r i p a r t i t e soul i n a deflationary l i g h t ,
for example, w i l l have reason for t h i n k i n g , o n the basis o f w h a t
follows, that Plato remains c o m m i t t e d to that same t r i p a r t i t e soul
i n the Laws. I n this way, m y account w i l l a d m i t at least some degree
of either l i t e r a l i s t a m p l i f i c a t i o n or deflationist c o n t r a c t i o n . M y
16
o w n p o s i t i o n , however, is that the t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y o f Republic a n d

Timaeus is c o m m i t t e d at least to (1) and (2) above, a n d I w i l l argue
that the Laws is c o m m i t t e d to t h e m as w e l l . F u r t h e r m o r e , the Ti
maeus also suggests that, o n Plato's view, (3) the three parts o f the
soul have d i s t i n c t p h y s i o l o g i c a l locations a n d associations w i t h i n
the b o d y (the reasoning p a r t is located i n the head, the s p i r i t e d i n
the chest, a n d the appetitive i n the m i d r i f f ) . A s we w i l l see, there
are reasons for t h i n k i n g that the Laws remains c o m m i t t e d to this
aspect o f t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y as w e l l (at least i n the case o f s p i r i t ) .
Finally, before t u r n i n g to m y positive account, i t s h o u l d be n o t e d
that m u c h o f the debate s u r r o u n d i n g the status o f t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y
i n the dialogue concerns the b u r d e n o f p r o o f : does i t lie w i t h those
w h o c l a i m Plato abandons the theory, or w i t h those w h o c l a i m he
continues to accept it? T h e r e are at least three i n i t i a l reasons for
t h i n k i n g that i t lies w i t h the former. F i r s t , a l t h o u g h Plato never
e x p l i c i t l y endorses t r i p a r t i t i o n i n the Laws, he also never e x p l i c i t l y
rejects i t , either i n the Laws or i n any other dialogue. H e does, h o w
ever, e x p l i c i t l y endorse t r i p a r t i t i o n i n t w o relatively late dialogues,
1 6
Those most resistant to the claim that tripartition is present in the Laws w i l l
tend to be literalists, however. Note that the sharp developmentalism that Bobonich
posits i n Plato's moral psychology is partly a result of his interpretation of the Re
public's tripartite theory. Bobonich adopts an extreme version of literalism according
to which the parts of the soul in the Republic are very robustly agent-like: not only
is each part a distinct source of motivation (a claim I accept), but each also has its
own rich, discrete psychological life, w i t h its own beliefs, thoughts, and fairly so
phisticated cognitive capacities. One reason why he perceives such a dramatic shift
between the Republic's theory and the Laws, then, is simply that he takes the former's
theory to be so extreme. Although I cannot address his interpretation of tripartition
in the Republic here, I do think that there are strong reasons for doubting it, many of
which have been recorded in Lorenz (Brute, 41—52) and Stalley ('Tripartite'). Once
Bobonich's interpretation of the Republic is disarmed, much of the theoretical basis
for identifying a sharp shift between it and the Laws is disarmed as well. Even gran
ted his strongly literalist reading of the Republic, however, my arguments w i l l point
to significant continuity i n Plato's thinking about the soul that (particularly i n the
light of the burden-of-proof shifting considerations adduced below) tells against Bo
bonich's developmentalist conclusions.
72 Joshua Wilburn
Timaeus and Phaedrus. Second, i n the Republic Plato deduces the

t r i p a r t i t e t h e o r y o n the basis o f the P r i n c i p l e o f Opposites, c o m
b i n e d w i t h the p h e n o m e n o n o f psychic conflict. Plato c e r t a i n l y ack
nowledges psychic conflict i n the Laws, w h i c h means that i f he h a d
come to reject t r i p a r t i t i o n , he w o u l d have h a d to have rejected either
the P r i n c i p l e o f Opposites itself, or at least its a p p l i c a t i o n to the fact
of psychic conflict. Y e t n e i t h e r the p r i n c i p l e n o r that c o n n e c t i o n is
ever called i n t o q u e s t i o n i n the Laws, or anywhere else i n the Pla
tonic c o r p u s . A n d finally, the context and aims o f the Laws are
17
quite d i s t i n c t f r o m those o f the Republic, and we s h o u l d expect to

f i n d differences i n its m o r a l psychological focus i n the l i g h t o f those
different a i m s . 18
I n w h a t follows I w i l l a t t e m p t to add to this b u r d e n o f proof. I f

w h a t I have said so far is r i g h t , t h e n there is r o o m i n the Laws for
the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul to c o n t i n u e to play an i m p o r t a n t p o s i
tive role i n m o r a l education and development.
2. M u s i c a l education
M y account w i l l draw o n t w o basic assumptions about the thu

moeides. T h e first is that the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul, for Plato, is
the p a r t o f the soul responsible for w h a t we m i g h t call o u r 'social'
or ' o t h e r - d i r e c t e d ' emotions and desires. These i n c l u d e : the desires
for h o n o u r , v i c t o r y , a n d good r e p u t a t i o n ; the emotions o f anger,
shame, a d m i r a t i o n , a n d disgust; a n d attitudes o f praise a n d blame.
Second, i t is one o f the p r i m a r y tasks o f early m u s i c a l education
i n the Republic to shape those desires a n d emotions o f the s p i r i t e d
part. I n particular, musical education aims to habituate i n d i v i d u a l s
to feel shame a n d disgust towards character and b e h a v i o u r that are
genuinely aischron, shameful, a n d to feel a d m i r a t i o n towards char
acter a n d b e h a v i o u r that are genuinely kalon, admirable or b e a u t i
f u l . I w i l l n o t argue for either o f these assumptions i n the present
17
Kamtekar ('Speaking', 181—2), too, points out that i f Plato attributes conflicting
mental states to a single subject i n the Laws (as Bobonich claims), then that would
seem to violate the Principle of Opposites and hence would demand an explanatory
story that Plato never provides.
18
I t should be noted here that the ostensible goal of Republic is to address the t w i n
questions 'What is justice/virtue?' and ' W h y should we be just/virtuous?', and the
theory of tripartition is central to the answers it provides to them. Neither question
is ever taken up i n the Laws i n any systematic way, however.
paper, a l t h o u g h I take b o t h o f t h e m , a n d especially the first, to be

at least r e l a t i v e l y u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l . 1 9
2 . 1 . Spirited motivation
The A t h e n i a n identifies v i r t u e as c o m p l e t e consonance b e t w e e n

c o r r e c t r a t i o n a l b e l i e f a n d law, o n the one h a n d , a n d an i n d i v i d u a l ' s
feelings o f pleasure a n d p a i n , o n the o t h e r (653 B - C ) . E d u c a t i o n ,
he says, is c o n c e r n e d w i t h f o s t e r i n g t h a t consonance f r o m the side
o f pleasure a n d p a i n . I t is 'the d r a w i n g and p u l l i n g o f c h i l d r e n t o
w a r d s the a r g u m e n t t h a t is said to be c o r r e c t b y law' (659 D 1-3),
a n d i t aims at ' c o r r e c t t r a i n i n g i n pleasures a n d pains, so t h a t a per
son hates w h a t he is s u p p o s e d to hate f r o m the v e r y b e g i n n i n g u n
t i l the end, a n d also loves w h a t he is s u p p o s e d to l o v e ' (653 B 6 - C
2). 2 0
T h e A t h e n i a n goes o n to i d e n t i f y e d u c a t i o n w i t h the c h o r a l art.
H u m a n beings alone a m o n g a n i m a l s perceive, a n d take pleasure i n ,
1 9
Certainly both of them have been widely endorsed and defended i n the secon
dary literature. The view that the spirited part of the soul is responsible for the
desires, emotions, and attitudes cited above is advocated in, among many others, T.
Brennan, ' T h e Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object' ['Spirited'], i n
Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 102—27 9 ; D. Cairns, Aidos: The
a t i o
Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature [Aidos] (Ox
ford, 1993), 383—4; J- Cooper, 'Plato's Theory of H u m a n Motivation', i n id., Reason
and Emotion (Princeton, 1999), 118—37; Hobbs, Hero; and T. I r w i n , Plato's Ethics
(Oxford, 1995). The view that early education targets the spirited part of the soul is
defended i n Cairns, Aidos, 386—8; R. C. Cross and A . D. Woozley, Plato's Repub
lic: A Philosophical Commentary (London, 1964), 123; J. C. B. Gosling, Plato ( L o n
don, 1973), 42—5; Hobbs, Hero, 58—9; J. Moss, 'Shame, Pleasure, and the Divided
Soul', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2005), 137—70; G. R. Lear, 'Plato
on Learning to Love Beauty', i n G. Santos (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Re
public (Maiden, Mass., 2006), 104—24; Mackenzie, Punishment, 169; and I . Vasiliou,
' F r o m the Phaedo to the Republic: Plato's Tripartite Soul and the Possibility of N o n -
Philosophical V i r t u e ' , in Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 9—32 at 29.
( I t is, however, partly challenged i n two recent articles by Wilberding, who argues
that the spirited part of the soul is the target of a smaller portion of musical and g y m
nastic training than is commonly supposed. See J. Wilberdmg, 'Plato's T w o Forms
of Second-Best Morality', Philosophical Review, 118 (2009), 351—74 at 361—9, and
id., 'Curbing One's Appetites in Plato's Republic' ['Appetites'], in Barney, Brennan,
and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 128—49.) For textual support for my first assumption,
see esp. Rep. 401 D—402 A , 439 E—440 A , 441 c, 549 A , 550 B , and 581 A ; Tim. 70 A — D ;
and Phdr. 253 D—254 A . For the second, see esp. Rep. 410 D—411 E and 441 E—442 A .
(Although the discussion of early education i n the Republic precedes the introduc
tion of the tripartite soul, Socrates' comment at 441 E 8—442 A 2 indicates that we
are to identify the thumoeides of books 2 and 3 w i t h the spirited part of the soul as it
is characterized i n book 4: 'And isn't it, as we were saying, a mixture of music and
poetry, on the one hand, and physical training on the other, that makes the two parts
harmonious?')
3 0
Translations of the Laws are based on T. Pangle, The Laws of Plato (Chicago,
74 Joshua Wilburn
order i n voice a n d b o d i l y m o v e m e n t , he says ( ' h a r m o n y ' is order

i n voice, ' r h y t h m ' order i n b o d i l y m o v e m e n t : 653 E - 6 5 4 A ) . T h a t
is why, f r o m the t i m e they are v e r y y o u n g , h u m a n beings are i n
capable o f k e e p i n g s t i l l or r e m a i n i n g silent, b u t are always m o v i n g
t h e i r bodies a r o u n d and u s i n g t h e i r voices. T h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f the
chorus attempts to i n s t i l the p r o p e r r h y t h m a n d h a r m o n y i n i n d i v i
duals b y d i r e c t i n g the pleasure they take i n order a n d b y i m p o s i n g
r h y t h m and h a r m o n y o n t h e i r o w n m o v e m e n t s a n d speech: b r o a d l y
speaking, gymnastic education is the b o d i l y p a r t o f the c h o r a l art
concerned w i t h d a n c i n g a n d o r d e r l y movement, and m u s i c a l educa
t i o n is the vocal p a r t o f the c h o r a l art concerned w i t h s i n g i n g and
o r d e r l y speech.
T h e r e is a prima facie reason for t h i n k i n g that m u s i c a l education
i n the Laws aims at the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul: i t targets the same
class o f emotions a n d attitudes that were p r e v i o u s l y a t t r i b u t e d to
the thumoeides—in particular, a d m i r a t i o n , disgust, a n d shame. T h e
choral art as a w h o l e , the A t h e n i a n indicates, a n d music i n p a r t i c u
lar, aims at a p r o p e r appreciation o f w h a t is admirable a n d b e a u t i f u l .
T h e p r o p e r l y educated i n d i v i d u a l , he explains, w i l l consider a d m i r
able things to be admirable a n d shameful things to be shameful. A n
i n d i v i d u a l is adequately educated i n this sense ' w h o is n o t f u l l y able
to express c o r r e c t l y w i t h voice a n d b o d y w h a t he understands, yet
feels pleasure and p a i n c o r r e c t l y — w a r m l y w e l c o m i n g w h a t is ad
m i r a b l e and b e i n g disgusted b y w h a t is shameful' (654 c 9 - D 3 ) . 21
W h a t is m o s t i m p o r t a n t is n o t a person's technical s k i l l i n s i n g i n g
and dancing, b u t rather the a d m i r a t i o n he feels for w h a t is kalon and
the c o n t e m p t he feels for w h a t is aischron. Song a n d dance p r o v i d e
means o f c u l t i v a t i n g these a p p r o p r i a t e attitudes because they are
1980), w i t h modifications. A l l other translations of Plato are based on J. Cooper

(ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis, 1997).
31
The properly musically educated individual's 'warm welcoming' {aoira'ôixevos,
654 D 2) of what is admirable has a parallel to Rep. 401 E—402 A: Socrates says that
if the young are properly reared on rhythm and harmony, they w i l l love what is ad
mirable and hate what is shameful before they are able to grasp reason, and that
when reason does come, they w i l l 'warmly welcome it' {aouaôiT , 402 A 3) on ac
count of their strong kinship {hi oiKeioTrjTa, 402 A 3—4) to it. Significantly, aouaêTai
is the verb used at 376 A 6 to describe the reaction that spirited dogs have to those
w i t h w h o m they are familiar (oiKeiov, 376 B 6). I t is a spirited trait to love and pro
tect what is familiar, and musical education in the Republic (and in the Laws, on my
account) aims to exploit that trait by making beautiful character OIKEIOV. Cf. n. 23
below. Brennan ('Spirited', 115—18) offers an insightful discussion of the role of the
oiKeiov in spirited psychology.
' i m i t a t i o n s ' o f m o r a l character: a d m i r a b l e postures a n d songs i m i
tate v i r t u e , and disgraceful postures a n d songs i m i t a t e vice (655 B ) .
B y d e l i g h t i n g i n the r i g h t k i n d s o f songs and dance, therefore, a
p e r s o n is c u l t i v a t i n g feelings o f a d m i r a t i o n towards kalon character
a n d b e h a v i o u r (and feelings o f shame and disgust towards aischron
character and b e h a v i o u r ) . T h e reason attitudes o f a d m i r a t i o n a n d
22
disgust are so i m p o r t a n t is t h a t those w h o a d m i r e a certain k i n d o f

character or b e h a v i o u r come to acquire t h a t character a n d to behave
i n those ways themselves. ' S u r e l y i t is necessary', the A t h e n i a n de
clares, 'that one w h o takes d e l i g h t i n t h i n g s t h e n becomes s i m i l a r
to the t h i n g s he takes d e l i g h t i n . . . A n d w h a t greater good or e v i l
c o u l d we say there is for us t h a n such c o m p l e t e l y necessary assimi
lation?' (656 B 4 - 7 ) . M u s i c a l education, t h e n , is designed to make
people a d m i r e a n d praise the r i g h t k i n d s o f t h i n g s so t h a t they be
come the r i g h t k i n d s o f p e o p l e .23
T h e r e are f u r t h e r reasons for t h i n k i n g t h a t m u s i c a l e d u c a t i o n

aims at the thumoeides, however. These become clearest t h r o u g h
the A t h e n i a n ' s discussion o f p u b l i c d r i n k i n g parties. W h e n the
A t h e n i a n suggests t h a t drunkenness can be useful a n d p r a i s e w o r t h y
u n d e r the r i g h t circumstances, he meets significant resistance f r o m
his m o r e austere C r e t a n and Spartan i n t e r l o c u t o r s . I n response to
t h e i r concerns, he p r o v i d e s an extended defence o f the practice i n
books 1 a n d 2. H e begins b y e x p l a i n i n g the p s y c h o l o g i c a l effects
o f w i n e - d r i n k i n g : w i n e makes pleasures, pains, feelings o f anger
(thumoi), a n d sexual desires stronger a n d m o r e intense, w h i l e i t
causes perceptions, m e m o r i e s , beliefs, a n d p r u d e n t t h o u g h t s to
' c o m p l e t e l y abandon' a person. T h e i n t o x i c a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , the
A t h e n i a n says, 'arrives at a d i s p o s i t i o n o f the soul t h a t is the same
as the one he h a d w h e n he was a y o u n g c h i l d ' (645 E 5 - 6 ) .
A l t h o u g h this represents a depraved state o f the soul, d r u n k e n -
3 3
Aristotle agrees that musical rhythms and harmonies contain likenesses to as
pects of character, and that taking pleasure i n the right kinds of music can make a
person more inclined to take pleasure in the right kinds of people and behaviour. He
offers an analogy: 'For i f someone enjoys looking at the image of something for no
other reason than because of its shape or form, he is bound to enjoy looking at the
very thing whose image he is looking at' {Pol. i34o 25—8). a
3 3
T h i s dual process of delighting i n the kalon and becoming more kalos oneself,
moreover, is mutually reinforcing, for people tend to take pleasure in what is most
like themselves: 'Those whose character is in accord w i t h what is said and sung and i n
any way performed—because of nature or habit or both—are necessarily delighted
by the admirable things, and led to praise them and pronounce them admirable'
(655 D 7 - E 3).
7 6 Joshua Wilburn
ness can, i f practised u n d e r the r i g h t c o n d i t i o n s a n d s u p e r v i s i o n ,

p r o v i d e at least t w o i n t e r r e l a t e d benefits i n a m o r a l educational
p r o g r a m m e . T h e first is that drunkenness can p r o v i d e a k i n d o f
endurance t r a i n i n g for people t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e i r sense o f shame
is tested. T h e A t h e n i a n p o i n t s o u t that a l t h o u g h Crete and Sparta
have developed m a n y ways o f testing t h e i r citizens i n t h e i r endur
ance o f pains—for example, t h r o u g h strenuous physical exercises
and exposure to extreme heat a n d c o l d — t h e y do n o t p r o v i d e c o m
parable tests for t h e i r endurance o f pleasures. T h i s is t r o u b l i n g , the
A t h e n i a n says, g i v e n that those w h o cannot h o l d f i r m i n the face
of pleasures are even worse t h a n those w h o cannot endure pains
(633 E). A l c o h o l , however, o n account o f its u n i q u e properties and
psychological effects, provides an excellent w a y o f testing resolve i n
the face o f t e m p t a t i o n . Because o u r pleasures are stronger a n d m o r e
intense w h e n we are d r u n k , they are m u c h harder to resist, and be
cause reasoning ' c o m p l e t e l y abandons' us, we cannot rely o n o u r
r a t i o n a l j u d g e m e n t s and desires to h o l d us i n check against t h e m .
T h i s means that we are c o m p l e t e l y at the m e r c y o f o u r n o n - r a t i o n a l
impulses. T h o s e w h o have c u l t i v a t e d the p r o p e r sense o f shame,
however, w i l l continue to f i n d m o r a l l y objectionable b e h a v i o u r re
p u g n a n t even w h i l e they are d r u n k a n d w i l l act accordingly; those
w h o have n o t , o n the other h a n d , w i l l i n d u l g e t h e i r basest pleasures
and impulses, h a v i n g n e i t h e r shame n o r reason to restrain t h e m .
D r i n k i n g parties, t h e n , p r o v i d e a w a y o f p r a c t i s i n g resistance to
pleasure and testing one's sense o f shame i n the process. 24
W h a t is n o t e w o r t h y about this discussion is that i t clearly draws a

d i s t i n c t i o n between t w o classes o f n o n - r a t i o n a l impulses: there are
the p o t e n t i a l l y v i c i o u s impulses, p a r t i c u l a r l y those related to plea
sure, that need to be resisted, a n d there are the better impulses,
p a r t i c u l a r l y feelings o f shame, that can do the resisting. T h u s , a l
t h o u g h the image o f the p u p p e t 'makes n o r o o m for silver cords',
this discussion o f drunkenness that i m m e d i a t e l y follows i t does re
cognize an i n t e r m e d i a t e class o f superior n o n - r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n s ,
and they are precisely the k i n d s o f m o t i v a t i o n s that were p r e v i o u s l y
a t t r i b u t e d to the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul. T h o s e m o t i v a t i o n s can
I n this way intoxication provides an opportunity to see what kinds of motiva

3 4
tions people have i n the absence of their better judgements, as well as how those
non-rational motivations balance against each other. See discussions of the function
of the drinking party in G. M . A . Grube, Plato's Thought [Thought] (Indianapolis,
1980), 243; Kamtekar, 'Psychology', 141—2; and G. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City
[Cretan] (Princeton, i960), 315—17.
cause a p e r s o n to act, moreover, i n d e p e n d e n t l y (a) o f his reason
i n g , w h i c h has abandoned h i m , a n d (b) o f his appetites, w h i c h he
is resisting. A n d finally, these v i r t u o u s m o t i v a t i o n s serve the same
psychological f u n c t i o n that is a t t r i b u t e d to the thumoeides i n t r i
p a r t i t e theory—namely, p r o v i d i n g courageous resistance to i n t e r n a l
threats to v i r t u e . T h e discussion o f drunkenness thus p o i n t s to a
d i s t i n c t psychic source o f n o n - r a t i o n a l , n o n - a p p e t i t i v e m o t i v a t i o n s .
I n other words, i t p o i n t s to the existence o f a s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the i n
dividual's soul. 25
T h e r e is a second benefit to d r i n k i n g parties. I f used properly,

they do n o t m e r e l y test a person's sense o f shame, b u t also reinforce
a n d shape that sense o f shame. A l t h o u g h education is supposed to
cultivate the p r o p e r n o n - r a t i o n a l feelings and attitudes i n i n d i v i d u
als, that education, the A t h e n i a n says, 'tends to slacken i n h u m a n
beings, a n d i n the course o f a l i f e t i m e i t becomes c o r r u p t e d to a
great extent' (653 C 7 - 9 ) . T h e p r i m a r y benefit o f alcohol, o n his ac
count, is that i t provides a w a y o f c o r r e c t i n g this n a t u r a l tendency
t h r o u g h a k i n d o f re-education o f adults:
D i d n ' t we assert that . . . the souls of drinkers, like some iron [Kadanep
Tivd otSrjpov], become fiery [Siairupovs], softened [paXdaKojrepas], and youth
ful, so that they can be easily led—as they were when they were young,
by someone who possesses the ability and the knowledge required to edu
cate and mould [nXaTTeiv] souls? Didn't we say that the one who did the
moulding is the same as he who moulded them earlier, the good lawgiver,
whose laws must be fellow drinkers at the banquet? They must be able
to make whoever becomes confident, bold, and more shameless than he
3 5
Brisson ('Soul', 294) also finds tripartition i n the passage on drunkenness, but
he does so solely on the basis of 645 D — E : 'When the Athenian suggests giving wine to
this puppet, we find a very clear distinction between (1) pleasures and pains, (2) an
gers and desires, and (3) sensations, memory, opinions, and thought, that is, between
appetite (epitkumiai), spirit (tkumos), and intellect (nous).' T h i s comment is some
what curious, however, because it is unclear how (1)—(3) are supposed to map onto
the tripartite soul, and particularly how (1) and (2) are supposed to map onto appe
tite and spirit. Brisson provides no details. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Plato
really intends to mark off any distinction between appetitive and spirited impulses at
645 D, given that the Athenian is at this point merely distinguishing between states
and impulses that are intensified by drinking and those that are weakened or elimi
nated by it—that is, between non-rational states and rational ones (corresponding to
the iron cords and golden cord, respectively, i n the immediately preceding puppet
image). The fact that the Athenian lists the non-rational impulses as ra? r/Sovds Kal
Xvuas Kal 6V[JLOV<; Kal e p a j r a ? at 645 D 7, without distinguishing among them (even
syntactically), confirms this reading. I t is not until the subsequent discussion of the
educational benefits of drinking parties that the distinction between appetitive and
spirited impulses becomes evident i n the way I have suggested.
78 Joshua Wilburn
should be . . . willing to act i n just the opposite way. When ignoble bold
ness appears, these laws will be able to send i n as a combatant the noblest
sort of fear accompanied by justice, the divine fear to which we gave the
name 'awe' and 'shame'. (671 B 8—D 3)
T h e r e are several things to note about this passage. F i r s t , wine's

usefulness lies i n the fact that i t makes the souls o f d r i n k e r s young
again. Y o u t h is the p e r i o d o f t i m e i n o u r lives w h e n we are m o s t
impressionable and educable, a n d alcohol t e m p o r a r i l y induces a re
t u r n to that impressionable a n d educable state. Second, the p r i m a r y
psychological means t h r o u g h w h i c h the i n t o x i c a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s are
to be educated is shame. I n a p r o p e r l y r u n d r i n k i n g party, i n d i v i
duals w i l l be encouraged to a v o i d indecorous behaviour, a n d w h i l e
those w h o succeed w i l l be p u b l i c l y praised, those w h o fail w i l l be
p u b l i c l y b l a m e d a n d h u m i l i a t e d . T h e s e practices w i l l reinforce
2 6
the attitudes o f a d m i r a t i o n and shame that were c u l t i v a t e d d u r i n g

early education, b u t w h i c h have since 'slackened'. A n d finally, the
A t h e n i a n uses d i s t i n c t m e t a p h o r i c a l language i n his discussion: the
soul is l i k e n e d to soft, fiery ' i r o n ' , a n d education is u n d e r s t o o d as a
process o f ' m o u l d i n g ' that i r o n .
T h i s characterization o f the effects o f m u s i c a l education o n the
soul parallels i n s t r i k i n g ways the Republic's characterization o f the
effects o f m u s i c a l education o n the spirited part o f the soul. I n the
Republic Socrates also characterizes early education as a k i n d o f
' m o u l d i n g ' o f the soul, for d u r i n g y o u t h a person is ' m o s t malleable'
and 'takes o n any stamp one wishes to impress o n h i m ' (377 A 12-B
3). A f t e r o u t l i n i n g his p r o g r a m m e o f m u s i c a l a n d gymnastic edu
cation, Socrates t h e n describes the psychological consequences o f
neglecting or o v e r i n d u l g i n g i n either o f the t w o disciplines. A b o u t
music he says:
When someone gives music an opportunity to charm his soul w i t h the flute
and to pour those sweet, soft, and plaintive tunes we mentioned through
his ear, as through a funnel, and when he spends his whole life humming
them and delighting i n them, then, at first, whatever spirit [thumoeides] he
has is softened like iron [ojonep oi8t]pov e/iaXaêv], and from being hard and
useless, i t is made useful. But i f he keeps at i t unrelentingly and is charmed
by the music, after a time his spirit [thumos] is melted and dissolved until
it vanishes, and the very sinews of his soul are cut out and he becomes 'a
feeble warrior'. (411 A 5—B 4)
See 671 D - 6 7 2 D ; cf. 648 B - E .

I n this passage the thumoeides is again l i k e n e d to i r o n , w h i c h music

can 'soften' a n d make usefully m a l l e a b l e . G y m n a s t i c education,
27
m e a n w h i l e , is u n d e r s t o o d as a process o f h a r d e n i n g the thumoeides

(410 D ) . I n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h music, gymnastics ensure t h a t the thu
moeides becomes t o u g h e n o u g h to h o l d the 'shape' that is g i v e n to i t
t h r o u g h m u s i c a l education. T h i s m e t a p h o r i c a l language precisely
parallels the A t h e n i a n ' s characterization o f the p s y c h o l o g y o f e d u
cation. G i v e n the parallel, a n d g i v e n t h a t i n the Republic the i r o n
like, malleable p a r t o f the soul is the s p i r i t e d p a r t , we have s t r o n g
reason for t h i n k i n g t h a t w h e n Plato employs the same characteriza
t i o n o f the p s y c h o l o g i c a l effects o f e d u c a t i o n i n the Laws, he c o n
tinues to have the thumoeides i n m i n d . 2 8
T h i s is b y n o means an isolated use o f the m o u l d i n g metaphor,

moreover. I n d e e d , passages t h r o u g h o u t the t e x t characterize p r o p e r
e d u c a t i o n i n terms o f hardness a n d softness o f the soul, a n d m a n y o f
t h e m c o n t a i n t a n t a l i z i n g occurrences o f thumos a n d its cognates. 29
F o r example, w h e n a p e r s o n d r i n k s w i n e , 'the soul, b y escaping

f r o m its dispiritedness [Suaû/xta], has its d i s p o s i t i o n t u r n e d f r o m
harder to softer, so t h a t i t becomes m o r e malleable, like i r o n w h e n i t
is p l u n g e d i n t o fire' (666 B 7 - c 2). L i k e w i s e , ' I f [ o u r citizens] aren't
practised i n e n d u r i n g pleasures and i n never b e i n g c o m p e l l e d to do
a n y t h i n g shameful, t h e i r softness o f s p i r i t [yXvKvdviiia] before plea
sures w i l l lead t h e m to experience the same t h i n g as those overcome
b y fears' (635 c 5 - D 1 ) . 3 0
Finally, i n his c o n d e m n a t i o n o f i n s u l t i n g speech, the A t h e n i a n

says, ' T h e one w h o speaks [abusively] is gracious to a graceless
3 7
The reason that the thumoeides is 'useful' when it has been softened is that, like
tempered metal, it can be moulded and shaped. O n the other hand, i f it is too soft,
or soft for too long, it becomes 'useless' (just as a hammer is useless i f the metal out
of which it is moulded never cools and hardens).
3 8
Cf. Horn. II. 24. 205: oibripeiov vv TOI r/rop. The heart is traditionally associated
w i t h thumos and is often characterized as 'iron' i n Homer. I t is also the seat of the
thumoeides in Plato (see Tim. 70 A—B and sect. 3.2 below).
3 9
T. Saunders, Plato's Penal Code [Penal] (Oxford, 1991), 185—7, discusses the
Laws' use of the 'physiological' language of hardness/softness and hotness/coldness
to characterize the soul, though he does not note any connections between the use
of that language and the use of thumos and its cognates.
3 0
See also 880 D 8—E 3, where the Athenian states that the laws exist 'partly for
the sake of those who have shunned education, who employ a certain tough nature
and have been i n no way softened so as to avoid proceeding to everything bad'; 633 D
2—3, where pleasures 'can t u r n to wax the spiritedness [thumos] even of those who
think themselves solemn'; and 789 E 2—3: 'When the child is born [the woman] must
mould it like wax so long as it remains moist.'
8o Joshua Wilburn
t h i n g , spiritedness [thumos], a n d gorges his anger w i t h w i c k e d

feasts, m a k i n g that sort o f t h i n g i n his soul [rrjs >l>vxrjs TO roiovrov]
that was at one t i m e t a m e d [fjjiap(i)8rj\ b y education savage again'
(935 3 6 ) . A l t h o u g h Plato avoids e x p l i c i t l y a c k n o w l e d g i n g the
A - 3 1
existence o f soul-parts i n the Laws, this r e m a r k comes close w i t h

its 'that sort o f t h i n g i n the s o u l ' . I n any event, the A t h e n i a n makes
i t clear that whatever i t is i n the soul that is responsible for anger
is also a p r i m a r y target o f education. Based o n e v e r y t h i n g we have
seen, we have g o o d reason for t h i n k i n g that that t h i n g is s t i l l the
s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul.
2.2. Pleasure and pain
T h e r e is an o b j e c t i o n that one m i g h t raise to m y account at this

p o i n t : the A t h e n i a n characterizes education as correct t r a i n i n g i n
pleasure and pain, and his p r o g r a m m e o f musical education is p r e
dicated o n the d e l i g h t that c h i l d r e n take i n songs, dance, and play.
T h i s m i g h t suggest that, to the extent that music targets p a r t o f
the t r i p a r t i t e soul, i t targets the appetitive p a r t , n o t the s p i r i t e d .
32
T h e r e are at least t w o ways to r e s p o n d to this w o r r y , however. F i r s t ,

the A t h e n i a n ' s talk o f pleasure and p a i n t h r o u g h o u t the dialogue
makes i t clear that he has i n m i n d n o t s i m p l y appetitive feelings o f
pleasure a n d p a i n , b u t a diverse range o f n o n - r a t i o n a l states and
impulses that e x p l i c i t l y i n c l u d e s p i r i t e d impulses such as anger and
e n v y . S i m i l a r l y , i n the Timaeus i t is the entire n o n - r a t i o n a l soul,
33
3 1
Cf. Rep. 442 A 2, where music 'tames' (r/ixepovoa) the spirited part of the soul.
3 3
T h i s is the view of Bobonich, who argues that, in the Laws, appetitive pleasure
(which Bobonich does not, of course, attribute to a distinct appetitive part of the
soul) is actually considered more useful than spirited emotions for the purposes of
moral education {Utopia, 365—7). Kamtekar ('Psychology', 128—30 and 145—8) also
emphasizes the role of pleasure in Magnesian early education and provides a useful
discussion of various interpretations of the psychology underlying pleasure's role
in education. Pleasure is also prominent i n the accounts of M o r r o w {Cretan, 302—
18) and R. F. Stalley, An Introduction to Plato's Laws [Introduction] (Indianapolis,
1983), 125—7. W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, iii. The Conflict of
Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, trans, by G. Highet (New York, 1944), 228, em
phasizes the Athenian's focus on 'irrational' impulses in general.
3 3
See the Athenian's discussion of the psychological causes of criminal behaviour
at 863 B—864 c. He initially identifies anger {thumos) and pleasure as the two non-
rational causes of crime (863 B 1—9), but at 863 E 6—8 he expands this list to include
'anger, fear, pleasure, pain, feelings of envy, and appetites'. Then, at 864 B 3—6, he
narrows the list back down to two categories: 'anger and fear, which we call "pain"'
and 'pleasure and appetites'. See similarly broad lists of pleasures and pains at 645 D,
649 D , and 934 A .
n o t m e r e l y the appetitive p a r t o f i t , that partakes i n pleasure a n d

p a i n , a n d i n the Republic each p a r t o f the soul is assigned its o w n
d i s t i n c t pleasures. Because the language o f pleasure a n d p a i n is
34
used t h r o u g h o u t the Laws as a w a y o f r e f e r r i n g generically to n o n -

r a t i o n a l affections, the A t h e n i a n ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f early education as
t r a i n i n g i n pleasure a n d p a i n does n o t determine o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of the p s y c h o l o g y u n d e r l y i n g that process. W h e n he characterizes
music as a process o f d i r e c t i n g a n d m o u l d i n g the child's feelings
of pleasure a n d p a i n , therefore, that leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y that
w h a t he has i n m i n d includes, or even p r e d o m i n a n t l y involves, spir
ited impulses. 35
Second (and m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y ) , i t s h o u l d be n o t e d that m y ac

c o u n t does n o t c l a i m that m u s i c a l education aims exclusively at the
s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul. Presumably, appetitive pleasure is a tar
get o f early education, a n d i n at least t w o ways—one negative a n d
one positive. I t is a target negatively i n that early education p a r t l y
aims to make sure that c h i l d r e n do n o t have s t r o n g a n d intractable
appetitive urges that m i g h t interfere w i t h t h e i r p u r s u i t o f decency.
W h i l e e n s u r i n g that they w o u l d be ashamed o f indecent appetitive
indulgence is one w a y to achieve the p r o p e r balance o f m o t i v a t i o n s ,
the task w i l l o b v i o u s l y be easier i f t h e i r appetites have been m o d e r
ated a n d c o n t r o l l e d t h r o u g h c h i l d h o o d r e a r i n g . Second, i t seems
36
safe to assume that m u c h o f the pleasure the c h i l d takes i n song,

dance, a n d play is appetitive pleasure, a n d that appetitive pleasure
a n d p a i n p l a y a positive psychological role i n the child's c o m i n g to
3 4
See Tim. 42 A , 69 C - D ; Rep. 580 D - 5 8 1 c.
3 5
Moreover, i n the Laws yaipew is the verb the Athenian most frequently uses to
refer to the pleasure the young take i n song and dance. I t occurs at least twenty-one
times i n book 2 (e.g. 654 c 7, 655 E 2, 656 B 5), and he clearly identifies -âipeiv w i t h
taking pleasure (see esp. 659 D 5 and 663 B 5, where yaipew is opposed to Xviretodai,
in parallel to the r/Sovr/ Kal Xv7rr/ that occurs throughout book 2, e.g. at 653 B 2—3, c
7, and 654 D 2). Even m the Republic, however, this kind of pleasure evidently plays
a positive role i n early education: Socrates says that those who are educated through
proper r h y t h m and harmony w i l l 'take delight' {yaipajv, 401 E 4) i n what is admir
able. The Athenian's emphasis on the pleasure and delight the young take in music is
nothing novel, therefore, and cannot be taken as evidence of a shift in Plato's views.
3 6
Wilberding (Appetites', 140—6) provides a useful discussion of how, on Plato's
account, our appetites can be trained through early education by practising self-
restrained and moderate behaviour. On Wilberding's view, though, this training af
fects the appetitive part of the soul exclusively: acting moderately, he claims, 'does
not serve to arouse the spirited part of the soul' (146). However, given Plato's view
that courage involves resistance by the spirited part against both external threats and
appetites within, it is unclear why moderate behaviour could not, for Plato, involve
both the subduing of appetite and stimulating training for the thumoeides itself.
82 Joshua Wilburn
have the r i g h t attitudes o f a d m i r a t i o n , disgust, a n d shame. W h i l e I

t h i n k that a range o f possible ways o f s p e l l i n g o u t this role are c o m
patible w i t h m y account, m y o w n tentative suggestion is the f o l l o w
i n g : the c h i l d takes b o t h appetitive pleasure and s p i r i t e d pleasure i n
song and dance, b u t for t w o different reasons. T h e c h i l d takes ap
p e t i t i v e pleasure because r h y t h m and h a r m o n y are pleasing to the
senses—because i t 'feels g o o d ' to perceive, a n d take p a r t i n , song
and dance—and the c h i l d takes s p i r i t e d pleasure because the thu
moeides is n a t u r a l l y responsive to w h a t seems kalon or admirable.
T h e appetitive pleasure serves to reinforce the s p i r i t e d pleasure,
and the result o f all this is that the c h i l d comes to develop the p r o p e r
s p i r i t e d attitudes o f a d m i r a t i o n , shame, and disgust. T h e i m p o r t a n t
p o i n t is this, t h o u g h : whatever role appetitive pleasure m i g h t play
i n m u s i c a l education, i t is clear that the primary a i m a n d outcome
of that education is for the i n d i v i d u a l to have the r i g h t feelings o f
a d m i r a t i o n , shame, a n d disgust. T h a t is w h y the i n s t i t u t i o n o f the
d r i n k i n g party, w h i c h is supposed to test a n d restore the effects o f
education, is t r a i n i n g i n shame. A n d because a d m i r a t i o n , shame,
and disgust are s p i r i t e d attitudes i n Plato, we have good reason for
t h i n k i n g that the p r i m a r y goal o f music is p r o p e r t r a i n i n g o f the
thumoeides. 17
One final q u e s t i o n that is w o r t h considering: w h y n o t t h i n k that

attitudes o f a d m i r a t i o n , disgust, and shame have become, i n Plato's
later w o r k , rational attitudes (or at least, as B o b o n i c h claims, a t t i
tudes that necessarily d r a w o n reasoning), a n d that m u s i c a l educa
t i o n thus aims at t r a i n i n g the c h i l d ' s developing r a t i o n a l capacities?
T h e r e is an i m m e d i a t e response to this, however. I f m u s i c a l edu
cation h a d its p r i m a r y psychological effect o n o u r r a t i o n a l nature,
t h e n i t w o u l d be inexplicable w h y d r i n k i n g parties w o u l d have the
effect o f m i m i c k i n g m u s i c a l education and r e s t o r i n g its p s y c h o l o g i
cal effects. I f early musical education were rational, t h e n w h y w o u l d
that education be renewed t h r o u g h drunkenness, w h i c h is precisely
(according to the A t h e n i a n ) w h e n o u r r a t i o n a l capacities abandon
us a n d o u r emotions are at t h e i r peak?
Grube {Thought, 252) agrees: 'The "part" of the soul most directly concerned
3 7
[in music and gymnastics] is undoubtedly the dv/xos, the spirit or feelings.' D. Cohen,
'Law, Autonomy, and Political Community i n Plato's Laws', Classical Philology, 88
( 993), 301—18 at 310, and Cairns {Aidos, ^~]~]) also emphasize the Athenian's focus
:
on shaping the values of shame and honour i n early education.

3. G y m n a s t i c e d u c a t i o n
The A t h e n i a n r e t u r n s to the t o p i c o f early e d u c a t i o n i n b o o k 7,

w h e r e his focus shifts to g y m n a s t i c e d u c a t i o n . A s we have seen,
he characterizes g y m n a s t i c s as the p a r t o f the c h o r a l a r t — t h a t is,
of education—concerned w i t h order i n b o d i l y m o v e m e n t . 3 8
The
A t h e n i a n ' s g y m n a s t i c proposals are f o u n d e d o n the ideas t h a t cer
t a i n k i n d s o f b o d i l y m o t i o n s characterize v i r t u o u s i n d i v i d u a l s , t h a t
those b o d i l y m o t i o n s express and imitate corresponding motions
a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f the v i r t u o u s i n d i v i d u a l ' s s o u l , a n d t h a t h a b i t u
a t i o n i n the a p p r o p r i a t e b o d i l y m o t i o n s can facilitate a c q u i s i t i o n
o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g p s y c h i c c o n d i t i o n . 3 9
H e n c e he reiterates his
earlier v i e w t h a t the r h y t h m i c m o v e m e n t s o f dance (like the har
m o n i e s o f song) are ' i m i t a t i o n s ' o f h u m a n character (798 D - E ) . The
p u r p o s e o f g y m n a s t i c s is to i m p o s e the r i g h t k i n d s o f m o v e m e n t o n
the body, therefore, so t h a t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g v i r t u o u s m o t i o n s o f
the s o u l become i n c u l c a t e d (at least i n a p r e l i m i n a r y w a y ) i n the i n
d i v i d u a l as w e l l . 4 0
T h i s process s h o u l d b e g i n , the A t h e n i a n claims, even before the

c h i l d is b o r n . A l l bodies benefit f r o m the i n v i g o r a t i n g s t i r p r o d u c e d
3 8
I t should be noted that, because singing and dancing are two sides of the same
art, music and gymnastics are not always very strictly separated from each other. I n
deed, participation i n a chorus w i l l count as both musical and gymnastic education.
Therefore, we should avoid thinking that musical and gymnastic training take place
strictly one at a time in succession. Cf. remarks i n M o r r o w (Cretan, 331—2) and L .
Strauss, The Argument and Action ofPlato's Laws (Chicago, 1975), 100.
3 9
The Athenian provides a useful physiological analogy to illustrate the effects of
gymnastics: i n the case of the body, a person can become accustomed to all kinds
of foods and drinks and exercises, even i f at first he is upset by them. Over time,
the person becomes familiar w i t h them and becomes 'like' them, and at that point
it would pain the person to change back to his old regimen. 'One must hold', the
Athenian says, 'that this very same thing applies to the thoughts of human beings
and the natures of their souls' (798 A ) . Saunders (Penal, 174—5) provides an account
of the psychological effects of punishment in the Laws that draws on this 'medi
cal', physiological model. According to Saunders, punishment is painful (and hence
effective) because it represents a sudden, violent breaking up of the patterns and af
fections to which the criminal agent has become accustomed.
4 0
See discussions of gymnastic education i n M o r r o w (Cretan, 304—9), Grube
(Thought, 246—52), and especially Kamtekar ('Psychology'), w i t h whose account I
take my own to be largely aligned. Whereas the accounts of Grube and Kamtekar
(along w i t h my own) focus on the inward psychological effects of gymnastic educa
tion, M o r r o w ' s interpretation focuses on the outward effects, pointing to the various
ways in which proper motion and dance are intended to impact on 'the gestures,
postures, and movements of ordinary life' (306). Kamtekar responds to M o r r o w ' s
account (128).
84 Joshua Wilburn
by a l l sorts o f shaking a n d m o t i o n s , ' he says, ' w h e t h e r the bodies be

m o v e d b y themselves, or i n carriers, or o n the sea, or b y b e i n g car
r i e d o n horses or o n any other b o d y ' (789 D 1-4). F o r that reason,
p r e g n a n t w o m e n m u s t go for regular walks, and, once c h i l d r e n are
b o r n , the infants' bodies a n d souls s h o u l d be k e p t i n m o t i o n as c o n
t i n u o u s l y as possible, 'as i f they were always o n a ship at sea' (790 c
5-8). M o t i o n b r i n g s order a n d q u i e t to the restlessness o f the i n
fant's soul, as evidenced b y the fact that m o t h e r s use r o c k i n g , n o t
stillness, to l u l l t h e i r babies to sleep. T h e A t h e n i a n explains this
phenomenon:
The passion being experienced is presumably terror, and the terror is due
to some poor habit of the soul. When someone brings a rocking motion
from the outside to such passions, the motion brought from without over
powers the fear and the mad motion within, and, having overpowered i t ,
makes a calm stillness appear in the soul that replaces the harsh pounding
of the heart [âpSta? ôAem}? TrijSrjaeojs] i n each case . . . I t thereby replaces
our mad dispositions w i t h prudent habits. (790 E 8-791 B 2)
Feelings o f fear are associated w i t h certain k i n d s o f m o t i o n s i n

the soul, a n d i f those m o t i o n s become a settled p a r t o f the c h i l d ' s
psychic h a b i t , they w i l l become an obstacle to its a c q u i s i t i o n o f
courage. Feeling fear is 'practice i n cowardice', the A t h e n i a n says,
41
and for that reason infants s h o u l d be k e p t free o f t e r r o r and suffer

ing as m u c h as possible d u r i n g the first three years o f t h e i r lives
(791 B; 792 B ) . T h i s is accomplished b y i m p o s i n g the r i g h t k i n d s o f
external m o t i o n s , w h i c h i n t u r n alleviate the internal m o t i o n s that
constitute that fear a n d w o r r y . 4 2
F r o m the ages o f three to five or six, c h i l d r e n s h o u l d p l a y games

4 1
Kamtekar ('Psychology') provides an illuminating discussion of this passage.
I n particular, she addresses the question i n what sense the disturbing motions of
the infant's soul could count as fear, given that the Athenian elsewhere character
izes fear as the expectation of evil (644 c), which (she claims) seems to require the
involvement of the rational part of the soul. Her suggestion is that what the infant
experiences are the physiological and phenomenological correlates of the rational
expectation of evil that constitutes fear, and that in virtue of their usual correlation
w i t h such expectation, those experiences can be counted as a primitive form of fear
(141). Her explanation of why rocking the child helps prepare it for courage is as
follows: ' I f the rational part may, but need not, occupy itself w i t h non-rational af
fections, then perhaps eliminating such affections from the child's early experiences
reduces the opportunities for the rational part to form the associated false opinions
which would, i f they took hold, make for a coward. Presumably the motions of fear
are uncomfortable and a child familiar w i t h them would tend to form the opinion
that whatever occasions them is evil' (145).
4 3
Grube {Thought, 246) concurs that external motion alleviates the troubling
o f t h e i r o w n design. T h e m a i n concern o f t h e i r nurses d u r i n g this
stage o f development is to make sure t h a t the c h i l d r e n do n o t be
come accustomed either to excessive l u x u r y — w h i c h leads to iras
c i b i l i t y , i l l - h u m o u r , a n d a p r o p e n s i t y to be upset b y t r i v i a l i t i e s — o r
to excessive p u n i s h m e n t — w h i c h leads to s e r v i l i t y and savageness
(791 D ) . A t the age o f six, the c h i l d r e n b e g i n to l e a r n m a r t i a l skills
such as horseback r i d i n g , archery, a n d j a v e l i n - t h r o w i n g , a n d i n later
years they s t u d y the t w o m a i n branches o f gymnastics, w r e s t l i n g
a n d dancing. Because the A t h e n i a n considers d a n c i n g and s i n g i n g
to be t w o sides o f the same a c t i v i t y — p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a c h o r u s —
m a n y o f his c o m m e n t s about the latter a p p l y to the f o r m e r as w e l l .
I n b o o k 7, however, the A t h e n i a n p r o v i d e s f u r t h e r details c o n c e r n
i n g the guidelines for dance. D a n c i n g , he says, is d i v i d e d i n t o t w o
m a i n f o r m s : i m i t a t i o n o f admirable bodies i n s o l e m n m o v e m e n t ,
a n d i m i t a t i o n o f shameful bodies i n l o w m o v e m e n t . T h e y o u t h s
s h o u l d be t r a i n e d o n l y i n the i m i t a t i o n o f the a d m i r a b l e , w h i c h
i n t u r n has t w o parts: the P y r r h i c or w a r l i k e p a r t , w h i c h involves
the i m i t a t i o n o f noble bodies engaged i n v i o l e n t m a r t i a l e x e r t i o n ,
a n d the peaceful p a r t , w h i c h involves the i m i t a t i o n o f noble bodies
b e h a v i n g m o d e r a t e l y i n peaceful c o n d i t i o n s (814 E-815 A ) . A S for 4 3
w r e s t l i n g , the y o u t h s m u s t n o t practise techniques t h a t are useless

for the purposes o f war, b u t s h o u l d focus exclusively o n those that
p r o m o t e strength, health, a n d m i l i t a r y prowess (796 A ) . T h e y o u t h s
s h o u l d practise w r e s t l i n g , fighting, and d a n c i n g t h a t involves heavy
psychic motion within. E. B. England, The Laws of Plato [Laws], 2 vols. (New York,
1976), ii. 241, however, offers an alternative interpretation of the passage. According
to England, (j>aiveodai at 791 A 4 indicates that the 'calm stillness' merely appears to
the child to be present i n its soul (but is not really present). Rocking accomplishes
this, England, claims, by distracting the child's attention away from the mad motion
w i t h i n . I t is not that the external motion actually has any effect on internal psychic
motion, on this account; it simply makes the child temporarily unaware of the troub
ling psychic motion.
4 3
Kamtekar takes it to be a virtue of her account (as do I ) that it provides an ex
planation of why, for the purposes of achieving the desired psychological effects of
gymnastic education, it is not enough that the young citizens simply observe orderly
movement, but must also practise orderly movement themselves. Because, on her
account, engaging i n the right kind of physical motion impacts the psychic motions
and affections within, we cannot produce those results simply as spectators ('Psycho
logy', 147—8). I n his own account of musical education, Aristotle offers a somewhat
different view on why the young must not be mere spectators: ' I t is not difficult to
see, of course, that i f someone takes part i n performance himself, it makes a great
difference i n the development of certain qualities, since it is difficult if not impos
sible for people to become excellent judges of performances if they do not take part
in it' (Pol. i 3 4 o 2 i - s ) .
b
86 Joshua Wilburn
a r m o u r a n d weapons, and the m o v e m e n t s that they l e a r n s h o u l d be

those t h a t are ' b y far the m o s t a k i n to f i g h t i n g i n w a r ' (814 D ) .
T h e r e are several reasons for t h i n k i n g t h a t g y m n a s t i c e d u c a t i o n is
directed at the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul. F i r s t , the A t h e n i a n makes
i t clear t h a t one o f the m o s t p r o m i n e n t aims o f gymnastic t r a i n
i n g is to prepare the y o u n g citizens for war b y m a k i n g t h e m m o r e
courageous. M o s t obviously, this aims at defence against external,
foreign enemies, b u t his remarks also reveal t h a t the citizens m u s t be
fit to c o m b a t i n t e r n a l 'enemies' as w e l l — n a m e l y , recalcitrant feel
ings o f pleasure a n d fear. T h e s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul, we have
44
seen, is the p a r t t h a t is specially responsible b o t h for the v i r t u e o f

courage and for b a t t l i n g external a n d i n t e r n a l enemies alike. A g a i n ,
this p r o v i d e s a prima facie reason for t h i n k i n g t h a t Plato presents
his gymnastic proposals w i t h the thumoeides i n m i n d .
Second, we once again f i n d a useful parallel to the Republic
(where gymnastic e d u c a t i o n is e x p l i c i t l y said to target the thu
moeides at 410 B 5 - 6 ) . I n the Laws, the A t h e n i a n identifies a cluster
of psychic defects t h a t can result f r o m i m p r o p e r gymnastic e d u
cation: the y o u n g can become i l l - h u m o u r e d (SVOKOXOV), irascible
(oLKpaKoXov), slavish (dveXevOepov), or savage (dypiov), a n d they can
come to possess cowardice (SeiAta) (791 B 7, D 5 - 9 ) . I n the Republic,
this same cluster o f defects are a l l e x p l i c i t l y i d e n t i f i e d as defects
of the thumoeides: excessive music r u i n s a person's thumoeides and
makes h i m i l l - h u m o u r e d (SVOKOXOV), irascible (aKpaKoXov), and
q u i c k - t e m p e r e d , w h i l e excessive gymnastics makes a p e r s o n savage
(dypiov); i l l - h u m o u r (SVOKOXLO) overstrains the thumoeides; l u x u r y
and softness i n t r o d u c e cowardice (SeiAta) i n t o i t ; a n d slavishness
(dvcXcvOcpia) t u r n s the thumoeides f r o m ' l i o n - l i k e ' to 'ape-like'
(411 B 6-c 2, D 7-E 2; 590 A 9 - B 9 ) . 4 5
Finally, f u r t h e r evidence can be f o u n d b y l o o k i n g to the Timaeus.

A s we have seen, the A t h e n i a n often characterizes o u r p s y c h o l o g y
i n terms o f m o t i o n (a p o s i t i o n w h i c h receives a theoretical f o u n
d a t i o n at 896 E f f . ) , a n d he characterizes gymnastic e d u c a t i o n as a
process o f i n s t i l l i n g the appropriate psychic m o t i o n s i n the soul
t h r o u g h t r a i n i n g i n c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o t i o n s o f the body. Similarly,
i n the Timaeus, p s y c h o l o g i c a l states a n d disturbances, as w e l l as
psychic h e a l t h a n d affliction themselves, are characterized i n terms
4 4
See 633 c-634 B ; 791 B - c ; 814 E ; 815 E-816 A ; cf. Rep. 442 A - c ; Tim. 70 B 3-5.
4 5
A n d cf. Laws 901 E 4—7, where cowardice and luxury cause 'softness of spirit'
{pa9v[LLa).
o f psychic m o t i o n , a n d education is u n d e r s t o o d as a process o f fos

t e r i n g the p r o p e r m o t i o n s i n each o f the three parts o f the soul
(90 c). " W i t h this f r a m e w o r k i n m i n d , T i m a e u s ' c o m m e n t s o n the
4 6
s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul are especially significant. H e says that the

s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul is located near the heart, a n d he explains:
T h e gods foreknew that the pounding of the heart [Trqh-qois r-ijs KapSias]
(which occurs when one expects what one fears or when one's anger is
aroused) would, like all such swelling of the passions [TOW dv/iov/ievajv], be
caused by fire. So they devised something to relieve the pounding: they
implanted lungs, a structure that is first of all soft and without blood and
secondly contains pores bored through i t like a sponge. This enables i t to
take i n breath and drink and thereby cool the heart. . . so that when an
ger (thumos) within the heart should reach its peak, the heart might pound
against something that gives way to i t and be cooled down. (70 c I - D 6)
H e r e , the ' p o u n d i n g ' o f the heart i n fear or anger is caused by, or

related to, the a g i t a t i o n o f the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul, w h i c h T i
maeus locates i n the chest. L i k e w i s e , i n the passage q u o t e d above
f r o m the Laws ( 7 9 0 E - 7 9 1 B ) , fear is associated w i t h precisely the
same ' p o u n d i n g ' o f the heart and a g i t a t i o n o f the soul. T h e par
allel suggests that i n the Laws Plato continues to be c o m m i t t e d to
a s i m i l a r m o d e l o f the soul's p h y s i o l o g i c a l associations, and that,
a l t h o u g h the thumoeides is n o t e x p l i c i t l y m e n t i o n e d i n the Laws ac
count, i t is s t i l l the psychic source o f the a g i t a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n fear
a n d anger. T w o f u r t h e r p o i n t s h i n t at this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . F i r s t , as
n o t e d above, the A t h e n i a n states that i f infants become accustomed
to feeling fear o f the sort he has described, they w i l l n o t become
courageous, b u t cowardly. A n d second, he follows u p his c o m m e n t s
b y asking, ' I f someone were to a p p l y every device i n an a t t e m p t to
make the three-year p e r i o d for o u r n u r s l i n g c o n t a i n the least pos
sible a m o u n t o f suffering a n d fears a n d every sort o f p a i n , d o n ' t we
suppose that he w o u l d give the soul o f the one b r o u g h t u p this way
a better s p i r i t [euû/xor]?' (792 B 4 - 8 ) .
4 6
Kamtekar's account of gymnastic education i n the Laws is similarly informed
by the psychology and physiology of the Timaeus ('Psychology', 130—43). Brisson
('Soul', 285—7) also draws attention to parallels between Timaeus and the Laws,
though w i t h a different focus.
88 Joshua Wilburn
4. T h e law
M o r a l e d u c a t i o n for the citizens o f M a g n e s i a does n o t e n d w i t h m u

sical a n d g y m n a s t i c t r a i n i n g . Plato also assigns t o the lawgiver, a n d
to the laws themselves, an i m p o r t a n t e d u c a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i n the
Laws. I n d e e d , one o f the c h i e f i n n o v a t i o n s o f the dialogue is Plato's
insistence t h a t the laws s h o u l d m a k e use o f persuasion, rather than
m e r e force. T h e A t h e n i a n draws an analogy: whereas the slave doc
tor ( w h o treats slaves) w i l l s i m p l y issue m e d i c a l orders w i t h o u t ex
p l a n a t i o n , the free d o c t o r ( w h o treats free m e n ) w i l l 'as m u c h as he
can teach the one w h o is sick. H e doesn't give orders u n t i l he has
i n some sense p e r s u a d e d ' (720 D ) . S i m i l a r l y , l e g i s l a t i o n s h o u l d be
a c c o m p a n i e d b y p r e l u d e s t h a t a t t e m p t to persuade the citizens to
f o l l o w the laws, r a t h e r t h a n s i m p l y t h r e a t e n t h e m w i t h p u n i s h m e n t
i f t h e y do n o t . C o m m e n t a t o r s have p r e s e n t e d a w i d e range o f i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n s o f the precise r o l e the p r e l u d e s are i n t e n d e d to play, a n d
i n w h a t sense t h e y are to 'persuade' the citizens. O n one side o f the
debate, c o m m e n t a t o r s such as B o b o n i c h a n d T e r e n c e I r w i n have
a r g u e d t h a t the p r e l u d e s teach the citizens i n a v e r y r o b u s t sense:
t h e y p r o v i d e the citizens w i t h ' g o o d epistemic reasons' for t h i n k
i n g t h a t the p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g the laws are t r u e (reasons w h i c h
Plato h i m s e l f accepts), a n d the r a t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n t h e y p r o v i d e is
i n t e n d e d to lead to u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 4 7
O n the o t h e r side, c o m m e n t a -
4 7
Bobonich {Utopia, 104). See C. Bobonich, 'Persuasion, Compulsion, and Free
dom in Plato's Laws' ['Persuasion'], Classical Quarterly, N S 41 (1991), 365—88; i d . ,
'Reading the Laws', i n C. G i l l and M . M . McCabe (eds.), Form and Argument in Late
Plato (Oxford, 1996), 249-82 at 264; i d . , Utopia, 97-119; and T. I r w i n , ' M o r a l i t y
as Law and Morality i n the Laws' [ ' M o r a l i t y ' ] , i n Bobonich (ed.), Guide, 92—107 at
98. The rationalist interpretation is well stated by Bobonich: 'What the lawgiver and
the preludes do is characterized as "teaching", that is, giving reasons to the citizens
and bringing i t about that they "learn" . . . T h e preludes are thus designed to be
instances of rational persuasion . . . Thus the citizens w i l l learn why the laws are
fine and just and should also learn why following the laws and, more generally, act
ing virtuously is good for them. They are to receive a true and reasoned account
of what is good for human beings' (Utopia, 104). Bobonich goes so far as to suggest
that the preludes could even produce knowledge i n the citizens ('Persuasion', 378—80)
(though cf. Bobonich's later remarks at Utopia, 199). R. Curren, 'Justice, Instruc
tion, and the Good: T h e Case for Public Education i n Aristotle and Plato's Laws',
Studies in Philosophy and Education, 13 (1994), 1—31 at 20—1, also advocates a ratio
nalist interpretation of the preludes. J. Annas, 'Virtue and Law i n Plato' ['Virtue'],
in Bobonich (ed.), Guide, 71—91, inclines towards the rationalist camp but adopts a
more moderate interpretation than that of Bobonich. She argues that the preludes
are neither wholly rational argument nor wholly 'rhetorical spell' (84—6). Many of
them, she claims, are more like an 'earnest address' that 'provides no argument' (76).
t o r s such as A n d r e L a k s a n d R i c h a r d Stalley have suggested t h a t the

p r e l u d e s appeal p r i m a r i l y t o non-rational aspects o f o u r p s y c h o l o g y ,
a n d t h a t for t h a t reason t h e y are n o t i n t e n d e d to p r o v i d e r a t i o n a l
education. 4 8
A l t h o u g h I w i l l not undertake a complete examination
o f the p r e l u d e s here, I w i l l b r i e f l y p r o v i d e some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n
f a v o u r o f t h i n k i n g t h a t the k i n d o f m o r a l e d u c a t i o n t h a t the laws,
t a k e n as a w h o l e ( t h a t is, taken to i n c l u d e the p r e l u d e s as w e l l as the
rules a n d p r e s c r i b e d p u n i s h m e n t s themselves), p r o v i d e is l a r g e l y
i n t e n d e d to appeal t o n o n - r a t i o n a l , s p i r i t e d a t t i t u d e s a n d desires.
A l t h o u g h t h i s does n o t b y i t s e l f s h o w t h a t t h e y are i n t e n d e d t o ap
peal to a d i s t i n c t s p i r i t e d part o f the s o u l , i n the l i g h t o f the above
analysis o f early e d u c a t i o n i t is reasonable to c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e y are.
I t is especially reasonable, I w i l l suggest, because there are s t r o n g
reasons for d o u b t i n g the r o b u s t l y r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s offered
by Bobonich and I r w i n . 4 9
4 8
See A . Laks, ' L ' U t o p i e legislative de Platon', Revue philosophique, 4 (1991),
416—28, and i d . , ' T h e Laws', i n C. Rowe and M . Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge
History of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge, 2000), 258—92 at 278;
Stalley, Introduction, 43, and i d . , 'Persuasion i n Plato's Laws' ['Persuasion'], His
tory of Political Thought, 15 (1994), 157—77; R- Mayhew, 'Persuasion and C o m p u l
sion i n Plato's Laws 10', Polis, 24 (2007), 91—111; E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the
Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), 212; England, Laws, i . 258; G. Morrow, 'Plato's Con
ception of Persuasion' ['Persuasion'], Philosophical Review, 62 (1953), 234—50, and
id., Cretan, 310; A . Nightingale, 'Writing/Reading a Sacred Text: A Literary I n
terpretation of Plato's Laws' ['Sacred'], Classical Philology, 88 (1993), 279—300, and
id., 'Plato's Lawcode i n Context: Rule by Written Law in Athens and Magnesia'
['Lawcode'], Classical Quarterly, N S 49 (1999), 100—22; Brisson, 'Ethics', 116—20;
C. Ritter, Platos Gesetze: Kommentar zum griechischen Text (Leipzig, 1896), 13—14;
and H . Gorgemanns, Beitrdge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi ( M u n i c h , i960),
who all adopt (varyingly strong versions of) anti-rationalist interpretations. Dodds,
for example, writes: ' I n the Laws, at any rate, the virtue of the common man is evi
dently not based on knowledge, or even on true opinion as such, b u t on a process
of conditioning or habituation by which he is induced to accept and act on certain
"salutary" beliefs . . . Plato now appears to hold that the majority of human beings
can be kept i n tolerable moral health only by a carefully chosen diet of "incanta
tions" (eTrqjSaC)—that is to say, edifying myths and bracing ethical slogans' (212).
M o r r o w shares Dodds's emphasis on the Athenian's characterization of educational
measures as errajSat ('Persuasion', 2381!.). Bobonich ('Persuasion', 373—7) offers a
reply to Morrow. Gorgemanns argues that the preludes make use of 'eine staatsman-
nische Rhetorik' that is directed to a popular, non-philosophical audience (70, 108).
4 9
I n support of his rationalist interpretation of the preludes, Bobonich points out
that what the preludes do is sometimes characterized as 'teaching', and that the citi
zens are sometimes characterized as 'learning' from them (Utopia, 104). However,
the passages that Bobonich cites—718 c—D, 720 D , 723 A , 857 D — E , and 888 A—are far
less conclusive than he suggests, for a number of reasons. (1) T w o of the occurrences
of 'learning' (718 D 6 and 723 A 5) are actually occurrences of evfxaOeorepov: the pre
ludes are intended to make the citizens r/fxepwrepov (718 D 4), evfxeveorepov (718 D 4,
90 Joshua Wilburn
T h e r e are several reasons f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t the e d u c a t i o n a l r o l e o f

the laws is c o n c e i v e d largely w i t h s p i r i t e d e m o t i o n s i n m i n d . F i r s t ,
the A t h e n i a n repeatedly a n d e m p h a t i c a l l y characterizes the task o f
the l a w g i v e r as t h a t o f m a k i n g the citizens u n i v o c a l i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e s
o f praise, b l a m e , a n d shame. T h e l a w g i v e r m u s t care for the citizens
by distributing honour and dishonour correctly among them, and i n
a l l the v a r i o u s experiences a n d circumstances t h a t arise t h r o u g h o u t
life, the l a w g i v e r m u s t issue praise a n d b l a m e c o r r e c t l y ' b y means
o f the laws themselves' (631 D 2 - 6 3 2 B 1 ) . 5 0
T h e traditional attitude
t o w a r d s incest p r o v i d e s a m o d e l f o r his a p p r o a c h . T h e reason t h a t
incest is the one sexual act f r o m w h i c h a l m o s t everyone refrains
'as w i l l i n g l y as possible' is t h a t everyone considers i t to be the m o s t
s h a m e f u l o f s h a m e f u l t h i n g s , a n d n o one ever says o t h e r w i s e (838 A -
c ) . T h e l a w g i v e r ' s goal, t h e n , is to i n s t i l the p r o p e r sense o f shame
i n the citizens b y f o s t e r i n g , t h r o u g h the laws themselves, u n i v e r -
723 A 4), and evfxaOeorepov. But evfxaOeorepov does not indicate that the citizens learn
from the preludes. I t indicates that, i f anything, the preludes make them 'better
suited for learning' or 'more disposed to learn'. T h a t implies that what the citizens
gain from the preludes does not constitute the learning itself, but at most a kind of
psychological preparation for learning, if any is to occur. T h e fact that evfxaOeorepov
is paired w i t h r/fxepwrepov and evfxeveorepov further suggests that the preludes aim at
a pre- or non-rational good condition of the soul, rather than at rational education.
(2) A t 720 D 4—6, while characterizing the free doctor to w h o m the prelude-giving
legislator is likened, the Athenian says that the doctor 'both learns [fiavOdvei] some
thing himself from the sick and, as much as he can, teaches [StSaa/eet] the afflicted
one'. T w o points are noteworthy here. First, the doctor only 'teaches' his patient
KCLQ* oaov 016s re eonv. T h a t suggests a limitation on how much the patient can actu
ally learn (cf. 718 D 5: el real fir/ \xeya TI, ofiiKpov be). Second, the sense of fiavOdvei is
evidently broad enough in this context to allow that the doctor is learning/rom the
patient. T h e doctor certainly cannot be learning medicine from a layperson, how
ever, but at most some empirical facts about the individual patient's case. I f that is all
that is necessary for something to count as learning, then to say the citizen 'learns'
from the preludes does not say very much at all. (3) A t 857 D 7 the free doctor is
accused of 'practically teaching' his patient. Once again, however, oêhov suggests
that what is going on at best approximates teaching, but is not actually teaching.
Moreover, the fact that this accusation is p u t into the mouth of the slave doctor,
who does not possess the art of medicine himself, further undercuts its significance
as a genuine assessment of what constitutes teaching the art of medicine. (4) T h e
Laws is noteworthy for the way i t characterizes 'education' as something that falls
far short of rational education. A t 653 B and 659 D 'education' (iraiheia) is defined as
the correct training i n pleasure and pain, and at 689 A—c the Athenian paradoxically
characterizes ignorance (dfxaOta, avoia) as the condition i n which a person feels plea
sure and pain in a way that is opposed to reasoning. A l l of this suggests that even
if the preludes are taken to teach the citizens (for example, w i t h iraiSevei at 857 E 3),
that does not necessarily mean that they provide rational education for the citizens.
5 0
Cf. 822 E—823 A .
Moral Education in Plato's Laws 9i
sal agreement about w h a t is p r a i s e w o r t h y a n d blameworthy. T o the
extent t h a t he succeeds, citizens w i l l behave correctly. F o r t h a t rea
son, the lawgiver 'reveres w i t h the greatest h o n o u r s ' the e m o t i o n o f
shame, a n d he considers a lack o f shame to be the greatest p r i v a t e
a n d p u b l i c e v i l (647 A - B ) .
Second, the p u n i s h m e n t s themselves t h a t the laws e m p l o y c o n
sist largely, and often exclusively, o f blame, dishonour, a n d p u b l i c
h u m i l i a t i o n . T o give j u s t a few examples: the p e n a l t y for m e n w h o
5 1
do n o t m a r r y b y the r e q u i r e d age o f t h i r t y - f i v e is t h a t they w i l l be

excluded f r o m the h o n o u r s the y o u n g pay to t h e i r elders (721 D ) ; the
p e n a l t y for b u y i n g or selling an a l l o t t e d house is t h a t an account o f
the offender's w r o n g d o i n g w i l l be w r i t t e n o n tablets to be stored i n
the temples, 'there to be read a n d r e m e m b e r e d for the rest o f t i m e '
(741 C 6 - 7 ) ; a n d those w h o abandon t h e i r post w h i l e s e r v i n g i n the
g u a r d are to be h e l d i n i l l - r e p u t e , and anyone w h o encounters t h e m
may strike t h e m w i t h i m p u n i t y (762 c ) .
A n d finally, as the converse o f this second p o i n t , there is s i g n i
ficant positive emphasis t h r o u g h o u t the preludes a n d laws, a n d i n
the A t h e n i a n ' s characterization o f the lawgiver's aims t h r o u g h o u t
the dialogue, o n the love o f v i c t o r y a n d good r e p u t a t i o n . I n d e e d ,
the a r g u m e n t o f the v e r y first p r e l u d e that the A t h e n i a n offers—
the p r e l u d e to the marriage law—appeals to 'the desire to become
famous a n d n o t to lie nameless after one has d i e d ' . T h e A t h e n i a n
also f r e q u e n t l y refers to the 'contest i n v i r t u e ' , and he claims that
we m u s t a l l be lovers o f v i c t o r y w h e n i t comes to v i r t u e (731 A ) .
C h i l d r e n m u s t be educated for the sake o f ' v i c t o r y ' over pleasures,
he says, and sexual i n d u l g e n c e s h o u l d be k e p t i n check b y love o f
h o n o u r (841 c ) . 5 2
T h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t caveat to add here: a l t h o u g h the laws a n d

51
Brisson ('Soul', 290—1) also observes that the punishments imposed by the laws,
as well as the preludes' heavy use of the rhetoric of praise and blame, are 'on the side
of spirit'.
5 3
I f the citizens treat the law against sexual indulgence w i t h sufficient reverence
and awe, the Athenian claims, then they w i l l be entirely obedient to it. However, the
Athenian acknowledges, not everyone w i l l be perfectly successful i n this regard, and
for that reason it is necessary to establish 'a second-best standard of the shameful and
noble' (841 B 5—6). According to this second-best standard, the citizens must always
have a sense of shame towards sexual behaviour that makes them practise it infre
quently and only when they can do so without being detected. Notice that there is no
mention i n any of this about the extent to which the citizens are rationally convinced
that they should not be sexually indulgent. The difference between the highest stan
dard and the second-best standard is simply a difference i n the degree to which the
citizens possess due reverence and shame.
92 Joshua Wilburn
preludes appeal largely a n d p r i m a r i l y to s p i r i t e d attitudes, they b y

no means do so exclusively. I n d e e d , i t is clear t h a t m a n y o f the
p u n i s h m e n t s p r e s c r i b e d b y the laws w i l l be especially repulsive to
the appetitive p a r t o f the soul, and some o f the m y t h s presented i n
the preludes are p l a i n l y i n t e n d e d to make the citizens (appetitively)
afraid o f d o i n g w r o n g b y c i t i n g p h y s i c a l l y p a i n f u l consequences. 53
Moreover, i t is clear t h a t at least some o f the preludes are i n t e n

ded to appeal p a r t l y to the citizens' rational nature, b y p r o v i d i n g
arguments or reason-like considerations i n favour o f o b e y i n g the
law. G i v e n Plato's r e c o g n i t i o n o f the d i v e r s i t y o f h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n
t h r o u g h o u t his works, a n d i n the Laws itself, i t w o u l d be strange i f
the laws a n d preludes d i d not reflect an awareness o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l
complexity.
H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h i t is clear t h a t some o f the preludes recognize
and appeal to o u r r a t i o n a l nature, there are s t r o n g reasons for res
i s t i n g the idea that they genuinely teach the citizens, i n the s t r o n g
sense o f p r o v i d i n g t h e m w i t h k n o w l e d g e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , or even a
f i r m grasp o n good reasons for h o l d i n g t r u e b e l i e f s . T o b e g i n w i t h ,
54
i n his late dialogues Plato raises concerns about the value and effect
iveness o f w r i t i n g t h a t bear d i r e c t l y o n the w r i t t e n l e g i s l a t i o n o f the
Laws. I n the Phaedrus Socrates levels the c r i t i c i s m t h a t w r i t i n g en
courages readers to defer to the a u t h o r i t y o f the w r i t e r rather t h a n
to l e a r n for themselves. W r i t i n g , Socrates says, ' w i l l enable t h e m
to hear m a n y t h i n g s w i t h o u t b e i n g p r o p e r l y taught, a n d they w i l l
imagine t h a t they have come to k n o w m u c h w h i l e for the m o s t p a r t
they w i l l k n o w n o t h i n g ' (275 A 7 - B 1). H o w e v e r , i t is n o t j u s t t h a t
53
Bobonich ('Persuasion', 375—6, and Utopia, 113—14) addresses the fact that the
preludes sometimes offer myths that appeal to our appetitive impulses. Cf. Saun
ders, Penal, 210—11.
5 4
The prelude that comes closest to doing so is the prelude to the law on piety,
which takes up most of book 10. T h e Athenian offers some very sophisticated argu
ments i n support of the claims that the gods exist, that they care for human beings,
and that they are not subject to bribery. However, the Athenian makes it clear that
the prelude to the law on piety is directed at impious individuals, many of whom
hold the beliefs that they do, not because they have vicious non-rational desires, but
because of ignorance (886 B ; 887 c—888 B ) . Indeed, some of them are 'naturally just'
and become impious 'without evil anger or disposition' (908 B , E ) . Moreover, the
Athenian makes it clear that impiety is special among crimes i n being (at least some
times) a purely rational failure of this sort. Given its uniqueness in this regard, it
makes sense that the prelude on impiety should appeal to rationality i n a way that
the others do not. Annas ('Virtue', 88) concurs that the prelude to the impiety law
requires special attention to argument: 'Citizens who have once got the idea of athe
ism need to be met w i t h argument, since a rational challenge to tradition has to be
met on its own ground.'
readers do n o t , as a m a t t e r o f fact, learn f r o m w r i t i n g ; rather, they
cannot learn f r o m i t . L e a r n i n g requires questioning, w h i c h w r i t i n g
does n o t p e r m i t :
Writing shares a strange feature w i t h painting. T h e offspring of painting

stand there as i f they are alive, but i f anyone asks them anything, they re
main most solemnly silent. T h e same is true of written words. You'd think
they were speaking as i f they had some understanding, but i f you question
anything that has been said because you want to learn more, i t continues to
signify just that very same thing for ever. (275 D 4-9)
Socrates' c o n c l u s i o n is that w r i t i n g is n o t to be taken seriously, be

cause w o r d s 'are as incapable o f speaking i n t h e i r o w n defence as
they are o f teaching the t r u t h adequately' (276 c 8-9).
T h e r e are several reasons for t h i n k i n g that this c r i t i c i s m applies to
the w r i t t e n legislation o f Magnesia. F i r s t , the p o i n t i n the Phaedrus
is clearly a general one: i t is n o t that some w r i t i n g , i f done i n the
r i g h t way, can a v o i d the s h o r t c o m i n g s Socrates describes; rather,
all w r i t i n g shares those shortcomings. T h e generality o f this p o i n t
is even emphasized (277 D - E ; cf. 261 E; 271 B ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , the
Phaedrus actually flags Socrates' discussion as one that specific
ally concerns the political role o f r h e t o r i c — i n particular, i n w h a t
ways i t is appropriate for p o l i t i c i a n s or lawgivers to make use o f i t
(see esp. 257 c-258 c ) . I n his closing remarks Socrates reiterates this
p o i n t b y e x p l i c i t l y a p p l y i n g their conclusions to laws and p o l i t i c a l
documents. ' I f Lysias or a n y b o d y else ever d i d or ever does w r i t e —
p r i v a t e l y or for the p u b l i c , i n the course o f p r o p o s i n g some law—a
p o l i t i c a l d o c u m e n t w h i c h he believes to e m b o d y clear k n o w l e d g e
of lasting i m p o r t a n c e , t h e n this w r i t e r deserves reproach, w h e t h e r
anyone says so or n o t ' (277 D 6-10). M o r e o v e r , the Laws' character
i z a t i o n o f the role o f law i n education echoes the Phaedrus i n at least
t w o n o t e w o r t h y ways. F i r s t , the Phaedrus introduces a n d draws o n
a m e d i c a l analogy: like the g o o d doctor, w h o m u s t be f a m i l i a r w i t h
the b o d y i n order to i m p r o v e i t , so also the good r h e t o r i c i a n m u s t
be f a m i l i a r w i t h the soul. R h e t o r i c itself, moreover, is l i k e n e d to
a m e d i c i n e or d r u g (<f>apiJ,aKov. 230 D 6; 268 c 3; 270 B 6; 274 E 6;
275 A 5). L i k e w i s e , we have seen that the A t h e n i a n introduces the
need for preludes b y w a y o f a m e d i c a l analogy, a n d he, too, charac
terizes law as a k i n d o f m e d i c i n e (cpdpiJ.aKov: 836 B 3; 919 B 4). T h e
g o o d j u d g e , he says, m u s t internalize the w r i t i n g s o f the lawgiver
a n d use t h e m as 'antidotes' (dAe^t^dp/xaKa: 957 D 6), b o t h for h i m -
94 Joshua Wilburn
self a n d for the rest o f the city, against v i c i o u s , u n l a w f u l s p e e c h . 55
Second, the Phaedrus' c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f r h e t o r i c as ' s o u l - l e a d i n g '

(ifivxayaiyia: 261 A 8; 271 c 10) anticipates the Laws' t a l k o f the 'pull
of law' (ayojyfj rfj TOV VOJJLOV: 645 A 4 - 5 ) t h a t draws the s o u l t o w a r d s
v i r t u e , as w e l l as its u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e d u c a t i o n as the 'drawing'
(ayajy-q: 659 D 2; cf. 643 D 2; 645 A i ) o f the s o u l t o w a r d s law. Fi
nally, we s h o u l d n o t e t h a t Plato's c r i t i q u e o f w r i t i n g is n o t u n i q u e
to the Phaedrus. C o n c e r n s a b o u t w r i t t e n law are also a r t i c u l a t e d i n
a n o t h e r late w o r k , Statesman (see esp. 294 A ff. and n . 61 b e l o w ) , and
even i n the Laws itself, the A t h e n i a n voices s c e p t i c i s m a b o u t the ef
fectiveness o f speeches ' s p o k e n before the masses' (890 E 1 - 3 ) . 56
In the l i g h t o f these considerations, the implications of the

Phaedrus' c r i t i q u e o f w r i t i n g for the w r i t t e n legislation of Mag
nesia are clear: w h a t e v e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l effect the preludes m i g h t
have o n the citizens, and even i f p a r t o f t h a t effect is a r a t i o n a l
one i n v o l v i n g p e r s u a s i o n , t h e y c a n n o t be teaching the citizens i n
any g e n u i n e sense. T e a c h i n g r e q u i r e s the active e n g a g e m e n t o f the
s t u d e n t or ' l i s t e n e r ' , w h i c h means above all questioning, and that
is precisely w h a t the w r i t t e n laws do n o t allow. I n d e e d , t h e y p o s i
t i v e l y discourage q u e s t i o n i n g , for the citizens are t r a i n e d to defer to
the laws as a g o d - g i v e n , absolute a u t h o r i t y , a n d anyone w h o does
q u e s t i o n t h e m is p u n i s h e d . 5 7
T h e analogy o f the free doctor, w h i c h
55
A n d cf. the characterization of wine as an educational (j>ap[j.aKov at 646 c 4, 647 E
1, 649 A 3, 666 B 6, and 672 D 7.
5 6
This point is noted by Nightingale ('Sacred', 288). We should also note the cri
tique of writing, and of written law, that is voiced i n the Seventh Letter (344 c—D).
5 7
I n general, the Laws does not promote an environment that is conducive to ra
tional, philosophical enquiry. T h i s point is noted i n Nightingale ('Sacred', 293—6),
Grube {Thought, 250), and M o r r o w ('Persuasion', 248—50). Morrow, for example,
writes: ' I t is hard to imagine how any citizen who had been subjected for thirty years
or more to the strictly supervised regimen we have described could retain the critical
power and the freedom of mind required for [dialectical and philosophical] study'
(248). Bobonich, on the other hand, argues that the Athenian does intend for the citi
zens to cultivate their rational skills i n a significant way (Utopia, 106—9). As evidence,
he draws attention to the fact that the citizens learn some mathematics, including the
doctrine of incommensurability, as well as some astronomy. Bobonich takes this to
indicate that the citizens are learning about non-sensible value properties, and that,
in doing so, they are being prepared for arguments, contained in the preludes, about
what is good for them. However, there is another way of interpreting the purpose of
these studies. The Athenian makes it clear that the purpose of learning astronomy is
to dispel the m y t h that the heavenly bodies are 'wanderers' that move without order,
and that the purpose of learning about incommensurability is that doing so intro
duces the citizens to 'divine necessity' (817 E—820 D ) . I n other words, the citizens
learn just what is useful for making them pious believers in the gods. (And note that
at 820 D 4—6 the Athenian says that these studies are not 'difficult' to learn, suggest-
B o b o n i c h a n d o t h e r advocates o f the r a t i o n a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cite

as evidence for t h e i r view, a c t u a l l y draws a t t e n t i o n to precisely t h i s
s h o r t c o m i n g o f the laws. F o r whereas the free d o c t o r persuades his
p a t i e n t t h r o u g h a conversation i n w h i c h the p a t i e n t is p e r m i t t e d
to ask questions, there is n o dialogue b e t w e e n the legislator or
the laws o n one side a n d i n d i v i d u a l citizens o n the o t h e r . 58
The
legislator issues the laws a n d the preludes, and the citizens must
obey t h e m . 5 9
E v e n i f the p r e l u d e s d i d , as B o b o n i c h claims, p r o v i d e
reasons t h a t P l a t o w o u l d endorse for h o l d i n g t r u e beliefs, at best
t h e y w o u l d p r o v i d e the citizens w i t h some reasons t h a t t h e y c o u l d
recite. 60
T h a t w o u l d not m e a n t h a t t h e y t r u l y understand those
ing that what the citizens are learning is actually unexceptional.) The point is not to
teach them about the Good (or even to prepare them for teaching about the Good),
but simply to make them acknowledge the active role of the divine in the universe.
Why is this so important? Because the revered status granted to the Magnesian laws
depends on the claim that those laws come from god. The citizens w i l l not be suf
ficiently reverent towards those laws, therefore, unless they believe that god exists
and watches over human affairs. M y reading receives further support from the fact
that, i n his closing remarks of the dialogue, the Athenian claims that no one who has
recognized the orderly motion of the stars can fail to recognize the existence of the
gods (966 E 2—967 A 1).
5 8
T h i s point is well made by Nightingale ('Sacred', 287, and 'Lawcode', 118—19)
and Stalley ('Persuasion', 170).
5 9
See Nightingale, 'Sacred', 291—3.
6 0
There are at least two reasons, however, for doubting that the reasons offered
by the preludes for complying w i t h the laws really are good reasons for holding true
beliefs. First, many of the arguments that are presented in the preludes are, as Stal
ley puts i t , 'embarrassingly bad' ('Persuasion', 171). T h i s is true even i f we leave
aside the many dubious myths and superstitions that some preludes advocate. Take,
for example, the prelude to the law on marriage, the Athenian's model prelude. The
argument it offers for the good of marriage is that having children provides a way
of satisfying the natural desire to be immortal and 'to become famous and not to lie
nameless after one has died' (721 c). I t seems clear, however, that the desire for fame
cannot be the right Platonic reason for doing anything, and, i n any event, the argu
ment certainly fails to explain why marriage has to take place between the ages of thirty
and thirty-five. But secondly, it is not even clear that it is good for everyone to marry
(or at least to marry at those ages). I n the Statesman the Eleatic Visitor criticizes
written legislation on the grounds that, given the unpredictability and variety of h u
man affairs and individual circumstances, ' i t is impossible to devise, for any given
situation, a simple rule that w i l l apply for everyone for ever' (294 B 4—6). Rather,
'his regulations for each community w i l l be rather imprecise and w i l l be concerned,
I think, w i t h the majority of the population, w i t h the most common situations, and
w i t h being broadly right' (295 A 5—8). What the Eleatic Visitor's remarks strongly
suggest is that, for at least some of the citizens, it w i l l not always be better for them
to obey at least some of the laws—the marriage law, for example. The fact that Plato
himself never married suggests that he did not endorse the Magnesian marriage law
as an absolute rule for living a good life (a point made by Stalley, 'Persuasion', 172).
I f this is right, then for those citizens in those circumstances i n which following a
g6 Joshua Wilburn
reasons, however. A s the Phaedrus indicates, rhetoric a n d w r i t t e n

speech at m o s t persuade, b u t they do n o t teach (277 E - 2 7 8 A ) . T h e
M a g n e s i a n citizens, we m a y conclude, m a y be persuaded b y the
preludes ( w h i c h surely involves a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y ) ,
b u t they do n o t , i n any significant way, learn f r o m t h e m .
T w o final considerations o n this matter: first, the A t h e n i a n re
peatedly characterizes the k i n d o f persuasion offered b y the legis
lator, the laws, a n d the preludes as paramuthia. 61
T h i s is significant
because Plato t y p i c a l l y identifies paramuthia as a means o f i n f l u e n
c i n g o u r non-rational psychology. I n the Statesman, paramuthein is
w h a t a cattle farmer ( b e i n g c o m p a r e d to a p o l i t i c i a n ) does i n order to
c a l m d o w n the cattle and c h a r m t h e m i n t o d o c i l i t y (268 B ) . O f spe
cial note for m y purposes, i t is a w o r d Plato uses to characterize the
k i n d o f influence that is exercised o n the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the s o u l . 62
Second, there are several i n d i c a t i o n s i n the Laws that m o s t c i t i

zens never really learn w h a t is good for t h e m at all. A s for p r u d e n c e
and f i r m l y h e l d true opinions,' the A t h e n i a n remarks, 'he is a l u c k y
person to w h o m they come even i n o l d age' (653 A 7 - 9 ) . I t seems 6 3
that far f r o m ever h a v i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g or knowledge, m o s t c i t i

zens never even have stable true beliefs. T h e o l d alone m a y possess
t h e m , and even a m o n g the o l d o n l y the ' l u c k y ' ones. M o r e o v e r ,
i f the citizens d i d learn w h a t is good for t h e m , t h e n i t is unclear
w h y education w o u l d 'slacken' t h r o u g h o u t their lives, and w h y the
s y m p o s i u m — a n exercise i n abandoning one's r a t i o n a l i t y — w o u l d be
necessary for r e s t o r i n g i t . T h i s p o i n t is especially c o m p e l l i n g w h e n
we consider, first, that the s y m p o s i u m is to take place q u i t e fre
q u e n t l y (at least m o n t h l y , and perhaps even daily; see 828 A - C ) , and
second, that i n the Republic the G u a r d i a n s (all o f w h o m are to have
stable belief, a n d at least some o f w h o m w i l l go o n to have k n o w
ledge) receive an absolute p r o h i b i t i o n against d r i n k i n g (403 E ) . I n
short, w h a t all o f this suggests is that w h i l e m o r a l education surely
does appeal to the M a g e n s i a n citizens' r a t i o n a l i t y i n various ways,
w h a t i t does n o t do is teach t h e m i n any m e a n i n g f u l sense. T h a t is
given law is not actually best for them, the preludes w i l l offer them reasons for hold
ing a belief—that following the law is good for them—that is not i n their case true.
Cf. I r w i n , ' M o r a l i t y ' , 95—9, who notes the problem of generality that written law
suffers from, but thinks that the external, written law is ideally supplemented by
each citizen's own 'internal law'.
61
Cf. the discussion in Nightingale, 'Sacred', 295.
6 2
See e.g. Rep. 442 A 2. Cf. Kamtekar, 'Psychology', 147.
6 3
precisely w h y deference a n d obedience to law are so i m p o r t a n t i n

Magnesia.
5. C o n c l u s i o n : the ally o f reason?
A r i s t o t l e remarks i n the Politics that the citizens o f Magnesia receive

'the same' education that the citizens o f K a l l i p o l i s receive ( 1 2 6 5 s
1-10). W h i l e this is no d o u b t an o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , I hope to have

at least p a r t i a l l y v i n d i c a t e d A r i s t o t l e ' s c o m m e n t : a c c o r d i n g to m y
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , m u s i c a l a n d gymnastic education a i m largely at the
s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the s o u l — u n d e r s t o o d as an i n d e p e n d e n t psychic
source o f m o t i v a t i o n — j u s t as they d i d i n the Republic. T h e Laws
adds s o m e t h i n g to the Republic's account, however. I n Magnesia, a
detailed w r i t t e n lawcode supplements and reinforces the values i n
s t i l l e d i n the citizens t h r o u g h early education, a n d i t does so i n p a r t ,
I have argued, b y c o n t i n u i n g to target the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f o u r psy
c h o l o g y t h r o u g h o u t a d u l t h o o d . W h a t a l l o f this shows is that B o -
b o n i c h ' s c l a i m that 'the parts o f the soul do n o t do any p h i l o s o p h i c a l
w o r k i n the Laws' is s i m p l y m i s t a k e n . A l t h o u g h t r i p a r t i t i o n is n o t
64
e x p l i c i t i n the Laws, the evidence s t r o n g l y suggests that Plato re

m a i n s c o m m i t t e d to i t , and that his views o n the thumoeides c o n t i n u e
to i n f o r m his policies o n m o r a l education. A n i m p o r t a n t difference,
however, is that whereas the Republic characterized s p i r i t ' s psychic
role as the role o f s u p p o r t i n g the c o m m a n d s issued b y the reasoning
p a r t o n the basis o f w i s d o m , the Laws casts d o u b t o n w h e t h e r m o s t
citizens w i l l ever achieve w i s d o m , k n o w l e d g e , or even stable belief.
I n t h e i r place, the citizens are to enslave themselves to the laws,
w h i c h e m b o d y — t o the extent possible for w r i t t e n legislation—the
w i s d o m o f the lawgiver. T h a t does n o t m e a n that the citizens are
not to make any use o f t h e i r o w n r a t i o n a l capacities, b u t i t does
m e a n that t h e i r m a i n use o f those capacities w i l l consist i n b e l i e v i n g
w h a t the laws say a n d f i g u r i n g out, i n t h e i r o w n i n d i v i d u a l c i r c u m
stances, w h i c h actions best c o n f o r m to t h e m . Sassi argues that the
laws i n Magnesia are i n t e n d e d to fill the gap that is left b y w h a t she
perceives to be the o m i s s i o n o f the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f the soul i n the
Laws. 6s
O n m y account, however, the gap that the laws f i l l is n o t left
b y a d e m o t e d thumoeides. I t is left rather b y a reasoning p a r t that
6 4
'Agency', 27. 6 5
' S e l f , 137-8.
98 Joshua Wilburn
i n m o s t cases never achieves reliably stable b e l i e f . T h i s suggests a

66
shift i n , or at least an expansion of, the role that the thumoeides plays
i n m o r a l development and v i r t u e : i n the Laws, the s p i r i t e d p a r t o f
the soul is no longer s i m p l y the ally o f reason, b u t n o w also, and
perhaps p r i m a r i l y , the ally of law.
Wayne State University
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in Barney, Brennan, and Brittain (eds.), Divided, 128-49.
102 Joshua Wilburn
'Plato's T w o Forms of Second-Best Morality', Philosophical Review,

118 (2009), 351-74.
Wilburn, J., 'Akrasia and Self-Rule i n Plato's Laws', Oxford Studies in An
cient Philosophy, 43 (2012), 25-53.
Woods, M . , 'Plato's Division of the Soul', Proceedings of the British
Academy, 73 (1987), 23-48.
Woolf, R., 'How to See an Unencrusted Soul', i n Barney, Brennan, and
FOUND IN TRANSLATION:
??????????? ??????????? ??????
3. 5, 1113 7-8, A N D I T S R E C E P T I O N
b
SUSANNE BOBZIEN
T H I S paper is d i s t i n c t l y o d d . I t demonstrates w h a t happens w h e n

an analytical p h i l o s o p h e r a n d h i s t o r i a n o f p h i l o s o p h y tries t h e i r
h a n d at the presently t r e n d i n g topic o f reception. F o r a novice
i n this genre, i t seemed advisable to start s m a l l . Rather t h a n re
searching the r e c e p t i o n o f an author or a book, chapter, section, or
paragraph, the focus o f this paper is o n one sentence: A r i s t o t l e ' s
Nicomachean Ethics 3. 5, n i 3 7 - 8 . T h i s sentence has m a r k e d l y
b
shaped scholarly and general o p i n i o n alike w i t h regard to A r i s t o t l e ' s

t h e o r y o f free w i l l . I n a d d i t i o n , i t has taken o n a curious life o f its
o w n . Part I o f the paper examines the t e x t itself. Part I I explores its
r e c e p t i o n f r o m a n t i q u i t y to the present day, i n c l u d i n g present-day
p o p u l a r c u l t u r e , later ancient, Byzantine, A r a b i c , L a t i n m e d i e v a l ,
Renaissance, V i c t o r i a n , and c o n t e m p o r a r y scholarship. T h e r e are
some surprises o n the way.
PART I : The Text of

Nicomachean Ethics 3 . 5 , 1 1 i 3 b
7-8
1. NE 11 i 3 7 ~ 8 : an E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n and the Greek t e x t

b
One o f the m o s t famous sentences i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Eth

ics comes f r o m his discussion o f the v o l u n t a r y ( T O €KOVOIOV), choice
© Susanne Bobzien 2013

Thanks to D i m i t r i Gutas, Stephen M e n n , and Geoffrey Moseley for assisting me
w i t h the Arabic text of the Nicomachean Ethics; to Katerina Ierodiakonou for sharing
some of her expertise i n Byzantine philosophy; and to the audience at the Prince
ton Colloquium i n A p r i l 2011, where I presented parts of this paper i n draft form.
Additional thanks go to Charles Brittain for his insightful remarks on a later draft,
to Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood for their judicious suggestions for further i m
proving the paper, and to Sara Protasi for help w i t h the bibliography.
104 Suzanne Bobzien
(Trpoaipaais), a n d o f w h a t is u p to us o r i n o u r p o w e r (e<£' rjp.Lv), to

w a r d s the b e g i n n i n g o f NE 3 . 5 . H e r e is a m u c h - q u o t e d t r a n s l a t i o n
of the lines:
(A) (1) For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting,
(2) and where we are able to say N o we are also able to say Yes. (Arist.
NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 , trans. Rackham)
b 1
T h e phrases 'we are free t o ' a n d 'we are able t o ' b o t h (seem t o )
translate e</>' i)p.iv (ioTiv). T h i s sentence f r o m the Nicomachean Ethics
o f t e n seems to be c o n s i d e r e d c r u c i a l f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r i s
totle's v i e w o n the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r h u m a n s have i n d e t e r m i n i s t
free c h o i c e . H e r e are the G r e e k lines o f w h i c h ( A ) is p u r p o r t e d to
2
be a t r a n s l a t i o n , f r o m B y w a t e r ' s O x f o r d e d i t i o n : 3
(B) (1) Iv ots yap r)piv TO TrpdrTeiv, Kal TO pi) TTpdrretv, (2) Kal Iv ols TO
pf], Kal TO vat.
T h e r e are n o variants for o u r sentence i n the apparatus c r i t i c u s .

(C) a n d (D) are t w o w o r d - b y - w o r d l i t e r a l ( a n d t h u s s o m e w h a t u n
sightly) translations:
(C) (1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act (is up to us), (2) and
where to not (is up to us), also to yes (is up to us).
(D) (1) For, where (the) acting is up to us, also (the) not acting (is up to
us), (2) and where (the) not (is up to us), also (the) yes (is up to us).
T h e i n s e r t i o n s i n a n g l e d brackets i n (C) a n d (D) seem n o t to be

q u e s t i o n e d b y anyone. So I w i l l n o t argue for t h e m . (C) a n d (D)
differ as f o l l o w s . (C) keeps the s y n t a c t i c a l role o f the G r e e k T O the
1
H . Rackham (trans.), Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.,
1926).
3
P. Destree, 'Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character' ['Character'], i n
M . Pakaluk and G. Pearson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aris
totle (Oxford, 2003), 285—318, sects. 1 and 2; F. Sparshott, Taking Life Seriously:
A Study of the Argument of the Nicomachean Ethics [Life] (Toronto, 1994), 130; C.
Rapp, 'Freiwilligkeit, Entscheidung und Verantwortlichkeit ( I I I 1—7)' ['Freiwillig-
keit'], i n O. Hoffe (ed.), Aristoteles: Die Nikomachische Ethik (Berlin, 1995), 109—33
at 131; also many of the authors mentioned i n sect. 7 below. T h e general idea is
often that our free (unpredetermined, uncaused, or unforced) choice is manifested
or expressed in our ability to say either 'no' or 'yes' to (to either reject or choose)
the course of action we deliberate about. For a detailed discussion see S. Bobzien,
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 1113 7—8 and Free Choice', i n P. Destree, R. Salles,
b
and M . Zingano (eds.), What is Up to Us? Studies on Causality and Responsibility in

Ancient Philosophy (Sankt Augustin, 2013), forthcoming. See also below, sect. 13.
3
J. Bywater, Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea (Oxford, 1894).
Found in Translation i OS
same i n ( i ) a n d ( 2 ) , i.e. as i n t r o d u c i n g an i n f i n i t i v a l clause; i n ( 2 )

these clauses w o u l d be abbreviated. ( D ) replicates the g r a m m a t i
cal category o f the Greek w o r d TO (as definite article) b y a d d i n g the
E n g l i s h 'the' i n brackets. I t does n o t i m p l y a p a r a l l e l i s m o f i n f i n i
t i v a l clauses between ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) . I do n o t see h o w one can retain
b o t h p o i n t s i n one E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h is w h y I have o p t e d
for t w o .
N o w to the p o i n t s that matter, (i) T h e r e is n o w o r d for 'saying',
or for a n y t h i n g similar, i n the Greek text. I n any r e n d e r i n g that has
a verb o f saying, m e a n i n g , i n t e n d i n g , etc., this verb is an addition b y
the translator. A n d i n s u p p l y i n g such a verb, translators i m p l y that
they read or i n t e r p r e t the passage i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. ( i i ) T h e r e is
n o w o r d for ' n o ' i n the Greek text. T h e w o r d that appears to have
been translated b y ' n o ' does n o t m e a n no, a n d i n the present use i t
means n o t .
F o r s o m e t h i n g like ( A ) to be j u s t i f i e d as a t r a n s l a t i o n o f (B), we
hence s h o u l d w a n t at least t w o o f the f o l l o w i n g three p o i n t s satis
fied. 2 . W e w o u l d w a n t some t e x t u a l parallels, i n w h i c h the Greek
for 'to n o t . . . to yes' has the m e a n i n g o f 'to say " n o " . . . to say
"yes"', w i t h a verb o f saying either e x p l i c i t l y g i v e n or i n d u b i t a b l y
u n d e r s t o o d ; these passages s h o u l d preferably be b y A r i s t o t l e , or
r o u g h l y f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s t i m e ( p l u s / m i n u s 500 years, say). 3 . W e
w o u l d w a n t an e x p l a n a t i o n h o w exactly to read (B) to m e a n some
t h i n g like ( A ) , i.e. i n v o l v i n g a verb o f saying a n d 'yes' and ' n o ' . 4. W e
w o u l d w a n t there to be n o reasonable alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that
does n o t insert a verb o f saying a n d does n o t render /xij b y ' n o ' . W e
take these three p o i n t s i n t u r n .
2 . Parallel passages considered
O u r passage f r o m the Nicomachean Ethics seems u n i q u e i n ancient

Greek texts i n h a v i n g TO and TO vai d i r e c t l y opposed to each
other, f u n c t i o n i n g as p a r t o f an a b b r e v i a t i o n for s o m e t h i n g ( i f u n
clear so far for w h a t ) . A fortiori, there seem to be n o parallels i n
w h i c h the Greek for 'to n o t . . . to yes' has the m e a n i n g o f 'to say
" n o " . . . to say "yes"', w i t h a verb o f saying either e x p l i c i t l y g i v e n
or i n d u b i t a b l y u n d e r s t o o d . O r i n any event n o b o d y has p u t one for
w a r d yet. T h e closest passages i n A r i s t o t l e ' s ceuvre are apparently
the f o l l o w i n g six:
io6 Suzanne Bobzien
• A dialectical proposition must be such that one can answer i t w i t h yes

or no.
e o r t yap Trporaots otaXeKTtKr} rrpos TJV eortv atTOKptvaoQat vat rj oir {Top.
I58 i5-i7)
a
• But i f the question is clear and simple, he should answer either yes or
no.
edv be Kat craves fj Kat IXTTXOVV TO epcoTcopievov, r/ vat rj ov aTTOKptreov. (Top.
160*33-4)
• T h e person questioned should answer either yes or no.
T O TJ vat TJ ov aTTOKptveoOat rov Ipcorojiievov. (SE I 7 5 9 ) b — I O
• T h e answerer must say either yes or no.

TJ vat TJ ov avdyKf] Xlyatv rov aTTOKptvoêvov. (SE I75 l3—14) b
• I t is possible . . . to be true to say either yes or no.

eyxcopei . . . 17 vat rj ov dXrjOe^ e t v a t Xeyetv (SE I76 IO—11) a
• . . . he should not say (the) yes or no i n the case of homonyms.

. . . ovb' £771 row o\iojvv\iOiiv T O vai 7] ov XeKTeov (SE iy6 I^—16)
4 A
W h a t makes these passages at least w o r t h c o n t e m p l a t i n g is t h a t

they each have a G r e e k verb o f s a y i n g c o m b i n e d w i t h the standard
5
Greek w o r d s for 'yes' a n d ' n o ' . H o w e v e r , the passages are n o t close

e n o u g h to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for the r e a d i n g o f o u r Greek sentence
(B) as (A). F i r s t , they are a l l i n the c o n t e x t o f A r i s t o t l e ' s dialectic.
Saying or a n s w e r i n g 'yes' or ' n o ' was p a r t o f the dialectical game
or m e t h o d , as is w e l l established. T h e r e are no comparable pas
6
sages i n A r i s t o t l e i n contexts o f h u m a n agency where the agent says

'yes' or ' n o ' as a w a y o f m a k i n g a choice ( d e c i d i n g , agreeing, t e l l i n g
themselves) to do or n o t to do s o m e t h i n g .
T h e passages f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s dialectic fail as parallels for t w o
f u r t h e r reasons. N o n e o f t h e m has a definite article ( T O ) i n f r o n t
of the 'yes' and the ' n o ' , as (B) has; a n d a l l have ov, the Greek
w o r d used equally for ' n o t ' a n d for ' n o ' , n o t /xij. B u t (B) has /xij.
N o w , [AT] is a w o r d used a d v e r b i a l l y for ' n o t ' i n c e r t a i n g r a m m a t i
cal c o n t e x t s — b u t n o t for ' n o ' . So the six passages are n o t p a r a l l e l
7
passages. N o r are there any other parallels i n the Corpus Aristoteli-

4
Several manuscripts do not have the TO. Some have i) before TO.
5
These are 'to say' {Xlyeiv) and 'to reply' {auoKpiveodai).
6
Cf. e.g. C. W. A. Whitaker, Aristotle's De interpretatione: Contradiction and
Dialectic (Oxford, 1996), 101.
7
The grammatical contexts in which juiy is used adverbially for 'not' are typically
one of the following: with the imperative; with the subjunctive; with the optative;
with the infinitive; and with participles when they have a conditional or general force
and i n certain indirect questions; cf. H . W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge,
Mass., 1920), 604—6, 608—30.
Found in Translation 107
cum (or i n any o f the ancient Greek texts i n the Thesaurus Linguae
Graecae) w h i c h have T O and T O vai opposed i n a sentence or se
quence o f sentences. 8
C h r i s t o p h e r T a y l o r , one o f the v e r y few philosophers w h o at

t e m p t to e x p l a i n the—presumed—'saying' i n ( A ) , suggests a pos 9
sible parallel i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Ethics. H e w r i t e s :
It is . . . possible that Aristotle is thinking of acting as itself a way of giv

ing an affirmative answer to the question 'Should I <2>?' and not acting as a
way of giving a negative answer to that question. Cf. (NE) V I . 2 , 1139 2i- a
2, 'what assertion and denial are i n thought, pursuit and avoidance are i n
desire', which seems to mean that pursuing some end is itself a way of as
serting that the thing is to be pursued (or that i t is good) and avoiding
something a way of denying that i t is to be pursued (or that i t is good). 10
T h i s is a brave a t t e m p t , t h o u g h unsuccessful. T h e passage T a y l o r

quotes does n o t 'seem to mean' w h a t he suggests. I f a a n d b are i n
t h o u g h t w h a t c a n d d are i n desire, i t is n e i t h e r i m p l i e d n o r i n d i c a t e d
that c-ing a n d <f-ing are ways of a-ing and b-ing. F o r i l l u s t r a t i o n : i f I
say that t r u t h is i n t h o u g h t w h a t the g o o d is i n desire, i t does n o t f o l
l o w that the g o o d is a k i n d o f t r u t h . Rather, the case suggests that
there is s o m e t h i n g that a and c, a n d b a n d d, respectively, share.
W h a t that s o m e t h i n g is w o u l d need to be separately i d e n t i f i e d .
I f we p u t this p o i n t aside a n d take T a y l o r at his w o r d , w h a t A r i s
totle seems to i n t e n d to say is
(E) (1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act (is up to us), (2) and
where to not act (is up to us), also to act (is up to us).
W e w i l l see b e l o w that to o b t a i n ( E ) n o verb o f saying needs to be

i n v o k e d . T h e p r o b l e m a t i c t r a n s l a t i o n (A) w o u l d thus be unneces
sary.
3. ' N o t ' a n d 'yes' as ' d o n ' t ' and ' d o '
C a n one p r o v i d e a plausible j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the i n s e r t i o n o f a verb

of saying a n d the t r a n s l a t i o n o f firj as no? N o t one o f the scholars
8
See below for some Byzantine Greek parallels. By contrast, there are quite a few
passages that oppose TO i W a n d TO OV.
9
The reader is not told, though, that there is no expression for 'saying' in the
Greek.
1 0
C. C. W. Taylor (trans, and comm.), Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Books II—
IV [NE] (Oxford, 2006), 164.
io8 Suzanne Bobzien
p r o p o s i n g (A) seems to have p r o v i d e d one. H e r e is one suggestion

as to w h a t they c o u l d have p r o v i d e d .
F i r s t , there is the fact that the ancients h a d n o q u o t a t i o n marks,
and that the definite article T O was f r e q u e n t l y used i n a w a y s i m i
lar to q u o t a t i o n marks i n E n g l i s h , to indicate that an expression
or sentence is m e n t i o n e d , n o t used. T h i s fact c o u l d be e x p l o i t e d
to j u s t i f y the t r a n s l a t i o n 'the " n o t " ' and 'the "yes"'. Second, per
haps A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f pn] i n (B) is n o t meant to be equivalent to
'ov , m e a n i n g ' n o ' , as used i n answers to questions. Rather, pn] m a y
be e m p l o y e d b y A r i s t o t l e the way i t is used i n i n d e p e n d e n t clauses
that express a c o m m a n d , as i n pn) Trpa£rjs, ' d o n ' t act!': a person de 11
liberates w h e t h e r to do s o m e t h i n g ; i t is u p to t h e m to choose n o t to
do i t ; i n this case, t h e i r choosing involves t h e i r t e l l i n g themselves
' d o n ' t act!'.
I n s u p p o r t o f this reading, reference c o u l d be made to A r i s t o t l e ' s
sporadic allusions to the use o f syllogisms i n practical reasoning
i n the Ethics. A n example w o u l d be NE i i 4 7 3 4 , o f a u n i v e r s a l
a
premiss, ' i t says to a v o i d t h i s ' (17 piev ovv Xeyei cj>evyeiv TOVTO). An
other passage one m i g h t adduce is NE 1 i 4 3 8 - 9 , 'for p r a c t i c a l w i s
a
d o m gives commands. F o r its end is (the question) w h a t one m u s t

do or n o t ( d o ) ' (17 p,iv yap <f>p6vrjais knnaKTiKr] IOTW TI yap Set Trpar-
T<ELV rj iirj, TO T E A O J avrrjs i o T i v ) . M o r e o v e r , i t c o u l d be adduced that
Plato takes t h i n k i n g to be i n t e r n a l speech; and that a c e n t u r y after
A r i s t o t l e , the Stoic C h r y s i p p u s h a d a t h e o r y that, i n r a t i o n a l beings,
the i m p u l s e to act takes the f o r m o f the agent's reason p r e s c r i b i n g
or c o m m a n d i n g the agent to act ( P l u t . Stoic, repugn. 1037 F ) . One
c o u l d i m a g i n e this to take the f o l l o w i n g f o r m : Zoe to herself ' D o n ' t
eat the baklavai'or Zoe to herself 'Eat the baklava!'. T h u s we w o u l d
get a reading o f the k i n d :
(F) (1) lv ofe ydp £c^>' rjp.iv TO rrpaTTeiv, Kal TO pi) TrpaTTeiv, (2) Kal Iv 01s TO pi)
{rrpd^jji;) Kal TO {rrpdôv);
i n translation:
(G) (1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act (is up to us), (2) and
where the 'don't (act!' is up to us), also the 'do (act!' is up to us).
T h i s seems to go some w a y towards e x p l a i n i n g the T O pn] (as opposed
1 1
T h i s use of [ir] w i t h the aorist subjunctive has a parallel i n the L a t i n ne.
to T O oil) i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h an i m p l i c i t verb o f s a y i n g . S t i l l , such
12
i m p e r a t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f T O fir) poses its o w n difficulties.
• T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the definite article T O i n l i e u o f q u o t a

t i o n marks obliterates the—expected—parallel between the t w o
uses o f T O i n (1) a n d its t w o uses i n (2).
• T h e fir] is n o longer o n a par w i t h the Vat". I n particular, g r a m
m a t i c a l l y v a i is n o t p a r t o f positive commands, a n d cannot be
short for 'do act!'.
• M o r e o v e r , w i t h this r e a d i n g one w o u l d s t i l l expect the se
quence p o s i t i v e - n e g a t i v e i n b o t h (1) a n d (2), n o w t a k i n g the
f o r m ' d o ! ' — ' d o n ' t ! ' i n (2). Instead the r e a d i n g has ' d o n ' t ! ' —
'do!'.
• A n d last b u t n o t least, we w o u l d need some s u p p o r t i n g e v i
dence i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t e x t for the a s s u m p t i o n that T O fir] i n the
m i d d l e o f (B) can be short for o u r t e l l i n g ourselves ' d o n ' t
act!'. Some h i n t s at p r a c t i c a l reasoning i n other books o f the
Nicomachean Ethics are n o t sufficient; n o r are references to
Plato's i n t e r n a l speech a n d Stoic impulses. W e w o u l d need
evidence that i n A r i s t o t l e T O fir] can be a reference to a self-
addressed i m p e r a t i v e , w h i c h I believe we do n o t have.
So ( F ) is n o t a viable o p t i o n . ( N o r , o f course, w o u l d ( A ) be a trans

l a t i o n o f (B) understood as ( F ) . ) T h u s , as far as I can see, there is n o
l e g i t i m a t e w a y o f g e t t i n g a t r a n s l a t i o n like (A) f r o m (B).
4. A l t e r n a t i v e ways to translate and

u n d e r s t a n d the sentence as a b b r e v i a t i o n
N o d o u b t , (B) does involve some a b b r e v i a t i o n , ellipsis, c o n t r a c t i o n ,

and there is n o s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d easy reading. S t i l l d i s r e g a r d i n g its
l i n g u i s t i c context, I n e x t ask: h o w else c o u l d one complete the e l
l i p t i c a l clause (B2)? F i r s t I l o o k at T O fir]; t h e n at T O v a l .
T h e r e is a n a t u r a l a n d simple w a y o f s u p p l e m e n t i n g T O fir]. T h i s
is b y s u p p l e m e n t i n g the i n f i n i t i v e 'to act' (rrpaTTciv) and reading T O
fir] as short for 'to n o t act is u p to us' ( T O fir) rrpaTTeiv i(j>' r)fiiv).
1 2
I have not found this reading of (B) explicitly defended anywhere, but I doubt
that I am the first to consider this option. Perhaps Taylor, NE, 164 (quoted above),
had something similar i n mind.
I IO Suzanne Bobzien
(H) ( i ) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act (is up to us), (2) and
where to not (act is up to us), also . . .
T h e r e are q u i t e a few examples i n A r i s t o t l e i n w h i c h /xij is short

for firj TrpaTT(Eiv (or a s i m i l a r verb o f d o i n g or h a p p e n i n g ) ; several
are i n the context o f w h a t is i<f>' rjfj.iv. I n a l l cases, j u s t beforehand
i n the sentence we f i n d TTpdrraiv (or that other verb o f d o i n g or
happening). 13
( H 2 ) u n q u e s t i o n a b l y provides the m o s t n a t u r a l w a y o f supple

menting T O i n the c o n t e x t o f the w h o l e sentence (B). So i t is
a good s t a r t i n g - p o i n t . W h a t are we t h e n to do w i t h T O vail T O vai
seems n o t to square s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y w i t h T O \ir], n o m a t t e r h o w
i n t e r p r e t e d . Any i n t e r p r e t e r is saddled w i t h this issue. S t i l l , i f ( H )
provides the correct s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n after T O \ir], i t is clear w h a t T O
v a i is i n t e n d e d to convey: the alternative 'to act'. So, assuming ( H )
to be correct, we get:
(I) (1) For, where to act is up to us, also to not act (is up to us), (2) and
where to not (act is up to us), also to (act is up to us).
(1) ev 01s yap ecî' rjpiiv TO rrpdrreiv, Kal TO pirj rrpdrreiv, (2) Kal ev 01s TO
{rrpdrreiv e^ rj/jiv), Kal TO {rrpdrreiv e^ rj^jiiv).
I n other words, T O vai is short for 'to act is u p to us' ( T O rrpdrreiv icp'
rjpiiv),as contrasted with 'to n o t act is u p to us'; i.e. w i t h emphasis o n

'act'. ( I ) is i n d e e d the w a y countless translators a n d scholars across
the ages have read (B). Sometimes, (B2) is s i m p l y rendered b y 'and
vice versa'. T h i s m a y be to evade the awkwardness o f the T O v a i ;
or to reflect the extreme b r e v i t y o f (B2). ( H e n c e f o r w a r d , I call a l l
translations o f type ( I ) vice-versa translations.)
C a n T O v a i be read as an a b b r e v i a t i o n o f 'to act (is u p to us)'—as
contrasted w i t h 'to n o t act')? G r a m m a t i c a l l y , this amounts to hav
i n g to show that i n the phrase T O v a i the G r e e k w o r d u s u a l l y trans
lated 'yes' can be an a b b r e v i a t i o n for an emphatic 'to 0 ' , contrasted
w i t h 'to n o t 0 ' (where 0 stands for a verb i n the i n f i n i t i v e ) . C a n this
be shown? N o t b y ancient Greek parallels.
13
NE I I I O I 7 1 8 djv S' ev avrqj rj apyjj, err' avrqj Kat T O rrpdrretv Kat [irj (i.e. rrpdr-
a —
retv)\ NE I I43 8—9 rt yap Set rrpdrretv rj [irj (i.e. rrpdrretv), TO Te'Ao? avrrjs eortv] E E
a
I223 5~8 <j>o.vep6v art evoe%erat Kat ytveodat Kat [irj (i.e. ytveodat), Kal art e<j>' avrqj
a
ravr'
eort ytveodat Kat [irj (i.e. ytveodat), djv ye Kvptos eort rov etvat Kat rov jirj etvat. ooa S' e<^'
avrqj eort rrotetv rj firj rrotetv. Cf. also Metaph. \o\2?~j—8 Tt? fiev ovv ota^jopa rov drrXcos
Kat jirj (i.e. ytveodat) drrXdjs, ev rot? <j>votKots e'tprjrat; Rhet. I 3 5 9 3 6 rdjv evoe-
a
ytyveodat
yoiievojv Kat ytyveodat Kat [irj (i.e. ytveodat); Ath. Pol. 4 3 . 5 Kat rrept rrjs 6orpa.KO<j>opta.s
errtêtporovtav otooaotv, et ooKet rrotetv rj [irj (i.e. 7rotetV).
However, there are several B y z a n t i n e G r e e k parallels for j u s t such

a use o f rat a n d even o f the phrase T O val. F o r example, we f i n d such
an a b b r e v i a t o r y use o f val several times i n the w o r k o f the n i n t h -
c e n t u r y g r a m m a r i a n G e o r g i u s Choeroboscus, where he is t a l k i n g
about the c o n j u g a t i o n o f verbs. ( H i s views have s u r v i v e d i n notes
taken b y his p u p i l s . ) H e r e is one instance: . . . eVeiSi) OVK ian T O a
yapaKT-qpiariKov TOW TpiTwv Trpoodmwv TOW iviKwv T O Se e val, otov
'ITVT!T(L eAeye ( ' . . . since the alpha is n o t a characteristic o f the t h i r d
14
p e r s o n singular; b u t the epsilon is, for example ervTrre eAeye'; the

e m p h a t i c 'is' translates 'val'). I n this clause, the val is s h o r t for eon
xapaKTrjpio-TiKov TOW TpiTow TrpooojTrow TOW iviKwv ('is a characteristic
of the t h i r d person s i n g u l a r ' ) , w h i c h is contrasted w i t h the p r e v i o u s
clause, w h i c h negates the same predicative phrase; j u s t as the val i n
(B) does i n the vice-versa reading (I). T h e earliest s u r v i v i n g parallel
(of at least three) for the use o f T O val as a b b r e v i a t i o n o f an i n f i n i t
ive or i n f i n i t i v a l phrase occurs i n the t h i r d o f the Orationes o f the
b i s h o p a n d p h i l o s o p h e r E u s t r a t i u s o f Nicaea (c. 1050/1060-c. 1120),
where he discusses the Filioque. H e w r i t e s : '0 AaTivos. Kal Seizor,
<f>rioiv, ov Trjs Fpafirjs cvpijTai TO p.i) TOV Ylov iKnoptvtodai. FIpos
TOVTO iyw. OVK tyw ye aTraiTovp.ai Setât T O p.r), aAA' auToy T O val IS
( ' T h e L a t i n [i.e. the R o m a n C a t h o l i c ] : and, he says, show me, where

i n the S c r i p t u r e i t is f o u n d t h a t i t (the S p i r i t , rrreu/xa f r o m line 22)
does n o t proceed f r o m the Son. A g a i n s t this I (say): I a m n o t re
q u i r e d to show t h a t i t (the S p i r i t ) does n o t (proceed f r o m the Son);
but he (is r e q u i r e d to show) t h a t i t does (proceed f r o m the S o n ) ' ) .
H e r e the emphatic ' t h a t i t does' translates ' T O vai a n d is s h o r t for
' t h a t i t does proceed f r o m the Son'. So there is g o o d evidence that
14
Georgius Choeroboscus, Prolegomena et scholia in Theodosii Alexandrini canones
isagogicos de flexione verborum, ed. A . Hilgard (GG 4.2; Leipzig, 1894), 86. 29—31;
cf. ibid. 85. 17-18; 86. 34-5; 336. 25-6.
15
Eustratius of Nicaea, Orationes, ed. A . Demetrakopoulos ('EKKXr/oiaoTiKri B i -
fiXioBr/Kri, 1; Leipzig, 1866; repr. Hildesheim, 1965), oration 3, 86. 23—6. T h e other
two parallels are: Joannes X I Beccus [the Patriarch], Four Books to Constantine Meli-
teniotes, ed. J.-P. Migne (Patrologia Graeca, 141; Paris, 1865), 337—96 at 388. 16—18:
erepov TOJ TT)V Ytov SLSOVTL eKTropevoiv <j>rjaeie rt? etrat Sta OTTOvSrjS, rj a.7TevavTtas rot?
avriXeyovoL, (15) [leretvaL TTJS atrt'a? TavTrjS TOJ YLOJ avviarav; et ydp rj dpvrjOLS 6id T O fir/,
r) 6[j.oXoyia TTavrais Sid TO vai; and Manuel I I Palaeologus [the Emperor, orator, and
theologian (1350—1425)], Dialogi cum mahometano, dialogue 17, in Piissimi et sapien-
tissimi imperatoris Manuelis Palaeologi opera omnia, theologica, polemica, panegyrica,
paedagogica, ed. J.-P. Migne (Patrologia Graeca, 156; Paris, 1866), 221. 29—31: aAA'
I I2 Suzanne Bobzien
i n the G r e e k language (B) w o u l d n a t u r a l l y have been u n d e r s t o o d as

an a b b r e v i a t i o n for the G r e e k v e r s i o n o f the vice-versa r e a d i n g ( I ) .
T h e a b b r e v i a t o r y use o f vai has at least p a r t i a l parallels i n c o n
t e m p o r a r y languages. T h u s the G e r m a n emphatic ' d o c h ' corres
ponds to vai i n this use, a n d allows an almost l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f
(B) i n the s p i r i t o f the vice-versa translations:
(J) (i) Denn wenn es bei uns liegt zu handeln, (liegt es) auch (bei uns) nicht
zu handeln, (2) und wenn ((es bei uns liegt)) nicht ((zu handeln)), dann
auch doch ((zu handeln)). 16
T h e E n g l i s h 'yes' or ' t o o ' c a n — i n f o r m a l l y — s t a n d i n for w h a t is ex

pressed b y the e m p h a t i c ' d o c h ' i n G e r m a n . T a k e this dialogue: 'this
is green'—'(no,) i t isn't'—'(yes,) i t i s ' — ' n o ' — ' y e s ' ; or its A m e r i c a n
E n g l i s h v a r i a t i o n : 'this is green'—'(no,) i t isn't'—'(yes,) i t is'—'is
n o t ' — ' i s t o o ' . So i n E n g l i s h , a crude equivalent o f (J) w o u l d be:
(K) (1) For, where acting is up to us, also not acting (is up to us), (2) and
where not ((acting is up to us)), also ((acting)) too.
T h e G e r m a n seems g r a m m a t i c a l l y j u s t fine a n d the E n g l i s h w o u l d

at least p r o b a b l y be u n d e r s t o o d b y a native speaker. T h u s we have
sufficient reason to conclude t h a t (B) is the Greek equivalent o f (J)
and ( K ) ; a n d moreover, g i v e n the g r a m m a t i c a l restrictions o f the
E n g l i s h language, t h a t E n g l i s h vice-versa translations like (I) t h a t
express the fleshed-out G r e e k v e r s i o n (I) o f (B) represent the cor
rect w a y o f t r a n s l a t i n g (B). T h u s we have a r e a d i n g o f (B) w h i c h
is superior to a l l others i n that i t makes f u l l sense o f the text as i t
s t a n d s . O v e r a l l , t h e n , (I) is vastly preferable to ( A ) . N o t o n l y are
17
there clear G r e e k parallels to (I) b u t n o t to ( A ) . I n a d d i t i o n , u n l i k e

(A), first, (I) does n o t require the s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a verb o f say
i n g ; second, (I) reads /xij c o r r e c t l y as ' n o t ' ; and finally, (I) requires
no c o m p l e x n o t - q u i t e - f i t t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
18
Based o n r e a d i n g (I), we can also e x p l a i n w h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s p o i n t i n

16
Double angled brackets are here used to indicate what would be understood,
but is not required to be supplied i n the translation for the translation to make
sense.
17
The reading (I)(J)(K) differs from the don't/do reading (G)(H). I n (I)(J)(K) the
vai stands i n as an abbreviation for a phrase that occurred in exactly the same form
earlier in the same sentence (i.e. TrpdrTeiv). I n the don't/do reading (G)(H) this is
not so.
18
Moreover, (I) makes perfect sense of the order affirmative/negative—negative/
affirmative in the sequence of the two conditionals (Bi) and (B2). I f instead (B2)
also had the order affirmative/negative, this would simply be a repeat of (Bi). I t is
stating (B) is. I t is to make e x p l i c i t an i m p o r t a n t element o f the l o

gical s t r u c t u r e o f the n o t i o n o f something's b e i n g u p to someone
(em+dative), an element w h i c h A r i s t o t l e indicates i n at least ten
other places: this is its two-sidedness. A r i s t o t l e never p r o v i d e s
19
a p h i l o s o p h i c a l account o f w h a t i t is for s o m e t h i n g to be i<f>' i)\riv

(as he does o f the v o l u n t a r y , d e l i b e r a t i o n , choice, v i r t u e , etc.). H e
uses i<l>' rjfiiv a n d other eW+dative personal p r o n o u n constructions
as expressions o f o r d i n a r y language w h i c h are generally u n d e r s t o o d
b y speakers o f the language. I n r e a d i n g ( I ) , sentence (B) makes
e x p l i c i t s o m e t h i n g people w h o speak the language assume: that
d o i n g s o m e t h i n g is u p to us if and only if n o t d o i n g i t is u p to
us, too. T o express this b i c o n d i t i o n a l , b o t h ( B i ) and (B2) are re
quired.
W h y does A r i s t o t l e state this b i c o n d i t i o n a l at the b e g i n n i n g o f
NE 3 . 5 , though? T h e reason is this: he needs to make e x p l i c i t the
logical s t r u c t u r e o f the n o t i o n o f e</>' i)\iiv at this p o i n t , since he ex
p l o i t s i t as p a r t o f the a r g u m e n t at NE n i 3 6 - i 4 . ° T h a t is, the
b 2
b i c o n d i t i o n a l is needed for the c o n t e x t o f (B).
5. T h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t o f (B) taken i n t o account
Hence, n e x t I consider h o w readings ( A ) a n d (I) o f the Greek sen

tence (B) fare, w h e n one takes the i m m e d i a t e l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t i n t o
a c c o u n t . T o start w i t h , note the f o l l o w i n g three p o i n t s :
21
F i r s t , the sentence before (B) is
thus ruled out. The interpretations behind (A) do not explain the inverted order.
Proponents of (A) could plead the rhetorical device of chiasmus, but it would be a
somewhat unusual and strained case.
19
EE 1223*5-9; 1225*9-10; i225 35-6; 1226*27-8; i 2 2 6 3 o - i ; NE 3. 1, 1110*17-
b b
18; 3. 5, 1115*2—3, 1125*26; cf. S. Bobzien, ' T h e Inadvertent Conception and Late
B i r t h of the Free-Will Problem' ['Free W i l l ' ] , Phronesis, 43 (1998), 133-75 143-5,
a t
also 139—40.
3 0
A t NE 1113 i4 Aristotle moves on to consider a possible objection.
b
3 1
Here I ignore the debate as to whether (i) the whole paragraph ni3 6—14 is b
meant to show that vice is up to us, w i t h Aristotle taking it to have been shown
already that virtue is up to us (the asymmetry reading); or whether (ii) the whole
paragraph is meant to show that both virtue and vice (acting virtuously and acting
viciously) are up to us. I believe (ii) is right, and that a good case can be made for
this, which I hope to do elsewhere. For the question whether NE 1113 7—8 supportsb
undetermined choice in Aristotle, this debate is of only minor importance. (Cf. also
the next footnote.)
ii4 Suzanne Bobzien
(L) Now, virtue is up to us, too, and equally also vice.

ec/>' rjpiiv 8rj Kal rj aperr/, opioiojs oe Kal rj KaKia. 22
(NE 11I3 6—7)
b
Second, the a r g u m e n t ends w i t h
(M) then it will be up to us to be virtuous people and to be vicious people.

ec/>' rfpiiv apa ro emeiKeoi Kal (JiavXois elvai. (NE 1113^3—14)
T h i s final clause o f the a r g u m e n t states almost the same t h i n g as

( L ) . T h i r d , o u r sentence (B) i m m e d i a t e l y follows ( L ) a n d begins
w i t h ' f o r ' (yap). I t thus p r o v i d e s a reason for ( L ) .
C o n s i d e r i n g also w h a t we k n o w about A r i s t o t l e ' s dialectic, we get
the f o l l o w i n g set-up o f an a r g u m e n t f r o m ( L ) to ( M ) , or f r o m 11 i 3 6 b
to 1 1 1 3 i 4 : A r i s t o t l e p r o v i d e s the thesis he intends t o p r o v e i n ( L )

b
at the b e g i n n i n g o f his a r g u m e n t . T h i s is standard i n A r i s t o t e l i a n

dialectic. H e t h e n argues for ( L ) u p u n t i l a n d i n c l u d i n g the ante
cedent o f the sentence 11 i 3 i 1-14. T h e consequent o f the sentence
b
is ( M ) . I t p r o v i d e s the c o n c l u s i o n o f the a r g u m e n t . T h u s f r o m (B)

to ( M ) (i.e. f r o m i i i 3 7 - 8 t o i 3 - i 4 ) A r i s t o t l e p r o v i d e s an a r g u
b b
m e n t for the thesis t h a t ( n o t j u s t actions b u t also) v i r t u e a n d vice

are u p t o us. T h i s is so regardless o f w h a t exactly the thesis ( L ) and
the c o n c l u s i o n ( M ) a m o u n t to. (B) is a premiss i n this a r g u m e n t .
W i t h the sentence f o l l o w i n g (B), A r i s t o t l e argues towards an i n
termediate conclusion: i t starts w i t h war', w h i c h i n g r a m m a t i c a l
contexts such as ours is translated m o s t n a t u r a l l y as 'hence':
(N) Hence, (1) if to act, being noble, is up to us, also to not act, being
shameful, will be up to us, and (2) if to not act, being noble, is up to
us, also to act, being shameful, (will be) up to us.
COOT' ( I ) el TO TTparreiv KOXOV OV i<j>' yfiiv earl, Kal TO fir/ vpa.TTe.iv ecf>'
rjp.iv eorai aloxpov ov, Kal (2) el TO pirf TTparreiv KaXov ov r)piv, Kal TO
TTparreiv aloxpov ov rjpiiv. (NE 1113 8—11)
b
( I have used b o l d t o indicate complete t e x t u a l agreement w i t h (B)

and u n d e r l i n i n g t o indicate parallels t o u n d e r s t o o d additions i n (B)
that are generally accepted.)
T h i s s t r i k i n g parallel p r o v i d e s a strong reason for r e a d i n g (B2) as
33
I n all the manuscripts that are considered i n the Oxford edition the sentence
does not have the particle Sr/ ('hence', 'now'), but the particle Se. Modern editions
of the Nicomachean Ethics tend to give Sr/. The difference is not relevant for present
purposes. I just mention that Aristotle does use the particle combination Se Kal . . .
Se . . . elsewhere in the Nicomachean Ethics in one sentence. Cf. e.g. eiraivovjiev Se Kal
rov oo<j>6v Kara TTJV eîv row eêow 6e rds eiraiverds dperd? Xeyofiev (NE I I 0 3 8 — 1 0 ) . a
Found in Translation "5
an a b b r e v i a t i o n along the lines w h i c h I — i n agreement w i t h n u m e r
ous other scholars—have suggested; that is, as s h o r t for
(B2) Kal Iv ots TO pi) {TrpaTTeiv ijpiv ecrrt) Kal TO {TrpaTTetv ijpiv eoTi).
(J2) and where to not (act is up to us), also to (act is up to us).
T h i s reading provides four perfectly m a t c h i n g cases, i n the r i g h t

order. T h e o n l y substantive difference is that i n ( L ) each t i m e an
evaluative a t t r i b u t e (KO.\6V, aloxpov) is a d d e d . T h e apparent lack o f
23
r e g u l a r i t y i n (B), f r o m positive/negative i n (1) to negative/positive

i n (2), finds a f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n i n the m o v e f r o m noble to shame
f u l i n the t w o conditionals o f (I). A r i s t o t l e ' s i n t e n t is to cover all
four possibilities a n d t h e i r interrelations (noble a c t i o n is p a i r e d w i t h
shameful i n a c t i o n ; noble i n a c t i o n w i t h shameful action), and for
each i n t e r r e l a t i o n he starts w i t h the noble case.
T h e parallel between (B) a n d ( N ) also provides strong reasons for
n o t a d d i n g a verb o f saying as readings o f type (A) do. F i r s t , w i t h
(A), the i n f e r e n t i a l 'hence' (WOT) is v e r y h a r d to e x p l a i n . Second, n o
m e n t i o n is made o f saying yes or no, or the like, ever again i n the
a r g u m e n t at issue. B u t i f (A) were correct, we w o u l d expect some
such m e n t i o n , g i v e n the parallel s t r u c t u r e o f ( N ) a n d (B). W e can
be m o r e precise: i f (A) were correct we w o u l d expect the second h a l f
o f ( N ) to be s o m e t h i n g like ( O 2 ) :
(O2) and if saying yes, being noble, is up to us, also saying no, being
shameful, is up to us.
B u t we do n o t have this. Rather, i f (A) were correct, ( N 2 ) w o u l d

j u s t h a n g i n the air, so to speak. T h e r e is n o t h i n g i n the previous
sentence for i t to l a t c h onto. G i v e n that even w i t h o u t the l i n g u i s t i c
context, ( A ) was somewhat grasping at straws, i t appears that the
l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t ( N ) provides the bale o f straw that w o u l d break
the camel's back.
33
For the purpose of this addition at this p o i n t i n b o o k 3 of the Nicomachean Ethics
see S. Bobzien, 'Choice and Moral Responsibility in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
iii 1—5', i n R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Nicomachean Eth
ics (Cambridge, 2013), forthcoming. For a different view see R. Sorabji, Necessity,
Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory [Necessity] (London, 1980), 248
n. 14 and 230.
116 Suzanne Bobzien
PART 1 1 : The Reception of

Nicomachean Ethics 3 . 5 , 1 1 i 3 7 - 8 b
N e x t I move to the s t a r t l i n g p h e n o m e n o n that, despite its u t t e r i m -

p l a u s i b i l i t y , versions o f the saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n have made t h e i r
way i n t o the general consciousness o f w h a t A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f stated.
T h a t is, I n o w move to the topic o f the r e c e p t i o n o f NE 3. 5,
1113V8.
6. R e c e p t i o n i n ' p o p u l a r c u l t u r e '
L e t us b e g i n w i t h the reception o f (A) i n w h a t m a y be called p o p u

lar c u l t u r e . I t is equally p o p u l a r o n blogs, Tweets, self-help and
alternative-healing websites, i n coffee-table books, a n d generally i n
collections o f famous quotations.
• (A) is n u m b e r t w o o f the i m m o r t a l Proverbs, Sayings and

Curses at a n g l e f i r e . c o m . 24
• I t made i t i n t o the i n s p i r a t i o n a l quotations for Teens at o x y -

genfactory.com, categorized u n d e r ' y e s ' . 25
• I n W i l l o w ' s Dreamscapes i t is one o f the quotations i n the ca

tegory 'daydreams' a n d the subcategory 'choose f r e e d o m ' . 26
• A t m o r e q u o t a t i o n s . c o m , i n L i f e Quotes, Cute Quotes, F u n n y

Quotes we f i n d i t as n u m b e r one u n d e r the heading ' w i l l ' . 2 7
• T h e keynote speech o f the ' W o r k s h o p o n C l i n i c a l T e a c h i n g '

i n 2009, delivered b y the dean o f the F a c u l t y o f M e d i c i n e ,
U i T M , includes the lines: 'Sometimes we are overcome b y
doubts a n d self-inflicted i n e r t i a . A r i s t o t l e realized that a n d he
o p i n e d , " W h e r e we are free to act, we are also free to refrain
f r o m acting, a n d where we are able to say N O , we are also able
to say Y E S " . ' 2 8
3 4
(http://www.angelfirexom/moon/immortal_quotaUtions/proverbs.html>
[accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
35
(http://oxygenfactory.com.au/teen-quote/) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
3 6
(http://www.dreamscapes.co.za/daydreams/ddo25) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
3 7
(http://morequotations.com/Quotations/will.html) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
3 8
(http://medicine.uitm.edu.my/index.php/home/244?date= 2010-10-01)
• Elsewhere, we f i n d sentence ( A ) as A Positive T h o u g h t F o r

Saturday, M a r c h 15, 2 0 0 8 ' . 29
• W e f i n d i t as the q u o t a t i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g a p h o t o g r a p h o f a
c h a r i t y celebration i n N i n n a Gay, Shifts: Beyond the Visible
( C e n t r a l M i l t o n Keynes, 2010), 26.
• I n I a n M c T a v i s h ' s A Prisoner's Wisdom ( A ) is interspersed to
encourage choice that transcends the E g o . 30
• ( A ) is one o f the t r u t h s m e n live b y i n John A . O ' B r i e n , Truths

Men Live By?
1
• ( A ) was the T w e e t o f the day o n 3 O c t o b e r 2011 at Dance_with_

life. 32
• A n d finally, i n the w o r l d o f blogs, E d i t h H a l l , i n The Edithorial

(Saturday, 10 M a r c h 2012), uses ( A ) to g e n t l y c r i t i c i z e Q u e e n
E l i z a b e t h I I : ' B u t A r i s t o t l e ' s response to her r e c o r d as r u l e r
w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y have been to p o i n t o u t that a v o i d i n g error
is n o t enough to q u a l i f y a person as good. " W h e r e we are free
to act we are also free to refrain f r o m acting, and where we are
able to say ' N o ' we are also able to say 'Yes'; i f therefore we
are responsible for d o i n g a t h i n g w h e n to do i t is r i g h t , we are
also responsible for n o t d o i n g i t w h e n n o t to do i t is w r o n g . "
( N i c o m a c h e a n E t h i c s 11 i 3 b 2 [ s i c ] ) . '
33
I n some o f these occurrences, the alleged A r i s t o t l e q u o t a t i o n is used

( i n an u n - A r i s t o t e l i a n w a y ) to r e m i n d us o f o u r free w i l l . I n others,
i t is used ( i n an equally u n - A r i s t o t e l i a n w a y ) as a source for o p t i
m i s m : d o n ' t w a l l o w i n y o u r apathy and m i s e r y ; say 'yes' to life.
W e l l , A r i s t o t l e is dead, his c o p y r i g h t has r u n o u t , or, m o r e ac
curately, never existed i n the first place, a n d he is n o t the o n l y p h i
losopher w h o is used for alien a n d p e r p l e x i n g purposes i n p o p u l a r
c u l t u r e . T h e extra t w i s t i n o u r case is that A r i s t o t l e never w r o t e a
Greek equivalent o f ( A ) i n the first place. B u t even this is i n no way
39
(http://therabexperience.blogspot.com/2008/03/positive-thought-for-saturday_
15.html) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
3 0
I . McTavish, A Prisoner's Wisdom: Transcending the Ego (Bloomington,
2012), 56.
31
J. A . O'Brien, Truths Men Live By: A Philosophy of Religion and Life [Truths]
(New York, 1946), 247.
33
(https://twitter.com/Dance_With_Life/status/120787725531103232) [accessed
27 Jan. 2013].
33
(http://edithorial.blogspot.com/2012/03/on-treason.html) [accessed 27 Jan.
2013].
n8 Suzanne Bobzien
u n i q u e . So too m u c h w e i g h t s h o u l d n o t be p u t o n this p a r t o f the

34
reception o f NE 3. 5, 11 i 3 7 - 8 , f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f v e r i d i c a -
b
lity. W h a t we have, however, is evidence o f h o w the same w o r d - s h e l l

can be filled w i t h different m e a n i n g i n different m i l l e n n i a , catering
to the v a r y i n g a n d c h a n g i n g consumer desires for t i t b i t s o f w i s d o m .
G i v e n the c o n t i n u o u s stream o f q u o t a t i o n s o f the saying-no trans
l a t i o n i t m a y n o t be an exaggeration, t h o u g h , to p r o c l a i m that the
saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n has become a m e m e . 35
7. R e c e p t i o n i n p o p u l a r p h i l o s o p h y a n d n o n - a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y
T h i n g s get j u s t a tad m o r e serious w h e n we m o v e to p o p u l a r p h i

losophy a n d to professional philosophers w h o do n o t specialize i n
ancient philosophy. A g o o d n u m b e r o f t h e m w h o are n o t A r i s t o t l e
scholars make use o f ( A ) i n t h e i r p u b l i c a t i o n s . W e m e n t i o n j u s t
some examples: T e o d r o s K i r o s i n Self-Construction and the Forma
tion of Human Values i n the c o n t e x t o f discussing h u m a n c h o i c e ; 36
Jeremy N a y d l e r i n The Future of the Ancient World, a t t r i b u t i n g the

b i r t h o f freedom o f choice to A r i s t o t l e ; George Stack i n A r i s t o t l e
37
and K i e r k e g a a r d ' s E x i s t e n t i a l E t h i c s ' ; J o h n A . O ' B r i e n i n Truths

38
MenLive By;39
M a x H a m b u r g e r mMorals and Law, 'assuming that
w h e n we can say " n o " we also can say "yes" a n d that i t is therefore
i n o u r p o w e r to act i n h a r m o n y w i t h goodness as w e l l as w i t h b a d
ness', w i t h reference to 11 i 3 7 - i 1 ; ° D a v i d Buchanan, i n An Ethic
b 4
for Health Promotion, uses ( A ) as evidence that A r i s t o t l e h e l d that

h u m a n choices are u n d e t e r m i n e d b y p r i o r causes; s i m i l a r l y B o b
41
34
For instance, many of the anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philo
sophers are told, often almost verbatim, about different philosophers, sometimes i n
the same work, sometimes i n other ancient authors. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae
philosophorum, vol. i, ed. M . Marcovich (Berlin, 1999).
35
The reader is encouraged to Google 'where we are able to say no, we are also
able to say yes' (with the quotation marks) for verification.
36
T. Kiros, Self-Construction and the Formation of Human Values: Truth, Lan
guage, and Desire (Westport, Conn., 1998), 84.
3 7
J. Naydler, The Future of the Ancient World: Essays on the History of Conscious
ness (Rochester, 2009), 197—8.
38
G. J. Stack, 'Aristotle and Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics', Journal of the His
tory of Philosophy, 12(1974), 1—19. O'Brien, Truths, 248.
3 9
4 0
M . Hamburger, Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle's Legal Theory (New
Haven, 1951), 31.
41
D. R. Buchanan, An Ethic for Health Promotion: Rethinking the Sources of Hu
man Well-Being (Oxford, 2000), 55.
D o y l e , i n his e-book o n Free Will, quotes ( A ) i n s u p p o r t o f A r i s
totle b e i n g an agent-causal l i b e r t a r i a n . 42
T h e m a j o r i t y o f the authors m e n t i o n e d use ( A ) i n order to a t t r i

bute to A r i s t o t l e a t h e o r y o f freedom o f choice, uncaused choice, or
agent causation, thus p e r p e t u a t i n g the m y t h that A r i s t o t l e endorsed
u n d e t e r m i n e d choice between alternatives. A n d i f i t was n o t for this
(a false i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e o n a m o s t i m p o r t a n t p h i l o s o p h i
cal topic, based o n a m i s t r a n s l a t e d sentence f r o m the Nicomachean
Ethics), the q u e s t i o n o f the reception o f NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 m i g h t be o f
b
l i t t l e interest. A s i t is, i t seems w o r t h w h i l e to ask: h o w d i d we ever

get to the general acceptance o f the saying-no translation? L e t us
start at the b e g i n n i n g .
8. A n c i e n t a n d B y z a n t i n e c o m m e n t a t o r s a n d c o m m e n t a r i e s 43
T h e r e appear to be n o saying-no translations o f (B) i n a n t i q u i t y , or

i n Byzantine a n d L a t i n m e d i e v a l texts. F o r a n t i q u i t y , the o n l y ex
tant ancient c o m m e n t a r y o n b o o k 3 o f the Nicomachean Ethics is b y
the early c o m m e n t a t o r Aspasius (fl. second c e n t u r y CE). Aspasius
considers a n d explains o n l y the first clause o f 11 i 3 7 - 8 , ( B i ) . H e b 4 4
is silent o n (B2). So is the A n o n y m o u s c o m m e n t a t o r o n b o o k 5 ( w h o

w r o t e i n the later second c e n t u r y CE). I c o u l d f i n d n o t h i n g o f rele
vance i n A l e x a n d e r o f A p h r o d i s i a s ' w r i t i n g s , or i n any other an
cient c o m m e n t a t o r s . (We k n o w that P o r p h y r y w r o t e a c o m m e n t a r y
o n the Nicomachean Ethics, b u t i t is lost, t h o u g h i t m a y have been
translated i n t o Syriac a n d A r a b i c . ) 4 5
T h e later ancient or, m o r e likely, B y z a n t i n e A n o n y m o u s para

phrase ( i n the past w r o n g l y a t t r i b u t e d either to A n d r o n i c u s o f
4 3
(http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/aristotle/)
4 3
For detailed information about the ancient commentaries on the Nicomachean
Ethics see H . P. F. Mercken, ' T h e Greek Commentators on Aristotle's Ethics', i n
R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed (London, 1990), 407—10. For detailed infor
mation about the Byzantine commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics see C. Barber
and D. Jenkins, Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics (Leiden,
2009).
4 4
Aspasius, In Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut
(Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 19.1; Berlin, 1889), 76. 8—16.
4 5
See The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics [Arabic NE], ed. A . A .
Akasoy and A. Fidora, with intro. and trans, by D. M . Dunlop (Leiden, 2005), 23—7,
for the evidence.
120 Suzanne Bobzien
R h o d e s or to H e l i o d o r u s o f Prusa) " 4 6
b u t c h e r s NE i i i 3 7 - 8 in a
b
strange a n d u n h e l p f u l w a y (50. 8 - 1 6 ) . ( B i ) has an u n m o t i v a t e d

T O dyadov i n s e r t e d , a n d the ydp is m o v e d f r o m ( B i ) to ( B 2 ) . T h e
result is:
(P) el oe TO Trpdrreiv TO dyaOov e^ r\\iiv, Kal TO pii) TrpaTTeiv e^ r\\iiv eoTiv ev

ots yap TO /IT], Kal TO vai ([Heliodorus], In EN 50. 10-11)
T h i s makes l i t t l e sense, b o t h t a k e n o n its o w n a n d i n its c o n t e x t .

A m o n g (other) Byzantine commentators o n the Nicomachean
Ethics, n e i t h e r E u s t r a t i u s o f N i c a e a n o r M i c h a e l o f Ephesus c o m
ments on book 3. 4 7
George Pachymeres' v e r y b r i e f c o m m e n t a r y or
paraphrase does n o t t o u c h o n the passage. 48
T h e Byzantine A n o n y
m o u s c o m m e n t a r y o n b o o k s 2-5 has a s h o r t p a r a g r a p h concerned
w i t h NE iii3 6-i4
b
(Anonymi in Eth. Nic. 154. 1 7 - 3 2 ) , b u t there
is n o t h i n g recognizable i n i t as paraphrase of, o r c o m m e n t on,
ni3 7-8.b 4 9
9. M e d i e v a l L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n s a n d
c o m m e n t a r i e s ( t w e l f t h a n d t h i r t e e n t h centuries)
I n the t w e l f t h century, B u r g u n d i o o f Pisa ( p o s s i b l y the first trans

lator o f the Nicomachean Ethics f r o m Greek into L a t i n ) provides
this translation:
4 6
[Heliodorus of Prusa], InEthicaNicomacheaparaphrasis, ed. G. Heylbut ( C o m -
mentaria i n Aristotelem Graeca, 19.2; Berlin, 1889). T h e date of composition is u n
known. T h e terminus ante quern is 1366, the date of the earliest manuscript. Michele
Trizio argues that the anonymous author relied on Eustratius of Nicaea's commen
tary on the Nicomachean Ethics ( M . Trizio, 'On the Byzantine Fortune of Eustratios
of Nicaea's Commentary on Books I and V I of the Nicomachean Ethics', i n K . Iero-
diakonou and B. Byden (eds.), The Many Faces of Byzantine Philosophy (Athens,
2012), 199-224).
4 7
Eustratius of Nicaea, Eustratii et Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea
commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 20; Ber
lin, 1892); Michael of Ephesus, Michaelis Ephesii in librum quartum Ethicorum
Nicomacheorum commentarium, ed. M . Hayduck (Commentaria i n Aristotelem
Graeca, 22.3; Berlin, 1901).
4 8
Georgios Pachymeres, Philosophia, 11. Ethica Nicomachea, ed. K . Oikono-
makos (Corpus Philosophorum M e d i i Aevi, Commentaria i n Aristotelem Byzantina,
3; Athens, 2005).
4 9
[Anonymus], In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea ii—v commentaria, in Eustratii et
Michaelis et anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea commentaria, ed. G. Heylbut (Comment
aria in Aristotelem Graeca, 20; Berlin, 1892), 122—255.
Found in Translation I 21
(Q) In quibus enim in nobis operari, et non operari; et in his, utique et
non. ° s
I n the early t h i r t e e n t h century, R o b e r t Grosseteste ( i 175-1253),

p r o b a b l y r e v i s i n g B u r g u n d i o , translates the sentence even m o r e
l i t e r a l l y as:
(R) In quibus enim nobis operari, et non operari; et in quibus non, et

eciam. 51
S u c h v e r y nearly w o r d - b y - w o r d translations were standard i n

m e d i e v a l L a t i n translations o f G r e e k texts. Grosseteste's transla
t i o n is k e p t i n the r e v i s i o n u s u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d to W i l l i a m o f M o e r -
beke (c. 1215-86), d a t i n g f r o m later i n the t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d 52
consequently becomes p a r t o f the L a t i n standard t r a n s l a t i o n . ( I

r e t u r n to this t r a n s l a t i o n b e l o w i n Section 12.3.)
T h e t w o earliest m e d i e v a l commentaries o n the Nicomachean
Ethics are b y A l b e r t u s M a g n u s a n d T h o m a s A q u i n a s . T h e y
were b o t h i n f l u e n t i a l for centuries. A l b e r t u s M a g n u s (c. 1200-80)
p r o v i d e s a clear vice-versa r e a d i n g o f 11 i 3 7 - 8 : b
(S) In quibuscumque enim in nobis est operari ilia, in illis eisdem in nobis
est non operari eadem: et in quibus in nobis est non operari aliqua, in
illis eisdem est etiam in nobis operari eadem. (Albertus Magnus, Liber
I I I Ethicorum, tract. 1, cap. xxi. 28, p. 227 Borgnet) 53
T h o m a s A q u i n a s (c. 1225-74) i his l i t e r a l c o m m e n t a r y p r o v i d e s an

n
extended e x p o s i t i o n o f the vice-versa reading o f 11 i 3 7 - 8 : b
(T) E t dicit quod simili ratione etiam malitia est voluntaria et in nobis ex-
istens, quia operationes eius sunt tales. E t hoc sic probat: quia si ope-
50
Burgundius Pisanus translator Aristotelis, Ethica Nicomachea: translatio an-
tiquissima librorum I I et I I I sine 'Ethica uetus', ed. R. A . Gauthier (Aristoteles L a -
tinus, 26.1—3, 2nd fasc; Turnhout, 1972), pp. 5—48, Clavis: 26. 1. 1 ( M ) , liber: 3,
cap.: 6, p. 32. 22. Six commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics were also translated
by Burgundio of Pisa, but I have not been able to check these; two remain unpub
lished.
51
R. Grosseteste (trans.), Ethica Nicomachea: libril—III; VIII. 1—5 (6) ('recen-
sio pura'—Burgundii translationis recensio), ed. R. A. Gauthier (Aristoteles Latinus,
26.1 —3, 3 d fasc; Turnhout, 1972), pp. 141—201, 271—305. 5, Clavis: 26. 2. 1 ( M ) ,
r
liber: 3, cap.: 7, p. 187. 23. This translation was known as the recensio pura.
53
William of Moerbeke (trans.), Aristotelis secundum exemplar Parisiacum: Ethica
Nicomachea ('recensio recognita'—Roberti Grosseteste translationis recensio), ed. R. A .
Gauthier (Aristoteles Latinus, 26.1—3, 4th fasc; Turnhout, 1974), pp. 375—588,
Clavis: 26. 3, liber: 3, cap.: 7, p. 418. 10. This translation was known as the recensio
recognita.
53
Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1891), vol. vii. Ethica.
122 Suzanne Bobzien
rari est in potestate nostra, oportet etiam quod non operari sit
in potestate nostra. Si enim non operari non esset in potestate nostra,
impossibile esset nos non operari: ergo necesse esset nos operari: et sic
operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex necessitate. Et similiter dicit quod
in quibus rebus non operari est in potestate nostra, consequens
est quod etiam operari sit in potestate nostra. Si enim operari non
esset in potestate nostra, impossibile esset nos operari. Ergo necesse
esset nos non operari: et sic non operari non esset ex nobis, sed ex ne
cessitate. (Aquinas, Sent. Eth., lectio 11 ([73201] Sententia Ethic., lib.
3 1. 11 n. 2); emphasis mine) 54
T h e r e are q u i t e a few L a t i n commentaries o n the Nicomachean Eth

ics w r i t t e n between the late t h i r t e e n t h and the fifteenth century,
m a n y o f t h e m n o t available i n m o d e r n editions, a n d i n c l u d i n g those
b y W a l t e r B u r l e y ( w r i t t e n 1334), A l b e r t o f Saxony, G e r a l d o f O d o ,
55
and J o h n B u r i d a n . 5 6
10. A r a b i c translations a n d commentaries
T h e interest i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Ethics b y early A r a b i c p h i

losophers plays a key role i n the reception o f NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 , and I b
t u r n to i t next.
10.1. Arabic translations
I n the 1950s the M a g h r i b ! m a n u s c r i p t o f an A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n o f

A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Ethics was discovered, i n t w o parts, i n Fez.
T h e m a n u s c r i p t ('Fez M S ' ) is dated to CE 1222. M o s t c e r t a i n l y
at least books I to I V go back to a n i n t h - or early t e n t h - c e n t u r y
t r a n s l a t i o n made b y I s h a q b. H u n a i n , p r e s u m a b l y v i a a Syriac
5 7
i n t e r m e d i a t e . T h i s m a n u s c r i p t is the oldest s u r v i v i n g text w h i c h

58
54
Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Etkicorum, in Opera omnia, ed. R. A. Gauth-
ier, vol. x l v i i / i (Rome, 1969).
55
Walter Burley, Expositio librorum Ethicorum (Venice, 1481; 2nd edn. 1500).
Burley provides a vice-versa translation and there is no hint of a saying-no under
standing i n the commentary. Burley is concerned with the relation between what is
e<^' rijiLv and Aristotle's notion of two-sided possibility or contingency. Sorabji, Ne
cessity, 234 and 228 n. 1, makes a similar point about (B).
56
J. Buridan, Quaestiones super decern libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum
(Paris, 1513); repr. as Super decern libros Ethicorum (Frankfurt a.M., 1968). Buridan's
commentary is i n question-and-answer format, and I have found nothing i n it that
concerns (B) directly.
57
Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic NE, 1-2, 27-8, 94-5. Ibid. 26, 62, 106.
5 8
has a verb o f saying added i n the t r a n s l a t i o n o f (B) (i.e. NE 11 i 3 7 - b
8). A literal r e n d e r i n g f r o m the A r a b i c o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g sen

tence i n t o E n g l i s h w o u l d be:
(U) (1) For the things that are up to us to do, (then) it is up to us not to do;
(2) and the things concerning which we say no(i), (then) concerning
those we say yes. (italics mine)
59
One can see that, apart f r o m the t w o occurrences o f 'we say',

the A r a b i c is v i r t u a l l y a l i t e r a l , w o r d - b y - w o r d t r a n s l a t i o n o f the
sentence—as was c o m m o n for early translations i n t o Syriac, A r a b i c ,
a n d L a t i n alike. W e can illustrate the fact t h a t we have—almost—a
w o r d - f o r - w o r d t r a n s l a t i o n b y p l a c i n g the G r e e k f r o m (B) i n p a r e n
theses after the E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n o f each o f the respective A r a b i c
phrases, w i t h phrases l a c k i n g a G r e e k ancestor p u t i n b o l d . T h u s
we o b t a i n i n the parentheses a sort o f b a c k - t r a n s l a t i o n f r o m A r a b i c
i n t o Greek ( w i t h o m i s s i o n o f the t w o verbs o f saying):
(V) (1) For (ydp) the things that (ev ots) are up to us (e<f>' r)piv) to do (TO
TrpdrTeiv), (then) (*at) it is up to us ((e<f>' r)plv)) not to do (TO pi) rrpdr-
reiv); (2) and («ai) the things concerning which (Iv ots) we say no(t) ° 6
( T O pr)), (then) (Kal) concerning those ((ev ots)) we say yes (TO v a i ) .
I n a d d i t i o n to the t w o occurrences o f 'we say', i n the A r a b i c trans

l a t i o n the i<f>' rjp.iv t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d i n the G r e e k i n ( B i ) a n d the
implicit reference to iv ots i n the G r e e k i n (B2) are s u p p l e m e n t e d
a n d thus made e x p l i c i t i n the A r a b i c . T h e t r a n s l a t i o n is n o t , as i t
stands, a saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n . F o r this, we w o u l d i n a d d i t i o n need
two m o d a l expressions i n (V2). These c o u l d be taken as u n d e r s t o o d
i n the A r a b i c . D u n l o p , i n his t r a n s l a t i o n o f the A r a b i c b e h i n d ( U 2 ) ,
reads the t e x t i n this w a y a n d makes t h e m e x p l i c i t : 61
(W) (1) That is, the things which are in our power to do are in our power
not to do, (2) and we may also say No in regard to the things in regard
to which we may say Yes.
I n f o r m at least, ( W ) qualifies as a v e r s i o n o f the saying-no transla

t i o n , i f w i t h a reversal o f the order o f the ' N o ' and the 'Yes' ( w h i c h
59
The Arabic is: LjJ N J ^ i Ljj ^ 1 *\J% LjUii UU lÛii oi U l Ji\ sLlNl oi iJJi }
Jîj (Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic NE, 207. 1—2).

60
The bracketed't' is explained below.
61
Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic NE, 206. (It seems that all of (2) could be taken as
subordinate to 'it is up to us' from (1).)
124 Suzanne Bobzien
is n o t present i n the A r a b i c ) . I n any event, note the t e r m i n o l o g i

cal m i s m a t c h between the t w o occurrences o f ' i n o u r p o w e r ' and
the t w o occurrences o f ' m a y ' i n ( W ) . T h e Greek (B) requires that
two occurrences o f i<f>' r)\iw be u n d e r s t o o d i n (B2)—even b y those
w h o choose a saying-no r e n d e r i n g . W h e t h e r the A r a b i c translator
u n d e r s t o o d his t e x t i n this way, we cannot know.
Significantly, the Fez M S also displays a t e x t u a l difference w i t h
regard to the l i n g u i s t i c context o f (B), m o r e precisely, w i t h regard to
the sentence i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g ( N ) . C o m p a r e d w i t h the Greek
m a n u s c r i p t t r a d i t i o n , there appears to be a lacuna i n the text, so
that instead o f
(N) Hence, (1) i f to act, being noble, is up to us, also to not act, being
shameful, w i l l be up to us, and (2) i f to not act, being noble, is up to
us, also to act, being shameful, (will be) up to us (NE 1113 8-i 1), b
the Fez M S has (the A r a b i c equivalent of)
(X) A n d , i f the doing of the noble is up to us, [assumed lacuna] then also
the doing of the shameful is up to us. 62
T h e difference between the Fez M S a n d Bywater's text is m o s t

easily e x p l a i n e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f t w o factors: first, an o m i s
sion i n the Fez M S that is the result o f one o f the scribes i n the
h i s t o r y o f its t r a n s m i s s i o n i n a d v e r t e n t l y m i s s i n g a line, somehow
c o n f o u n d i n g the second clause o f ( N i ) w i t h the v e r y s i m i l a r second
clause o f ( N 2 ) . Once this lacuna was p a r t o f the m a n u s c r i p t t r a d i
t i o n , any reader a n d later scribe w i l l have h a d difficulties i n seeing
the p o i n t o f (B2), since (B) o r i g i n a l l y served as a p r e p a r a t i o n for
the s t r u c t u r a l l y parallel ( N ) (see Section 5 above). T h i s s t r u c t u r a l
parallel w o u l d have been e l i m i n a t e d w i t h the lacuna, a n d this e l i m i
n a t i o n m a y have t r i g g e r e d or c o n t r i b u t e d to a reading w i t h a verb
of s a y i n g .
63
Second, the A r a b i c w o r d used as the particle o f n e g a t i o n (la, ~i)

has a different range o f a p p l i c a t i o n f r o m the Greek \ir]. I t can be
used b o t h to express ' n o ' and to express ' n o t ' . I t w o u l d have been
the w o r d to be used for a l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f the \ir] i n (B2), i f this
6 3
The Arabic is: U l L£JI J*ii M J ^ * ^ J** ^ (Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic
NE, 207. 2-3).
6 3
The lack of parallel from (N) i n (X) may have led D u n l o p i n his translation
(W) to reverse the order of 'saying yes' and 'saying no', thus introducing a parallel
between acting and saying yes and not acting and saying no. The saying-no transla
tions lack such a parallel, although we would expect it (see above, sect. 4).
was c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d as an abbreviated second h a l f o f a v i c e -

versa t r a n s l a t i o n . B u t i t can also be u n d e r s t o o d as ' n o ' i n parallel to
vai u n d e r s t o o d as 'yes'. T h i s fact w o u l d have facilitated a reading as
' n o ' rather t h a n ' n o t ' i n ( U 2 ) .
T h e editors o f the 2005 e d i t i o n o f the Fez M S expressly c a u t i o n
readers that despite its early age, i t is m o s t u n l i k e l y that, where the
A r a b i c t e x t differs f r o m the s u r v i v i n g Greek manuscripts, the Fez
M S represents w h a t A r i s t o t l e w r o t e . G e n e r a l l y b y far the l i k e l i
6 4
est e x p l a n a t i o n o f t e x t u a l discrepancies is the repeated change o f

language and script: f r o m Greek to Syriac, Syriac to A r a b i c , a n d
finally f r o m O r i e n t a l A r a b i c s c r i p t i n t o M a g h r i b ! s c r i p t .
65
T h e A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n h a d a discernible direct i m p a c t o n l y i n
the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g w o r l d . I b n Sina (c.980-1037) p r o b a b l y k n e w
i t . I b n R u s h d (1126-98) a n d Moses M a i m o n i d e s (1135-1204) were
definitely f a m i l i a r w i t h i t a n d used i t for t h e i r w o r k s . I t s i m p a c t
6 6
o n the West seems to have been m o s t l y i n d i r e c t . T h i s b r i n g s us to

the A r a b i c commentaries o n the Nicomachean Ethics.
10.2. Arabic commentaries: the S u m m a A l e x a n d r i n o r u m and Ibn

Rushd's middle commentary on the N i c o m a c h e a n E t h i c s
Al-FarabT (872-950) is l i k e l y to have p r o d u c e d a c o m m e n t a r y o n the

Nicomachean Ethics, b u t i t is l o s t . P r o b a b l y after 1177, I b n R u s h d
67
w r o t e a c o m m e n t a r y o n the Nicomachean Ethics. I t survives i n L a t i n

a n d H e b r e w translations o n l y . W h e t h e r I b n R u s h d h a d direct ac
68
cess to P o r p h y r y ' s lost c o m m e n t a r y is unclear. A n o t h e r p o t e n t i a l l y

relevant t e x t s u r v i v i n g o n l y v i a the A r a b i c is the s u m m a r y or para
phrase o f the Nicomachean Ethics k n o w n as the Summa Alexandri
norum. T h e A r a b i c p r e s u m a b l y goes back to the late t e n t h - c e n t u r y
B a g h d a d translator I b n Z u r ' a h . T h e Greek o r i g i n a l m a y have been
composed i n the early first c e n t u r y b y the Peripatetic N i c o l a u s o f
6 4
Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic NE, 103—4. For details about the transmission pro
cess and reliability of the manuscript see also E. A. Schmidt and M . Ullmann, Aris
toteles in Fes: Zum Wert der arabiscken Uberlieferung der Nikomachischen Etkik' fur
die Kritik des griechischen Textes (Heidelberg, 2012).
6 5
Cf. ibid. 94-5.
6 6
Ibid. 31-55. Ibid. 18, 41-2, 45.
6 7
6 8
Aristotle/Averroes, Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis [2nd jfuntine],
vol. iii (Venice, 1562; repr. Frankfurt a.M., 1963). I b n Rushd, Averroes' Middle
Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel ben
jfudak, ed. L . Berman (Jerusalem, 1999).
126 Suzanne Bobzien
D a m a s c u s . B o t h I b n R u s h d ' s m i d d l e c o m m e n t a r y a n d the Summa

69
Alexandrinorum were translated i n t o L a t i n b y H e r m a n n u s A l e m a n -

nus i n T o l e d o , the former i n 1240, the latter c o m p l e t e d i n 1243/4.
I n the Summa the w h o l e o f NE 11 i 3 6 - i 4 is s u m m a r i z e d i n the f o l
b
l o w i n g t w o sentences.
(Y) Et res quas agere in nobis est, non agere eas in nobis est. Si igitur agere
actiones pulcras in nobis est, etiam res turpes agere in nobis est. 70
T h e r e is no verb o f saying n o r any trace o f the saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n .

T h i s is i n line w i t h the aforementioned p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Greek
o r i g i n a l goes back to the first c e n t u r y CE.
B u t I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y t u r n s o u t to be i m p o r t a n t for us. I t
is a so-called m i d d l e c o m m e n t a r y . I n his m i d d l e commentaries I b n
R u s h d intersperses sentences f r o m the A r i s t o t e l i a n t e x t w i t h por
tions o f paraphrastic c o m m e n t a r y . ( T h e b e g i n n i n g o f a c o m m e n t
after a p o r t i o n o f t e x t m a y be i n d i c a t e d b y an intendo or the like,
b u t there is otherwise n o e x p l i c i t d i s t i n c t i o n between the p o r t i o n s
of t e x t and the p o r t i o n s o f c o m m e n t a r y ; i n particular, there is rarely
the ancient equivalent o f q u o t a t i o n marks, i.e. a 'he says' before a
q u o t a t i o n f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s text.) I f we disregard I b n R u s h d ' s c o m
ments, the t e x t c o r r e s p o n d i n g to NE 11 i 3 6 - i 4 t h a t he quotes and
b
comments u p o n is: 71
(Z) (1) E t hoc quoniam res, quas facere in nobis est: et non facere eas in no
bis est: . . . (2) et in quibus rebus dicimus sic, in his quoque possumus
dicere non. (3) Et si fuerit in nobis facere res pulchras, ergo et facere
res turpes in nobis est. (4) Cumque fuerit in nobis facere res pulchras,
et res turpes, et fuerit in nobis facere eas et non facere.
T h e r e can be no d o u b t t h a t I b n R u s h d is here c o m m e n t i n g o n the

A r a b i c t e x t o f the Nicomachean Ethics w h i c h we (also) have as the
Fez M S . F i r s t , as i n the A r a b i c ( U 2 above), we have a verb o f say
7 2
i n g before the L a t i n sic a n d non i n ( Z 2 ) — w h i c h w o u l d correspond

69
Akasoy and Fidora, Arabic NE, 62—79. Translation possibly via a Syriac inter
mediate (ibid.).
70
Text from the 1904 Marchesi edition: C. Marchesi (ed.), L'Etica nicoma
chea nella tradizione latina medievale: documenti ed appunti (Messina, 1904),
lii—liii (http://www.24grammata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Nicomachea-
Marchesi-24grammata.com_.pdf) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
71
Aristotle/Averroes, 2nd Juntine, 19. 18—26. The ellipsis stands for I b n Rushd's
comment 'intendoque rerum, quarum in nobis est potentia faciendi eas, in nobis
quoque est potentia non faciendi eas'.
7 3
This is in line with the general view that the copy of the Nicomachean Ethics that
I b n Rushd commented on was the Arabic version that also survived in the Fez M S .
to the Greek TO vai and TO /XIJ. Second, we have, as the subsequent

sentence ( Z 3 ) , almost exactly the sentence that results f r o m the la
cuna i n the Fez M S (above, ( X ) ) .
N o t e , t h o u g h , t w o subtle changes. T h e A r a b i c m a n u s c r i p t has i n
( U 2 ) 'saying n o ' before 'saying yes'. T h i s is i n line w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s
o r i g i n a l t e x t (B2), w h i c h has first, vai second. M o r e o v e r , ( U 2 )
contains n o e x p l i c i t m o d a l expression. I b n R u s h d has reversed the
order o f the positive and negative expressions a n d added a m o d a l
verb ('possumus') to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g clause ( Z 2 ) . T h i s is b u t the
n e x t expected step for someone whose source for the Nicomachean
Ethics has the lacuna. Since the parallel i n the G r e e k between (B)
a n d ( N ) (above, Section 5) is lost, some other purpose w o u l d need
to be f o u n d for the second clause o f ( U ) . T h e reversal o f ' n o n ' a n d
'sic' introduces a parallel between a c t i n g a n d saying yes and n o t act
i n g and saying n o . T h i s opens u p the p o s s i b i l i t y for the readings o f
7 3
(B) discussed i n Part I , Sections 1 - 3 . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the m o d a l

expression prevents an apparent inconsistency: 'and where we say
yes, we also say n o ' w i t h o u t the 'possumus' c o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as a
confession o f a penchant for paraconsistency. U n l i k e D u n l o p i n his
t r a n s l a t i o n ( W ) , I b n R u s h d i n his c o m m e n t a r y adds o n l y one m o d a l
expression. I n s i m i l a r i t y to ( W ) , there is n o direct parallel between
' i n nobis est' ( Z i ) a n d 'possumus' ( Z 2 ) , t h o u g h the G r e e k (B) w o u l d
suggest t w o u n d e r s t o o d occurrences o f ' i n nobis est' i n ( Z 2 ) .
H e r m a n n u s ' t r a n s l a t i o n o f I b n Rushd's Nicomachean Ethics
c o m m e n t a r y is dated to 1240. H e r m a n n u s also translated the
Nicomachean Ethics f r o m A r a b i c i n t o L a t i n . Some fragments o f
this t r a n s l a t i o n s u r v i v e d . G i v e n that the A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n a n d
74
I b n Rushd's c o m m e n t a r y are o u r earliest (and before the f o u r t e e n t h

a n d fifteenth centuries, i t seems, o n l y ) source o f s o m e t h i n g a k i n to
the saying-no reading o f NE i i i 3 7 - 8 , t h e i r t r a n s m i s s i o n i n the
b
W e s t e r n w o r l d is o f major i m p o r t a n c e . W e skip the details o f the

sparse evidence for t r a n s m i s s i o n i n the t h i r t e e n t h to m i d - f i f t e e n t h
c e n t u r y and m o v e d i r e c t l y to the Renaissance.
As it did i n Dunlop's translation of the Fez M S (see above).

7 3
7 4
Cf. A. A. Akasoy and A. Fidora, 'Hermannus Alemannus und die alia translatio
der Nikomachischen Ethik', Bulletin depkilosopkie medievale, 44 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 79—93.
128 Suzanne Bobzien
11. M o d e r n r e c e p t i o n o f NE 11 i 3 7 - 8
b
T h e i n v e n t i o n o f the p r i n t i n g press i n the m i d - f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y

soon leads to a w i d e spread i n E u r o p e o f b o t h A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s
and I b n R u s h d ' s commentaries. Between 1494 a n d 1498 the A l d i n e
editio princeps o f A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s is p r i n t e d i n Venice. I n 1497
Jacques Lefevre d'fitaples (1450-1536) publishes his e d i t i o n o f the
Nicomachean Ethics.
15
11.1. Latin translations
I n the same year 1497, a v o l u m e w i t h three different translations

of the Nicomachean Ethics is p u b l i s h e d : one, the so-called antiqua
76
traductio, w h i c h — v e r y nearly—corresponds to Grosseteste's, one 77
b y L e o n a r d o B r u n i (c. 1370-1444), a n d one b y J o h n A r g y r o p o u l o s

(1415-87). B r u n i ' s 1416-17 t r a n s l a t i o n has:
(AA) . . . nam in quibus utrum agamus uci non agamus in nobis est: et in
nostra sunt potestate. 78
H e r e , instead o f (B2) we have s i m p l y 'they, too, are i n o u r p o w e r ' .

W h e t h e r this is B r u n i ' s w a y o f concealing a lack o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of the G r e e k is unclear. A r g y r o p o u l o s ' 1450s r e n d e r i n g is closer to
o u r G r e e k text:
(BB) Quibus enim in rebus nostra in potestate situm est agere in iis et non
agere. E t in quibus non agere: in iis est et agere 79
I n agreement w i t h A l b e r t u s M a g n u s ' and A q u i n a s ' commentaries,

this is an e x p l i c i t vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n and thus w i t h o u t verbs o f
75
J. Lefevre d'Etaples, Decern librorum Moralium Aristotelis tres conuersiones
(Paris, 1497).
7 6
Aristotle, Decern librorum Moralium Aristotelis tres conuersiones: Prima
Argyropili Byzantijl secunda Leonardi Aretinij tertia vero Antiqua per Capita
et numeros conciliate: communij familiariq[ue] commentario [jfacobi Stapulensis]
ad Argyropilum adiecto [Tres conuersiones] (Paris, 1497) (http://diglib.hab.de/
inkunabeln/i55-3-quod-2f-i/start.htm) [accessed 27 Jan. 2013].
77
' I n quibus enim in nobis operari et non operari: et in quibus non et etiam' (i.e.
with ' i n nobis' instead of 'nobis', like Burgundio): (http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/
i55-3-quod-2f-i/start.htm?image = oo27i) = 7V£s conuersiones, pdf p. 271.
78
(http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/i55-3-quod-2f-i/start.htm?image = oo365) =
Tres conuersiones, pdf p. 365. The next sentence corresponds to (N).
79
(http://diglib.hab.de/inkunabeln/i55-3-quod-2f-i/start.htm?image = ooo53) =
Tres conuersiones, pdf p. 53.
saying. So none o f the three translations i n the v o l u m e has a verb

o f saying.
B r u m ' s and A r g y r o p o u l o s ' translations are the basis for
m a n y o f the vast n u m b e r o f fifteenth- a n d s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
c o m m e n t a r i e s . T h e sixteenth c e n t u r y sees a n u m b e r o f n e w L a t i n
80
translations o f the Nicomachean Ethics. T w o i n f l u e n t i a l s i x t e e n t h -

c e n t u r y w o r k s also have vice-versa translations. I n 1540/42, i n
Paris, I o a c h i m P e r i o n translates:
(CC) Quas enim res in nobis situm est, ut agamus, eas etiam in nobis si-
tum est, ut ne agamus. Quasque res in nobis situm est ut non agamus,
easdem ut agamus in nostra est potestate. 81
A n d i n 1558 the F r e n c h p h i l o l o g i s t D e n y s L a m b i n ' s w i d e l y used

L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n o f the Nicomachean Ethics was p u b l i s h e d i n
Venice, and s h o r t l y after i n Paris. L a m b i n , too, p r o v i d e s a f u l l -
fledged vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n o f 11 i 3 7 - 8 :
b
( D D ) Quas enim res agere in nobis situm est, easdem non agere possumus:
et quas non agere in nobis situm est, earundem quoque agendarum
potestas nostra est. 82
A c o m p a r i s o n o f A r g y o p o u l o s ' , Perion's, a n d L a m b i n ' s translations

w i t h the m e d i e v a l ones reveals t h a t the w o r d - b y - w o r d m e t h o d has
been superseded b y exegetical translations. I n 1566 the Swiss h u
m a n i s t scholar T h e o d o r Z w i n g e r chooses L a m b i n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n to
be p r i n t e d aside his G r e e k e d i t i o n . I n 1716 W i l l i a m W i l k i n s o n o f
83
T h e Queen's College, O x f o r d , does the same i n his Aristotelis Ethi-

corum Nicomacheorum libri decern—except for some s m a l l m o d i f i c a
tions o f the t r a n s l a t i o n , b u t none i n the sentence at issue. W i l k i n
84
son's b o o k is r e p r i n t e d i n 1803, 1809, a n d 1818 and remains for

over a h u n d r e d years the t e x t w i t h w h i c h the Nicomachean Ethics
8 0
Cf. e.g. I . P. Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 1200—1500 (Leiden, 2008). Bejczy's introduction
gives a useful overview.
81
I . Perion (trans.), Aristoteles: De Moribvs qu[a]e Ethica nominantur, ad Nico-
machu[m] filium, libri decern (Paris, 1540; repr. Basel 1542).
8 3
D. Lambin (trans.), Aristoteles: In libros De moribus adNicomachum annotatio-
nes (Venice, 1558).
8 3
D. Lambin (trans.), Aristoteles: Ethicorum Nicomachiorum libri decern, ed. T.
Zwinger (Basel, 1566). Our sentence is at p. 144.
8 4
D. Lambin (trans.), Aristoteles: Ethicorum Nicomacheorum libri decern, ed. W.
Wilkinson (Oxford, 1716). Our sentence is at p. 99.
130 Suzanne Bobzien
is t a u g h t at O x f o r d . I n 1828 the w o r k is replaced b y E d w a r d C a r d -

well's G r e e k - o n l y textbook.
11.2. Latin commentaries and paraphrases
D u r i n g the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, thousands o f c o m

mentaries o n A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s are w r i t t e n a n d p u b l i s h e d , i n c l u d i n g
m a n y o n the Nicomachean Ethics? I n order to f i n d an explanation
5
for the o r i g i n o f saying-no translations (of the A l d i n e a n d later the

Bekker text, i.e. o f the W e s t e r n m a n u s c r i p t t r a d i t i o n ) , we need to
f o l l o w the p a t h o f I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n the Nicomachean
Ethics i n the West a n d i n p r i n t . I b n R u s h d was h e l d i n h i g h es
teem i n the Renaissance, a n d the influence o f his w o r k s is m u l t i p l y
attested. 86
I t appears that the first p r i n t e d L a t i n v e r s i o n o f I b n R u s h d ' s

c o m m e n t a r y o n the Nicomachean Ethics stems f r o m a 1483 v o l u m e
that also contains a L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n o f the Nicomachean Ethics
p r i n t e d before the commentary. T h e t r a n s l a t i o n is i d e n t i c a l to the
Grosseteste/Moerbeke standard t r a n s l a t i o n (version (R) a b o v e ) . 87
Since i n L a t i n the w o r d for ' n o t ' (non) also means 'no' a n d the
relevant w o r d for ' t o o / d o c h ' (etiam) also means 'yes', the G r o s
seteste/Moerbeke t r a n s l a t i o n is theoretically c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a
saying-no reading, w i t h a verb o f saying u n d e r s t o o d . A c c o r d i n g l y ,
i n p r i n c i p l e , the t e x t o f the Nicomachean Ethics and c o m m e n t a r y
o n 11 i 3 7 - 8 i n this 1483 v o l u m e w o u l d be c o m p a t i b l e .
b
T h i n g s are different i n a later p r i n t i n g o f I b n R u s h d ' s c o m

mentary, the Venice 1562 second J u n t i n e e d i t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ,
v o l u m e i i i . T h e title-page p r o c l a i m s that the v o l u m e contains all
8 8
of A r i s t o t l e ' s ethical w o r k s together w i t h I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y

o n the Nicomachean Ethics and paraphrase o f the Republic. In
85
See e.g. D. E Lines, Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca 1300-1650)
(Leiden, 2002).
86
See e.g. A. A. Akasoy and G. Giglioni (eds.), Renaissance Averroism and its Af
termath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe (New York, 2013).
8 7
N . Vernia (ed.), Aristoteles: Opera latina cum commentariis Averrois (Venice,
1483): ' I n quibus enim nobis operari et non operari et in quibus non et etiam' (book 3,
ch. 8, third sentence). The text continues: 'qua re si operari bonum existens in nobis
est: et non operari i n nobis erit malum existens. et si non operari bonum existens i n
nobis'. This is the end of the page. The text lacks the consequent of (N2), probably
a printer's error. I n any case it is not a translation of the Arabic version that I b n
Rushd used.
8 8
Aristotle/Averroes, 2nd Juntine. The text of the relevant passages in the first
edition from 1550—2 is identical.
this b o o k the c o m m e n t a r y is n o t appended to the t r a n s l a t i o n as

a w h o l e . Rather, the relevant b i t s are added after each chapter.
T h e t r a n s l a t i o n is n o t the antiqua, b u t a recent new t r a n s l a t i o n b y
the H u m a n i s t a n d translator Johannes Bernardus Felicianus. H e
renders 11 i 3 7 - 8 as:
b
(EE) In quibus enim in nostra potestate situm est agere, situm est et non
agere. et in quibus non agere, simili modo et agere.
T h i s is an e x p l i c i t vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n , as appears to be standard

i n the sixteenth century. T h r e e pages later, f o l l o w i n g the e n d o f NE
3 . 5 , the L a t i n o f I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n the same passage,
c o n t a i n i n g c i t a t i o n f r o m the A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n w i t h i n his c o m m e n
tary, is added (text ( Z ) above). I n this e d i t i o n we thus have t h e — i l l -
f i t t i n g — c o m b i n a t i o n o f a vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n w i t h a c o m m e n t a r y
w h i c h p r o v i d e s a reverse saying-no paraphrastic r e n d e r i n g . T h i s is
m o s t significant: a c r i t i c a l reader w h o compares text and c o m m e n
t a r y is b o u n d to be somewhat p u z z l e d . A reader w h o wishes to retain
the a u t h o r i t y o f b o t h A r i s t o t l e ' s t e x t a n d I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y
is b o u n d to take some a c t i o n to make the t w o m a t c h . I t can o n l y
have been a m a t t e r o f t i m e u n t i l some such reader m a t e r i a l i z e d .
I t is n o t m y i n t e n t , n o r w i t h i n m y expertise, to p r o v i d e a c o m p r e
hensive s t u d y o f h o w NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 was h a n d l e d i n the vast n u m
b
ber o f L a t i n translations, paraphrases, summaries o f and c o m m e n

taries o n the Nicomachean Ethics p r o d u c e d between the end o f the
fifteenth a n d m i d - s e v e n t e e n t h century. Rather, I have p i c k e d o u t
some texts t h a t appear p a r a d i g m a t i c for w h a t happened, w h i c h is
the f o l l o w i n g . T h e G r e e k text o f the W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n becomes the
standard text, v i a the A l d i n e e d i t i o n . A t the same t i m e , I b n R u s h d
is recognized as an a u t h o r i t y o n A r i s t o t l e a n d the L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n
o f his c o m m e n t a r y o n the Nicomachean Ethics ( i n c l u d i n g fragments
o f text f r o m the A r a b i c t r a n s l a t i o n o f the w o r k t h a t he used, a n d i n
p a r t i c u l a r the lacunose 11 i3 8—11) becomes a standard c o m m e n
b
tary. T h e W e s t e r n Greek text a n d I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y are re

peatedly p r i n t e d together i n one v o l u m e , first separately, later w i t h
parts o f the latter inserted after chapters o f the former. L a t i n s u m
maries, explications, paraphrases, and commentaries rely o n I b n
R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y ( w i t h o u t t h e i r authors necessarily l o o k i n g at
the G r e e k t e x t for c o m p a r i s o n ) .
B y 1578, i t seems, someone has c o m p a r e d I b n R u s h d ' s c o m
m e n t a r y w i t h the A l d i n e , and someone has a t t e m p t e d to make the
132 Suzanne Bobzien
t w o m a t c h . T h e evidence is an explicatio accuratissima p u b l i s h e d

that year, w h i c h offers a h y b r i d paraphrase-translation o f 11 i 3 7 - 8 , b
c o m b i n i n g the vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n o f the A l d i n e w i t h the A r a b i c -

o r i g i n L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n i n a new, specific way. T h e a u t h o r o f the
summary-paraphrase w i t h t e x t u a l notes o f the Nicomachean Ethics
is the G e r m a n classical scholar J o a c h i m Camerarius ( i 500-74). T h e
text was p o s t h u m o u s l y p u b l i s h e d i n F r a n k f u r t . I t gained a w i d e
8 9
readership a n d was s t i l l used i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . 90

There
are n o t e x t u a l notes o n 11 i 3 7 - 8 , b u t the f o l l o w i n g paraphrase is
b
offered:
(FF) Ubi enim penes nos est ut aliquid agamus, ibi est etiam ut non aga-
mus. Et ubi affirmandi potestas est, ibi et negandi est.
T h i s sentence was n o t p r o p o s e d as a t r a n s l a t i o n o f the Greek

( A l d i n e ) text. N o r is i t a saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n . Rather, i t manifests
the parallel o f ' b e i n g able to do' and 'saying yes' w i t h ' b e i n g able
n o t to do' and 'saying n o ' as we f i n d i t i n I b n R u s h d (the reverse
saying-no reading). W h a t is n o t e w o r t h y is that we have a s t r u c t u r a l
parallel o f ( B i ) a n d (B2) (ubi, ibi) and particles that correspond to
the G r e e k o f the A l d i n e (enim i n ( B i ) , et i n (B2)), c o m b i n e d w i t h
L a t i n verbs for 'saying yes' a n d 'saying n o ' a n d an e x p l i c i t m e n t i o n
of & potestas i n (B2), w h i c h parallels the penes o f ( B i ) .
One can see h o w i t m a y be o n l y a m a t t e r o f t i m e before, first,
based o n h y b r i d explications like these, a h y b r i d translation, based
o n t w o different texts, m a y see the l i g h t o f day; a n d before, se
c o n d , this h y b r i d t r a n s l a t i o n is offered as an actual t r a n s l a t i o n o f
the G r e e k A l d i n e (or, later, Bekker) e d i t i o n . S u c h a h y b r i d transla
t i o n is the saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n . I t seems that for actual instances
of the saying-no t r a n s l a t i o n o f (B) we have to m o v e i n t o n i n e t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y G e r m a n y and B r i t a i n a n d translations i n t o m o d e r n l a n
guages.
12. C o m m e n t a r i e s a n d m o d e r n - l a n g u a g e translations
i n the n i n e t e e n t h and early t w e n t i e t h centuries
T h e earliest t r a n s l a t i o n o f the Nicomachean Ethics into English, by

8 9
I . Camerarius, Ethicorum Aristotelis Nicomachiorum explicatio accuratissima
(Frankfurt a.M., 1578).
9 0
Yale has the copy of the American icjth-cent. scholar Thomas Day Seymour.
I n Oxford, St John's, Keble, and T r i n i t y have copies.
J o h n G i l l i e s i n 1 7 8 9 , c o n v e n i e n t l y j u s t leaves o u t the entire sen

91
tence 11 i 3 7 - 8 — o r perhaps we s h o u l d say paraphrases over i t . T h e

b
relevant passage reads (at p. 304):
(GG) Ends are then the objects of volition; and the means of attaining them
are the objects of deliberation and preference; which, being conver
sant only about such things as are in our power, the virtues imme
diately proceeding from them must also be in our own power, and
voluntary, as well as the contrary vices.
The Spectator bemoaned the lack o f literalness o f this t r a n s l a t i o n

(vol. 43 (1870), 179). T h e earliest G e r m a n t r a n s l a t i o n , b y C h r i s
t i a n G a r v e (1742-98) at the e n d o f the eighteenth c e n t u r y , is 92
m o r e literal a n d p r o v i d e s a t r a d i t i o n a l vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n o f NE
1113V8:
( H H ) Denn allenthalben, wo das Handeln in unsrer Gewalt ist, da ist auch

das Nichthandeln in unsrer Gewalt: und wenn das Unterlassen von
uns abhaengt, so haengt auch das T h u n von uns ab.
A n d come the n i n e t e e n t h century, NE n i 3 7 - 8 is always trans

b
lated. T h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y also sees a f u r t h e r milestone i n

A r i s t o t l e scholarship: the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the Bekker e d i t i o n ( 1 8 3 1 -
7 0 ) , w h i c h soon becomes the standard e d i t i o n used b y scholars
93
w o r l d w i d e ( i n c l u d i n g O x f o r d ) . T h e first Bekker e d i t i o n o f the

Nicomachean Ethics appears i n 1831. T h e passage i i i 3 7 - 8 is b
i d e n t i c a l w i t h ( B ) . T h e r e are n o c o m m e n t s o n the sentence. 94
12.1. Vice-versa translations
Between 1818 a n d 1925, I have c o u n t e d at least eight E n g l i s h trans

lations t h a t p r o v i d e variations o f the vice-versa r e a d i n g . S t a r t i n g
95
9 1
J. Gillies (trans.), Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, Comprising his Practical Philo
sophy (London, 1789).
9 3
V. C. Garve (trans, and comm.), DieEthik des Aristoteles, 2 vols. (Breslau, 1798—
1801) (partly posthumous edition).
9 3
I . Bekker (ed.), Aristotelis opera (Berlin, 1831).
9 4
K . L . Michelet's Ethicorum Nicomacheorum libri decern. Ad codicum manuscrip-
torum et veterum editionum fidem recensuit commentariis illustravit in usum scholarum
suarum, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1829; 2nd edn. 1835), also has (B). I n the preface (vol. i, p. vi)
Michelet acknowledges that he used I b n Rushd's commentary. But it left no trace
with respect to 11 i3 7—8 (ibid. i. 50; ii. 156).
b
9 5
There are also more Latin vice-versa translations, e.g. i n Karl Zell's Graeco-
Latin edition of the Nicomachean Ethics: K . Zell (trans.), Aristotelis Ethica Nicoma-
chea (Heidelberg, 1820).
134 Suzanne Bobzien
1818 w i t h T h o m a s T a y l o r , f o l l o w e d 1828 b y an A n o n y m o u s ,
9 6 9 7
f o l l o w e d b y the f r e q u e n t l y r e p r i n t e d 1861 Chase t r a n s l a t i o n , the

98
first, i t seems, w h o actually used the phrase 'vice versa':
(II) Wherever it is in our power to do, it is also in our power to forbear

doing, and vice versa.
T h e n i n 1879 comes W a l t e r H a t c h , w h o pairs the f o l l o w i n g vice-

versa t r a n s l a t i o n :
(JJ) Where the power of action depends upon our own selves, in such cases
there is also the power of forbearing; and where there is a power of for
bearing, there is also a power of acting
w i t h an e x p l a n a t o r y saying-no c o m m e n t o n the same page:
(KK) But if the doing of good be within our own power, the refraining
from good will be within our power, since where there is 'nay' there
is also 'yea.' 99
T h i s seems r i g h t i n the t r a d i t i o n o f the L a t i n 1562 Juntine e d i t i o n

(see above, Section 11.2), a vestige of, or late witness to, the j u x t a
p o s i t i o n o f a vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n o n the one h a n d w i t h a reference
to 'yes' a n d ' n o ' as we have i t i n I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y o n the
other. I n fact, the c o m m e n t a r y p r i n t e d along w i t h H a t c h ' s transla
t i o n o f w h i c h ( K K ) is a p a r t is n o t h i n g b u t an E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n
of the a n o n y m o u s paraphrase o f the Nicomachean Ethics (see above,
Section 8), here a t t r i b u t e d to A n d r o n i c u s o f Rhodes. C u r i o u s l y , the
Greek r e l a t i n g to NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 (text (P) above) is m i s t r a n s l a t e d i n
b
( K K ) i n a m a n n e r t h a t p a r t i a l l y parallels the m i s r e n d e r i n g o f (B) i n

( A ) — n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the vice-versa t r a n s l a t i o n (JJ).
T h e r e f o l l o w w i t h vice-versa translations R . W . B r o w n e i n
96
T. Taylor, The Rhetoric, Poetic, and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols.
(London, 1818), i i . 90: 'for in those things in which to act is in our power, not to act
is also i n our power; and in those things in which we have the power not to act, we
have likewise the power to act'.
97
['Vincent'], A New Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2nd
edn. (Oxford, 1826), 82: 'for whenever we have the power to do, we have also the
power not to do; and where we have the power not to do, we have also the power
to do'.
98
D. P. Chase, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle: A New Translation, Mainly
from the Text of Bekker (Oxford, 1861). There were at least 21 editions published
between 1911 and 2010 in the Everyman's Library series (London and New
York).
99
W. M . Hatch, The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle (London, 1879), 144.
Found in Translation i3S
1889, 100
J. E . C. W e l l d o n i n 1 8 9 2 , 101
Edward Moore in 1902, 102
a n d finally, i n 1925, Ross w i t h the t r a n s l a t i o n w h i c h ( i n the revised

A c k r i l l / U r m s o n version) is s t i l l one o f the m o s t used t o d a y : 103
( L L ) For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act,
and vice versa.
12.2. Nineeenth-century commentaries on the N i c o m a c h e a n E t h i c s
T h e s e translations are c o m p l e m e n t e d b y at least three o f the stan

d a r d n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y L a t i n or E n g l i s h commentaries w h i c h
j u d g e (B2) to be u n r e m a r k a b l e a n d do n o t c o m m e n t o n i t at a l l :
R a m s a u e r / S u s e m i h l , G r a n t , a n d Stewart. O n i i i 3 7 - 8 Ramsauer
b
a n d S u s e m i h l are silent; G r a n t notes 'elsewhere (Met. V I I I i i 2)

A r i s t o t l e states i n m o r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o r m this first step i n the
d o c t r i n e o f f r e e - w i l l , n a m e l y t h a t every p s y c h i c a l Svvapiis is a ca
p a c i t y o f contraries'; a n d Stewart w r i t e s : ' G r a n t refers to Met.
0 2 where at pierd Xoyov Swdfieis are said to be TCOV ivavriajv. Cf.
Met. 0 5 where or rrpoalpeais is said to be T O xvpiov, a n d to
d e t e r m i n e w h i c h o f the t w o possible ivavria shall be s e l e c t e d . ' 104
12.3. Faux-literal translations
I n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y there seems also to originate a different

t r a n s l a t i o n , a n d the earliest (apparently) w h i c h translates the pi-q—
i n c o r r e c t l y — w i t h a w o r d like ' n o ' rather t h a n ' n o t ' . T h e first per
petrators seem to be G e r m a n . Rieckher, i n 1856, translates (B2) as:
100
R. W. Browne, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1889), 66: 'for
wherever we have the power to do, we have also the power not to do; and wherever
we have the power not to do, we have also the power to do'.
101
J. E. C. Welldon, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1892), 73:
'for where it is i n our power to act, it is also i n our power to refrain from acting,
and where it is in our power to refrain from acting, it is also in our power to act'. By
1912, there are five reprints.
E. Moore, An Introduction to Aristotle's Ethics (New York, 1902) (chs. 1—4,
1 0 3
parts of ch. 10), 138: ' I f it is in our own power to act, it must also be in our own
power not to act (else our action was not really i n our power but was compulsory),
and vice versa.'
103
D. Ross, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1925); repr. in J. Barnes
(ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Oxford,
1984), ii. 1758.
104
G . Ramsauer and F . Susemihl, Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea (Leipzig, 1878),
165 and 733; A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1866), ii. 26; J. A. Stewart,
Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1892), 274.
136 Suzanne Bobzien
(MM) Denn wo das T h u n in unserer Gewalt ist, da ist es auch das Unter-
lassen, und wo das Nein, da ist es auch das J a . 105
T h e i n f l u e n t i a l 1911 t r a n s l a t i o n b y Rolfes is almost i d e n t i c a l (!), b u t

even shorter:
( N N ) Denn wo das T u n in unserer Gewalt ist, da ist es auch das Unter-

lassen, und wo das Nein, da auch das J a . 106
B o t h versions keep the parallel o f the article ' t o ' for ( B i ) and (B2).
I call this f a m i l y o f translations faux-literal, since they appear to be
w o r d - b y - w o r d , b u t translate \ir] w i t h ' n o ' .
Perhaps i t is n o coincidence that f a u x - l i t e r a l translations first
appear i n G e r m a n w o r k s . Conceivably, i t was the result o f the
a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d a m b i g u i t y i n the L a t i n (Section 11.2). I n the
m i d - n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a L a t i n v e r s i o n o f the Nicomachean Ethics
was p r o b a b l y used as a guide i n t r a n s l a t i n g the Greek. N o w , as
stated above, i n L a t i n the w o r d for ' n o t ' (non) also means ' n o ' ; and
i n L a t i n (as i n Greek) the relevant w o r d for ' t o o / d o c h ' (etiam) also
means ' y e s ' . 107
T h u s the Grosseteste/Moerbeke l i t e r a l L a t i n for
(B2), 'et i n q u i b u s n o n , et eciam' (text ( R ) above), can be under
stood i n at least t w o ways, either o f w h i c h treats the ' n o n ' a n d the
' e t i a m ' as g r a m m a t i c a l l y parallel expressions. T h e r e is o n the one
h a n d the p a i r ' n i c h t (zu h a n d e l n ) ' a n d ' d o c h (zu h a n d e l n ) ' and o n
the other the p a i r 'das N e i n ' a n d 'das Ja'. I n G e r m a n and E n g l i s h
( i n contrast to R o m a n c e l a n g u a g e s ) 108
there is n o s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d
way o f c o v e r i n g b o t h readings i n one t r a n s l a t i o n . T h e translator
has to make a choice a n d m a y need some help i n m a k i n g this
choice. A t this p o i n t , commentaries a n d a n y t h i n g else that aids the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a Greek passage—such as t e x t u a l parallels—may
become i m p o r t a n t . L i n g u i s t i c context and a r g u m e n t structure
were rarely a m o n g the aids i n early V i c t o r i a n times. T h u s i f a
c o m m e n t a r y based o n I b n R u s h d ' s was consulted o n the lines, this
m a y w e l l have been decisive a n d have p u s h e d a translator towards
the second ( f a u x - l i t e r a l ) o p t i o n .
105
J. Rieckher (trans.), Nikomachische Ethik (Stuttgart, 1856), 77: 'For where the
doing is i n our power, there the refraining is, too (i.e. in our power), and where the
No, there the Yes is too (i.e. i n our power).'
106
E. Rolfes (trans.) and G. Bien (ed.), Aristoteles: Nicomachische Ethik (Ham
burg, 1985), 55: 'For where the doing is i n our power, there the refraining is, too
(i.e. in our power), and where the No, there the Yes, too.'
107
See above, sect. 4, for the Greek and the German.
108
Some renderings into Romance languages simply retain the ambiguity.
A n o t h e r observation t h a t m a y have aided translators towards a

f a u x - l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n c o u l d have been a perceived s i m i l a r i t y o f NE
11 i 3 7 - 8 to t w o passages i n the N e w T e s t a m e n t , each o f w h i c h c o n
b
trasts T O rat a n d T O ov. These are Paul's Second E p i s t l e to the Cor

i n t h i a n s 1:17 (Iva fj rrap' ipioi TO vai vai Kai TO OV OV;) a n d the E p i s t l e
o f James 5 : 1 2
(TJTOJ Si vfiuiv T O vai vai Kai TO OV OV, iva p,rj VTTO Kpi-
oiv TciariTti). 109

Each t i m e the c o n t e x t suggests reference to a spoken
'yes' a n d ' n o ' , i n d i c a t e d b y the neuter definite article T O . C h r i s t i a n
scholars w o u l d have been f a m i l i a r w i t h these passages a n d w o u l d
thus have h a d a precedent ( i f w i t h T O OV rather t h a n T O pirj), or at
least a conceptual template, for the reading o f ' n o ' a n d 'yes' i n NE
11 i 3 7 - 8 , u n d e r s t o o d as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is s a i d .
b 1 1 0
Be t h a t as i t may. Q u i t e generally, i f someone is faced w i t h a faux-

l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n , the easiest manoeuvre for t h e m to fill i t w i t h sense
is b y assuming an i m p l i c i t verb o f saying. T h e saying-no transla
t i o n s i m p l y makes this e x p l i c i t ; a n d I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y , or a
derivative c o m m e n t a r y , w o u l d have sanctioned i t .
12.4. Saying-no translations and paraphrases (by date)
F i n a l l y , to the saying-no translations themselves. T h e first I f o u n d

(and there m a y w e l l be earlier ones) is a t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o G e r m a n
f r o m 1863 b y the G e r m a n w r i t e r , l i t e r a r y h i s t o r i a n , a n d p h i l o l o g i s t
A d o l f Stahr:
(OO) ( 1 ) Denn in alien Bereichen, wo das handeln bei uns steht, steht auch
das nicht handeln bei uns, (2) und wo wir Nein sagen koennen, koen-
nen wir auch Ja sagen. 111
N o t e t h a t the contrast b e t w e e n 'bei uns steht' i n (1) and 'koennen'

i n (2) corresponds almost l i t e r a l l y to I b n R u s h d ' s ' i n n o b i s ' i n the
clause c o r r e s p o n d i n g to (1) a n d 'possumus' i n the clause corres-
1 0 9
I n the New K i n g James Version 'that with me there should be yea yea, and nay
nay?' and 'But let your yea be yea; and your nay nay; lest you fall into judgment'.
1 1 0
The two biblical passages are referenced in Patristic and Byzantine Greek texts
alone over a hundred times (as a T L G search will confirm).
111
'(1) For i n all areas where the acting is with us, the not acting also is with us,
(2) and where we can say No, we can also say Yes' (A. Stahr (trans, and comm.), Aris-
toteles' nikomachischeEthik (Stuttgart, 1863), 86). This German translation seems to
be part of the first complete set of translations of Aristotle into German. There are
no comments on NE 11 i3 7—8, and throughout, there are frequent references to the
b
translation by Garve, who, as we saw above, provided a vice-versa translation, and

very few references to other works.
i38 Suzanne Bobzien
p o n d i n g to (2). T h i s is p r o b a b l y n o t a coincidence. T h e n e x t saying-

no t r a n s l a t i o n is f r o m 1869, b y R o b e r t W i l l i a m s :
1 1 2
(PP) (1) For, where it is in our power to do a thing, it is equally in our

power to abstain from doing it; (2) where refusal is in our power, as
sent is equally so.
T h i s t e x t was w i d e l y spread and h a d at least four editions. I t was

praised i n The Spectator. 111
I n 1881 follows the m u c h - l a u d e d trans
l a t i o n b y P e t e r s , w h o translates:
114
( Q Q ) ( ) For where it lies with us to do, it lies with us not to do. (2) Where
l
we can say no, we can say yes.
A g a i n , we have the t e l l i n g contrast between 'lies w i t h us' i n (1) and

'can' i n (2) t h a t evokes I b n R u s h d . T h i s t r a n s l a t i o n sees its fifth
e d i t i o n i n 1893. I n 1897 George Stock publishes a b o o k i n w h i c h
he rewrites the Nicomachean Ethics as a dialogue, to make i t palat
able to the E n g l i s h readership. H e r e is a paraphrase o f o u r passage
( r o u g h l y 11 i 3 6 - i 4 ) , where Stock has A r i s t o t l e speak:
b
(RR) But when I speak of the voluntariness of virtue or vice, you must
understand me to mean that the virtuous or vicious man is a free
agent, that there is no force acting upon him except what comes from
his own nature, except, in fact, himself. If he knows the right and the
wrong, it is as open to him to choose the one as the other. Where he
can do, he can refrain from doing, and where he can say 'no', he can
say 'yes'. 115
I n 1900 B u r n e t , i n his famous c o m m e n t a r y , c o m m e n t s o n o u r lines:

' T h i s is because o u r capacities are /xe-rd \6yov, and every \6yos i m
plies b o t h "yes" and " n o " . ' " T h u s B u r n e t reads /xij as ' n o ' , rather
6
t h a n ' n o t ' . H e adds 'Cf. above n o 3 a 2 0 s q q ' . B u t i i o 3 2 o f f . does

a
n o t p r o v i d e any useful i n f o r m a t i o n i n s u p p o r t o f his statement t h a t

R. Williams (trans.), The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle [NE] (London,
1 1 3
1869; 2nd edn. 1876; 3rd edn. 1879), 62. There are no comments or references other
than to Bekker's 1861 text.
113
Review of Williams, NE, i n The Spectator, 43 (1870), 178-80 at 178-9.
114
F. H . Peters (trans.), The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1881),
74. (There are no notes or comments on this sentence, only general acknowledge
ment of prior translations and commentators, without any names, as well as of use
of Bekker, and i n the fifth edition (1893) of Bywater.)
115
S. G. Stock, Lectures in the Lyceum; or, Aristotle's Ethics for English Readers
(London, 1897), 179.
116
J. Burnet (comm.), The Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1900), 134.
'every Xoyos i m p l i e s b o t h "yes" a n d " n o " ' . N o r does the Metaphy

sics passage i o 4 6 3 6 f f . (i.e. A r i s t . Metaph. 0 2, w h i c h G r a n t a n d
a
Stewart h a d referred to as evidence for A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f free

w i l l ) , w h i c h B u r n e t adduces i n s u p p o r t o f his saying-no reading.
I n 1920 Samuel Sidney M c C l u r e summarizes the passage f r o m
NE 3. 5 t h u s :
1 1 7
(SS) Choice is not the same thing as a voluntary act; nor is it desire, or
emotion, or exactly 'wish,' since we may wish for, but cannot make
choice of, the unattainable. Nor is it deliberation—rather, it is the act
of decision following deliberation. If man has the power to say yes,
he has equally the power to say no, and is master of his own action.
T h e 'yes' a n d ' n o ' i n the last sentence can o n l y be i n reference

to i i i 3 7 - 8 . A s i n I b n R u s h d ' s a n d C a m e r a r i u s ' commentaries,
b
t h o u g h , the order o f the negative a n d the positive are the reverse

of t h a t i n 11 i 3 8 . N e x t i n line seems to be Rackham's w i d e l y used
b
a n d m u c h - q u o t e d 1926 t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h is n o t h i n g b u t o u r sen
tence ( A ) , the sentence t h a t has become the A r i s t o t l e - m e m e :
(1) For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting,
(2) and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes.
I n this t r a n s l a t i o n , too, there is a contrast between b e i n g free i n

(1) and b e i n g able to i n (2), w h i c h matches I b n R u s h d ' s ' i n n o b i s '
a n d 'possumus'. N o n e o f the four translations, n o r any o f the para
phrases, n o r B u r n e t ' s c o m m e n t a r y m e n t i o n s earlier translations or
commentaries w h i c h adopt the saying-no reading.
W h a t are we to make o f this s i t u a t i o n i n the r e c e p t i o n o f such
a c r i t i c a l text? A couple o f t h i n g s come to m i n d . F i r s t a n d fore
m o s t , the h y b r i d translation w h i c h , above i n Section 1 1 , we a n t i c i
pated as a n a t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f C a m e r a r i u s ' h y b r i d explanation
of the seeming i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f the G r e e k t e x t o f the W e s t e r n t r a
d i t i o n w i t h I b n R u s h d ' s c o m m e n t a r y has come i n t o b e i n g i n m u l
t i p l e forms.
Second, i t was standard i n the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y translations,
summaries, paraphrases, analyses, etc. to p r o v i d e b o o k 3 chapter 5
of the Nicomachean Ethics w i t h titles such as 'the f r e e d o m o f m a n ' ,
' f r e e d o m o f the w i l l ' , a n d to assume that i t c o n t a i n e d A r i s t o t l e ' s
S. S. McClure, The World's Greatest Books, x i i i . Philosophy and Religion (New
1 1 7
York, 1920). T h i s is identical to vol. i of J. A . Hammerton (ed.), Outline of Great

Books (New York, 1936).
140 Suzanne Bobzien
t h e o r y o f free w i l l . ( R a c k h a m s t i l l translates ifi' w i t h 'free'.)

A n d there is t h r o u g h o u t i n V i c t o r i a n times a C h r i s t i a n b a c k g r o u n d
to the translator's comments. T h i s C h r i s t i a n b a c k g r o u n d assumes
that h u m a n beings have free, u n d e t e r m i n e d choice: the a b i l i t y to
choose between good and bad. T h i s idea goes back at least to the
second c e n t u r y CE i n early C h r i s t i a n t e x t s . " A n d i n the n i n e t e e n t h
8
c e n t u r y A r i s t o t l e was read w i t h this c o n c e p t i o n o f a free w i l l and

a choice between good a n d b a d i n m i n d . T h u s n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
translators w o u l d have h a d l i t t l e difficulty i n s l i g h t l y t w i s t i n g the
text to f i t this idea—not i n order to make a p o i n t o f A r i s t o t l e ex
egesis, b u t s i m p l y because they believed a n y h o w that A r i s t o t l e ad
vocated f r e e d o m o f choice i n 3. 5. A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t w o u l d have
been assumed to w o r k f r o m a c t i n g a n d n o t acting b e i n g u p to us,
via choosing n o t to act a n d choosing to act b e i n g u p to us, to o u r
acting or n o t a c t i n g n o b l y or shamefully b e i n g u p to us; free choice
w o u l d have p r o v i d e d the p o i n t where the goodness or badness o f
the person latches o n t o t h e i r actions.
T h i r d , i t is also w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g that i n V i c t o r i a n times the
strictures o n translations were m u c h m o r e relaxed. T h e belief that
the translator was to present w h a t the a u t h o r meant, i f there are
difficulties i n t r a n s l a t i n g the t e x t as i t stands, was w i d e l y accepted
( a l t h o u g h towards the end o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y r e q u i r e m e n t s
became s t r i c t e r ) . I n a d d i t i o n , translators were n o t i n the h a b i t o f
c o n s i d e r i n g the l i n g u i s t i c c o n t e x t a n d the logical s t r u c t u r e o f the
a r g u m e n t as means for m a k i n g sense o f a piece o f text. So they
w o u l d have been u n l i k e l y to have considered sentence ( N ) for m a k
ing sense o f ( B ) . " 9
T h u s , we can u n d e r s t a n d h o w the m i s r e n d e r i n g ( A ) made its

way i n t o translations o f the V i c t o r i a n era. I t is the result o f the
c o n f o u n d i n g o f the G r e e k t e x t o f the W e s t e r n t r a d i t i o n w i t h the
L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n o f I b n Rushd's m i d d l e c o m m e n t a r y , w h i c h itself
is, m o s t probably, the result o f a lacuna, a n d subsequent reinter-
p r e t a t i o n o f (B2). T h i s r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is i n line w i t h the late an
cient and C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n o f r e a d i n g A r i s t o t l e as advocating a
free w i l l and free choice between g o o d and e v i l .
1 1 8
Cf. Bobzien, 'Free W i l l ' , 172-4.
1 1 9
See sect. 5 above for details.
13. C o n t e m p o r a r y r e c e p t i o n i n ancient p h i l o s o p h y
T o conclude, a b r i e f o v e r v i e w over c o n t e m p o r a r y reception, as

w h i c h I count, somewhat a r b i t r a r i l y , the p e r i o d f r o m 1950 o n
wards. I have l o o k e d at a g o o d p a r t o f the countless c o n t e m p o r a r y
E n g l i s h translations, commentaries, i n t r o d u c t i o n s , a n d c o m p a
nions o f or to the Nicomachean Ethics.
We f i n d s t i l l several r e n o w n e d commentaries that do n o t c o m
m e n t o n i i i 3 7 - 8 at a l l — p r e s u m a b l y because the c o m m e n t a t o r s
b
consider t h e i r r e a d i n g o f the t e x t to be s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a n d u n -
p r o b l e m a t i c . Examples are J o a c h i m i n 1951, D i r l m e i e r i n 1956,
G a u t h i e r - J o l i f i n 1 9 7 0 . T h e r e are vice-versa translations i n , for
120
example, G a u t h i e r - J o l i f , W a r d m a n i n 1963, and A p o s t l e - G e r s o n

i n 1 9 8 3 , as w e l l as i n some scholarly books a n d a r t i c l e s ( i n a l l
121 122
cases w i t h o u t c o m m e n t o n the choice o f t r a n s l a t i o n ) . R e g a r d i n g the

f a u x - l i t e r a l translations, we can observe an increase i n these, i n c l u d
i n g D i r l m e i e r , G i g o n , K e n n y , I r w i n , a n d Sauve M e y e r . I n recent 1 2 3
English-language translations, saying-no renderings appear to o u t -
1 3 0
H . H . Joachim and D. A . Rees, A r i s t o t l e : The Nicomachean Ethics. A Com
mentary (Oxford, 1951); F. Dirlmeier, A r i s t o t e l e s : Die Nikomachische E t h i k [NE 1]
(Berlin, 1956), and [ N E 2] (Stuttgart, 2003); R. A . Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif (trans,
and comm.), L'Ethique a Nicomaque [ E t h i q u e ] , 2nd edn. (Louvain, 1970).
131
Gauthier and Jolif, Ethique, i . 68: 'en effet, la ou il est en notre pouvoir d'agir, i l
est aussi en notre pouvoir de ne pas agir (et reciproquement, la ou le non est en notre
pouvoir, le out Test aussi)' (in French non+adj. translates 'not'; cf. also sinon for ' i f
not'; hence 'le non' for 'the not' is possible). A. E. Wardman in A. E. Wardman and
R. Bambrough, The Philosophy of A r i s t o t l e (New York and London, 1963), 359: ' T h e
point is that where we can act, we can also refrain, and vice versa.' H . G. Apostle
and L . P. Gerson (ed. and trans.), A r i s t o t l e : S e l e c t e d Works (Grinnell, 1983), 459:
'For where it is i n our power to act, it is also i n our power not to act, and where it is
in our power not to act, it is also i n our power to act\
1 3 3
Such as W. F. R. Hardie, A r i s t o t l e ' s E t h i c a l Theory (Oxford, 1968; 2nd edn.
1980), 178: '"where it is i n our power to act it is also i n our power not to act, and
v i c e v e r s a " (11 i3 7—8; cf. 11 i5 2—3)'.
b a
1 3 3
Dirlmeier, NE 2, 66: 'denn iiberall wo es i n unserer Macht steht zu handeln,
da steht es auch in unserer Macht, nicht zu handeln, und wo das Nein, da auch das
Ja'; O. Gigon, Die Nikomachische E t h i k (Zurich, 1967); A . Kenny, The Aristotelian
E t h i c s (Oxford 1978), 7—8: 'we are told that where it is in our power to do something,
it is also i n our power not to do it, and when the "no" is i n our power, the "yes" is
also ( i i i 3 7 — 8 ) ' ; T. I r w i n , The Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, 1985), 66: 'for
b
when acting is up to us, so is not acting, and when N o is up to us, so is Yes'; S.

Meyer, A r i s t o t l e on Moral Responsibility (Oxford, 1993), 130, and Aristotle on the
Voluntary', i n R. K r a u t (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean E t h
ics (Oxford, 2006), 152: 'For i n those cases in which it is up to us to do something it
is also up to us not to do it, and i n cases i n which no is up to us, so is yes.'
142 Suzanne Bobzien
n u m b e r t h e i r alternatives. W e f i n d t h e m , for example, i n the trans

lations o f M a r t i n O s w a l d i n 1962 ( ' F o r where i t is i n o u r p o w e r to
act, i t is also i n o u r p o w e r n o t to act, a n d where we can say " n o , " we
can also say " y e s " ' ) ; Roger C r i s p i n 2000 ( ' W h e r e i t is i n o u r p o w e r
to act, i t is also i n o u r p o w e r n o t t o act, a n d where saying " N o "
is i n o u r power, so is saying " Y e s " ' ) . C h r i s t o p h e r R o w e i n 2002
( ' F o r w h e n a c t i n g depends o n us, n o t a c t i n g does so too, a n d w h e n
saying n o does so, saying yes does t o o ' ) ; a n d C h r i s t o p h e r T a y l o r
i n 2006 ('where a c t i n g is u p t o us, n o t a c t i n g is u p to us, too, a n d
where one can say N o , one can also say Y e s ' ) . T h e y are also p r e 1 2 4
sent i n m a n y scholarly commentaries, books, a n d articles, such as

E v e r s o n (1990), Broadie (1991 a n d 2002), Sparshott (1994), Rapp
(1995), Pakaluk (2005), T a y l o r (2006), a n d Destree (201 i ) . None I 2 S
of these scholars a n d philosophers m e n t i o n s that the G r e e k does n o t

include a verb o f saying; or that the Greek includes n o equivalent to
'no'. I n fact, none o f the translations a n d commentaries I have been
able t o consult, regardless o f the r e n d e r i n g o f NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 offered b
or used, m e n t i o n s that the Greek c o u l d be translated differently.
14. C o n c l u s i o n
I n Part I , I p r o v i d e d a t e x t u a l analysis o f NE 11 i 3 7 - 8 . T h e result

b
was that there is o n l y one type o f correct t r a n s l a t i o n o f the sentence:
1 3 4
M . Ostwald (trans.), A r i s t o t l e : Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, 1962), 65;
R. Crisp (trans.), A r i s t o t l e : Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2000), 45; Chris
topher Rowe i n S. Broadie and C. Rowe (trans.), A r i s t o t l e : Nicomachean Ethics
[ N E ] (Oxford, 2002), 130; Taylor, NE, 24.
1 3 5
S. Everson, 'Aristotle's Compatibilism i n the Nicomachean Ethics', Ancient
Philosophy, 10 (1990), 81—103 9°> repr. in L . P. Gerson (ed.), A r i s t o t l e :
a t
Psychology
and E t h i c s (London, 1999), 252—76; S. Broadie, E t h i c s with A r i s t o t l e [ E t h i c s ] (Oxford,
1991), 153—4, 5 6 , 159 w i t h n. 31, and S. Broadie, 'Philosophical Introduction', i n
:
Broadie and Rowe, NE, 9—91 at 40; Sparshott, L i f e , 130, 134 w i t h n. 82; Rapp, 'Frei-
willigkeit', 131; M . Pakaluk, A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Ethics: An I n t r o d u c t i o n (Cam
bridge, 2005), 145: ' I n cases in which it's up to us to carry out an action, it's also up
to us to refrain from carrying i t out; and i n cases i n which saying "no" is up to us,
saying "yes" is also up to us'; Taylor, NE, 164; Destree, 'Character', 289. Cf. also
the advertising and blurb for Bernard Williams's short (posthumously forthcoming)
book A H i s t o r y of Freedom: 'One of the things that distinguishes human beings from
animals is the sense of ourselves as free, autonomous individuals. I n the words of the
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle: "Where we are free to act, we are also free not
to act, and where we are able to say ' N o ' , we are also able to say 'Yes'."' B. Williams,
A H i s t o r y of Freedom (London, forthcoming: Orion publishing I S B N 978—0—297—
81704-8).
as an abbreviated v e r s i o n o f w h a t I have called vice-versa transla
tions; moreover, that saying-no translations are n o t accurate r e n
derings o f the t e x t we have. I n Part I I , Sections 6 and 7, I offered
a glimpse o f the m e m e - l i k e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f saying-no translations
o f NE 11 i 3 7 ~ 8 i n present-day p o p u l a r c u l t u r e and p o p u l a r p h i l o
b
sophy. I n Sections 8 to 12 I offered an e x p l a n a t i o n o f how, i n the

n i n e t e e n t h century, saying-no translations came about as the result,
i f y o u w i l l , o f a h i s t o r i c a l accident: the confluence o f the W e s t e r n
t e x t u a l t r a d i t i o n o f the Nicomachean Ethics w i t h a defective A r a b i c
t r a n s l a t i o n , v i a the L a t i n t r a n s l a t i o n o f an A r a b i c c o m m e n t a r y ; a n d
c o m b i n e d w i t h this, a u b i q u i t o u s belief i n the a u t h o r i t y o f previous
generations o f scholars, c e n t u r i e s - o l d persistent m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f freedom, often based o n C h r i s t i a n teach
ings o f free w i l l , lack o f consideration o f l i n g u i s t i c context and the
course o f A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t , a n d the prevalence o f i n t e r p r e t a t i v e
over l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n i n V i c t o r i a n times. A s to c o n t e m p o r a r y re
c e p t i o n , i t is s t i l l developing.
All Souls College, Oxford
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ARISTOTLE ON PRIMARY
???? ?? ??????? ?
BENJAMIN MORISON
i . Introduction
F O R A r i s t o t l e , the science o f Physics is the s t u d y o f nature {phusis).

O r m o r e precisely, i t is the s t u d y o f bodies i n so far as they are
n a t u r a l , or have a n a t u r e . I n this respect, Physics differs f r o m
1
e.g. G e o m e t r y , w h i c h is the s t u d y o f bodies i n so far as they have

m a g n i t u d e . A b o d y ' s nature is defined as its ' p r i n c i p l e o f change
2
a n d rest', i.e. those features o f a b o d y w h i c h d e t e r m i n e w h e n i t is

3
c h a n g i n g a n d w h e n i t is at rest, and w h i c h changes i t undergoes.

As A r i s t o t l e says, 'x is at rest' s h o u l d be taken to mean s o m e t h i n g
like 'x can change b u t is n o t c h a n g i n g ' , so another w a y o f saying
4
w h a t A r i s t o t l e means is that Physics is the s t u d y o f bodies i n so far

as they e m b a r k o n , undergo, a n d stop changing.
T w o A r i s t o t e l i a n examples. F i r s t , a stone falls n a t u r a l l y w h e n i t
is d r o p p e d f r o m a h e i g h t . W h y ? W e l l , i t has w i t h i n i t a p r i n c i p l e o f
change, n a m e l y o f local m o t i o n — w h e n i t is o u t o f the r i g h t f u l place
of the element earth i t falls to that place. So its nature determines
that i t w i l l fall w h e n i n those c o n d i t i o n s , as l o n g as there is n o t h i n g
i n its w a y (a case discussed b y A r i s t o t l e i n Physics 8 . 4 ) . B u t equally,
w h e n i t gets to the r i g h t f u l place o f earth (and certain other c o n d i
tions are fulfilled), i t n o longer f a l l s — i t comes to a stop. I t s nature
© Benjamin Morison 2013
T h i s paper is a greatly expanded version of my article ' L e temps primaire du
commencement d'un changement' ['Temps primaire'], i n J.-F. Balaude and F.
Wolff (eds.), A r i s t o t e et l a pensee du temps (Le Temps Philosophique, 11; Universite
Paris X—Nanterre, 2005), 99—111. M y original interest i n the topic was sparked by
Jonathan Barnes and by hugely enjoyable conversations i n Geneva in the summer
of 1997 w i t h Franco Parrachini. For specific comments on the present text or its
ancestors, I am grateful to Andreas Anagnostopoulos, Jonathan Barnes, Jonathan
Beere, A r n o l d Brooks, Antony Eagle, Edward Hussey, John H y m a n , Boris Kment,
Hendrik Lorenz, Ofra Magidor, M o h a n Matthen, Pierre Pellegrin, Jacob Rosen,
Ralph Wedgwood, Christian Wildberg, and audiences/seminar participants i n
Oxford, Cambridge, N o r w i c h , Paris, Berlin, and Princeton.
1
Cf. Phys. 2. 2, I 9 3 2 2 - i 9 4 i 2 .
b a 2
Ibid. 3
Phys. 2. 1, i 9 2 2 o - 3 .
b
4
Phys. 6. 3, 234*32-3; cf. 5. 2, 2 2 6 i s - i 6 ; 6. 8, 239*13-14.
b
ISO Benjamin Morison
determines w h a t c o n d i t i o n s need to be i n place for i t to e m b a r k o n

its j o u r n e y , and the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t stops.
Second example. A h u m a n b e i n g takes i n food, and its nature (its
soul) determines h o w i t changes i n response to this f o o d — i t grows,
and distributes the food accordingly. T h e soul also determines w h a t
l i m i t s there are to the g r o w t h o f a h u m a n . W e do n o t j u s t g r o w and
g r o w as we eat, u n l i k e a fire, w h i c h j u s t grows and grows as m o r e
and m o r e is fed to i t : ' w h i l e the g r o w t h o f fire goes o n w i t h o u t l i m i t
so l o n g as there is a s u p p l y o f fuel, i n the case o f a l l c o m p l e x wholes
f o r m e d i n the course o f nature there is a l i m i t or ratio w h i c h deter
mines t h e i r size and increase' (DA 2. 4, 4 i 6 i 5 - i 7 ) . Hence the soul
a
is also a p r i n c i p l e o f rest, i n the sense that i t determines w h e n certain

processes stop, a n d is responsible for m a i n t a i n i n g those end-states
w h e n they are achieved.
Now, i f something's nature is its p r i n c i p l e o f change a n d rest,
t h e n o b v i o u s l y a s t u d y o f N a t u r e (or some p r e l i m i n a r y to i t ) has
to get to grips w i t h w h a t p r i n c i p l e s are, a n d w h a t change a n d rest
are. So i t is n o surprise that i n his Physics A r i s t o t l e investigates
not j u s t questions c o n c e r n i n g h o w m a n y p r i n c i p l e s there are (Phy
sics i ) and w h a t sorts o f p r i n c i p l e s there are (2. 3), b u t also the de
s
f i n i t i o n o f (3. 1 - 3 ) a n d p r e c o n d i t i o n s for (4) m o t i o n a n d the other

k i n d s o f change, n a m e l y q u a l i t a t i v e change (i.e. alteration), q u a n t i
tative change (i.e. g r o w t h a n d d i m i n u t i o n ) , a n d substantial change
(i.e. w h e n s o m e t h i n g comes i n t o b e i n g or passes o u t o f b e i n g ) . I n
books 5-8 A r i s t o t l e explores f u r t h e r features o f change, i n c l u d i n g
w h e t h e r i t is continuous, w h e t h e r i t has contraries, h o w to i n d i v i d u
ate changes, w h e t h e r i t can go o n for ever, etc. B u t A r i s t o t l e also
6
investigates w h a t happens w h e n an object transitions f r o m resting

to changing, and f r o m c h a n g i n g to resting, a n d this is n o surprise
given that nature is a p r i n c i p l e o f b o t h change a n d rest.
2. Does change h a r b o u r paradox?
G i v e n the central i m p o r t a n c e o f the concept o f change i n Physics,

the student o f nature w o u l d do w e l l to ensure that the n o t i o n does
5
Book 1 might even originally have been a separate treatise called 'On Principles'
(flepl dpx<^ )- See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction
v
and Commentary [Physics] (Oxford, 1936), 1—19, esp. 5.

6
Books 5, 6, and 8 might even originally have formed a separate treatise with a
title reflecting this, namely 'On Change' (flepl Kivr)oeojs). See Ross, Physics, loc. cit.
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 151
not h a r b o u r paradox, a n d can be i n v o k e d w i t h o u t danger i n the sci

ences. I n particular, the student o f nature s h o u l d n o t s i m p l y assume
t h a t j u s t because we h a p p i l y use the concept o f change i n o u r every
day speech, i t is conceptually u n p r o b l e m a t i c . F o r instance, A r i s
totle is v e r y concerned i n the Physics to 'clean u p ' the concept o f
b e i n g somewhere, or b e i n g i n a place, a n d p r o v i d e a t h o r o u g h ac
c o u n t o f w h a t a place is, even t h o u g h we u n t h i n k i n g l y invoke the
concept i n o u r o r d i n a r y speech. B u t i f a p a r t i c u l a r concept cannot
7
be made precise, or can be s h o w n to be o f n o conceptual use, e.g.

the concept o f b e i n g e m p t y (discussed i n Physics 4. 6 - 9 ) , A r i s t o t l e is
p r e p a r e d s i m p l y to reject its use. ( A r i s t o t l e n o t o r i o u s l y t h i n k s there
is n o such t h i n g as b e i n g absolutely empty.) I f i t t u r n s o u t t h a t we
can make no sense at a l l o f w h a t i t is for s o m e t h i n g to change, or
start to change, or stop changing, or be at rest, t h e n we s h o u l d n o t
use these n o t i o n s i n o u r physics or biology, o n p a i n o f f r a m i n g the
orems i n v o k i n g those concepts w h i c h w i l l t u r n o u t to be false or
even nonsense.
T h i s last p o i n t is p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t . One o f A r i s t o t l e ' s m a i n
goals i n his s t u d y o f nature is to get clear about w h a t the soul is,
i.e. w h a t feature i t is t h a t m a r k s o u t animate bodies f r o m i n a n i
mate ones. W h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e o f the soul is t h a t o n l y those bodies
w h i c h possess a soul can engage i n certain changes, e.g. g r o w i n g ,
s w i m m i n g , eating, sneezing, a n d indeed i t is precisely because those
bodies have a soul t h a t they engage i n these changes. B u t i f the
w h o l e n o t i o n o f a 'change' t u r n s o u t to be p r o b l e m a t i c — i f i t t u r n s
out t h a t the t h i n g s we w a n t to say about m o t i o n a n d change are i l l -
f o u n d e d — t h e n characterizing the soul as that w h i c h is responsible
for certain changes w i l l , i n t u r n , be unacceptable. W e w i l l be left
w i t h o u t an adequate characterization o f the soul, a n d w i t h o u t the
r i g h t to c o n t i n u e to conceive o f certain bodies as ensouled. T h e r e
c o u l d be n o biology. S i m i l a r considerations a p p l y to astronomy, as
A r i s t o t l e conceives o f i t .
I n Physics 3 A r i s t o t l e offers a d e f i n i t i o n o f w h a t change is, b u t i t
is i n Physics 5 a n d 6 t h a t he engages i n a sustained discussion o f the
properties o f changes, w h a t the different types o f change are ( 5 . 1 ,
2), h o w to i n d i v i d u a t e t h e m (5. 4 ) , w h i c h changes are c o n t r a r y to
w h i c h (5. 5), w h a t the r e l a t i o n between change a n d rest is (5. 6),
w h i c h aspects o f change are c o n t i n u o u s (6. 1, 2), h o w the c o n t i n u -
7
For a treatment of Aristotle's account of place along these lines see B. Morison,
On Location: A r i s t o t l e ' s Concept of Place [ L o c a t i o n ] (Oxford, 2002).
152 Benjamin Morison
i t y o f t i m e (the n u m b e r o f change) and m a g n i t u d e (the t h i n g w h i c h

changes) are related (6. 4 ) , w h a t happens i n the transitions f r o m rest
to change, and change to rest (6. 5), w h a t the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f
change is (6. 6), w h a t role the finite a n d infinite p l a y (6. 7), w h a t the
properties o f rest are (6. 8), a n d finally h o w to solve Zeno's para
doxes o f m o t i o n (6. 9).
T h e discussion o f Zeno's paradoxes helps i l l u s t r a t e the c l a i m that
i n books 5 a n d 6 A r i s t o t l e is, a m o n g other things, c o n s i d e r i n g the
s u i t a b i l i t y o f the concept o f change for physics. F o r i f that c l a i m is
true, i t is easy to see w h y A r i s t o t l e needs to c o n f r o n t the paradoxes:
they are challenges w h i c h m u s t be m e t i f we are to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t
change or m o t i o n is. F o r instance, they appear to threaten A r i s
totle's oft-repeated tenet that a l l changes are changes from some
t h i n g to s o m e t h i n g , since o n Zeno's p i c t u r e , changes can never
8
come to c o m p l e t i o n . Z e n o appears to open u p the p o s s i b i l i t y that

changes c o u l d go o n for ever w i t h o u t ever reaching t h e i r e n d p o i n t .
I t is surely n o coincidence either that the i m p o r t a n t p o i n t A r i s t o t l e
makes i n other contexts about certain activities (energeiai), n a m e l y
that, u n l i k e changes (kineseis), they can go o n for ever, also appears
to be threatened b y Zeno's n e v e r - c o m p l e t i n g changes. 9
M a n y o f the questions i n Physics 6 concern the r e l a t i o n between

t i m e a n d change. M o t i o n takes t i m e . I f I d r o p a stone and i t falls
to the g r o u n d , the f a l l i n g takes a certain a m o u n t o f t i m e . T h e fact
that changes, processes, or whatever take t i m e marks t h e m o u t f r o m
the n a t u r a l bodies w h i c h themselves u n d e r g o these changes. F o r a
stone does n o t take a c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f t i m e . W h a t takes t i m e is
the stone's d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , e.g. falling to earth, b u t the stone i t
self does n o t take t i m e . T h i s c o n n e c t i o n between change and t i m e is
not c o i n c i d e n t a l ; A r i s t o t l e actually defines t i m e i n terms o f change
(specifically, as the n u m b e r o f change i n respect o f the before and
after). 10
B u t because changes or processes take t i m e , we w o n d e r how much

t i m e they took, i.e. h o w l o n g they lasted. A n d i n a d d i t i o n , we en
q u i r e i n t o when they o c c u r r e d , w h i c h w i l l be a m a t t e r o f d e t e r m i n -
8
5. 1, 224 i; for other references see n. 36 below.
Pkys.
b
9
N o doubt P h y s i c s 5 and 6 also fulfil a further function, that of clarifying the pro
perties of change in preparation for the complex argument of P h y s i c s 8, which at
crucial points draws on theorems proven in those books, e.g. 8. 7, 26o i9—21. ( I am b
grateful to Sebastian Odzuck for help w i t h this.)

1 0
Phys. 4. 11, 2 i 9 2 . For a complete treatment see U. Coope, Time f o r A r i s t o t l e :
b
Physics IV. 10-14 (Oxford, 2005).

i n g w h e n they started and w h e n they finished. T h i s w i l l often be

precisely i n order to determine h o w l o n g they lasted. B u t there
m i g h t be other reasons w h y the student o f nature wishes to k n o w
w h e n a p a r t i c u l a r change occurred, i.e. w h e n a p a r t i c u l a r b o d y u n
d e r w e n t a change, for instance i n order to determine w h a t the c o n
d i t i o n s o b t a i n i n g i n the e n v i r o n m e n t o f that b o d y were w h e n the
change was i n i t i a t e d .
I n the chapter o f Physics 6 w h i c h is the m a i n focus o f this paper,
n a m e l y 6 . 5 , A r i s t o t l e is p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n t w o central w h e n -
questions w h i c h one m i g h t raise c o n c e r n i n g change: w h e n some
t h i n g started changing, a n d w h e n i t finished changing. Q u i t e apart
f r o m the p u r e l y c h r o n o l o g i c a l question o f w h e n these things oc
c u r r e d , we w a n t to k n o w w h e t h e r there are some mysterious states
apart f r o m m o t i o n a n d rest (as i t were, the states o f ' g e t t i n g g o i n g '
or ' c o m i n g to rest'). A n d i f so, do n a t u r a l bodies have a p r i n c i p l e to
be i n those states too? D o objects move seamlessly f r o m change to
rest and back to change again? Just as we students o f n a t u r a l p h i
losophy need to be clear about w h a t happens w h e n one b o d y is i n
contact w i t h another—about h o w a b o d y relates to the rest o f the
w o r l d , and h o w the parts o f a b o d y relate to one another—so we
need to be f a m i l i a r w i t h the structure o f change, and h o w changes
a n d periods o f rest relate to each other.
W e t e n d to t h i n k that we have a f i r m grasp o f w h a t change, or
kinesis, is, according to A r i s t o t l e , even i f his d e f i n i t i o n o f i t i n Phy
sics 3. 1 is famously obscure. I n p a r t , this is because we are confi
dent o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the o r d i n a r y E n g l i s h w o r d 'change',
so that even i f we m i g h t f i n d i t h a r d to define that w o r d , we are able
to use i t w i t h o u t too m u c h reflection. However, one o f the lessons
o f A r i s t o t l e ' s discussions o f kinesis i n b o o k 6 is that we need to be
m o r e cautious i n o u r use o f the w o r d . W e use the w o r d 'change'
to cover a w i d e r range o f p h e n o m e n a , e.g. i n locutions such as 'at
that p o i n t , the water changed i n t o ice'. B u t this t r a n s i t i o n , f r o m
water to ice, is n o t a change according to A r i s t o t l e . I t is the culmi
nation o f a change, and happens instantaneously, whereas accord
i n g to A r i s t o t l e , all changes take t i m e (i.e. take place over a stretch
o f t i m e ) . T h e change w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d i n the water b e c o m i n g ice
was the c o o l i n g or freezing o f the water, and that d i d take a certain
a m o u n t o f t i m e . T h u s , for A r i s t o t l e , there are transitions w h i c h are
n o t changes. ( T h i s is one reason some have preferred to translate
kinesis as 'process' a n d n o t 'change'.)
iS4 Benjamin Morison
These transitions p r o v i d e yet another reason for b e i n g w a r y o f

the so-called C a m b r i d g e d e f i n i t i o n o f w h a t i t is to change, n a m e l y
that x has changed j u s t w h e n s o m e t h i n g is true o f x at one t i m e and
false o f x at another. T h i s (failed) d e f i n i t i o n is already infamous for
a l l o w i n g for 'mere C a m b r i d g e ' changes, such as w h e n Socrates is
taller t h a n Theaetetus at one t i m e a n d shorter t h a n h i m at a later
t i m e , w i t h o u t his h a v i n g h i m s e l f changed h e i g h t . B u t the defini
t i o n w i l l also certify as changes m o r e subtle examples o f transitions
w h i c h w i l l t u r n o u t n o t to be A r i s t o t e l i a n processes. I f i t is true at t 1
that x is changing, a n d true at t that x has come to rest, i t m o s t cer

2
t a i n l y does n o t follow, a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , that x has undergone

a change from c h a n g i n g to resting. {Mutatis mutandis, i f i t has gone
f r o m resting to changing.) A m o n g other aspects o f change, Phy
sics 6 examines i n detail the nature o f these transitions f r o m rest to
change, a n d f r o m change to rest, n e i t h e r o f w h i c h are themselves
changes.
T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the observation that for A r i s t o t l e kinesis is
m u c h n a r r o w e r t h a n m i g h t at first appear cannot be overstated. F o r
i t is a c o r o l l a r y o f this v i e w that to say that s o m e t h i n g is n o t subject
to change leaves open that the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n engages i n t r a n s i t i o
nal switches w h i c h are n o t changes. A n d so w h e n A r i s t o t l e claims
that the soul is n o t subject to kinesis {DA i . 3, 4 o 6 2 ) , this does a : l
not r u l e o u t switches such as, for instance, those f r o m perceptual

i n a c t i v i t y to perceptual a c t i v i t y . B i o l o g y w i l l be r i d d l e d w i t h ex
12
amples o f such switches or transitions. S m a l l wonder, t h e n , that

Physics 6 takes u p o n itself a close s t u d y o f the conceptual range o f
the n o t i o n o f kinesis.
3. Changes have n o b e g i n n i n g , b u t they

do have an end: t r a d i t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
H e r e is the central stretch o f t e x t that w i l l c o n c e r n me i n this paper:

Physics 6. 5, 2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 2 7 (the t r a n s l a t i o n is m i n e ) :
b a
on 23S 30b
piev Toivvv TO n,eTaf$ef$\t]K6s, ore n,eTaf$ef$\t]Ke rrpayrov, Iv

eKeiva) loriv, brjXov Iv cS be Trpcora) pLeTajiejiXrjKev TO piera-
11
ev n row dSwdrajv T O VTrdpêw avrfj Kivqoiv.
1 3
For a similar point see J. Rosen, ' M o t i o n and Change i n Aristotle's Physics 5. 1',
Phronesis, 57 (2012), 63—99 64. a t
fiefiXrjKos, dvdyKr/ aro{i,ov etvai. Xiyco Si TTpcoTov o fj/rj

rep erepov n avrov etvai TOLOVTOV eoriv. eorco yap Siaiperov TO
AT\ Kal Sir/pr/oOco Kara TO B. el fjiev ovv iv TCO AB /xera- 235 35 b
fiefiXrjKev rj irdXiv iv TCO BT, OVK av iv TTpcoTcp TCO AT \ie-

TafiefiXrjKos eir/. el S' iv eKaTepcpfieTefiaXXev(dvdyKr/ yap
rj iieTafiefiXrjKevai rj {leTafidXXeiv iv eKaTepcp), Kav iv TCO 236 i a
oXcp fjierafiaAAor dAA'^v [AeTafiefiXrjKos. 6 avros Si Ao-

yos Kal el iv TCO fj,ev {leTafidXXei, iv Si TCO fjierafiefiXr}-
Kev eorai yap n TOV TTpcoTov irporepov ajar' OVK av eir/ Siai
perov iv a> iierafiefiXrjKev. (jjavepov ovv o n Kal TO e<J)6apfjie- 236 5 a
vov Kal TO yeyovos iv dro/xo; TO [jiev e(f)6aprai TO Si ye-

yovev.
Xeyerai Si TO iv a> TTpcorcp iierafiefiXrjKe Sixcos, TO
fiiv iv a> TTpcorcp iTrereXeoOr/ r) iierafioXr) (rore yap aXr/-
9is €L7T€LV OTl fjieTafiefiXrjKev), TO S' iv CO TTpCOTCp 7]pâTO /X£-
rafidXXeiv. TO fjiev ovv Kara TO reXos rrjs /xeTajSoA^s TTpco-
-
236 io
a
TOV Xeyoêvov virapxei re Kal eoriv (ivSex^rai 7 P imre- a
XeoOrjvai iierafioXrjv Kal eon iierafioXrjs reXos, o Srj Kal

SeSeiKrai dSiaiperov ov Sid TO irepas eivai)' TO Si Kara rr)v
apxrjv oXays OVK eoriv ov yap eoriv ap^r) iierafioXrjs, ovS' iv
cp TTpcoTU) TOV xpovov [AerefiaXev. eorco yap TTpcorov i^ cp
13
236^5
T O AA. TOVTO Srj dSiaiperov fiiv OVK eoriv ovftfir/oerai yap
eô/xem eivai r d vvv. en S' el iv TOO TA xpovcp rravrl rjpe-
/xei (K€LG9CO yap r/peôvv), Kal iv TOO A r/peêi, COOT' el d/xe-
pes ion TO AA, a\ia r]pe\ir]oei Kal \iera$e$Xr]KO$ eorav iv
fiiv yap TCO A r/peêi, iv Si TOO A iierafiefiXrjKev. iirel S }
236 2o
a
OVK eoriv d/xepe's , avdyKr/ SiaipeTov etvai Kal iv OTCOOVV TCOV TOVTOV
-
fjLerafiefiXrjKevar SiaipeOivTos yap TOV AA, €.1 \iiv iv {^r/Se-

Tepcp [AeTafiifiXrjKev, ovS' iv TOO oXcp' el S' iv aôtv / x e T a -
fiaXXei Kal iv TOO uavTi, el S iv OaTepcp [AeTafiifiXrjKev,
} 1 4
OVK iv TOO oXcp TTpcoTcp. COGT€ avdyKr/ iv OTCOOVV iieTafiefiXrj- 236^5

Kevai. (jjavepov TOLVVV OTL OVK eoTiv iv to TTpcoTcp fieraê-
fiXrjKev aTTeipoL ydp at Siaipioeis.
[ 3 5 3 ° ] Therefore it is clear that that which has changed, when primar
2 b
ily it has changed, is in that to which it has changed: but the primary time
in which that which has changed has changed must be indivisible. I call
'primary' that which is such-and-such not i n virtue of something other
than it being such-and-such. For let [235 35] A C be divisible, and let it
b
have been divided at B. I f then it has changed i n A B or again i n BC, A C

cannot be the primary time in which it has changed. If, on the other hand,
I read fierefiaXev
13
here with E F K , rather than fierefiaWev,
3
which Ross prints.
More on this below.
Reading el S' (with the manuscripts) instead of Ross's e t r \
14
is6 Benjamin Morison
it was changing in both (for necessarily [236*1] i t must either have changed
or be changing i n both of them), then i t would be changing in the whole
too; but our assumption was that i t had changed. T h e same argument ap
plies too i f i t is changing i n one part but has changed i n the other: for there
will be something prior to what is primary. Therefore [236*5] the time i n
which i t has changed cannot be divisible. Thus i t is clear that both that
which has been destroyed and that which has come into being have been
destroyed and have come into being i n an indivisible time.
'The primary time i n which something has changed' is said i n two ways.
In one, i t is the primary time i n which the change finished (for at that point
it is true to say that it has changed), and i n the other i t is the primary time
in which the thing started [236*10] to change. T h e one that is said to be
primary i n relation to the end of the change is both real and exists (for i t is
possible for a change to finish, and there is an end of a change, which has
in fact also been shown to be indivisible since i t is a limit), whereas the one
in relation to the start of the change does not exist at all, for there is no be
ginning of a change, at least there is no [236*15] primary part of the time i n
which i t embarked on change. For let the primary time be A D . T h e n this
is not indivisible. For then the nows would be next to each other. Again, i f
it were at rest i n the whole of the stretch of time CA (for let us grant that i t
is at rest), then i t would be at rest i n A too, w i t h the result that i f A D is
I S
partless, i t will simultaneously be at rest and have changed; [236*20] for i t is

at rest at A and has changed at D. But i f A D is not partless, i t must be divis
ible and i t must have changed i n any part of i t whatsoever, for suppose A D
is divided, then i f i t has changed i n neither part, i t w i l l not have changed
in the whole either, and i f i t is changing in both, i t is changing i n the whole
too, and i f i t has changed i n one or the other, [236*25] the whole w i l l not be
the primary time i n which i t has changed. So i t must have changed i n any
part whatsoever. I t is clear then that the primary time i n which the thing
has changed does not exist. For the divisions are endless.
T h e basic s t r u c t u r e o f this t e x t is as follows. I n the first section,

2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 7 , A r i s t o t l e proves—or attempts to p r o v e — t h a t some
b a
t h i n g he terms 'the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h that w h i c h has changed

has c h a n g e d ' m u s t exist and be i n d i v i s i b l e . I n the second sec
16 17
t i o n , 2 3 6 7 - 2 7 , A r i s t o t l e specifies that the phrase to en hoi protoi

a
metabebleken ('the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed')
15
There is a misprint ('AC') at this point i n the revision of Hardie and Gaye's
translation of the Physics i n J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The
Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton, 1984). The misprint is not present in Hardie
and Gaye's original translation in W. D. Ross (ed.), The Works of Aristotle, vol. i i
(Oxford, 1930). Thanks to John Cooper for spotting this.
16
235^32: ev dj 7rpdjTqj ij.6Tafi6fi\r]K6v TO [xeTafiefiXriKos.17
235^33: O.TOIIOV.
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 iS7
actually has two m e a n i n g s . A c c o r d i n g to the first m e a n i n g , i t refers
18
to the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g finished c h a n g i n g — i n 19
this sense o f the phrase, the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has

changed exists, a n d i n d e e d is the p r i m a r y t i m e whose existence
A r i s t o t l e h a d p r o v e n i n the first section. A c c o r d i n g to the second
m e a n i n g , i t refers to the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started
to c h a n g e — i n this sense o f the phrase, the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h
20
s o m e t h i n g has changed does not exist, a n d A r i s t o t l e offers a l o n g

a n d i n t r i c a t e a r g u m e n t i n 2 3 6 15-27 to prove this.
s
I shall be saying a l o t m o r e about the m e a n i n g o f the key phrase

to en hoi protoi metabebleken i n this paper. B u t r i s i n g above its i n
tricacies for a m o m e n t , we can see that i n the course o f this stretch
of t e x t A r i s t o t l e makes a c l a i m w h i c h at first s i g h t — a n d indeed at
m a n y subsequent sights too—seems absurd: namely, that a change
has no b e g i n n i n g , a l t h o u g h i t does have an e n d ( 2 3 6 i o - i 1). A b
21 a
s u r d ' is m y choice o f w o r d , b u t even A r i s t o t l e ' s closest p u p i l a n d

successor T h e o p h r a s t u s called the c o n t e n t i o n ' a m a z i n g ' . (As a l
22
ways w i t h T h e o p h r a s t u s , we s h o u l d n o t assume that this means that

he is c r i t i c i z i n g his Master. M o r e l i k e l y is that he was s i m p l y soften
ing u p the reader: 'this m a y seem amazing, b u t actually y o u ' l l see
that i t is q u i t e t r u e ' . ) 23
But w h y is i t absurd or amazing to say that changes have n o be

g i n n i n g , b u t do have an end? Presumably for the f o l l o w i n g three
reasons at least:
(a) H o w can s o m e t h i n g get g o i n g i f its m o v i n g has n o beginning?

(b) T h e c l a i m seems a r b i t r a r i l y a s y m m e t r i c — w h y s h o u l d there
be a difference between the b e g i n n i n g and e n d o f a change?
(c) I f a change has no b e g i n n i n g , w h a t about the p e r i o d o f rest
w h i c h o c c u r r e d before it? D i d i t have an end? I n any case,
do periods o f rest have the same properties as changes, a n d
i f n o t , w h y not?
18
236 7: Xeyerai he TO ev qj irpojTOj i-ieTafiefiXr/Ke
a
Stâj?.
19 236 7~8: T O [lev ev qj Trpo'jTOj eTrereXeodrj rj [LeTofioXrj.
a
30
236 9~10: T O S' ev qj Trpo'jTOj r j p ^ a r o
a
[leTaflaXXeiv.
31
236 I4: ov yap eoriv dpyrj
a
[LeTofioXr)*;.
3 3
BavîaoTov (Themist. I n Pkys. 195.8 Schenkl= 15 6A F H S & G ) ; BavîaoTa (Simpl.
I n Phys. 986. 6 Diels= 156B F H S & G ) .
33
For another example of a merely apparent criticism on the part of Theophrastus
see B. Morison, 'Did Theophrastus Reject Aristotle's Account of Place?', Phronesis,
55 (2010), 68-103.
i58 Benjamin Morison
E x c i t e d b y A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a i m that a change has n o b e g i n n i n g , c o m

m e n t a t o r s have a t t e m p t e d to reconstruct his a r g u m e n t , a n d have
almost u n i f o r m l y u n d e r s t o o d h i m to mean the following: there is
no first instant or m o m e n t o f a change. I shall be a r g u i n g that A r i s
totle does n o t m e a n that a n d does n o t assert that, a n d I shall be
e x a m i n i n g the relevant t e x t m o r e closely i n a m o m e n t . B u t an or
t h o d o x v e r s i o n o f the a r g u m e n t is w o r t h l a y i n g o u t .
T h e a r g u m e n t is supposed to go like this. Suppose that x is at
rest, and t h e n moves. Suppose f u r t h e r that there is a last m o m e n t ,
ti, at w h i c h x is at rest. T h e n let the first m o m e n t at w h i c h x is m o v
i n g be t . E i t h e r t is previous to f , or t = t , or t is after t .
z z : z 1 z 1
(Step i ) I f t were previous to f , t h e n there w o u l d be a p e r i o d o f

z :
t i m e , n a m e l y f r o m t to f , d u r i n g w h i c h x w o u l d be b o t h
z :
at rest and i n m o t i o n , w h i c h is impossible.

(Step 2 ) I f t were i d e n t i c a l to t , t h e n at that instant, x w o u l d be at
z 1
rest (because t is the last m o m e n t o f rest), and x w o u l d be

1
i n m o t i o n (because t is the first m o m e n t o f m o t i o n ) . B u t

z
this is impossible.
(Step 3) B u t i f t were after f , t h e n , since t w o instants cannot be
z :
consecutive—rather, they m u s t b o u n d a p e r i o d o f t i m e —
there w o u l d be a p e r i o d o f t i m e between t a n d t d u r i n g 1 z
w h i c h x w o u l d be neither i n m o t i o n , n o r at rest, w h i c h is
impossible.
So t is n o t previous to f , n o r i d e n t i c a l w i t h f , n o r after t . T h e r e
z : : 1
fore i t does n o t exist.

T h i s does indeed have the m a k i n g s o f a really good paradox.
T h e r e are t w o i m p o r t a n t assumptions l y i n g b e h i n d i t .
(a) I t is supposed that 'x is i n m o t i o n ' a n d 'x is at rest' are

c o n t r a d i c t o r i e s — t h e y cannot be true together a n d yet one
m u s t be true.
(b) I t is supposed that t i m e is a c o n t i n u u m , and that instants are
like p o i n t s o n a line, i n that between any t w o p o i n t s there is
another p o i n t .
I do n o t i n t e n d to take issue w i t h either o f these assumptions; A r i s

totle endorses t h e m b o t h a n d that is g o o d e n o u g h for m y purposes
here. One o f the things I w a n t to do i n this paper is cast d o u b t o n
w h e t h e r A r i s t o t l e r a n the a r g u m e n t i n the f o r m j u s t given.
M y first d o u b t is that the a r g u m e n t g i v e n is arbitrary, i n this re-
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 iS9
spect: i t established o n l y that if there is a last m o m e n t o f rest, then
there is n o first m o m e n t o f m o t i o n . I n other words, i t o n l y estab
lishes a c o n d i t i o n a l , a n d n o t the desired c l a i m (the consequent o f
the c o n d i t i o n a l ) . One w a y o f seeing w h y this matters is that i f we
hypothesize the c o n t r a r y o f the antecedent (that there is n o last m o
m e n t o f rest), we c o u l d perfectly w e l l hypothesize a first m o m e n t o f
m o t i o n , w i t h o u t c o n t r a d i c t i o n . B u t there is n o h i n t o f an appreci
a t i o n o f this i n A r i s t o t l e ' s text.
M y second d o u b t is that w h e n we t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n to the other
e n d o f the change, we can use exactly the same f o r m o f a r g u m e n t to
argue f r o m the a s s u m p t i o n that there is a last m o m e n t o f m o t i o n , to
the c o n c l u s i o n that there is n o first m o m e n t o f rest. However, A r i s
totle definitely does n o t do this. H e argues that the e n d o f a change
a n d the b e g i n n i n g o f the subsequent p e r i o d o f rest coincide, and oc
c u r instantaneously. ( I shall say m o r e about this later.)
M y t h i r d d o u b t is that n o w h e r e does A r i s t o t l e ever talk o f the first
or last m o m e n t o f change or rest u s i n g an expression i n v o l v i n g the
w o r d for an i n s t a n t (nun). ZA
H e uses a l o c u t i o n w h i c h sounds s i m i l a r
to t h i s — b u t is n o t i d e n t i c a l , and is i n fact c r u c i a l l y different. T h a t
l o c u t i o n is to en hoi protoi metabebleken ( 2 3 5 3 2 - 3 ; 236 7), w h i c h I
b a
have translated as 'the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h i t has changed'. T h i s

phrase does n o t refer to an instant as a m a t t e r o f its m e a n i n g , a n d
nor does i t refer to s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is f i r s t — a t least, n o t i f b y that
we are to u n d e r s t a n d temporally first. O r so I shall argue.
One reason for t h i n k i n g that A r i s t o t l e is n o t r e f e r r i n g to the first
instant o f a change w h e n he uses this l o c u t i o n is q u i t e s i m p l y that
he does n o t use the G r e e k w o r d for 'instant' {nun) i n i t . B u t even i f
this does n o t convince y o u , there is irrefutable p r o o f that the phrase
to en hoi protoi metabebleken is n o t supposed to be understood i n its
v e r y m e a n i n g as r e f e r r i n g to an instant, a n d that is that A r i s t o t l e u n
dertakes to prove that the t i m e en hoi protoi metabebleken ( w h e n that
phrase is u n d e r s t o o d to refer to the e n d o f a change) is n o t a stretch
of t i m e b u t is an instant ( 2 3 5 3 4 - 2 3 6 5 ) . I f that phrase s i m p l y meant
b a
'the first instant i n w h i c h the t h i n g has changed' vel sim., t h e n i t

w o u l d be e n t i r e l y otiose—and scarcely i n t e l l i g i b l e — t o prove that
this was n o t a stretch o f t i m e (and the a r g u m e n t w o u l d look v e r y dif
ferent f r o m the c o m p l e x one that A r i s t o t l e actually gives at 2 3 5 3 4 - b
236 5). M o r e o v e r , A r i s t o t l e also proves that the t i m e en hoi protoi

a
3 4
' T h e first instant of change' would presumably correspond to an expression
such as T O TTJS [leTafloXris Trpajrov vvv.
i6o Benjamin Morison
metabebleken ( w h e n that phrase is u n d e r s t o o d to refer to the b e g i n

n i n g o f a change) is neither an instant ( 2 3 6 i 6 - 2 o ) nor a stretch o f
a
t i m e ( 2 3 6 2 0 - 6 ) . A g a i n , i f the phrase s i m p l y meant 'the first i n s t a n t

a
i n w h i c h the t h i n g has changed' vel sim., t h e n i t w o u l d be e n t i r e l y

otiose to prove that i t was n o t a stretch o f t i m e , a n d m y s t i f y i n g to
prove that i t was n o t an instant.
B u t i n fact i t s h o u l d be obvious that A r i s t o t l e is n o t u s i n g the
w o r d proton to refer to t e m p o r a l p r i o r i t y , because his e x p l a n a t i o n
for w h a t the w o r d proton does mean i n this c o n t e x t makes this ex
p l i c i t (235 33~4): ' I call "proton" that w h i c h is such-and-such b u t
a
n o t i n v i r t u e o f s o m e t h i n g other t h a n i t b e i n g s u c h - a n d - s u c h . ' 25
W h a t e v e r this means, i t does n o t even sound like a d e f i n i t i o n o f

'first' i n the sense o f ' t e m p o r a l l y first'. A better t r a n s l a t i o n w o u l d
be s o m e t h i n g like ' p r i m a r y ' , i n the sense o f 'logically p r i m a r y ' , or
perhaps ' p r i m a r y i n b e i n g ' or s o m e t h i n g like that. T h i s sense o f the
w o r d needs some e x p l a n a t i o n , w h i c h I shall n o w a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e .
I n d e e d , once we have u n d e r s t o o d h o w A r i s t o t l e intends the w o r d
proton to be u n d e r s t o o d , we w i l l see i m m e d i a t e l y w h y i t is that we
s h o u l d n o t i n t r o d u c e talk o f instants either.
4. T h e m e a n i n g o f proton, a n d an analogy w i t h places
A h e l p f u l place to start i n e l u c i d a t i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s m e a n i n g is a pas

sage r i g h t at the b e g i n n i n g o f Physics 6. 6 ( 2 3 6 i 9 - 2 3 ) : b
Every changing thing changes i n a stretch of time, but changing in a stretch

of time can be understood as meaning either i n a primary stretch of time,
or i n respect of some other stretch of time (e.g. something changes i n some
year i n virtue of the fact that i t changes on some day). So the primary stretch
of time i n which a changing thing changes is such that necessarily the thing
is changing i n any part of i t whatsoever.
T h e p o i n t b e h i n d this is the f o l l o w i n g . Suppose someone asks me:

' W h e n d i d y o u go to the C i t y ? ' . I m i g h t r e p l y : ' I n 2 0 1 1 ' . ' W h e n i n
2011 ?', he persists. ' O n D e c e m b e r 5 t h ' , I reply. I t is i n v i r t u e o f the
fact that m y j o u r n e y to the C i t y o c c u r r e d o n 5 D e c e m b e r 2011 that i t
o c c u r r e d i n 2 0 1 1 . T h e ' i n v i r t u e o f here Qioti) captures the fact that
f r o m ' I w e n t to the C i t y o n 5 D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 1 ' we can infer ' I w e n t
to the C i t y i n 2 0 1 1 ' , b u t n o t vice versa. ( T h e r e are p l e n t y o f things
3 5
Xeyoj Se TrpojTov o [irj TOJ erepov TL OVTOV etvai TOIOVTOV eoTiv.
w h i c h happened i n 2011 b u t w h i c h d i d n o t h a p p e n o n 5 D e c e m b e r
2011.) So, as A r i s t o t l e p u t s i t i n the text j u s t q u o t e d , the change
( m y j o u r n e y to the C i t y ) t o o k place i n some year (2011) i n v i r t u e o f
the fact that i t took place o n some day o f that year (5 D e c e m b e r ) .
N o w , i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , 2011 is n o t the p r i m a r y t i m e
o f m y j o u r n e y to the City, since there is a p a r t o f 2011 i n w h i c h
m y j o u r n e y occurred, n a m e l y 5 D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 1 . N o w i n fact, 5
D e c e m b e r 2011 is n o t the p r i m a r y t i m e either, since m y j o u r n e y
d i d n o t occur d u r i n g the whole o f that t i m e , b u t o n l y i n the evening
o f 5 December. E v e n t h e n , we c o u l d be m o r e precise about w h e n
m y j o u r n e y took place w i t h i n that stretch (between 5.42 p . m . a n d
7.16 p . m . , or whatever).
W h a t I m e a n b y b e i n g ' m o r e precise' is the f o l l o w i n g . I specified
the t i m e o f m y j o u r n e y as (first) 2011 (call this t i m e A ) , (then) 5
D e c e m b e r 2011 (call this t i m e B ) , (then) the evening o f the fifth
( t i m e C ) , a n d (finally) the stretch between 5.42 p . m . a n d 7.16 p . m .
o n that day ( t i m e D ) . I n so d o i n g I specify the t i m e o f m y j o u r n e y
m o r e and m o r e precisely, i n this sense: a n y t h i n g w h i c h happens i n
t i m e B happens i n t i m e A b u t n o t vice versa, so B is a m o r e precise
t i m e - s t r e t c h t h a n A . S i m i l a r l y , a n y t h i n g w h i c h happens i n t i m e C
happens i n t i m e B b u t n o t vice versa, so C is a m o r e precise t i m e -
stretch t h a n B . L i k e w i s e , a n y t h i n g w h i c h happens i n t i m e D hap
pens i n t i m e C b u t n o t vice versa. So D is the m o s t precise o u t o f
all the g i v e n time-stretches.
L e t us assume that D is the m o s t precise stretch o f t i m e for the
j o u r n e y . I n that case, i t qualifies as the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the
j o u r n e y took place, since I was engaging i n m y change ( j o u r n e y i n g
to the C i t y ) at every substretch o f i t (as A r i s t o t l e puts i t i n the text
above: 'necessarily the t h i n g is c h a n g i n g i n any p a r t o f i t whatso
ever'). M o r e o v e r , there is n o p a r t o f m y j o u r n e y w h i c h lies outside
that stretch o f t i m e either. Hence, that stretch o f t i m e exactly fits
m y j o u r n e y : i t is the m o s t precise specification possible o f w h e n m y
j o u r n e y t o o k place. T h a t stretch o f t i m e D has an i m p o r t a n t p r o
p e r t y : any stretch o f t i m e w h i c h includes D w i l l be a true answer to
the q u e s t i o n ' w h e n d i d the j o u r n e y take place?'. Possible answers
i n c l u d e : w i n t e r 2 0 1 1 ; the second decade o f the t w e n t y - f i r s t cen
t u r y ; the t w e n t y - f i r s t c e n t u r y itself; etc. T h u s , the p r i m a r y stretch
o f t i m e ( D ) i n w h i c h the change took place has e x p l a n a t o r y value;
we can e x p l a i n w h y any true answer to the q u e s t i o n ' w h e n d i d the
j o u r n e y take place?' is true b y a d v e r t i n g to the fact that the t i m e -

stretch specified i n that answer includes D .
T h e r e is a parallel for this i n Physics 4. 1-5, A r i s t o t l e ' s account
of p l a c e . I m a g i n e somebody asking me where I am. I r e p l y : ' I
26
a m i n P r i n c e t o n ' . T h e y t h e n ask f u r t h e r : ' W h e r e i n P r i n c e t o n ? ' —

' I n M a r x H a l l ' — ' W h e r e i n M a r x H a l l ? ' — ' O n the second f l o o r ' —
' W h e r e o n the second f l o o r ? ' — ' I n r o o m 208'. Each t i m e , I specify
a m o r e precise place where I a m . T h e sense i n w h i c h each o f m y
replies is m o r e precise is the f o l l o w i n g . E v e r y t h i n g i n M a r x H a l l is
i n P r i n c e t o n , b u t n o t vice versa. ( F o r instance, Firestone L i b r a r y
is i n P r i n c e t o n , b u t n o t i n M a r x H a l l . ) L i k e w i s e , e v e r y t h i n g o n the
second floor o f M a r x H a l l is i n M a r x H a l l , b u t n o t vice versa. E v e r y
t h i n g i n r o o m 208 is o n the second floor o f M a r x H a l l , b u t n o t vice
versa.
A r i s t o t l e holds that e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h has a place has a primary
place—i.e. a most precise place. Special features o f this place i n c l u d e
the f o l l o w i n g : i t m u s t c o n t a i n n o t h i n g besides that o f w h i c h i t is the
p r i m a r y place (Physics 4. 2, 2 0 9 i ) . A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s that a c o r o l l a r y
b
of this is that i t m u s t be a surface, a n d i n fact he famously says that

x's p r i m a r y place is 'the i n n e r surface o f x's s u r r o u n d i n g s ' . T h e i m
portance o f x's p r i m a r y place, p, is that since p is x's m o s t precise
place, i t is i n v i r t u e o f the fact that x is i n p that x is i n a n y t h i n g at
all. So, for instance, I a m i n the air at the m o m e n t i n v i r t u e o f the
fact that I a m i n this surface o f air. A n y t h i n g i n this surface o f air
is i n the air, whereas i t is n o t the case that a n y t h i n g i n the air is i n
this surface o f air.
I do n o t w a n t to discuss here the m e r i t s o f A r i s t o t l e ' s remarks
about p l a c e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t for o u r purposes is that A r i s
27
totle refers sometimes to x's p r i m a r y place as that i n w h i c h x is

n o n - d e r i v a t i v e l y (kath'hauto), the contrast b e i n g w i t h those things
w h i c h x is i n d e r i v a t i v e l y (kath' heteron or kat' alio}. - T h i s is
2 8
3 6
A parallel remarked by Ross i n P h y s i c s , i n his note to 6. 6, 236 2o—i (in his
b
commentary he often renders rrpwrov by 'commensurate'). He does not mention the

parallel i n connection w i t h Aristotle's first elucidation of what 'primary' means, at
6- 5, 235 33—4. M y temporal example is similar to that given by Wagner, in A r i s
b
toteles: Physikvorlesung (Berlin, 1967), 626—7, translated and endorsed as correct by

Strobach, i n The Moment of Change: A Systematic H i s t o r y i n the Philosophy of Space
and Time [Moment] (Dordrecht, 1998), 74—5. Wagner does not mention the parallel
w i t h place, nor does Strobach. Hardie and Gaye often translate Trpcorov as 'primary',
which suggests that they also saw that temporal priority is not at issue.
3 7
See Morison, Location, for a full discussion of these issues.
3 8
See Phys. 4. 2, 209*31.
m i r r o r e d b y his contrast i n Physics 6. 6 between the primary t i m e i n

w h i c h a c h a n g i n g t h i n g changes, a n d the t i m e i n w h i c h i t changes
in respect of something else (kath' heteron, 2 3 6 2 i ) . b
N o w , at Physics 6. 6, 2 3 6 i 9 - 2 3 , A r i s t o t l e was addressing the

b
q u e s t i o n o f w h e n s o m e t h i n g is changing, i.e. w h e n a change occurs.

Since changes take time, the q u e s t i o n ' w h e n d i d the change occur?'
can be answered t r u l y o n l y b y a specification o f a stretch o f t i m e
( A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r d for a stretch o f t i m e is chronos), hence w h y A r i s
totle p o i n t s o u t t h a t 'every c h a n g i n g t h i n g changes i n a stretch o f
t i m e ' ( 2 3 6 i 9 ) . B u t o f course, some t h i n g s h a p p e n instantaneously,
b
a n d do n o t take t i m e . F o r instance, m y arrival i n the C i t y is a good

candidate for b e i n g j u s t such an instantaneous occurrence. (As we
shall see, A r i s t o t l e is v e r y interested i n such occurrences.) B u t n o
tice that there is exactly the same s t r u c t u r e to possible answers to
the q u e s t i o n ' W h e n d i d he arrive i n the C i t y ? ' . T h e r e are m o r e or
less precise answers to the q u e s t i o n ( ' i n 2 0 1 1 ' , ' o n D e c e m b e r 5 t h ' ) ,
a n d there w i l l be a m o s t precise answer (one w h i c h specifies the ex
act instant at w h i c h I a r r i v e d ) . T h i s m o s t precise answer w i l l be
the p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h I a r r i v e d . I n this case, the p r i m a r y t i m e
of the relevant occurrence is n o t a stretch o f t i m e (a chronos) b u t
rather an i n s t a n t (a nun). So a l t h o u g h some t r u e answers to the
q u e s t i o n ' w h e n d i d he arrive?' w i l l specify stretches o f t i m e (an
swers such as ' 2 0 1 1 ' ) , those answers w i l l be t r u e because they c o n
t a i n the p r i m a r y t i m e o f m y a r r i v a l ( n a m e l y a certain i n s t a n t w h i c h
is c o n t a i n e d i n 2011).
T a k i n g i n t o account t h a t t h i n g s w h i c h h a p p e n can be either
changes or instantaneous occurrences such as a r r i v i n g , we can
p o i n t to the f o l l o w i n g parallels between w h a t A r i s t o t l e says about
place, a n d w h a t he says about t i m e :
(ai) A b o d y x is i n a place P i n respect o f s o m e t h i n g else i f f x is i n

P b u t there is s o m e t h i n g y i n w h i c h x is such that y is p a r t
of P a n d x is i n y.
(02) A change/occurrence x is i n a t i m e T i n respect o f s o m e t h i n g
else i f f there is s o m e t h i n g y i n w h i c h x is such t h a t y is p a r t
of T a n d x is i n y.
(bi) A b o d y x is i n a place P p r i m a r i l y i f f x is i n P b u t there is
n o t h i n g else y i n w h i c h x is such that y is p a r t o f P a n d x is
i n y.
Q)2.) A change/occurrence x is i n a t i m e T p r i m a r i l y i f f x is i n T
b u t there is n o t h i n g else y i n w h i c h x is such that y is p a r t

of T and x is i n y.
T h e n o t i o n , t h e n , o f a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h some change/
occurrence x happens is thus far f r o m b e i n g s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f the
first moment at w h i c h x happens, or s o m e t h i n g like that. T h e r e is
no e x p l i c i t m e n t i o n o f moments at a l l , n o r is there is any h i n t o f
first m o m e n t s . T h e p r i m a r y t i m e o f an event E (an occurrence or a
change or whatever) is the t i m e A B — e i t h e r a stretch o f t i m e ( A ±
B ) , or an instant ( A = B ) — s u c h that E occurs i n A B , a n d n o p a r t o f
E occurs at any t i m e outside A B , a n d such that there is no stretch
of t i m e C D w h i c h is a p a r t o f A B i n w h i c h E is n o t t a k i n g place.
5. T h e p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed
I n Physics 6. 5, 2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 2 7 , A r i s t o t l e w i l l a t t e m p t to prove t w o
b a
things: that there is no p r i m a r y t i m e at or i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g began

to change ( 2 3 6 i 5 - 2 7 ) , b u t there is a p r i m a r y t i m e at or i n w h i c h
a
s o m e t h i n g finished c h a n g i n g ( 2 3 5 3 4 - 2 3 6 5 ) . Or, to p u t this an

b a
other way, there is no w a y to specify precisely when s o m e t h i n g does

e n o u g h c h a n g i n g to c o u n t as h a v i n g changed, i.e. w h e n i t transitions
f r o m rest to change, b u t there is a w a y to specify precisely when i t
transitions f r o m change to rest. T h a t this is w h a t A r i s t o t l e is d o i n g
s h o u l d be u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l ; he tells us i n 2 3 6 7 - i 5 that this is exactly
a
w h a t he is g o i n g to do. B u t w h a t demands e x p l a n a t i o n is h o w A r i s
totle can c l a i m that the single l o c u t i o n , to en hoi protoi metabebleken,
can refer to either the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g began to
change, or the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g finished changing.
T h i s is w h a t I w a n t to l i n g e r o n i n this section, before investigat
i n g i n the n e x t section the t w o arguments that A r i s t o t l e gives for
his t w i n claims (that there is no p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h i t started to
change, b u t there is a p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h i t finished changing).
A r i s t o t l e is clear that to en hoi protoi metabebleken, w h i c h l i t e r a l l y
means 'the p r i m a r y [ t i m e ] i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed', can be
taken i n t w o q u i t e different ways ( 2 3 6 7 - i o ) :
a
Xeyerat oe TO IV CS Trpcora) pLeTajiejiXrjKe SIÔJS, TO

piev Iv co Trpcora) CTTCTCXCOOTJ rj pLeTafioXr/ (rore yap aXrj-
Ocs CITTCIV on ftcraficfiXriKcv), TO O" IV a) Trpcora) fjpi;aTO \ic-
rajidXXetv. 236 io
a
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 i6s
'The primary time i n which something has changed' is said i n two ways.
I n one, i t is the primary time i n which the change finished (for at that point
it is true to say that i t has changed), and i n the other i t is the primary time
in which the thing started to change.
T h e r e are t w o p u z z l i n g features i n A r i s t o t l e ' s e l u c i d a t i o n o f the

double m e a n i n g o f the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken. (i) H o w
on earth can one a n d the same phrase manage to refer b o t h to
the start o f a change and to the finish} ( i i ) H o w can i t be that a
phrase w h i c h contains the perfect f o r m 'has changed' (metabebleken)
can have its meanings u n f o l d e d b y phrases c o n t a i n i n g aorist forms,
n a m e l y 'finished' (epetelesthe) a n d 'started' (erxato)} 29
A f t e r a l l , the
G r e e k perfect t y p i c a l l y captures the idea that s o m e t h i n g is i n a cer
t a i n state, a state w h i c h has been reached as a result o f the past per
formance o f the a c t i o n specified b y the relevant verb. T h e aorist,
on the other h a n d , s i m p l y states that an action o c c u r r e d i n the past,
v i e w i n g that action as a w h o l e , a n d saying n o t h i n g about the agent's
current condition.
We s h o u l d note that the a m b i g u i t y A r i s t o t l e p o i n t s to is a l l due
to the m e a n i n g o f the w o r d metabebleken. F o r the phrase w h i c h is
said to have t w o meanings is to en hoi protoi metabebleken, and yet
the s t r i n g o f w o r d s en hoi protoi appears i n the elucidations o f both
of the t w o meanings: to en hoi protoi epetelesthe he metabole, a n d to
en hoi protoi erxato metaballein. So i t is n o t the w o r d protos w h i c h is
responsible for generating the t w o meanings. T h e r e f o r e i t m u s t be
all d o w n to the w o r d metabebleken. B u t before we get i n t o c l a r i f y i n g
w h a t metabebleken means, we first have to decipher the g r a m m a r o f
the w h o l e phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken. I t is a n o u n phrase
f o r m e d b y the article f o l l o w e d b y a relative clause, b u t there is n o
e x p l i c i t antecedent for the relative p r o n o u n . I t is clear that i n E n g
l i s h one has to s u p p l y a n o u n such as ' t i m e ' as antecedent for en hoi
protoi. N o w , one m u s t r e m e m b e r that the w o r d ' t i m e ' is n o t here
t r a n s l a t i n g the w o r d chronos. A r i s t o t e l i a n G r e e k lacks a w o r d w h i c h
is n e u t r a l as between 'stretch o f t i m e ' (chronos) and ' i n s t a n t o f t i m e '
(nun), a w o r d w h i c h w o u l d be genus, as i t were, to those t w o species.
B u t i t is easy to see that the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken m u s t
3 9
Strobach { M o m e n t , 73) states correctly that 'ixeTafiefiXr/Kev is i n one sense syno
nymous w i t h ripâro ixeTafiaXXeiv; in another sense it is synonymous w i t h eVereAe'a^
r/ [jLerafioXri , and offers the following terse explanation for what is going on: the dis
tinction between two types of aorist (ingressive and perfective) is 'transferred into
the two different meanings of [leTafiifiXriKev (257 n. 77). I n my text I offer a fuller
and somewhat different explanation.
be n e u t r a l i n its m e a n i n g as between 'stretch o f t i m e ' a n d 'instant',

because w h e n d e n y i n g the existence o f the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h
s o m e t h i n g started to change, A r i s t o t l e proves that i t can be neither
an instant nor a stretch o f t i m e . 3 0
Since the w o r d protoi i n o u r phrase is i n a p p o s i t i o n to the relative

p r o n o u n , i t is easiest to render the phrase i n E n g l i s h b y t a k i n g i t
outside the relative clause, s u p p l y i n g the m i s s i n g n o u n , to give us
the f o l l o w i n g r e n d e r i n g o f to en hoi protoi metabebleken: 'the p r i m a r y
t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g has changed'. So now, we m u s t look at the
Greek perfect f o r m metabebleken. I t means s o m e t h i n g like this: 'x
is i n a state o f h a v i n g changed'. A s G o o d w i n puts i t i n his de
3 1
s c r i p t i o n o f the Greek perfect: ' T h e Perfect represents an action as

already finished at the present t i m e ' (§ 1 7 . i ) ; ' [ I ] t i m p l i e s the per
formance o f the action i n the past t i m e , yet states o n l y that i t stands
completed at the present t i m e ' (§ 17.2 N o t e 1). T h e perfect tense has
perfective aspect. So, for instance, to ask ' w h e n p r i m a r i l y some
32
t h i n g has changed'—hote metabebleken proton (cf. 6. 5, 235 7; 3 1 ) — b
is to ask w h e n p r i m a r i l y s o m e t h i n g is i n the state o f h a v i n g changed.

Since this state can endure for a w h i l e , this w o u l d be to ask w h e n
exactly the t h i n g is i n the state o f h a v i n g changed.
B u t w h a t about to en hoi protoi metabebleken} Is this a phrase re
f e r r i n g to the t i m e w h e n the t h i n g is i n the state o f h a v i n g changed?
T h e answer is no. T o see this, we have to notice s o m e t h i n g about
the E n g l i s h perfect. A s C o m r i e puts i t : ' i n E n g l i s h , the Perfect m a y
n o t be used together w i t h specification o f the t i m e o f the past s i t u
ation, i.e. one cannot say / have got up at five o'clock this morning,
because the specific reference to the p o i n t o f t i m e at five o'clock
this morning is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the E n g l i s h P e r f e c t ' .
33
However,
C o m r i e p o i n t s o u t that other languages do a l l o w for perfect forms
Hence one should absolutely resist the temptation to translate the phrase T O iv
3 0
cu as 'the first instant i n which something has changed', or 'le

7rpwTu) [.leTafiefiXriKev
premier (moment) dans lequel ce qui a change a change', as Pierre Pellegrin trans
lates it ('Debut et fin du mouvement et du repos: remarques sur la communication
de Benjamin Morison' ['Remarques'], in J.-F. Balaude and F Wolff (eds.), A r i s t o t e
et l a pensee du temps (Le Temps Philosophique, n ; Universite Paris X—Nanterre,
2005), 113—26 at 121). I rather like Hardie and Gaye's original (1930) translation: 'the
primary when i n which something has changed'. But the nominalization of 'when'
is a little awkward.
31
W. W. Goodwin, The Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb [Syn
tax], 3rd edn. (1867; repr. Cambridge L i b r a r y Collection; Cambridge, 2009).
Emphasized by Strobach, Moment, 73.
3 3
B. Comrie, Aspect
3 3
(Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics; Cambridge, 1976),
54. He does acknowledge that there are a few instances where it is not excluded that
to be m o d i f i e d b y adverbial phrases specifying w h e n the relevant

action or event t o o k place, and produces examples f r o m Spanish
a n d Russian; he also p o i n t s o u t that i n E n g l i s h y o u can achieve the
same result i f y o u a d d the specification 'as an afterthought': ' I have
been to B i r m i n g h a m , last week i n f a c t ' . I s u b m i t that w h e n A r i s
34
totle w o n d e r s in what time s o m e t h i n g has changed, he is w o n d e r

i n g when it got the changing done that qualifies the thing as having
changed, m u c h as we m i g h t wonder, i f someone says ' I have been to
B i r m i n g h a m ' , w h e n i t was that they w e n t to B i r m i n g h a m . W h e n we
ask w h e n they w e n t there, we are asking w h e n the event t o o k place
w h i c h qualifies t h e m as n o w b e i n g i n the state o f h a v i n g been to
B i r m i n g h a m — w h e n the event t o o k place w h i c h qualifies t h e m now
as b e i n g p a s t - B i r m i n g h a m - v i s i t o r s . ( T h i s is d i s t i n c t f r o m asking,
for instance, h o w l o n g they have been i n the state o f b e i n g past-
Birmingham-visitors.)
I n Greek, can t e m p o r a l adverbial phrases, m o d i f y i n g perfect
verbs, p l a y this role o f specifying w h e n the relevant action took
place w h i c h p u t the object i n the c u r r e n t state expressed b y the
perfect? I t h i n k they can, and I t h i n k we get a p r i m e example
elsewhere i n Physics 6. Consider the f o l l o w i n g c l a i m i n Phy
sics 6. 6: ' E v e r y t h i n g w h i c h is m o v i n g m u s t be i n a state o f h a v i n g
m o v e d p r e v i o u s l y ' ( 2 3 6 3 3 - 4 ) . T h e adverb ' p r e v i o u s l y ' {proteron)
b 3S
modifies the perfect i n f i n i t i v e 'be i n a state o f h a v i n g m o v e d ' (keki-

nesthai). B u t w h a t is b e i n g said to have occurred p r e v i o u s l y is n o t
the state o f h a v i n g m o v e d — t h a t state is c u r r e n t — b u t rather the
moving w h i c h p u t the t h i n g i n its c u r r e n t state o f h a v i n g m o v e d . So
the adverb ' p r e v i o u s l y ' is m o d i f y i n g a perfect f o r m , b u t i t refers to
the t i m e w h e n the relevant action itself t o o k place, rather t h a n to
w h e n the t h i n g is i n the condition o f h a v i n g p e r f o r m e d the action.
S i m i l a r l y , I c l a i m , our key phrase 'the t i m e i n w h i c h p r i m a r i l y the
t h i n g has m o v e d ' is r e f e r r i n g to the t i m e i n the past w h e n the object
w h i c h is c u r r e n t l y i n the state o f h a v i n g m o v e d got the m o v i n g done
w h i c h makes i t c o u n t as n o w b e i n g i n the state o f h a v i n g m o v e d .
T h u s , the basic m e a n i n g o f metabebleken is 'x is i n a state o f hav
i n g changed', a n d the phrase en hoi protoi is i n v i t i n g us to specify
exactly {protoi) w h e n x engaged i n the change w h i c h p u t i t i n the
we specify some time i n which the relevant event or action occurred—we can say ' I
have seen Fred today'—'provided that the time includes the present' (ibid.).
34 I b i d . 54-s.
35
irav TO Kivoxifxevov avdyKTj KEKivfjoQai nporepov.
state o f ( n o w ) h a v i n g changed. N o w we have an answer to one o f

the puzzles about the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken, n a m e l y
w h y i t is that A r i s t o t l e feels he can gloss its meanings u s i n g verbs i n
the aorist, g i v e n that the verb i n the phrase is perfect. T h e answer
is that the phrase refers to the t i m e w h e n the object i n q u e s t i o n per
formed the change (aorist) w h i c h makes i t true that i t n o w counts as
having changed (perfect). T h e change i n aspect is to be e x p l a i n e d i n
a s i m i l a r w a y to the e x p l i c a t i o n o f w h y there is a change i n aspect i n
E n g l i s h w h e n I ask w h e n i t was that y o u went to B i r m i n g h a m (aor
ist), after l e a r n i n g that y o u have been (perfect) to B i r m i n g h a m ; I a m
asking w h e n y o u p e r f o r m e d the change, i.e. g o i n g to B i r m i n g h a m ,
w h i c h makes i t true that y o u n o w c o u n t as h a v i n g changed, i.e. as
h a v i n g been to B i r m i n g h a m .
So far so good. B u t we s t i l l have n o t generated the double m e a n
i n g that A r i s t o t l e insists the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken has,
w h e r e b y i t can refer b o t h to the start a n d to the e n d o f a change.
F o r that, we need to i n t r o d u c e one f u r t h e r c o m p l e x i t y . W e have to
note that A r i s t o t l e starts Physics 6. 5 w i t h the f o l l o w i n g observa
t i o n : 'every c h a n g i n g t h i n g changes f r o m s o m e t h i n g to s o m e t h i n g '
( 2 3 5 6 - 7 ) . E v e r y change, i n other w o r d s , has a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t and
b 36
an e n d p o i n t . W h e n x changes, x changes f r o m h a v i n g F p r e d i c a t e d
of i t to h a v i n g G p r e d i c a t e d o f i t , where ' F ' a n d ' G ' m a y name places
( i n w h i c h case the change i n q u e s t i o n is l o c o m o t i o n ) , or qualities ( i n
w h i c h case the change i n q u e s t i o n is alteration), etc. T o p u t things
s l i g h t l y less c l u m s i l y : w h e n x changes, x changes from b e i n g F and x
changes to b e i n g G . I d r a w a t t e n t i o n to A r i s t o t l e ' s observation be
cause we have to note that there are three different things we m i g h t
say about x, each o f t h e m u s i n g the verb 'to change': 'x changes',
'x changes f r o m b e i n g F ' , a n d 'x changes to b e i n g G ' . T h u s , w h e n
A r i s t o t l e uses the verb f o r m metabebleken, he m i g h t have i n m i n d
any one o f three different things: ( 1 ) 'x has changed' (as i n 'x has
undergone its entire change', or 'x has changed f r o m b e i n g F to be
i n g G ' ) , (2) 'x has changed f r o m b e i n g F ' , and (3) 'x has changed
to b e i n g G ' . These statements have different t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . I n
the m i d d l e o f the change i n question, for instance, ( 1 ) is false, as is
(3), b u t (2) is true.
T h u s , there are i n fact three different things that A r i s t o t l e c o u l d
mean b y the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken. I t c o u l d mean
3 6
The observation is a familiar one i n the three books constituting the Tlepl KIVT)-
aeojs (5. 1, 2 2 4 i ; 225*1; 6. 4, 2 3 4 n ; 8. 2, 252 io).

b b b
(1) the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x d i d the c h a n g i n g necessary to p u t i t

i n t o a state o f h a v i n g changed f r o m F to G (of h a v i n g c o m p l e t e d the
w h o l e change, i n other w o r d s ) , or (2) the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x
d i d whatever is necessary to p u t i t i n t o the state o f h a v i n g changed
f r o m F, or (3) the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x d i d whatever is neces
sary to p u t i t i n t o a state o f h a v i n g changed to G . I n o u r passage,
we have A r i s t o t l e u s i n g the phrase i n senses (2) and (3). T h u s , A r i s
totle glosses one m e a n i n g o f to en hoiprotoi metabebleken as to en hoi
protoi epetelesthe he metabole: the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the change
finished. T h i s is the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x d i d whatever is ne
cessary to p u t i t i n t o a state o f having changed to being G (meaning
3). A n d he glosses the other m e a n i n g o f to en hoiprotoi metabebleken
(the other m e a n i n g relevant for our passage) as to en hoiprotoi erxato
metaballein: the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the change started. T h i s is
the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x d i d whatever is necessary to p u t i t i n t o
a state o f having changed from being F (meaning 2).
I f I a m r i g h t about this, t h e n we w o u l d expect A r i s t o t l e some
where to use the l o c u t i o n 'the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x has m o v e d '
i n sense (1)—i.e. to refer to the exact t i m e i n w h i c h the whole change
t o o k place (a stretch o f t i m e , necessarily). H e r e , the perfect 'x has
m o v e d ' w o u l d m e a n 'x is i n the state o f h a v i n g c o m p l e t e d the w h o l e
change'. A n d we do get j u s t this, i n Physics 6. 6, where A r i s t o t l e , i n
the course o f another l o n g and i n v o l v e d a r g u m e n t , says: ' I f some
t h i n g has changed [kekinetai] i n the p r i m a r y t i m e X R over the m a g
n i t u d e K L , t h e n . . .' (236 34~5). H e r e , the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h
b
the t h i n g i n question has changed (kekinetai) is the p r i m a r y t i m e

i n w h i c h the whole change took place—the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h
the t h i n g changed f r o m b e i n g F to b e i n g G (that A r i s t o t l e has the
w h o l e change i n m i n d is clear f r o m the fact that there is a magnitude
specified over w h i c h the t h i n g has changed, and the change i n ques
t i o n occupies the stretch o f t i m e X R ) . T h u s , I contend, we f i n d i n
Physics 6 all three uses o f the perfect i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a t e m
p o r a l adverbial m o d i f y i n g phrase o f the f o r m ' i n such-and-such a
t i m e ' . Each t i m e , the t e m p o r a l m o d i f i e r specifies w h e n the i t e m i n
question p e r f o r m e d whatever is necessary to p u t i t i n t o the state o f
h a v i n g changed, where this state m i g h t be any o f these three: hav
i n g changed f r o m F, h a v i n g changed to G , or h a v i n g changed f r o m
F to G .
A s I said above, E n g l i s h cannot easily use these t e m p o r a l m o d i
f y i n g phrases w i t h the perfect, so i t is difficult to render some o f
these f o r m u l a t i o n s i n i d i o m a t i c E n g l i s h . However, i t is possible to

f i n d examples i n E n g l i s h o f the use o f the phrase 'x has m o v e d ' to
m e a n b o t h ' x has m o v e d f r o m b e i n g F ' and 'x has m o v e d to b e i n g
G ' . Suppose I a m o n a t r a i n , w h i c h is s i t t i n g at the station, a n d I
a m w a i t i n g for the t r a i n to leave; I m i g h t exclaim, w h e n the t r a i n
has finally left, 'we have m o v e d ! ' . B u t suppose that the t i c k e t i n
spector n o w comes u p to me a n d tells me to m o v e seats (perhaps I
a m s i t t i n g i n the w r o n g one); I get u p a n d move f r o m that seat to
another, a n d I tell h i m ' O K , n o w I have m o v e d ' . I n the first case,
m y utterance is supposed to capture the fact that we have started to
move; i n the second case, m y utterance is supposed to capture the
fact that I have c o m p l e t e d the move (to another seat). 37
So I hope to have offered explanations for (i) w h y the phrase 'the

p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed' has t w o meanings,
r e f e r r i n g to b o t h the e n d and the start o f the change, a n d ( i i ) w h y
A r i s t o t l e employs the aorist forms 'finished' a n d 'started' i n u n
p a c k i n g those t w o meanings, despite the presence o f the perfect
f o r m 'has changed' i n the phrase itself.
W i t h this g r o u n d w o r k , we can t u r n to the substantive p h i l o s o p h i
cal claims that A r i s t o t l e is g o i n g to make c o n c e r n i n g the p r i m a r y
t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started changing a n d the p r i m a r y t i m e
i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g finished changing. W h a t A r i s t o t l e w i l l c l a i m is
that we cannot p i n p o i n t when s o m e t h i n g started changing, i.e. d i d
the changing necessary to c o u n t as h a v i n g changed, whereas we can
p i n p o i n t exactly when the t h i n g c o m p l e t e d the change. Or, to use
the examples f r o m the t r a i n , we cannot p i n p o i n t w h e n the t r a i n d i d
w h a t is necessary to c o u n t as h a v i n g m o v e d f r o m its s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ,
b u t we can p i n p o i n t w h e n i t was that I d i d w h a t is necessary to
c o u n t as h a v i n g m o v e d to m y new seat.
3 7
I am grateful to Myles Burnyeat, Christian Wildberg, Jonathan Beere, Jacob
Rosen, and especially Hendrik Lorenz, for discussion of the Greek perfect. I n
Burnyeat's already classic 2008 paper 'Kinesis vs. Energeia: A Much-Read Passage
in (but not of) Aristotle's Metaphysics', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34
(2008), 219—92, he details two uses of the Greek perfect which are exploited i n
Metaphysics Theta. Jonathan Beere showed me that the ambiguity i n the phrase TO
iv cu 7rpwTu) [xeTafiefiXriKev that Aristotle points to in the Physics cannot be explained
by the same ambiguity i n the Greek perfect that is exploited i n the Metaphysics (see
also J. Beere, Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta
(Oxford Aristotle Studies; Oxford, 2009), 221—6).
6. T h e end o f the change
T h e actual w a y that A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion progresses is like this. I n

2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 7 he observes and attempts to prove that there is indeed
b a
a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed, a n d this t i m e is i n

fact i n d i v i s i b l e . A t this stage i n the a r g u m e n t A r i s t o t l e does n o t re
veal that the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken is ambiguous, a n d
c o u l d refer to the b e g i n n i n g o f a change as m u c h as to the e n d o f
a change. A t this p o i n t (no d o u b t u n d e r the influence o f the p r e
c e d i n g discussion i n 2 3 5 6 - 3 o ) we are concerned o n l y w i t h w h a t
b
happens at the e n d o f a change, a n d we do n o t suspect that we are

g o i n g to t u r n o u r a t t e n t i o n to the b e g i n n i n g o f a change. B u t that is
w h a t happens at 2 3 6 7 - i 5 , w h e n A r i s t o t l e observes the a m b i g u i t y
a
i n the phrase to en hoi protoi metabebleken, and observes that w h e n

this phrase refers to the end o f a change, there is such a t h i n g as the
p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g has changed, b u t w h e n i t refers to
the b e g i n n i n g o f a change, there is n o such p r i m a r y t i m e . T h e n , i n
2 3 6 i s - 2 7 , he gives the p r o o f for this latter c l a i m .
a
T h u s we need to start w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s p r o o f i n 2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 7 that

b a
there is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed, where this

can be paraphrased as s o m e t h i n g like the f o l l o w i n g c l a i m : w h e n
s o m e t h i n g changes f r o m b e i n g F to b e i n g G , there is a p r i m a r y (i.e.
m o s t precise) t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g makes the t r a n s i t i o n to hav
i n g changed to b e i n g G . H i s a r g u m e n t that there is such a p r i m a r y
t i m e , a n d that i t is i n d i v i s i b l e , is actually rather difficult.
H e r e is the complete a r g u m e n t ( 2 3 5 3 2 - 2 3 6 5 ) :
b a
the primary time i n which that which has changed has changed must be
indivisible. I call 'primary' that which is such-and-such not i n virtue of
something other than i t being such-and-such. (1) For let A C be divisible,
and let i t have been divided at B. (2) I f then i t has changed i n A B or again
in B C , A C cannot be the primary time i n which i t has changed. (3) If, on
the other hand, i t was changing i n both (for necessarily i t must either have
changed or be changing i n both of them), then it would be changing i n the
whole too; but our assumption was that i t had changed. (4) The same argu
ment applies too i f i t is changing in one part but has changed i n the other:
for there will be something prior to what is primary. (5) Therefore the time
in which it has changed cannot be divisible.
T h e f o r m o f this a r g u m e n t is a reductio: the s u p p o s i t i o n that the

p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g completes the change is divisible is
s h o w n to be impossible, b y e x a m i n i n g the various different p o s s i b i

lities for that scenario a n d r u l i n g each out; A r i s t o t l e t h e n infers that
the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g c o m p l e t e d the change m u s t be
i n d i v i s i b l e . W e can see i m m e d i a t e l y that there is a p r o b l e m w i t h this
reasoning: i t presupposes that the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g
completes its change actually exists. W h e n A r i s t o t l e discusses the
p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started its change, he shows that
i t can be neither divisible n o r i n d i v i s i b l e ; here, where he discusses
the end o f the change, there is o n l y a p r o o f that the p r i m a r y t i m e i n
w h i c h the t h i n g finished c h a n g i n g cannot be divisible.
N o n e the less, we can f o l l o w t h r o u g h the details o f the proof.
F i r s t , we assume that ( i ) the p r i m a r y t i m e A C is divisible, a n d we
d i v i d e i t at B ; i n other words, we assume first (for reductio) that A C
is a stretch o f t i m e , n o t an instant. (2) B u t i f the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n
transitions to its e n d p o i n t i n either A B or B C , t h e n A C c o u l d n o t
be the p r i m a r y t i m e o f this t r a n s i t i o n , since there w o u l d be a p a r t
of i t ( A B or B C ) i n w h i c h the t r a n s i t i o n was made. (Suppose I j o u r
neyed f r o m P r i n c e t o n to N e w Y o r k C i t y o n M o n d a y ; I left at 5.42
i n the afternoon a n d a r r i v e d at 7.16 i n the evening. Is the stretch
of t i m e f r o m 7.00 to 7.30 the p r i m a r y t i m e o f m y arrival? N o , be
cause we can d i v i d e i t i n t o t w o parts at 7.15, and see that I a r r i v e d
i n one o f the parts; hence 7.00 to 7.30 is n o t the p r i m a r y t i m e o f m y
arrival.) (3) B u t any p u t a t i v e p r i m a r y t i m e o f the c o m p l e t i o n o f the
change cannot be one i n w h i c h the object is i n m o t i o n t h r o u g h o u t
the stretch o f t i m e (i.e. is at every i n s t a n t s t i l l i n m o t i o n ) : for t h e n
i t does n o t complete the change i n that stretch. ( A r i s t o t l e assumes
that w h e n i t completes the change i t is n o longer i n m o t i o n . ) So i f i t
is c h a n g i n g across b o t h parts o f A C , t h e n A C is n o t after a l l a stretch
of t i m e i n w h i c h i t makes the t r a n s i t i o n to h a v i n g changed. (4) A r i s
totle continues rather p e r p l e x i n g l y b y t a l k i n g again about the first
case, w h e n the t h i n g has changed i n either A B or B C . H e says: 3 8
' T h e same a r g u m e n t applies too i f i t is c h a n g i n g i n one p a r t b u t

has changed i n the other; for there w i l l be s o m e t h i n g p r i o r to w h a t
is p r i m a r y ' I f , for instance, the t h i n g is c h a n g i n g i n A B b u t t h e n
transitions to h a v i n g changed i n B C , t h e n A C is n o t the p r i m a r y
t i m e o f the t r a n s i t i o n , since B C is p r i o r to i t . T h e t h i n g w i l l be
c h a n g i n g i n A C d e r i v a t i v e l y ; to be m o r e precise, i t is c h a n g i n g i n
B C , a n d therefore c h a n g i n g i n A C derivatively. ( I t is a rather strange
feature o f this a r g u m e n t that A r i s t o t l e is a p p a r e n t l y prepared to a l -
3 8
Ross: 'Aristotle by oversight adds this as if it were a separate case' (ad loc).
l o w that the t h i n g m a y have changed i n A B b u t t h e n be c h a n g i n g
in BC.)
F r o m a l l o f this A r i s t o t l e draws the c o n c l u s i o n that A C m u s t be
i n d i v i s i b l e — i . e . an instant, o n the g r o u n d s that he has exhausted a l l
the possible options i f A C is divisible.
N o w , as I said earlier, this a r g u m e n t seems o n l y to show the f o l
l o w i n g : if there is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g has changed,
t h e n i t m u s t be i n d i v i s i b l e . T a k e any stretch o f t i m e d u r i n g w h i c h
39
s o m e t h i n g completes its change. F o r example, i m a g i n e again I go

f r o m P r i n c e t o n to N e w Y o r k City, a n d that I arrive i n N e w Y o r k
early i n the evening (at 7.16 p . m . ) . L e t us stipulate that an even
i n g begins at 6.00 p . m . (instant A ) and ends at 12.00 a.m. (instant
B ) , a n d let us d i v i d e i t i n t o t w o halves, at 9.00 p . m . ( C ) . T h e n B C
is n o t the p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h I c o m p l e t e d the j o u r n e y to N e w
Y o r k , since I a r r i v e d i n A C . N o w concentrate o n A C , and d i v i d e
that at an i n s t a n t D , a n d so o n . W h a t guarantee do we have that
this d i v i s i o n w i l l come to an end at an i n s t a n t or a point? W e k n o w
that any stretch o f t i m e we take w i l l fail to be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n
w h i c h I c o m p l e t e d the j o u r n e y (that is w h a t the a r g u m e n t we have
j u s t l o o k e d at establishes—or p u r p o r t s to establish), b u t we have
n o a r g u m e n t as yet that there w i l l actually be an instant at w h i c h I
arrive. I do i n fact t h i n k that such an a r g u m e n t can be c o n s t r u c t e d
along A r i s t o t e l i a n lines—and I shall give i t later i n this paper (see
below, Section 9 ) — b u t A r i s t o t l e ' s actual a r g u m e n t at this p o i n t i n
the t e x t seems to be i n c o m p l e t e . I w i s h I k n e w o f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
according to w h i c h he w o u l d have offered a plausible a r g u m e n t for
this here, b u t there does n o t seem to be one.
7. T h e b e g i n n i n g o f the change
M e a n w h i l e , there is the q u e s t i o n o f the b e g i n n i n g o f a j o u r n e y ,

w h i c h A r i s t o t l e t u r n s his a t t e n t i o n to at 236 7. A s I said earlier,
a
A r i s t o t l e starts b y p o i n t i n g o u t that the phrase to en hoi protoi

metabebleken is ambiguous, and b y p o i n t i n g o u t that i t can refer to
the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started to change. H e states
o u t r i g h t that such a p r i m a r y t i m e does n o t exist at a l l (holds). F o r
3 9
Cf. D. Bostock, 'Aristotle on Continuity i n P h y s i c s V I ' ['Continuity'], i n L .
Judson (ed.), A r i s t o t l e ' s Physics: A C o l l e c t i o n of Essays (Oxford, 1991), 179—212 at
195-6.
'there is no b e g i n n i n g o f a change, at least there is n o p r i m a r y p a r t

of the t i m e i n w h i c h i t e m b a r k e d o n change' ( 2 3 6 i 4 - i 5 ) . ° H i s
a 4
a r g u m e n t here is a better one, a l t h o u g h i t is somewhat c o m p l e x

and its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is c o n t r o v e r s i a l .
I n b r o a d o u t l i n e , A r i s t o t l e argues as follows. H e labels A D ' the
p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x started its j o u r n e y . H i s strategy w i l l be to
show that A D cannot be partless ( 2 3 6 i 6 - 2 0 ) , a n d cannot be exten
a
ded ( 2 3 6 2 0 - 7 ) . Hence the p r i m a r y t i m e does n o t exist ( 2 3 6 2 6 - 7 ) .

a a
Each section o f the a r g u m e n t needs extensive c o m m e n t .
(i) 2 3 6 16-20 a
Then [ A D ] is not indivisible; for then the nows would be next to each other.
Again, i f it were at rest i n the whole of the stretch of time CA (for let us
grant that i t is at rest), then i t would be at rest i n A too, w i t h the result that
if A D is partless, i t w i l l simultaneously be at rest and have changed; for i t
is at rest at A and has changed at D.
We are assuming that the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x started its j o u r n e y

is A D , a n d we are supposing A D to be partless. N o w , w i t h i n this
s u p p o s i t i o n that A D is partless, A r i s t o t l e considers t w o p o s s i b i l i
ties: first, that A D is an i n d i v i s i b l e stretch o f t i m e , and second, that
A D is i n fact an instant. T h e arguments against each are separated b y
the eti at line 17. So first, A r i s t o t l e considers that A D is an i n d i v i s i b l e
stretch o f t i m e , i.e. a stretch o f t i m e b o u n d e d b y t w o instants b u t n o t
divisible. ( T h i s w o u l d be the t e m p o r a l equivalent o f w h a t w o u l d be
i n geometrical terms an i n d i v i s i b l e line, a curious p h e n o m e n o n o n
w h i c h there survives a spurious A r i s t o t e l i a n treatise, On Indivisible
Lines.* ) 1
T h i s possibility, however, A r i s t o t l e dismisses w i t h the
4 0
The manuscripts differ in their readings at 236 i5- Some have [leTefiaXXev;
a
some
have [jLerifiaXev. Ross goes w i t h the imperfect, but I think the aorist is preferable (and
I have translated it here). The aorist is often used to express mgressive aspect: ' T h e
Aorist of verbs which denote a s t a t e or c o n d i t i o n generally expresses the entrance into
t h a t s t a t e o r c o n d i t i o n ' (Goodwin, Syntax, § 19 Note 1). This fits well w i t h what
Aristotle is saying here: there is no primary time i n which the thing gets moving, or
embarks on its change. (For another ingressive aorist i n a similar context see 6. 8,
239 i 1: r)p6[j.rio€v; there, Aristotle shows that there is no primary time i n which some
a
thing embarks on rest, i.e. gets some resting done. For more on this, see sect. 11
below.) The imperfect might also seem appropriate because at the beginning of the
change from being F to being G, when the thing has changed from being F, it is still
changing, and the imperfect [jLerifiaXXev might seem to capture this. But we have the
easy—and paralleled—use of the ingressive aorist available.
4 1
See M . Timpanaro Cardini, P s e u d o - A r i s t o t e l e : De lineis insecabilibus (Testi e
documenti per lo studio dell'antichita, 32; Varese-Milan, 1970).
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 i7S
shortest o f arguments: 'for t h e n the n o w s w o u l d be n e x t to each
o t h e r ' . T h e reference has to be to A a n d D b e i n g contiguous, because
there is n o other p a i r o f instants u n d e r discussion. So w h a t we have
is a metaphysical a r g u m e n t against the p o s s i b i l i t y o f such i n d i v i s i b l e
stretches, as Ross says i n his note ad loc.: ' T o treat A D as i n d i v i s i b l e
w o u l d be to adopt the v i e w w h i c h regards t i m e as made u p o f v e r y
s h o r t i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t s o f t i m e c o n t i g u o u s to one a n o t h e r . ' T h i s has
42
already been s h o w n b y A r i s t o t l e to be impossible i n the first chapter

o f b o o k 6 o f the Physics, so w h a t we have here is a compressed
a r g u m e n t d r a w i n g o n a p r e v i o u s l y established result.
A f t e r eti at 2 3 6 17, A r i s t o t l e considers the second, a n d m o r e fa
s
m i l i a r , possibility, n a m e l y t h a t A D m i g h t be i n d i v i s i b l e because
i t is an instant. T h i s is equivalent to the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t A a n d
D are i d e n t i c a l . T h i s o p t i o n cannot be r u l e d o u t o n metaphysical
g r o u n d s alone, a n d so receives a m o r e extended a r g u m e n t . A r i s t o t l e
w i l l show t h a t u n d e r this s u p p o s i t i o n , the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n w i l l s t i l l
be at rest at A , a n d yet w i l l have already m o v e d at D — w h i c h , seeing
t h a t A a n d D are i d e n t i c a l , is impossible.
H e shows this b y t a k i n g a stretch o f t i m e C A , where C is an i n
stant somewhere i n x's i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g p e r i o d o f rest. I f i t is
at rest d u r i n g the w h o l e o f C A , t h e n i t w i l l be at rest at A ( 2 3 6 i 7 - a
18). N o w , this is n o t an a r g u m e n t f r o m , so to speak, the w h o l e to

the p a r t . Rather, A r i s t o t l e is p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t i f A D is the p r i m a r y
t i m e i n w h i c h x started its j o u r n e y , a n d before x started its j o u r n e y
i t was at rest (as opposed to j u s t c o m i n g i n t o existence at A ) , t h e n
x m u s t also be at rest at A . F o r either x has got m o v i n g b y A or i t
has n o t . I f i t has, t h e n A D cannot be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x
4 3
Ross, P h y s i c s , 650. I am grateful to Antony Eagle for showing me the natural
ness of this interpretation. I t might be tempting to think that two different instants
are being denied to be contiguous, namely the indivisible primary time, identified
as the first instant of motion, and the last instant of rest. T h i s would then be step 3
of the argument given above on page 158: there is no first instant of motion because
it would have to be contiguous w i t h the last instant of rest. T h i s is Bostock's posi
tion i n his note ad loc. in R. Waterfield (trans.), A r i s t o t l e : Physics (Oxford, 1996),
277: 'Aristotle assumes that there is a last instant before the change begins, so if
A D were a first instant at which the change has begun, these two instants would be
next to one another. But that is impossible.' I have given reasons for thinking that
Aristotle is not talking about first instants here, but even i f he were, he certainly
has not mentioned yet a last instant of rest. ( M y discussion of Aristotle's argument
dismissing the possibility of A D being an indivisible stretch of time fills a gap i n
Morison, 'Temps primaire', a gap noticed by Parrachini, 'Raisons et deraisons d'un
etonnement millenaire: a propos de l'analyse aristotelicienne du changement dans
Phys. Z 5', in M . Bonelli and A. Longo (eds.), «Quid est veritas?»: hommage a Jona
than Barnes (Naples, 2010), 87—114 at 103 n. 36.)
started to move, because i t has already started to m o v e b y A . So i t

has n o t m o v e d yet b y A , and is therefore at rest. B u t , A r i s t o t l e ar
gues, A D was supposed to be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h i t started
to move, so i t m u s t have started to m o v e i n A D . A s A r i s t o t l e puts
i t , i t is at rest at A , a n d yet m u s t have m o v e d at D ( 2 3 6 i 9 ) . B u t A
a
and D are i d e n t i c a l , so there is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
(ii) 2 3 6 2 0 - 7
a
(1) But i f A D is not partless, i t must be divisible and i t must have changed
in every part of i t whatsoever, for (2) suppose A D is divided, then i f i t has
changed i n neither part, i t w i l l not have changed i n the whole either, and
(3) i f i t is changing i n both, it is changing in the whole too, and (4) i f i t has
changed i n one or the other, the whole will not be the primary time i n which
it has changed. So i t must therefore have changed i n any part whatsoever.
(5) I t is clear then that the primary time i n which the thing has changed
does not exist. For (6) the divisions are endless.
I n this t e x t A r i s t o t l e shows that the p r i m a r y t i m e A D i n w h i c h x

started to change cannot be a stretch o f t i m e either, a n d t h e n c o n
cludes i n the final sentence (5) that, since i t is n o t an instant a n d i t
is n o t a stretch, i t does n o t exist. P r o p o s i t i o n (6), 'for the divisions
are endless' (236 27), belongs w i t h the p r o o f that the p r i m a r y t i m e
a
A D is n o t a stretch o f t i m e .
Recall that i n 2 3 6 i 6 - 2 0 A r i s t o t l e showed that A D is n o t an i n
a
stant, i.e. is n o t i n d i v i s i b l e . H e r e , t h e n , he considers the p o s s i b i l i t y

that i t is divisible, i.e. a divisible stretch o f t i m e . A r i s t o t l e wants to
show that i n this case too, n o stretch A D can be the primary t i m e i n
w h i c h x started m o v i n g . T o show this, we first o f a l l observe that
i f A D is the p r i m a r y t i m e o f x's t r a n s i t i o n f r o m rest to m o v e m e n t ,
t h e n this t r a n s i t i o n is o n g o i n g i n any a n d every extended p a r t o f
A D , as A r i s t o t l e says i n (1). F o r suppose we d i v i d e A D at some
p o i n t , n a m e l y F. T h e n (2) i f x started to m o v e i n neither A F n o r
F D , A D w o u l d n o t be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x started to move.
A n d (3) i f x is m o v i n g i n b o t h , t h e n i t started m o v i n g i n neither
A F n o r F D . A n d (4) i f i t started i n one, and n o t the other, t h e n A D
c o u l d n o t be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x h a d started to change. A n d
so x m u s t have started to change i n b o t h A F and F D — i . e . A D m u s t
indeed be the p r i m a r y stretch o f t i m e i n w h i c h x does the c h a n g i n g
necessary to c o u n t as h a v i n g got m o v i n g , a n d so x started c h a n g i n g
across the w h o l e o f A D : every p a r t o f A D contains p a r t o f x's t r a n
s i t i o n f r o m rest to m o v e m e n t .
B u t now, i f every p a r t o f A D contains p a r t o f x's t r a n s i t i o n f r o m

rest to m o v e m e n t , as i t w o u l d have to i f i t were the p r i m a r y t i m e
of x's t r a n s i t i o n , t h e n A D cannot after a l l be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n
w h i c h x started to move, for the f o l l o w i n g reason. L e t us focus o n
l o c o m o t i o n for a m o m e n t . Since A D is a stretch o f t i m e , x covered a
c e r t a i n a m o u n t o f g r o u n d d u r i n g i t ( i f i t d i d n o t , t h e n i t d i d n o t get
g o i n g i n i t ) . B u t now, we can d i v i d e A D i n t o t w o ; x covered some
g r o u n d i n the first half, and some m o r e g r o u n d i n the second half.
B u t t h e n that first h a l f o f A D already contains x's s t a r t i n g to move.
T h e second h a l f o f A D does n o t even look any m o r e like a t i m e dur
i n g w h i c h p a r t o f x's t r a n s i t i o n o c c u r r e d . G i v e n that x covered some
g r o u n d i n that t i m e , that p e r i o d o f t i m e encompasses an occurrence
w h i c h counts as x's s t a r t i n g to move. B u t o f course, we can make the
same observation about the first h a l f o f A D : we can d i v i d e i t , a n d
f i n d always that i n the first h a l f o f that d i v i s i o n x has covered some
g r o u n d , and so that stretch o f t i m e w i l l encompass the t r a n s i t i o n .
Hence, because we can always d i v i d e t i m e at any p o i n t we want—as
A r i s t o t l e p u t s i t : 'the divisions are endless' (6)—we can always f i n d
a substretch o f A D w h i c h w i l l c o u n t as the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h
x has started m o v i n g .
N o w , I have f o l l o w e d closely A r i s t o t l e ' s o w n a r g u m e n t o f 2 3 6 i 5 -a
27. N o t i c e that I have n o t t a l k e d o f a 'first m o m e n t o f change'. N o r

d i d I have to suppose that there is a last m o m e n t o f rest. T h e w h o l e
s t r u c t u r e o f the a r g u m e n t was s i m p l y that if there is such a p r i m a r y
t i m e then there is n o such p r i m a r y t i m e , and i f the s u p p o s i t i o n that
P i m p l i e s that i t is n o t the case that P, t h e n i t is n o t the case that P.
Does i t f o l l o w f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t that there is no first m o
m e n t at w h i c h x has started to change? Yes. F o r i f there were a first
m o m e n t o f x's change ( i n the sense: a first m o m e n t at w h i c h x star
ted to change), t h e n i t w o u l d be the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x started
to move. B u t there is n o such p r i m a r y t i m e . So there is n o first m o
m e n t o f change ( i n that sense). B u t this is n o t w h a t A r i s t o t l e tries
to prove, a l t h o u g h i t is a c o r o l l a r y o f w h a t he says.
8. A n a s s u m p t i o n
One a s s u m p t i o n that I a m m a k i n g is that i f s o m e t h i n g has changed

a n d is s t i l l c h a n g i n g at a p a r t i c u l a r instant, t h e n i t has already
'covered some g r o u n d ' i.e. i t has already changed over a certain
m a g n i t u d e , where this c o u l d m e a n that is has covered some g r o u n d ,
1 8
7 Benjamin Morison
g r o w n a c e r t a i n a m o u n t , or increased b y a certain w e i g h t , etc. I t

seems to me to be the a s s u m p t i o n responsible for the result that
A r i s t o t l e obtains, and i t seems c o m p l e t e l y j u s t i f i e d b y the m e a n i n g
of 'x has changed'. I n d e e d , A r i s t o t l e w i l l go o n i n Physics 6. 6,
2 3 6 3 2 - 2 3 7 i 7 , to prove this result, w i t h an a r g u m e n t that does
b a
not depend o n w h a t he proves i n Physics 6 . 5 . ( H e starts f r o m the

simple t h o u g h t that a n y t h i n g w h i c h has changed has changed f r o m
s o m e t h i n g to something. B u t distance, size, w e i g h t , or whatever
are a l l divisible, and so the change m u s t be divisible. Change does
not h a p p e n b y 'leaps'.)
9. P r i m a r y t i m e o f the e n d o f a change, a n d the

a s y m m e t r y between the b e g i n n i n g a n d the e n d
I n o w w a n t to r e t u r n to A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t that there is a p r i m a r y

t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g finished changing. Y o u w i l l recall that this
a r g u m e n t seemed o n l y to establish that if there were such a p r i m a r y
t i m e , i t w o u l d be an instant. W h a t we w a n t is an a r g u m e n t w h i c h
actually shows that there is such an instant. N o w , the reason w h y
we do i n fact seem licensed to suppose that there is such an i n s t a n t
is that w h e n s o m e t h i n g has finished changing, i t is at rest. B u t i f
s o m e t h i n g has finished changing, i t is n o t the case that i t m u s t have
'got some rest done'. A s one m i g h t p u t i t , i n the case o f m o t i o n :
to arrive somewhere is n o t yet to have stayed s t i l l at that place (al
t h o u g h i t m a y be impossible to arrive somewhere w i t h o u t that ar
r i v a l i n i t i a t i n g a p e r i o d o f rest). So we have an a s y m m e t r y between
the t w o cases A r i s t o t l e is discussing: (a) for s o m e t h i n g to c o u n t as
h a v i n g started changing, i t m u s t have got some c h a n g i n g done, and
therefore i t m u s t have covered some g r o u n d i n its change, b u t (b) for
s o m e t h i n g to c o u n t as h a v i n g finished changing, i t is n o t the case
that i t m u s t have been at rest already for a p e r i o d o f t i m e . Case (a)
allows one to r u n an a r g u m e n t like A r i s t o t l e ' s i n 2 3 6 2 0 - 7 : w h e n
a
y o u t r y to single o u t w h e n the t h i n g started to change, y o u have to

give a t e m p o r a l i n d i c a t i o n w h i c h covers some a m o u n t o f the change
(otherwise y o u have n o t singled o u t w h e n i t got e n o u g h c h a n g i n g
done to q u a l i f y as h a v i n g changed), b u t any a m o u n t o f the change
y o u r t e m p o r a l i n d i c a t i o n covers w i l l c o n t a i n a p a r t (the later o f the
two parts) w h i c h is n o t the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m rest to m o t i o n . Case (b)
does n o t allow such an a r g u m e n t , because there is n o p e r i o d o f rest
to appeal to.
I n short, we can have a p r i m a r y t i m e o f the e n d o f a change, w h i c h

is an instant, because there is n o conceptual reason w h y there s h o u l d
n o t be an instant w h i c h is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y one at w h i c h x finishes
c h a n g i n g a n d at w h i c h x is at rest (presumably b y b e i n g the l i m i t
i n g i n s t a n t o f a longer p e r i o d at w h i c h x is at rest). H o w e v e r , w e
cannot have a p r i m a r y t i m e o f the b e g i n n i n g o f a change, where
this is conceived o f as b e i n g w h e n x transitions to b e i n g i n m o t i o n ,
because 'x has m o v e d f r o m b e i n g F ' i m p l i e s that x has g o t some
m o v i n g done, a n d n o a m o u n t o f m o v i n g is s m a l l e n o u g h to be the
b e g i n n i n g o f the m o t i o n . I n slogans: 'x has finished c h a n g i n g ' does
n o t i m p l y 'x has got some resting done', b u t 'x has started c h a n g i n g '
does i m p l y 'x has got some c h a n g i n g done'.
10. F i r s t objection: there is n o m o t i o n or rest at an instant
M a n y w o u l d p r o d u c e an o b j e c t i o n t o A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t s — a n d
for that m a t t e r m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m — b y p o i n t i n g to A r i s
totle's n o t o r i o u s d o c t r i n e that n o t h i n g is m o v i n g o r at rest i n an
instant, a n d t h e n p o i n t i n g o u t that m y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ' s
arguments makes l i b e r a l use o f statements p r e d i c a t i n g m o t i o n o r
rest o f s o m e t h i n g at an instant. I t is true that A r i s t o t l e does say that
n o t h i n g is m o v i n g i n an i n s t a n t , a n d he extends this c l a i m to b e i n g
43
at rest: 'since n o t h i n g is o f such a nature as to m o v e i n an instant, i t

is clear that n o t h i n g rests i n an instant e i t h e r ' . B u t this statement
44
is a m b i g u o u s between ' n o t h i n g can t r u l y be said to be m o v i n g at an

instant' a n d ' n o t h i n g can t r u l y be said t o m o v e during an i n s t a n t ' .
T h e second o f these is, I j u d g e , w h a t A r i s t o t l e m e a n t to say, n o t the
first. T h a t is, he m e a n t to c l a i m that n o t h i n g can get any movement
done i n an instant. Equally, i n the same sense, n o t h i n g can get any
rest done i n an i n s t a n t . 45
T h a t this m u s t be w h a t A r i s t o t l e means is s t r o n g l y suggested b y

the fact that he uses the n o t i o n s o f b e i n g at rest at an instant a n d
b e i n g i n m o t i o n at an instant t h r o u g h o u t his c o m p l e x discussion o f
the c o n t i n u i t y o f change. F o r instance, w h e n g i v i n g h i s a r g u m e n t
4 3
Phys. 6. 3, 2 3 4 2 4 : ovOev ev rqj vvv
a
Kivelrai.
4 4
Phys. 6. 3, 2 3 4 3 3 ~ 4 : e7ret ev TOJ vvv ovdev
a
7re<j>VKe Kivetodcu, SrjXov oj? ouS' rjpe[j.etv.
4 5
So—although this w i l l be a case that Aristotle himself denies is possible—a
swinging pendulum that is at rest momentarily at the end of each swing gets no
rest done over a day's worth of swinging. You cannot add up all the instants and get,
say, five minutes' worth of rest.
:8o Benjamin Morison
that there is n o p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has changed, he

claims ( i n the course o f his a r g u m e n t ) ' i t is at rest i n A ' (en toi A
eremei, 2 3 6 i 8 ) . I n an a t t e m p t to preserve the o r t h o d o x y that A r i s
a
totle does n o t a l l o w m o t i o n or rest at an instant, R i c h a r d Sorabji

has argued that this statement is n o t s o m e t h i n g that A r i s t o t l e en
dorses in propria persona, b u t rather s o m e t h i n g that he concedes to
his o p p o n e n t , o n l y to derive a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m it. " B u t whatever
4 6
one makes o f A r i s t o t l e ' s statement at 2 3 6 i 8 , y o u o n l y have to c o n

a
sider the p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h x has finished changing. T h i s ,

as A r i s t o t l e remarks, is i n d i v i s i b l e , i.e. an instant. ( H i s a r g u m e n t
for this m a y have been d o u b t f u l , b u t i t is none the less w h a t he
claims.) H o w e v e r , at that instant x has finished c h a n g i n g (according
to A r i s t o t l e ) — a n d is therefore at rest. N o d o u b t i t does n o t get any
resting done i n that instant, b u t n o t h i n g precludes A r i s t o t l e f r o m
m a k i n g statements about w h a t is true o f the object at that i n s t a n t
(namely, i t finished c h a n g i n g a n d is at rest).
O f A r i s t o t l e ' s four arguments for w h y n o t h i n g is i n m o t i o n i n an
instant (Physics 6. 3, 2 3 4 2 4 - 9 ) , n o t a l l are easily taken as a r g u
a b
ments for w h y s o m e t h i n g cannot get any m o t i o n or rest done i n an

instant. Perhaps i n the end A r i s t o t l e d i d n o t clearly see the differ
ence between m o v i n g at an instant a n d g e t t i n g some m o t i o n done
d u r i n g an i n s t a n t (as far as I can tell, the G r e e k is the same for b o t h ) .
B u t o n balance, I t h i n k that A r i s t o t l e s h o u l d n o t be taken to be c o m
m i t t e d to the v i e w that there is n o m o t i o n or rest at an instant. H i s
p o s i t i o n seems to be this: m o t i o n and rest take place over periods
of t i m e , a n d at any instants w i t h i n those periods o f t i m e the object
i n q u e s t i o n is actually i n m o t i o n (or at rest). B e i n g i n m o t i o n or at
rest at an instant is derivative f r o m b e i n g i n m o t i o n or at rest over
a p e r i o d w h i c h includes that instant.
4 6
'[T]he reference to rest at an instant is more easily taken as adhominem, not as
representing Aristotle's own opinion' (R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum
(London, 1983), 415 n. 17; his emphases). Bostock agrees ('Continuity', 193; 210).
I n arguing this, Sorabji is recanting his earlier view (in Aristotle on the Instant of
Change' ['Instant'], Proceedings of the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , suppl. 50 (1976), 69—87),
where he rightly claims that 'although [Aristotle] denies that things can change or
remain i n the same state at an instant, he concedes there are many other things that
can be true of them at an instant' (81), and identifies our passage as an instance of
Aristotle making just such a predication, i n propria persona (84).
11. Second o b j e c t i o n : there is n o p r i m a r y

t i m e at w h i c h s o m e t h i n g at rest is at rest
I n Physics 6. 8 A r i s t o t l e t u r n s his m i n d to periods o f rest. A t 2 3 9 1 0 - s
11 he states that there is n o p r i m a r y t i m e w h e n s o m e t h i n g r e s t e d . 47
A t first glance i t looks as i f A r i s t o t l e is flatly d e n y i n g that there c o u l d

be a p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has stopped c h a n g i n g a n d is
at rest, w h i c h w o u l d therefore be the p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h i t came
to a halt. I f so, i t appears that he is d e n y i n g that there is a p r i m a r y
t i m e o f the end o f a change! A s Pierre P e l l e g r i n translates i t : ' i l n ' y
a done pas n o n p l u s de ( m o m e n t ) p r e m i e r dans lequel [ i l v a u d r a i t
m i e u x dire: auquel] ce q u i est en repos est arrive en repos' ('Re-
marques', 1 2 4 ) . T h i s w o u l d deny w h a t I have taken A r i s t o t l e to
48
prove i n 6. 5, 2 3 5 3 4 - 2 3 6 5 , where I i n t e r p r e t e d h i m as a r g u i n g that

b a
there is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g stops c h a n g i n g (and that

this t i m e is an i n s t a n t ) . 49
I n fact, Pellegrin's t r a n s l a t i o n m u s t be the w r o n g w a y o f t a k i n g

2 3 9 i o - i 1. A r i s t o t l e is n o t c o n t r a d i c t i n g i n Physics 6. 8 w h a t he says
a
i n Physics 6. 5. H e is n o t saying that there is n o p r i m a r y t i m e i n

w h i c h s o m e t h i n g arrived at a state of rest ('est arrive en repos'), b u t
rather d e n y i n g that there is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g gets
any rest done. ° A f t e r all, t i m e is i n f i n i t e l y divisible ( 2 3 9 i 7 - 2 2 ) a n d
5 a
n o rest can be done i n an instant ( 2 3 9 i 1-17). Hence there is n o a
p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x has actually got some rest done.

M o r e carefully, A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t for this is as follows. S u p
pose x has stopped c h a n g i n g at instant A . I t is therefore at rest f r o m
i n s t a n t A onwards. H o w e v e r , b y the t i m e o f A , i t has got n o rest
done yet. So w h a t is the p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h i t got some rest
done? F o r any i n s t a n t B later t h a n A , A B cannot be the p r i m a r y
t i m e i n w h i c h x got some rest done, because such a p e r i o d o f t i m e
can always be d i v i d e d (239 22) at a p o i n t C such that x w i l l have got
a
4 7
ovoe orj TO rjpeîovv o r e Trpajrov rjpe[j.rjGev eonv.
4 8
Notice that Pellegrin supplies 'moment' w i t h irpajrov.
4 9
Pellegrin complains: 'Bien qu'il ne fasse pas une theorie du repos aussi develop-
pee que sa theorie du changement, Aristote esquisse done cette theorie du repos, et
je ne comprends pas que B. Morison le nie' (ibid.). This section addresses that lack
of comprehension. Sorabji also worries that what Aristotle says i n 6. 8 is i n tension
w i t h 6. s ('Instant', 84).
50
One needs to translate correctly the ingressive aorist r/peixr/oev (see n. 40
above).
i8z Benjamin Morison
some rest done i n A C . So there is no primary t i m e i n w h i c h x has

got some rest done (239 2o). a
N o t e that this result c o n c e r n i n g rest is m i r r o r e d exactly b y

change. Just as there is no p r i m a r y t i m e at w h i c h x got some
a m o u n t o f rest done, there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x got some
a m o u n t o f change done (this is w h a t was s h o w n i n 6. 5, 2 3 6 2 0 - 7 : a
there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started to change).

T h i s nice m i r r o r i n g confirms m y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the previous
a r g u m e n t i n 6. 5. T h e t w o arguments are v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l i n
structure: b o t h possibilities, that the p r i m a r y t i m e be i n d i v i s i b l e
and that i t be a stretch, are rejected, and this is f o l l o w e d b y the re-
ductio move. M o r e o v e r , i n b o t h cases the reductio move is f o l l o w e d
b y an e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h y the p r i m a r y t i m e cannot be a stretch o f
t i m e — a n explanation w h i c h technically belongs to the second l i m b
of the d i l e m m a . So at 6. 5, 236 27, A r i s t o t l e ends the discussion
a
b y saying 'for the divisions are endless', whereas at 6. 8, 2 3 9 2 0 - 2 , a
he ends b y saying 'the reason for this is that . . .'. T h u s , far f r o m

casting any d o u b t o n m y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ' s v i e w i n 6. 5,
the passage f r o m 6. 8 is v e r y m u c h i n line w i t h i t . ( A l t h o u g h the
t w o arguments are s i m i l a r i n structure, the one i n 6. 8, 2 3 9 i 4 - 2 2 , a
is somewhat easier to follow, I f i n d . )

P e l l e g r i n and Sorabji are r i g h t to call a t t e n t i o n to 6. 8. I t gives
us a w e a l t h o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s views o n rest and
change. I n 2 3 9 i o - 2 2 , as we have j u s t seen, A r i s t o t l e proves that
a
there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g embarks o n rest (i.e.

gets some resting done). I n 2 3 8 2 6 - 2 3 9 i o he also proves that there
b a
is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g comes to a stop, 51
i.e. there
is no p r i v i l e g e d p a r t o f the change w h i c h we can single o u t as b e i n g
the last part, solely o n the basis o f the logic o f change.
T h e a r g u m e n t goes like this. T h e p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h some
t h i n g comes to a stop (call i t A B ) is either an instant or a stretch
of time, (i) I t is n o t an instant ( 2 3 9 3 - 6 ) , and ( i i ) i t is n o t a stretch
a
( 2 3 9 6 - i o ) , therefore 'there w i l l n o t be a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h i t
a
comes to rest' ( 2 3 9 i o ) . (i) W h y is the p r i m a r y t i m e n o t an instant?

a
W e l l , there is no g e t t i n g any m o t i o n done i n an instant, so there

is no c o m i n g to a rest i n an instant. W h y is there no g e t t i n g any
m o t i o n done i n an instant? Because i f there were, t h e n the t h i n g
w o u l d have to have m o v e d (kekinesthai, 239 5) i n p a r t o f the i n
a
stant. T h e t h e o r e m A r i s t o t l e is d r a w i n g o n is that i f x moves i n

5 1
239*10: OVK eorai ev (p Trpajra) lorarai.
A B , t h e n s o m e t h i n g t h a t moves at the same speed as x, s t a r t i n g

at A , b u t s t o p p i n g halfway (distance), w i l l stop before x. A t that
p o i n t , before B , i t w i l l be i n a c o n d i t i o n o f h a v i n g m o v e d a cer
t a i n distance (half). So equally, x, w h e n i t is at t h a t p o i n t , w i l l have
m o v e d a certain distance. B u t i f x has to be i n the c o n d i t i o n o f hav
ing m o v e d t h a t distance halfway t h r o u g h A B , A B cannot be i n d i v i
sible, ( i i ) W h y is the p r i m a r y t i m e n o t a stretch o f time? W e l l , i f i t
is, t h e n the t h i n g is m o v i n g i n all parts o f the t i m e (by the d e f i n i t i o n
of p r i m a r y t i m e ) . T h i s is impossible, so i n fact 'there w i l l n o t be a
p r i m a r y t i m e ' ( 2 3 9 9 - i o ) . T h i s a r g u m e n t is o b v i o u s l y h i g h l y c o m
a
pressed. A r i s t o t l e observes t h a t i f the p r i m a r y t i m e is a stretch, t h e n

the t h i n g is m o v i n g i n all parts o f the t i m e (so m u c h follows f r o m
the d e f i n i t i o n o f p r i m a r y t i m e ) . B u t i n t h a t case, i f we d i v i d e the
p r i m a r y t i m e i n t o t w o , t h e n the t h i n g is s t i l l m o v i n g i n the second
h a l f o f the t i m e , and so i t is c o m i n g to rest i n the second half. B u t
i n t h a t case, the second h a l f o f the o r i g i n a l stretch is a better can
didate for b e i n g the p r i m a r y t i m e . B u t there is an infinite s u p p l y o f
subparts o f the stretch o f t i m e w h i c h w i l l be better candidates for
the p r i m a r y t i m e . I f the last second is the p r i m a r y t i m e , w h a t about
the last half-second? A n d the last quarter-second? Etc. I n each o f
these stretches, the t h i n g is c o m i n g to rest. B u t there is no l i m i t to
h o w s h o r t a p e r i o d i n w h i c h i t is c o m i n g to rest can be.
Since the o n l y r e m a i n i n g o p t i o n for the p r i m a r y t i m e o f the
t h i n g ' s c o m i n g to rest, were i t to exist, was t h a t i t was a stretch
of t i m e , and this has been s h o w n to be impossible because o f the
i n f i n i t e d i v i s i b i l i t y o f t i m e , t h e n i t follows t h a t there is no p r i m a r y
t i m e i n w h i c h i t is c o m i n g to r e s t . 52
One i n t r i g u i n g t h i n g about this a r g u m e n t is the parallel A r i s t o t l e

insists o n between this result and some result c o n c e r n i n g m o v e -
5 3
This represents my unpacking of the Aristotle's claim at 239*8—10: eirei ovv xpo-
vos earlv ev qj Trpo'jrqj 'lararai, Kal OVK drofiov, OTTOS oe xpovos els drreipo. [lepioros, OVK
e o r a i ev qj Trpwrqj l o r o r o i . Aristotle's sentence has a slightly odd structure. The first

half of the protasis of the e-nei clause ('the primary time in which the thing comes to
rest is a stretch of time and not indivisible') is obviously not endorsed by Aristotle,
since the apodosis denies the very existence of the primary time in which something
comes to rest. The puzzle is that e-nei normally means 'since', and in sentences of the
form 'since P, Q', 'P' is usually endorsed by the speaker. The only way to understand
what is going on is to take the protasis not as expressing something Aristotle actu
ally endorses, but as expressing the other live option at this point in the argument,
namely that the primary time is a stretch of time (since, as has already been proven,
it is not indivisible). So although Aristotle does not in fact endorse the protasis, it
expresses the best remaining option according to the argument, if the primary time is to
exist at all. Hence my paraphrase in the text.
m e r i t ( 2 3 8 3 6 - 2 3 9 i ) : 'Just as there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the

b a
m o v i n g t h i n g kineitai, so there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h the t h i n g

comes to r e s t . ' W h a t is A r i s t o t l e r e f e r r i n g to here? I t m u s t be a re
53
ference back to the c l a i m i n 6. 5 that there is no b e g i n n i n g o f change,

that is, that there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g embarks o n
m o t i o n . T h e reason w h y i t m u s t be a reference to this is that this is
the o n l y previous result he has s h o w n c o n c e r n i n g the non-existence
of a p r i m a r y t i m e . ( T h e other result he showed was the positive re
sult that there is a p r i m a r y t i m e o f the end o f a change.) T h u s , we
m u s t translate kineitai accordingly: 'just as there is no p r i m a r y t i m e
i n w h i c h the m o v i n g t h i n g gets going, so there is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n
w h i c h the t h i n g comes to r e s t ' . 54
T h u s i n 6. 8, far f r o m discovering a n y t h i n g w h i c h threatens our

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 6. 5, we f i n d A r i s t o t l e p r o v i n g m o r e results c o n
c e r n i n g the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m change to rest, all o f w h i c h are conso
n a n t w i t h w h a t we f o u n d i n 6. 5
12. T w o p h i l o s o p h i c a l difficulties
I t is t i m e to take stock. T h e f o l l o w i n g p i c t u r e is e m e r g i n g o f A r i s
totle's v i e w o f change a n d rest.
( 1 ) T h e r e is no p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g gets u n d e r w a y
(6. 5, 2 3 6 i 5 - 2 7 ) . T h e r e is, i n other words, no m o s t precise
a
way o f specifying w h e n s o m e t h i n g transitions f r o m b e i n g at

rest to changing.
(2) T h e r e is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g finished chan
g i n g (6. 5, 2 3 5 3 0 - 2 3 6 7 ) . T h e r e is, i n other words, a m o s t
b a
precise w a y o f specifying w h e n s o m e t h i n g transitions f r o m

changing to b e i n g at rest. T h i s t r a n s i t i o n happens at an i n
stant.
(3) T h e r e is no p r i m a r y t i m e — n o m o s t precise specification—
of w h e n s o m e t h i n g embarks o n its p e r i o d o f rest b y g e t t i n g
some resting done (6. 8, 2 3 9 i o - 2 2 ) . a
(4) T h e r e is no p r i m a r y t i m e — n o m o s t precise specification—

of w h e n s o m e t h i n g comes to a stop w h i l e c h a n g i n g (6. 8,
238 36-239 io).
b a
5 3
ojoirep he TO Kivovfxevov OVK eariv ev d> irpajTto Kiveirai, ovrcos ovh* ev d> lararai TO
lorafxevov.
One way of seeing how K i v e i r a i can mean this is to think of the meaning of the
5 4
active form, Kiveiv: it can mean to get something moving.

A r i s t o t l e chooses to express the first o f these claims as the c l a i m

that a change has no b e g i n n i n g ( 2 3 6 i 4 ) . A n d he chooses to ex
a s s
press the second o f these claims as the c l a i m that a change has an

e n d ( 2 3 6 i 2 ) . N o t i c e that he does n o t a t t e m p t to express any re
a s 6
sult about rest u s i n g the language o f s t o p p i n g and s t a r t i n g : 'x starts

to be at rest', or 'x finishes b e i n g at rest' do n o t appear to be w e l l
f o r m e d for A r i s t o t l e . T h u s , he formulates questions c o n c e r n i n g
w h e n s o m e t h i n g starts to change a n d finishes changing, b u t does
n o t raise questions i n this f o r m about rest. T o express the idea be
h i n d ' e m b a r k i n g o n a p e r i o d o f rest', he uses the ingressive aor
ist ( 2 3 9 i 1: eremesen), a f o r m w h i c h he also used o f m o t i o n i n 6. 5
a
( 2 3 6 i 5 : metebalen—see n . 40 above). B u t w h e n t a l k i n g about rest,

a
he does n o t e m p l o y the c i r c u m l o c u t i o n w i t h an a u x i l i a r y verb that

he used o f m o t i o n i n 6. 5 to express e m b a r k i n g o n m o t i o n (236 9~ a
10: erxato metaballein).

N o w , there is a p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h x finished changing. A n d
this p r i m a r y t i m e is an instant. A n d even i f x does n o t get any rest
i n g done i n that instant, that instant does b o u n d a p e r i o d o f rest for
x. W e also k n o w that at the e n d o f that p e r i o d o f rest, w h e n x starts
c h a n g i n g again, there is n o start to that change. Does that m e a n that
change is somehow open-ended at the start, b u t closed at the end,
whereas rest is closed at the start, a n d open-ended at its end? I do
n o t t h i n k so. W e need to f o l l o w A r i s t o t l e ' s f o r m o f w o r d s v e r y care
fully. H e says 'there is n o b e g i n n i n g o f a change; at least, there is
n o p r i m a r y p a r t o f the t i m e i n w h i c h i t e m b a r k e d o n change' ( 6 . 5 ,
2 3 6 i 4 - i 5 ) , m e a n i n g that there is n o p r i m a r y t i m e i n w h i c h some
a 5 7
t h i n g started to change. T h i s o b v i o u s l y does n o t mean that changes

never start. I t means rather that there is n o w a y o f p i n n i n g d o w n
exactly w h e n s o m e t h i n g got e n o u g h c h a n g i n g done to c o u n t as hav
i n g started. This aspect o f his v i e w (that there is n o p r i m a r y t i m e i n
w h i c h s o m e t h i n g started to change) seems to be unobjectionable.
T o take the case o f m o t i o n , A r i s t o t l e is c l a i m i n g that we can say
exactly w h e n s o m e t h i n g arrived (this is w h e n i t finished m o v i n g ) ,
b u t we cannot say exactly w h e n s o m e t h i n g left. A n a r r i v a l is a p u n c
t u a l event whose precise t i m i n g can be p i n n e d d o w n . A departure is
n o t — a t least, i f one understands b y 'departure' a single event that
takes place w h i c h qualifies s o m e t h i n g to c o u n t as h a v i n g departed;
5 5
ov ydp EOTiv dp%rj [LeTafioXrjS.
5 6
eon iêraôXrj^ re'Ao?.
5 7
ov ydp EOTiv dp%rj [LeTafioXrjS, ouS' ev qj Trpo'jTOj TOV %povov [leTeflaXev.
there j u s t is no such event. B u t there are t w o t h i n g s w h i c h do seem

to be questionable about A r i s t o t l e ' s view, (i) W h y i d e n t i f y the be
g i n n i n g o f a change as w h e n the c h a n g i n g t h i n g started to change?
(ii) W h y conclude f r o m the fact that there is n o primary time w h e n
the t h i n g started to change that there is no such t h i n g as the b e g i n
n i n g o f the change, i.e. that if y o u cannot p i n d o w n w h e n s o m e t h i n g
has started to change, then there is n o b e g i n n i n g o f the change?
L e t me take the t w o questions i n t u r n , (i) W h y does A r i s t o t l e
i d e n t i f y the b e g i n n i n g o f the change as w h e n the t h i n g started to
change? T o answer this, we have to i d e n t i f y w h a t other options
there m i g h t be. Presumably s o m e t h i n g can be starting to change
w i t h o u t having started to change. O r d i n a r y language c e r t a i n l y
seems to allow this: ' Q u i c k , the game is s t a r t i n g ' we cry, w h e n the
players are f o r m i n g u p o n the p i t c h . A r i s t o t l e identifies the start
of a change w i t h some p a r t o f the change, and t h e n finds h i m s e l f
unable to p i n d o w n w h a t that p a r t is. B u t w h a t i f we took instead
an instant w h e n the t h i n g is s t i l l at rest? One advantage o f this w a y
of l o o k i n g at the m a t t e r is that one c o u l d t h e n p o i n t to a parallel
between the beginning and the end o f a change: where the start o f
a change w o u l d be w h e n s o m e t h i n g is s t a r t i n g to change (and is
still at rest), so the e n d o f a change is w h e n s o m e t h i n g has finished
c h a n g i n g (and is newly at rest). T h e start o f a change, i n this sense,
w o u l d t h e n have a p r i m a r y t i m e , n a m e l y the last i n s t a n t o f rest.
I can see n o reason w h y A r i s t o t l e c o u l d n o t agree w i t h t h i s — i t is
n o t inconsistent w i t h w h a t he says. A f t e r a l l , he says that 'there
is no b e g i n n i n g o f a change; at least, there is no p r i m a r y p a r t o f
the t i m e i n w h i c h i t e m b a r k e d o n change' ( 2 3 6 i 4 - i 5 ) , and the
a
epexegetic oude ( w h i c h I have translated as 'at least') is consistent

w i t h the t h o u g h t that there m i g h t be another w a y o f e x p l a i n i n g
w h a t the b e g i n n i n g o f a change is. H e is p r o m p t e d to talk o f the
b e g i n n i n g o f a change i n these terms o n l y because he is interested,
at that p o i n t i n the text, i n the q u e s t i o n o f w h e n s o m e t h i n g does
the c h a n g i n g necessary to c o u n t as having changed (metabebleken);
he never asserted that this was the o n l y w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t
m i g h t be m e a n t b y the b e g i n n i n g o f a change.
M o r e o v e r , this is n o t his actual practice. W h e n t a l k i n g i n De in-

cessu animalium 4 about h o w h u m a n s get m o v i n g , A r i s t o t l e says:
' T h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h we step o u t also shows that the o r i g i n o f
m o v e m e n t is i n the r i g h t side; for a l l h u m a n s p u t the left foot fore
most, and, w h e n standing, preferably place the left foot i n f r o n t , u n -
Aristotle on Primary Time in Physics 6 18 7
less they do otherwise accidentally' ( 7 o 6 4 - 9 , trans. Forster, l i g h t l y

a
adapted). H e r e , A r i s t o t l e seems perfectly h a p p y to talk about w h a t

is g o i n g o n w h e n we start m o v i n g — p r e s u m a b l y because he is t a l k
i n g about w h a t happens w h e n we take o u r first step. I conclude that
i n Physics 6. 5 A r i s t o t l e is d e n y i n g that there is a b e g i n n i n g o f a
change o n l y i n one, specific, sense o f ' b e g i n n i n g ' .
T h e fact that there is a clear b o u n d i n g instant at the b e g i n n i n g
of a change—even i f A r i s t o t l e chooses n o t to call i t the b e g i n n i n g o f
a change i n Physics 6—is reassuring. Changes are clearly d e l i m i t e d
b y b o u n d i n g instants—the last i n s t a n t o f rest beforehand (at w h i c h
x has n o t yet changed f r o m its i n i t i a l state), a n d the first instant
of rest afterwards (at w h i c h x has changed to its final state). So ef
fectively, A r i s t o t l e is c o m m i t t e d to the t h e o r y that changes occupy
o p e n intervals o f t i m e . T h a t we s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t A r i s t o t l e this w a y
5 8
is suggested b y the fact that i n b o t h Phys. 6. 6, 2 3 6 3 4 - 5 , a n d 6. 8,

b
239 23~6, he is comfortable r e f e r r i n g to the p r i m a r y t i m e o f the

a
w h o l e change f r o m i n i t i a l state to e n d state, and that p r i m a r y t i m e

is a stretch o f t i m e — t h e stretch o f t i m e , I c o n t e n d , between the t w o
bounding instants. 59
So we do n o t have to conclude that changes are i n e l i m i n a b l y

vague, or a n y t h i n g like that. W e c o u l d treat the b o u n d i n g instant
of a change as its start, or we c o u l d treat the first step o f an animal's
j o u r n e y as the b e g i n n i n g o f that j o u r n e y . W h a t A r i s t o t l e observes
i n 6. 5 is that as a m a t t e r o f the logic o f the concept o f change, there
is no p r i v i l e g e d p a r t o f a change such that i t is i n v i r t u e o f hav
i n g done that m u c h c h a n g i n g that s o m e t h i n g s h o u l d c o u n t as hav
i n g changed. T h i s does n o t threaten the fact that one can i d e n t i f y a
b o u n d i n g instant at the start o f a change, a n d i t does n o t threaten
the p o s s i b i l i t y that for any g i v e n change, facts about w h a t k i n d o f
5 8
Cf. Sorabji: ' I am not saying that the period of motion has no boundary. I t w i l l
have an instant bounding it on either side' ('Instant', 73).
5 9
A r n o l d Brooks draws my attention to Phys. 6.3, 234 34— 5, where Aristotle ar
a b
gues that something cannot be in motion at an instant, because then it w i l l also be

able to be at rest i n an instant, and then what are we to say of the instant bounding
on one side a period of rest and on the other a period of change? The thing would
be both at rest and i n motion i n that instant, and this is impossible. Brooks wonders
whether this argument directly refutes my interpretation of Aristotle whereby the
end of the change is also the bounding instant of rest, and my suggestion here that
the beginning of change be identified w i t h the bounding instant of rest. The solution
is this: even though these bounding instants bound the periods of change, they are
not instants at which the object is changing (or getting any change done), and so we
are not led to claim that the object is both i n motion and at rest at the same time.
change i t is m i g h t c o n t e x t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e a candidate for the first

part of it.
(ii) W h y is i t t h a t A r i s t o t l e argues f r o m the fact t h a t there is no
p r i m a r y or exact t i m e at w h i c h s o m e t h i n g has started to change t h a t
there is n o b e g i n n i n g o f change? H e seems to have a t h o u g h t such
as the f o l l o w i n g : i f there is n o exact t i m e i n w h i c h an event or a p r o
cess, or whatever, happens, t h e n i t does n o t really exist. B u t is t h a t
really a sufficient reason for d e n y i n g its existence?
A useful w a y o f seeing the puzzle here is to r e t u r n to the c o m
parison between places a n d times. I said before t h a t s o m e t h i n g has
a place i f f i t has a p r i m a r y place. T h i s w o r k s i n the f o l l o w i n g way.
A l l and o n l y bodies w i t h s u r r o u n d i n g s are i n a place. T h e p r i m a r y
place o f a b o d y x — t h a t i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h x is i n any p a r t ( p r o p e r or
i m p r o p e r ) o f its s u r r o u n d i n g s — i s the i n n e r surface o f these sur
r o u n d i n g s . T h e r e is n o t h i n g , therefore, w h i c h has s u r r o u n d i n g s
w h i c h does n o t have a p r i m a r y place. W h e n I ask where some b o d y
x is, the answer w h i c h is given m a y be m o r e or less precise ( I have
explained earlier w h a t I m e a n b y this). I n other words, answers
m a y specify m o r e or less precisely where x is. I m p r e c i s e places—
n o n - p r i m a r y places—feature i n less precise answers, b u t the re
spondent is s t i l l a t t e m p t i n g to say where x is. I n general, exchanges
such as the one I c o n s t r u c t e d before w i t h the sequence o f questions
'where is x?', each t i m e e l i c i t i n g a m o r e a n d m o r e precise answer—
' M a r x H a l l ' , ' O n the second floor', ' I n r o o m 2 0 8 ' — m u s t have an
e n d - p o i n t , a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , n a m e l y at the specification o f x's
p r i m a r y place. I f there is n o e n d to this sequence, t h e n x has no
place to be specified. P r i m a r y places are w h a t guarantee occupancy
of a place, i.e. to be i n a place (en topoi) is to have a p r i m a r y place.
G i v e n the i d e n t i c a l characterizations o f a p r i m a r y place a n d a
p r i m a r y t i m e , i t appears to f o l l o w that for s o m e t h i n g to be i n t i m e
or i n a t i m e (en chronoi) is for s o m e t h i n g to have a p r i m a r y t i m e .
T h e r e has to be a most precise specification o f when s o m e t h i n g oc
c u r r e d for i t to be possible to specify the t i m e w h e n i t happened
even imprecisely. T h u s , A r i s t o t l e ' s t h o u g h t seems to be that we can
n o t specify the precise t i m e w h e n the start o f any change ( i n the
sense o f w h e n the t h i n g started to change) actually occurred. W h a t
A r i s t o t l e is d e n y i n g is t h a t there is a start o f a change in the sense of
there being some part of the change which counts as its beginning, since
i t can never be specified w h i c h i n s t a n t or substretch o f the change
this w o u l d be.
B u t is the fact that we cannot say w h e n s o m e t h i n g takes place

(because i t lacks a m o s t precise specification o f w h e n i t happens)
e n o u g h to j u s t i f y us i n d e n y i n g its existence? One o f A r i s t o t l e ' s o w n
doctrines seems to be available here to use against h i m . T o m o t i v a t e
this, I need to talk about places again.
A l t h o u g h n o t e v e r y t h i n g has a place, e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h exists is
somewhere, a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e . Basically, for x to have a place, x
has to be related i n an appropriate w a y to its s u r r o u n d i n g s , n a m e l y
b y b e i n g i n contact w i t h t h e m . A l l things w h i c h exist a n d w h i c h
either are n o t related i n this w a y to t h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g s , or have n o
s u r r o u n d i n g s , have to be a p p r o p r i a t e l y related to s o m e t h i n g w h i c h
does have a place i n order to c o u n t as b e i n g somewhere.
Consider some examples. T a k e the infamous goat-stag (cf. Phys.
4. 1, 2o8 3o). I t does n o t exist, so i t is nowhere. T a k e k n o w l e d g e
a
(4. 3, 2 i o i ) . I t is somewhere i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g i n souls, a n d souls

b
are i n t u r n somewhere i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g i n bodies, w h i c h do have

a place. T a k e heat (4. 3, 2 i o 2 6 - 7 ) . T h i s is an especially good ex
b
ample since we o b v i o u s l y locate heat. M o s t o f us prefer to go some

where where i t is h o t for o u r holidays, for instance; or to take an
example m o r e s u i t e d to A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g i c a l explorations, animals
seek w a r m t h , or seek to be near w a r m t h . Y e t w a r m t h is n o t the sort
o f t h i n g to be i n contact w i t h its s u r r o u n d i n g s . H o t things, h o w
ever, are, a n d that is A r i s t o t l e ' s answer: heat is somewhere i n v i r t u e
o f b e i n g a p r o p e r t y (pathos) o f bodies, w h i c h do have places. Lastly,
take the top h a l f o f the water i n a glass o f water. I t is n o t i n contact
w i t h its s u r r o u n d i n g s — n o t entirely, anyway—since i t is c o n t i n u o u s
w i t h (rather t h a n i n contact w i t h ) the other h a l f o f the water. A n d
yet we can locate i t , since we locate i t as part o f s o m e t h i n g w h i c h
does have a place, n a m e l y a l l the water i n the glass.
W i t h a l l these l a s t - m e n t i o n e d items, we can say where they are
(knowledge, heat, parts), b u t we m u s t u n d e r s t a n d that they are n o t
somewhere because they have a place s t r i c t l y speaking, b u t because
they are related i n various significant ways to t h i n g s w h i c h do have
places. I n other words, such items as the ones I have j u s t l i s t e d lack
p r i m a r y places (because they lack places), b u t we can s t i l l say where
they are.
B u t I have been i n s i s t i n g t h r o u g h o u t o n the analogy between
places a n d times for A r i s t o t l e . A n d so we need to ask ourselves w h y
i t c o u l d n o t be the case that the b e g i n n i n g o f a change is the k i n d
o f i t e m w h i c h does n o t have a p r i m a r y t i m e , a n d yet w h i c h can be
'located' i n t i m e , j u s t as things like k n o w l e d g e a n d heat can be l o

cated, even t h o u g h they do n o t have p r i m a r y places. T h e analogy
looks to be p r o m i s i n g . A f t e r a l l , A r i s t o t l e does actually believe that
changes themselves have p r i m a r y times (6. 6, 2 3 6 3 4 - 5 ; 6. 8, 2 3 9 2 3 -
b a
6) a n d they are p a r a d i g m a t i c a l l y t h i n g s in time, neatly delineated

b y b o u n d i n g instants (as I suggested i n (i) above). Perhaps starts o f
changes ( i n the sense A r i s t o t l e is concerned w i t h ) are j u s t related
somehow to changes, such that we can actually say w h e n they take
place, even t h o u g h they do n o t have p r i m a r y times.
I n g e n i o u s t h o u g h this m i g h t be, I t h i n k that to a t t e m p t such a
m o v e w o u l d miss the force o f w h a t exactly A r i s t o t l e is d e n y i n g i n
6 . 5 . F o r A r i s t o t l e ' s p o i n t is that there is n o m i n i m u m l e n g t h o f t i m e
a change m u s t take such that i t counts as h a v i n g started i n v i r t u e o f
h a v i n g lasted at least that long. ( I n m u c h the same way, i f m a t t e r
is i n f i n i t e l y divisible, one cannot say h o w m u c h space s o m e t h i n g
m u s t take u p i n order to c o u n t as b e i n g extended, i.e. a m i n i m u m
extension such that i t is i n v i r t u e o f s o m e t h i n g b e i n g extended b y
at least that m u c h that i t counts as b e i n g extended. A p o i n t is too
small; a n y t h i n g else is too large.) I f that is w h a t someone means b y
the expression 'the b e g i n n i n g o f a change', t h e n i t is i n d e e d true
that we cannot say w h e n the b e g i n n i n g o f a change is. I f y o u w a n t
to t h i n k o f the start o f a change i n the w a y I suggested above, as the
b o u n d i n g i n s t a n t between the change a n d the p r i o r p e r i o d o f rest,
that is fine, a n d y o u can say w h e n that happens. A n d i f y o u w a n t to
consider the first step o f an animal's j o u r n e y as the b e g i n n i n g o f its
j o u r n e y , that is fine too. B u t i f y o u w a n t to t h i n k o f the start o f any
change as that p r i v i l e g e d p a r t o f the change such that i t is i n v i r
tue o f the object h a v i n g gone t h r o u g h that p a r t o f the change that
i t counts as h a v i n g changed, t h e n there are p r o b l e m s .
One cannot say that the start o f a change ( i n the sense A r i s t o t l e is
interested i n here) is related to the change as heat or k n o w l e d g e is
related to a b o d y w i t h a place, because the start o f a change ( i n this
sense) is j u s t the k i n d o f t h i n g w h i c h w o u l d , were i t to exist, h a p p e n
at a certain t i m e . I t is n o t that the start o f the change, so u n d e r s t o o d ,
is m e t a p h y s i c a l l y a different k i n d o f t h i n g f r o m a change; the sort o f
start o f a change that A r i s t o t l e has i n m i n d is precisely supposed to
be locatable i n t i m e , as a change is locatable i n t i m e . A n d the p r o b
l e m w i t h such alleged b e g i n n i n g s o f change is that they cannot take
place i n an instant (because the t h i n g cannot get any c h a n g i n g done
i n an i n s t a n t ) , a n d they cannot take place i n a stretch, because a l -
t h o u g h such a stretch w o u l d have a clearly defined first l i m i t (the last
i n s t a n t o f rest; i n s t a n t A i n A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t i n 6. 5), i t w o u l d
have n o determinate end l i m i t . A t any instant D y o u choose after
A , the object w i l l have changed a certain a m o u n t d u r i n g A D , a n d
hence y o u can choose a substretch o f A D ( s t a r t i n g at A , a n d e n d i n g ,
say, at B ) such that the answer to the q u e s t i o n ' d i d i t start to m o v e
i n B D ? ' w i l l be n o (and so A D is n o t the p r i m a r y t i m e o f the start
of the change). Starts o f changes j u s t are n o t clear-cut i n the w a y
that they s h o u l d be i f they are to have a p r i m a r y t i m e ; if, i n other
words, they are to be p r o p e r l y speaking i n t i m e . T h e r e really is n o
such t h i n g as the start o f a change, where this is u n d e r s t o o d as a p a r t
of the change i n w h i c h some c h a n g i n g gets done.
13. H o w does this concern the student o f nature?
W h a t is the lesson that the student o f nature s h o u l d d r a w f r o m this?

I take i t that i t is s o m e t h i n g like the f o l l o w i n g . Physics a n d B i o l o g y
can s t i l l make use o f the n o t i o n o f s t a r t i n g to do s o m e t h i n g . I n d e e d ,
A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f continues to do so. F o r instance, he investigates
h o w animals get m o v i n g , i n De incessu animalium. B u t i n the l i g h t o f
A r i s t o t l e ' s investigations i n the Physics, we need to r e m e m b e r that
i f we are g o i n g to talk o f the start o f a change (e.g. the start o f an
animal's j o u r n e y to f i n d food), t h e n s o m e t h i n g other t h a n the c o n
ceptual nature o f change itself m u s t be d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h stretch
we are r e f e r r i n g to. So, for instance, w h e n we are t a l k i n g about the
b e g i n n i n g o f the animal's j o u r n e y , the c o n t e x t m i g h t determine that
we are t a l k i n g o f its first step. Once we have absorbed the lessons
of Physics 6, we can continue to talk about the starts o f change, a n d
the ends o f change, and changes themselves, w h e n they occur, etc.,
safe i n the k n o w l e d g e that we u n d e r s t a n d w h a t we m e a n w h e n we
do so, and that we u n d e r s t a n d the pitfalls a c c o m p a n y i n g the n o t i o n .
I n m u c h the same way, A r i s t o t l e can talk, i n his b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s ,
of where the parts o f the b o d y are, safe i n the k n o w l e d g e that i t has
been established h o w parts o f the b o d y are somewhere i n a different
way f r o m bodies themselves. T h e student o f nature can c a r r y o n
d e p l o y i n g the concept o f change i n her explanations o f the w o r l d ,
despite the recalcitrant difficulties w h i c h that concept offers.
Princeton University
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Translation (Princeton, 1984).
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Theta (Oxford Aristotle Studies; Oxford, 2009).
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Judson (ed.), Aristotle's Physics: A Collection of Essays (Oxford, 1991),
179-212.
Notes and introduction to R. Waterfield (trans.), Aristotle: Physics
(Oxford, 1996).
Burnyeat, M . , 'Kinesis vs. Energeia: A Much-Read Passage in (but not of)
Aristotle's Metaphysics', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008),
219-92.
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1976).
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dies; Oxford, 2005).
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[Syntax], 3rd edn. (1867; repr. Cambridge Library Collection; Cam
bridge, 2009).
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Works of Aristotle, vol. ii (Oxford, 1930).
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Phronesis, 55 (2010), 68-103.
'Le temps primaire du commencement d'un changement' ['Temps
primaire'], in J.-F. Balaude and F. Wolff (eds.), Aristote et la pensee
du temps (Le Temps Philosophique, 11; Universite Paris X-Nanterre,
2005), 99-111.
On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place [Location] (Oxford, 2002).
Parrachini, E , 'Raisons et deraisons d'un etonnement millenaire: apropos
de l'analyse aristotelicienne du changement dans Phys. Z 5', in M . Bo-
nelli and A. Longo (eds.), «Quid est veritas?»: hommage a Jonathan Barnes
(Naples, 2010), 87-114.
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and F. Wolff (eds.), Aristote et la pensee du temps (Le Temps Philoso
phique, 11; Universite Paris X-Nanterre, 2005), 113-26.
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(2012), 63-99.
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mentary [Physics] (Oxford, 1936).
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the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 50 (1976), 69-87; a revised version ap
pears in J. Barnes, M . Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aris
totle 3: Metaphysics (London, 1979), 159—77.
Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983).
Strobach, N., The Moment of Change: A Systematic History in the Philo
sophy of Space and Time [Moment] (Dordrecht, 1998).
Timpanaro Cardini, M . , Pseudo-Aristotele: Delineis insecabilibus (Testi e
documenti per lo studio dell'antichita, 32; Varese-Milan, 1970).
Wagner, H . , Aristoteles: Physikvorlesung (Berlin, 1967).
ELEMENTAL STRUCTURE
AND T H E T R A N S F O R M A T I O N
O F T H E E L E M E N T S I N ON
GENERATION AND CORRUPTION 2. 4
MARY KRIZAN
THE m u t u a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the elements is o f t e n t h o u g h t to sig

n i f y a l i m i t i n g case o f s u b s t a n t i a l change i n A r i s t o t l e : a l t h o u g h the
elements are p h y s i c a l l y s i m p l e bodies, t h e y are able to change i n t o
one another, a n d t h u s , e l e m e n t a l change is the l o w e s t level o f s u b
s t a n t i a l change i n A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l w o r l d . 1
A s the l i m i t i n g case o f
s u b s t a n t i a l change, i t is to here, i f a n y w h e r e , t h a t anyone w i s h i n g
to evaluate A r i s t o t l e ' s c o m m i t m e n t to a p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m o f
s u b s t a n t i a l change s h o u l d t u r n . I t s h o u l d t h u s strike one as r a t h e r
p e c u l i a r t h a t few c o n t e m p o r a r y scholars have u n d e r t a k e n a s e r i
ous a n d careful s t u d y o f the e l e m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s themselves,
since such a s t u d y m a y reveal aspects o f e l e m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t
© M a r y Krizan 2013
I would especially like to thank Dominic Bailey, Christopher Dodsworth, David
Ebrey, Brad Inwood, K a t h r i n Koslicki, M i t z i Lee, John Mouracade, Robert Pasnau,
Justin Waldo, and audiences at California State University-Fullerton, Spring H i l l
College, University of Connecticut, and University of Iowa for conversations, criti
cisms, and feedback that have, in various ways, improved this project i n its various
iterations. I am also grateful to the Emerson and Lowe families for their generous
gift of an Emerson—Lowe Dissertation Fellowship, which funded the initial stage of
this research.
1
For the purpose of this paper, I use the term 'element' to refer to Aristotle's
physically simple bodies—earth, air, fire, and water. One should note that this use
of 'element' may not be entirely correct: (1) Aristotle often uses arotêta when re
ferring to other entities, such as the primary contrarieties; (2) he often refers to the
physically simple bodies as rd KaXovfxeva arotêta, suggesting that they are not genu
inely elemental; and (3) there is reason to suspect that earth, air, fire, and water are
compound substances, and hence, are not genuine elements. For an excellent dis
cussion of these issues see T. J. Crowley, ' O n the Use of S t o i c h e i o n i n the Sense of
"Element"', Oxford S t u d i e s i n Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2005), 367—94, and id., A r i s
totle's "So-Called Elements'", Phronesis, 53 (2008), 223—42. For the purpose of this
paper, I also use the phrases 'elemental transformation', 'elemental transmutation',
and 'elemental change' interchangeably to refer to the process whereby one simple
body is generated from one or two other simple bodies.
196 Mary Krizan
c o u l d offer f r u i t f u l insights i n t o the c o n t i n u i n g debate about the

status o f m a t t e r i n A r i s t o t l e . 2
I n this paper, m y modest goal is to offer an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f

the elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s as described i n On Generation and
Corruption 2. 4, and to use this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to develop a m o d e l
of elemental s t r u c t u r e t h a t is consistent w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s account
of elemental change. I n the first section I examine the account o f
the elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n GC 2. 4, a r g u i n g t h a t each o f the
three types o f change t h a t A r i s t o t l e describes indicates a r e l a t i o n
ship b e t w e e n one element and one o f the three i n t o w h i c h i t can
change. I n the second section I examine three m a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
of elemental s t r u c t u r e f o u n d i n the l i t e r a t u r e , c o n c l u d i n g t h a t none
of these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can adequately account for the substantial
u n i t y o f elements i n a w a y t h a t is consistent w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s account
of the elemental transformations. I n the t h i r d section I develop an
alternative m o d e l o f elemental structure that is consistent w i t h A r i s
totle's account o f the elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s and can adequately
e x p l a i n the substantial u n i t y o f elements. T h e m o d e l t h a t I propose
retains a c o m m i t m e n t to p r i m e m a t t e r i n A r i s t o t l e , b u t differs f r o m
3
A m o n g contemporary authors, M . L . G i l l , A r i s t o t l e on Substance: The Paradox
of Unity [Paradox] (Princeton, 1989), 67—77, offers the most complete analysis of
elemental transformations; the analyses offered in E. Gannage (trans, and comm.),
Alexander of Aphrodisias: O n Aristotle's On Coming-to-Be and P e r i s h i n g 2. 2—5
[Alexander] (Ithaca, NY, 2005), 58—77, and E. Lewis (trans, and comm.), Alexander
of Aphr o d i s i a s : O n Aristotle's Meteorology 4 [Alexander Meteorology] (Ithaca, NY,
1996), 40—5, are also instructive. The ancient commentators on Aristotle provide
less assistance than one would like: only two ancient commentaries on the text
of On Generation and Corruption survive. O f these, Alexander's is preserved i n
fragments through the commentary of Philoponus and the Book of Morphology, by
the 8th-cent. alchemist Jabir b. Hayyan, though Alexander also summarizes his
account of Aristotle's elemental transformations i n the opening of his commentary
on Meteorology 4 and introduces them i n his general account of hylomorphism
in De anima. Themistius and Simplicius engage w i t h some of the key issues of
On Generation and Corruption in their commentaries on the P h y s i c s and De c a e l o ,
but are silent on the issue of elemental transformation. The medieval commentary
tradition, on the other hand, offers valuable insight into traditional interpretations
of elemental transformations and prime matter. The elemental transformations were
a common topic in Scholastic Questions commentaries; although many of these are
currently available only as manuscripts, a renewed interest in the Latin commentary
tradition of On Generation and Corruption has, i n recent years, yielded several
new critical editions of these works. For an overview of the commentary tradition
and On Generation and Corruption see J. M . M . H . Thijssen, ' T h e Commentary
Tradition on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione: A n Introductory Survey', i n
J. M . M . H . Thijssen and H . A . G. Braakhuis (eds.), The Commentary Tradition
on A r i s t o t l e ' s De generatione et corruptione: Ancient, Medieval, and E a r l y Modern
(Turnhout, 1999), 9—20.
Elemental Structure in G C 2. 4 197
t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i n so far as I argue that, i n the l i m i t i n g

case o f the elemental transformations, the m a t t e r o f the elements
a n d the m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t o f substantial change are d i v o r c e d .
1. T h e elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n GC 2. 4
I n On Generation and Corruption 2. 4 A r i s t o t l e offers his m o s t c o m

plete account o f the elemental transformations. I n De caelo 3 . 6 , be
g i n n i n g at 3 0 4 2 3 , he p r o v e d t h a t the elements do change i n t o one
b
another; n o w he explains how such changes p r o c e e d . I n his account 3
he appeals to the basic features o f simple bodies p r o v e n earlier i n

b o o k z o f On Generation and Corruption. I n GC z. z he p r o v e d that
four p r i m a r y contraries i n t w o pairs, h o t - c o l d a n d w e t - d r y , are the
simplest or m o s t basic qualities available to t o u c h ; a n d i n GC z. 34
he p r o v e d that each o f the elements consists o f one o f the four p h y

sically possible p a i r i n g s o f the four q u a l i t i e s . T h e result is that the
5
four elements—fire, air, water, a n d earth—consist o f h o t / d r y , w e t /

hot, c o l d / w e t , and d r y / c o l d , respectively.
A t 3 3 i i 2 - i 6 A r i s t o t l e claims t h a t i t is possible for any one o f
a
the four elements to change i n t o any o f the others, and i n the re
m a i n d e r o f GC 2. 4 he describes three types o f change that generate
an element. I refer to these changes as (1) ' p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical
changes', (2) ' d i f f i c u l t changes', a n d (3) ' n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes'. 6
I n this section I argue t h a t each type o f change explains the r e l a t i o n

ship between an element a n d one o f the three t h a t i t is able to change
i n t o , a n d thus, the three accounts o f change are necessary a n d suf
ficient for d e s c r i b i n g the m u t u a l elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . 7
3
Philoponus, Joachim, and Williams all place the reference of -nporepov at 331*7
to De caelo 3. 6; see Philop. I n GC 231. 18—20 Vitelli; H . H . Joachim, A r i s t o t l e : O n
Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [Coming-to-Be] (Oxford, 1922), 220; C. J. F. W i l
liams (trans, and comm.), A r i s t o t l e ' s De generatione et corruptione, Translated with
Notes [De generations] (Oxford, 1982), 161.
4
329 32—330*12. There are two odd features of the discussion: (1) Aristotle re
b
duces all of the tangible qualities to wet and dry, and does not suggest that any re
duce to cold or hot; and (2) heavy and light are left out of the discussion.
5
3 3 ° * 3 ° 7 - Aristotle notes that six combinations are logically possible, but only
—b
four are physically possible.

6
I n addition to these three possible types of change, Aristotle describes a fourth
process that does not generate an element; see 33 i 26—30. b
7
I n arguing that each type of change explains the relationship between an
element and one of the three that it can change into, my account of elemental
transformations differs from that of other scholars who have tackled this difficult
i 8
9 Mary Krizan
I . I . Paradigmatic cyclical change
I n GC 2. 4, at 3 3 i 2 3 - 2 , A r i s t o t l e introduces his first m e c h a n i s m

a b
for e x p l a i n i n g the generation o f one element f r o m another. H e

writes:
For those that have counterparts [avjnjioXa\ shared with each other, the
change is fast, but for those that do not, the change is slow, because it is
easier for one to change than for many. For example, air will come to be
from fire when one of the opposites changes (for fire was hot and dry, and
air is hot and wet, so that there will be air when dry is overtaken by wet);
and again, water will come to be from air, if hot is overtaken by cold (for
air was hot and wet, and water was cold and wet, so that there will be wa
ter when hot changes). In the same way, there will be earth from water
and fire from earth. For both have a counterpart in common: water is wet
and cold, and earth is cold and dry, so that earth will come to be when
wet is overtaken, and again, since fire is dry and hot, and earth is cold and
dry, if cold is destroyed, then fire will come to be from earth. (GC 2. 4,
3 3 I 2 - 2)
a
3
b
T h e changes t h a t A r i s t o t l e describes i n this passage proceed i n

the f o l l o w i n g order: fire -> air -> w a t e r s e a r t h s fire, and so f o r t h . A c
c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , the change is fast because each o f the elements
i n the series shares a c o u n t e r p a r t , a n d thus, the generation o f a n e w
element requires a change i n o n l y one o f the qualities o f the p r e
existing element. 8
A r i s t o t l e c o n f i r m s t h a t this m a n n e r o f change for the elements is

cyclical at 3 3 i 2 - 3 . T h i s , however, presents an i n t e r p r e t a t i v e ques
b
t i o n : is the cycle u n i d i r e c t i o n a l , or can i t proceed i n either direction?

G i l l suggests t h a t the cycle m a y proceed i n either d i r e c t i o n , a n d as
evidence cites a passage f r o m GC 2. i o . T h e r e A r i s t o t l e w r i t e s :
9
issue; see e.g. M . Furth, Substance, Form, and Psyche: An A r i s t o t e l i a n Metaphysics

[Substance] (Cambridge, 1988); G i l l , Paradox; Lewis, Alexander Meteorology; D.
Charles, 'Simple Genesis and Prime Matter' ['Simple Genesis'], i n F. de Haas
and J. Mansfeld (eds.), A r i s t o t l e : O n Generation and Corruption, Book I [GC I ]
(Oxford, 2004), 151—69; Gannage, Alexander; and F. A. Lewis, 'What's the Matter
with Prime Matter?' ['Matter'], Oxford S t u d i e s i n Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008),
123-46.
I translate ovôXa
8
as 'counterparts', following Williams. Williams provides a
detailed discussion of the term in De generatione, 162, and C. J. F. Williams (trans,
and comm.), Philoponus: O n Aristotle's On Coming-to-Be and P e r i s h i n g 1. 6—2. 4
(Ithaca, NY, 1999), 172. Cf. Furth, Substance, 224.
G i l l , Paradox,
9
70. Charles is also committed to the thought that forward and
backward cyclical changes use the same mechanism; see Charles, 'Simple Gene-
The cause of this, as has been said often, is circular motion: for this alone
is continuous. That is why the others that change into one another on ac
count of their affections and potentialities, such as the simple bodies, are
imitating circular motion: for whenever air comes to be from water and fire
comes to be from air, and again, water comes to be from fire, we say that
generation has come around in a circle because it has reversed back to the
beginning. (GC 2. 10, 33& 34-337 6) b a
Does this passage c o n f i r m t h a t p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical t r a n s f o r m a

tions m a y proceed i n either direction? I argue t h a t i t does n o t .
T h e passage does n o t reveal the type o f changes i n v o l v e d i n this
p a r t i c u l a r cycle; i t suggests o n l y that i t is a cycle. T h e passage is
s t r i k i n g l y different f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f p a r a d i g m a t i c
cyclical changes i n GC 2. 4 n o t o n l y because i t introduces changes
t h a t are the reverse o f the cycle described there, b u t also because
one o f the changes—the change f r o m fire to water—does n o t even
involve a shared c o u n t e r p a r t . T h e GC 2. 10 passage entails o n l y
the weaker c l a i m t h a t m a n y changes between elements proceed
i n a cycle, w h i c h is f u r t h e r c o n f i r m e d b y A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion
of changes b e t w e e n air a n d water i n Meteor. 1. 9, 3 4 6 3 6 - 3 4 7 8 . b a
I t does n o t indicate t h a t instances such as the change f r o m water

to air or water to f i r e — w h i c h c e r t a i n l y do occur—proceed b y the
same mechanisms as the p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes described
i n GC 2. 4, 3 3 i 2 3 - 2 .
a b
A f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical change as a type

of m o t i o n p r o v i d e s evidence t h a t such change m u s t be u n i d i r e c
t i o n a l . C y c l i c a l change between the elements is a type o f m o t i o n
t h a t is b o t h s i m p l e a n d c o n t i n u o u s : i t is s i m p l e because i t is one
of t w o types o f possible m o t i o n for s i m p l e bodies, a n d i t is c o n
t i n u o u s because i t imitates the m o t i o n o f the heavenly b o d i e s . I f 10
cyclical changes between the elements were b i d i r e c t i o n a l , t h e n the

elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w o u l d fail to be s i m p l e and c o n t i n u o u s .
sis', 158—60. I n the Epitome Averroes assumes—without argument—that the reverse

cycle occurs; see S. Kurland (trans, and comm.), Averroes: On Aristotle's De ge-
neratione et corruptione, Middle Commentary and Epitome [ A v e r r o e s ] (Cambridge,
1958), 129-30.
10
I n De caelo i . 3, 27o 26—3 1, Aristotle indicates that circular and linear motions
b
are the only possible types of motion for simple bodies. Circular motion is prior to
linear motion because it is 'more simple and complete', as Aristotle acknowledges
in Phys. 8. 9, 265*13—17. I n GC 2. 4 Aristotle is concerned with circular motion; his
account of change here may be contrasted with his discussion of the linear motions
of the elements in P h y s i c s 8. 4 and De caelo 4. 3.
200 Mary Krizan
T h e y w o u l d fail to be s i m p l e because m o v i n g i n b o t h directions en

tails t h a t there are t w o m o t i o n s {Phys. 8. 8, 2 6 i 3 2 - 4 ) , a n d hence,
b
the m o t i o n w o u l d be c o m p l e x ; a n d they w o u l d fail to be c o n t i n u o u s

because m o v i n g i n b o t h directions i m p l i e s t h a t there is a m o m e n t
at w h i c h m o t i o n stops a n d changes d i r e c t i o n {Phys. 8. 8, 2 6 2 i 2 - a
17). F u r t h e r m o r e , b i d i r e c t i o n a l m o t i o n allows for change t h r o u g h

p a r t o f the cycle, as i n the change f r o m water to earth a n d back to
water; this type o f change cannot be c o n t i n u o u s , since, as A r i s t o t l e
suggests, c o n t i n u o u s change requires the c o m p l e t i o n o f the c y c l e . 11
T h u s , I conclude t h a t p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes, as described

i n GC 2. 4, are u n i d i r e c t i o n a l . C o n s i d e r i n g p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical
changes as a type o f m o t i o n t h a t is b o t h s i m p l e a n d c o n t i n u o u s
confirms t h a t such changes m a y n o t proceed i n b o t h directions.
T h e considerations f r o m Physics 8. 8 do n o t r u l e o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y
of abbreviated cycles o f change, like those suggested i n GC 2. 10;
they do, however, c o n f i r m that p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes m a y
not proceed i n t w o opposite directions i f they are to be s i m p l e and
continuous. 12
1.2. Difficult change
A second w a y i n w h i c h one element generates another is t h r o u g h

w h a t I refer to as ' d i f f i c u l t ' change. A r i s t o t l e describes this m a n n e r
of change i n GC 2. 4, 33 i 2 - i 1: b
But, it is possible for water to be generated from fire, and earth from air,
and again, earth from water and fire from air—but it is more difficult, be
cause more things must change. For it is necessary, if fire will come to be
from water, that both cold and wet are destroyed, and again, if air will come
to be from earth, that cold and dry are destroyed. Similarly, if water and
earth will come to be from fire and air, both opposites must change. This
type of generation, then, takes longer. (GC 2. 4, 3 3 i 2 - n ) b
Regardless o f h o w one i n t e r p r e t s p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical change, i t is

clear t h a t A r i s t o t l e needs an account o f ' d i f f i c u l t ' change i n order
to f i l l o u t his c l a i m that each element is able to change i n t o each o f
11
Aristotle suggests at Phys. 8. 8, 264 24—8, that continuous motion is not possible
b
over a semicircle or the arc of a circle. Themistius—appropriately, I think—reads the

passage as confirming that there cannot be continuous motion forward and backward
through parts of a circle. See Themist. I n Phys. 232. 1—9 Schenkl.
13
I n addition, admitting that the cycle may proceed in the opposite direction en
tails that non-reciprocal changes are redundant within Aristotle's theory of elemental
change, as I argue in sect. 1.3 below.
the others. F i r e , for example, can change i n t o air b y a p a r a d i g m a t i c

cyclical change; even i f fire were able to change i n t o e a r t h b y the
same m e c h a n i s m , this w o u l d n o t yet e x p l a i n h o w fire c o u l d change
i n t o water.
T h e i n t e r p r e t a t i v e issue for difficult changes centres o n the ques
t i o n : w h y do such changes take longer t h a n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical
changes? I t is clear t h a t difficult changes are m o r e difficult t h a n
p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes because t w o o f the contraries m u s t
change, b u t i t is n o t clear w h y this takes l o n g e r . I f a change i n t w o
13
contraries takes longer t h a n a change i n one contrary, t h e n i t f o l

lows t h a t the contraries do n o t change s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n difficult
changes. I f they d i d , t h e n they w o u l d n o t take longer t h a n p a r a d i g
m a t i c cyclical changes, a l t h o u g h they m a y s t i l l be m o r e difficult.
I agree w i t h the general analysis o f difficult changes p r o p o s e d i n
d e p e n d e n t l y b y F u r t h a n d G i l l , a l t h o u g h i t raises some a d d i t i o n a l
w o r r i e s for A r i s t o t l e ' s account. F u r t h suggests:
Fire can and does turn into Water, and vice versa, or Air into Earth,
but because those parts are not "consecutive" (in the technical sense
defined above), each such change must go through an intermediate stage,
involving first one and then a second contrariety as the persisting subject;
for this reason it is "more difficult" (33ib6) and "takes longer" ( 3 3 i b i i ) ,
whereas change between the "consecutives" is "easier" and thus "quick"
(33ia25, 24). 14
A c c o r d i n g to F u r t h , the reason w h y changes o f the second type take

longer is t h a t there is some i n t e r m e d i a t e stage between, for example,
fire a n d water. T h i s m a y be spelt o u t i n the f o l l o w i n g way: we b e g i n
w i t h fire, w h i c h is h o t and d r y ; d u r i n g the first stage o f the trans
f o r m a t i o n f r o m fire to water, the d r y is overtaken b y the w e t , a n d
i n the second stage, the c o l d is overtaken b y the dry. T h u s , water
comes to be f r o m fire, b u t the process takes longer t h a n i f air were
to be generated f r o m fire.
T h e w o r r y for this account is that, at some stage o f the process,
there w i l l be another element (e.g. air), and hence, i t w o u l d be m o r e
a p p r o p r i a t e to say t h a t water came to be f r o m air, n o t f r o m fire.
A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f does n o t address this w o r r y , a n d thus one m a y
s i m p l y accept the consequence, n o t i n g t h a t A r i s t o t l e is concerned
13
Some have denied that they do, i n fact, take longer; this w i l l emerge as an issue
in sect. 2. i .
14
F u r t h , Substance, 224. By 'consecutive', F u r t h means changes that follow the
cycle fire -* air -* water dearth.
zoz Mary Krizan
to show that water can come to be f r o m fire, even i f fire is n o t located

n e x t to water i n the series g i v e n b y p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical c h a n g e . 15
1.3. Non-reciprocal change
T h e t h i r d m a n n e r i n w h i c h one element can change i n t o another is

t h r o u g h w h a t I refer to as ' n o n - r e c i p r o c a l change'. A r i s t o t l e i n t r o
duces this m e c h a n i s m at 3 3 i i 2 - 2 4 :
b
On the other hand, if a single quality of each one passes away, then the
change is easier, but it is not reciprocal; earth and air will come to be from
fire and water, and fire and water will come to be from air and earth. So,
whenever the cold of water and the dryness of fire pass away, there will
be air (for the heat of fire and the wetness of water remain), but when the
heat of fire and the wetness of water pass away, there will be earth because
what remains is the dryness of fire and the coldness of water. And simi
larly, fire and water will also come to be from air and earth: for when the
heat of air and the dryness of earth pass away, there will be water (since the
moisture of air and the coldness of water remain), but when the moisture
of air and the coldness of earth pass away, there will be fire because what
remains is the heat of air and the dryness of earth, which were fire. (GC
2- 4, 3 3 i i 2 - 2 4 )
b
T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f change differs f r o m the other t w o because i t

suggests a w a y i n w h i c h one element is generated b y t w o elements.
I t has p r o v e n to be the m o s t difficult for h i s t o r i c a l a n d c o n t e m p o r
ary readers o f A r i s t o t l e , as there are objections to the account itself.
Nevertheless, I argue that these objections can be avoided b y i n
t e r p r e t i n g the relationship between the t w o generating elements as
an agent/patient r e l a t i o n ; i n d o i n g so, I show that the t h i r d type o f
change is necessary a n d sufficient i n f i l l i n g o u t A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a i m that
each o f the elements m a y generate each o f the others.
One o b j e c t i o n to A r i s t o t l e ' s account o f n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes
is that he is confusing the p e r i s h i n g o f a c o n t r a r y w i t h the change
i n t o an opposite, thus r e n d e r i n g n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes superflu
ous. W i l l i a m s outlines this o b j e c t i o n ; here is a s u m m a r y , u s i n g the
example o f fire a n d water c h a n g i n g i n t o e a r t h . W h e n earth w i l l
16
be generated f r o m fire a n d water, the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n requires t w o

changes: (i) h o t p e r i s h i n g f r o m fire, a n d (ii) w e t p e r i s h i n g f r o m w a
ter. T h e result, a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , is (iii) a single element, earth.
15
This is the explanation accepted by G i l l , Paradox, 74—5.
16
Williams provides the clearest explanation of the objection (De generatione,
163). A version was first noticed by Philoponus (In GC 234. 19—235. 18 Vitelli).
Yet w h e n h o t perishes f r o m fire, the result is actually c o l d , and thus
(i) entails that there is already earth; a n d w h e n w e t perishes f r o m
water, the result is s o m e t h i n g dry, a n d so ( i i ) also entails that there
is already earth. T h u s , the result o f the change w i l l be t w o q u a n t i
ties o f earth, each o f w h i c h c o u l d be a r r i v e d at i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d
w i t h o u t appealing to the other. So, the account o f n o n - r e c i p r o c a l
changes is superfluous.
A second o b j e c t i o n to A r i s t o t l e ' s account o f n o n - r e c i p r o c a l
changes is that i t is unclear w h y the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t w o elements
w o u l d sometimes p r o d u c e one element, a n d at other times w o u l d
p r o d u c e a different element: i t is unclear, for example, w h y the
i n t e r a c t i o n o f fire a n d water w o u l d sometimes p r o d u c e air a n d at
other times w o u l d p r o d u c e earth. A s s u m i n g an equal q u a n t i t y o f
fire a n d water, a n d assuming that the p r i m a r y contraries are equally
able to act and be acted u p o n , either r e s u l t — e a r t h or a i r — w o u l d
seem to be r a n d o m , a n d thus n o t n a t u r a l . O n the other h a n d , one
m a y assume that some contraries are m o r e active t h a n others: i f d r y
is a p r i v a t i o n o f wet, t h e n w e t m a y be m o r e active t h a n dry, a n d i f
c o l d is a p r i v a t i o n o f heat, t h e n h o t m a y be m o r e active t h a n c o l d .
1 7
I f this is the case, t h e n one m i g h t suggest that the result o f fire a n d

water is always a i r — w h i c h is s t i l l unsatisfactory, since i t does n o t
e x p l a i n h o w earth m i g h t be generated f r o m fire and w a t e r . 18
B o t h o f these objections m a y be avoided b y r e f r a m i n g the rela

t i o n s h i p between the t w o elements that interact i n a n o n - r e c i p r o c a l
change. I suggest that one o f the p a i r is the agent, or efficient cause
of the change, and the other is the patient, or the m a t e r i a l cause
of the change. Consider the example o f fire a n d water. O n the one
h a n d , w h e n fire acts o n water, the result is that the water boils a n d
becomes air. I n this case, fire is the source o f heat that changes the
c o l d , w e t water i n t o h o t , w e t air; water is the m a t t e r that is trans
f o r m e d i n t o air. O n the other h a n d , w h e n water acts o n fire, the
result is the opposite: water cools the fire, r e s u l t i n g i n a c o l d , d r y
17
The thought that one of the contraries i n a pair is more active than the other
is derived from Aristotle's claim, at GC 2. 5, 332 23—4, that one of the contraries
a
in each pair is a privation. Commentators have been quite interested i n this claim:
Philoponus reads it as suggesting that one of the two contraries is more like form,
and hence better; Averroes suggests in the Middle Commentary that cold is the priva
tion of heat, and dry is the privation of moist, and Oresme agrees. See Philop. In GC
242. 15—22 Vitelli; Kurland, Averroes, 82—3; and N . Oresme, Quaestiones super De
generatione et corruptione [Super GC] 2. 5, 221. 76—90 Caroti.
18
G i l l seems to arrive at the conclusion that fire and water always produce air, but
for different reasons; see G i l l , Paradox, 73—4.
204 Mary Krizan
substance, i.e. e a r t h . I n b o t h cases, the p a t i e n t o f the change is

19
converted i n t o the new element, a n d the agent does n o t survive

i n d e f i n i t e l y — i t is used u p as a result o f enacting the c h a n g e . 20
T h i s alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can a v o i d b o t h objections raised

above, a n d has f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t o r y benefits i n the c o n t e x t o f GC
2. 4. F i r s t , i t avoids the second o b j e c t i o n b y p r o v i d i n g a s t o r y
about w h e n , a n d why, one specific element comes to be f r o m
the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t w o others. I f I a m r i g h t t h a t p a r a d i g m a t i c
cyclical changes are u n i d i r e c t i o n a l , t h e n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes also avoids the charge o f s u p e r f l u i t y : i n
fact, i t explains changes t h a t are counter to the cycle o u t l i n e d i n
Section 1.1.
A second i n t e r p r e t a t i v e benefit o f this e x p l a n a t i o n o f n o n -
reciprocal changes is t h a t i t makes sense o f the difference between
n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes and impossible changes, as discussed i n GC
2. 4. A f t e r i n t r o d u c i n g the three possible types o f change, A r i s t o t l e
suggests t h a t a final m e c h a n i s m o f change is impossible. H e w r i t e s :
It is not possible for the destruction of one quality of each of the elements,
taken in consecutive order, to bring about a change in any of the bodies be
cause what remains in both is either the same or the opposite—and a body
cannot come to be from either option. (GC 2. 4, 33i 26-3o) b
A c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m s , this account is j u s t as confused as A r i s t o t l e ' s

account o f n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes. O n m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , however,
i t represents a genuine physical i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Consider the interac
t i o n b e t w e e n fire and air, and assume that fire is a c t i n g u p o n air. I f
the h o t o f fire acts u p o n the h o t o f air, t h e n there w i l l be n o change.
I f the d r y o f fire acts u p o n the w e t o f air, t h e n there are t w o pos
sible results: either d r y takes over wet, i n w h i c h case fire remains,
or w e t resists the change f r o m dry, i n w h i c h case air remains. I n no
19
The example that comes to mind is the interaction between water and the glow
ing embers of a campfire: when water acts upon the embers, the material that used
to be fire turns to a black, earthy substance, and i n destroying the fire, the water
destroys itself in the process.
30
Oresme, Super GC 2. 9, sketches a relevantly similar view. Oresme suggests
that when air is generated from fire and water, water acts on fire, generating the
form of air in the matter of fire, and in doing so destroys itself. M y view is different
from Oresme's because I find that the relationship should be the reverse—that is,
water is generating the form of earth i n the matter of fire—and because I make the
agent/patient relationship explicit rather than implicit. See Oresme, Super GC 2. 9,
250. 56—64 Caroti.
case is i t possible for a t h i r d element, different f r o m fire or air, to

be generated f r o m the i n t e r a c t i o n o f these t w o . 21
A t h i r d and m o r e general benefit o f m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that i t fills

out A r i s t o t l e ' s account o f w h y each element is able to change i n t o the
other three. Each o f the three types o f change i n GC 2. 4 explains the
relationship between one element a n d the other three: p a r a d i g m a t i c
cyclical change explains h o w an element m i g h t change i n t o the n e x t
element i n the u n i d i r e c t i o n a l cycle fire -> air -> w a t e r s earth; difficult
change explains h o w an element m i g h t change i n t o an element w i t h
w h i c h i t has n o contraries i n c o m m o n ; a n d n o n - r e c i p r o c a l change
explains h o w an element m i g h t change i n t o the element ' b e h i n d '
i t i n the cycle. T h e fastest a n d easiest change w i l l be i n t o the n e x t
element i n the cycle, a l t h o u g h the other t w o types o f change are
possible—difficult change is possible t h r o u g h an i n t e r m e d i a t e stage,
a n d n o n - r e c i p r o c a l change is possible w i t h the assistance o f an
other element that functions as the agent o f the change. I n effect,
n o n - r e c i p r o c a l change is an e x p l a n a t i o n o f counter-cyclical changes,
needed to complete the account o f elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o
m i s e d i n the o p e n i n g o f GC 2. 4 a n d foreshadowed i n DC 3. 6.
2. E l e m e n t a l transformations and elemental s t r u c t u r e

i n t r a d i t i o n a l and revisionary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
Scholars have often appealed to the elemental transformations as

a l i m i t i n g case o f m a t e r i a l change; i t is thus a test for d e t e r m i n i n g
w h e t h e r A r i s t o t l e is c o m m i t t e d to a p u r e l y p o t e n t i a l , inseparable,
a n d i m p e r c e p t i b l e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t u m o f change that the inter
pretative t r a d i t i o n refers to as ' p r i m e m a t t e r ' or prima materia. 22
T h e vast literature s u r r o u n d i n g this issue is generally concerned

31
I n defence of Williams, Aristotle's own description of the process at 33i 30—6 b
seems confused, for he suggests that it is possible for heat to destroy dry, contrary to
his own account of change between opposites. Despite the inadequacy of Aristotle's
example, I believe that the logical point still stands.
3 3
As Zeller famously describes prime matter: ' I f we abstract entirely from any
thing which is a product of Becoming—that is to say, i f we think to ourselves a kind
of object which has not as yet become anything, then we shall have pure Matter
without any determination by Form. T h i s w i l l be that which is nothing, but can
become everything—the Subject to which no one of all the thinkable predicates be
longs, but which precisely on that account is equally receptive of them all. I n other
words, it is that which is all i n Possibility and nothing in Actuality: it is purely poten
tial Being, without any kind of actual existence' (E. Zeller, A r i s t o t l e and the E a r l i e r
P e r i p a t e t i c s (London, 1897), 347—8).
206 Mary Krizan
w i t h the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n : w h a t is the m a t t e r o f the elements, a n d

does i t p e r s i s t t h r o u g h e l e m e n t a l changes? W h i l e there is a v a r i
ety o f answers, the ones t h a t I a m c o n c e r n e d w i t h fall i n t o three
m a i n camps: t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , w h i c h argue t h a t the m a t
ter for the elements is p r i m e m a t t e r a n d t h a t p r i m e m a t t e r persists
t h r o u g h s u b s t a n t i a l changes b e t w e e n the e l e m e n t s ; 23
strong revisio-
n a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , w h i c h d e n y t h a t there is a m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u
ant for changes b e t w e e n the elements a n d argue t h a t the elements
are m a t t e r for one a n o t h e r ; 24
a n d weak r e v i s i o n a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,
w h i c h argue t h a t the c o n t r a r i e s t h e m s e l v e s — w h i l e n o t e x p l i c i t l y
m a t t e r f o r the elements—are a p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m for e l e m e n t a l
change. 25
33
T h e traditional interpretation may be traced back to the ancient commenta
tors; it is explicitly found in the commentaries on On Generation and Corruption of
Philoponus and Alexander, as well as Alexander's commentary on De anima. For
discussion of the latter see I . Kupreeva, 'Qualities and Bodies: Alexander against
the Stoics', Oxford S t u d i e s i n Ancient Philosophy, 25 (2003), 297—344, P - 3°8—9- es
For modern versions of traditional interpretations see e.g. F. Solmsen, Aristotle

and Prime Matter: A Reply to H u g h R. K i n g ' , Journal of the H i s t o r y of I d e a s , 19
(1958), 243—52; J. Owens, 'Matter and Predication in Aristotle' ['Predication'], i n E.
M c M u l l i n (ed.), The Concept of Matter [Concept] (Notre Dame, 1963), 99-115; N .
Luyten, 'Matter as Potency' ['Potency'], i n M c M u l l i n (ed.), Concept, 122—33; H- M .
Robinson, 'Prime Matter in Aristotle', Phronesis, 19 (1974), 168—88; P. Suppes,
Aristotle's Concept of Matter and its Relation to M o d e r n Concepts of Matter',
Synthese, 28 (1974), 27—50; Williams, De generatione; C. Page, 'Predicating Forms
of Matter i n Aristotle's Metaphysics' ['Forms'], Review of Metaphysics, 39 (1985),
57—82; and Lewis, 'Matter'.
24
Strong revisionary interpretations are defended i n H . R. K i n g , Aristotle
without Prima Materia', Journal of the H i s t o r y of I d e a s , 17 (1956), 370—89; W.
Charlton, A r i s t o t l e ' s Physics Books I and I I (Oxford, 1970); i d . , 'Prime Matter: A
Rejoinder', Phronesis, 28 (1983), 197—211; and S. Broadie, 'On Generation and Cor
ruption I . 4: Distinguishing Alteration—Substantial Change, Elemental Change,
and First Matter in G C ['Distinguishing Alteration'], in de Haas and Mansfeld
(eds.), GC I , 123—50.
35
The weak revisionary interpretation is defended i n F u r t h , Substance, 221—7,
and G i l l , Paradox, 41—82 and 243—52. A related interpretation, advanced by E.
Lewis, suggests that the contraries are the matter of the elements and Aristotle is
not committed to prime matter, b u t Aristotle none the less accepts a hylomorphic
analysis of elements; see Lewis, Alexander Meteorlogy, 15—26.
I leave aside other accounts that may be described as quasi-traditional, b u t do
not fall into the main camps described above: for example, versions of the view that
prime matter or ultimate matter is a kind of extension, has extension essentially, or
is physical stuff, as defended i n R. Sokolowsi, 'Matter, Elements and Substance i n
Aristotle', Journal of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy, 8 (1970), 263—88; S. Cohen, A r i s
totle's Doctrine of the Material Substrate', P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 93 (1984), 171—94;
C. Byrne, 'Prime Matter and Actuality', Journal of the H i s t o r y of Philosophy, 33
(1995), 197—224; i d . , 'Matter and Aristotle's Material Cause', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 31 (2001), 85—112. Charles, i n 'Simple Genesis', defends an alternative
In e v a l u a t i n g these three types o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , there are two

q u e s t i o n s t h a t one s h o u l d ask: (1) is the a c c o u n t o f e l e m e n t a l change
e n t a i l e d b y the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n consistent w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s a c c o u n t i n
GC 2. 4?, and (2) can the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n the u n i t y
o f the elements? (2) is i m p o r t a n t because A r i s t o t l e r e p e a t e d l y refers
to the elements as ' s i m p l e b o d i e s ' {airXa awfiara), thus distinguish
ing them from the composite chemical c o m p o u n d s . 2 6
Regardless
o f w h e t h e r one considers the elements to be absolutely s i m p l e or
s i m p l e o n l y qua b o d y an a c c o u n t o f t h e i r u n i t y is r e q u i r e d to ex
p l a i n w h y t h e y are simple bodies, despite h a v i n g t w o d i f f e r e n t c o n
traries.
2.1. Traditional interpretations
A c c o r d i n g to t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f A r i s t o t l e , w h i c h I refer
to c o l l e c t i v e l y as T I , e v e r y case o f s u b s t a n t i a l change r e q u i r e s three
explanatory components: a substantial f o r m , w h i c h enforms a sub
stance, a p r i v a t i o n , w h i c h indicates the opposite f r o m w h i c h the
substance came to be, and an u n d e r l y i n g m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t or
s u b s t r a t u m t h a t persists t h r o u g h the substantial change. 27
Since
that resists characterization, suggesting that what the tradition calls 'prime matter'
is a purely logical object.
3 6
See e.g. Phys. 4. 1, 2o8 8-9; 4. 8, 2 i 4 i 3 - i 4 ; Decaelo
b b
1. 2, 268 28-9; 3. 8, 3o6 9~
b b
10; DA 3. i , 4 2 4 2 9 - 3 o ; M e t a £ / z . ,4 8, 988 3o; A 9, i o i 7 i o - i 1; H 1, io42 8. Whether

b b b a
or not the simple bodies are ovvOera is a matter of debate; traditional interpretations
affirm that the simple bodies are composites of matter and form, and thus are not
elements i n the most precise sense of the term, whereas strong revisionary interpre
tations deny that the simple bodies are ovvOera. Aristotle's own account of the rela
tionship between the contraries in an element is not helpful in this matter; he refers
to the compounds as at auêuêt? (330 3i; 330^34), and the act of their combining
a
as ovvhvdt,eo9ai (330 31). ov'êvîs has the general meaning of 'being yoked together',
a
and applies to pairs of things. T h e uses i n Aristotle that Bonitz cites as similar to the
use here are found i n the Nicomachean E t h i c s ; at NE 113 i i o , and again at 1 i33 6,
b a
the term is used to signify a conjunction of terms w i t h m a proposition; see H . Bon

itz, Index A r i s t o t e l i c u s (Berlin, 1870), 710. 26—32.
3 7
For the purpose of this paper, I do not distinguish between Thomistic tradi
tional interpretations, which suggest that there is a single material continuant for
substances at different levels of ontological complexity (e.g. a human being and a
corpse) and that this continuant is prime matter, and weaker traditional interpre
tations, which suggest that prime matter is only necessary as a material continuant
for substantial changes between the elements. Defenders of prime matter i n the lat
ter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century tend to reject the
Thomistic reading, which may be supported in Metaphysics Z, and instead opt for a
weaker reading, which may be supported by considerations of matter in the biologi
cal works. None the less, there have been several Thomistic defences in the last fifty
years; see e.g. Owens, 'Predication'; Luyten, 'Potency'; and Page, 'Forms'.
2o8 Mary Krizan
the elements are susceptible to substantial change, an e x p l a n a t i o n

of t h e i r changes requires these three components; hence, the ele
ments, like other s u b l u n a r y n a t u r a l entities subject to generation
and c o r r u p t i o n , are c o m p o u n d s o f m a t t e r and f o r m . Since the ele
ments are the simplest perceptible bodies, the m a t t e r t h a t underlies
t h e m cannot be a separable, perceptible b o d y ; so, t h e i r m a t t e r m u s t
be p u r e l y p o t e n t i a l , i m p e r c e p t i b l e , inseparable p r i m e matter.
T r a d i t i o n a l accounts o f A r i s t o t l e ' s elements and t h e i r m u t u a l
transformations assume t h a t the m a t t e r o f an element is p r i m e m a t
ter, a n d the substantial f o r m o f an element is a u n i t y characterized
by the t w o contraries, or elemental potentials, t h a t are definitive
of the element. F i r e , for example, consists o f a f o r m c o n s t i t u t e d
by h o t a n d dry, a n d matter, w h i c h is p r i m e matter. F u r t h e r m o r e ,
since p r i m e m a t t e r underlies the elements, one can appeal to p r i m e
m a t t e r i n order to e x p l a i n h o w one element changes i n t o another
w i t h o u t a loss i n c o n t i n u i t y . W h e n fire changes i n t o air, the f o r m
of air comes i n t o existence o u t o f the f o r m o f fire, w h i c h ceases to
exist; p r i m e m a t t e r remains t h r o u g h o u t the entire change. 28
Can the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n e x p l a i n the elemental transfor

m a t i o n s i n a w a y t h a t is consistent w i t h GC 2. 4? I suggest t h a t there
are t w o c o m p e l l i n g reasons w h y i t cannot. F i r s t , the t r a d i t i o n a l i n
t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n so far as i t takes b o t h contraries as c o n s t i t u t i v e o f an
element, cannot e x p l a i n the difference b e t w e e n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyc
lical changes and n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes. I t is o d d to suppose t h a t
29
p a r t o f a substantial f o r m survives a substantial change, a n d hence,

the entire f o r m o f an element m u s t pass o u t o f existence i n an ele
m e n t a l change. I f the entire f o r m o f an element passes o u t o f ex-
3 8
For a useful overview of the traditional interpretation of elemental change see
Lewis, 'Matter', 126-8.
3 9
Thomas of Sutton was aware of this problem, but i n his commentary on GC 2. 4
he indicates that the counterpart must be corrupted i n a substantial change, because
otherwise an accident (e.g. heat) would be prior to a substantial form (e.g. the form
of air). See Thomas of Sutton, In GC 139. 24—38 Kelley. Buridan was also aware of
the problem, and in his Questions commentary offers a theory of resistance that is
supposed to solve the problem, suggesting that there is more resistance involved i n
a non-reciprocal change than in a paradigmatic cyclical change. See Buridan, Super
GC 230. 6—232. 5 Streijger—Bakker—Thijssen. G i l l develops a different version of
the problem, focusing on the fact that prime matter alone is inadequate to explain
why changes between elements sharing a counterpart are faster than non-reciprocal
changes; see G i l l , Paradox, 74. Although the ancient commentators did not worry
about this particular problem, Alexander was concerned w i t h a related issue—why
non-reciprocal changes take longer than paradigmatic cyclical changes. See Gan-
nage, Alexander, § 61, 109—10.
istence i n an elemental change, t h e n there is n o substantive differ
ence between p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes a n d difficult changes,
a n d hence, n o e x p l a n a t i o n for w h y difficult changes take longer t h a n
p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes. I n b o t h cases, one substantial form
is destroyed a n d a n e w one comes i n t o existence; or, alternatively,
i n b o t h cases t w o contraries are d e s t r o y e d . 30
Second, the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot sufficiently account

for the role o f a p r i v a t i o n i n substantial changes between the ele
ments. I n p a r a d i g m a t i c substantial and quasi-substantial changes, a
p r i v a t i o n is the opposite o f the f o r m t h a t comes to be, a n d i t is a n o n
essential feature o f the m a t t e r to w h i c h i t attaches. F o r example,
w h e n a statue comes to be o u t o f bronze, one m a y i d e n t i f y the p r i v a
t i o n as the l u m p i n e s s o f the bronze; this feature is the opposite o f
the statue f o r m i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g non-statue, and i t is n o t essential
to bronze qua b r o n z e — i t does n o t differentiate b r o n z e f r o m g o l d
or clay. T h e substantial f o r m s o f fire a n d water are n o t opposites
i n the same w a y as statue and non-statue: they have a c o u n t e r p a r t
i n c o m m o n , and b o t h contraries i n the f o r m o f fire are essential to
fire. Since the s i m p l e bodies are s i m p l e , they do n o t have any fur
ther non-essential features t h a t c o u l d e x p l a i n w h a t the p r i v a t i o n is;
a n d hence, the p r i v a t i o n c o m p o n e n t o f the f o r m - m a t t e r - p r i v a t i o n
m o d e l o f change is inexplicable.
T h e t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n fares n o better o n the q u e s t i o n o f
u n i t y ; the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m is the u n i t y o f f o r m . F i r s t , i n order
to make the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n consistent w i t h GC 2. 4, the
m o s t logical route is to say that p a r t o f the f o r m remains i n p a r a d i g
m a t i c cyclical changes; for instance, w h e n fire changes to air, p a r t
o f the f o r m o f fire ( h o t ) remains. Yet i f h o t is p a r t o f a substan
t i a l f o r m , a n d p a r t o f a substantial f o r m can s u r v i v e a substantial
change, t h e n the substantial f o r m was n o t a u n i f i e d s i m p l e to b e g i n
w i t h . Second, even i f this p r o b l e m can be avoided, there is n o t yet
3 1
an e x p l a n a t i o n for the u n i t y o f a substantial f o r m w i t h i n any par

t i c u l a r element. I t cannot be u n i f i e d i n v i r t u e o f its r e l a t i o n to the
m a t t e r or the w h o l e , since it is supposed to p r o v i d e the c o n d i t i o n s
3 0
T h i s second way of understanding the problem can result in further worries
for the view; Thomas of Sutton, In GC 2. 4, 141. 34—142. 2 Kelley, worried that it
would be difficult to explain the numerical identity of the same contrary in different
elements, e.g. the heat i n fire and i n air.
3 1
T h i s line of reasoning may lead one to suspect that each of the simple bodies
actually has two substantial forms, analogous to an Ockhamist interpretation of the
Aristotelian soul.
2IO Mary Krizan
for u n i t y and i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f the m a t t e r a n d the w h o l e , a n d i d e n t i

f y i n g i t as u n i f i e d i n v i r t u e o f itself is circular.
2 . 2 . The strong revisionary interpretation
I n the l i g h t o f the difficulties for the elemental transformations that

f o l l o w f r o m T I , one m a y w o n d e r w h e t h e r the concept o f m a t t e r as a
p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m is d o i n g any e x p l a n a t o r y w o r k at all. A c c o r d
i n g to w h a t I call the s t r o n g r e v i s i o n a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( S R I ) , i t is
not; a l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e is c o m m i t t e d to a s u b s t r a t u m o f substantial
change, this c o m m i t m e n t does n o t entail the existence o f a persist
ing substratum.
S R I m a y be m o t i v a t e d as follows. I n the case o f a bronze statue,
one m a y notice that we can refer to the m a t t e r (bronze) and the
p r i v a t i o n ( l u m p ) , b u t w h a t is d o i n g the e x p l a n a t o r y w o r k is the lump
of bronze. T h i s l u m p o f bronze, w h i c h we refer to as 'bronze' i n or
d i n a r y language, is the m a t e r i a l s u b s t r a t u m o f change, even t h o u g h
i t does n o t survive the c h a n g e — w h i c h is w h y we p r o p e r l y call a
statue made o f bronze a 'brazen statue' a n d n o t a 'bronze s t a t u e ' . 32
L i k e w i s e for the elements: w h e n fire changes i n t o air, there is no

f u r t h e r m a t t e r that underlies the change. Just as a statue came to be
o u t o f bronze, air came to be o u t o f fire; a n d no f u r t h e r d e c o m p o
s i t i o n o f the elements is logically r e q u i r e d or even w a r r a n t e d .
A consequence o f S R I is that the elements are the simplest m a t t e r
as w e l l as the simplest bodies. T h u s , S R I entails that the elements
are n o t h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s , a v o i d i n g the p r o b l e m about the
u n i t y o f f o r m l o d g e d against T I . F u r t h e r , i n d o i n g away w i t h the
f o r m - m a t t e r - p r i v a t i o n m o d e l o f substantial change, i t avoids p r o b
lems that arose because o f an i n a b i l i t y to locate the relevant p r i v a
t i o n i n substantial changes.
S R I , however, faces objections s i m i l a r to those raised against T I
w h e n i t is i n t r o d u c e d i n order to e x p l a i n the elemental transfor
m a t i o n s i n GC 2 . 4. F i r s t , S R I also fails to e x p l a i n w h y difficult
changes take longer t h a n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes. Since each
simple b o d y is the cause o f another, there is n o significant differ
ence between a change f r o m fire to air a n d a change f r o m fire to w a
ter; i n b o t h cases, one b o d y is destroyed a n d a n e w one comes i n t o
existence. Second, S R I is unable to e x p l a i n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical
changes, g i v e n its insistence o n the u l t i m a t e s i m p l i c i t y o f a simple
3 2
Metaph. 6 7, 1049*23.
body. A r i s t o t l e suggests that part o f fire—hot—does n o t change i n
the t r a n s m u t a t i o n f r o m fire to air, b u t i f simple bodies are genuinely
simple, they s h o u l d n o t have parts; and hence, i t is impossible for a
p a r t to r e m a i n .
S R I is also unable to account for the u n i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l
elements. 33
A s simple bodies a n d s i m p l e matter, the elements
are u n i f o r m bodies; a p o r t i o n o f fire, for instance, is u n i f o r m l y
h o t a n d dry, a n d a p o r t i o n o f air is u n i f o r m l y h o t and wet. H o w
m i g h t one e x p l a i n the u n i f o r m i t y o f qualities i n a simple body? I t
cannot be explained b y r e d u c i n g the contraries to an element, since
t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n was needed i n order to e x p l a i n the elemental
transformations. I t also cannot be explained b y r e d u c i n g a s i m p l e
b o d y to its qualities, for then, the s i m p l e b o d y w o u l d n o longer be
simple. T h u s a reference to the b o d y cannot e x p l a i n the u n i t y o f
the contraries, and a reference to the contraries cannot e x p l a i n the
u n i t y o f the b o d y . 34
2.3. The weak revisionary interpretation
I n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one another, F u r t h a n d G i l l b o t h a r r i v e d at a n o n -
t r a d i t i o n a l account o f the elemental transformations that is weaker
t h a n S R I . T h i s account denies A r i s t o t l e ' s c o m m i t m e n t to p r i m e
matter, b u t affirms the c l a i m that there is a s u b s t r a t u m that persists
t h r o u g h changes between the elements. I f there is n o p r i m e matter,
t h e n w h a t survives a change f r o m one element i n t o another? T h e
answer is that i t is one o f the contraries: i n particular, i t is the c o n
t r a r y that is shared, as a c o u n t e r p a r t , between the elements i n v o l v e d
i n the change.
T h e weak r e v i s i o n a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( W R I ) is i n i t i a l l y m o r e p l a u
sible t h a n b o t h T I and S R I , i n so far as i t provides a better ac
c o u n t o f the elemental transformations i n GC 2. 4. F i r s t , i t provides
an adequate explanation o f p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes. I n these
3 3
The problem for unity that I introduce here is unrelated to the so-called prob
lem of 'vertical unity' sometimes raised against traditional interpretations of sub
stantial change. W h i l e I find that the problem of vertical unity does arise here, it
is not the most compelling objection to T I . I t does, however, present a compelling
objection to the weaker revisionary interpretation, as discussed below in sect. 2.3.
3 4
One should notice that this problem of unity for simple bodies is similar to a
problem for uniform composite substances; this 'problem of mixture' arises in GC
1. 10 and 2. 7. For an overview of the problem of mixture see J. M . Cooper, ' T w o
Notes on Aristotle on M i x t u r e ' , i n id., Knowledge, Nature, and the Good (Princeton,
2004), 148-73-
21 2 Mary Krizan
changes, there is a shared c o u n t e r p a r t that survives the change and

there are t w o opposites; so i n the change f r o m fire to air, h o t sur
vives as the s u b s t r a t u m or c o n t i n u a n t , a n d the change is f r o m d r y to
wet. Second, the account explains w h y difficult changes take longer
t h a n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes: since elemental changes require
a shared c o u n t e r p a r t that acts as c o n t i n u a n t , difficult changes re
q u i r e a two-stage process. I n the change f r o m fire to water, there
35
is first a change f r o m d r y to wet, w i t h h o t u n d e r l y i n g , a n d t h e n a

change f r o m h o t to c o l d , w i t h w e t u n d e r l y i n g . T h i s , too, is consis
tent w i t h GC 2. 4 . 3 6
A l t h o u g h W R I fares better t h a n T I a n d S R I i n so far as i t

provides an account o f elemental change that is nearly consistent
w i t h GC 2. 4, i t falls s h o r t o n the q u e s t i o n o f u n i t y . T h e r e are t w o
3 7
ways that the o b j e c t i o n m a y be framed. F i r s t , i t m a y appear that

an elemental change is an instance o f alteration, n o t substantial
change. W h e n fire changes to air, there is a change f r o m d r y - h o t to
w e t - h o t ; h o t survives the change, l o s i n g one p r o p e r t y a n d g a i n i n g
another. I n this sense, i t is analogous to the case o f the uneducated
m a n b e c o m i n g educated. Second, i t m a y appear that elemental
changes are instances o f mere aggregation. F i r e is an aggregate o f
hot a n d d r y a n d water is an aggregate o f w e t a n d hot; we m a y call
these bodies 'fire' a n d 'air', b u t i n r e a l i t y they are n o t h i n g m o r e
t h a n aggregates o f c o n t r a r i e s .
38
35
This is an improvement over T I and S R I : although a defender of those posi
tions might try to explain the difference between paradigmatic cyclical and difficult
changes by appealing to the two-stage process, it is not required by either theory i n
the same way that it is required by W R I .
3 6
Unfortunately, neither F u r t h nor G i l l gives a compelling account of how W R I
might explain non-reciprocal changes. F u r t h is silent on the issue, and Gill's ac
count seems confused—she suggests that air and earth w i l l generally result i n water,
although Aristotle certainly thinks that the combination of air and earth could pro
duce fire as well.
3 7
I say 'nearly consistent', since I have left the applicability of W R I to non-
reciprocal changes as an open question. I t is unclear to me that W R I can explain
non-reciprocal changes: W R I is most readily committed to explaining changes such
as the transformation from fire to earth as a paradigmatic cyclical change, w i t h dry
as the substratum, making an explanation of non-reciprocal changes redundant.
3 8
Lewis, 'Matter', 129 n. 12, introduces a similar objection, suggesting that F u r t h
and G i l l commit Aristotle to a bundle theory. A related problem is that this result
might subject Aristotle to the objection he raises against Empedocles—first in GC
2. 1, and later i n GC 1. 10 and 2. 7. T h e first version of the objection suggests that
Empedocles is a kind of mereological essentialist—which, on its own, does not tell
against W R I , since elements do seem to have their contraries essentially. The second
version of the objection does tell against W R I : i f one holds an Empedoclean view of
3. A n e w m o d e l o f elemental s t r u c t u r e
T h e c o m m o n p r o b l e m for T I , S R I , a n d W R I is t h a t none o f these

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is able to e x p l a i n the u n i t y o f the elements i n a w a y
t h a t is consistent w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s account o f elemental t r a n s f o r m a
tions i n GC 2. 4. I n order to solve this p r o b l e m , I i n t r o d u c e an alter
native account o f the structure o f A r i s t o t l e ' s elements. T h i s p i c t u r e ,
w h i c h is a weak t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , is t r a d i t i o n a l i n scope i n
so far as I accept a h y l o m o r p h i c structure for A r i s t o t l e ' s elements
as w e l l as a featureless m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t , b u t i t b o r r o w s features
f r o m W R I i n so far as i t accepts different f u n c t i o n a l roles for the
p r i m a r y contraries.
3.1. A sketch of elemental structure
A r i s t o t l e ' s elements are each f o r m e d o u t o f t w o p r i m a r y contrar

ies, a n d the c o m m o n p r o b l e m for i n t e r p r e t e r s o f A r i s t o t l e has been
d e c i d i n g h o w the contraries relate to one another, b o t h w i t h i n an i n
d i v i d u a l element a n d i n the elemental transformations. I argue that
the u n i t y p r o b l e m m a y be resolved b y suggesting t h a t the t w o c o n
traries w i t h i n an element have different f u n c t i o n a l roles: one o f the
contraries serves the role o f substantial f o r m , a n d the other serves
the role o f matter. I f this is r i g h t , t h e n the u n i t y p r o b l e m m a y be
avoided: as w i t h p a r a d i g m a t i c n a t u r a l substances, the f o r m p r o v i d e s
the c o n d i t i o n s for unity, a n d the m a t t e r w i t h i n a substance is depen
dent o n the f o r m for its c o n t i n u e d existence.
W h e r e m i g h t one f i n d evidence for such a v i e w i n A r i s t o t l e ? GC
2. 3 p r o v i d e s a s t a r t i n g - p o i n t :
Nevertheless, being four, each is one simpliciter [O.TT\6JS]: earth is dry more
than cold, water is cold more than wet, air is wet more than hot, and fire is
hot more than dry. (GC 2. 3, 331*3-6)
T h i s passage has p e r p l e x e d c o m m e n t a t o r s ; I take A r i s t o t l e ' s sug

gestion i n the passage to mean t h a t one o f the fo u r contraries
(a) defines a p a r t i c u l a r element m o r e t h a n the other c o n t r a r y h a d
elements, Aristotle contends, then the formation of naturally composite homogen
eous bodies is impossible. I f W R I is right, then it suggests that (i) simple bodies are
not genuine 'elements' because they have simpler parts; and (ii) those simpler parts
do not change; therefore (iii) the elements do not change. Yet if the elements do not
change, then chemical composition is impossible, and Aristotle's theory of the ho-
moeomers collapses.
214 Mary Krizan
by the element, a n d (b) defines one element m o r e t h a n the other

t h r e e . I f one accepts a h y l o m o r p h i c account o f the elements, t h e n
39
this passage p r o v i d e s good evidence t h a t one o f the t w o contraries

that make u p each element is its substantial f o r m , g i v e n t h a t a sub
stantial f o r m is supposed to p r o v i d e the d e f i n i t i o n o f a substance.
I f one o f the t w o contraries o f each element is its substantial f o r m ,
t h e n the passage at 33i 3—6 indicates the p a r t i c u l a r f o r m h a d b y
a
each element: the f o r m o f earth is dry, the f o r m o f water is c o l d , the

f o r m o f air is wet, a n d the f o r m o f fire is h o t . T h i s leads to a related
question: w h a t is the role o f the second c o n t r a r y i n the pair? I sug
gest t h a t the second c o n t r a r y takes o n the role o f m a t t e r w i t h i n the
elements, so t h a t the m a t t e r o f e a r t h is c o l d , the m a t t e r o f water is
wet, the m a t t e r o f air is h o t , a n d the m a t t e r o f fire is dry. A l t h o u g h
the f ou r contraries themselves do n o t change, as A r i s t o t l e indicates
at GC 2. 1, 3 2 9 2 - 3 , they m a y p e r f o r m different f u n c t i o n a l roles
b
w i t h i n different elements. T h i s does n o t e n t a i l that, for example,

the h o t o f fire is different f r o m the h o t o f air; rather, i t entails t h a t
the same q u a l i t y — h o t — i s able to p e r f o r m the role o f f o r m or m a t
ter, d e p e n d i n g o n the element t h a t is b e i n g considered.
A significant o b j e c t i o n to this m o d e l is f o u n d i n the Meteorology.
I n several passages i n b o o k 4 A r i s t o t l e e x p l i c i t l y states t h a t h o t and
c o l d are active a n d w e t a n d d r y are passive; for example, i n 4. 8 he
states:
From these things, it is clear that the bodies are composed of heat and cold,
and these agents operate by thickening and solidifying. Because these fa
shion bodies, heat is in all of them, but cold is in some in so far as heat is
3 9
Commentators have been perplexed by this passage because Aristotle says at
Meteor. 4, 382^—4, that water is most representative of the moist. Philoponus and
Alexander attempt to resolve this difficulty by appealing to the definition of mois
ture: moisture is that which is less easily bounded, and air is less easily bounded than
water; so, air is most representative of the moist. See Philop. In GC 230. 27—231. 3
Vitelli, and Alexander i n Gannage, Alexander, § 42, 103—4. Joachim, on the other
hand, attempts to resolve the difficulty by suggesting that Aristotle is comparing the
qualities w i t h i n a single element w i t h one another: so by saying that water is primar
ily cold, he means that it is denned by cold more than by wet, and is not making a
further comparison between water and the other elements; see Joachim, Coming-to-
Be, 219. Oresme supports Aristotle's distribution of the four qualities in GC 2. 3 by
an appeal to nobility and location: he suggests, i n agreement w i t h Averroes in the
Middle Commentary, that cold is a privation of hot and dry is a privation of moist.
Since a privation is less noble than that which it is a privation of, and nobler elements
are closer i n location to the superlunary realm, because it is more noble than the sub
lunary realm, it should follow that air, which is located above water, is defined by
wet rather than cold. See Oresme, Super GC 2. 5, 221. 76—90 Caroti.
absent. Thus, these are present because they are active, and the wet and
dry because they are passive, and thus all of them are common to mixed
bodies. (Meteor. 4. 8, 384 24-3o) ° b 4
I f one supposes t h a t f o r m is active a n d m a t t e r is passive, t h e n the

d o c t r i n e o f Meteorology 4 entails t h a t w e t a n d d r y s h o u l d always
f u n c t i o n as matter, a n d h o t a n d c o l d s h o u l d always f u n c t i o n as
f o r m . T h i s w o u l d effectively destroy the m o d e l presented here;
4 1
for i f one o f the contraries is the f o r m o f an element, t h e n fire a n d

air w o u l d have the same f o r m , as w o u l d water and earth, thus de
feating the purpose o f i n t r o d u c i n g a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a r y as the f o r m
of each element.
T h e response to this o b j e c t i o n is t h a t i n the Meteorology A r i s t o t l e
is concerned w i t h the m a t t e r o f m i x e d , or homoeomerous, bodies,
w h i c h are o f an essentially different character f r o m the s i m p l e
bodies. H o m o e o m e r s such as metals and the homogeneous parts o f
plants a n d animals are composed o u t o f all four o f the s i m p l e bodies,
a n d as a result the relations o f f o r m a n d m a t t e r w i t h i n these bodies
are different. I f i t even makes sense to talk about the substantial
f o r m o f an i n d i v i d u a l homoeomer, t h a t substantial f o r m m u s t be
an i n t e r m e d i a t e between h o t a n d c o l d , rather t h a n h o t simpliciter or
c o l d simpliciter. F u r t h e r m o r e , A r i s t o t l e has already argued i n GC
2. 2 t h a t the p r i m a r y contraries are m u t u a l l y active and passive,
w h i c h suggests that w e t and d r y m a y be active i n the context o f On
Generation and Corruption, j u s t as h o t and c o l d m a y be passive. 42
So, the Meteorology o b j e c t i o n does n o t refute the p r o p o s e d sketch

of elemental s t r u c t u r e i n On Generation and Corruption.* 3
O n its o w n , this account o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the elements is i n c o m -

4 0
See also Meteor. 4. 1, 3 7 8 i 2 - i 3 ; 4. 4, 3 8 i 2 3 - 7 ; and 4. 5, 3 8 2 3 i - i .
b b a b
4 1
M y development of this objection is influenced by a very brief remark i n C. V.
Mirus, ' T h e Homogeneous Bodies i n Meteorology IV. 12', Ancient Philosophy, 26
(2006), 45—64. He notes (p. 58) that moist and dry are the matter for the homo
geneous stuffs in Meteorology 4. Mirus, however, considers hot and cold as efficient
causes, and does not indicate a commitment to substantial forms for the homoeo
mers.
4 3
A similar explanation is found i n Gannage, Alexander, 74—5. I take it that the
function of a primary contrary as active or passive depends upon its role in explana
tion: in GC 2. 2—5, hot—cold and wet—dry may be both active and passive; in Mete
orology 4, hot—cold are active and wet—dry are passive; and, as suggested by GA 2. 1,
734 3i—6, hot and cold may be passive when they form the material of an actual,
b
living organism.
4 3
Philosophers i n the M i d d l e Ages were, none the less, quite concerned about
the abilities of the primary contraries to be mutually active and passive, and it was
a common topic i n the Questions commentaries. For example, Buridan, Super GC
21 6 Mary Krizan
plete because i t fails to account for a m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t i n sub

stantial changes, as t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are apt to accept. I n
a change f r o m fire to air, for example, h o t cannot be the m a t e r i a l
c o n t i n u a n t : at the start o f the change, i t is n o t m a t t e r at all, a n d the
p r e - e x i s t i n g ' m a t t e r ' — d r y — d o e s n o t survive the change. T o avoid
this difficulty, I suggest t h a t w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e o f each element
there is a f u r t h e r m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t ; w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r element
i t essentially depends o n one o f the contraries, t h o u g h as d e t e r m i n
able matter, i t m a y depend o n any o f the contraries.
T h u s , there are three layers i n this sketch o f elemental s t r u c t u r e :
( i ) the substantial f o r m , w h i c h is the c o n t r a r y m o s t definitive o f the
element; ( 2 ) the m a t t e r o f the element, w h i c h is the second c o n t r a r y
i n the pair; a n d (3) the m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t , w h i c h depends o n the
m a t t e r o f the element. These layers are represented i n the accom
p a n y i n g table. A s i n d i c a t e d i n the table, each o f the elements has a
u n i q u e f o r m a n d a u n i q u e type o f m a t t e r ; the o n l y feature c o m m o n
to the elements is p r i m e matter, w h i c h has a v e r y l i m i t e d role as
a m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t o f substantial c h a n g e . Hence, this sketch is
44
a v e r y weak v e r s i o n o f a t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n so far as the

e x p l a n a t o r y role o f p r i m e m a t t e r has been w e a k e n e d . 45
3 . 2 . Prime matter and the elemental transformations
T h e p r o p o s e d sketch o f elemental structure a n d change represents a

relevant departure f r o m the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r i m e m a t
ter i n so far as i t a d m i t s an a s y m m e t r y between o r d i n a r y cases o f
substantial change a n d the elemental transformations. I n o r d i n a r y
cases o f substantial change, one m i g h t i d e n t i f y the u n d e r l y i n g m a t
ter as that w h i c h persists t h r o u g h a substantial change: i n a change
2. 2, 197. 24—198. 3 Streijger—Bakker—Thijssen, suggests that hot and cold are more
active and wet and dry are less active, and thus wet and dry are more passive.
4 4
I retain the term 'prime matter' here, which may invoke the question: what is
the difference between the 'matter' of column 3 and 'prime matter'? I n a sense, the
elements, contraries, and prime matter are all possible referents of the term 'matter';
this issue is addressed i n sect. 3.4 below.
4 5
On this model, prime matter is not the material continuant i n more organized
types of substantial and quasi-substantial change; for example, bronze—and not
prime matter—is the material continuant when a bronze statue is formed from a
lump of bronze, and various homoeomers w i t h particular degrees of temperature
and humidity qualities—not prime matter—are the material continuants in a sub
stantial change from a living animal into a corpse. Hence, the proposed model is not
a Thomistic account, and it is not clear that it could be reconciled w i t h Thomistic
theories of prime matter.
Element Form Matter Continuant
Fire HOT* dry prime matter

Air WET hot prime matter
Water COLD wet prime matter
Earth DRY cold prime matter
* Here and for the remainder of the paper, I use

CAPITALS to indicate a contrary in its functional role as
substantial form.
f r o m an e m b r y o to a h u m a n b e i n g , for example, the u n d e r l y i n g

m a t t e r is flesh and b l o o d , a n d i n a change f r o m a l u m p o f bronze
to a bronze statue, the u n d e r l y i n g m a t t e r is bronze. B y analogy,
the u n d e r l y i n g m a t t e r i n a change f r o m fire to air is p r i m e matter.
Hence, t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s accept p r i m e m a t t e r as f u l f i l l i n g
the role o f m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t i n the elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s i n
m u c h the same w a y t h a t flesh a n d b l o o d f u l f i l the role o f m a t e r i a l
c o n t i n u a n t i n a change f r o m an e m b r y o to a h u m a n being.
One s h o u l d notice, however, t h a t materials such as flesh a n d
b l o o d p e r f o r m t w o roles i n the e x p l a n a t i o n o f o r d i n a r y substantial
changes: (i) they u n d e r l i e the substantial change, a n d thus f u n c t i o n
as a p e r s i s t i n g m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t ; and ( i i ) they constitute the
n e w substance and are, i n fact, the m a t t e r t h a t the substance is
made of. Flesh a n d b l o o d persist i n a change f r o m an e m b r y o to a
h u m a n being, and are also the m a t t e r o f a h u m a n being. I f p r i m e
m a t t e r is d i r e c t l y analogous to u n d e r l y i n g m a t t e r i n o r d i n a r y sub
stantial changes, t h e n i t , too, s h o u l d p e r f o r m b o t h o f these roles.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t is n o t clear t h a t a p u r e l y p o t e n t i a l s u b s t r a t u m
m i g h t constitute a n y t h i n g , thus exacerbating the already difficult
objections faced b y the t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
O n m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the t w o roles for u n d e r l y i n g m a t t e r as
(i) m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t and (ii) the m a t t e r c o n s t i t u t i v e o f a substance
are d i v o r c e d i n the l i m i t i n g case o f the elemental transformations.
O n the one h a n d , p r i m e m a t t e r takes o n the role o f m a t e r i a l c o n
t i n u a n t , b u t does n o t constitute an element: a l t h o u g h p r i m e m a t
ter persists t h r o u g h a change f r o m fire to air, i t does n o t constitute
either. O n the other h a n d , the contraries constitute an element: they
are w h a t an element is composed of, as matter, a l t h o u g h they do n o t
persist t h r o u g h a substantial change as a m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t . So, a l -
2l8 Mary Krizan
t h o u g h d r y a n d h o t constitute fire a n d air, respectively, they do n o t

persist t h r o u g h a change i n t o the n e x t element i n the cycle. " T h u s , 4 6
p r i m e m a t t e r is a m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t , and p e r f o r m s one o f the roles

of u n d e r l y i n g m a t t e r i n o r d i n a r y substantial changes. T h e role o f
p r i m e m a t t e r is weakened because p r i m e m a t t e r is n o t the m a t t e r
that constitutes an element: this is the role o f the c o n t r a r i e s . 47
3.3. Elemental structure and the transformation of the elements
T h e p r o p o s e d sketch o f elemental structure allows for a b r o a d l y

t r a d i t i o n a l account o f elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t h a t can e x p l a i n
the three types o f elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n GC z. 4. F i r s t , i t
allows one to e x p l a i n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes u s i n g a f o r m -
m a t t e r - p r i v a t i o n m o d e l . W h e n fire changes to air, for example, the
new f o r m W E T comes to be f r o m its opposite, dry. A s i n p a r a d i g
m a t i c substantial changes, d r y acts as the p r i v a t i o n o f W E T . L i k e
the l u m p t h a t serves as the p r i v a t i o n o f statue f o r m i n the expla
n a t i o n o f a bronze statue, d r y does n o t survive the change; and,
given its f u n c t i o n a l role as the c o n s t i t u t i v e m a t t e r o f fire, i t is n o t
the f o r m o f fire or p a r t o f the f o r m o f fire. I n this p a r t i c u l a r change,
one s h o u l d notice t h a t the f u n c t i o n a l role o f h o t changes: i t acted
as the f o r m i n fire, and n o w acts as m a t t e r i n air. Since p r i m e m a t
ter is the m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t that underlies each change f r o m one
opposite to another, the account is consistent w i t h a f o r m - m a t t e r -
p r i v a t i o n m o d e l o f change: i n this example, the change is f r o m d r y
to w e t , w i t h p r i m e m a t t e r p e r s i s t i n g t h r o u g h the change.
T h e p r o p o s e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f elemental structure allows for
a consistent e x p l a n a t i o n o f the rest o f the p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical
4 6
I n suggesting that the contrarieties may be the matter of an element, I agree
w i t h E. Lewis in Alexander Meteorology. M y own interpretation differs from that
of Lewis i n so far as I take it that prime matter is necessary i n order to explain the
persisting feature of substantial change; without this feature, an account like that of
Lewis is subject to the same objections as W R I . For Lewis's account see Alexander
Meteorology, esp. 36—42; for further discussion of Lewis see Gannage, Alexander,
71-7.
4 7
One may notice that my proposed distinction between material continuant and
the matter that constitutes a substance is similar to Code's distinction between mat
ter o f and matter from. T h i s distinction suggests that one may differentiate the mat
ter of an entity (e.g. the flesh and blood of a human being) from the matter from
which an entity comes to be (e.g. an embryo i n the case of a human being). See A .
Code, 'The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter' ['Persistence'], P h i l o s o p h i c a l S t u d i e s ,
29 (1976), 357—67. Even on Code's analysis, however, matter of retains both of its
roles as persisting and constitutive in the limiting cases of elemental change; my pro
posal thus introduces a further distinction that arises at the level of elemental change.
changes. W h e n water comes f r o m air, C O L D arises f r o m h o t , a n d
the f u n c t i o n a l role o f w e t changes; w h e n e a r t h comes f r o m water,
D R Y arises f r o m w e t , a n d the f u n c t i o n a l role o f c o l d changes; a n d
w h e n fire comes f r o m earth, H O T arises f r o m c o l d , a n d the f u n c
t i o n a l role o f d r y changes. T h i s same m o d e l also explains difficult
transformations: these take longer because they require a two-stage
process, a n d the t w o stages are necessitated b y the theory, g i v e n that
the c o n s t i t u t i v e m a t t e r o f fire ( d r y ) is n o t the opposite o f the f o r m o f
water. Finally, the p i c t u r e is consistent w i t h the a r g u m e n t i n Sec
t i o n 1.1 above t h a t p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes are u n i d i r e c t i o n a l ;
countercyclical changes are n o t a possible type o f p a r a d i g m a t i c cyc
lical change o n this m o d e l .
T h i s m o d e l can also p r o v i d e an account o f n o n - r e c i p r o c a l
changes, as e x p l a i n e d i n Section 1.3 above. T h e r e , I argued that
n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes are a w a y o f e x p l a i n i n g c o u n t e r c y c l i c a l
change, a n d require an a g e n t - p a t i e n t relationship b e t w e e n ele
ments. F o r example, w h e n earth is generated f r o m water a n d fire,
water acts u p o n fire, c o o l i n g fire b u t d e s t r o y i n g itself i n the process.
O n the proposed m o d e l , the f o r m o f water (COLD) overtakes the
f o r m o f fire ( H O T ) , leaving c o l d a n d dry. F u r t h e r , since water does
not r e m a i n , the f o r m C O L D does n o t r e t a i n its f u n c t i o n a l role as
f o r m ; i t is d o w n g r a d e d to the role o f c o n s t i t u t i v e matter, a n d hence,
the r e s u l t i n g b o d y is D R Y and c o l d , w h i c h , as expected, is earth.
As i n p a r a d i g m a t i c cyclical changes, the a c t i v i t y o f change occurs
b e t w e e n one opposite a n d another, w i t h p r i m e m a t t e r u n d e r l y i n g
the process. T h u s , n o n - r e c i p r o c a l changes m a y also be e x p l a i n e d
u s i n g a f o r m - m a t t e r - p r i v a t i o n m o d e l o f change.
3.4. Elemental structure and unity
T h e p r o p o s e d sketch o f elemental s t r u c t u r e passes the first test: i t

allows for an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f elemental changes i n GC 2. 4 t h a t is
consistent w i t h the text. C a n i t also a v o i d the p r o b l e m o f u n i t y ? I t
can c e r t a i n l y avoid the related p r o b l e m s o f u n i t y t h a t affected T I
a n d S R I . Since a single c o n t r a r y is the substantial f o r m o f any par
t i c u l a r element, the p r o b l e m for the u n i t y o f f o r m raised against T I
is avoided: the p r o b l e m does n o t arise, g i v e n t h a t the substantial
f o r m o f any element is essentially simple. G i v e n the deeper struc
t u r e o f the elements entailed b y the theory, i t can also avoid the o b
j e c t i o n raised against S R I . T h e t h e o r y admits t h a t there are parts
zzo Mary Krizan
of the elements t h a t are o n t o l o g i c a l l y m o r e basic t h a n the elements

and t h a t those parts have different f u n c t i o n a l roles w i t h i n an ele
m e n t ; hence, i t is possible to e x p l a i n the u n i f o r m i t y o f an element
b y appealing to those f u n c t i o n a l roles. I n fire, for instance, there is
u n i f o r m i t y because dryness is u n i f o r m l y heated, a n d i n air, there is
u n i f o r m i t y because heat is u n i f o r m l y m o i s t e n e d b y wet.
F u r t h e r m o r e , b y r e c o g n i z i n g the different f u n c t i o n a l roles o f the
contraries w i t h i n an element, the m o d e l allows for a better account
of s t r u c t u r e t h a n W R I . W i t h i n W R I , each o f the contraries w i t h i n
an element appears to have an equal status—there is n o differenti
ation i n the roles that the contraries take o n . A s I have suggested,
4 8
a differentiation i n the f u n c t i o n a l roles o f the contraries w i t h i n an

element allows one to account for u n i f o r m i t y w i t h i n each element;
this avoids the o b j e c t i o n t h a t elements are mere aggregates o f c o n
traries. T h e m o d e l also avoids the o b j e c t i o n t h a t elemental change
is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n an alteration i n a q u a l i t y : a l t h o u g h h o t sur
vives the change f r o m fire to air, i t does n o t s u r v i v e as matter, and
hence, is n o t a subject t h a t is m o d i f i e d b y d r y at one t i m e a n d b y
w e t at another. Rather, h o t has a different role i n air a n d fire, and
i n v i r t u e o f this different role i t is n o t a c o n t i n u a n t t h a t changes its
properties over t i m e .
3.5. Elemental structure and the homonymy of matter
One m i g h t w o r r y that the difference b e t w e e n m y p r o p o s a l a n d W R I

is p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c , n o t a substantive difference. B y c a l l i n g the h o t
w i t h i n fire ' f o r m ' a n d the d r y w i t h i n fire ' m a t t e r ' , i t m a y appear
that I have done l i t t l e m o r e t h a n use the language o f the t r a d i t i o n a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n order to refer to the basic components o f W R I i n
a different way. G i l l a n d F u r t h do n o t refer to the h o t shared b y fire
and air as ' m a t t e r ' , n o r do they a d m i t t h a t elements c o u l d have sub
stantial forms; b u t were they to prefer the language o f the t r a d i t i o n ,
they m i g h t label the f u r t h e r components o f elemental s t r u c t u r e i n
the w a y t h a t I have here.
T h e substantive difference between m y p r o p o s e d m o d e l and
W R I is at the level o f m a t t e r and s u b s t r a t u m . U n l i k e W R I , m y
m o d e l does n o t suppose t h a t any one o f the contraries is a c o n
t i n u a n t or p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m o f change at a l l : t h a t is the j o b
(and the o n l y j o b ) o f p r i m e matter. T h e contraries themselves
For a visual representation of the view see F u r t h , Substance, 224.

m a y take o n the role o f matter w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r elements, b u t

the contraries are n o t a p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m o f change. I n the
elemental t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s the p e r s i s t i n g s u b s t r a t u m is d i v o r c e d
f r o m the contrarieties as w e l l as the elements themselves.
T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n requires a subtle r e m a r k about the h o m o n y m y
o f matter. T h e second b o o k o f On Generation and Corruption is
about the p r i n c i p l e s a n d elements o f bodies, and after A r i s t o t l e c r i
ticizes the theories o f m a t t e r h e l d b y his predecessors i n the o p e n i n g
o f GC 2. 1, we are left to w o n d e r : w h a t is the m o s t basic m a t t e r i n
A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l philosophy? A r i s t o t l e gives s o m e t h i n g o f an an
swer i n GC 2. 1, at 3 2 9 2 4 - 3 ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y , the t e x t u a l c o m p l e x i t y
a b
o f the passage, w i t h unclear references to other w o r k s a n d a m b i g u

ous genitive p r o n o u n s , often raises m o r e questions t h a n i t answers.
A s is usual w i t h A r i s t o t l e , the answer to o u r q u e s t i o n about the
nature o f m a t t e r is t h a t i t depends. I n a m o m e n t o f c l a r i t y i n the
difficult passage, A r i s t o t l e i n t r o d u c e s three levels or types o f p r i n
ciple:
First, the potentially perceptible body is principle; second, the contrarie

ties, I mean, for example, hot and cold, and third, fire and water and such.
(GC 2. 1, 329^3-4)
O n the p r o p o s e d m o d e l , each o f these three p r i n c i p l e s is, i n fact,

a type o f m a t t e r — d e p e n d i n g o n w h a t we m e a n b y ' m a t t e r ' . I f b y
' m a t t e r ' we m e a n the m o s t basic m a t e r i a l c o n t i n u a n t u n d e r l y i n g
changes between the elements, t h e n p o t e n t i a l l y perceptible b o d y
is matter. I t is p o t e n t i a l l y perceptible b o d y because i t is, b y itself,
n e i t h e r perceptible n o r a b o d y : u n l i k e the p r i m a r y contrarieties,
i t is n o t a perceptible quality, a n d u n l i k e the elements, i t is n o t a
perceptible body. I t is thus n o t to be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the p r i m a r y
contrarieties or the s i m p l e bodies, as defenders o f W R I a n d S R I
sometimes suggest. I t is, i n the l i m i t i n g case o f substantial change,
49
the p e r s i s t i n g m a t t e r t h a t underlies changes between h o t - c o l d a n d

w e t - d r y . I f b y ' m a t t e r ' we m e a n t h a t w h i c h constitutes any par
t i c u l a r element, considered outside the scope o f elemental change,
t h e n the contrarieties are matter: each o f the elements has one o f the
4 9
Gill, Paradox, 247, suggests that the potentially perceptible body is identified
with the contrarieties: the contrarieties perform both the role of a persisting feature
of elemental change and the role of what is replaced in elemental change. Broadie, i n
offering an argument against Aristotle's commitment to prime matter in G C 2. 1,
329 24— i, suggests that potentially perceptible body is to be identified with the
a b
simple bodies; see Broadie, 'Distinguishing Alteration', 141—2.

222 Mary Krizan
contraries as its matter, a n d the contrarieties do n o t persist i n the

role o f m a t t e r t h r o u g h any p a r t i c u l a r substantial change. Finally, i f
b y 'matter' we m e a n the physical stuff that makes u p the c o m p o
site substances i n the s u b l u n a r y w o r l d , t h e n the elements or simple
bodies themselves are m a t t e r . 50
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bonitz, H . , Index Aristotelicus (Berlin, 1870).

Broadie, S., 'On Generation and Corruption I. 4: Distinguishing
Alteration—Substantial Change, Elemental Change, and First Matter
in GC ['Distinguishing Alteration'], in de Haas and Mansfeld (eds.),
GC I , 123-50.
Byrne, C , 'Matter and Aristotle's Material Cause', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 31 (2001), 85-112.
'Prime Matter and Actuality', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33
(i995), 197-224.
Charles, D., 'Simple Genesis and Prime Matter' ['Simple Genesis'], in de
Haas and Mansfeld (eds.), GC I, 151-69.
Charlton, W., Aristotle's Physics Books I and I I (Oxford, 1970).
'Prime Matter: A Rejoinder', Phronesis, 28 (1983), 197-211.
Code, A., 'The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter' ['Persistence'], Philoso
phical Studies, 29 (1976), 357-67.
Cohen, S., Aristotle's Doctrine of the Material Substrate', Philosophical
Review, 93 (1984), 171-94.
Cooper, J. M . , 'Two Notes on Aristotle on Mixture', in id., Knowledge,
Nature, and the Good (Princeton, 2004), 148-73.
Crowley, T . J . , Aristotle's "So-Called Elements'", Phronesis, 53 (2008),
223-42.
'On the Use of Stoicheion in the Sense of "Element" ', Oxford Studies
De Haas, E , and Mansfeld, J. (eds.), Aristotle: On Generation and Cor
ruption, Book I [GC I] (Oxford, 2004).
Furth, M . , Substance, Form, and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics [Sub
stance] (Cambridge, 1988).
50
The interpretation of 'matter' here is thus a broadly functionalist account, fol
lowing the model i n Code, 'Persistence', but with a twist: i n paradigmatic substan
tial changes, there are two uses of 'matter', and i n elemental changes, there are three
uses of 'matter'. This further use of 'matter' at the level of elemental changes is what
solves a seeming paradox at the lowest ontological level, and a failure to recognize it
has long shrouded Aristotle's theory of matter i n a veil of obscurity.
Gannage, E . (trans, and comm.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle's

On Coming-to-Be and Perishing 2. 2 - 5 [Alexander] (Ithaca, NY, 2005).
Gill, M . L . , Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity [Paradox],
(Princeton, 1989).
Joachim, H . H . , Aristotle: On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away [Coming-
to-Be] (Oxford, 1922).
King, H . R., Aristotle without Prima Materia', Journal of the History of
Ideas, 17 (1956), 370-89.
Kupreeva, I. (trans.), Philoponus: On Aristotle's On Coming-to-Be and Per
ishing 2. 5—j 1 (Ithaca, NY, 2005).
'Qualities and Bodies: Alexander against the Stoics', Oxford Studies
Kurland, S. (trans, and comm.), Averroes: On Aristotle's De generatione et
corruptione, Middle Commentary and Epitome [Averroes] (Cambridge,
1958).
Lewis, E . (trans, and comm.), Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotle's Me
teorology 4 [Alexander Meteorology] (Ithaca, NY, 1996).
Lewis, F. A., 'What's the Matter with Prime Matter?' ['Matter'], Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008), 123-46.
Luyten, N., 'Matter as Potency' ['Potency'], in McMullin (ed.), Concept,
122-33.
McMullin, E . (ed.), The Concept of Matter [Concept] (Notre Dame, 1963).
Mirus, C. V., 'The Homogeneous Bodies in Meteorology IV. 12', Ancient
Philosophy, 26 (2006), 45-64.
Owens, J., 'Matter and Predication in Aristotle' ['Predication'], in M c M u l
lin (ed.), Concept, 99-115.
Page, C , 'Predicating Forms of Matter in Aristotle's Metaphysics'
['Forms'], Review of Metaphysics, 39 (1985), 57-82.
Robinson, H . M . , 'Prime Matter in Aristotle', Phronesis, 19 (1974), 168-88.
Sokolowsi, R., 'Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle', Journal of
the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), 263-88.
Solmsen, E , Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King',
Journal of the History of Ideas, 19 (1958), 243-52.
Suppes, P., Aristotle's Concept of Matter and its Relation to Modern Con
cepts of Matter', Synthese, 28 (1974), 27-50.
Thijssen, J. M . M . H . , 'The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De
generatione et corruptione: An Introductory Survey', in J. M . M . H .
Thijssen and H . A. G. Braakhuis (eds.), The Commentary Tradition on
Aristotle's De generatione et corruption: Ancient, Medieval, and Early
Modern (Turnhout, 1999), 9-20.
Williams, C. J. F. (trans, and comm.), Aristotle's De generatione et corrup
tione, Translated with Notes [De generatione] (Oxford, 1982).
224 Mary Krizan
(trans, and comm.), Philoponus: On Aristotle's On Coming-to-Be and

Perishing i. 6-2. 4 (Ithaca, NY, 1999).
Zeller, E . , Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (London, 1897).
OPTIMALITY REASONING IN
ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL TELEOLOGY
DEVIN HENRY
IN t h i s paper I e x a m i n e the use of o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n A r i s

totle's n a t u r a l teleology, w i t h special a t t e n t i o n to its a p p l i c a t i o n i n
the d o m a i n o f l i v i n g t h i n g s . B y optimality reasoning I m e a n reason
i n g t h a t appeals to some idea o f o p t i m a l ' d e s i g n ' i n o r d e r to u n d e r
s t a n d w h y t h i n g s are the w a y t h e y are. I n A r i s t o t l e , such o p t i m a l i t y
r e a s o n i n g is expressed b y his famous p r i n c i p l e t h a t n a t u r e does
n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t always w h a t is best for the substance g i v e n the
range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s {IA 2, 7 0 4 i 2 - i 8 , t r a n s l a t e d b e l o w ) . M y
b
aim
i n t h i s paper is to shed l i g h t o n A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n his
a c c o u n t o f n a t u r a l substances. H o w do we u n d e r s t a n d the concept
1
of 'the best' at w o r k i n the p r i n c i p l e ? H o w does A r i s t o t l e conceive
© D e v i n Henry 2013
Versions of this paper were presented to the Institute for the History and Philosophy
of Science and Technology and Collaborative Program in Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy at the University of Toronto (December 2010), as part of a 'Symposium
on Teleological T h i n k i n g i n Scientific Explanations' w i t h Jeff M c D o n o u g h and
Jim Lennox, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Bos
ton (December 2010), as well as at the West Coast Plato Workshop in Portland (May
2011), 'Teleological and Necessitarian Explanation i n the Ancient Life Sciences',
University of Patras, Greece (June 2011), and 'Causation, Explanation, and Value i n
Plato', Harvard University (December 2011). I have also benefited from comments
by Jim Lennox, Mariska Leunissen, Joe Karbowski, Byron Stoyles, Monte John
son, and various audience members at each venue. Finally, I am especially grateful
to Brad Inwood for his detailed comments and suggestions. The paper is substan
tially better for them.
1
I n spite of the importance of this principle i n Aristotle's natural science, there
has been surprisingly little scholarship devoted to it. The seminal work on the sub
ject is J. G. Lennox, 'Nature Does N o t h i n g i n Vain', i n H . - C . Gunther and A .
Rengakos (eds.), Beitrdge zur antiken Philosophic: F e s t s c h r i f t f i l f Wolfgang Kullmann
(Stuttgart, 1997), 199—214; repr. in J. G. Lennox, A r i s t o t l e ' s Philosophy of Biology
[Philosophy of Biology] (Cambridge, 2001), 205—23 (all references herein are to the
reprint). T o my knowledge, the only other major work on this principle is P. Huby,
'What D i d Aristotle Mean by "Nature does N o t h i n g i n Vain"?' ['Nothing in Vain'],
in I . Mahalingam and B. Carr (eds.), L o g i c a l Foundations (Hong Kong, 1991), 158—
66, and M . Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Science of Nature {Ex
planation and Teleology] (Cambridge, 2010), s.vv 'nature: does nothing i n vain' and
'nature: does what is best, given the possibilities'. See also M . R. Johnson, A r i s t o t l e
on Teleology [ T e l e o l o g y ] (Oxford, 2005), s.v. 'nature: nothing i n vain', and A . Gott-
226 Devin Henry
of the range o f possibilities here? A n d w h a t role does o p t i m a l i t y

reasoning p l a y i n A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l science? I b e g i n b y l o o k i n g at
the roots o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n Plato, w h i c h p r o v i d e s the i n
tellectual b a c k d r o p for A r i s t o t l e ' s p r i n c i p l e . A s we shall see, w h i l e
b o t h Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e v i e w the n a t u r a l w o r l d (or at least p a r t o f
it) as the p r o d u c t o f an o p t i m i z i n g agent a n d w h i l e b o t h see this as
s u m p t i o n as licensing a p a t t e r n o f reasoning t h a t appeals to a certain
c o n c e p t i o n o f 'the best', they disagree f u n d a m e n t a l l y over w h a t the
o p t i m i z a t i o n agent is a n d h o w i t operates.
i . Platonic o r i g i n s
We are first i n t r o d u c e d to o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n the famous pas

sage at Phaedo 97 B 8-98 A 2, where (Plato's) Socrates invokes ' w h a t
is best' as a cause (atria) o f t h i n g s i n nature. A s Plato tells the story,
Socrates t o o k Anaxagoras' idea t h a t Reason 'directs a n d is the cause
of e v e r y t h i n g ' a n d grafted o n t o i t the n o t i o n o f o p t i m i z a t i o n . Socra
tes e x p l a i n s : ' / thought t h a t i f this were so, t h e n Reason s h o u l d d i r e c t
e v e r y t h i n g and arrange each t h i n g i n the w a y t h a t was best.' T h i s is
supposed to g r o u n d the e x p l a n a t o r y strategy i n t r o d u c e d next: ' I f ,
t h e n , one w i s h e d to k n o w the cause o f each t h i n g , w h y i t comes to
be or perishes or exists, one h a d to f i n d w h a t was the best w a y for i t
to be, or to be acted u p o n , or to act.' N o t i c e the p a t t e r n o f inference
here. / / the w o r l d is arranged b y an o p t i m i z i n g agent ( a s s u m p t i o n ) ,
then it follows t h a t we can e x p l a i n w h y t h i n g s are the w a y they are
by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t they are i n the best possible state. Socrates
goes o n to p r o v i d e an example o f w h a t an e x p l a n a t i o n o f the sort he
is after m i g h t look like:
As I reflected on this subject I was glad to think that I had found in

Anaxagoras a teacher about the cause of things after my own heart, and
that he would tell me, first, whether the earth is flat or round, and then
would explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better, and that it
2
was better to be so. If he said it was in the middle of the universe, he would
helf, Teleology, F i r s t Principles, and S c i e n t i f i c Method i n A r i s t o t l e ' s Biology [First

Principles] (Oxford, 2012), s.v 'natures: as doing nothing without a point'.
3
According to Timaeus, the primary agent responsible for order in the cosmos is
the Demiurge, who is supremely good. And Timaeus claims that it is not p o s s i b l e for
one who is supremely good to do anything except what is best (29 E 1—2). There
fore, everything the Demiurge creates must of n e c e s s i t y be in its optimal state (29 D
7-30 A 7).
Optimality Reasoning in Aristotle's Natural Teleology 227
go on to show that it was better for it to be in the middle. And if he showed

me those things, I should be prepared never to desire any other kind of
cause. (97 D 5-98 A 2, trans. Grube)
T h e example suggests t w o stages to the account: (1) a d e s c r i p t i o n o f

the e m p i r i c a l facts c o n c e r n i n g the shape o f the earth; a n d (2) a state
m e n t o f the aitia, w h i c h tells us that the e a r t h is the w a y i t is because
t h a t is the best w a y for i t to be. A close analysis o f the Phaedo pas
sage thus suggests t h a t w h a t Socrates is offering here is a t w o - p a r t
m o d e l o f e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e first p a r t calls for a descriptive account
of the e x p l a n a n d u m , w h i l e the second p a r t involves i d e n t i f y i n g the
o p t i m u m , w h i c h tells us the best w a y for t h a t p h e n o m e n o n to be.
We w i l l have explained the p h e n o m e n o n ( g i v e n its aitia) w h e n we
have s h o w n t h a t the facts described i n the first step m a t c h the o p
t i m u m revealed i n the second. I n this way, the fact t h a t r o u n d is the
best shape for the earth to be explains w h y i t has the shape i t does.
Famously, Socrates' i n i t i a l e n t h u s i a s m for o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n
the Phaedo gave w a y to t h o u g h t s o f another p a t t e r n o f e x p l a n a t i o n ,
namely, one t h a t invokes F o r m s as explananda. Yet Socrates never
rejects the teleological m o d e l . I n s t e a d the Phaedo leaves us w i t h t w o
forms o f adequate e x p l a n a t i o n , one t h a t makes use o f o p t i m a l i t y rea
s o n i n g and one t h a t appeals to F o r m s . T h e r e are n o suggestions i n
t h a t dialogue as to h o w these t w o are supposed to f i t together i n t o a
u n i f i e d p a t t e r n o f e x p l a n a t i o n or, indeed, i f they do. Instead, deve
l o p i n g a m o r e i n t e g r a t e d t h e o r y o f scientific e x p l a n a t i o n is left for
the Timaeus. A c c o r d i n g to Sedley, Plato's use o f teleology i n the
Timaeus moves us even f u r t h e r away f r o m the e m p i r i c i s m o f Preso-
cratic n a t u r a l science towards a c o n c e p t i o n o f n a t u r a l science as 'an
exercise o f pure t h o u g h t ' . H e r e o p t i m a l i t y reasoning becomes an
3
a priori a t t e m p t to reconstruct, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f experience, the

p a t t e r n o f reasoning t h a t w e n t i n t o the w o r l d ' s design b y the crea
tive Nous. O n Sedley's reading, i t is i r r e l e v a n t to Plato's p r o j e c t i n
the Timaeus w h e t h e r or n o t o u r observations about the actual w o r l d
t a l l y w i t h o u r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the D e m i u r g e ' s reasoning process.
T h e g u i d i n g q u e s t i o n is s i m p l y : w h a t w o u l d reason itself j u d g e to be
best? F o r Sedley, this a r m c h a i r approach to causal e n q u i r y f o r m s
p a r t o f Plato's o n g o i n g a t t e m p t to ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e ' n a t u r a l science
(1 i o ) . A l t h o u g h m y focus i n this paper is o n A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f o p -
4
3
D. Sedley, Creationism audits Critics in A n t i q u i t y [Creationism] (Berkeley, 2007),
109—12.
4
For other interpretations of the Timaeus' account of teleology see: S. K . Strange,
228 Devin Henry
t i m a l i t y reasoning, I s h o u l d say a few w o r d s about h o w m u c h o f m y

account depends o n this p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the Ti
maeus.
As m e n t i o n e d , p a r t o f the a r g u m e n t o f this paper is that b o t h
Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e t o o k the n a t u r a l w o r l d to be the p r o d u c t o f an
o p t i m i z i n g agent a n d that b o t h saw this c l a i m as licensing the use o f
o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n n a t u r a l science b u t that they disagreed f u n
d a m e n t a l l y over w h a t the o p t i m i z a t i o n agent is a n d h o w i t operates
(see Section 6 b e l o w ) . M y analysis o f these f u n d a m e n t a l differences
w i l l depend m a i n l y o n the c l a i m that Plato t h o u g h t the w o r l d was
i n t e l l i g e n t l y designed b y a d i v i n e craftsman. T h i s is a consistent
theme r u n n i n g t h r o u g h several o f Plato's dialogues (e.g. Republic,
Philebus, Laws 10). A n d w h i l e n o t everyone agrees o n w h i c h de
tails o f Plato's creationist account he i n t e n d e d to be taken seriously, 5
m o s t c o m m e n t a t o r s (ancient a n d m o d e r n ) at least take the basic

c l a i m o f i n t e l l i g e n t design as a x i o m a t i c . N o w the teleological ex
6
planations i n the Timaeus that appeal to o p t i m i z a t i o n are prima facie

accounts o f the reasoning process that w e n t i n t o the design o f some
feature o f the cosmos. I f Plato accepted that the w o r l d was p u t t o
gether b y a D i v i n e C r a f t s m a n w h o deliberated about w h a t was best
for each t h i n g , t h e n i t is reasonable to suppose that those accounts
'The Double Explanation in the Timaeus', i n G. Fine (ed.), P l a t o i : Metaphysics

and Epistemology (Oxford, 1999), 397—415; Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 280—
302; T. K . Johansen, P l a t o ' s Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus—Critias
[Natural Philosophy] (Cambridge, 2004); and S. Broadie, Nature and D i v i n i t y i n
P l a t o ' s Timaeus [Nature and D i v i n i t y ] (Cambridge, 2012).
5
The main disagreements surrounding the Timaeus' creation story are the sepa-
rateness of the Demiurge (Johansen, Natural Philosophy, ch. 4; Broadie, Nature and
D i v i n i t y , ch. 1) and what Broadie calls the 'proto-historical inauguration' of the cos
mos {Nature and D i v i n i t y , 243).
6
As is well known, the Timaeus itself is full of remarks describing the account as
etVaj?. Some take this to mean that the entire creationist story is only metaphorical.
See e.g. F. M . Cornford, P l a t o ' s Cosmology (London, 1937), 31—2. But etVaj? need
not be read in that way. Indeed, as Johansen notes {Natural Philosophy, 50), there are
several passages i n the Timaeus where the claims being made are described as 'true'.
On my reading, Timaeus' remarks are meant to suggest that we should not expect
an enquiry into the world of becoming to yield stable, precise knowledge; our grasp
on the subject-matter reaches no higher than belief {irions) {Tim. 27 D 5—29 D 3; cf.
Rep. 6, 509 A 6—513 E 3). (See P h i l e b . 58 B 9—59 D 8. Compare Aristotle's remarks i n
the Nicomachean E t h i c s about the level of precision we should expect from an en
quiry whose subject-matter is imprecise and holds only for the most part.) On this
reading etVaj? modifies how closely our accounts approximate certain truth (they are
only 'likely'), not whether those accounts should be taken literally or metaphorically
(Johansen, Natural Philosophy, 51—2).
are m e a n t to capture the c h a i n o f inferences t h a t the D e m i u r g e h i m

self f o l l o w e d i n w o r k i n g o u t his designs. T h i s does n o t m e a n that
Plato t h i n k s h u m a n o p t i m a l i t y reasoning is an exact reconstruc
t i o n o f the D e m i u r g e ' s thought-process; such reasoning is at best
a likely r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . F i n a l l y , w h i l e I t h i n k Sedley is r i g h t that
7
Plato t h o u g h t t h a t o p t i m a l i t y reasoning i n the Timaeus c o u l d be car

r i e d o u t e n t i r e l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f experience, n o t h i n g substantial
i n this paper hinges o n that c l a i m . I n d e e d , as we shall see, there is at
least one reason for t h i n k i n g t h a t this m i g h t n o t be the case ( t h o u g h
not a decisive o n e ) . 8
2. N a t u r e does n o t h i n g i n v a i n
T h e o p t i m a l i t y reasoning o u t l i n e d i n Phaedo 97 B 8-98 A 2 a n d e m

p l o y e d t h r o u g h o u t the Timaeus can be seen as the i n t e l l e c t u a l an
cestor o f A r i s t o t l e ' s o w n famous p r i n c i p l e , whose f u l l expression is
f o u n d i n the f o l l o w i n g passage:
We must begin the investigation by laying down as suppositions those

things we often use in natural enquiry, grasping that this is the way things
are in all the works of nature. One of these is that nature does nothing in
vain but always what is best for the substance from among the possibilities
concerning each kind of animal; for this reason, if it is better this way, then
it is that way and being in that state is in accordance with nature. (IA 2,
7<H i2-i8)
b
T w o p r e l i m i n a r y remarks about A r i s t o t l e ' s o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e are

i n order here.
7
See Sedley, Creationism, i n ; cf. previous note.
8
That reason has to do with the role of constraints in the Timaeus, to which I shall
return. I f Sedley is right about this last claim, then it would mean that the Timaeus
is an even more extreme form of rationalism than the Phaedo. Sedley argues that
optimality reasoning in the Timaeus proceeds without regard to empirical data: T f
by good fortune the unfolding story of how the world was devised and built i n fact
proves to tally with the data of our experience, that is something the reader is no
doubt expected to note in its favor, but is no part of the actual argument for it' ( C r e
ationism, 109). A t least judging from Socrates' example of what a proper teleological
explanation would look like at Phaedo 97 D 5—98 A 2, interpreting the empirical data
through our understanding of optimal designs is central to the teleological enterprise
of the Phaedo. I n the Phaedo the value of optimality reasoning is that it helps make
our empirical observations about the world intelligible ('Why is the earth round? Be
cause that is the optimal shape for the earth'). O f course this reading is consistent
with Sedley's interpretation, since it only suggests that the teleological approach
espoused by Timaeus is further on its way towards 'intellectualizing' physics than
anything Socrates had hoped to get from Anaxagoras in the Phaedo.
230 Devin Henry
F i r s t , I take the p r o p o s i t i o n that nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t

always w h a t is best for the substance f r o m a range o f possibilities
to express a single u n i f i e d p r i n c i p l e . B y contrast, L e n n o x argues
that there are t w o separate p r i n c i p l e s here: 'nature does n o t h i n g i n
v a i n ' (his N P ) , w h i c h is used to e x p l a i n the absence o f features; and
'nature always does w h a t is best', w h i c h is used for those features
that are present because they are better for the animals that pos
sess t h e m . A l t h o u g h d o i n g n o t h i n g i n v a i n a n d d o i n g w h a t is best
c e r t a i n l y express different ideas, I a m n o t c o n v i n c e d that A r i s t o t l e
sees these as separate p r i n c i p l e s to be i n v o k e d i n different expla
n a t o r y contexts. A r i s t o t l e c e r t a i n l y does n o t treat t h e m as separate
p r i n c i p l e s i n the above passage. N o r does he always do so i n prac
tice. F o r example, at IA 8, 7 o 8 9 - 2 0 (discussed b e l o w ) , A r i s t o t l e
a
invokes the w h o l e p r i n c i p l e as p a r t o f the e x p l a n a t i o n for the ab

sence o f legs i n snakes. A n d GA 2. 5, 7 4 i 4 - 5 , appeals to the fact b
that nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n to account for the presence o f males

i n a n i m a l s . W h i l e I w i l l often shorten the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e for
9
convenience, we s h o u l d assume that the entire p r i n c i p l e is at w o r k .

We also need to say s o m e t h i n g about the 'nature' whose actions
are governed b y this p r i n c i p l e . A r i s t o t l e often characterizes the
p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y o f nature u s i n g the language o f design. N a t u r e
is said to devise (mechanatai) clever mechanisms (PA 6 5 2 3 i ) . I t a
is described as a k i n d o f s u p e r i n t e n d e n t that seeks (bouletai) to

regulate the gestation periods o f animals a c c o r d i n g to the cycles o f
the heavens (GA 7 7 8 4 ) . A n d i t is c o m p a r e d to various craftsmen,
a
i n c l u d i n g a p a i n t e r (GA 7 4 3 2 0 - 5 ) , a s c u l p t o r (GA 7 3 o 2 4 - 3 3 ) ,
b b
a carpenter (GA 7 3 o i 9 - 2 3 ; 7 4 o 2 5 - 7 4 i 3 ) , a n d a housekeeper

b b a
(GA 7 4 4 i 6 - 2 7 ) . I n at least t w o places A r i s t o t l e even uses the

b
phrase ' d e m i u r g i c n a t u r e ' (he demiourgesasa phusis: PA 6 4 5 9 - n ; a
GA 7 3 i 2 4 ) , w h i c h is r e m i n i s c e n t o f the language o f the Timaeus.

a
Such s t r o n g design language m i g h t be taken to suggest that w h a t

A r i s t o t l e is t a l k i n g about here is some k i n d o f Cosmic N a t u r e
on a par w i t h Plato's D e m i u r g e . Yet, however t e m p t i n g this
1 0
inference m a y be, A r i s t o t l e ' s personification o f nature can o n l y be

m e t a p h o r i c a l . F o r there is l i t t l e evidence that he t h i n k s o f nature
as an i n t e l l i g e n t designer. I n d e e d , A r i s t o t l e ' s theoretical account
11
9
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 130. H u b y , ' N o t h i n g in Vain'.
1 0
11
Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 184; Johnson, 80—1; L . Judson, 'Aris
Teleology,
totelian Teleology', Oxford S t u d i e s i n Ancient Philosophy, 29 (2005), 341—66 at 361;
and Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 17—18, 61—2, 126.
of nature p o s i t i v e l y tells against that reading. I n Physics 2. 1 nature

is defined as 'a p r i n c i p l e or cause o f b e i n g changed a n d b e i n g at
rest in that to w h i c h i t belongs p r i m a r i l y , i n v i r t u e o f itself, a n d
n o n - i n c i d e n t a l l y ' ( i 9 2 2 0 - 3 ) . N o r do any o f the senses o f phusis
b
canvassed i n Metaphysics 5. 4 refer to the concept o f a Cosmic

N a t u r e . I n Physics 2. 6 A r i s t o t l e e x p l i c i t l y contrasts nature w i t h
intelligence (and craft) as d i s t i n c t k i n d s o f m o v i n g cause (e.g. Phys.
i 9 8 2 - 4 ; cf. i 9 2 8 - 3 4 a n d GA 7 3 5 2 - 4 ) . F i n a l l y , i n Physics 2. 8
a b a
he rejects the idea that natures are r a t i o n a l agents that deliberate

about t h e i r ends ( i 9 9 2 0 - 6 ; i 9 9 2 6 - 8 ) .
a b 1 2
H a v i n g said that, i n w h a t follows I shall continue to e m p l o y the

language o f engineering a n d design despite its p o t e n t i a l to mislead
because i t is a v e r y convenient w a y o f t a l k i n g about o p t i m a l i t y . I n
deed, as we have j u s t seen, A r i s t o t l e h i m s e l f uses that language. B u t ,
again, such language is n o t m e a n t to i m p l y that A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s
of nature as a r a t i o n a l agent engaged i n deliberation. Instead, the
o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as a generalization over
the goal-directed actions o f the f o r m a l natures o f p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r a l
substances (for example, the f o r m a l natures of snakes do n o t h i n g i n
vain). 13
W e can illustrate A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning b y l o o k

ing at t w o examples f r o m the text. T h e first is his e x p l a n a t i o n for
the peculiar j a w c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the r i v e r crocodile at PA 4. 11,
6 9 i 2 7 - i 5 . A r i s t o t l e begins b y n o t i n g that birds, fish, a n d four-
a b
footed egg-layers all have jaws that move u p a n d d o w n rather t h a n

f r o m side to side (as they do i n h u m a n s ) . T h e reason, he tells us,
is that side-to-side m o t i o n is useful o n l y for animals w i t h g r i n d -
1 3
P h y s i c s 2. 8 has become the dominant focus of scholarship on Aristotle's natural
teleology for the past several decades. The primary battleground for the different
sides of the debate has been the so-called rainfall argument at I98 i7—199*8. For a b
survey of the major positions w i t h m this debate see R. W. Sharpies, 'The Purpose
of the Natural World: Aristotle's Followers and Interpreters', i n J. Rocca, Teleology
i n the Ancient World (Cambridge, 2013, forthcoming). I w i l l not enter the fray here.
Instead I shall limit myself to the role of optimality reasoning i n the case of living
things whose adaptations are incontrovertibly teleological i n Aristotle's view. Most
scholars agree that Aristotle's teleology does not depend on conscious intentionality
in this context.
13
See also Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 184; Leunissen, Explanation and Te
leology, 119 (though see 123); and Gotthelf, F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , 171. For the claim that
'the formal nature' of a natural substance is the primary moving cause of its genera
tion see Metaph. Z 7, 1032*20-5 (cf. GA 4. 4, 7 7 o i 5 - i 7 ) . A t GA
b
2. 4, 7 4 o 2 5 - 3 4 ,
b
Aristotle identifies the productive nature that constructs the parts of a living thing
w i t h the active power {TTOIOVOO, bvva[jLi<;) of its nutritive soul.
232 Devin Henry
ing teeth. A n d since these animals lack g r i n d i n g teeth, h a v i n g jaws

that can m o v e sideways w o u l d have been i n v a i n . Since nature does
n o t h i n g i n v a i n , i t follows t h a t these animals w i l l possess j a w s t h a t
m o v e u p a n d d o w n only. A r i s t o t l e t h e n notes t h a t the r i v e r crocodile
is p e c u l i a r i n t h a t i t is the o n l y f o u r - f o o t e d egg-layer whose m o u t h
is set u p so that its u p p e r j a w moves w h i l e the l o w e r j a w remains
stationary ( w h i c h is the reverse o f the n o r m a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n ) . A g a i n
A r i s t o t l e explains this feature u s i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f o p t i m i z a t i o n . C r o
codiles have v e r y s m a l l f r o n t l i m b s t h a t are i l l - e q u i p p e d for grasp
ing food. A s a result, nature has 'designed' t h e i r m o u t h s n o t o n l y
for c h e w i n g b u t also for seizing a n d h o l d i n g t h e i r prey. T h e r e are
at least t w o possible ways to configure the jaws to do this: have the
b o t t o m j a w m o v e u p a n d d o w n , or have the u p p e r j a w m o v e u p and
d o w n . O f these t w o possibilities, the latter c o n f i g u r a t i o n t u r n s o u t
to be the m o s t useful for the crocodile:
Relative to seizing prey and holding onto them, the more useful movement
for striking a blow is the one that has the greatest force. And a blow from
above is always more forceful than one from below. And to an animal that
has no hands or proper feet and which has to use its mouth for seizing food
as well as for chewing it, the power to seize it is more necessary. Therefore
it is more useful for the crocodile to be able to move its upper jaw than its
lower one. (PA 4. 11,69 i 9 ~ i 5) b
W h i l e the crocodile c o u l d have been b u i l t w i t h a m o u t h whose

l o w e r j a w m o v e d u p a n d d o w n (standard issue for a f o u r - f o o t e d egg-
layer), h a v i n g its u p p e r j a w m o v e t u r n s o u t to be the best j a w design
for a crocodile f r o m a m o n g the range o f possibilities.
A second example o f A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning is af
f o r d e d b y his e x p l a n a t i o n for w h y snakes have n o legs:
The cause [aitia] of why snakes are footless is both that nature does noth
ing in vain but in every case acts with a view to what is best for each thing
from among the possibilities while maintaining the distinctive being and
essence of the thing itself, and, as we have said, because no blooded ani
mal can move by means of more than four points. It is clear from this that
of all blooded animals whose length is out of proportion with the rest of
their bodily constitution, such as snakes, none of them can be footed; for
they cannot have more than four feet. If they had, they would be bloodless.
Whereas, if they had two or four feet, they would be practically incapable
of any movement at all, so slow and useless would their movement be of
necessity. (IA 8, 708^-20; cf. PA 4. 13, 695 i7~26) b
T h e absence o f legs i n snakes is s o m e t h i n g that demands explana

t i o n because they are the o n l y b l o o d e d land-dwellers that lack this
feature. G i v e n their u n u s u a l l e n g t h , we m i g h t have expected nature
to have e q u i p p e d snakes w i t h a l o t o f legs like a centipede. H o w e v e r ,
A r i s t o t l e has already established i n I A 7 (discussed b e l o w ) that n o
b l o o d e d a n i m a l can move at m o r e t h a n four p o i n t s o f m o t i o n . So the
m o s t legs a snake c o u l d have w o u l d be four. B u t g i v i n g four legs to
a snake w o u l d o b v i o u s l y be pointless, since snakes c o u l d n o t move
effectively w i t h o n l y four (cf. PA 4. 13, 6 9 6 i 2 - i 5 ) . T h e r e f o r e , legs
a
on a snake w o u l d be i n v a i n . A n d since nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n

b u t always w h a t is best for an a n i m a l g i v e n the range o f p o s s i b i l i
ties, i t follows that snakes do n o t have legs.
W h y n o t j u s t shorten the snake's b o d y i n order to accommodate
four legs? A s the above passage makes clear, the essence o f a t h i n g
sets p r i o r constraints o n w h a t its f o r m a l nature can do. T h i s is w h a t
A r i s t o t l e means w h e n he says that nature does w h a t is best ' w h i l e
m a i n t a i n i n g the d i s t i n c t i v e b e i n g a n d essence o f each t h i n g i t s e l f .
A r i s t o t l e seems to treat the elongated b o d y o f a snake as one o f its
essential properties ( s o m e t h i n g i t cannot change w h i l e s t i l l r e m a i n
ing w h a t i t i s ) , and so this s t r u c t u r a l aspect o f the snake's design
14
constitutes a b u i l t - i n feature that m u s t be preserved w h e n t r y i n g to

o p t i m i z e its f o r m . I f h a v i n g an elongated b o d y is p a r t o f w h a t makes
s o m e t h i n g a snake, t h e n clearly nature c o u l d n o t make a snake w i t h
a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y shorter body.
These examples can help to shed l i g h t o n w h a t A r i s t o t l e means b y
saying that nature does n o t h i n g ' i n v a i n ' (maten). F o r i t is n o t i m
m e d i a t e l y obvious f r o m his use o f the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e . One 1 5
place to look for an answer is Physics 2. 6. T h e r e A r i s t o t l e tells us

that the j u d g e m e n t that s o m e t h i n g F is ' i n v a i n ' is always relative
to its end G ( i 9 7 2 3 - 9 ) . F o r example, suppose I go to the m a r k e t
b : 6
(F) for the sake o f b u y i n g fish (G), b u t w h e n I get there I fail to

a c c o m p l i s h that goal. I n that case we w o u l d say that I w e n t to the
m a r k e t ' i n v a i n ' . However, A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f maten i n the o p t i m a l -
14
I discuss the role of constraints below. While this suggestion may strike readers
of the Metaphysics as questionable, in the biological works Aristotle often includes
the parts of animals as well as their physical features i n the o v o i a of a thing (e.g. P A
3. 6, 6 6 9 i 2 : lungs; 4. 5, 678*33-4, and 4. 13, 69S i7-2S: being blooded; 4. 6, 682*35-
b b
b
32: being divided into sections; 4. 9, 685 i2—16: length and slimness). See Gotthelf,
b
F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , ch. 10, and Lennox, P a r t s o f Animals, 314.

15
I am grateful to Rachel Barney for pressing me on this point.
16
Johnson, Teleology, 81—2.
234 Devin Henry
i t y p r i n c i p l e does n o t o b v i o u s l y c o n f o r m to this analysis. H e r e we

are supposed to reason c o u n t e r f a c t u a l l y that, i f some feature were
present, i t w o u l d exist i n v a i n precisely because i t w o u l d lack an
end. I f crocodiles h a d jaws t h a t m o v e d sideways, t h a t setup w o u l d
exist i n v a i n because w i t h o u t g r i n d i n g teeth i t w o u l d n o t serve any
f u n c t i o n . L i k e w i s e , i f snakes h a d legs, t h e i r legs w o u l d exist i n v a i n
precisely because they w o u l d n o t serve any p a r t i c u l a r end. A n d yet,
according to the Physics account, o n l y those t h i n g s t h a t have deter
m i n a t e ends can be said to exist i n v a i n .
I suspect A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f maten i n the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e is
less technical t h a n the Physics 2. 6 account w o u l d suggest. A r i s t o t l e
may j u s t m e a n t h a t nature never does a n y t h i n g 'for n o r e a s o n ' , 17
i n w h i c h case saying t h a t nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n is equivalent

to saying t h a t nature does n o t h i n g superfluous {periergon, e.g. GA
744 36). H o w e v e r , there is a w a y to u n d e r s t a n d the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n
a
ciple so t h a t i t conforms to the Physics account. T h e Physics tells

us that the expression ' i n v a i n ' is used whenever s o m e t h i n g F fails
to b r i n g about t h a t e n d G for the sake o f w h i c h i t naturally {pe-
phuken) exists. One w a y t h a t we m i g h t d e t e r m i n e a part's n a t u r a l
f u n c t i o n is b y l o o k i n g to the w i d e s t k i n d to w h i c h t h a t p a r t belongs
and asking h o w m o s t m e m b e r s o f the w i d e r k i n d use t h a t p a r t . F o r
example, a survey o f a l l animals t h a t possess legs (the w i d e r k i n d )
reveals t h a t such animals t y p i c a l l y use t h e i r legs for l o c o m o t i o n .
T h i s p r o v i d e s good i n d u c t i v e evidence t h a t nature's goal i n e q u i p
p i n g animals w i t h legs is to allow t h e m to m o v e f r o m place to place
(cf. PA 6 9 5 2 2 - 3 ) . T h u s we can say t h a t nature w o u l d have done
b
s o m e t h i n g i n v a i n b y e n d o w i n g snakes w i t h legs, since they w o u l d

n o t p e r f o r m the f u n c t i o n for w h i c h they n a t u r a l l y e x i s t .18
H a v i n g l o o k e d at A r i s t o t l e ' s o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i n context, let

me n o w t u r n to m y three m a i n questions:
( 1 ) H o w are we to u n d e r s t a n d the concept o f 'the best' at w o r k

i n the p r i n c i p l e ?
(2) H o w does A r i s t o t l e conceive o f the range o f possibilities?
1 7
The second meaning of maten listed i n LSJ is 'at random, without reason'. See
also Johnson, Teleology, 80.
1 8
We can put the point in less metaphorical terms by speaking of the development
of the legs as occurring i n vain. I n most animals that have legs the developmental
process that results i n those parts naturally occurs for the sake of locomotion. I f this
same developmental process were to occur i n snakes, it would be ' i n vain' i n so far
as it would fail to achieve its natural end.
(3) W h a t role does o p t i m a l i t y reasoning p l a y i n A r i s t o t l e ' s n a

t u r a l science?
I shall take these u p i n t u r n .
3. N a t u r e always does ' w h a t is best'
A r i s t o t l e seems to take i t as axiomatic t h a t b e i n g is better t h a n n o n -

being. A n d since ' t o be' for a l i v i n g t h i n g is ' t o be alive', i t follows
t h a t l i v i n g is better t h a n n o n - l i v i n g (GA 2. 1, 7 3 i 2 8 - 3 o ; cf. DA
b
2. 4, 4 1 5 12-14). A l l a n G o t t h e l f has argued t h a t A r i s t o t l e is n o t

b
appealing to any i n d e p e n d e n t standard o f goodness here; rather,

the life (or b e i n g ) o f a t h i n g constitutes its good. O n this account,
the parts o f a l i v i n g t h i n g are j u d g e d to be good or b a d i n r e l a t i o n
to the c o n t r i b u t i o n they make to the organism's s u r v i v a l a n d w e l l -
b e i n g . I n the l i g h t o f this, w h e n A r i s t o t l e says t h a t nature always
19
does ' w h a t is best' for the substance, we can take h i m to m e a n that

the parts o f l i v i n g t h i n g s have been o p t i m i z e d for c o n t r i b u t i n g to
the life o f the i n d i v i d u a l . B u t does this mean that each p a r t o f a
l i v i n g t h i n g e x h i b i t s perfect design o r does A r i s t o t l e have i n m i n d
s o m e t h i n g m o r e m o d e s t t h a n that?
We can b e g i n to g a i n some i n s i g h t i n t o this q u e s t i o n b y u s i n g the
discussion o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n Politics 4. 1 as a f r a m e w o r k . A r i s t o t l e
tells us t h a t the study o f c o n s t i t u t i o n s is the subject o f a single sci
ence a n d t h a t p a r t o f the j o b o f t h a t science is t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t
sort o f c o n s t i t u t i o n is best. H o w e v e r , the student o f p o l i t i c s m u s t
be careful to d i s t i n g u i s h between the ideal c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d the best
possible c o n s t i t u t i o n g i v e n a set o f r e a l - w o r l d circumstances:
Hence it is clear that constitutions are the subject of a single science, which
has to consider what the best constitution is and what its character must be
in order to meet our aspirations (when nothing external prevents it from
being implemented), and what sort of constitution is suited to which parti
cular city. For the best constitution is often not attainable, so that the good
legislator and true statesman must consider what is the most excellent in the
unqualified sense \rr\v Kpariar-qv a-nXajs] and what is best given the under
lying conditions \TTJV IK TOW vrroKeiiievcov apiar-rjv]. (Pol. 4. 1, i 2 8 8 2 i - 6 )
b
1 9
A . Gotthelf, ' T h e Place of the Good i n Aristotle's Teleology', in J. J. Cleary
and D. C. Shartin (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium i n Ancient Phi
losophy, 4 (1988), 113—39.
236 Devin Henry
A r i s t o t l e recognizes t h a t certain c o n s t i t u t i o n s m a y be the best w a y

of o r g a n i z i n g the offices i n a polls i n the abstract b u t t h a t those sorts
of c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y n o t be possible g i v e n the r e a l - w o r l d c i r c u m
stances. Since the ideal c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y n o t be the same as the
best realizable c o n s t i t u t i o n , p o l i t i c a l science m u s t n o t o n l y consider
theoretical alternatives b u t e m p i r i c a l ones as w e l l . T h i s same dis
t i n c t i o n can be a p p l i e d to the f o r m s o f l i v i n g things. W h e n A r i s t o t l e
says nature always does w h a t is best for the substance, he does n o t
mean w h a t is best i n the u n q u a l i f i e d sense, b u t o n l y w h a t is best
given w h a t the circumstances allow. I n the case o f l i v i n g things,
nature's a b i l i t y to do w h a t is best is affected b y the presence o f
various b i o l o g i c a l constraints.
B o t h Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e appeal to the n o t i o n o f constraints to ex
p l a i n the fact t h a t the w o r l d is n o t absolutely perfect. A t Tim. 30 A 3,
for example, T i m a e u s says t h a t the D e m i u r g e desired to p r o d u c e
w h a t is best for the cosmos 'as far as i t is possible' (kata to dunaton).
T h e nature o f the constraints o p e r a t i n g o n the D e m i u r g e i n the Ti
maeus, however, remains c o n t r o v e r s i a l . A c c o r d i n g to Sedley, for ex
ample, the D e m i u r g e ' s creative activities are l i m i t e d o n l y b y c o m
p e t i n g f u n c t i o n a l demands; there is n o suggestion t h a t m a t t e r itself
m i g h t impose its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t constraints o n w h a t the D e m i
urge can d o . I n d e e d , Sedley argues t h a t i t is inconceivable t h a t
20
Plato's t h e o l o g y w o u l d tolerate the n o t i o n o f design faults result

ing f r o m the recalcitrant nature o f matter: ' W o u l d Plato's t h e o l o g y
really allow t h a t the best t h i n g i n the universe, god, m i g h t o n occa
sion be defeated b y the lowliest t h i n g , matter? T h i s is such an u n -
Platonic t h o u g h t t h a t v e r y clear evidence w o u l d be needed before
the p o i n t c o u l d be safely conceded. I believe there is n o n e . ' O n 21
Sedley's reading, the o n l y s u b o p t i m a l i t y t h a t exists i n Plato's w o r l d

is 'caused b y the demands o f [functional] biology, n o t the nature o f
m a t t e r ' . B y contrast, Johansen argues t h a t the necessary properties
and m o t i o n s o f the s i m p l e bodies can impose p r i o r constraints o n
w h a t is possible for the D e m i u r g e to b r i n g a b o u t . These are cases
22
where the D e m i u r g e is unable to 'persuade' necessity to do as i t

bids b u t m u s t instead w o r k w i t h i n the constraints set b y i t . F o r ex
ample, at Tim. 75 A 7 - D 4 we are t o l d t h a t 'there is n o w a y [oudamei]
that a n y t h i n g whose generation a n d c o m p o s i t i o n are a consequence
of necessity can accommodate the c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h i c k bone and
Sedley, Creationism, 116—21. 21

I b i d . 116.
Johansen, Natural Philosophy, 101—2.
massive flesh w i t h keen and responsive p e r c e p t i o n ' . T h e force o f

this statement seems to be t h a t such a c o m b i n a t i o n is n o t even pos
sible for the D e m i u r g e h i m s e l f to b r i n g about. T h e necessary char
acter o f the materials i n v o l v e d w i l l n o t a l l o w i t . I n d e e d , T i m a e u s
goes o n to say t h a t were i t n o t for these m a t e r i a l constraints, o u r
heads w o u l d have been f o r t i f i e d w i t h t h i c k bones, w h i c h i n t u r n
w o u l d have p r o l o n g e d o u r life. T h i s is p r e t t y clear evidence that
the D e m i u r g e ' s a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e w h a t is best for the cosmos is n o t
o n l y constrained b y c o m p e t i n g f u n c t i o n a l demands b u t also b y the
necessary properties o f the simple bodies themselves. 23
A r i s t o t l e also accepts t h a t the natures o f l i v i n g t h i n g s operate

w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f constraints. A s a result o f these constraints, the
best ( e m p i r i c a l l y ) possible f o r m s often t u r n o u t to be worse t h a n the
best conceivable ones. I t is w o r t h d w e l l i n g o n this at some l e n g t h be
cause i t helps to make clear t h a t his o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f o p t i m a l i t y
is n o t that o f extreme perfection.
A r i s t o t l e recognizes a n u m b e r o f different b i o l o g i c a l constraints
affecting the e m p i r i c a l possibilities. One type o f constraint arises
f r o m general considerations o f s u r v i v a b i l i t y . F o r example, every
t h i n g t h a t grows m u s t have parts for t a k i n g i n a n d processing food,
along w i t h a s u p p l y o f n a t u r a l heat for t r a n s f o r m i n g t h a t food i n t o
the raw materials used to n o u r i s h its b o d y {PA 2. 3, 65o 2 ff.). T h i s a
means t h a t nature cannot design a viable o r g a n i s m w i t h o u t parts

t h a t satisfy these demands: hence animals have parts like hearts
a n d livers. W e have also seen h o w the essence o f a t h i n g sets p r i o r
constraints o n the actions o f its f o r m a l nature. A s A r i s t o t l e puts i t ,
nature always does w h a t is best ' w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g the d i s t i n c t i v e
b e i n g and essence o f each t h i n g i t s e l f {IA 8, 7 o 8 i 1-12). I n these
a
cases the c o n s t r a i n t i n q u e s t i o n is r o o t e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f the a n i

mal's substantial being. I f p a r t o f w h a t i t is to be a snake is to be a
b l o o d e d a n i m a l whose l e n g t h is o u t o f p r o p o r t i o n w i t h the rest o f
its body, t h e n nature cannot make a snake w i t h a shorter body. F o r
such an a n i m a l w o u l d n o t be a snake b y d e f i n i t i o n . T h e existence24
of c o m p e t i n g f u n c t i o n a l demands is a t h i r d source o f b i o l o g i c a l c o n
straint. F o r example, A r i s t o t l e treats the elephant's t r u n k {PA 2. 16)
a n d the fact t h a t fish are so p r o l i f i c {GA 3. 4, 7 s s i i - i ) as trade-
a b
3 3
Sedley, Creationism, 121—2, acknowledges this example but denies that it has
anything to do w i t h constraints imposed by matter. I do not find his explanation of
this passage convincing.
3 4
See also P A 2. 16, 6 s 9 6 - i 3 , and 4. 13, 6 9 S i 7 - 2 6 .
b b
238 Devin Henry
offs between m u l t i p l e a n d c o n f l i c t i n g functions: i n the case o f the

elephant the functions o f b r e a t h i n g and l o c o m o t i o n , i n the case o f
the fish different functions associated w i t h r e p r o d u c t i o n .
T h e above three cases can be classified as constraints arising f r o m
the f o r m a l a n d final cause. B u t A r i s t o t l e also allows that certain fea
tures o f a t h i n g ' s m a t e r i a l nature can set p r i o r constraints o n w h a t
its f o r m a l nature can do. (These are cases where the m a t t e r is n o t
itself c o n d i t i o n a l l y necessitated b y f o r m . ) T h e r e are at least three
ways that features o f the m a t e r i a l nature can act as a constraint o n
form. 2 5
I n some cases the a m o u n t o f m a t e r i a l available d u r i n g develop

m e n t imposes p r i o r constraints o n w h a t the f o r m a l nature is able to
achieve. H e r e nature is analogous to an engineer whose hands are
t i e d b y the fact that his s u p p l i e r d i d n o t p r o v i d e h i m w i t h e n o u g h
raw materials to do his j o b . F o r example, A r i s t o t l e notes that a l l
h o r n - b e a r i n g animals lack incisors i n b o t h jaws (an e m p i r i c a l o b
servation). T h e cause o f this, he tells us, is the fact that r u m i n a n t s
lack sufficient developmental resources to p r o d u c e both h o r n s and a
complete set o f teeth. T h i s lack o f raw materials thus imposes c o n
straints o n the p r o d u c t i o n o f those parts (PA 3. 2, 6 6 3 2 8 - 6 6 4 2 ) .
b a
I n order to compensate for the decrease i n m a s t i c a t i o n created b y

the absences o f incisors, nature has e q u i p p e d r u m i n a n t s w i t h a
m u l t i p l e - c h a m b e r e d stomach (PA 3. 14). N o t i c e that this is n o t the
result o f a t r a d e - o f f between c o m p e t i n g f u n c t i o n a l demands, since
the functions o f h o r n s a n d teeth do n o t conflict. Instead the lack
of incisors results f r o m the fact that the s u p p l y o f available m a t t e r
d u r i n g d e v e l o p m e n t sets l i m i t s o n w h a t the f o r m a l nature can b u i l d .
I n a d d i t i o n to d e v e l o p m e n t a l constraints, the basic m a t e r i a l c o n
s t i t u t i o n o f an a n i m a l can also prevent nature f r o m a c h i e v i n g per
fection. I n De generatione animalium A r i s t o t l e treats the a b i l i t y to
generate live y o u n g as the m o s t perfect f o r m o f r e p r o d u c t i o n (GA
2. 1, 7 3 2 2 5 - 7 3 3 i 6 ; 2. 4, 7 3 7 i S - 2 7 ) . I n a perfect w o r l d , t h e n , a l l
a b b
animals w o u l d be live-bearers. However, A r i s t o t l e notes that b i r d s

are b y nature c o l d a n d d r y (a p r o p e r t y o f t h e i r m a t e r i a l nature) and
so lack the necessary v i t a l heat to b r i n g t h e i r offspring to c o m p l e t i o n
35
M y account depends on the controversial idea that Aristotle treats certain fea
tures of the material nature as causally basic in the sense of being causes of many
other features of a living thing while nothing 'more fundamental' (ava)dev) is the
cause of them (cf. G A 5. 7, 788^4—16). For a defence of this claim see D. Charles,
A r i s t o t l e on Meaning and Essence (Oxford, 2000), e.g. 334—5; Leunissen, Explanation
and Teleology, e.g. 24—5; and Gotthelf, F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , ch. 8.
internally. A s a consequence o f this b i r d s generate e x t e r n a l l y b y lay

ing eggs. I n order to compensate for the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f the e m b r y o
nature has e n d o w e d b i r d s w i t h the a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e a hard-shelled
egg, w h i c h protects i t as i t develops. I n this w a y l a y i n g hard-shelled
eggs represents the best possible w a y o f r e p r o d u c i n g given the p r i o r
constraints i m p o s e d o n the b i r d ' s design b y its d i s t i n c t i v e m a t e r i a l
nature. T h e r e is no i n d i c a t i o n anywhere i n the text to suggest that
A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s the p a r t i c u l a r b o d i l y c o n s t i t u t i o n o f b i r d s is itself
the result o f some teleological d e m a n d . Instead he treats this fea
t u r e o f its m a t e r i a l nature as causally b a s i c . 26
A t h i r d k i n d o f c o n s t r a i n t associated w i t h a t h i n g ' s m a t e r i a l
nature are w h a t we m i g h t call architectural constraints. H e r e the
21
features o f the animal's basic b o d y p l a n ( i n c l u d i n g its dimensions

a n d the placement o f its organs) make some t r a i t p h y s i c a l l y i m
possible. T h i s is n i c e l y i l l u s t r a t e d b y A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion o f the
oesophagus i n PA 3. 3. I n a l l b l o o d e d animals f u r n i s h e d w i t h lungs
the oesophagus is situated b e h i n d the w i n d p i p e , w h i c h makes the
a n i m a l susceptible to c h o k i n g . A r i s t o t l e does n o t t r y to e x p l a i n this
away b y s h o w i n g h o w c h o k i n g c o n t r i b u t e s to some h i g h e r func
t i o n so that this is, i n fact, the best conceivable design for a l u n g
possessor. H e acknowledges that this is a b a d set-up (phauloteta,
665 8) and that a m u c h better c o n f i g u r a t i o n w o u l d have been to
a
connect the stomach d i r e c t l y to the m o u t h ( w h i c h is exactly h o w

fish are designed, 6 6 4 i 9 - 2 4 ) . T h a t w o u l d remove the need for an
a
oesophagus and thereby eliminate the c h o k i n g p r o b l e m entirely.

B u t A r i s t o t l e argues that this w a y o f c o n f i g u r i n g the b o d y is n o t
possible for a b l o o d e d a n i m a l f u r n i s h e d w i t h lungs. F i r s t o f all, i n
order for the lungs to w o r k efficiently they m u s t be connected to
the m o u t h b y means o f an extended tube; hence the presence o f the
w i n d p i p e . I t follows f r o m this that animals w i t h lungs m u s t also
have an oesophagus c o n n e c t i n g the stomach to the m o u t h ( 6 6 4 2 5 - a
32). Second, a l l b l o o d e d animals m u s t have a heart. T h e placement

of the heart ( w h i c h is o f p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e ) makes i t u n a v o i d
able that the w i n d p i p e w i l l be situated i n f r o n t o f the oesophagus
3 6
The question of how Aristotle thinks we go about determining which features
of a thing are basic and thus do the constraining is beyond the scope of this paper. I t
is bound up w i t h difficult questions about causal priority, essences, and the method
for establishing first principles.
3 7
I borrow this phrase from S. J. G o u l d and R. C. Lewontin, 'The Spandrels
of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Pro
gramme', Proceedings of the Royal S o c i e t y of London, 205 (1979), 581—98.
240 Devin Henry
( 6 6 5 9 - 2 6 ) . I n order to ' r e m e d y the p r o b l e m ' {ten phauloteta . . .

a
iatreuken, 66s 6—8), A r i s t o t l e says, nature has devised a q u i c k fix i n

a
the form o f the e p i g l o t t i s ( i n m a m m a l s ) and a collapsible l a r y n x ( i n

b i r d s and reptiles). H e r e , the a w k w a r d p o s i t i o n o f the oesophagus
b e h i n d the w i n d p i p e is e x p l a i n e d , n o t b y the goal-directed actions
of the f o r m a l nature, b u t b y c e r t a i n a r c h i t e c t u r a l constraints t h a t
are i m p o s e d o n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a l l b l o o d e d animals f u r n i s h e d
w i t h lungs. I n this case the constraints themselves can be i d e n t i f i e d
as the cause o f the design flaw, w h i l e nature's o p t i m i z i n g efforts
are the cause o f its remedy.
A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e w i l l i n c l u d e features o f a t h i n g ' s architecture
i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f its substantial b e i n g (see n . 14), i t is i m p o r t a n t to
d i s t i n g u i s h w h a t I a m c a l l i n g ' a r c h i t e c t u r a l constraints' f r o m those
constraints r o o t e d i n its essence. W e can see this b y c o n t r a s t i n g the
way the l e n g t h o f a snake puts (formal) constraints o n the n u m b e r
of legs i t has w i t h the w a y the physical dimensions o f a fish p u t (ar
chitectural) constraints o n the n u m b e r a n d c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f its fins
{PA 4. 13). F o r example, A r i s t o t l e tells us that the w i d t h and flatness
of a skate p r e v e n t i t f r o m h a v i n g the t y p i c a l f o u r - f i n c o n f i g u r a t i o n
of other b o n y fish ( 6 9 6 2 i - 7 ) . G i v e n this a r c h i t e c t u r a l constraint,
a 2 8
i t is impossible for nature to b u i l d a skate w i t h four evenly placed

fins. Instead, nature has g i v e n i t a single fin s t r e t c h i n g a r o u n d the
outer edge o f its b o d y as its p r i m a r y means o f p r o p u l s i o n . W i t h ar
c h i t e c t u r a l constraints, t h e n , certain features o f the animal's basic
b o d y p l a n make other traits physically impossible. I n cases where
the constraint emerges f r o m the v e r y d e f i n i t i o n o f a t h i n g ' s sub
stantial b e i n g , certain designs become analytically impossible. O b
v i o u s l y nature c o u l d design a reptile t h a t h a d a m o r e p r o p o r t i o n a t e
b o d y i n order to accommodate f o u r legs. B u t such a creature w o u l d
not be a snake b y d e f i n i t i o n . 29
3 8
As mentioned, there is a question here about the method by which Aristotle
goes about determining the causal priority among features, i n this case why he treats
the physical dimensions of the skate as the basic feature of its architecture that does
the constraining. I shall leave that question to one side.
3 9
The contrast can be made even more explicit by considering P A 4. 9, 685 i3— b
17. There Aristotle notes that, while most octopuses have two rows of suckers, the
kind called eXeSwvr/ has only a single row: ' T h i s is because of the length and thinness
of its (material) nature; for it is necessary [sc. given its physical dimensions] that the
narrow tentacle have a single row of suckers. I t is not, then, because it is best that
it has this feature, but because it is necessary owing to the distinctive account of its
being [ S i a TOV "biov Xoyov TTJS ouat'a?].' The constraining feature here is the narrow
ness of the arm. Although this feature happens to be in 'the distinctive account of its
W h a t the discussion o f b i o l o g i c a l constraints makes clear is that

A r i s t o t l e does n o t t h i n k o f teleological causation i n terms o f extreme
perfection (at least n o t i n the s u b l u n a r y w o r l d o f m a t e r i a l c o m p o
sites). I n a perfect w o r l d snakes w o u l d be e q u i p p e d w i t h enough
legs to allow t h e m to move f r o m place to place w i t h ease, all m a m
mals w o u l d be constructed w i t h o u t the need for an epiglottis, a n d
r u m i n a n t s w o u l d have h o r n s as w e l l as a f u l l c o m p l e m e n t o f teeth.
B u t A r i s t o t e l i a n natures operate i n a w o r l d that is replete w i t h c o n
straints. A s a result o f these constraints, the best possible forms
often t u r n o u t to be worse t h a n the best conceivable ones. I n m a n y
cases various constraints conspire to make i t v i r t u a l l y impossible to
achieve absolute p e r f e c t i o n . F o r example, A r i s t o t l e argues that all
30
b l o o d e d animals require some sort o f i n t e r n a l skeleton as a s u p p o r t

system. I n designing sharks and rays, however, three constraints
arise that impose l i m i t s o n h o w nature can achieve that goal ( w i t h
the f o l l o w i n g see PA 2. 9, 655 23-8). O n the one h a n d , the ' m o r e
a
f l u i d ' (hugroteran) m o v e m e n t o f sharks a n d rays requires a skeletal

structure that is q u i t e flexible (a f u n c t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t ) . O n the other
h a n d , the animal's f o r m a l nature 'cannot d i s t r i b u t e the same excess
materials to m a n y different locations at once' (a developmental c o n
straint), a n d i t m u s t use u p all the earthy m a t e r i a l o n the f o r m a t i o n
o f its s k i n (a c o m p e t i n g f u n c t i o n a l demand). So w h i l e s o l i d bone
m i g h t make for a better skeleton i n the abstract, g i v e n these various
constraints cartilage t u r n s o u t to be the best possible m a t e r i a l for the
skeletons o f sharks and rays.
A s we have seen, A r i s t o t l e ' s o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e states that the
natures o f l i v i n g things never do a n y t h i n g i n v a i n (outhen poiei
maten) b u t always (aei) select w h a t is best for the substance f r o m
a m o n g the range o f possibilities. T h i s gives the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e
the character o f a u n i v e r s a l 'law' that governs all the actions o f the
f o r m a l nature. I t follows that, i f the development o f some feature X
being', it is operating as an architectural (rather than purely formal) constraint: hav

ing narrow arms makes more than one row of suckers physically impossible. I n this
case the constraint itself (rather than the optimizing actions of the formal nature) ex
plains the trait i n question. This contrasts w i t h the discussion of the oesophagus i n
PA 3 . 3 . There the architectural constraint explained the existence of the design flaw
(the awkward position of the oesophagus behind the windpipe), while the optimizing
actions of the formal nature explained its remedy (the epiglottis/collapsible larynx).
For a discussion of the octopus example see J. G. Lennox (trans, and comm.), Aris
totle: O n the Parts of Animals I—IV [Parts of Animals] (Oxford, 2001), 314.
3 0
Gotthelf, First Principles, ch. 8, provides a complex illustration of this point.
242 Devin Henry
is an i n t r i n s i c p r o d u c t o f the f o r m a l nature, t h e n X m u s t be the best

way of realizing t h a t feature f r o m a m o n g the p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 31
But
this w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e appears to con
flict w i t h another teleological p r i n c i p l e according to w h i c h nature
does e v e r y t h i n g either because i t is ( c o n d i t i o n a l l y ) necessary or o n
account of the better (GA i . 4, 7 i 7 i 5 - i 6 ) . A r i s t o t l e takes these
a 3 2
t w o alternatives to be m u t u a l l y exclusive. For any feature X, i f X

is a p r o d u c t of the f o r m a l nature, t h e n i t is present either because i t
is necessary for p e r f o r m i n g some f u n c t i o n <f> or because i t is better.
By 'better' he means t h a t X i m p r o v e s the execution o f <f> t h o u g h i t
is not, s t r i c t l y speaking, necessary for </>-ing. F o r example, the liver
is necessary for all b l o o d e d animals because of the essential role i t
plays i n processing n u t r i m e n t (PA 3. 7, 6 7 o 2 2 - 9 ; 4. 2, 6 7 7 3 6 - 5 ) .
a a b
T h e kidneys, o n the other h a n d , are n o t necessary for processing

n u t r i m e n t (you c o u l d b u i l d an a n i m a l w i t h o u t t h e m ) , b u t h a v i n g
kidneys i m p r o v e s t h a t f u n c t i o n (PA 3. 7, 6 7 o 2 3 - 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g
b
to this p r i n c i p l e , explanations i n terms o f 'the better' are to be

contrasted with explanations t h a t appeal to c o n d i t i o n a l necessity.
B u t this does n o t actually conflict w i t h m y r e a d i n g of the o p t i m a l
i t y p r i n c i p l e as a universal law o f b i o l o g i c a l f o r m , since the GA 1. 4
p r i n c i p l e ( I shall argue) is n o t contrasting c o n d i t i o n a l necessity, o n
the one h a n d , w i t h o p t i m i z a t i o n , o n the other. For 'the better' i n
the GA 1. 4 p r i n c i p l e does n o t capture the same idea as 'the best' i n
the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e . T h i s is clear f r o m the fact that o p t i m a l
33
i t y reasoning cuts r i g h t across the GA 1. 4 d i s t i n c t i o n .

31
Note that this does not mean that Aristotle thinks every feature of the organic
body has been optimized for the performance of some function; Aristotle is no Pan-
glossian. For the formal nature is not theper se cause of every feature in a living thing.
Some features are incidental by-products of the actions of formal natures (e.g. bile:
PA 4. 2, 677*12—18), others the result of necessary changes rooted in the material
nature (e.g. GA 5. 1—7; see M . Leunissen and A . Gotthelf, 'What's Teleology Got
to Do with It? A Reinterpretation of Generation of Animals V ['GA V ] , Pkronesis,
55 (2010), 325—56; repr. in Gotthelf, First Principles, ch. 5), while others may be the
direct result of biological constraints (e.g. the suckers on the eXeSoJvrj). Since none of
these features is the per se result of the goal-directed activities of the formal nature,
they fall outside the scope of Aristotle's optimality principle.
3 3
et orj rrdv rj <j>vois rj Sta TO dvo.yKO.iOV 7rotet rj Sta TO fieXnov, Kav rovro TO [lopiov etrj
Sid rovrajv Bdrepov. I take r/ (j>vois here to refer to the formal nature of the animal in
question.
33
Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 221 n. 6, raises the issue but does not address
it. Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 133, recognizes that 'the better' and 'the
best' are not equivalent notions. Nevertheless, she contrasts appeals to optimization
with appeals to conditional necessity (119). Compare Gotthelf, First Principles, 12
n. 18, 174 n. 56, 235-6.
F i r s t take c o n d i t i o n a l necessity. I n order to execute the f u n c t i o n

o f c h o p p i n g , an axe m u s t be made o f some h a r d m a t e r i a l ; that type
o f m a t e r i a l is c o n d i t i o n a l l y necessary for b e i n g an axe. B u t this ge
n e r a l r e q u i r e m e n t is satisfied, albeit to different degrees, b y a w h o l e
range o f materials such as i r o n , bronze, or d i a m o n d . S u p p o s i n g the
art o f the b l a c k s m i t h is also governed b y an o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e ,
we s h o u l d expect the expert b l a c k s m i t h to select the best m a t e r i
als for c h o p p i n g f r o m a m o n g that range o f possibilities. I n this w a y
explanations i n terms o f c o n d i t i o n a l necessity are f u l l y c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h , rather t h a n opposed to, explanations that e m p l o y o p t i m a l i t y
reasoning. S o m e t h i n g can both be necessary for d o i n g <f> and be (or
n o t be) the o p t i m a l w a y o f executing </>. N o w take the other side
34
o f the contrast. T o say that some p a r t is present ' o n account o f the

better' means that i t is n o t necessary for d o i n g <f> b u t i t i m p r o v e s
the animal's a b i l i t y to do </>. F o r example, w h i l e animals can sur
vive w i t h o u t kidneys, h a v i n g t h e m i m p r o v e s liver f u n c t i o n b y faci
l i t a t i n g its a b i l i t y to concoct the b l o o d . I n this w a y n u t r i t i o n w o r k s
better w i t h kidneys. B u t notice that there m a y be a range o f better
a n d worse ways o f i m p r o v i n g liver f u n c t i o n . Since nature always
does w h a t is best for each substance f r o m a m o n g the range o f alter
natives, t h e n we can e x p l a i n w h y animals have k i d n e y s b y s h o w i n g
that a m e c h a n i s m for f i l t e r i n g the b l o o d is i n fact the best way o f i m
p r o v i n g liver f u n c t i o n .
I f this is r i g h t , t h e n the p r i n c i p l e that nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n
b u t always w h a t is best ( o p t i m a l ) for the o r g a n i s m g i v e n the range o f
possibilities is d i s t i n c t f r o m , a n d even c o m p l e m e n t a r y to, the p r i n
ciple that nature always does s o m e t h i n g either because i t is neces
sary or because i t is better. A n d i f i t is true that nature does nothing
i n v a i n b u t always w h a t is best for the o r g a n i s m , t h e n the design
o f b o t h its necessary parts (e.g. the l i v e r ) and w h a t L e u n i s s e n calls
its ' s u b s i d i a r y ' (e.g. k i d n e y s ) and ' l u x u r y ' parts (e.g. horns)—those
that are present o n account o f the b e t t e r — w i l l equally be subject to
principles of optimization.
3 4
The existence of females is an example of something that is both conditionally
necessary for reproduction and the best way of ensuring the persistence of species
from among the available alternatives. See C. W i t t , 'Aristotle on Deformed K i n d s ' ,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 43 (2012), 83—106.
244 Devin Henry
4. N a t u r e ' s design space
A s we have seen, o p t i m a l i t y reasoning requires d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t

is best ' f r o m a m o n g the possibilities c o n c e r n i n g each k i n d o f a n i
m a l ' . B u t h o w does A r i s t o t l e t h i n k the student o f nature goes about
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t range? H o w do we come to k n o w w h i c h m o d i f i c a
tions are i n fact possible for a g i v e n trait? A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e is n o t
e x p l i c i t about this, I t h i n k t h a t there is e n o u g h evidence to a l l o w us
to make some reasonable conjectures.
A c c o r d i n g to one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , call i t the i n d u c t i v e reading, the
range o f w h a t is possible for a given t r a i t is d e t e r m i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y
b y o b s e r v i n g the range o f actual v a r i a t i o n e x h i b i t e d b y the w i d e r
k i n d . F o r example, the range o f possible dental arrangements for
3 5
a b l o o d e d a n i m a l corresponds to the various ways t h a t teeth are ac

t u a l l y arranged i n a l l the b l o o d e d animals taken collectively. Since
no b l o o d e d a n i m a l has b o t h serrated teeth a n d tusks, i t follows (ac
c o r d i n g to this reading) t h a t this c o m b i n a t i o n is n o t a m o n g the
range o f possibilities. O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n A r i s t o t l e conceives o f
the range o f possibilities i n p u r e l y e m p i r i c a l terms: ' T h u s w h a t is
possible w i t h i n a k i n d is established inductively, t h r o u g h a s t u d y
of the ways, to use o u r example, teeth are arranged i n the various
kinds of toothed animals.' 36
T h e r e is at least one example i n the corpus t h a t p o i n t s towards the

i n d u c t i v e reading. I n PA 4. 5 A r i s t o t l e considers w h y sea u r c h i n s
have five eggs s y m m e t r i c a l l y placed a r o u n d t h e i r bodies t h a t line
u p w i t h each o f t h e i r five teeth and stomachs. H e first w o r k s o u t
that sea u r c h i n s m u s t have an o d d n u m b e r o f eggs. A s the i n d u c t i v e
reading predicts, he t h e n rules o u t any o d d n u m b e r greater t h a n five
o n the g r o u n d s t h a t n o other m e m b e r o f the w i d e r k i n d has t h e m
arranged i n t h a t way:
The egg cannot be continuous, since i t does not occur i n that way i n any
of the other hard-shelled animals; i t is always on one side of the disk only.
3 5
This reading is defended by Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, e.g. 207, 214, and
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, e.g. 132—3. Although Leunissen explicitly en
dorses Lennox's reading, her interpretation turns out to be much less restrictive. For
she allows for a notion of 'design space' (61) that includes more than what is actually
realized in the world. O n her reading, the range of possibilities also includes 'hypo
thetical' designs (126) that are known by means of 'thought experiments' (62). T h i s
is compatible w i t h the interpretation I defend below.
3 6
Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 214.
Accordingly, since this part is common to all of them while the spherical
body is peculiar to the sea urchin, i t is not possible for the eggs to be even
in number. I f they were, they would have to be arranged i n opposition be
cause both sides would have to be symmetrical, and then there would be
eggs on both sides of the circumference. But this arrangement is not found
in any other hard-shelled animal. (68o i4-2i) b
A r i s t o t l e concludes that sea u r c h i n s m u s t have exactly five eggs

because that is the best arrangement f r o m a m o n g the r e m a i n i n g
possibilities. A s this passage makes clear, those possibilities are es
tablished (at least i n p a r t ) b y appealing to the observable range o f
variations a m o n g the m e m b e r s o f the w i d e r k i n d .
However, there are at least t w o other passages that suggest A r i s
totle is n o t t h i n k i n g o f the range o f possibilities p u r e l y i n t e r m s
o f ' e m p i r i c a l possibilities' as characterized b y the i n d u c t i v e read
i n g . T h e first comes i n PA 3. 2, where A r i s t o t l e takes u p M o m u s '
c r i t i c i s m s i n one o f Aesop's fables. A c c o r d i n g to the v e r s i o n o f
37
the story that A r i s t o t l e appears to know, Zeus fashioned a b u l l a n d

asked M o m u s to j u d g e his h a n d i w o r k . M o m u s was so c o n s u m e d
w i t h jealousy that he blasted Zeus for f a i l i n g to p u t h o r n s o n the
b u l l ' s shoulders, whence i t c o u l d deliver the strongest blows. I n
defence o f the b u l l ' s design, A r i s t o t l e launches i n t o the f o l l o w i n g
counter-attack:
Nature also acted correctly i n making the structure of the horns on the
head, rather than acting like Aesop's Momus, who blames the bull because
it does not have its horns on its shoulders, from where i t could produce
the strongest blows, but on the weakest part, its head. Momus made these
accusations through a lack of sharp insight. For just as horns, i f they had
been placed anywhere else on the body, would provide weight while not
being useful and even be a hindrance to many of its functions, so too would
they be useless i f placed on the shoulders. Indeed, one should target not
3 7
Lennox dismisses this counter-example on the grounds that it is a criticism of
a fable writer, not a natural philosopher, and so cannot be taken seriously (J. G.
Lennox, 'Teleology in Scientific Explanation: Commentary on Henry and M c -
Donough', presented at the annual meeting for the American Philosophical Asso
ciation (Boston, 2010)). However, at Phys. 2. 2, I94 3i—4, Aristotle likewise refers
a
to the views of a poet as a way to make a serious philosophical point (see also Phys.
2. 8, I 9 8 i 8 ) . Moreover, Phil Horky suggests that it would not have been unusual
b
for Aristotle to have taken Aesop's views seriously (personal communication). They
would certainly have been considered a legitimate source of reputable opinions—
that is, as part of the endoxa. Whether or not Aristotle takes Aesop's view as a serious
challenge here, it is clear that his explanation for why bulls have horns on their heads
is meant to be taken seriously. A n d that is sufficient for my point.
246 Devin Henry
only from where the strongest blows would come but also from where they
would be further forward. So, since bulls do not have hands and it is i m
possible for horns to be on the feet, and further i f they were on the knees
they would prevent them from bending, they must have horns just as they
in fact do—on the head. A n d at the same time, the body's other movements
are also naturally most unimpeded. (PA 3. 2 , 6 6 3 3 4 - i 2 ) a b
A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e does n o t invoke the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e here,

this passage is a nice example o f the use o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning. I t
is one o f the few places where A r i s t o t l e e x p l i c i t l y considers a range
of options, rules some o u t as n o t b e i n g possible, and t h e n shows
h o w a m o n g the r e m a i n i n g possibilities the one selected is clearly
the best.
T h e passage considers several different locations for p l a c i n g
h o r n s o n a b u l l : head, shoulders, knees, feet, a n d hands. T h e last
t w o options are b o t h excluded f r o m the range o f w h a t is possible
for a b u l l (for reasons that need n o t concern us here). B u t shoulders
and knees are clearly treated as b e i n g a m o n g the possibilities.
A r i s t o t l e rules these options o u t , n o t because they are impossible,
b u t because they are s u b o p t i m a l . T h i s is clearly a p r o b l e m for the
i n d u c t i v e reading. Since there are n o h o r n e d animals that actually
have h o r n s o n t h e i r shoulders or o n t h e i r knees, the i n d u c t i v e
m e t h o d w o u l d have l e d A r i s t o t l e to conclude that these locations
are n o t w i t h i n the range o f w h a t is possible for a b u l l . F o r i n d u c t i o n
tells us that h o r n s are never located i n those spots. B u t that is n o t
38
w h a t A r i s t o t l e does here. I n this example w h a t is possible for a b u l l

is n o t established i n d u c t i v e l y t h r o u g h a careful s t u d y o f the ways
that h o r n s are actually arranged i n the various k i n d s o f h o r n e d
animals. Instead, A r i s t o t l e speculates about a set o f hypothetical
designs a n d t h e n offers reasons for w h y nature d i d n o t select those
alternatives.
T h e snake example offers f u r t h e r evidence that A r i s t o t l e ' s
m e t h o d o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t is possible for a g i v e n t r a i t is n o t
entirely an e m p i r i c a l m a t t e r b u t makes use o f reasoning that is,
i n some sense, i n d e p e n d e n t o f experience. A r i s t o t l e tells us that
h a v i n g m o r e t h a n four l i m b s is n o t a m o n g the range o f possibilities
for a snake because n o b l o o d e d a n i m a l can m o v e at m o r e t h a n four
p o i n t s o f m o t i o n (IA 8, 7 o 8 i 2 - i 4 ) . W h e n we t u r n to I A 6 we dis
a
cover that this c l a i m is itself d e r i v e d f r o m u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e s that
Compare Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 214.

a p p l y to all things that move f r o m place to place b y means o f l i m b s

{IA 6, 7 0 7 6 - i 6 ) . T h e relevant a r g u m e n t i n I A 6 is c o m p l i c a t e d ,
a
b u t i t appears to have the f o l l o w i n g structure:
( P i ) T W O o f the p r i m a r y dimensions o f a m o v i n g body, the su

p e r i o r / i n f e r i o r and the r i g h t / l e f t , are connected to one an
other t h r o u g h a c o m m o n o r i g i n i n the centre o f the body,
w h i c h is the source o f t h e i r m o v e m e n t (this c o m m o n o r i g i n
is the heart i n b l o o d e d animals).
(P2) T h i s p r i m a r y o r i g i n o f m o t i o n m u s t be located at some fixed
distance f r o m the p r o x i m a t e sources o f m o t i o n i n the l i m b s
( w h i c h i n animals are the j o i n t s : see De motu 1).
(P3) T h e p r i m a r y o r i g i n o f m o t i o n m u s t be m o r e or less the same
distance f r o m each o f those p r o x i m a t e sources o f m o t i o n .
F r o m these three p r i n c i p l e s A r i s t o t l e derives the conclusion:
Since these conditions apply exclusively or most of all to blooded animals,

it is clear that i t is not possible for any blooded animal to move by more
than four points of motion and that if some animal naturally moves by only
four points, i t must of necessity be blooded, (yoyîg-z/^)
A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e goes o n to say that this conclusion is c o n f i r m e d

b y w h a t we observe a m o n g b l o o d e d animals ( 7 0 7 2 3 - 7 o 8 7 ) , the
a a
c o n c l u s i o n itself is n o t s o m e t h i n g that is k n o w n b y experience.

W h a t is possible for a snake is established, n o t s t r i c t l y b y appealing
to observations o f the w i d e r k i n d , b u t b y s h o w i n g h o w i t follows
f r o m general p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g the physical dimensions o f the
animal's b o d y . 39
T h e lesson I w i s h to d r a w f r o m these t w o examples is the f o l

l o w i n g . W h i l e A r i s t o t l e is n o t e x p l i c i t about h o w he t h i n k s the s t u
dent o f nature goes about d e t e r m i n i n g the range o f possibilities for
a g i v e n t r a i t , i t is clearly n o t s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f reading off that
3 9
I t is true that Aristotle establishes the fact that no blooded animal moves at more
than four points (the ore) inductively by surveying various animal kinds (cf. IA i ) ,
but the reason why it is not possible (the Store) is grasped by means of this rational ar
gument. Note that, while the universal principles that figure i n such arguments may
themselves be established inductively (see De iuv. 4 6 9 * 2 2 — i , translated below), that
b
is not the issue here. What is at issue is the nature of our grasp on the conclusion
of the argument, which concerns the range of what is possible. Frede characterizes
what is known by deduction from first principles as 'apriori' knowledge ( M . Frede,
Aristotle's Rationalism', i n M . Frede and G. Striker (eds.), Rationality in Greek
Thought (Oxford, 1996), 157—74 5&)- While I agree w i t h this characterization, I
a t I
refrain from using that language here.

248 Devin Henry
range d i r e c t l y f r o m the observed variations e x h i b i t e d b y some w i d e r

k i n d . Instead, d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t is possible requires a m i x t u r e o f
e m p i r i c a l a n d r a t i o n a l i s t considerations. I n some cases the n a t u r a l
scientist m i g h t need to e x t e n d b e y o n d w h a t is observable a n d use
her i m a g i n a t i o n to consider h y p o t h e t i c a l designs that are n o t real
ized b y any actual species (as i n the h o r n s case). I n others she m a y
need to rely o n arguments where w h a t is a n d is n o t possible is es
tablished t h r o u g h reasoning that proceeds, i n some sense, i n d e p e n
d e n t l y o f experience (as i n the snake example). O f course A r i s t o t l e
does n o t go as far as Plato i n t r e a t i n g o p t i m a l i t y reasoning as an ex
ercise o f p u r e t h o u g h t where one s i m p l y attempts to reconstruct,
entirely i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f experience, the p a t t e r n o f reasoning t h a t
w o u l d have gone i n t o something's o p t i m a l design. One o f the m a i n
reasons, we have seen, is t h a t A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s nature's a b i l i t y to o p
t i m i z e traits is largely restricted b y the existence o f various b i o l o
gical constraints. A n d k n o w i n g w h i c h constraints are operative o n
a given o r g a n i s m is n o t s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be w o r k e d o u t f r o m the
armchair. These are facts t h a t depend o n k n o w l e d g e t h a t can be
a c q u i r e d o n l y b y carefully s t u d y i n g l i v i n g t h i n g s i n t h e i r n a t u r a l
environments.
One m i g h t object t h a t the contrast w i t h Plato here is u n f a i r given
the earlier discussion about constraints i n the Timaeus. T h e idea
that Plato treats o p t i m a l i t y reasoning as an exercise o f p u r e t h o u g h t
was p a r t o f Sedley's c l a i m t h a t the Timaeus represents Plato's o n
g o i n g a t t e m p t to ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e ' n a t u r a l science. H o w e v e r , i f Jo-
hansen is r i g h t about the existence o f m a t e r i a l constraints, t h e n
surely Plato w o u l d agree w i t h A r i s t o t l e t h a t k n o w i n g w h i c h c o n
straints are operative o n a given o r g a n i s m cannot be w o r k e d o u t
entirely f r o m the armchair. F o r facts about the necessary p r o p e r
ties o f m a t t e r w i l l depend o n k n o w l e d g e t h a t can be a c q u i r e d o n l y
t h r o u g h an e m p i r i c a l study o f the w o r l d . H o w e v e r , I do n o t t h i n k
this o b j e c t i o n is decisive. F o r Sedley c o u l d accept t h a t the necessary
properties o f m a t t e r set p r i o r constraints o n Nous's design space and
s i m p l y argue t h a t Plato t h o u g h t we c o u l d deduce those properties
f r o m a priori k n o w l e d g e o f the g e o m e t r i c a l figures t h a t constitute
the simple bodies (cf. Tim. 53 B 7-69 A 5 ) . 4 0
4 0
Even i f Plato did think that our knowledge of material constraints depended
in some sense on experience, we could still agree w i t h Sedley that i n the Timaeus
optimality reasoning is seen as an attempt to reconstruct the pattern of reasoning
that went into the world's design by the creative Nous. I t is just not a purely a priori
5. T h e role o f o p t i m i z a t i o n i n n a t u r a l science
I n o w w a n t to t u r n to m y final q u e s t i o n about the role o f the

o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i n A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l science. T h e r e are t w o
m a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s canvassed i n the l i t e r a t u r e . I n I A 2, 7 0 4 i 2 -
b
18, A r i s t o t l e tells us t h a t the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e is a m o n g those

t h i n g s t h a t m u s t be l a i d d o w n as suppositions (hupothemenois) o f
n a t u r a l e n q u i r y . L e n n o x argues t h a t ' s u p p o s i t i o n ' here s h o u l d be
taken i n the technical sense o f Post. An. 1. 2 . T h e r e we are t o l d
41
t h a t suppositions are a k i n d o f postulate (thesis) w h i c h , along w i t h

definitions, are i n c l u d e d a m o n g the first p r i n c i p l e s o f a d e m o n
strative science. A n d such p r i n c i p l e s , we are t o l d , are ' a m o n g the
premisses' o f a d e m o n s t r a t i o n (Post. An. 1. 10, 76 35~9; 7 7 i o - i 2 ) .
b a
I f the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e is a s u p p o s i t i o n i n this technical sense,

L e n n o x argues, t h e n we s h o u l d expect i t to f u n c t i o n as a premiss
in demonstrations. 42
I n contrast to this, L e u n i s s e n argues that
teleological p r i n c i p l e s , such as 'nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n ' , do
n o t figure i n scientific explanations p r o p e r l y speaking. Instead,
t h e i r f u n c t i o n is p u r e l y h e u r i s t i c i n the sense t h a t they point us
towards those causally relevant features t h a t are cited i n p r o p e r
e x p l a n a t i o n s . L i k e a l l heuristic devices, L e u n i s s e n argues that
43
such teleological p r i n c i p l e s can be k i c k e d aside once those causal

features have been f o u n d so t h a t the u l t i m a t e e x p l a n a t i o n can be
f o r m u l a t e d ' w i t h o u t the teleological p r i n c i p l e f i g u r i n g as one o f
its p r e m i s s e s ' . 44
O n the account I shall defend, the o p t i m a l i t y
exercise that proceeds entirely independently of experience. While this would force
us to give up the idea that the Timaeus is an attempt at 'intellectualizing' physics (as
Sedley claims), this does not affect my overall thesis about Aristotle's central revi
sions to the Platonic conception of optimality (see below, sect. 6).
4 1
Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 211—15.
4 3
For problems w i t h the use of 'premiss' here see Leunissen, Explanation and
Teleology, 122 n. 25. Although I am sympathetic to Leunissen's claim that the opti
mality principle does not have the right structure to function as a genuine premiss
in an Aristotelian syllogism, the reading I defend below does not turn on whether or
not explanations that feature the optimality principle meet the formal requirements
for proper demonstrations. I return to this question below.
4 3
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 125—7, discusses the teleological p r i n
ciple i n GA 1. 4 as a paradigm example.
4 4
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 121; see also § 4.2, esp. 129—35. By call
ing teleological principles 'heuristic' devices Leunissen is not reviving the so-called
Kantian reading of Aristotle's teleology (e.g. W. Wieland, ' T h e Problem of Teleo
logy', i n J. Barnes, M . Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, i . Sci-
2SO Devin Henry
p r i n c i p l e actually plays b o t h o f these roles i n A r i s t o t l e ' s n a t u r a l

science. A c c o r d i n g to this p l u r a l i s t reading, w h i l e A r i s t o t l e does
use o p t i m a l i t y reasoning as a heuristic device for i d e n t i f y i n g the
causally relevant features o f n a t u r a l phenomena, there are clear
examples where the fact that nature does w h a t is best for the sub
stance is treated as one o f those causally relevant features. I n those
cases the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e m u s t be c i t e d i n a causal e x p l a n a t i o n
for the p h e n o m e n o n i n question.
T h e r e is at least one example i n the b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s where the
o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e is clearly used as a heuristic device. I n GA
2. 5 A r i s t o t l e raises the puzzle about w h y males exist i n a d d i t i o n
to females ( 7 4 i 4 - 5 ) . H e invokes the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e to help
b
resolve this puzzle: i f females c o u l d generate o n t h e i r o w n , t h e n

males w o u l d exist i n vain; nature does n o t h i n g i n vain; therefore,
males m u s t make some c o n t r i b u t i o n to generation. B u t notice that
this does n o t e x p l a i n w h y males exist. K n o w i n g that nature does
n o t h i n g i n v a i n allows us to infer that males make some neces
sary c o n t r i b u t i o n to generation. B u t this is o n l y a p r e l i m i n a r y step
towards the u l t i m a t e e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e u l t i m a t e e x p l a n a t i o n m u s t
i d e n t i f y the cause for the sake o f w h i c h males exist, w h i c h picks o u t
t h e i r necessary f u n c t i o n (they p r o v i d e sensory soul: 7 4 i 6 ) . A l l the
b
o p t i m i z a t i o n p r i n c i p l e does here is help us to see that males m u s t

make some c o n t r i b u t i o n to generation; i t does n o t tell us w h a t that
c o n t r i b u t i o n is. I n this example, t h e n , o p t i m a l i t y reasoning clearly
forms p a r t o f a chain o f inferences leading to the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the
p r i m a r y cause o f the e x p l a n a n d u m . B u t since the p r i n c i p l e does n o t
state that cause, i t w i l l n o t be p a r t o f the actual explanation.
T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g i m p o r t a n t to be gleaned f r o m Leunissen's i n
sights about the heuristic role o f teleological p r i n c i p l e s i n A r i s t o t l e ' s
ence (London, 1975), 141—60). On that reading, Aristotle thinks it is useful to look at
nature 'as i f it was governed by final causes, since adopting the teleological perspec
tive helps to identify the real (i.e. material-efficient) causes of things. Since Aristotle
thinks final causes have no ontological significance (on the Kantian reading), na
tural science can dispense w i t h the crutch of teleology once those true causes have
been found. Leunissen denies that this is Aristotle's view (e.g. 112). On her reading,
Aristotle sees natural science as a search for the ultimate causes of natural pheno
mena, which include final causes. Those final causes have real ontological force and
constitute an ineliminable feature of Aristotle's world. L i v i n g things really are teleo-
logically organized systems whose development and functioning are controlled by
the goal-directed actions of their formal natures. I t is only the teleological principles,
such as 'nature does nothing i n vain', that Leunissen thinks play a heuristic role i n
Aristotle's natural science. For a thorough critique of the Kantian reading of A r i s
totle see Johnson, Teleology, 182—7.
n a t u r a l science, especially w h e n c o m p a r e d w i t h Plato. F o r Plato the

universe really is designed b y a D i v i n e C r a f t s m a n w h o deliberated
about w h a t was best for each t h i n g a n d t h e n , w i t h the help o f the
lesser gods, p u t those plans i n t o action. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k o p
t i m a l i t y reasoning is a l i t e r a l a t t e m p t to reconstruct the chain o f i n
ferences t h a t the D e m i u r g e f o l l o w e d i n w o r k i n g o u t those designs.
W h i l e A r i s t o t l e agrees w i t h Plato t h a t o p t i m a l i t y reasoning is a use
f u l strategy for d i s c o v e r i n g causes, such reasoning does n o t repre
sent any actual d e l i b e r a t i o n process o n the p a r t o f nature. F o r the
natures o f l i v i n g t h i n g s do n o t deliberate {Phys. 2. 8, i 9 9 2 6 - 3 o ) . A t
b
the same t i m e i t w o u l d be a mistake to suppose t h a t A r i s t o t l e v i e w e d

o p t i m a l i t y reasoning as p u r e l y heuristic. A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s t h a t the
i n n e r sources o f change that regulate the g r o w t h and development
o f l i v i n g t h i n g s really do operate a c c o r d i n g to p r i n c i p l e s o f o p t i m i
z a t i o n , a fact t h a t makes a real difference to h o w the w o r l d t u r n s
out. W h i l e A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f design language m a y be c o m p l e t e l y
m e t a p h o r i c a l , his c l a i m t h a t the natures o f l i v i n g t h i n g s never do
a n y t h i n g i n v a i n b u t always w h a t is best for the substance m o s t cer
t a i n l y is n o t .
4 5
T h e p r o b l e m w i t h Leunissen's r e a d i n g is that there are several

examples i n A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s where the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n
ciple clearly plays an e x p l a n a t o r y role. I n those cases the o p t i m a l i t y
p r i n c i p l e is n o t s i m p l y a heuristic device t h a t can be k i c k e d aside
once the causally relevant features have been identified. T h e fact
t h a t natures are o p t i m i z i n g agents is one o f those causally relevant
features a n d so cannot be e l i m i n a t e d f r o m the e x p l a n a t i o n w i t h o u t
loss o f crucial e x p l a n a t o r y content. T h i s seems to c o n f o r m better
to L e n n o x ' s reading. L e t m e offer t w o examples. " 4 6
F o r the first example we can r e t u r n once again to A r i s t o t l e ' s ex

p l a n a t i o n for w h y snakes have n o l e g s . A s we have seen, A r i s t o t l e
47
e x p l i c i t l y identifies the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e as a causal factor {aitia)

i n the e x p l a n a t i o n for the absence o f legs i n snakes. I n d e e d , i t is d i f -
4 5
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 119, agrees with this much: ' I take it that
the different kinds of actions ascribed to these formal natures reflect the operations
of different kinds of causality that typically obtain in the production of animals and
their parts. Teleological principles are thus no mere metaphors; they all carry onto-
logical force.'
4 6
Of these two examples, Leunissen discusses only the first (Explanation and Te
leology, 131—2). See also GA 2. 6, 744^4— i, and the examples discussed in Lennox,
b
Philosophy of Biology, 211—15.

4 7
Cf. Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 218.
252 Devin Henry
ficult to see h o w the e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d s t i l l be e x p l a n a t o r y i f i t d i d

not i n c l u d e reference to that p r i n c i p l e as a cause. L e u n i s s e n cor
rectly identifies the fact that snakes have elongated bodies a n d the
fact that h a v i n g four legs w o u l d be pointless as b e i n g relevant to the
explanation. B u t these facts alone are n o t sufficient to e x p l a i n w h y
snakes do n o t have any legs (they m i g h t s t i l l have h a d t w o or f o u r ) .
We also need to k n o w that the f o r m a l natures o f snakes do n o t h i n g
i n v a i n b u t always w h a t is best for the a n i m a l and that h a v i n g no
legs is the best design for a snake g i v e n the possibilities.
T h e other example comes f r o m De iuventute. I n De iuv. 2 A r i s
totle claims that the arche o f the soul is located i n the m i d - s e c t i o n o f
the o r g a n i s m between its u p p e r a n d l o w e r parts. T h i s , he says, can
be established b o t h t h r o u g h p e r c e p t i o n (kata ten aisthesin) a n d ac
c o r d i n g to reason (kata ton logon) ( 4 6 8 2 0 - 3 ) . W i t h arguments that
a
proceed kata ten aisthesin the c o n c l u s i o n is established i n d u c t i v e l y

by appealing to w h a t is observable. B y contrast, w i t h arguments
that proceed kata ton logon the c o n c l u s i o n is established b y show
ing h o w i t follows o f necessity f r o m certain u n i v e r s a l principles. " 4 8
De iuv. 2-3 attempts to establish the p r o p o s i t i o n about the arche o f

the soul b y d r a w i n g o n observable data gathered f r o m the e m p i r
ical s t u d y o f animals and plants, w h i l e De iuv. 4 provides a d d i t i o n a l
s u p p o r t b y appealing to different r a t i o n a l arguments. T h e first o f
these r a t i o n a l arguments e x p l i c i t l y invokes the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e
as one o f its premisses:
Thus i t is clear from what has been said, i n accordance w i t h the observed
facts, that both the origin of the sensory part of the soul and those con
nected w i t h growth and nutrition are located i n this and in the middle of
the three parts of the body. T h i s is also i n accordance w i t h reason because
we see that i n every case nature does that which is best [TO KO.\\IOTOV] from
among the possibilities: the two parts of the body (that which prepares the
ultimate nutriment and that which receives it) would each accomplish its
proper function most i f each origin was i n the middle of the substance; for
then the soul w i l l be close to both parts, and the central position of such a
capacity will be i n a position of control. (De iuv. 4, 6 9 2 3 - i ) 4
a b
As w i t h the snake example, the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e forms an i n -

+ See e.g. MA 1, 698*11-13; Meteor. 4. 1, 3 7 8 i - 2 6 ; PA 2. 1, 646*29-30; GA
8 b
3
1. 20, 729*20—4; 2. 4, 740*4—5. See also R. Bolton, ' T w o Standards of I n q u i r y i n

Aristotle's De caelo', in A . C. Bo wen and J. Wilberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aris
totle's De caelo (Boston, 2009), 51—82. I disagree w i t h Bolton's main thesis that the
distinction i n question maps onto the distinction between scientific and dialectical
arguments.
e l i m i n a b l e p a r t o f the e x p l a n a t i o n for w h y the arche o f the soul is

located i n the m i d - s e c t i o n o f the o r g a n i s m between its u p p e r a n d
lower parts. T o see this, consider h o w someone like Empedocles
w o u l d e x p l a i n the p h e n o m e n o n . F o r Empedocles, the fact that the
arche o f the soul is located i n the m i d d l e o f the b o d y rather t h a n i n
some other l o c a t i o n is m e r e l y accidental and the result o f chance. O f
course he c o u l d agree w i t h A r i s t o t l e that the u p p e r and l o w e r parts
o f an a n i m a l h a p p e n to f u n c t i o n best w h e n the arche o f the soul is
located i n the m i d d l e . B u t that fact is irrelevant to the e x p l a n a t i o n . 49
T h u s , A r i s t o t l e is j u s t i f i e d i n d r a w i n g the inference that the arche

o f the soul is located i n the m i d d l e r e g i o n because that is the best
l o c a t i o n for i t to be, o n l y i f i t is true that the f o r m a l natures o f l i v
i n g t h i n g s are o p t i m i z i n g agents that always do w h a t is best for the
substance g i v e n the range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s . W i t h o u t c i t i n g the o p
50
t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e as p a r t o f the e x p l a n a t i o n , A r i s t o t l e ' s teleological

account o f the soul's o r i g i n loses its e x p l a n a t o r y force.
I t is clear f r o m the above discussion that A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s the o p t i
m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e can p l a y different roles i n n a t u r a l science. I n some
cases o p t i m a l i t y reasoning is a useful heuristic that helps i d e n t i f y
the causally relevant features c i t e d i n the e x p l a n a t i o n o f some na
t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n , even t h o u g h the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e itself does
n o t f o r m p a r t o f the u l t i m a t e explanation. H o w e v e r , as we have
seen, there are also cases where the fact that nature does w h a t is
best for each substance is a m o n g the causally relevant features a n d
so cannot be e l i m i n a t e d f r o m the account w i t h o u t loss o f c r u c i a l
e x p l a n a t o r y content.
T h i s does n o t c o m p l e t e l y v i n d i c a t e L e n n o x ' s reading, however.
T h e debate between L e n n o x a n d L e u n i s s e n has to do w i t h the role
o f the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i n d e m o n s t r a t i o n (apodeixis). A c c o r d i n g
to L e n n o x , o p t i m a l i t y reasoning is a special f o r m o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n
i n w h i c h the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e functions as one o f its premisses.
W h i l e L e u n i s s e n agrees that p r o p e r explanations i n b i o l o g y m u s t
be demonstrative i n f o r m , she denies that explanations that invoke
4 9
Likewise in the case of snakes, Empedocles might say that snakes lose their legs
owing to some accident during development (compare PA i . i , 640*19—24). The fact
that they happen to move better without them is merely a fortuitous outcome and
not part of the reason why snakes lack legs.
50
Compare the last sentence of I A 2, 7o4 i2—18: 'Nature does nothing in vain but
b
always what is best for the substance from among the possibilities concerning each
kind of animal; for this reason, if it is better this way, then it is that way and being in
that state is in accordance with nature.'
254 Devin Henry
teleological p r i n c i p l e s c o u l d meet the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s that the

Analytics places o n p r o p e r demonstrations. M o r e specifically, she
denies t h a t such p r i n c i p l e s have the r i g h t s t r u c t u r e to f u n c t i o n as
genuine demonstrative premisses. T h u s , she concludes, such te
51
leological p r i n c i p l e s c o u l d n o t be p a r t o f scientific explanations p r o

p e r l y speaking.
W h i l e I a m sympathetic to Leunissen's concerns here, the fo
cus o n the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f d e m o n s t r a t i o n is a r e d h e r r i n g .
T h e i m p o r t a n t issue is n o t w h e t h e r explanations t h a t feature the
o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e c o u l d be reconstructed i n demonstrative f o r m
b u t w h e t h e r the fact t h a t nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t always
w h a t is best for the substance is one o f the causally relevant features
of the p h e n o m e n o n i n q u e s t i o n . I f i t is, t h e n a causal e x p l a n a t i o n
of t h a t p h e n o m e n o n m u s t make reference to the o p t i m a l i t y p r i n
ciple. N o w i t is obvious to anyone w h o reads A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g i c a l
w o r k s t h a t the causal explanations o n offer are n o t demonstrative i n
f o r m . A l t h o u g h L e n n o x believes t h a t m a n y o f those explanations
5 2
c o u l d be r e f o r m u l a t e d i n ways that meet the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s

of p r o p e r demonstrations, he suggests t h a t i m p o r t a n t content m a y
be lost i n the process o f c o n v e r t i n g t h e m i n t o the logical syntax o f
a demonstrative s y l l o g i s m . T h u s , even i f L e u n i s s e n is technically
53
r i g h t t h a t we c o u l d n o t reconstruct explanations t h a t feature the

o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i n p r o p e r demonstrative f o r m (and I a m n o t
c o n v i n c e d she is), i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s the o p t i
m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e does n o t f o r m p a r t o f any causal explanations for
n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a a n d m u s t therefore be p a r t o f some p r e l i m i n a r y
stage o f discovery. T h e fact t h a t nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t
always w h a t is best for the substance m i g h t s i m p l y be a m o n g those
causally relevant features t h a t get lost i n the process o f s y l l o g i z i n g
those e x p l a n a t i o n s .54
51
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 122.
53
For doubts that explanations in biology could be proper demonstrations see J.
Barnes, 'Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration', Phronesis, 14 (1969), 123—52, and
G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge, 1996), ch. 1. For replies see
Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 1—6, and Gotthelf, First Principles, ch. 7. M y reading
is meant to be neutral on this issue. Lennox, Philosophy of Biology, 6.
5 3
54
Leunissen allows that teleological principles might be 'part of the partial or in
formal explanation of some phenomenon' and thus part of 'the larger explanatory
account' {Explanation and Teleology, 122). But she does not say what that entails.
If all she means is that technically the formalized demonstration will not feature the
optimality principle, then that is less interesting. Explanations of natural pheno
mena are supposed to give us knowledge of their causes. And the fact that nature
6. T w o conceptions o f o p t i m a l i t y
I n this paper I have a t t e m p t e d to draw a t t e n t i o n to A r i s t o t l e ' s use

o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning as an i m p o r t a n t d i m e n s i o n o f his n a t u r a l te
leology, s o m e t h i n g ( I have suggested) he i n h e r i t e d f r o m Plato. A s
we have seen, b o t h Plato and A r i s t o t l e v i e w the n a t u r a l w o r l d as the
p r o d u c t o f an o p t i m i z i n g agent, and b o t h see this a s s u m p t i o n as l i
censing a certain p a t t e r n o f reasoning t h a t appeals to a c o n c e p t i o n
o f ' w h a t is best' {to ariston). T h i s shared c o m m i t m e n t to o p t i m a l i t y
reasoning h i g h l i g h t s an i m p o r t a n t c o n t i n u i t y between Platonic a n d
A r i s t o t e l i a n teleology. D e s p i t e this general agreement, however, i t
w o u l d be a mistake to t h i n k that A r i s t o t l e s i m p l y t o o k over Plato's
use o f o p t i m a l i t y reasoning w i t h o u t significant m o d i f i c a t i o n s . I n
this section I w o u l d like to d r a w o u t m o r e e x p l i c i t l y t w o key dif
ferences i n the w a y Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e u n d e r s t a n d the use o f o p t i
m a l i t y i n n a t u r a l science.
T h e first major difference concerns the scope o f t h e i r respective
o p t i m a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s . I n the Phaedo Socrates extends the n o t i o n
o f o p t i m a l i t y to the w h o l e cosmos. A t 98 B 1-4 he says: 'Once he
[Anaxagoras] h a d given the best for each as the cause for each a n d
the general cause o f a l l , I t h o u g h t he w o u l d go o n to e x p l a i n the
common good for a l l , a n d I w o u l d n o t have exchanged m y hopes for
a f o r t u n e . ' T h i s is echoed in Laws 10, where the A t h e n i a n Stranger
attempts to convince C l i n i a s o f the thesis t h a t the universe has been
arranged w i t h an eye to the g o o d o f the w h o l e cosmos a n d t h a t its
i n d i v i d u a l parts ( i n c l u d i n g Clinias himself) have each been created
for the sake o f t h a t w h o l e :
T h e supervisor of the universe has arranged everything w i t h an eye to its

preservation and excellence, and its individual parts play appropriate active
does nothing in vain but always what is best for the substance is among the causes of
certain natural phenomena and so must be cited in a complete explanatory account
of them. I f Lennox is right about the loss of explanatory content i n converting such
explanations into proper demonstrative form, then the formal demonstration that
drops the optimality principle w i l l actually turn out to be less explanatory than the
informal explanation that includes it. For example, the demonstration of the fact
that snakes have no legs would contain less causal information (and therefore be less
explanatory) than the informal explanation we get i n IA 7 that includes as a cause
(atrt'a) of that phenomenon the fact that the formal natures of snakes do nothing i n
vain but always what is best for the substance from among the possibilities. I do not
see how this can be reconciled w i t h Leunissen's claim that teleological principles
serve a purely heuristic role in Aristotle's natural science.
25 6 Devin Henry
or passive roles according to their various capacities. These parts, down to

the smallest details of their active and passive functions, have each been put
under the control of ruling powers that have perfected the minutest con
stituents of the universe. Now then, you perverse fellow, one such part—
a mere speck that nevertheless constantly contributes to the good of the
whole—is you, you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to
provide the entire universe w i t h a life of prosperity. You forget that cre
ation is not for your benefit; you exist for the sake of the universe. Every
doctor, you see, and every skilled craftsman always works for the sake of
some end product as a whole. He handles his materials so that they will give
the best results i n general, and he makes the parts contribute to the good
of the whole, not vice versa. But you're grumbling because you don't ap
preciate that your position is best both for the universe and for you, thanks
to your common origin. (Laws 10, 903 B 5—D I , trans. Saunders, modified)
F o r Plato, t h e n , i n order to e x p l a i n w h y things are the w a y they are

we need to consider n o t o n l y w h a t is best relative to each i n d i v i d u a l
b u t also w h a t is best relative to the w h o l e cosmos.
Sedley has argued that A r i s t o t l e , too, t h i n k s o f the universe as an
organized w h o l e e n d o w e d w i t h a nature o f its o w n . T h i s cosmic
5 5
nature, Sedley argues, is s o m e t h i n g over a n d above the natures o f

its i n d i v i d u a l parts (animals, plants, etc.). Sedley's m a i n evidence
for this r e a d i n g comes f r o m a c o n t r o v e r s i a l passage at the start o f
Metaphysics A 10:
We must consider also i n which way the nature of the whole [rj rov oXov <j>v-
criy] contains the good and the best—whether as something separated and
by itself, or as its arrangement. Or is i t i n both ways, like an army? For an

army's goodness is i n its ordering, and is also the general. A n d more the
general, since he is not due to the arrangement, but the arrangement is due
to h i m . A l l things are i n some joint-arrangement, but not fishes, fowls and
plants all i n the same way. A n d the arrangement is not such that nothing
has any relation to anything else. They do have a relation: for all things are
jointly arranged i n relation to one thing. But i t is like i n a household, where
the free men have least licence to act at random, but all or most of what they
do is arranged, while the slaves and beasts do little for the common good
and act mostly at random: for that is the sort of principle that each one's
nature is. I mean, for example, that at least each of them must necessarily
come to be dissolved; and there are likewise other things i n which all par
ticipate for the whole. (Metaph. A 10, 1075*11-25, trans. Sedley)
5 5
Sedley, Creationism, 194—204; id., 'Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic' [ A r i s
totelian and Platonic'], i n J. G. Lennox and R. Bolton (eds.), Being, Nature, and
Life in Aristotle (Cambridge, 2010), 5—29; i d . , 'Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropo-
centric?' ['Anthropocentric'], Pkronesis, 36 (1991), 179—96.
Sedley takes the reference to 'the nature o f the w h o l e ' to p i c k o u t a

cosmic nature t h a t belongs to the universe as a w h o l e and embodies
its good. T h i s cosmic nature, Sedley argues, is p r i o r (and therefore
i r r e d u c i b l e ) to the natures o f the i n d i v i d u a l organisms, since the
latter are parts o f the f o r m e r . 56
I t is e n t i r e l y possible t h a t A r i s t o t l e recognized m o r e inclusive

i n d i v i d u a l s above the level o f p a r t i c u l a r organisms and t h a t these
m o r e inclusive i n d i v i d u a l s m i g h t have 'natures' o f t h e i r o w n . 5 7
H o w e v e r , we m u s t be careful about h o w we u n d e r s t a n d this idea.

Suppose the reference to nature i n the Metaphysics passage does
p i c k o u t the nature o f the w h o l e cosmos. I n that case there is n o
d o u b t that A r i s t o t l e is r e f e r r i n g to the order and s t r u c t u r e dis
p l a y e d b y the universe a n d n o t to some cosmic agent t h a t imposes
t h a t order and s t r u c t u r e o n i t like Plato's D e m i u r g e . I n A r i s
5 8
totle's system G o d (the analogue o f the general i n this passage)

is responsible for the o r d e r l y arrangement o f the universe, n o t as
an efficient cause, b u t as a final cause. M o r e specifically, G o d is a
cause o f t h a t arrangement as an object o f desire. A l l n a t u r a l bodies,
f r o m the elements to animals and plants to the heavenly bodies, i n
some sense 'desire' to be like the d i v i n e . A n d w h e n the activities
o f a l l these goal-directed substances are each d i r e c t e d towards the
same e n d ( i m i t a t i o n o f G o d ) , the result is a universe t h a t e x h i b i t s
order a n d a r r a n g e m e n t . U n l i k e Plato, A r i s t o t l e n o w h e r e refers to
59
this order and arrangement (the cosmic good) as the e n d for the
sake o f w h i c h its parts come to be and exist. Rather, the o r d e r l y
arrangement o f the w h o l e cosmos is itself a consequence of, a n d
5 6
See Sedley, Creationism, 198—200.
5 7
See D. Henry, 'Organismal Natures', i n J. Mouracade (ed.), Aristotle on Life
(Apeiron, special issue, 41.3; 2008), 47—74 at 67—70. I n the Politics Aristotle has no
trouble seeing the polis as a natural whole that is ontologically prior to the citizens
that are its parts (Pol. 1. 2, 1253 19—30; cf. Metaph. Z 16). I f this is right, then it may
a
not be much of a stretch to imagine Aristotle treating the cosmos itself as complex
individual endowed w i t h its own cosmic nature.
5 8
M y reading depends on recognizing that Aristotle uses 'nature' i n many ways.
The two main candidates here would be: (1) nature as an inner principle of change
and stasis in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself, and not incident
ally (Phys. 2. 1, i 9 2 2 i - 2 ; cf. Metaph. Z 7 , 1032*20-5; GA 74o 25-34; 7 7 o i 5 - i 7 ) ;
b b b
and (2) nature as 'the form and essence of a thing, which constitutes the end of the
process of its generation' (Metaph. A 4, i o i 5 i o — 1 1 ; cf. GC 335 4—7). See also PA
a b
1.1, 64i 22—33. When Aristotle refers to 'the nature of the whole' i n the Metaphy
a
sics A passage, he is almost certainly using 'nature' i n a way that is akin to (2), albeit
without the implication that the universe itself came to be.
5 9
Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology, 46—7.
258 Devin Henry
is thus explained by, the goal-directed activities o f each p a r t i c u l a r

n a t u r a l substance a i m i n g at its o w n i n d i v i d u a l good.
T h u s , w h i l e I a m n o t u n s y m p a t h e t i c to Sedley's c l a i m that A r i s
totle t h i n k s the universe has a nature o f its o w n ( p r o p e r l y under
stood), w h a t I do f i n d objectionable is the idea that he t h i n k s the
parts o f the universe are co-ordinated i n such a way that t h e i r m u
tual interactions c o n t r i b u t e to this cosmic good and, u l t i m a t e l y , the
good o f m a n . T h e r e is so l i t t l e evidence for this interactive d i
6 0
m e n s i o n o f A r i s t o t e l i a n teleology that I f i n d i t h a r d to believe this

was a core feature o f A r i s t o t l e ' s teleological perspective. I f i t were,
t h e n we s h o u l d have expected A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g y to be d r i v e n b y
a deep interest i n ecology and ecological relations. Yet, we f i n d no
traces o f the concept o f an ecosystem, no sign o f the idea o f 'the web
of life', and v e r y l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to the u b i q u i t o u s co-adaptations
that exist between l i v i n g t h i n g s . Sedley's m a i n response to the
61
absence o f evidence for global teleology i n A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g i c a l

w r i t i n g s is to say that w h i l e b i o l o g y is 'squarely focused o n i n
d i v i d u a l b o d i l y f u n c t i o n i n g ' , the global teleology is s u p p l i e d b y
m e t a p h y s i c s . H o w e v e r , i t is n o t that the b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s lack ex
62
amples o f such ' c o - o r d i n a t i o n ' between species (see e.g. PA 4. 13,

6 9 6 2 4 - 3 5 ; GA 3, 7 6 o 3 i - i ; 4. 10, 7 7 7 i 6 - 7 7 8 9 ) . T h e p r o b l e m
b a b b a
is that there are so few o f t h e m . I f A r i s t o t l e really d i d v i e w nature

t h r o u g h the lens o f interactive teleology, t h e n we w o u l d expect his
b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s to be f u l l o f such examples. M o r e o v e r , i t is n o t clear
w h y a study o f the c o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d interactions between the parts
of nature—i.e. e c o l o g y — s h o u l d b e l o n g to metaphysics and n o t to
the science o f nature itself. T h e absence o f a n y t h i n g like an ecolo
gical perspective f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s science o f nature and the fact that
his b i o l o g y is so 'squarely focused o n i n d i v i d u a l b o d i l y f u n c t i o n
i n g ' make m u c h better sense i f we assume that he rejected Plato's
cosmic teleology.
W h a t e v e r we t h i n k o f Sedley's i n t e r a c t i o n i s t reading o f A r i s t o
telian teleology, i t remains that A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f o p t i m i z a t i o n i n
n a t u r a l science does n o t i n any w a y depend o n the n o t i o n o f a cos
m i c good. A r i s t o t l e tells us that nature does w h a t is best for each
p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f o r g a n i s m (hekaston genos zoou). A n d whenever he
invokes this p r i n c i p l e to e x p l a i n the parts o f l i v i n g things, ' w h a t is
6 0
See Sedley, 'Anthropocentric', 180, and Aristotelian and Platonic', 24.
6 1
Contrast the ecologically rich perspective in Darwin's Origin ofSpecies.
6 3
Sedley, Anthropocentric', 195—6, and Aristotelian and Platonic', 24—5.
best' is always u n d e r s t o o d i n r e l a t i o n to t h a t t h i n g ' s o w n survival

and w e l l - b e i n g . A r i s t o t l e does n o t d e m a n d , as P l a t o clearly does,
t h a t we also s h o w h o w each p a r t i c u l a r l i v i n g t h i n g c o n t r i b u t e s to
the best possible state o f the u n i v e r s e as a w h o l e . 6 3
The second difference b e t w e e n P l a t o a n d A r i s t o t l e concerns the

w a y i n w h i c h each conceives o f the o p t i m i z i n g agent itself. A s we
have seen, Plato's o p t i m i z i n g agent is a D i v i n e C r a f t s m a n w h o is
c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y r a t i o n a l i t y and imposes goodness o n the world
f r o m o u t s i d e {Tim. 29 A 5 - B 1; 29 D 7 - c 1; 46 c 7 - E 6: Laws 10,
889 A 4—E 1; 892 A 2 - c 7 ) . 6 4
A r i s t o t l e , o n the o t h e r h a n d , identifies
his o p t i m i z i n g agent w i t h n a t u r e , w h i c h is c o n t r a s t e d w i t h i n t e l l i
gence {nous) and craft {techne) a n d defined as a p r i n c i p l e o f change
in t h a t to w h i c h i t belongs p r i m a r i l y , i n v i r t u e o f itself, a n d non-
i n c i d e n t a l l y {Phys. 2. 1, i 9 2 2 0 - 3 ) .
b 6 s
M o r e specifically, I have sug
gested t h a t the ' n a t u r e ' t h a t does n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t always w h a t
is best for the substance is m e r e l y a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n over the formal
natures o f p a r t i c u l a r n a t u r a l substances. O b v i o u s l y A r i s t o t l e s t i l l
owes us an answer to the q u e s t i o n o f h o w the natures o f l i v i n g t h i n g s
manage to b r i n g a b o u t t h e i r ends w i t h o u t i n t e n t i o n s and desires.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , he never a c t u a l l y addresses t h i s p r o b l e m a n y w h e r e
i n the e x t a n t c o r p u s . H o w e v e r , I t h i n k he has the resources to do so.
W h i l e a f u l l defence o f t h i s is n o t possible here, to close t h i s paper
let me t r y to sketch o u t w h a t I t h i n k t h a t a c c o u n t m i g h t l o o k l i k e . 6 6
6 3
Moreover, I have argued that Aristotle limits the optimality principle to the
goal-directed activities of an organism's formal nature. A n d since not all features
of a living thing are due to its formal nature, not every feature of the organic body
w i l l have been optimized for the performance of some function (see n. 28). Thus,
Aristotle not only restricts the optimality principle to living things, he restricts it to
certain features of living things.
6 4
On the separateness of the Demiurge from the physical cosmos see Johansen,
Natural Philosophy, 79—83, and Broadie, Nature and Divinity, ch. 1.
6 5
Johansen, Natural Philosophy, 76—8, identifies the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus
w i t h craftsmanship {techne) itself rather than a craftsman endowed w i t h intelligence
and forethought. O n this reading, the gap between Plato and Aristotle becomes nar
rower than suggested here. On Johansen's reading, the difference between their res
pective optimizing agents would lie simply i n the external/internal distinction.
6 6
For an alternative account see Leunissen and Gotthelf, 'GA V , 344—7, and
Leunissen, 'Crafting Natures: Aristotle on Animal Design', i n G. Dicker (ed.), An
nual Proceedings of the Center for Philosophic Exchange ( S U N Y Brockport, 2012),
28—51. T h e following takes its lead from the account of Aristotelian natures de
fended by Alexander of Aphrodisias ap. Simpl. In Phys. 310. 25—311. 1 Diels (cf.
Alex. Aphr. In Metaph. 103. 37—104. 1, 349. 7—17 Hayduck). For a discussion of
Alexander's reading see D. Henry, 'Embryological Models in Ancient Philosophy',
Phronesis, 50 (2005), 1—42 at part 2.
260 Devin Henry
A l t h o u g h m a n y o f the explanations i n A r i s t o t l e ' s b i o l o g i c a l w o r k s

make use o f the m e t a p h o r o f a d e m i u r g i c nature ' f a s h i o n i n g ' a n i
mals a n d t h e i r parts like a craftsman, A r i s t o t l e c o u l d cash i n the
m e t a p h o r for the language o f causal powers (dunameis). A c c o r d i n g
to the account i n Metaphysics 0 1-5, causal powers come i n t w o
k i n d s : r a t i o n a l and n o n - r a t i o n a l p o w e r s (Metaph. 0 2, i o 4 6 3 6 - 2 ) .
a b
R a t i o n a l powers are capacities to p r o d u c e c o n t r a r y effects (for ex

ample, the art o f m e d i c i n e is a capacity to p r o d u c e h e a l t h a n d dis
ease). A s such, A r i s t o t l e argues, contact w i t h a suitable p a t i e n t is
necessary b u t n o t sufficient to t r i g g e r the power. T h e r e m u s t also
be a deliberate decision o n the p a r t o f the agent to b r i n g about one
or the other o f its effect ( i o 4 8 i - i 5 ) . a 6 7
N o n - r a t i o n a l powers, o n
the other h a n d , p r o d u c e u n i f o r m effects (for example, the h e a t i n g
p o w e r o f fire o n l y has the capacity to p r o d u c e heat, n o t cold) a n d so
are t r i g g e r e d s i m p l y b y the presence o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g power.
W i t h n o n - r a t i o n a l powers, once agent a n d p a t i e n t come i n t o c o n
tact u n d e r the r i g h t causal c o n d i t i o n s , t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g powers
are activated straight away, r e s u l t i n g i n a change t h a t is d e t e r m i n e d
b y the character o f t h e i r respective powers. N o deliberate decision
o n the p a r t o f the agent is necessary.
T h e r e is some evidence t h a t A r i s t o t l e t h o u g h t the m e t a p h o r o f a
nature ' f a s h i o n i n g ' animals was s i m p l y s h o r t h a n d for a m o r e c o m
plex account i n terms o f the a c t i v a t i o n o f a series o f n o n - r a t i o n a l
powers. F o r example, at the end o f GA 2. 4 A r i s t o t l e identifies
the nature t h a t constructs the parts o f an a n i m a l w i t h the active
powers o f its o w n n u t r i t i v e soul ( 7 4 0 3 4 - 7 4 i 3 ) . A n d i n t w o places
b a
he compares generation to the sequence o f automatic m o v e m e n t s

executed b y a mechanical p u p p e t : GA 2. 1, 7 3 4 i o - i 3 ; 2. 5, 7 4 i 7 -
b b
9. I n the f o r m e r passage we are t o l d t h a t the a b i l i t y o f these auto

matons to m o v e o f t h e i r o w n accord is due to the fact that each
p a r t contains a dunamis for m o t i o n . A n d such dunameis can o n l y
be n o n - r a t i o n a l p o w e r s ; for the m a r k o f an a u t o m a t o n is t h a t its
m o v e m e n t s are n o t the result o f r a t i o n a l decisions (cf. 7 4 0 18-24). b
Because n o n - r a t i o n a l powers do n o t require a deliberate decision to

activate t h e m , b u t instead a c t i o n occurs as soon as agent a n d p a t i e n t
6 7
T h i s is why I think it is a dead end to search for Aristotle's answer to the prob
lem at hand i n his cryptic remark at the end of Physics 2. 8 that natural teleology
does not depend on deliberation 'for even the art does not deliberate' (i99 26—30). b
Whatever Aristotle means by this, Metaphysics © 5 is clear that the exercise of a re-
Xvr/, at least, requires a deliberate decision on the part of the agent that possesses that
come i n t o contact, this w o u l d a l l o w A r i s t o t l e to e x p l a i n h o w the

natures o f l i v i n g t h i n g s manage to b r i n g about t h e i r ends w i t h o u t
h a v i n g to a t t r i b u t e to t h e m real psychological states. T h u s , to say
that nature does n o t h i n g i n v a i n b u t always w h a t is best for the or
g a n i s m is, then, j u s t to say those dunameis that make u p its f o r m a l
nature are c o - o r d i n a t e d i n such a way that t h e i r m u t u a l a c t i v a t i o n
generates parts that are o p t i m i z e d for its p a r t i c u l a r w a y o f l i f e . 68
The University of Western Ontario
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123-52.
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68
This does not imply that Aristotle thinks final causation is a mere heuristic
device i n the Kantian sense. For Aristotle will insist that species natures contain the
hvvajxeis they do for the sake of the ends they bring about (see Metaph. ® 8, io5o 4— a
14). T o ask what co-ordinated those hvvajxeis i n the first place would be misguided,
since the developmental capacities possessed by Aristotelian species are not the re
sult of any process of evolution. That the natures of living things contain the sorts
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totle's world, explained only (as a final cause) by reference to the contribution they
make to the animal's survival and well-being.
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Critias [Natural Philosophy] (Cambridge, 2004).
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(eds.), Beitrdge zur antiken Philosophic: Festschrift fur Wolfgang Kull-
mann (Stuttgart, 1997), 199-214; repr. i n J. G. Lennox, Aristotle's Phi
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'Teleology i n Scientific Explanation: Commentary on Henry and M c -
Donough', presented at the annual meeting for the American Philoso
phical Association (Boston, 2010).
Leunissen, M . , 'Crafting Natures: Aristotle on Animal Design', i n G.
Dicker (ed.), Annual Proceedings of the Center for Philosophic Exchange
( S U N Y Brockport, 2012), 28-51.
Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle's Science of Nature [Explana
tion and Teleology] (Cambridge, 2010).
and Gotthelf, A . , 'What's Teleology Got to Do w i t h It? A Reinter-
pretation of Generation of Animals V ['GA V ] , Phronesis, 55 (2010), 325-
56; repr. i n A. Gotthelf, First Principles (Oxford, 2012), ch. 5.
Lloyd, G. E. R., Aristotelian Explorations (Cambridge, 1996).
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'Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropocentric?' [Anthropocentric'],
Phronesis, 36 (1991), 179-96.
'Teleology: Aristotelian and Platonic' [Aristotelian and Platonic'], i n
J. G. Lennox and R. Bolton (eds.), Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle
(Cambridge, 2010), 5-29.
Sharpies, R. W , 'The Purpose of the Natural World: Aristotle's Follow
ers and Interpreters', i n J. Rocca, Teleology in the Ancient World (Cam
bridge, 2013, forthcoming).
Strange, S. K . , 'The Double Explanation i n the Timaeus', i n G. Fine (ed.),
Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford, 1999), 397-415.
Wieland, W., 'The Problem of Teleology', i n J. Barnes, M . Schofield, and

R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, i . Science (London, 1975), 141-60.
W i t t , C , 'Aristotle on Deformed Kinds', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philo
sophy, 43 (2012), 83-106.
ARISTOTELIAN RESPONSIBILITY
J O H N M . COOPER
I N t w o i n d e p e n d e n t t r e a t m e n t s — E u d e m i a n Ethics z. 6-9 a n d
Nicomachean Ethics 3. 1—Aristotle discusses the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
a n d correlative lack o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f agents for the t h i n g s that
they d o — i n a b r o a d use o f the t e r m , for t h e i r actions. I n b o t h
places he w o r k s w i t h the same basic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t sort
1
© John M . Cooper 2013

I thank audiences for vigorous discussion when I presented early versions of this
paper at Oxford and Cornell. I thank particularly T. H . I r w i n for his written com
ments on the first version, presented i n Oxford i n January 2010; I have been able to
improve the paper at several places by taking them into account. Discussions w i t h
Richard Parry and w i t h Roger Wertheimer i n Atlanta when I used material from
the paper for a lecture at Agnes Scott College in October 2010 led to other i m
provements. Further improvements resulted from discussions on this topic at the
Academy of Athens, when I lectured there in A p r i l 2011, at Columbia University,
where I gave the Tsakopoulos Lecture i n December 2011, and at Florida State U n i
versity in M a r c h 2012. I am grateful also to Thomas Barrett for his written com
ments and to h i m and the other students for a good and helpful discussion when
I presented the paper at a Princeton 'first-year' graduate seminar in October 2012.
Finally, I particularly thank Brad Inwood for his unusually extensive and thorough
editor's comments and suggestions on the paper as submitted in July 2012: the pub
lished version is better both i n expression and i n thought as a result.
1
The Eudemian treatment is a self-contained presentation of a comprehensive
theory of those of their actions for which specifically human agents are responsible.
Chapter 6 begins, ' L e t us, then, make a new beginning for the ensuing investigation'
( i 2 2 2 i 5 ) . (Translations from the Eudemian Ethics are my own, based on Walzer—
b
Mingay's O C T (1991), but w i t h frequent departures, all duly noted; whenever pos
sible, I stick to manuscript readings and forgo emendations.) The last sentence of
chapter 9, running over into chapter 10, marks the definitive conclusion of that inves
tigation: 'So, then, as to the voluntary and the involuntary, let them be thoroughly
marked off i n the foregoing way; let us speak after this of decision . . .' (i225 i7—18;
b
at 7, i223 2i—2, Aristotle had indicated that 'the ensuing investigation' marked at
a
I 2 2 2 i 5 has two parts: the voluntary and involuntary, and decision). ( I n my main
b
text I render Aristotle's talk here and elsewhere of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary',
i.e. 'not-voluntary', in terms of what an agent is responsible, or not responsible, for
in what they do; I comment on this implied equivalence below, n. 11, and see also
nn. 5 and 10.) The Nicomachean treatment (3. 1) is similarly followed up by the
announcement at the beginning of 3. 2 that 'Since the voluntary and the involun
tary have been thoroughly marked off, it is next i n order to go through decision'
( i i n 4 — 5 ) . (Translations from the Nicomachean Ethics are my own, based on By-
b
266 John M. Cooper
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that is: i t is, as I w i l l argue, causal responsibility.

H e also presents a single t h e o r y o f w h a t agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
w h a t they do consists i n , t h o u g h the E u d e m i a n t r e a t m e n t differs
i n t w o respects f r o m the m u c h b e t t e r - k n o w n N i c o m a c h e a n one.
F i r s t , i t l i m i t s itself to discussing the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y specifically
and o n l y o f a d u l t h u m a n beings for some o f t h e i r actions: i t leaves
aside, undiscussed, c h i l d r e n and teenagers, and n o n - h u m a n a n i
mals, groups that do figure i n the N i c o m a c h e a n discussion as
agents responsible for some o f w h a t they do. Second, i t differs
slightly, b u t m o m e n t o u s l y , i n w h a t i t includes a m o n g the things
an a d u l t h u m a n agent m i g h t do for w h i c h they are responsible. 2
F u r t h e r m o r e , A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s , and argues i n an extension o f the

3
N i c o m a c h e a n t r e a t m e n t (NE 3 . 5 ) , that a d u l t agents, i n particular,

are responsible n o t j u s t for m a n y o f t h e i r actions, as other agents
also are. A d u l t s are responsible i n a d d i t i o n for t h e i r o w n characters
as m o r a l l y good (or at least decent) or b a d people o f one stripe
and degree or other. A s a result, they are responsible also for t h e i r
p a r t i c u l a r tendencies to feel n o n - r a t i o n a l desires, o f appetite and
s p i r i t , a n d for the a c c o m p a n y i n g e m o t i o n a l feelings—as w e l l as for
the o c c u r r e n t desires and feelings to w h i c h these tendencies give
rise. I n this way, A r i s t o t l e argues that a d u l t h u m a n agents ( b u t
4
they alone a m o n g agents) are responsible n o t o n l y for some o f the
water's O C T ( 1 8 9 4 ) , though I often adopt Rowe's renderings.) But, as noted just

below in my main text, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle resumes the discussion
of the voluntary in chapter 5, after completing his discussion of decision (and its
related topics of deliberation and wishing). N o t h i n g i n the Eudemian Ethics corres
ponds to this Nicomachean extension.
3
A t EE 2. 8, 1225*19—34, Aristotle allows some actions done from strong emo
tional feelings to count as involuntary; he denies this i n the Nicomachean Ethics. See
below, n. 30.
3
Even i n the Eudemian Ethics: see 1223*10—13, 19—20.
4
The broad scope of the Nicomachean theory, i n which one can be responsible
both for things one does and for one's feelings, is duly reflected, by anticipation of
this later extension, i n the opening lines of NE 3. 1: 'So, since virtue concerns both
feelings and actions, and praise and blame arise for voluntary ones, but for involun
tary ones sympathetic allowance, [we need to discuss the voluntary and the involun
tary].' None the less (see sect. 11), Aristotle's theory of voluntariness, developed i n
3. 1, as also i n the Eudemian Ethics, is presented as a theory of voluntary and not
voluntary action only; the voluntariness of some feelings follows as a result of our
responsibility, through our prior voluntary actions, for the states of character part
of whose constitution is the tendency to experience specific sets of such feelings on
specific sorts of occasions. They are voluntary, when voluntary at all, i n a derivative,
secondary way that does not require any adjustment i n the definition of voluntari
ness as restricted to actions, provided in NE 3 . 1 .
t h i n g s they d o — t h e i r actions—but for m a n y o f t h e i r o c c u r r e n t

desires, feelings, and emotions too.
W h a t is A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t h e o r y of? I n m o
d e r n p h i l o s o p h y and m o d e r n life (and i n m o s t m o d e r n languages)
we all recognize causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as one sort o f responsibility.
A n d agents can be causally responsible t h r o u g h t h e i r actions for
some things that happen. B u t for other things there are other causes:
a d r o u g h t , for example, caused b y c h a n g i n g patterns o f global mete
orology, w o u l d m o s t often be the cause o f a crop's failure, n o t some
h u m a n actions or inactions. W e also all recognize legal responsibi
l i t y as another; and that is something, again, that i n d i v i d u a l agents
can bear, t h o u g h again, I suppose, n o t o n l y they (corporations, for
example, have legal responsibilities). B u t i n c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o
sophy a n d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y life, we hear a l o t o f talk o f specifically
'moral' responsibility, especially i n contexts o f j u d g i n g a n d b l a m i n g
others for h a v i n g behaved ' i m m o r a l l y ' . T h a t is a sort o f responsibi
l i t y a t t r i b u t e d o n l y to n o r m a l a d u l t h u m a n beings, or at any rate i t
is n o r m a l l y t h o u g h t to be l e g i t i m a t e l y a t t r i b u t e d o n l y to t h e m . B u t
i t has f r e q u e n t l y been n o t i c e d that, as I m e n t i o n e d above, A r i s t o t l e
is q u i t e e x p l i c i t (twice, i n fact) i n the N i c o m a c h e a n t r e a t m e n t that,
as he t h i n k s , small c h i l d r e n a n d n o n - h u m a n animals too 'do v o
l u n t a r y a c t i o n s ' — w h i c h i m p l i e s , for h i m , that they are responsible
for some o f w h a t they do. T h i s suggests that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y he
5
investigates, at least i n the Nicomachean Ethics, is n o t ' m o r a l res

p o n s i b i l i t y ' , even i n the case o f a d u l t humans.
A r i s t o t l e does n o t say animals a n d n o n - a d u l t h u m a n s do v o l u n
t a r y actions i n the E u d e m i a n discussion. T h e r e f r o m the outset, as
n o t e d j u s t now, he speaks e x p l i c i t l y o n l y o f a d u l t h u m a n beings as
' v o l u n t a r y ' , responsible agents. B u t he l i m i t s his discussion i n the
Eudemian Ethics i n that w a y because, as he t h i n k s , o n l y adults are
either v i r t u o u s or v i c i o u s people, a n d i n the Eudemian Ethics A r i s
totle focuses his discussion o f v o l u n t a r y agency o n s h o w i n g that acts
o f v i r t u e a n d vice are the agent's o w n responsibility. ( E v e n i n the
Nicomachean Ethics, A r i s t o t l e ' s focus i n his t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
5
NE 3. 1, i n i 25—6, and 3. 2, 111 i 8—9. Here he says only that animals and chil
a b
dren do some 'voluntary' actions (he does not use of them instead or in addition a
separate Greek word one could translate as 'responsible', e.g. a'trioi). However (see
next note, and E E 2. 6, I223 i6—18), for Aristotle voluntary actions simply are the
a
ones that one is the cause of in a certain specific way, and so is causally responsible
for, as explained below. So i n emphasizing that children and animals do some things
voluntarily, he is saying that they are responsible for some of what they do.
268 John M. Cooper
is o n a d u l t a c t i o n ; the p a r a l l e l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f c h i l d r e n a n d animals
is a t a n g e n t i a l matter, aside f r o m the m a i n q u e s t i o n s addressed.)
However, w i t h only a little b i t of linguistic tweaking Aristotle's the
o r y as advanced i n the Eudemian Ethics makes animals responsible
for some o f w h a t t h e y do: see 2. 8, 1 2 2 4 ^ 0 - 3 0 . 6
H e n c e i t is clear
t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , as p r e s e n t e d i n b o t h the Eu
demian a n d the Nicomachean Ethics, is n o t , at least taken as a w h o l e
a n d i n its i n t e n t i o n s , a t h e o r y o f w h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d o r d i n a r y
people m e a n n o w a d a y s w h e n t h e y speak o f ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' .
H i s t h e o r y is i n t e n d e d to be a t h e o r y o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t he t h i n k s
c h i l d r e n a n d n o n - h u m a n animals can have, as w e l l as a d u l t h u m a n s .
On the other hand, Aristotle does emphasize a connection

b e t w e e n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t his t h e o r y offers an a c c o u n t o f a n d
the l e g i t i m a t e p r a i s e w o r t h i n e s s and blameworthiness o f agents;
a n d praise a n d b l a m e are f u n d a m e n t a l to w h a t people understand
b y ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' . W h a t y o u are ' m o r a l l y ' responsible for
h a v i n g done y o u are b l a m e w o r t h y for h a v i n g done i f i t was b a d , or
p r a i s e w o r t h y i f i t was g o o d . I n fact, A r i s t o t l e i n t r o d u c e s his treat
m e n t o f v o l u n t a r i n e s s i n the first lines o f NE 3 b y s a y i n g t h a t one is
p r a i s e d or b l a m e d ( l e g i t i m a t e l y , he means) o n l y for t h i n g s t h a t are
6
I t is true that Aristotle begins his discussion (EE 2. 6, I 2 2 2 i 8 — 2 0 ) by l i m i t i n g
b
actions (irpaêis) to adults (see also I223 i—9); so when subsequently he discusses
a
responsibility for actions (irpaêis) he is limiting himself to adult responsibility. B u t

notice that at 2. 8, i224 2o—30, where Aristotle reverts to the claim ( i 2 2 2 i 8 — 2 0 )
a b
that neither children nor animals do actions, he recognizes that they do do things
(not irparreiv, b u t noieiv, a verb he has also used of humans when they 'do' actions,
i 2 2 3 8 ) , and he says that, unlike cases when lifeless things 'do' or bring things about,
a
when animals do things they do them from appetite, a non-rational type of desire.
On the theory of voluntariness (responsibility) Aristotle is building up to i n the Eu
demian Ethics and sets out i n chapter 9, when an adult human acts, i.e. does some
thing, solely from appetite—not all adult actions are done also from a decision, for
Aristotle—then something that they do gets counted as something voluntary: A r i s
totle's theory holds that voluntary acts are done from non-rational desire or from
decision (see below). So when animals (and children) also act from non-rational de
sires alone, as of course for Aristotle they always do whenever they do anything at all,
the Eudemian Ethics' theory implies that they likewise act voluntarily, do something
they are responsible for. (The addition implied, when Aristotle states his theory suc
cinctly at 2. 9, I 2 2 5 3 7 — i , of 'on thought', Kara TTJV Stdvotav, when an act done from
a b
desire is counted as voluntary, is only a verbal obstacle to this conclusion: i t is ex

plicated, i — 1 0 , as 'not on account of ignorance'. I n the Nicomachean treatment, as
b
we w i l l see, this last phrase replaces the Eudemian Ethics' reference to 'on thought'
as any part of the definition of voluntariness. N o t h i n g suggests that in the Eudemian
Ethics Aristotle would deny that children and non-human animals do some things
thinking and indeed knowing, i.e. not in ignorance, that they are doing them. Hence,
as implied by the Eudemian Ethics' theory, they do them voluntarily, and are respon
sible for what they do.)
v o l u n t a r y , that is, one's o w n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; that is why, he says,

i n a close consideration o f v i r t u e , such as he is a t t e m p t i n g i n this
p a r t o f the Ethics, i t is necessary to m a r k off t h o r o u g h l y w h a t one
is responsible, or n o t responsible, for. (Here he is m a k i n g the u n
7
stated b u t obvious a n d generally shared a s s u m p t i o n that v i r t u e a n d

v i r t u o u s actions are things that above all else we are l e g i t i m a t e l y
praised for.) Philosophers w h o discuss ' m o r a l ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m a t c h
that w i t h another concept. T h e y conceive o f a special sort o f praise
and, especially, blame: 'moral praise' or 'moral b l a m e ' , to w h i c h
o n l y adults are, i t is generally t h o u g h t , l e g i t i m a t e l y subject. I f ,
t h e n , A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y concerns a d u l t h u m a n
agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w h a t they do, either w h o l l y (as f o r m a l l y
presented i n the Eudemian Ethics) or at any rate as its p r i m a r y focus
( i n the Nicomachean Ethics), and i f he regards i t as i m p o r t a n t , as
we have seen he does, to l i n k r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to praiseworthiness
a n d blameworthiness, s h o u l d we conclude, despite the appearances
g i v e n b y his i n c l u s i o n o f other t h a n a d u l t h u m a n agents as i n some
w a y or to some degree responsible for some o f w h a t they do, that
his t h e o r y really does concern, perhaps as a special case, specific
ally 'moral' responsibility? Perhaps he sees an i m p o r t a n t difference
between the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for actions that c h i l d r e n a n d animals
have a n d a d u l t agents' responsibility? Because o f special features o f
a d u l t agency, perhaps he holds that adults often satisfy n o t o n l y the
same c r i t e r i a that these other agents do w h e n they act responsibly,
b u t a d d i t i o n a l ones too, m a k i n g t h e m ' m o r a l l y ' responsible a n d
subject to ' m o r a l ' praise a n d blame, as well?
I n w h a t follows I w i l l argue that we s h o u l d answer these ques

tions w i t h a f i r m ' n o ' . F o r now, let me p o i n t o u t s i m p l y that all that
A r i s t o t l e actually says i n NE 3. 1 about p r a i s i n g a n d b l a m i n g is that
i t is only i f an agent does s o m e t h i n g they are responsible for that
7
Aristotle makes the same point at EE 2. 6, where again he is introducing his
discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary (but this time it comes towards the
end of the chapter, I223 9—10). Chapter 6, crucially important as it is in p r o v i d
a
ing the essential leading idea of Aristotle's theory of the voluntary, speaks except i n
this final paragraph not at all of voluntary and involuntary but throughout only of
origins or originating principles (dpx 0 causes (atrt'a, ainov).
a o r
Before speaking of
voluntary and involuntary, i n this last paragraph, he is careful first to introduce the
terminology of what is 'up to' human beings (i223 2—3, 6, 8, 9), explicitly linking
a
this to what human beings are themselves the origin and originating cause of. V o l u n
tary and involuntary then become the main topic only of the further discussion, i n
chapters 7—8. First, in this last paragraph of chapter 6, they must be linked to what
a human being is an originating cause of, i.e. what they do that is 'up to' them. See
further n. 12 below.
270 John M. Cooper
they are l e g i t i m a t e l y to be praised or b l a m e d for w h a t they do. H e

does n o t say, and, as we w i l l see u p o n closer consideration o f his the
ory, he does n o t mean, that when an agent does do s o m e t h i n g good
or b a d that they are responsible for d o i n g , they are l e g i t i m a t e l y to
be praised or b l a m e d for d o i n g it. N o r (see b e l o w ) does he even sup
pose that there is a l e g i t i m a t e general b u t defeasible p r e s u m p t i o n ,
w h e n someone is responsible for d o i n g s o m e t h i n g good or b a d , that
they are to be praised or b l a m e d for i t . O n his theory, b e i n g respon
sible for d o i n g s o m e t h i n g is o n l y a necessary c o n d i t i o n for l e g i t i m a t e
praise or blame; w h e t h e r praise or blame (even ' i n one's heart' and
unspoken) is m e r i t e d is to be d e t e r m i n e d o n i n d e p e n d e n t , f u r t h e r
grounds. B u t , I take i t , ' m o r a l ' responsibility, as that is u n d e r s t o o d
i n o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y discourse, for s o m e t h i n g b a d is u n d e r s t o o d to
be a sufficient c o n d i t i o n for ' m o r a l ' blame (for those w h o e m p l o y
that concept): anyone w h o is ' m o r a l l y ' responsible for an action o f
stealing is thereby l e g i t i m a t e l y subject to negative m o r a l evaluation
as a person, i n so far as they have done that action; h a v i n g done i t
is a b l o t o n t h e i r character, s o m e t h i n g they s h o u l d feel b a d about
(and, i f they are religious, seek forgiveness for f r o m G o d , i f n o t also
f r o m the v i c t i m ) . T h u s , as I w i l l t r y to show, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s the
8
ory, an a d u l t p e r s o n w h o does s o m e t h i n g i n itself ( b y his lights)

m o r a l l y good or b a d that they are responsible for d o i n g is, i n ge
neral, n o t l e g i t i m a t e l y either praised or b l a m e d simply because they
are responsible for h a v i n g done such a t h i n g . A n d w h e n , o n his the-
9
8
See e.g. A . Eshleman, ' M o r a l Responsibility', in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), ed. E. N . Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2oo9/entries/moral-responsibility/) [accessed 4 Apr. 2013], where i n
the first paragraph we read: 'to be morally responsible for something, say an action,
is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to
these—for having performed i t ' .
9
I add the qualification ' i n general' here because Aristotle does seem to think that
anyone who is fully virtuous merits praise for every good thing that they do that they
are responsible for doing (see Rhet. 1. 9, I 3 6 6 3 6 ; EE 2. 1, i22o 6—7; 2. 6, I223 9—
a a a
10; 2. 11,1228 9—10; NE 1. 12, 1 i o i i 2 — 1 8 ) , just as every fully vicious person merits
a a
blame for every bad thing that they similarly do. T h i s would apply as much to so
cially and personally inconsequential virtuous or vicious actions (such as eating at
the right time, i n the right way, and the right amount—or the wrong ways, times,
amounts, and so on—under totally unremarkable circumstances of daily life) as it
does to the grandest and most consequential of virtuous or vicious acts: sacrificing
one's life for a friend or one's country, or venally betraying them, for example. I n
both sorts of case, the marvellous beauty and intelligent grasp of the whole of human
life and the human good (or vile misunderstanding of it) shines into and through the
action. Fully or completely virtuous and vicious people are relatively rare, however,
and many non-virtuous (but only decent) people do good things and are responsible
ory, they are l e g i t i m a t e l y praised or b l a m e d , they are n o t praised or

b l a m e d i n any such m o r a l i s t i c or m o r a l l y j u d g e m e n t a l way.
We s h o u l d , t h e n , definitely n o t take A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f res
p o n s i b i l i t y to be a theory, specifically, o f ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' .
We s h o u l d n o t , I w i l l argue, even take i t to i n c l u d e , w h e t h e r
i m p l i c i t l y or explicitly, a t h e o r y o f some special f u r t h e r sort o f
responsibility—'moral' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — b e y o n d the sort he intends
to analyse i n his theory, t h a t a d u l t h u m a n agents ( b u t n o t c h i l d r e n
a n d animals) have for some o f t h e i r responsible actions (the m o r a l l y
g o o d or b a d ones). A t any rate, we m u s t first consider A r i s t o t l e ' s
t h e o r y as a t h e o r y applicable to a l l agents—children, n o n - r a t i o n a l
animals i n general, as w e l l as a d u l t h u m a n beings (Sections I I - V I I
b e l o w ) . T h a t is the core o f his t h e o r y o f responsibility. I m e n t i o n e d
above t h a t A r i s t o t l e does consider a d u l t h u m a n s responsible also
for t h e i r settled characters, a n d as we w i l l see, he does n o t i n c l u d e
n o n - r a t i o n a l animals i n the g r o u p o f agents so responsible ( c h i l d r e n
do n o t have settled characters i n the first place). W e w i l l need, t h e n ,
to go b e y o n d a s t u d y o f the core t h e o r y to see w h a t A r i s t o t l e has
to say about the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e i r characters t h a t o n l y a d u l t
h u m a n agents have (see Section I X b e l o w ) . I w i l l argue t h a t even
at t h a t p o i n t , no c o n c e r n for w h a t people nowadays speak o f as
'moral' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d 'moral' praise or blame enters A r i s t o t l e ' s
theory.
As n o t e d above, another sort o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that agents can
have for w h a t they do is legal responsibility. B u t i t is even clearer
t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s is n o t a t h e o r y m e r e l y and specifically o f legal res
p o n s i b i l i t y . Some o f the examples A r i s t o t l e discusses, i n a t t e m p t i n g
to clarify w h a t an agent is responsible for a n d w h a t n o t , are i n d e e d o f
a sort discussed b y rhetoricians (such as the sophist A n t i p h o n i n his
Tetralogies) as issues for law courts to decide (a j a v e l i n - t h r o w e r k i l l s
someone w h o , perhaps, s h o u l d n o t have w a n d e r e d o n t o the j a v e l i n
field). B u t A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y is a general, indeed all-encompassing,
one t h a t concerns a l l sorts o f t h i n g s that agents do, and i t is n o t
l i m i t e d to, or at any p o i n t focused u p o n , actions t h a t raise questions
of legal responsibility. A r i s t o t l e does address issues specifically to
for doing them, or, also, bad things—they can even do them, on some occasions, i n
very much the same ways, on the same temporary understanding, or lack of it, that
characterizes the fully virtuous and vicious (see NE 2. 4, 1105*28—32). For Aristotle,
as we w i l l see, the question of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness is completely
open in such cases; one needs to consider the circumstances before one can decide
on that question.
272 John M. Cooper
do w i t h w h a t is or is n o t , or o u g h t or o u g h t n o t to be, c o u n t e d for
or against r e s p o n s i b i l i t y specifically i n the context o f the law, else
where i n the Ethics, i n the j o i n t l y N i c o m a c h e a n a n d E u d e m i a n b o o k
on justice (see e.g. i i3S 25 f f . ) ; b u t these are secondary a n d a n c i l l a r y
b
discussions, i n w h i c h his core t h e o r y is d r a w n u p o n for i l l u m i n a t i o n

of legal cases. H i s core theory, as e x p o u n d e d i n NE 3. 1 a n d 5 a n d i n
EE 2. 6-9—my subject i n this paper—is n o t a n d does n o t i n c l u d e a
t h e o r y o f legal responsibility, or o f the p r o p e r p r i n c i p l e s for a legal
system to f o l l o w i n assigning i t .
W h a t remains, then, f r o m m y r o u g h classification o f n o t i o n s o f
responsibility, is causal responsibility. I n fact, as I w i l l argue, leav
ing aside for the m o m e n t the extension o f his t h e o r y to cover res
p o n s i b i l i t y for character and so for feelings, A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y is a
t h e o r y o f one special sort o f causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for things that
happen, n a m e l y the causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f agents for some o f the
things that they do, that is, things that they cause i n one p a r t i c u l a r
way, n a m e l y b y doing t h e m . H e v e r y clearly introduces and marks
his t h e o r y i n EE 2. 6 as a t h e o r y o f causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( I w i l l
say m o r e about this j u s t below, i n Section I I ) , and he indicates
the special status i n his t h e o r y of, specifically, agents as causes of,
specifically, what they do, b y p r e s e n t i n g his t h e o r y i n b o t h the Eu
demian and the Nicomachean Ethics as a t h e o r y o f 'the v o l u n t a r y
and the i n v o l u n t a r y ' ( T O 4KOVOIOV KOI T O aKovaiov). 10
W h e n the w i n d
blows a tree over, the w i n d is the cause (the p r i n c i p a l a n d o r i g i n a t
ing cause, A r i s t o t l e holds) o f the tree's f a l l i n g — a n d so, we c o u l d
perfectly n a t u r a l l y say, responsible for that event. B u t that is n o t a
case o f s o m e t h i n g that happens, or is done b y the w i n d , v o l u n t a r i l y
10
See EE 2. 7, 1223*21; NE 3. 1, n o 9 3 2 — 3 . I translate OLKOVOIOV throughout as
b
'involuntary', i.e. not voluntary (the contradictory opposite, on Aristotle's usage).

I t is true that in one brief passage, well into his treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics
(at i n o i 8 — 2 4 ) , Aristotle draws a distinction between something's being 'not vo
b
luntary' (oi>x eKovoiov) and something's being OLKOVOIOV ('countervoluntary', i n the

attractive neologism adopted by C. Rowe and S. Broadie (trans, and comm.), Aris
totle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 2002)): the 'countervoluntary' is what, being not
voluntary, is also regretted. T h i s distinction is not drawn i n the Eudemian discus
sion (though the basis for it, that i n ordinary usage something is not called OLKOVOIOV
unless it is distressful, is remarked on at 1223*30). I n fact, Aristotle's core theory
marks off voluntary actions from ones that are not voluntary, and he introduces and
concludes his discussions i n both the Eudemian Ethics (1223*21; I 2 2 5 i 7 ) and the
b
Nicomachean Ethics (1 io9 32—3; 111 i 4 ) by contrasting these two notions using the
b b
standard pair of TO eKovoiov Kal TO OLKOVOIOV. I t would be an error to translate OLKOVOIOV

as 'countervoluntary' i n any of those passages, or i n almost all the other occurrences
of the word i n Aristotle. The right translation is 'involuntary' (meaning by that 'not
voluntary').
(or i n v o l u n t a r i l y either). O n l y w h e n we consider an agent causing
s o m e t h i n g where causing that is an a c t i o n i t does do we f i n d any
t h i n g v o l u n t a r y or i n v o l u n t a r y . So, A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y is a t h e o r y o f
one specific case o f causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — t h e causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
o f agents for the actions that they do, a n d therefore cause, n a m e l y
the v o l u n t a r y ones—and o f t h e i r lack o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the i n v o
l u n t a r y (and, as a special case o f the latter, the ' c o u n t e r v o l u n t a r y ' )
ones. A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y is a t h e o r y o f a certain sort o f causal res
11
p o n s i b i l i t y , n o t o f either legal or ' m o r a l ' responsibility.

L e t us t u r n , t h e n , to A r i s t o t l e ' s texts, to see h o w he develops a n d
explains his t h e o r y o f agents' responsibility.
I I
T h e E u d e m i a n t r e a t m e n t begins w i t h the statement that h u m a n

beings are the o n l y substances that are o r i g i n a t i n g sources (apxai)
o f one specific a n d i m p o r t a n t sort o f t h i n g . A l l substances (that is,
plants a n d animals) are, he says, o r i g i n a t i n g sources o f some things
(for example, they generate specific sorts o f offspring), a n d there
are other sorts o f o r i g i n a t i n g sources as w e l l , for example i n m a t h e
m a t i c a l sciences, where the basic t r u t h s are o r i g i n a t i n g sources for
the theorems. H u m a n s , t h o u g h , besides generating other humans,
are w h a t A r i s t o t l e calls here ' c o n t r o l l i n g ' {Kvpiai) sources, i n that
they are also o r i g i n a t i n g sources o f changes ( m o v e m e n t s — t h i n g s
that happen); f u r t h e r m o r e , u n l i k e all other animals, w h i c h also o r i
ginate changes, a m o n g the changes that h u m a n beings originate are
actions (rrpaîs). M o r e o v e r , A r i s t o t l e adds, o r i g i n a t i n g sources are
causes (airCat) o f whatever has b e i n g or comes to be f r o m t h e m . So
humans, i n b e i n g o r i g i n a t i n g sources o f some o f t h e i r actions, are
the o r i g i n a t i n g causes o f t h e m . T h e s e actions, A r i s t o t l e explains,
i n b e i n g caused b y humans, are ' u p to t h e m ' avrois): ' a l l the
1 1
Here and elsewhere I may seem to be using 'voluntary' and 'responsible' vir
tually interchangeably. But though Aristotle's theory certainly does explain the vo
luntariness of actions in terms of their agents' causal responsibility for them, both
in English and i n the Greek equivalent an agent can be responsible, through what
their voluntary actions cause, for a good deal more than just their actions themselves.
Thus (to draw on an example from below, sect, V I I I ) , my dog can be responsible for
the mess on my kitchen floor by voluntarily (and perhaps defiantly) peeing on it; but,
on Aristotle's theory, it is only his action of peeing that was voluntary. We need to
bear that distinction in mind as we proceed in the coming sections to the details of
Aristotle's theory.
274 John M. Cooper
ones t h a t are u p to t h e m t h e y are the cause of, a n d a l l the ones t h e y

are the cause o f are u p to t h e m ' (i 223*7-9). T h u s , an action's b e i n g
'up to us' a n d o u r b e i n g the cause o f i t are e q u i v a l e n t n o t i o n s . 1 2
So,
A r i s t o t l e concludes EE 2. 6 b y saying, we need to f i n d o u t which
o f o u r actions we are ourselves the cause and o r i g i n of: namely, he
says, as a l l agree, those t h a t are o u r v o l u n t a r y o n e s . 13
He then be
gins the e n q u i r y i n t o the v o l u n t a r y i n 2. 7 (1223*23-7) b y i n d i c a t i n g
t h a t the causes o f h u m a n actions are desire {ope&s), d e c i s i o n (rrpo-
aipeoLs), and t h o u g h t (Stavota), and t h a t there are three s u b d i v i s i o n s
o f desire: w i s h , s p i r i t e d desire, a n d a p p e t i t e (fiovXrjois, Ovôs, Imdv-
fxia). 14
1 3
A n action's being up to me or caused by me may differ in the meanings or con
notations of these distinct terms, of course, but w i t h this equivalence Aristotle makes
it clear that the notion of what is 'up to us' as he employs i t i n his discussions of the
voluntary, both here and i n the Nicomachean Ethics, is a strictly causal one. I f we are
the (originating) cause of an action of ours, i t is up to us to do; and if something is
up to us to do, or not do, that means merely that i f we (should) do i t we are (would
be) the cause, and i f we do not do i t we are the cause of that, as well. Wherever i n
either the Eudemian or the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle speaks of something being
up to us to do or not do, he says nothing about any 'free choice' between the alterna
tives, especially i f that is taken to imply a 'liberty of indifference'. He speaks only of
our causal role i n doing whatever we do, including our omissions. (See further n. 47
below, and its main text.)
13
I223 i6—17: i n fact what Aristotle literally says is that all agree that the actions
a
a human being is the cause of are all and only those that are both voluntary and
done on his own decision, when what he means instead is that humans are causes of
their voluntary actions, including those that are done on a decision. Adults are held,
under his theory not only i n the Nicomaceahn Ethics but i n the Eudemian Ethics as
well, to be responsible for akratic actions, which are definitely not done, according
to Aristotle, on decisions to do them: see e.g. i 2 2 3 i — 2 , 8, 33. T h e slip, if there is
b
one, no doubt results from his focus, noted above, on showing the voluntariness of
acts of virtue and vice: actions of virtue or vice are always done on decisions to do
them. I n any event, the Eudemian Ethics' introduction here (at 1223^—9 together
w i t h 16—17) ° f its discussion of voluntary and involuntary actions establishes the
following terminological relationships: actions that are 'up to' an agent are all and
only the ones that that agent causes through its own agency (or would cause, i f it did
them), and all and only the voluntary actions are actions that an agent is cause of i n
that way. T h u s 'up to oneself and 'voluntary' are coextensive terms (in the case of
things 'up to oneself that one actually does), but 'up to oneself is an overtly causal
notion, while 'voluntary' is not. One should note that this coextensiveness applies i n
Aristotle's conception of agency to all agents, animals and small children as well as
adults. Whenever an agent does something voluntary i t does something 'up to i t ' to
do. For the application of the terminology of 'up to' i t to all animals see Phys. 8. 4,
255*5-10.
1 4
He then proceeds, i n 2. 7—9, by considering each of these in t u r n as what is
the cause of actions that are voluntary, before deciding (i225 36— i) that the right
a b
answer is: the voluntary is what is done 'on thought' (TO Kara TTJV hidvoiav). Thus
the Eudemian Ethics' verbal formula for what the voluntary is does differ markedly
T h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y discussion i n the Eudemian Ethics is i m p o r t a n t

for t w o m a i n reasons. F i r s t , i t establishes t h a t the t h e o r y o f w h a t i t
is to be v o l u n t a r y , and o f w h i c h t h i n g s are v o l u n t a r y , is g o i n g to be a
t h e o r y c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n actions. T h e N i c o m a c h e a n t r e a t m e n t has
n o such i n t r o d u c t o r y discussion, b u t leaps in medias res b y r e m a r k
i n g (1 i o 9 3 0 - i ) t h a t v i r t u e concerns passions and actions and t h a t
b
for V o l u n t a r y ones' people are p r a i s e d or b l a m e d . 1 5

T h i s obscures
the focus o f the t h e o r y o f the v o l u n t a r y , as i t is g o i n g to be form
ally p r e s e n t e d i n 3. 1, o n actions (alone), o n t h i n g s t h a t people do,
w h i l e the E u d e m i a n t r e a t m e n t makes t h a t focus e x p l i c i t a n d clear.
Secondly, i t is c r y s t a l clear f r o m the Eudemian Ethics' introduction
t h a t the t h e o r y to be p r o p o s e d is a t h e o r y o f causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y —
t h a t is, causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y specifically of agents, specifically for ac
tions; i t is also m a d e clear t h a t t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y m u s t rest i n the
agent's desires, decisions, and t h o u g h t s (these, the Eudemian Ethics
e x p l i c i t l y announces, are the causes o f a c t i o n s ) . 16
from the Nicomachean Ethics' summary statement denning the voluntary, discussed
in the next paragraph but one below. But i n fact, as we w i l l see, when one takes into
account the qualifications provided i n the discussion i n the Eudemian Ethics leading
up to its formula, the two theories do not differ at all i n substance.
15
I t is sometimes thought that Aristotle means here to mark off the voluntary, as
if by definition, as whatever is blameworthy (if it is bad, i.e. vicious) or praiseworthy
(if it is good, i.e. virtuous). On such a view, voluntary actions would be subject to an
initial, though defeasible, presumption of praiseworthiness or blameworthiness: i f it
was something completely trivial, in no way a good or a bad thing to do, that would
count as a 'defeater'. However, we w i l l see as we proceed that in fact Aristotle applies
to at least two classes of what he counts as voluntary actions a threefold set of options:
praise, blame, or sympathetic allowance (see sect, v below). Moreover, many of what
Aristotle counts as virtuous actions, all of which are voluntary, are too simple and
universally expected of us to be even presumptively worth praising anyone for (or
blaming anyone for not doing): ones of eating w i t h normal decorum, as against mild
overindulgence, behaving w i t h normal friendliness as against abruptly (but not ac
tually rudely) to shopkeepers or people passing by in the street, for example. I t would
seem, then, that Aristotle did not mean at i i o 9 3 0 to imply a presumption of praise
b
or blame (even a defeasible one) for voluntary actions. ( I thank Lesley Brown and
Anna Marmodoro for questions that led me to add this footnote.)
1 6
As noted above (pp. 271—2), besides the two formal expositions of voluntariness,
EE 2. 6—9 and NE 3. 1—5, Aristotle develops and applies ideas about voluntariness i n
NE 5 =EE 4, chapters 8—9. A t one place there (1 i 3 5 i ) Aristotle speaks of getting old
b
and dying and similar things that 'belong to us by nature' as things 'that we both do
[npaTTOfxev] and undergo', none of which is either voluntary or involuntary. He is no
doubt led to speak of (some) of these as things we do (i.e. actions of ours) because of
the naturalness, both i n Greek and English, of saying that we 'do' these things. But
his theory of voluntariness in the formal expositions in both treatises does not treat
these as actions at all: that is why, on the official theory, they are neither voluntary
nor involuntary.
276 John M. Cooper
Despite n o t h a v i n g a c l a r i f y i n g i n t r o d u c t i o n , w h e n the
N i c o m a c h e a n t r e a t m e n t finally gives its s u m m a r y statement o f
w h a t the v o l u n t a r y is, almost at the e n d o f his discussion (111 i 2 2 - a
4), A r i s t o t l e echoes the E u d e m i a n emphasis o n h u m a n beings as

apx h o r i g i n a t i n g sources, a n d o r i g i n a t i n g sources specifically o f
a
actions (he has already m e n t i o n e d i n t e r n a l sources o f action i n

11 i o i 5 ff.): the v o l u n t a r y , he says, is 'that o f w h i c h the o r i g i n a t i n g
a
source (apxv) l s
t m m
agent] itself, w h e n i t k n o w s the p a r t i c u l a r s
e
of the action's (IT p&£ is) s i t u a t i o n ' . So i n the Nicomachean

17
Eth
ics too A r i s t o t l e defines the v o l u n t a r y i n p u r e l y causal terms: to
be v o l u n t a r y an action has to have a certain k i n d o f ' o r i g i n a t i n g
source', v i z . a cause i n t e r n a l to the agent. N o n e the less, i f one
d i d n o t have the E u d e m i a n i n t r o d u c t i o n i n m i n d (as m o s t scholars
reading NE 3. 1 do n o t ) , i t m i g h t take q u i t e a b i t o f reflection for a
reader to realize that the sort o f o r i g i n a t i n g source b e i n g referred to
i n this s u m m a r y is an o r i g i n o f actions (not, for example, o f other
movements, such as those b e l o n g i n g to the digestive system, or the
ones that go o n i n the m o t h e r ' s w o m b , or the father's s c r o t u m , i n
the process o f generation)—despite the e x p l i c i t m e n t i o n o f actions
i n its second clause. H e n c e one m i g h t miss the fact, made e x p l i c i t
i n the Eudemian Ethics at i 2 2 3 2 3 - 5 , that the o r i g i n b e i n g sought
a
is to be located either i n desires, r a t i o n a l and n o n - r a t i o n a l , or i n

decision, o r / a n d i n t h o u g h t . N o n e the less, i t is clear u p o n reading
and t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h the w h o l e chapter that the f o l l o w i n g is w h a t
A r i s t o t l e means to be saying n o t o n l y i n the Eudemian Ethics b u t
also i n the Nicomachean Ethics:
T h e v o l u n t a r y is whatever action has its o r i g i n a t i n g source

w i t h i n an agent, i.e. i n some or other o f its desires, or i n a
decision that i t makes, a n d i n its thoughts (i.e. i n those o f its
thoughts i n w h i c h i t k n o w s the p a r t i c u l a r s o f the action's s i t u
ation).
O n his view, i n b o t h treatments, w h a t i t is to be v o l u n t a r y is to be
1 7
T h o u g h grammatically awkward, this wording makes it clear that on Aristotle's
definition the only things that are directly voluntary are actions (as noted above, n. 4,
feelings and character are voluntary only derivatively). So certain actions, the vo
luntary ones, are what on this definition an agent is responsible for. So for Aristotle,
when someone causes an explosion, what is voluntary for the agent, and what they
are responsible for, is not the explosion, but doing the action of causing one. See fur
ther below, sect. i l l .
an a c t i o n t h a t has t h a t sort o f source, v i z . , a causal one i n t e r n a l to

the agent.
I l l
A r i s t o t l e sets his task i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g the v o l u n t a r y i n the Eudemian

Ethics (2. 6, I 2 2 3 i 5 - i 6 ) as 'to get a grasp o n w h i c h o f one's actions
a
one is oneself cause a n d o r i g i n o f — a n d , correlatively, o f w h i c h ones

one is n o t the cause and o r i g i n of. Before we p r o c e e d to e x a m i n e his
theory, we need to pay heed to the p a r t i c u l a r way t h a t A r i s t o t l e has
of, so to speak, i n d i v i d u a t i n g a c t i o n s . 18
T h i s differs m a r k e d l y f r o m
recent a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories, w h i c h speak o f an
a c t i o n ( o n an occasion) as h a v i n g m a n y t r u e d e s c r i p t i o n s , u n d e r
some o f w h i c h it m i g h t be v o l u n t a r y , b u t i n v o l u n t a r y u n d e r others.
A r i s t o t l e , less a r t i f i c i a l l y a n d w i t h less b u r d e n o f theory, speaks i n
stead o f many actions done o n each single occasion. C o n s i d e r a single
occasion w h e n someone acts. A s the s u m m a r y d e f i n i t i o n i n NE 3. 1
I j u s t q u o t e d i m p l i e s , w h e n A r i s t o t l e asks w h i c h actions are v o l u n
t a r y and w h a t makes an a c t i o n v o l u n t a r y , his q u e s t i o n is, w h i c h o f
the m a n y t h i n g s the p e r s o n does o n an occasion, i f any, c o u n t as v o -
1 8
I n contemporary philosophy the standard view, or treatment, of actions i n
volves considering a single action at any time, which then is susceptible of multiple
true descriptions. O n such a view the bodily movements or ensemble of movements
in which the agent immediately exercises their agency could be regarded as the 'basic
action' to which these further descriptions apply: nipping a light switch, turning
on a light. I n Aristotle's NE definition for voluntary actions ( i i n 2 2 — 4 ) quoteda
just above, one can see at once that he approaches this topic w i t h an alternative,
multiple-actions-at-a-time view, illustrated below i n my main text. He speaks of
'the particulars i n which the action [i.e. the one that the definition means to identify
as a voluntary one] is situated'. The basic action, on the standard view, takes place
in all the particulars that help to distinguish the different descriptions that apply to
that basic action; so, i n fact, do each of the 'other' actions-under-a-description, such
as nipping a switch or turning on a light. When Aristotle speaks of the voluntary
action in any case of voluntary action, he is plainly considering a large number of
distinct actions done at the same time w i t h the same movements, each action taking
place in some particulars of its own situation, differing from one another in that they
do have those different particulars; the voluntary ones among those actions are the
ones that have their origin i n the agent's desires or decisions, and knowledge. Aris
totle never countenances talk of a single action being voluntary under one description,
but perhaps not voluntary under some other one that equally applies to it. I point
out this difference between Aristotle's approach to the individuation of actions and
the contemporary one simply out of faithfulness to Aristotle's view. T h o u g h I think
Aristotle's approach is more intuitive and natural, I do not mean to claim for it any
theoretical superiority. For an alternative similar to Aristotle's see A. I . Goldman,
'The Individuation of Action', Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971), 761—74.
278 John M. Cooper
luntary? W h i c h , i f any, c o u n t instead as i n v o l u n t a r y ? W h a t makes

the difference? Consider O e d i p u s at the crossroads. O n his w a y to 19
Thebes, O e d i p u s confronts an older m a n c o m i n g i n the other direc

t i o n w h o offensively orders h i m to step aside a n d let h i m pass. So ( i n
a single, u n i f i e d m o v e m e n t ) O e d i p u s raises his c l u b and smashes the
m a n o n the head, r e d u c i n g h i m to a heap o n the roadside a n d i n fact
k i l l i n g h i m ; moreover, the m a n , u n b e k n o w n s t to Oedipus, was a l l
along his o w n father. I n A r i s t o t l e ' s w a y o f t h i n k i n g about actions,
O e d i p u s does a huge n u m b e r , i n fact a v i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d one, o f
different actions i n t h a t first m o v e m e n t . H e raises the c l u b and h i t s
the m a n ; he raises the c l u b and h i t s his o w n father; he collapses
the m a n i n t o a heap; he collapses his father i n t o a heap; he k i l l s the
m a n ; he k i l l s his father; he fulfils the p r o p h e c y that he w o u l d k i l l his
father; he gives an o b n o x i o u s o l d geezer w h a t he h a d c o m i n g to h i m ,
n a m e l y a beating; m a y b e he gave an o l d geezer w h a t he h a d c o m
i n g to h i m , his death. A n d o n a n d o n . A r i s t o t l e ' s question, t h e n ,
2 0
is: w h i c h , i f any, o f a l l these vastly n u m e r o u s t h i n g s that O e d i p u s

d i d — t h a t is, t h a t were his actions—were v o l u n t a r y , a n d w h i c h i f
any were i n v o l u n t a r y , a n d w h a t makes the difference between the
t w o sets?
I n NE 3 . 1 , h a v i n g first a n n o u n c e d the need for a t h e o r y o f the v o
l u n t a r y a n d the i n v o l u n t a r y , A r i s t o t l e i m m e d i a t e l y proposes a s u m
m a r y statement c o v e r i n g a l l (and, i t seems, o n l y ) the i n v o l u n t a r y
actions. H e t h e n goes o n i n the rest o f the chapter to elucidate
this statement and, i n fact, to adopt i t , as elucidated, as p a r t o f
his o w n t h e o r y : ' i t is t h o u g h t t h a t t h i n g s t h a t h a p p e n [TO. yiyvo-
/xera] b y c o m p u l s i o n [/3ia] or t h r o u g h ignorance [Si' ayvoiav] are i n
v o l u n t a r y ' (1 i o 9 3 5 - i 1 i o i ) . N o t i c e t h a t the ' t h i n g s t h a t h a p p e n '
b a
referred to here i n c l u d e o n l y actions. 21

T h e 'voluntary' and 'invo-
1 9
Aristotle may be thinking of Oedipus when he mentions a person who struck a
man, not knowing it was his father, at NE $ = EE 4, 1I35 28—30. a
3 0
On single occasions of action there w i l l be many, many things relevant to his
agency that are true of the agent, his circumstances, and the consequences of his
action. A given observer might or might not take note of most of these, or take an
interest in them i f they did. None the less, an agent always does an open-endedly
numerous number of things, ready for any observer or theorist to take note of and
raise questions about. T h a t open-endedness is not a reasonable ground of objection
to Aristotle's way of counting actions; at any rate, it does not give the observer the
power to bring an action into being just by paying attention to it.
3 1
As noted above, Aristotle's core theory of voluntariness, which he is about to
develop for us i n the remainder of this chapter, is a theory of voluntary actions, as
such. See nn. 4, 16, 17, and sect, ix below. I n 3. 1 (and EE 2. 6—9) Aristotle rea-
l u n t a r y ' t h i n g s r e f e r r e d to three or f o u r lines before, i n the first

sentence o f the chapter, w h e r e these t e r m s are i n t r o d u c e d i n t h i s
c o n t e x t , are ' a c t i o n s ' . 22
I t is i m p o r t a n t to bear t h i s i n m i n d i f we are
p r o p e r l y to u n d e r s t a n d the n e x t sentence a n d its examples: ' W h a t is
c o m p e l l e d has its o r i g i n a t i n g source f r o m o u t s i d e , the s o r t o f source
i n w h i c h the one a c t i n g , or the one b e i n g affected [ b y the s o u r c e ] ,
c o n t r i b u t e s n o t h i n g — f o r e x a m p l e , i f a w i n d or people h a v i n g h i m
u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l t o o k h i m off [ / c o / x t W t ] s o m e w h e r e . ' 23
A r i s t o t l e is
n o t e n v i s a g i n g here (as he is o f t e n m i s t a k e n l y t h o u g h t to be) some
t h i n g like a t o r n a d o p i c k i n g someone u p a n d d r o p p i n g t h e m d o w n
s o m e w h e r e i n t a c t , or people b i n d i n g someone u p , l o c k i n g t h e m i n
the t r u n k o f a car, d r i v i n g off, a n d depositing t h e m somewhere.
N o m o r e is he t h i n k i n g o f someone's b e i n g k n o c k e d u n c o n s c i o u s
a n d c a r r i e d off. I n n o n e o f these cases does the p e r s o n engage t h e i r
a g e n c y — t h e y do n o t do a n y t h i n g , t h e y do n o t act at a l l . A r i s t o t l e
discusses cases o f this k i n d i n the Eudemian Ethics: someone grabs
someone else's a r m a n d uses i t to s t r i k e a t h i r d p e r s o n . 2 4
Aristotle
sonably works out first a theory of the voluntariness specifically and only of actions
(doings), before considering other things besides actions that also count as voluntary.
3 3
I t is true, as noted above, that Aristotle writes in the same sentence referred
to here that virtues concern 'passions and actions', but passions are silently set
aside from the outset, beginning w i t h the mention of praise and blame in 1 i o 9 3 1 — b
lawgivers ( 34—5) do not punish people for how they feel. I n this chapter only actions
b
are considered as either voluntary or involuntary (this is duly registered, as we saw

above, in Aristotle's summary statement, 111 i 22—4, of what the voluntary is, w i t h
a
its second clause specifying knowledge of the particulars of 'the action' as required
for voluntariness). So no other sorts of phenomena, other things that happen (e.g.
the wind blowing a tree over), are included w i t h i n the intended scope of the phrase
'things that happen' at 11 i o i . a
3 3
I translate 6 irpdrraw r) 6 iraoxtov at 11 io 2—3 by 'the one acting, or the one be
a
ing affected [by the source]', rather than by e.g. 'the agent, or [rather] the v i c t i m '
(T. H . I r w i n i n Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd edn. (Cambridge and Indiana
polis, 1999)), because (even if, as I explain below, this agent is a victim) we must
not take being a v i c t i m in the way indicated here to preclude being also an agent,
as Irwin's translation (intentionally, i t seems) suggests it does. Notice, i n any event,
that ndoxcov here refers to undergoing effects imposed by the outside source. I t is not
to be related to the irdOr) (passions) that Aristotle begins the chapter by specifying
that, alongside actions, virtues and vices concern. Also, one should note that the verb
Aristotle uses for 'taking h i m off' extremely often, when a person is the object of the
verb, means 'conduct, escort' and does not at all connote physical carrying of the
person; see LSJ s.v I I . So here. ( I thank Christopher Taylor for raising questions
that led me to add the clarifications in this note, and the preceding one.)
3 4
A t EE I224 i5—20 Aristotle talks about 'lifeless' things, such as a stone, and
a
how they have two sorts of motion, their own natural one (downwards, for example),
caused by an inner impulse of their own, and another 'compulsory' one, by neces-
sitation, when something outside moves them contrary to that natural impulse. So
2 8o John M. Cooper
makes i t clear there that he t h i n k s there is n o t h i n g i n v o l u n t a r y g o i n g

on i n any such case—even if, i n the cases i n the Nicomachean Ethics,
the v i c t i m d i d n o t w a n t to be where they ended u p a n d d i d n o t w a n t
to be b l o w n a r o u n d or b o u n d u p a n d c a r r i e d i n that way. I n cases
like that, where someone undergoes s o m e t h i n g b u t does n o t act at
all, n o t h i n g i n v o l u n t a r y occurs, a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e ' s c o n c e p t i o n ,
and his theory, o f the i n v o l u n t a r y . I n A r i s t o t l e ' s core theory, i n v o
l u n t a r y things are necessarily i n v o l u n t a r y actions.
IV
Hence, we need to f i l l o u t A r i s t o t l e ' s examples so that they c o n

cern actions o f the person w h o is affected b y the force f r o m o u t
side, b u t actions that are none the less n o t v o l u n t a r y . I n the case
of the w i n d , A r i s t o t l e m u s t be c o n s i d e r i n g an a c t i o n o f the c o m
pelled person to go where they are b l o w n , b u t an i n v o l u n t a r y one.
I n the case o f people w h o have t h e m u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l , i t is the
action o f g o i n g where they are made to go b y those people—again,
one they do i n v o l u n t a r i l y . I n the first case we c o u l d t h i n k o f a sailor
i n a boat w h o is b l o w n b y the w i n d to a l a n d i n g i n some h a r b o u r
they were n o t sailing to; they were acting a l l the w h i l e they were be
i n g b l o w n , keeping the boat erect a n d p o i n t i n g i t as best they c o u l d
i n the d i r e c t i o n they w a n t e d to go, b u t b e i n g b l o w n none the less
where the w i n d was t a k i n g t h e m . Since they were a c t i n g i n the ways
i n d i c a t e d a l l that w h i l e , a r r i v i n g at that h a r b o u r was s o m e t h i n g they
d i d ; i t is w h a t a l l those actions added u p to. T h i s too was an action
of theirs, b u t ( u n l i k e the steering a n d p o i n t i n g ) i t was i n v o l u n t a r y
because they h a d n o choice i n the matter: the w i n d dictated where
they w o u l d arrive, i.e. w o u l d go; they (their desires a n d k n o w l e d g e ,
the requisite causes o f v o l u n t a r y action) d i d n o t . T h e y went to that
place c o m p e l l e d b y the w i n d , n o t v o l u n t a r i l y . L i k e w i s e , the people
w i t h the person u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l d e t e r m i n e d where that person
far, he says, that is like the human case: movement is voluntary when deriving from
the inner impulse, involuntary when from the outer cause. However, Aristotle insists
that i n the case of the stone its natural motion is not voluntary, nor, by implication, is
its necessitated one involuntary. Later, at I 2 2 4 i 3 — 1 5 , he alludes to the case where
b
someone takes someone else's hand and strikes some third party w i t h it. Aristotle
compares that w i t h just the sort of necessitation that a stone undergoes. So in this
human case, as w i t h that of the stone, the person is not involuntarily struck. (Aris
totle irrelevantly makes the person struck resist the striker's force; but that does not
affect the lack of involuntariness i n what happens to him.)
w o u l d e n d u p (that is, where they w o u l d go, that specific action o f

theirs) because, as the p e r s o n w a l k e d along u n d e r t h e i r o w n power,
b e i n g p u s h e d b y t h e m a n d restrained f r o m g o i n g o f f i n other direc
tions, they made sure that the v i c t i m o n l y w a l k e d where they w a n t e d
t h e m to. T h e v i c t i m w e n t to the place the people i n c o n t r o l i n t e n d e d
a n d where they made sure he w e n t , a n d this was an action o f his.
B u t i t was n o t the result o f any desire o f his to go there (he h a d no
such desire, a n d p r e s u m a b l y also desired not to go there), n o r d i d i t
result i n any way f r o m his k n o w i n g where he was g o i n g (he m a y or
m a y n o t have k n o w n where he was g o i n g — t h a t d i d n o t m a t t e r ) : so
i t was an i n v o l u n t a r y action. I t was i n v o l u n t a r y because p h y s i c a l l y
compelled.
A s A r i s t o t l e says, i n all cases o f c o m p e l l e d action the v i c t i m i z e d
agent does n o t c o n t r i b u t e a n y t h i n g to the d o i n g o f that p a r t i c u l a r
action, the i n v o l u n t a r y o n e — i n these cases, the action o f g o i n g to
the specified place. H e does go there, that is an action o f his; b u t
he c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g to his d o i n g that. T h a t he d i d that was de
t e r m i n e d b y — i t h a d its complete o r i g i n a t i n g cause i n — t h e w i n d or
the people w h o h a d c o n t r o l o f h i m . M a n y other actions he d i d at the
same t i m e a n d w i t h the same movements, he d i d v o l u n t a r i l y — t h a t
is, f r o m his o w n desires and knowledge as the o r i g i n a t i n g causes o f
them. T h e sailor tended the t i l l e r a n d reefed the sails, s t r u g g l i n g to
stay afloat: all o f those actions o f his were v o l u n t a r y . S t i l l , all the
w h i l e that he was d o i n g all those things he was also, inevitably, do
i n g the action o f g o i n g to where the w i n d was t a k i n g h i m . A s for
the k i d n a p v i c t i m , he w a l k e d along, perhaps l o o k i n g all the w h i l e
for some way o f escape, a n d c e r t a i n l y reluctantly, u n t i l he f o u n d
h i m s e l f where the kidnappers were m a k i n g h i m go. H e c o n t r i b u
ted n o t h i n g whatsoever to his d o i n g that action, the action o f g o i n g
where he none the less w e n t , even t h o u g h i t was his desires, his o w n
c o n t r o l over his b o d i l y movements, a n d his knowledge that were
o r i g i n a t i n g causes o f all the p a r t i c u l a r steps he k n o w i n g l y took as
he w a l k e d along—therefore, v o l u n t a r i l y .
I n b o t h cases, o f course, the agent d i d have options: the sailor
c o u l d have abandoned the boat b y j u m p i n g overboard, or let i t cap
size, a n d c o u l d have n o t k e p t steering and m a n a g i n g the sails. I n
that case he w o u l d n o t have sailed a n d so n o t have done an action
o f going where the w i n d t o o k h i m (viz. to the u n w a n t e d h a r b o u r ) .
O r else he m i g h t j u s t have d r o w n e d , a n d a r r i v e d there dead (again,
w i t h o u t going there). T h e k i d n a p v i c t i m c o u l d have resisted m o r e
282 John M. Cooper
v i g o r o u s l y t h a n he d i d ; he c o u l d have refused to w a l k a n d gone l i m p ,

thus f o r c i n g the k i d n a p p e r s to b u n d l e h i m u p a n d p h y s i c a l l y carry
h i m , or else beat h i m unconscious so as to make c a r r y i n g h i m easier.
I n either case, they w o u l d insist o n his c o m i n g to be there, even
t h o u g h i n either case he w o u l d n o t go there. T o take those options
(the o n l y ones available, g i v e n the force o f these external powers) is,
effectively, to cease to act at a l l ; b e i n g p h y s i c a l l y c a r r i e d or b l o w n
somewhere, as I n o t e d above, is n o t d o i n g a n y t h i n g . B e i n g i n e r t l y
so c a r r i e d w o u l d n o t be c o u n t e d o n A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y as a n y t h i n g
involuntary, because for A r i s t o t l e o n l y actions are either v o l u n t a r y
or n o t . T h a t seems to me e n t i r e l y reasonable, even i f i t goes against
our w a y o f speaking about involuntariness. F o r A r i s t o t l e , the char
acterizations o f v o l u n t a r y or i n v o l u n t a r y reasonably do n o t a p p l y to
a n y t h i n g that j u s t happens to people or t h i n g s ; o n his core theory,
i t o n l y applies to actions, to things that agents do. T h e s e agents h a d
o n l y the o p t i o n o f ceasing to act altogether.
I n these cases, t h e n , the agent does n o t have the o p t i o n o f d o i n g
some other a c t i o n t h a n to go where he does go; i f he acts at a l l , 2 5
that is where he is g o i n g to do the a c t i o n o f going. H e goes there

u n d e r c o m p u l s i o n (fttq), and therefore i n v o l u n t a r i l y . H i s o n l y o p
t i o n is s i m p l y to do the a c t i o n o f s t o p p i n g acting altogether, and
let his b o d y be subject to whatever m a n i p u l a t i o n h u m a n or n a t u r a l
forces impose.
A r i s t o t l e n e x t discusses t w o f u r t h e r cases, and this t i m e the agent

does have an o p t i o n o f w h i c h o f t w o actions to take ( b e y o n d the
action o f s t o p p i n g acting). These are cases o f — w h a t I w i l l call, i n
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to c o m p u l s i o n — c o e r c i o n , again one b y a physical
force, the other b y h u m a n agents. H i g h seas coerce a ship captain
to order the cargo d i t c h e d i n order to save the ship a n d the lives
3 5
i.e. i n any relevant way: if the sailor decided to just sit i n the boat reading a book
without doing any sailor's work, or the kidnap victim, after going limp, pulled out a
book and sat on the ground reading it, then i n being forcibly transported to the des
tination they would function i n being so transported no differently from a couple of
corpses. Likewise, i f all action was completely futile, for example i f the w i n d were
simply too strong for steering to have any effect, then even i f the sailor pulled and
tugged against the w i n d all the while his boat was being borne out of his control onto
the shore he would not have been an agent going where he ended up. No more would
the kidnapped person if carried while futilely kicking and screaming.
o f the people o n i t ; a t y r a n t coerces a m a n to do s o m e t h i n g s e r i

o u s l y s h a m e f u l ( b e t r a y his c o u n t r y say) b y t h r e a t e n i n g to h a r m his
w i f e a n d c h i l d r e n , w h o m the t y r a n t has u n d e r his c o n t r o l , i f he does
n o t — n o t to p r o t e c t t h e m f r o m i n j u r y is s e r i o u s l y s h a m e f u l too. The
q u e s t i o n A r i s t o t l e considers is w h e t h e r these too s h o u l d be c o u n t e d
as actions done u n d e r c o m p u l s i o n , a n d therefore as i n v o l u n t a r y —
ones t h a t the agent is n o t responsible for, because the originating
source o f t h e m lies n o t i n his o w n desires or decision, a n d know
ledge, b u t i n the o u t s i d e force. A r i s t o t l e ' s answer is f i r m a n d de
cisive: all cases o f coerced a c t i o n are n o t i n v o l u n t a r y , b u t , i n fact,
voluntary. 2 6
T h e y differ f u n d a m e n t a l l y f r o m actions t h a t are com
pelled. T h e agent's desires or decision, a n d t h e i r t h o u g h t s , are the
3 6
See m o i 8 : 'So such actions are voluntary.' T o clarify Aristotle's distinction
a
between compulsion and what I am calling coercion, and to see why he insists that
coerced actions are voluntary, consider this variation on the compelled action of my
kidnap victim. So far i n my main text we have considered two cases, one where the
victim does the action of going where he is forced to go, and the other where he re
fuses and is simply carried off, altogether inactive. But there is a third possibility.
Suppose, as before, that the victim realizes it is hopeless to resist, and thinks the
best chance he has of breaking free is to co-operate. So, while still looking around
furtively for openings for escape, he plays along, so that his captors do not need to
keep on exercising their control (pushing h i m ahead, keeping the ropes tight, etc.).
They just tell h i m which direction to walk, and how fast, and so on, and he fol
lows their instructions. T h i s person decides to go wherever it is they are taking h i m
(maybe they even tell h i m where, so he knows the destination as one of the parti
culars in which this action of his of going somewhere is situated). He acts under
coercion, because of their implicit or explicit serious and believable threat of harm
to h i m if he does not co-operate. But he goes voluntarily. His action of going there is
not compelled (as we saw it would be if he were bound and pushed or pulled along)
but voluntary. (Of course, there is more to be said about this action than merely
that: see the next two paragraphs of my main text.) The fact that, as noted above,
the compelled agent had the option of ceasing to act, w i t h the result that he would
be physically carried to the same place, does not, as I explained, make his action of
walking a case of coerced, but voluntary action. However, i f instead he should take
that option, the action that he then does (of going limp etc.) he does voluntarily, as
I have also said. So i f he knows that by going limp he w i l l just make the kidnappers
beat h i m over the head and carry h i m , he may be responsible for doing the further
action of allowing himself to be carried there. Still, getting there by being carried is
neither voluntary nor involuntary—it just happens to h i m . So the distinction between
compulsion and coercion remains. The coerced agent does an action of going to the
place he ends up i n (and does it voluntarily); the compelled agent ends up there,
and goes there, involuntarily. I n assessing responsibility and considering praise or
blame i n all three cases—the compelled agent, the coerced one, and the one that
goes limp—we l i m i t ourselves to what they did do voluntarily. Voluntarily walking
under coercion, voluntarily opting to go limp, and voluntarily allowing yourself to
be carried somewhere are importantly different actions. Praise and blame for these
different voluntary actions involve different considerations. ( I thank Ursula Coope
and Terence I r w i n for raising questions that led to these clarifications.)
28 4
John M. Cooper
o r i g i n a t i n g cause o f these, a n d all, coerced actions; the outside force

( t h o u g h present a n d operating) is n o t t h e i r o r i g i n .
W h e n the captain t h r e w the cargo o v e r b o a r d he k n e w w h a t he
was d o i n g a n d d i d i t for a reason (presumably, a sufficient one: b u t
that does n o t matter, so far as voluntariness goes); he desired and
decided to do i t . So i t was v o l u n t a r y , however m u c h u n w i s h e d for
and regretted. T h e s i t u a t i o n he was i n was u n l u c k y ; he is the v i c t i m
of m i s f o r t u n e . B u t his a c t i o n o f t h r o w i n g the cargo o v e r b o a r d was
voluntary. H e is responsible for that t h i n g that he d i d : t h r o w i n g the
cargo o v e r b o a r d (under these c o n d i t i o n s o f duress, o f course: those
are a m o n g the relevant p a r t i c u l a r s o f that action).
L i k e w i s e for the m a n w h o betrayed the state secret ( i f that is w h a t
he d i d ) . H e decided, or perhaps he o n l y j u s t felt, that i t was m o r e
shameful n o t to p r o t e c t his f a m i l y f r o m h a r m t h a n to betray the
secret. ( H e m a y or m a y n o t have been w r o n g about that.) H e too
is the v i c t i m o f b a d luck: the m i s f o r t u n e o f falling, w i t h his family,
i n t o the clutches o f the t y r a n t . B u t w h e n he betrayed the secret he
d i d that action v o l u n t a r i l y : the o r i g i n a t i n g source o f i t lay w i t h i n
his desires or decision, and k n o w l e d g e , n o t i n the force a p p l i e d b y
the t y r a n t w i t h his threat. So he is responsible for this specific t h i n g
that he d i d : t e l l i n g that secret (under these c o n d i t i o n s o f threat, i t
has to be emphasized, since that is a relevant p a r t i c u l a r o f the spe
cific action o f secret-betrayal that he d i d ) . Or, alternatively, i f the
m a n refused to tell the secret a n d thereby caused the h a r m to his
f a m i l y that the t y r a n t threatened, w h i c h was a seriously shameful
t h i n g to do, t h e n he v o l u n t a r i l y h a r m e d his f a m i l y a n d v o l u n t a r
i l y d i d s o m e t h i n g shameful. H i s desires a n d decision were the (or
at least an important) o r i g i n a t i n g cause o f that h a r m . L i k e O e d i p u s
w h o k i l l e d the o l d geezer v o l u n t a r i l y , this m a n h a r m e d his f a m i l y
v o l u n t a r i l y . ( T h e fact that the t y r a n t also h a r m e d t h e m v o l u n t a r i l y
is irrelevant, so far as this q u e s t i o n is concerned.) So this m a n is re
sponsible for h a r m i n g his f a m i l y shamefully (whether or n o t he was
r i g h t about w h a t the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n called f o r ) . B u t , again, we m u s t
bear i n m i n d that this h a r m f u l a n d shameful t h i n g he d i d was done
u n d e r those c o n d i t i o n s o f threat: those c o n d i t i o n s are p a r t o f the
p a r t i c u l a r s o f the specific h a r m f u l a n d shameful t h i n g that he d i d .
O f course, that is n o t the w h o l e story, a n d A r i s t o t l e adds t w o

sorts o f qualifications to that j u d g e m e n t o f voluntariness. F i r s t , he
allows that cases o f coercion are i n a w a y m i x e d , as he puts i t ; there
is s o m e t h i n g i n t h e m i n some w a y that is i n v o l u n t a r y . Secondly,
he emphasizes that i t does n o t i n any way f o l l o w f r o m the fact that

someone v o l u n t a r i l y d i d s o m e t h i n g b a d that he is b l a m e w o r t h y for
h a v i n g done w h a t he d i d ; n o r is someone w h o has v o l u n t a r i l y done
s o m e t h i n g good necessarily praiseworthy. H e n c e there is p l e n t y o f
r o o m to make relevant d i s t i n c t i o n s a m o n g v o l u n t a r y , coerced ac
tions, where s o m e t h i n g good or b a d is done: some o f these m a y be
praiseworthy, others b l a m e w o r t h y , others to be m e t w i t h s y m p a
thetic allowance, as A r i s t o t l e p u t s i t (avyyvwfj.rj), and n o t i n any way
h e l d against the person w h o d i d t h e m v o l u n t a r i l y (see 111 o 19-26). a
F i r s t , then, for w h a t is i n v o l u n t a r y about coerced actions. A r i s

totle p o i n t s o u t that w h e n these agents acted, the b a d t h i n g they
d i d — t h a t is, t e l l i n g the secret, or causing the h a r m to t h e i r family,
or t h r o w i n g the cargo overboard—was done (as I have made clear i n
m y recital o f the events) n o t ' w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n ' (aTrXws) or ' i n its
o w n r i g h t ' (KO.0' avro). 21
T h a t is, shamefully b e t r a y i n g t h e i r c o u n
try, or h a r m i n g t h e i r o w n family, or t h r o w i n g the cargo overboard,
is n o t the w h o l e o f w h a t they d i d i n d o i n g the b a d t h i n g . So t h o u g h
they d i d do that b a d t h i n g , they d i d n o t do i t like t h a t — t h a t is, for
n o other reason t h a n for it, for h a r m i n g or b e t r a y i n g or t h r o w i n g
t h i n g s away. So far as such u n q u a l i f i e d or i n - i t s - o w n - r i g h t d o i n g o f
any o f these things goes, they n o t o n l y d i d n o t , they surely w o u l d
never, do such an act v o l u n t a r i l y . So i f they ever do do such an act
o f u n q u a l i f i e d whatever i t m a y be, that action w i l l c e r t a i n l y have to
be i n v o l u n t a r y (even ' c o u n t e r v o l u n t a r y ' ) . T h i s is the ' a d m i x t u r e '
3 7
i n o 9 , 18—19; 11 i o 3 , 5. Aristotle understandably focuses on bad actions done
a b
under coercion: these, he argues, are not to be blamed, but given sympathetic al
lowance because of the exigent circumstances. However, though he takes no explicit
notice of this, his analysis opens up parallel cases where, because of the exigent cir
cumstances, the agent does the right thing, but because of the exigency does not
deserve praise for doing so: these would involve a parallel to sympathetic allowance,
which one might call 'sympathetic reservation'. For example, suppose the ship cap
tain, in the excitement caused by the storm, keeps thinking of the ship owner and
his distress at the loss of the cargo, and so cannot bring himself to throw it over
board: he does not hold back from doing that because i n fact, i n a cool moment, that
would have been the right decision, but just because of his sympathy for his friend,
the owner. Or suppose the man subject to the tyrant's threats does the right thing
(e.g. refuses to tell the secret) but not on the grounds that make that the right thing
to do (in which case his action would merit praise, because it would show laudatory
resolve not to be distracted by threats from doing the right thing): he does it because
all he can think of when subjected to the tyrant's pressure is the punishment he w i l l
receive when his government learns of his betrayal. We should bear i n mind, i n as
sessing Aristotle's theory, both of these alternatives to praise and blame for bad and
good actions under exigent circumstances: sympathetic allowance and what I have
called sympathetic reservation.
2 86 John M. Cooper
of the i n v o l u n t a r y i n w h a t they d i d . I t is n o t that there actually was

a n y t h i n g relevantly i n v o l u n t a r y that they i n fact d i d : they d i d n o t
betray, h a r m , or t h r o w things away w i t h o u t qualification, b u t with
certain qualifications. N o n e the less, i t is i m p o r t a n t to d i s t i n g u i s h
the case o f v o l u n t a r y coerced actions f r o m ones where coercion is
absent b y p o i n t i n g o u t that there is this possible i n v o l u n t a r y action
l u r k i n g i n the b a c k g r o u n d ( i n this negated w a y ) i n (at least t y p i c a l )
cases o f coercion. So, A r i s t o t l e i m p l i e s , this l u r k i n g m e r e l y possible
action is i n a w a y in the a c t i o n that was actually done. T h e s e agents
were forced b y exigent circumstances to do s o m e t h i n g v o l u n t a r i l y
that they d i d n o t w a n t to do a n d w o u l d never have done v o l u n t a r i l y
except i n those or s i m i l a r exigent c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 28
A n d that is why, secondly, A r i s t o t l e makes a p o i n t o f m e n t i o n i n g

that, even i f i n some such cases the agent is l e g i t i m a t e l y praised for
d o i n g w h a t they d i d (if, say, they refused to betray the secret and
that was i n fact the r i g h t t h i n g , because i t is a really i m p o r t a n t l y fine
t h i n g to keep state secrets), or l e g i t i m a t e l y b l a m e d (if, say, they t o l d
the secret a n d i t was i n fact m o r e shameful to do that t h a n to a l l o w
the threatened h a r m to t h e i r f a m i l y ) , i n other cases the l e g i t i m a t e
response is n e i t h e r o f those, b u t to make sympathetic allowance for
t h e m (avyyvajfirj). Some threats or dangers can s t r a i n o u r h u m a n
nature too m u c h for us to expect anyone (short o f a great hero) to
not do the w r o n g t h i n g (a /xi) Set)—in o u r t y r a n t - t h r e a t e n e d person's
case, the w r o n g bad a n d shameful t h i n g . W e make allowances and
do n o t blame or even h o l d i t against someone w h e n such h o r r i b l e
pressure is p u t o n t h e m that they are h a v i n g to consider either be
t r a y i n g a state secret or d o i n g t h e i r f a m i l y serious h a r m . W e under
stand that that k i n d o f pressure makes i t v e r y h a r d to t h i n k o u t or
decide, or even feel like d o i n g , w h a t m i g h t i n fact be the r i g h t t h i n g .
I f they make a mistake u n d e r circumstances like these, w e l l , that is
One might note here that many actions undertaken despite their unwanted con
3 8
sequences (say, having a twenty-year mortgage debt to pay off, after signing loan
documents as the best available way of obtaining a house one wants) also have some
thing involuntary about them: no one takes on such a debt 'without qualification' or
'in its own right'. But having such an involuntary element does not make an act a
coerced one, on Aristotle's theory of coerced or 'mixed' actions. For h i m , coercion
requires truly exigent circumstances: believable threat to life, serious harm to one
self or someone one has responsibilities for or cares greatly about, and the like. T h a t
it is not always easy or generally agreed whether some circumstance is an exigent
one does not undermine Aristotle's account: whether one was coerced is often, and
reasonably, hard to determine. ( I thank Terence I r w i n for discussion leading to this
clarification.)
c o m p l e t e l y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . L i k e w i s e , i f i n fact the s t o r m was not

so t e r r i b l e after a l l , or i n a cooler m o m e n t the c a p t a i n m i g h t have
devised some o t h e r r e m e d y t h a n to t h r o w the cargo o v e r b o a r d , i t
m a y v e r y w e l l be t h a t i t w o u l d be l e g i t i m a t e and h u m a n l y o n l y p r o
p e r l y considerate o f us to m a k e allowances, a n d (even i f we were
the c a r g o - o w n e r ) n o t h o l d i t at a l l against h i m . 2 9
S t i l l , there is n o
w a r r a n t , i n the l i g h t o f these facts, to change the analysis a n d de
clare t h a t w h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y d i d (the specific qualified s h a m e f u l , or
d e s t r u c t i v e , t h i n g t h a t t h e y d i d ) was done i n v o l u n t a r i l y W h e n our
n a t u r e undergoes s u c h strains, i t r e m a i n s we w h o act, we the agent,
since the o r i g i n o f the t h i n g i n q u e s t i o n t h a t we do lies squarely i n
o u r desires a n d decisions, a n d o u r k n o w l e d g e , n o t i n any outside
force or p o w e r . 3 0
3 9
One should take note also of what Aristotle says (11 io 26—9) about Alcmaeon's
a
action of murdering his mother, and his claim, i n Euripides' play, that he was 'neces
sitated' to do it. Perhaps i n the play (which is lost) Alcmaeon meant to say he acted
under compulsion (jSt'a); but Aristotle mentions h i m here as someone who claimed
to have acted under coercion (his father's curse, if he did not kill her, was, Aristotle
says he said, among the dvayKaoavra—this being the term Aristotle uses for coercion
as opposed to compulsion). T h a t is, Aristotle counts h i m as claiming to have done a
'mixed' action—voluntary, but excusable. Aristotle says it was ridiculous to claim the
curse imposed coercive pressure, of the sort the tyrant or the high seas certainly did
on the people in his other examples. So Alcmaeon is not i n the least entitled to sym
pathetic allowance for the murder. But why was it ridiculous to claim coercion in this
case? Presumably because it is ridiculous to think any god could be brought, even by
a murdered father's curse, to visit anything bad on Alcmaeon for not murdering his
mother! (Broadie and Rowe's account of the absurdity here, p. 312, is ineffective: if
both alternatives, doing the murder and accepting the alleged consequences of the
curse, were 'humanly unbearable', i.e. such as to 'overstrain human nature', then
Alcmaeon was acting under coercion, whichever of the alternatives he chose.) Aris
totle's point is that, even i f Alcmaeon trembled i n fear of his father's curse and that
fear was among the emotions and desires that caused his action (idiotically supersti
tious as he may have been), it is not merely how you feel that determines whether
you acted under coercion; there has to be, objectively speaking, something i n human
nature itself and human circumstances, as they actually are, that places real pressure
on anyone i n a situation similar to the agent's.
3 0
Here we touch upon what I think is the sole significant difference between the
Eudemian and the Nicomachean treatments of voluntariness. I n a somewhat cryptic
final section of EE 2. 8 (1225 i9—34) Aristotle seems to allow that some emotions (an
a
ger, lust) or unspecified and puzzling 'natural conditions' can sometimes arise in a
human person which are 'strong and beyond nature' (that is, I take it, too strong
for our nature to withstand, to-^vpa teal vnep TTJV <j>voiv)—a strange t h i n g for a 'na
tural condition' to be! I n those cases, he says, we should make allowances, not, as i n
the Nicomachean Ethics, by retaining our judgement that they have acted voluntar
ily (while holding that they are not subject to legitimate criticism), but by holding
that these emotions and conditions are 'naturally such as to exercise compulsion on
our nature', thus rendering those acts not voluntary at all, but involuntary because
compelled. Aristotle goes on to compare people in such situations to those who speak
2 88 John M. Cooper
So far, t h e n , we have discussed actions t h a t are c o m p e l l e d (filaia,

done /3ia), a n d those that are coerced (the so-called ' m i x e d ' actions).
T h e former, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s theory, are w i t h o u t exception i n v o l u n
tary, the latter, again w i t h o u t exception, v o l u n t a r y . T h e former
have t h e i r o r i g i n outside the person; the latter have t h e i r o r i g i n a t
i n g source inside h i m or her, specifically i n the agent's desires, or
decision-power, a n d i n t h e i r t h o u g h t . A r i s t o t l e ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f the
v o l u n t a r y i n NE 3. 1 (111 C22-4, c i t e d above) specifies t h a t i t is o n l y
actions, h a v i n g t h e i r o r i g i n i n this specific w a y w i t h i n the agent, o f
w h i c h he k n o w s the p a r t i c u l a r s i n w h i c h the actions are situated,
that are v o l u n t a r y . O n l y for those is the agent responsible. W h e n
O e d i p u s k i l l e d his father, he d i d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y m a n y other ac
tions, for example the action o f g i v i n g the geezer w h o was b l o c k i n g
his w a y w h a t was c o m i n g to h i m . T h i s second a c t i o n o f his h a d its
o r i g i n a t i n g source i n his anger and his consequent desire k n o w i n g l y
to beat the geezer over the head—that b e i n g w h a t O e d i p u s t h o u g h t
he h a d c o m i n g to h i m . B u t since he d i d n o t k n o w the p a r t i c u l a r fact
about the a c t i o n t h a t he also d i d o f b a s h i n g and k i l l i n g his father,
that the geezer he was b a s h i n g was his father, he d i d n o t do the ac
t i o n o f b a s h i n g a n d k i l l i n g his father v o l u n t a r i l y . A r i s t o t l e adds at
once t h a t the ignorance t h a t makes an a c t i o n t h a t one does i n v o l u n
t a r y does n o t i n c l u d e ignorance for w h i c h one is oneself responsible,
t h r o u g h one's p r i o r actions, such as the ignorance o f p a r t i c u l a r s t h a t
b e i n g d r u n k or v i o l e n t l y angry m a y cause, n o r i n general i g n o r
31
ance o f t h i n g s everyone is reasonably expected to take the t r o u b l e
prophecies when possessed by the god, as at the Pythian oracle: some god is acting on
them, causing what they say, rather than themselves being the originating source of
their actions through their own desires and state of mind. T h i s is a very injudicious
concession on Aristotle's part (it invites the claim i n all sorts of emotional situations
that what one did was involuntary because compelled), and I take the explicit use
of the same term for 'sympathetic allowance' (ovyyvfxt^) i n the Nicomachean Ethics
( m o 2 4 ) as here i n the Eudemian Ethics as intended to emphasize the Nicomachean
a
Ethics' departure from, and correction of, the Eudemian Ethics' injudicious analysis.
I take it, though Aristotle is not explicit here or elsewhere about this, that among
3 1
the particulars one could be ignorant of are various 'moral' features of the situation,
for example, that pawing this particular female is shameful and bad (something that
you do when drunk, due to drink), or that slugging this offensive man i n the face
(something that you do i n , and because of, violent anger) is shameful. I t is not just
factual ignorance, due to drink, for example that what you are doing i n reaching out
to paw someone is knocking over a prized vase, or ignorance due to anger that you
are shoving someone hard enough to break his arm, that prevents an act from being
involuntary; drink or violent anger can make you ignorant of relevant moral facts
too, and acting in ignorance of them on such an occasion also counts not as acting
from ignorance of a 'particular', but only in ignorance.
to k n o w a n d to bear i n m i n d . 3 2
So we n e e d to add to A r i s t o t l e ' s ac
c o u n t o f i n v o l u n t a r y actions a second class, besides c o m p e l l e d ones:
actions due to ignorance o f s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i c u l a r s o f those actions'
circumstances. 33
A b o u t the actions t h a t are i n v o l u n t a r y due to i g n o r a n c e , i t is i m

p o r t a n t to emphasize t h a t the agent does n o t desire or decide to do
those actions at a l l , j u s t as w i t h c o m p e l l e d actions. So those actions
do n o t have t h e i r o r i g i n i n the agent's desires or d e c i s i o n - p o w e r . 34
N o n e the less, the o r i g i n o f t h e m lies w i t h i n the agent i n a w a y t h a t

makes t h e m his or her actions: the agent's t h o u g h t s , specifically
t h e i r i g n o r a n t t h i n k i n g t h a t d i d n o t i n c l u d e the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t
( i n O e d i p u s ' case) the geezer was his father, cause t h i s a c t i o n . The
o r i g i n a t i n g cause i n these cases, as A r i s t o t l e says, is i g n o r a n c e : a n d
o f course, the i g n o r a n c e i n q u e s t i o n is a feature o f the agent's o w n
t h o u g h t s i n a n d as t h e y do the a c t i o n . C o n t r a s t the case o f c o m
p e l l e d a c t i o n , w h e r e the cause lies outside. H o w e v e r , i n b o t h cases
o f i n v o l u n t a r y action—agents d o i n g s o m e t h i n g f r o m i g n o r a n c e a n d
ones c o m p e l l e d to do s o m e t h i n g — t h e y v o l u n t a r i l y do lots o f o t h e r
actions i n the same m o v e m e n t s as those i n w h i c h t h e y do the invo
l u n t a r y one. W i t h the c o m p e l l e d agent, however, i t is the outside
3 3
This latter qualification is made explicit at EE 2. 9, i 2 2 5 i 1—16, and echoed at
b
NE 3 . 5 , 1 1 i3 33—11 i4 3- See also 11 i3 24—5 and 3 1—3, where Aristotle repeats the
b a b
point that ignorance that one has oneself caused voluntarily, i.e. through one's own
desires and knowledge at some earlier time (e.g. by getting drunk), does not render
involuntary relevant actions that one does later. Notice also that Aristotle's recog
nition, i n discussing coerced actions, that not all coerced bad actions, even though
voluntary, merit blame, but sympathetic allowance instead, applies here too. Yes,
your anger (one of your own states of motivation) caused you, for example, to lose
control and slug some offensive guy i n the face, a shameful thing to do: but some
sudden face-to-face insults can be such that, as Aristotle puts it at 11 io 25—6 i n dis a
cussing coerced actions, they 'overstrain human nature, and no one could endure
them'. On Aristotle's theory, even if he does not take explicit notice of the parallel
in this respect between coerced actions and some actions done ' i n ' but not 'due to'
ignorance, some bad actions that are not due to ignorance, and so count as voluntary
on his theory, are none the less, on his view, properly not subject to blame, but are
to be given sympathetic allowance. I t is not merely w i t h coerced actions that one
has the options, depending on the circumstances, of praising, blaming, or neither of
those, but showing sympathetic allowance; one has the same three options also i n
the case of voluntary actions done in ignorance but not due to ignorance.
3 3
I take it, however, that ignorance of some trivial and insignificant feature of an
action would not make it, for Aristotle, an involuntary one. If, for example, I do not
know that the club I beat someone over the head w i t h once belonged to my second
cousin, it should not follow, on Aristotle's theory, that I involuntarily beat the person
w i t h my second cousin's former club. Aristotle speaks briefly and summarily here.
3 4
As we have seen, other actions that he does i n the same movements do, of course,
have their origins i n his desires or decision-power, and in his knowledge.
290 John M. Cooper
force t h a t sets and b r i n g s a b o u t the e n d r e s u l t o f the c o m p e l l e d ac

t i o n ; whereas, w i t h the i g n o r a n t agent i t is t h e i r o w n i g n o r a n c e t h a t
sets and b r i n g s a b o u t the e n d r e s u l t o f the a c t i o n . So an agent a c t i n g
f r o m i g n o r a n c e r e m a i n s the o r i g i n a t i n g cause o f t h e i r i g n o r a n t ac
t i o n ; n o t h i n g o u t s i d e causes i t instead. H e n c e , t h i s is a case n o t o n l y
o f an a c t i o n t h a t an agent does i n v o l u n t a r i l y , b u t one o f w h i c h the
o r i g i n a t i n g source lies w i t h i n t h e m . N o t a l l i n v o l u n t a r y actions have
t h e i r o r i g i n i n a n y t h i n g outside, 'the agent c o n t r i b u t i n g n o t h i n g ' . 3 5
V I
So far we have b e e n s p e a k i n g o n l y o f a d u l t h u m a n agents. A r i s

totle's t h e o r y is p r e s e n t e d as a t h e o r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e m , and that
is w h e r e his i n t e r e s t i n the t o p i c o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y lies. A s noted
3 5
When Aristotle's formula in the Nicomachean Ethics defines the voluntary as
'that of which the originating source is in [the agent] itself, when [my italics] it knows
the particulars of the action's situation', note that he apparently implies that not
positively grasping the particulars of an action that one none the less does renders
it involuntary. Thus i f I happen not to know that Princeton water comes from the
Delaware and Raritan canal, then, it seems to be implied, I involuntarily let some
D & R water into my sink when I turn on the tap i n Princeton. A n d that may seem a
strange thing to say: even i f I do not know that fact, surely I still do let some D & R
water into my sink voluntarily, just because I voluntarily turn the tap on. But i n
fact, as we have seen, in applying his formula to his second sort of involuntary action
(ones done i n ignorance), Aristotle speaks always of acts done not just in ignorance
(as w i t h letting D & R water into my sink) but from ignorance. Presumably when I let
the D & R water in I do not do that from ignorance (as Oedipus did when he killed
his father). Now, a person in Oedipus' situation might or might not have gone ahead
and bashed the geezer even i f he had known it was his father; but he would certainly
have stopped and thought a b i t before continuing. So the action that he did, i n the
way he did it (i.e. without pausing to think), was caused by that ignorance. But i n
my case, my not knowing did not play any sort of causal role i n my letting the D & R
water i n . What do I care where my water comes from? N o t knowing where it comes
from had no effect on my letting i n the D & R water, i n the way that I did that. I t
seems, then, that i n the Nicomachean definition of the voluntary, the requirement
that the agent know the particulars of any voluntary action he does is more success
ful if we interpret that to mean that the agent must act not from ignorance i n doing
it. M o r e precisely, then, the voluntary, for Aristotle, is: that of which the originating
source is i n [the agent] itself, when it acts not from ignorance of the particulars of
the action's situation. ( I thank Hendrik Lorenz for raising questions that led to this
clarification.) Alternatively, to meet this potential difficulty, one might say simply
that the particulars referred to i n the definition, ignorance of which renders an action
involuntary, are to be understood exclusively as significant ones. (See n. 33 above.)
Perhaps Aristotle means his definition to allow that ignorance of some trivial and
insignificant feature of an action (such as, in my example, where the water comes
from) does not make it involuntary.
previously, he recognizes o n l y i n passing his theory's a p p l i c a b i l i t y
to a n i m a l a n d i m m a t u r e h u m a n agents; b u t i n d o i n g so, he shows
clearly that he recognizes a n d accepts that a p p l i c a t i o n , even i f he
has l i t t l e interest i n e x a m i n i n g i t closely. A n d i n fact o n l y a l i t t l e
reflection shows that o n A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y c h i l d r e n , a n d indeed a n i
mals o f many, m a n y species ( i f n o t a l l ) , do do q u i t e a l o t o f things
v o l u n t a r i l y , a n d some things i n v o l u n t a r i l y . H i s definitions o f v o
luntariness i n terms o f an o r i g i n a t i n g source i n an agent's desires
(but n o t decisions: for A r i s t o t l e , o n l y a d u l t agents have the capa
c i t y for t h a t ) , and o f k n o w i n g ( i n the sense o f n o t b e i n g i g n o r a n t of)
significant p a r t i c u l a r s i n w h i c h actions are situated, a p p l y to these
other agents, too. A u t o m a t i c processes, o f course, cause some o f the
t h i n g s animals and c h i l d r e n do, as w i t h h u m a n adults. B u t some o f
w h a t they do is caused b y t h e i r desires, g u i d e d b y w h a t they k n o w
about t h e i r s i t u a t i o n (that is, about the p a r t i c u l a r s i n w h i c h w h a t is
caused b y t h e m i n that way w i l l take place). D o m e s t i c animals, b u t
w i l d ones too, often k n o w w h e n a n d where there is food to be f o u n d
at times w h e n they are h u n g r y , and they act v o l u n t a r i l y , o n A r i s
totle's theory, w h e n they t h e n p u r s u e a n d consume i t . T h e y scratch
t h e i r itches, m o v e u n d e r cover w h e n i t is t i m e to go to sleep, a n d do
m a n y other h u m d r u m actions, k n o w i n g w h a t they are d o i n g , a n d
out o f n a t u r a l l y arising desires o f theirs. C o r r e s p o n d i n g things are
true also o f c h i l d r e n f r o m an early age. So all those behaviours are
v o l u n t a r y actions ( i n a b r o a d usage o f the w o r d ' a c t i o n ' that A r i s
totle does i n fact often e m p l o y ) : i f one wishes to restrict the use o f
3 6
the t e r m ' a c t i o n ' , as A r i s t o t l e does i n the E u d e m i a n treatment, so

that i t applies o n l y to h u m a n adults, t h e n one can say that c h i l d r e n
a n d these other animals at any rate do some o f what they do v o l u n
tarily, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f voluntariness, a n d therefore that they
are responsible for those things.
T h e y do some acts i n v o l u n t a r i l y , too, for w h i c h they are n o t

r e s p o n s i b l e — n o t h i n g inside t h e m , i n t h e i r desires and thoughts,
causes those acts. T h e y can be c o m p e l l e d to act, b y b e i n g dragged
or p u s h e d along, j u s t as we adults can be, acting all the w h i l e . A s
w i t h us, some o f w h a t they do i n such circumstances m a y be v o
luntary, b u t the c o m p e l l e d action o f g o i n g where we drag or p u s h
3 6
See e.g. the extended treatment i n Parts of Animals of differences among ani
mals in regard to their 'activities' {TTpdêis), announced at 1. 1, 487*10—11. Notably,
we find this broad usage when Aristotle speaks of animals and children as 'acting'
(irpaTTeiv) i n NE 3. 1, at 1111*26, one of the two passages where he indicates his ac
ceptance of such agents as capable of voluntary action.
292 John M. Cooper
t h e m is i n v o l u n t a r y . L i k e w i s e , a cat can i n v o l u n t a r i l y d r e n c h itself

(and the carpet) i f i t knocks over a f i s h b o w l w h i l e t r y i n g to get at
the fish inside. I t d i d n o t k n o w t h a t i t r i s k e d g e t t i n g itself a n d the
carpet drenched. So i n b o t h these sorts o f case—compelled and i g
n o r a n t action—animals do t h i n g s that, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s theory, they
are n o t responsible for doing. Perhaps n o n - h u m a n animals cannot
be coerced i n t o a n y t h i n g ; I do n o t k n o w about that. C h i l d r e n , h o w
ever, clearly can be, j u s t as they can be b r i b e d i n t o d o i n g things.
So a m o n g these a d d i t i o n a l agents we f i n d cases o f b o t h v o l u n t a r y
action ( i n c l u d i n g coerced action) a n d each o f the t w o classes o f i n
v o l u n t a r y action t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y exposes: the c o m p e l l e d and
the i g n o r a n t . A d u l t h u m a n s have n o m o n o p o l y o n v o l u n t a r y and
i n v o l u n t a r y action. These other agents are j u s t as m u c h responsible
for some o f w h a t they do, a n d n o t responsible for some o f the rest.
These results o f A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y c h i m e perfectly w i t h o r d i n a r y
and accepted views, i n d e e d evident facts, about animals and c h i l
dren. T h a t gives considerable s u p p o r t to A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f res
p o n s i b i l i t y . H i s p u r e l y causal account w h e n a p p l i e d to s m a l l c h i l
d r e n a n d animals yields a result that c o m m o n sense f u l l y endorses.
W e see a n d cannot reasonably deny t h a t other animals, as w e l l as
c h i l d r e n , definitely do do v o l u n t a r i l y some o f the t h i n g s they do,
and others i n v o l u n t a r i l y . So they are, as agents, responsible, j u s t as
we adults are, for some o f the t h i n g s they do a n d n o t responsible for
other t h i n g s t h a t they do.
W h a t , however, about praise a n d blame? A s we do too i n o u r
common-sense speech a n d t h o u g h t about responsibility, A r i s t o t l e
connects the v o l u n t a r y w i t h praise- a n d blameworthiness. A r i s t o t l e ,
however, as I n o t e d above (Section I ) , claims about voluntariness
o n l y t h a t i t is a necessary c o n d i t i o n for l e g i t i m a t e praise a n d blame;
for h i m there is n o i m p l i c a t i o n at a l l f r o m voluntariness to praise-
or blameworthiness, even w h e n the v o l u n t a r y action was s o m e t h i n g
good or b a d to d o . F o r h i m , n o t every good a c t i o n v o l u n t a r i l y done
37
3 7
So it would be open to h i m to say that there is something special about children
and animals that makes it always inappropriate to praise or blame them: something
in their natures as agents, perhaps, precludes this. He might point to their lack of the
power for decision-making, and argue that since animal and child agency is d i m i
nished to that extent, in comparison w i t h that of adults, it is never legitimate to praise
or blame them for anything they do. So, he could say, they meet the necessary condi
tion for legitimate praise and blame of some of their actions (the voluntary ones), but
other factors (systemic ones) prevent them from ever i n fact being worthy of praise or
blame. I n fact, Aristotle says nothing to this effect and it would seem rather arbitrary,
on his purely causal theory of the voluntary, to break the link from voluntariness to
is p r a i s e w o r t h y , a n d n o t every b a d a c t i o n v o l u n t a r i l y done is b l a m e
w o r t h y T o say t h a t an agent is responsible for a g o o d or a b a d ac
t i o n is n o t yet to praise or b l a m e t h e m , even ' i n one's h e a r t ' . In
any case, i t is a n o t h e r e v i d e n t fact o f c o m m o n life t h a t people do
praise and b l a m e b o t h t h e i r c h i l d r e n and t h e i r d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s for
some t h i n g s t h e y do v o l u n t a r i l y ( t h o u g h c e r t a i n l y n o t a l l even o f the
g o o d or b a d t h i n g s t h e y v o l u n t a r i l y d o ) . 3 8
So I take i t t h a t A r i s t o t l e
w o u l d n o t t h i n k t h a t , because o f the l i n k t h a t he recognizes b e t w e e n
v o l u n t a r i n e s s a n d praise a n d b l a m e , his causal t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i
b i l i t y , c o v e r i n g a n i m a l s a n d c h i l d r e n , too, is inadequate: he w o u l d
have n o p r o b l e m i n a c c e p t i n g the idea t h a t because c h i l d r e n and
a n i m a l s do v o l u n t a r y actions t h e y are l e g i t i m a t e l y subject, exactly
as n o r m a l a d u l t s are, too, to praise or b l a m e for some o f t h e m . 3 9
(I
actual praise and blame for some actions even i n the case of such diminished agents as
animals and children. (Which those actions would be is another question.)
3 8
T h e fact that domestic animals are normally trained by their owners to behave
or not behave in certain ways is clearly part of the background that makes praise
and blame seem sometimes appropriate i n their case. Humans do not normally live
in that kind of close relationship w i t h wild species (and they live w i t h insects and
vermin such as mice on a different basis from w i t h dogs and cats, or even sheep and
cows, i n their houses and on their farms). So (except w i t h captured ones i n zoos or
circuses) any praise or blame that might be accorded wild animals' voluntary ac
tions would have to come, i f at all, from other animals of their own species, w i t h
which they live or anyhow interact, and it might be doubtful whether even w i l d apes
have the capacity to praise or blame one another (though some recent observations
of ape communities both i n captivity and i n the wild might give one pause over this
assumption). I have read about a rogue lion in an African wild-life preserve that is
known periodically to attempt to have sex w i t h females of other prides than his own,
and then, when they refuse h i m , he and his younger brother attack and, i f possible,
k i l l them. Such very abnormal and leoninely vicious behaviour does seem voluntary,
and presumably all lions must know that this is not the right way for a lion to behave:
no other lions do this. So perhaps even w i t h wild animals praise or blame might be
legitimate. Even if the fellows of their own species w i t h which they live might be
incapable of doing either of those things, we can do it for them. However, I limit my
discussion in the mam text to domestic animals.
3 9
One should emphasize here that Aristotle does not i n any way mark off adult
human voluntary acts as a special class of voluntary ones from those of non-adult
agents. He neither says that only the adult ones are open to praise or blame (see n. 37)
nor that only the adults' are 'up to them' (see n. 12 above). Alexander of Aphrodisias,
writing in the 2nd cent, C E , five hundred years after Aristotle's death, develops an
anti-Stoic Aristotelian' analysis (which he happily attributes to Aristotle himself,
as an honoured authority), according to which only adults do voluntary actions that
are 'up to them'. See Alex. Aphr. Defato 13, 180. 4—6, and 14, 183. 26—32 Bruns. I n
effect, then, for Alexander, only adult humans are 'responsible' agents. Alexander's
distinction between what is voluntary and what is 'up to' the agent does violence to
Aristotle's texts, though it is easily understood and explicable as a move i n the 2nd-
cent. Peripatetic attacks on Stoic theories of action and determinism.
294 John M. Cooper
w i l l r e t u r n b e l o w to say m o r e about the praise or blame that A r i s

totle has i n m i n d here.)
VII
B u t s h o u l d we object? S h o u l d we insist that we w a n t and, m o r a l l y

speaking, need, as a replacement, or as a s u p p l e m e n t to A r i s
totle's theory, a f u r t h e r k i n d o f responsibility, specifically 'moral'
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — s o m e t h i n g that belongs o n l y to h u m a n a d u l t s ? 40
T h i c k , evaluatively r i c h , responsibility, so to speak, as opposed to

a t h i n sort o f c h i l d - a n d - a n i m a l , mere causal responsibility? A s I
m e n t i o n e d at the outset, this t h i c k l y evaluative concept is an active
presence nowadays i n o u r o r d i n a r y discourse a n d d a i l y life. People
use i t all the t i m e . I t is also, as a result, the subject o f a great deal
of a t t e n t i o n b y m o r a l philosophers a n d action theorists: there are
n u m e r o u s general theories o f ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' , a t t e m p t i n g to
e x p l a i n i n careful n o r m a t i v e detail w h a t i t is, or h o w best to de
velop an adequate theoretical c o n c e p t i o n o f i t , even i f an adequate
c o n c e p t i o n w o u l d require r e g i m e n t a t i o n o f some o r d i n a r y ways o f
speaking a n d t h i n k i n g about responsibility. M y question, t h e n , is
this: is A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for w h a t they
do, as I have explained i t so far, adequate for our o w n needs i n
t h i n k i n g about agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( i n c l u d i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
of a d u l t h u m a n agents for w h a t they do)? D o we need, i n t h i n k
i n g about agents a n d responsibility, a special concept o f 'moral'
responsibility? S h o u l d we even restrict agent r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to
4 0
O n the first suggested option, we would say that Aristotle's theory is mistaken:
it omits a crucial condition, beyond the causal ones he isolates and explains so well i n
his analysis of (mere) voluntariness, as something necessary for responsibility, namely
(as I go on to explain i n my main text) the capacity for making reasoned decisions.
The second option seems to have been T. H . Irwin's, when he wrote his 'Reason and
Responsibility i n Aristotle', i n A . Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1980), 117—55. I r w i n argues there that we can construct from A r i s
totelian materials (and that Aristotle and we need) an Aristotelian 'complex' theory
of responsibility limited to adult humans, whose capacity for making and acting on
'decisions' {TTpoaiploeis) makes them free i n a way that animals and human children
are not, and so makes them legitimately subject to real praise and blame (praise and
blame of the 'moral' sort). The brunt of my remarks i n what follows is to argue
against either rejecting Aristotle's own 'simple' theory, as I r w i n calls it, as an i n
adequate theory of responsibility, or supplementing it w i t h a second, Aristotelian
'complex' theory. I n my view, Aristotle did not think we needed any theory of res
ponsibility beyond his 'simple' one, and I think he was right.
'moral' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y — s o that o n l y n o r m a l h u m a n adults are really
responsible for any o f t h e i r actions, a n d i n b e i n g responsible are
always, specifically, ' m o r a l l y ' responsible? 41
F o r this, A r i s t o t l e ' s p u r e l y causal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f agents w o u l d

be too l i t t l e ; some a d d i t i o n a l factor c o n c e r n i n g the specific charac
ter o f the agency o f a d u l t humans, i n contrast to that o f c h i l d r e n
a n d animals, w o u l d need to be added. Perhaps w h a t is r e q u i r e d
for this w o u l d be a m o r a l conscience, or the capacity to tell w h a t
is m o r a l l y g o o d or r i g h t f r o m w h a t is m o r a l l y b a d or w r o n g . Cer
t a i n l y animals do n o t possess that capacity, and i n c h i l d r e n i t is n o t
f u l l y developed. Or, i n m o r e specifically p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms, adults
are, b u t c h i l d r e n a n d animals are not, ' a u t o n o m o u s ' agents—agents
w i t h the p o w e r n o t j u s t to figure out, after t h i n k i n g about the m a t
ter, w h a t to do, b u t also to reflect c r i t i c a l l y u p o n a n d set t h e i r o w n
ends for action. M y question, t h e n , is w h e t h e r that difference i n
a d u l t h u m a n vs. a n i m a l agency requires a different c o n c e p t i o n o f
a d u l t h u m a n s ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for actions f r o m w h a t is appropriate
for c h i l d r e n a n d animals. I f so, one m i g h t t h e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r
perhaps one o u g h t to deny altogether a n y t h i n g like true responsibi
lity (true agewf-responsibility) to c h i l d r e n a n d animals—perhaps we
s h o u l d consider their 'actions' as no different i n causal b a c k g r o u n d
f r o m w h a t the w i n d does w h e n i t blows a tree over. D o we need
a concept o f a d u l t agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for their actions that goes
b e y o n d the one that A r i s t o t l e presents?
I k n o w that m a n y people nowadays are c o n v i n c e d that we do:
a u t o n o m o u s agency or action b y agents w i t h a conscience seems to
t h e m so i m p o r t a n t l y different f r o m the agency o f n o n - r a t i o n a l a n i
mals a n d c h i l d r e n . H o w e v e r , one m a y grant this difference b u t s t i l l ,
f o l l o w i n g A r i s t o t l e , resist the idea that i t requires a separate c o n
c e p t i o n o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for actions i n the case o f agents possessing
these capacities. One c o u l d also d o u b t , w i t h h i m , that i n case an
action o f a n o r m a l a d u l t agent deserved praise or blame, the praise
or blame i n q u e s t i o n w o u l d , because o f this difference i n sources o f
agency, p r o p e r l y be o f a different t y p e — ' m o r a l ' praise or b l a m e —
f r o m that due to an a n i m a l or c h i l d ; o n this, see below.
L e t me first p o i n t o u t some o f the special attractions o f A r i s t o t l e ' s
4 1
You can be legally responsible (e.g. under statutes imposing strict liability) for
things that happen that you do not count as 'morally' responsible for (and do not do
voluntarily either, by Aristotle's definition). Legal responsibility, as I mentioned i n
sect. 1, needs to be set aside as a special further topic.
296 John M. Cooper
theory, as i t stands. T h e c r u c i a l advantage as I see i t is that, u n l i k e

' m o r a l ' responsibility, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n A r i s t o t l e ' s p u r e l y causal
t h e o r y is decisively a n d sharply separated f r o m questions about va
lues. F o r A r i s t o t l e , to be responsible for an action is a clear-cut, fac
tual m a t t e r o f the action's o r i g i n s : i f i t was o r i g i n a t e d b y any o f an
agent's desires, or a decision, taken together w i t h its t h o u g h t , t h e n i t
is v o l u n t a r y and the agent is responsible for it. One m i g h t argue over
w h e t h e r an action really was c o m p e l l e d , or really was done f r o m i g
norance, so that (on A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y ) the agent w o u l d n o t be re
sponsible for i t . B u t i n p r i n c i p l e this is a settleable m a t t e r o f fact.
I f neither o f these c o n d i t i o n s is f u l f i l l e d , the action is v o l u n t a r y :
that is, i t is r i g h t l y j u d g e d to have h a d its o r i g i n w i t h i n the agent
and specifically i n t h e i r desires or decisions, a n d t h e i r t h o u g h t . So
the agent is responsible for h a v i n g done i t . Questions o f praise and
blame do l e g i t i m a t e l y arise once the action is r i g h t l y j u d g e d to be
v o l u n t a r y ( b u t o n l y t h e n ) , p r o v i d e d that i t was a good or b a d t h i n g
to do. B u t the standards and basis o n w h i c h such questions are ap
p r o p r i a t e l y answered are f u r t h e r ones, o f a n o r m a t i v e sort. T h e r e ,
serious disagreement m i g h t open u p — a n d A r i s t o t l e , i n m y o p i n i o n ,
shows good p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u d g e m e n t i n f i r m l y p l a c i n g serious dis
agreement there, and keeping i t o u t o f assessments o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
itself. I n the case o f coerced actions, especially, some people w i l l
t h i n k i t is reasonable to be sympathetic and n o t blame people, and
perhaps n o t even to p u n i s h t h e m , for some b a d things they do, i f one
sees extenuating circumstances. O t h e r s w i l l not. A n d so on. T h e y
can t h e n , i f they are o p e n - m i n d e d people, discuss the m a t t e r and
a t t e m p t to come to some agreement, or n a r r o w t h e i r disagreement.
M e a n w h i l e responsibility is established a n d n o t d i s p u t e d . T h i s cla
rifies and l i m i t s any disputes or disagreements; they become w h o l l y
n o r m a t i v e , and h a r d as n o r m a t i v e issues are to argue about, at least
the a r g u m e n t w i l l be o n the p r o p e r g r o u n d .
B y contrast, ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' , as its v e r y name implies, car

ries w i t h i t h e a v i l y evaluative i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t suggests that i f y o u
are morally responsible for d o i n g s o m e t h i n g , or for s o m e t h i n g that
happens as a result o f some action o f yours, t h e n some m o r a l issue
was i n v o l v e d . T o accept m o r a l responsibility, or a l l o w someone
4 2
4 3
Hence there is a tendency in ordinary speech and thought to withhold the ter
minology of responsibility i n speaking of trivial actions—tying your left shoe first,
or walking faster than usual for some reason having nothing to do w i t h your own
or other people's moral interests. (Philosophical theories of responsibility might, of
else to say y o u were responsible, for some b a d t h i n g y o u d i d or that

resulted f r o m y o u r a c t i o n can s o u n d as i f y o u t h i n k y o u are m o r a l l y
to blame. W e f r e q u e n t l y hear people deny r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for d o i n g
s o m e t h i n g , or even deny they did i t at all, w h e n i t is p l a i n to c o m m o n
sense that they d i d do i t . Someone u n w i t t i n g l y a n d n o n - c u l p a b l y
lets the cat o u t o f the back door: they say 'I'm n o t responsible!' or
even ' / d i d n ' t let the cat o u t ' . Y e t they are the one w h o opened the
door w h e n the cat was l u r k i n g for its o p p o r t u n i t y . T h e y say this
because they t h i n k , reasonably i n the case I have i n m i n d , that they
are n o t to be b l a m e d at all, or even ( i n other s i m i l a r cases) that they
d i d absolutely the right t h i n g , despite the b a d b u t unsuspected c o n
sequences. A n d because they are t h i n k i n g o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n terms
o f 'moral' responsibility, they t h i n k that, i n order to assert t h e i r
innocence, they have to deny r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d even deny h a v i n g
done the a c t i o n . O f course, this is a mistake, p r e s u m a b l y even as
43
j u d g e d b y the standards i m p o s e d b y ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' , w h e n

that is p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d : o n those standards y o u can be caus
ally responsible for an action or its consequences, even i f n o issue
o f m o r a l i t y is i n v o l v e d , a n d even if, t h o u g h one was i n v o l v e d , y o u
were n o t ' m o r a l l y ' responsible for a n y t h i n g i n the circumstances.
B u t h o w m u c h better i t is n o t to confuse the q u e s t i o n o f respon
s i b i l i t y b y b i n d i n g i t u p conceptually w i t h questions o f praise or
b l a m e — l e t alone ' m o r a l ' praise or blame. A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y h e l p
f u l l y keeps these questions clearly apart f r o m one another.
O r consider the d o c t r i n e o f the 'double effect' i n C a t h o l i c m o r a l
theology a n d i n j u s t - w a r theory. O n this d o c t r i n e , y o u m i g h t be i n
c l i n e d to c l a i m y o u were n o t responsible for k i l l i n g civilians w h e n
y o u o r d e r e d the b o m b i n g o f a m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l site and y o u k n e w
that m a n y c i v i l i a n deaths w o u l d result i n nearby h o u s i n g , because
y o u d i d n o t ' i n t e n d ' i t : i n the t h o u g h t that i n f o r m e d y o u r a c t i o n
y o u d i d n o t ' d i r e c t ' i t to that end. Y o u were n o t 'morally' respon-
course, regiment such restrictions away, on the ground that they reflect confusion
about the implications of responsibility, i.e. 'moral' responsibility.) On Aristotle's
theory, of course, all such actions, trivial though they may be, count as ones the
agents are responsible for on precisely the same ground as they are for any other
action, however momentous: their desires and knowledge are the originating cause.
T h i s is clarifyingly straightforward.
4 3
For the conceptual implications of 'moral responsibility' see Eshleman, ' M o r a l
Responsibility'. Note that if one restricts agent-responsibility to adults (separating
that from mere causal responsibility, open to children, animals, and mere natural
processes), then the agents i n my examples, and other similar ones, really have done
nothing they are responsible for.
298 John M. Cooper
sible for the deaths, y o u c o u l d say; so y o u m i g h t t h i n k y o u needed to

d i s c l a i m all responsibility. B y contrast, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s theory, i f y o u
k n e w w h a t y o u were d o i n g , i t matters n o t a w h i t to y o u r responsibi
l i t y w h e t h e r y o u ' i n t e n d e d ' o n l y some o f w h a t y o u were d o i n g , w h i l e
seeing some o f the rest o f i t as o n l y an ' u n i n t e n d e d ' consequence.
F o r A r i s t o t l e , y o u have no g r o u n d at all to say y o u were n o t respon
sible for k i l l i n g the civilians. I t does n o t f o l l o w at all, o f course, that
y o u were necessarily to blame for y o u r decision, a n d its predictable
result. O n A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y i t is a f u r t h e r question, once y o u r res
p o n s i b i l i t y is acknowledged, whether, or h o w m u c h , y o u are l e g i t i
m a t e l y to be b l a m e d — a n d w h e t h e r ' m o r a l l y ' so or not. W e need to
k n o w i n all such cases w h a t y o u r f u l l circumstances were, a n d w h a t
h u m a n l y speaking we can expect or require people to w i t h s t a n d ,
before we can speak o f legitimate praise or blame (whether ' m o r a l '
or n o t ) . O n his theory, t h o u g h f u l l y responsible for d o i n g t h e m , y o u
are to be excused for d o i n g some o f the b a d t h i n g s y o u v o l u n t a r i l y
do—or at least y o u are to be s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y responded to, w i t h the
result that any blame y o u receive is d i m i n i s h e d a n d qualified. T h e
circumstances matter, for praise and blame. M e a n w h i l e , for A r i s
totle (and for anyone w h o restricts t h e i r discourse about responsi
b i l i t y so as to c o n f o r m i t to his t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) the agent is
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y to be j u d g e d responsible for t h e i r b a d actions, and
those actions' b a d consequences. A r i s t o t l e , b y keeping questions o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y separate f r o m m o r a l evaluation, disallows obfuscat
i n g attempts to distance oneself f r o m the foreseen consequences o f
one's v o l u n t a r y actions.
These seem to me good reasons for b e i n g satisfied w i t h A r i s

totle's t h e o r y as i t stands. T h e r e is n o reason to t h i n k i t clearly i n
adequate as a t h e o r y o f n o r m a l a d u l t responsibility, i n c l u d i n g the
role o f praise a n d blame i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h responsibility. W e can
do e v e r y t h i n g we clearly need to do i n assigning r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
a d u l t actions a n d r e s p o n d i n g evaluatively to t h e m w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g
of n o r m a l a d u l t h u m a n beings, w h e n i t comes to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
actions, i n any other way t h a n the causal one that A r i s t o t l e analyses
so b r i l l i a n t l y . W e do n o t need to invoke instead a different—and
p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f u s i n g — c o n c e p t i o n o f ' m o r a l ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as ap
p l y i n g to a d u l t h u m a n s ' actions. W h e n any agent, a d u l t h u m a n or
other, is responsible, according to A r i s t o t l e ' s theory, for any action
of theirs, t h e n they are the one that is answerable, i f a n y t h i n g needs
to be answered for, a n d i n whatever way one m i g h t j u d g e t h e m to be
answerable, w h e t h e r w i t h o u r m o d e r n n o t i o n o f ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i
l i t y ' or n o t . I n r e c o g n i z i n g an agent's A r i s t o t e l i a n responsibility, I
w i l l i n g l y grant, anyone w h o wishes to do so m a y a p p l y the concepts
of 'moral' praise and blame i n the case o f some responsible agents
( n o r m a l adults) b u t n o t others. T h e y m a y invoke special c o n d i t i o n s
that any responsible agent m u s t meet i f they are to be g i v e n this spe
cial sort o f praise, a n d so w i t h h o l d such praise f r o m agents other
t h a n n o r m a l a d u l t humans. T h e y m a y h o l d n o r m a l a d u l t h u m a n
agents n o t m e r e l y causally b u t also ' m o r a l l y ' responsible for some
of w h a t they do. O t h e r s may, i f they prefer, set aside a n d refuse to
e m p l o y the concepts o f ' m o r a l ' responsibility, ' m o r a l ' praise, a n d
' m o r a l ' blame, f i n d i n g the n o n - j u d g e m e n t a l , u n l o a d e d , o r d i n a r y
praise a n d blame that we e m p l o y for n o n - a d u l t agents adequate,
a n d indeed m o r e congenial, even for adults. So, as for the basic n o
t i o n itself o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for actions, I w o u l d vote to stick w i t h
A r i s t o t l e ' s p u r e l y causal concept. I t closes n o doors anyone s h o u l d
w a n t to keep open, a n d i t c l a r i f y i n g l y keeps questions o f responsi
b i l i t y separate f r o m issues about appropriate evaluative response.
VIII
I t is a f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n whether, none the less, i n order to do f u l l

justice to a d u l t h u m a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d its special features, we
m a y need the idea o f specifically ' m o r a l ' responsibility. I do n o t
t h i n k we do—even i f there is such a concept, a n d even i f m a n y
people t h i n k i t i m p o r t a n t to a p p l y i t i n j u d g i n g other people a n d
t h e i r actions. I n addressing this q u e s t i o n now, let me b e g i n b y ex
p l a i n i n g the contrast I have j u s t d r a w n between ' m o r a l ' praise a n d
blame (not, I have c l a i m e d , recognized b y A r i s t o t l e at all) a n d w h a t
I have referred to as ' o r d i n a r y ' praise a n d blame—the praise a n d
blame that A r i s t o t l e considers l e g i t i m a t e for b o t h a n i m a l a n d a d u l t
h u m a n agents, u n d e r certain circumstances, w h e n they v o l u n t a r
i l y do good or b a d things. I t is c e r t a i n l y true, as I have already
n o t e d , that a n i m a l and c h i l d agency are l i m i t e d i n h i g h l y signifi
cant ways, i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h that o f n o r m a l adults. F o r one t h i n g ,
there are m a n y fewer things that an a n i m a l or a c h i l d can do v o
l u n t a r i l y t h a n a n o r m a l a d u l t can. N o r m a l adults' increased k n o w
ledge o f the p a r t i c u l a r s o f t h e i r actions as w e l l as t h e i r possession
of a m o r a l conscience and the a u t o n o m y o f a d u l t agency c e r t a i n l y
300 John M. Cooper
give adults a m u c h w i d e r range o f possible v o l u n t a r y actions t h a n

c h i l d r e n or animals are capable of. B u t , for A r i s t o t l e , any praise or
blame they m a y l e g i t i m a t e l y i n c u r for t h e i r actions is n o t s t r u c t u r
ally different f r o m praise or blame animals or c h i l d r e n m a y i n c u r for
the vastly m o r e l i m i t e d ranges o f a c t i o n they can p e r f o r m . A t any
rate, he never notes, or makes p a r t o f his t h e o r y o f responsibility,
differences either o f degree or o f k i n d between the praise and blame
a d u l t h u m a n beings m a y be subject to a n d the praise a n d blame o f
c h i l d r e n a n d animals, w h i c h o f course he was, like a l l o f us, q u i t e
familiar w i t h , even t h o u g h he never discusses i t specifically.
I m e n t i o n e d above that people c e r t a i n l y do sometimes praise and
blame t h e i r c h i l d r e n a n d domestic animals for things they do or
do n o t do. B u t i t m i g h t be said, against A r i s t o t l e , that w h e n we
praise or blame a c h i l d or a n i m a l we t h i n k o f ourselves as, and i n
deed are, addressing t h e m , a n d a t t e m p t i n g to affect t h e i r b e h a v i o u r
i n the future, i n significantly different ways f r o m w h e n we praise or
blame a n o r m a l a d u l t . H o w so? W e l l , some m i g h t say, animals and
c h i l d r e n , w h e n praised or b l a m e d , are s i m p l y b e i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y
m a n i p u l a t e d , t h r o u g h t h e i r affectionate dependence o n the praiser
or blamer, or t h e i r fear o f b e i n g made to suffer at t h e i r hands: such
praise a n d blame is j u s t a means o f causing or p r e v e n t i n g repetitions
of such actions i n future. T h e p r a i s i n g ( ' r e i n f o r c i n g ' ) and the b l a m
i n g or s h a m i n g ( ' i n h i b i t i n g ' ) o f a n i m a l and c h i l d b e h a v i o u r works,
to the extent i t w o r k s at a l l , they t h i n k , o n l y t h r o u g h psychological
mechanisms over w h i c h the c h i l d or a n i m a l has n o c o n t r o l . Praise
and blame i n this case does n o t presuppose any capacity at a l l o f
the recipients to be responsible as agents—conceiving themselves as
agents, w i t h choices to m a k e — f o r w h a t they d i d that y o u are prais
i n g or b l a m i n g , or responsible as agents for w h a t they m a y do i n the
future as a result o f y o u r i n t e r v e n t i o n i f i t has its i n t e n d e d effect.
B u t that seems to me c e r t a i n l y too l i m i t e d a v i e w o f praise and
blame for c h i l d r e n , a n d o f t h e i r capacities. I t h i n k i t is also too dis
missive o f animals. I t is true, o f course, o f a l l praise a n d blame ( i n
c l u d i n g that o f adults, and w h e t h e r ' m o r a l ' or n o t ) that they have
t h e i r effects i n p a r t t h r o u g h i n v o l u n t a r y psychological mechanisms
that the praiser or b l a m e r m a y w e l l be a i m i n g to use so as to m a n i
pulate the recipient. So, there is n o d o u b t that o u r praise a n d blame
of c h i l d r e n does to a large extent have this f u n c t i o n o f i n c u l c a t i n g
social n o r m s i n t h e m . B u t i n the case o f c h i l d r e n (and animals, too,
t h o u g h this is less m a r k e d and m a y a p p l y o n l y to the praise and
blame o f some p e t - o w n e r s ) i t has another d i m e n s i o n as w e l l , j u s t as
i t does for n o r m a l adults. W h e n I praise m y s i x - y e a r - o l d c h i l d , or
b l a m i n g l y a d m o n i s h her, I a m speaking to her d i r e c t l y as already
an agent o n her o w n , w i t h choices to make, p a r t l y o f course so as
to help her g r a d u a l l y develop her powers as an agent to the p o i n t
where she w i l l become the sort o f f u l l m o r a l agent that we t h i n k
n o r m a l adults are. I do n o t w a n t her i n future n o t to do again the
t h i n g I force her a t t e n t i o n negatively u p o n b y b l a m i n g her for i t ,
or to repeat w h a t I p r a i s i n g l y encourage, merely (or even, really, at
all, i f I a m a responsible parent) so as to gain or retain m y affection,
or so as n o t to suffer the p a i n o f m y disapproval. I w a n t m y praise
or blame, accompanied b y the explanations I give her, t a i l o r e d to
her level o f possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g , to help her to f i n d a n d see her
o w n reasons, i n d e p e n d e n t o f the effects o f the reinforcements, for
b e h a v i n g i n the w a y I w a n t her to. A t the same t i m e , I a m h o p i n g
to encourage her now, w h e n I blame her, to reflect o n her c u r r e n t
b l a m e d b e h a v i o u r as s o m e t h i n g she has done, as an agent m a k i n g
choices, and, perhaps, to berate or praise herself for h a v i n g done i t .
I t seems to me that w i t h domestic animals too we are addressing
t h e m as agents i n b o t h these ways w h e n we praise a n d blame t h e m —
as w e l l , o f course, as t r y i n g to affect t h e i r i n v o l u n t a r y psychological
mechanisms so that they w i l l behave i n future as we w i s h . ( T h a t
seems true at least o f those w h o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r animals, a n d are
n o t brutes themselves i n dealing w i t h t h e m . ) I w a n t m y d o g n o t to
pee o n the floor n o t merely, a n d i n d e e d n o t at a l l (at best), f r o m fear
of m y disapproval or to r e t a i n m y affection. I a m n o t o u t to create
a n e u r o t i c dog. I w a n t h i m to learn n o t to do i t f r o m a concep
t i o n o f h i m s e l f as a dog that k n o w s h o w to live p r o p e r l y i n a house;
this requires a l o t o f other i n h i b i t i o n s a n d learnt behaviours, a l l o f
w h i c h I w a n t h i m to f i n d i n t e r n a l i z e d ideas o f his o w n for u n d e r t a k
ing. D o g s a n d other domestic animals c e r t a i n l y have a m u c h m o r e
l i m i t e d capacity for such agency (and such a self-conception) t h a n
h u m a n c h i l d r e n have, n o t to speak o f teenagers. B u t they do, v e r y
obviously, have i t . M a n y pet-owners, at any rate, c e r t a i n l y do t h i n k
they k n o w this about t h e i r dogs a n d cats; they praise a n d blame
t h e m o n that basis.
Hence I a m s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d n o t to make too m u c h o f the c o m
m o n practice nowadays o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ' m o r a l ' praise and blame
f r o m the o r d i n a r y sort that applies to c h i l d r e n a n d animals. I t h i n k
A r i s t o t l e is o n solid g r o u n d i n i g n o r i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n his
302 John M. Cooper
o w n t h e o r y o f agents' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for their actions. W h e n we

praise or blame a cat or dog, or a c h i l d , for s o m e t h i n g good they
have done ( w h e n i t r e q u i r e d t h e i r i n h i b i t i n g some s t r o n g c o n t r a r y
n a t u r a l i m p u l s e ) , or b a d ( w h e n they f o l l o w e d some n a t u r a l i m p u l s e
they have been t r a i n e d n o t to give i n t o ) , I t h i n k we mean (unless
we are s i m p l y m a n i p u l a t i v e a n d heartless brutes ourselves) to be
c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h t h e m d i r e c t l y as agents ( n o t j u s t as pleasure-
a n d - p a i n machines to be c u n n i n g l y m a n i p u l a t e d b y us). A s I have
said, we are encouraging t h e m to f i n d in those v e r y behaviours
s o m e t h i n g to be attracted to, or averted f r o m , s o m e t h i n g to feel
good or b a d about, i n a personal way—as s o m e t h i n g they can, i n
t h e i r t h o u g h t s about themselves, i d e n t i f y themselves as agents w i t h .
T h e r e is m u c h m o r e i n this praise a n d blame t h a n mere p u l l i n g o n
psychological cords and g e t t i n g the recipients, w i l l y - n i l l y , to be
have i n future as y o u w i s h t h e m to. W h e n one takes that i n t o ac
count, there seems to me l i t t l e to j u s t i f y i n s i s t i n g o n a sharp line
between praise o f these l i m i t e d agents—dogs and cats m u c h m o r e
l i m i t e d ones t h a n c h i l d r e n — a n d praise o f m o r e complete, n o r m a l
a d u l t agents.
I t is true, o f course, that w h e n we praise or blame adults we often
do so as persons w h o can engage i n f u l l reasoning about g o o d and
bad, a n d i n d e c i d i n g i n the l i g h t o f that reasoning h o w i t is best for
t h e m to behave (as animals c e r t a i n l y cannot, a n d c h i l d r e n o n l y at a
certain age, a n d to o n l y a l i m i t e d degree). T h i s capacity does indeed
involve a deepened persona a n d self, b e y o n d w h a t a c h i l d or a n i m a l
is capable of. M o r e o v e r , adults, w h e n they do g o o d or b a d things,
can i n m a n y cases f i n d w h a t we nowadays call 'moral' reasons for
or against d o i n g t h e m (reasons connected to respect and disrespect
for other persons, for example), as animals at least cannot do. A l s o ,
given the vastly w i d e r range ( m e n t i o n e d above) o f things they m a y
do v o l u n t a r i l y , because o f t h e i r vaster k n o w l e d g e o f the c i r c u m
stances o f t h e i r actions, a d u l t h u m a n s do m u c h m o r e o f w h a t they
do v o l u n t a r i l y t h a n animals or c h i l d r e n can possibly do, w i t h t h e i r
l i m i t e d k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t they are d o i n g whenever they act.
I t is at this p o i n t that the c o n c e p t i o n o f specifically ' m o r a l ' res
p o n s i b i l i t y , a n d l i a b i l i t y to ' m o r a l ' praise and blame, m a y enter.
B u t I do n o t see good reason to regard the e n r i c h e d sort o f agency
possessed b y a d u l t h u m a n s as having to b r i n g w i t h i t any such n e w
sort o f praise a n d blame—specifically 'moral' praise/blame: praise,
or especially blame, o f a m o r a l i s t i c , m o r a l l y j u d g e m e n t a l sort, i n
w h i c h a p e r s o n is responsible at a l l o n l y i f they m e r i t m o r a l c o n
d e m n a t i o n or m o r a l praise. T h i s e n r i c h e d agency o n l y expands the
range a n d n u m b e r o f actions (and even types o f action: 'moral' a n d
'immoral' actions, too) t h a t a d u l t h u m a n s can v o l u n t a r i l y do, for
w h i c h questions o f praise or blame m i g h t arise. One m a y prefer, as
a m a t t e r o f general p o l i c y i n one's relations w i t h other people, n o t
to i n d u l g e i n ' m o r a l ' c o n d e m n a t i o n (or ' m o r a l ' praise) at a l l — b l a m e
i n w h i c h one expresses the feeling t h a t someone's action has s h o w n ,
for example, such disregard for someone else's rights, or such dis
respect, t h a t t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p i n the m o r a l c o m m u n i t y has been
c o m p r o m i s e d , so t h a t they n o t o n l y o u g h t to feel b a d about t h e m
selves as persons, b u t owe the offended p a r t y (and the c o m m u n i t y )
an apology and a sincere p r o m i s e n o t to behave t h a t w a y i n f u t u r e —
i f n o t also to seek G o d ' s forgiveness. One can restrict one's praise
a n d blame, w h e n one does feel i t r i g h t to blame or praise another
p e r s o n , to n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a m o r e c o m p l e x a p p l i c a t i o n to the
44
a d u l t h u m a n case o f exactly w h a t praise a n d blame mean, or can a n d

s h o u l d m e a n , as I have explained, for small c h i l d r e n and domestic
animals. W h e n a vicious person, for example, does some vicious act
(behaves b a d l y i n seeking pleasures o f table or bed, or cheats a b u s i
ness partner, say), one m a y w e l l reasonably t h i n k i t n o t w o r t h the
psychological t r o u b l e to blame t h e m at a l l : they are hopeless, y o u
m i g h t t h i n k , so w h a t is the point? ( W h i c h does n o t m e a n t h a t y o u
s h o u l d n o t r e p o r t the cheater or get t h e m p u n i s h e d . ) B u t w h e n i t is
reasonable to assume the psychological b u r d e n o f b l a m i n g t h e m (re
acting to t h e m , a n d to w h a t they have done, w i t h feelings o f b l a m e ) ,
A r i s t o t e l i a n blame, i f displayed to t h e m , w i l l be a i m e d p r i m a r i l y
at i n f l u e n c i n g t h e m , as self-conscious agents, to t h i n k again about
w h a t they have done, i n case they m i g h t o n reflection see for t h e m
selves g o o d reasons w h y they s h o u l d n o t act i n those ways. T h i s
4 4
Here we must bear in mind that on Aristotle's view, and on the view of the per
sons whose attitudes I am describing here, there is always an option, when reacting
to someone's voluntary bad or good action, not to praise or blame at all, but, i f it was
a bad action, to respond w i t h sympathetic allowance—in case it was either coerced or
due to 'voluntary' ignorance, under circumstances where you think normal human
beings should not be expected to see the right thing to do: they 'overstrain human
nature' ( m o 2 5 ; see n. 32 above). A n d , for trivial voluntary actions such as tying
a
one's right shoe first instead of the left, no reactive response at all is merited. So, on
Aristotle's view and the view of those whose attitudes I am describing, to recognize
responsibility does not, as 'moral' responsibility does, involve thinking that the agent
has done anything worthy of praise or blame or other such reactive attitudes, or even
any reactive attitude at all.
304 John M. Cooper
need n o t involve w a n t i n g t h e m to feel b a d , and c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t

involve j u d g i n g t h e m ' m o r a l l y ' (as we n o w u n d e r s t a n d that t e r m )
and w a n t i n g t h e m to feel excluded f r o m the m o r a l c o m m u n i t y u n t i l
they p r a y to G o d for forgiveness or make sincere promises n o t to
behave that w a y i n future. O r d i n a r y praise and blame, o f the same
sort that we assign to c h i l d r e n a n d domestic h o u s e h o l d animals, is
good enough—or indeed, as I t h i n k , better.
So far, t h e n , i n this section I have been a r g u i n g that A r i s t o t l e ' s
theories o f voluntariness a n d a g e n t - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are adequate
as they stand. W e do n o t need any n o t i o n o f specifically ' m o r a l '
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as a special sort o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that goes b e y o n d
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y analyses. T h e q u e s t i o n
remains whether, for those w h o do value ' m o r a l ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
and t h i n k i t i m p o r t a n t for us to be ready to react w i t h attitudes o f
' m o r a l ' praise and blame to w h a t we nowadays t h i n k o f as m o r a l l y
good and b a d actions, A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y m i g h t , b y simple supple
m e n t a t i o n , a l l o w r e c o g n i t i o n o f this f u r t h e r k i n d o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
(see above, n . 39). I n fact, there are good reasons for h o l d i n g that
any such a c c o m m o d a t i o n w o u l d require m u c h m o r e t h a n a simple
s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n , a n d indeed that to a t t e m p t to ' s u p p l e m e n t ' A r i s
totle's t h e o r y b y i n t e r p r e t i n g i t i n such a way as to a l l o w such
r e c o g n i t i o n w o u l d i n fact t h o r o u g h l y u n d e r m i n e i t .
W e need to bear i n m i n d that for A r i s t o t l e the ' m o r a l ' v i r t u e s
and vices encompass vastly m o r e t h a n justice and other v i r t u e s c o n
c e r n i n g w h a t we owe to one another as a m a t t e r o f m o r a l r i g h t and
w r o n g — a characteristically m o d e r n , l i m i t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l i t y
and its requirements. T h e n o t i o n o f ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' is centred
o n this l i m i t e d c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l r i g h t a n d w r o n g . F o r A r i s t o t l e ,
there are v i r t u e s (and vices) i n r e l a t i o n to all aspects o f h u m a n life,
m o s t o f t h e m o f p u r e l y personal c o n c e r n a n d n o t 'other-related':
h o w to t h i n k a n d feel about the value o f money, b o d i l y pleasure,
p o l i t i c a l and social power, personal luxuries, games a n d other pas
times, h a r m o n i o u s relations w i t h one's neighbours, a n d indeed the
value o f e v e r y t h i n g that is n a t u r a l l y o f any positive or negative value
i n h u m a n life. F o r A r i s t o t l e , there is a v i r t u o u s w a y o f d o i n g almost
any daily action, i n one's p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, a n d m a n y v i
cious ones. A n d , for h i m , whenever anyone does a v i r t u o u s action,
w h e t h e r they are v i r t u o u s people or n o t , they do i t o n a 'decision'
(rrpoaiptois)—the p o w e r for w h i c h m a r k s o f f a d u l t h u m a n agents
f r o m animals a n d c h i l d r e n , and forms the basis for a t t e m p t i n g to
s u p p l e m e n t A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y so as to a l l o w re
c o g n i t i o n o f ' m o r a l ' responsibility. B u t m o s t o f A r i s t o t l e ' s v i r t u o u s
a n d v i c i o u s actions seem o b v i o u s l y n o t f i t subjects o f that k i n d o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (or the c o r r e s p o n d i n g sort o f praise or blame): m o
d e r a t i o n i n p u r s u i t o f the pleasures o f the table, or o v e r r a t i n g a n d
o v e r i n d u l g i n g i n t h e m , for example. A n d to force o n A r i s t o t l e re
c o g n i t i o n o f the special a n d i n d e e d p r i o r m o r a l i m p o r t a n c e o f w h a t
we owe to one another as a m a t t e r o f m o d e r n - d a y ' m o r a l ' r i g h t a n d
w r o n g (so as to l i m i t m o r a l responsibility, for h i m , so that i t a p p l i e d
o n l y to those v i r t u o u s a n d v i c i o u s acts) w o u l d require an intolerable
u p d a t i n g i n his o w n m o r a l attitudes that, i f i t d i d n o t d i r e c t l y u n d e r
m i n e his simple t h e o r y o f voluntariness a n d agent-responsibility,
w o u l d c e r t a i n l y be n o s i m p l e s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n .
M o r e damagingly, any such a t t e m p t e d ' s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n ' w o u l d
deprive A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f agent r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f w h a t I have ar
g u e d is its chief excellence: its salutary separation o f questions o f
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f r o m evaluative issues. I n r e c o g n i z i n g ' m o r a l ' res
p o n s i b i l i t y o f n o r m a l adults for some o f the things they do he w o u l d
be a d m i t t i n g a f o r m o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that fused these issues. T o i n
t e r p r e t h i m that w a y w o u l d c e r t a i n l y violate, a n d seriously too, the
v e r y s p i r i t o f his t h e o r y o f agent responsibility.
T o conclude m y discussion o f A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y o f r e s p o n s i b i
l i t y for actions, then. W e s h o u l d , w i t h A r i s t o t l e , n o t t h i n k we need
a concept o f m o r a l responsibility, a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b e l o n g i n g e x p l i
c i t l y and o n l y to n o r m a l a d u l t h u m a n b e i n g s . R e c o g n i z i n g a n d
45
a t t a c h i n g due i m p o r t a n c e to the special character o f a d u l t agency—

its a u t o n o m o u s character, its i n c l u s i o n o f m o r a l j u d g e m e n t a m o n g
the bases for d e c i d i n g w h a t to do—does n o t require, as I have ar
gued, t a k i n g that f u r t h e r step. A s I have emphasized, those w h o
w i s h to use such a concept i n j u d g i n g people a n d t h e i r b e h a v i o u r as
m o r a l malefactors or saints r e m a i n free to do so. W e can f o l l o w A r i s -
4 5
Perhaps some w i l l resist, and insist there is an important difference in what
responsibility is for adults, i n all their actions and not only i n the morally good or
bad ones, because they bring to bear ideas about God as judge and human beings as
sinners (something that animals and small children cannot be): our responsibility is
ultimately to God. However, we do not need such ideas in order to make good sense
of ourselves and our place in the natural and social worlds, or to live good human
lives. Aristotle's moral theory, in any event, is constructed on the assumption that
we do not need such ideas in order to understand us humans as agents or to frame an
adequate conception of our responsibility for what we do. I t is certainly unwarran
ted, as I have argued, to seek to find room w i t h i n his theory for a distinction between
two sorts of praise, and a higher sort of responsibility corresponding to one of those.
306 John M. Cooper
totle a n d keep d i s t i n c t i o n s a m o n g degrees o f agency separate f r o m

questions o f responsibility. W e can recognize that a d u l t agents are
responsible for m u c h m o r e i n t h e i r actions t h a n a dog or a c h i l d can
possibly be, a n d i n p r a i s i n g a n d b l a m i n g dogs, c h i l d r e n , a n d n o r m a l
adults, we can and s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y h o l d that fact i n m i n d i n m a n y
circumstances. A g a i n , as I have emphasized, those w h o w i s h to re
cognize and e m p l o y a special k i n d o f m o r a l praise and blame are free
to do so. B u t b y t h i n k i n g i n terms o f a special kind o f responsibility,
m o r a l responsibility, a n d a special kind o f praise, m o r a l praise and
blame, applicable o n l y to n o r m a l adults, a l l we do is m u d d y waters
that r e m a i n b e a u t i f u l l y clear i f we stick to A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y .
46
IX
I t remains to r e m i n d ourselves that i n b o t h the Eudemian and the

Nicomachean Ethics A r i s t o t l e ' s concern is to define the v o l u n t a r y
specifically w i t h a v i e w to a r g u i n g that v i r t u o u s a n d vicious ac
tions m e r i t praise a n d blame respectively. H i s p a r t i c u l a r concern
is to show that v i r t u o u s a n d v i c i o u s people, i n particular, are to
be praised and b l a m e d , respectively, for t h e i r v i r t u o u s and v i c i o u s
a c t i o n s — w h i c h for h i m requires, as I have said, that those actions
be v o l u n t a r y . I n the N i c o m a c h e a n treatment, as I said at the b e g i n
n i n g , A r i s t o t l e h o l d s that h u m a n beings ( b u t n o t other animals) are
responsible for t h e i r settled characters, for example as j u s t or u n
j u s t , temperate or s e l f - i n d u l g e n t persons; o n l y i f this is so can the
actions they do i n consequence o f b e i n g the k i n d o f people they are
be v o l u n t a r y , as A r i s t o t l e wishes to c l a i m they are. A r i s t o t l e t u r n s
i n 3. 5 to establish that responsibility. H e begins the chapter b y as
serting that we are responsible for b e i n g v i r t u o u s or v i c i o u s people,
as the case m a y be, a n d offering a b r i e f a r g u m e n t i n s u p p o r t o f that
c l a i m (11 i 3 4 - i 4 ) . H e r e he assumes ( i 3 ) that ( i n some w a y ) w h a t
b b
i t is to be decent or v i r t u o u s , or base, is to engage r e g u l a r l y i n v i r -
4 6
I do not mean to say that Aristotle's theory is complete as it stands; I have my
self noted, mostly in footnotes, numerous points at which his theory, as he himself
states it, has gaps or is inexplicit; a complete theory would take explicit notice of
these. I t may need further significant elaboration, i n order to take account of sub
tleties concerning the effects of consent both when physically forced and when not,
or cases of bribes, or special cases of duress when an agent has psychological addic
tions, and so on. I think it can be made to handle these complications quite well, but
I do not go into them here.
tuous or v i c i o u s actions a n d activities f r o m a decision (irpoaipeois),
occasion b y occasion, to do so. Since a decision o f ours causes each
o f these actions, they are a l l ' u p to u s ' : as he has j u s t argued ( i n
47
3. 2-4), i n e x p l a i n i n g w h a t a decision is, any a c t i o n done o n a de

cision to do i t is v o l u n t a r y . Hence, A r i s t o t l e infers, because we are
responsible for each o f the actions t h a t we do as v i r t u o u s or v i c i o u s
persons, once o u r characters are f o r m e d , a n d since h a v i n g a charac
ter j u s t is r e g u l a r l y d o i n g c o r r e s p o n d i n g actions o n decisions to do
t h e m , we are responsible for o u r characters. B e i n g responsible for
the actions j u s t is b e i n g responsible for the character.
I n w h a t follows i n the chapter A r i s t o t l e does n o t w i t h d r a w or
q u a l i f y this p r i n c i p a l a r g u m e n t i n any way; he t h i n k s i t is c o n
clusive. I n fact, g i v e n its assumptions, i t p l a i n l y is conclusive. T h e
m a j o r p o r t i o n o f the chapter, however, undertakes a v e r y different
a r g u m e n t , one i n t e n d e d to reinforce this p r i n c i p a l one. A r i s t o t l e
argues that we are responsible for o u r established m o r a l characters,
as also for a l l o u r other character traits, because we are responsible
for c o m i n g to be, and for being, i n those states i n the first place.
A r i s t o t l e begins b y c o n s i d e r i n g an o b j e c t i o n someone m i g h t make
to his o w n and, as he says, the law's view, t h a t w h e n people are re
sponsible for t h e i r ignorance o f some p a r t i c u l a r o f a b a d action's
s i t u a t i o n , t h e n t h a t ignorance does n o t make i t i n v o l u n t a r y w h e n
they do i t : they themselves are responsible for such i g n o r a n t actions
w h e n they do t h e m . Suppose, however, a p e r s o n does s o m e t h i n g
b a d because they failed to k n o w the b a d - m a k i n g feature o f the s i t u
a t i o n s i m p l y f r o m i n a t t e n t i o n : w h a t one notices or does n o t notice,
they m i g h t say, varies freely f r o m person to person and occasion to
occasion, so they are n o t responsible for this b a d t h i n g . A r i s t o t l e
4 7
A t 8—11 he claims, more expansively, that when 'acting is fine [i.e. virtuous]
b
and up to us, not acting is shameful [i.e. vicious] and up to us', and when 'not acting
is fine and up to us, acting is shameful and up to us'. This does not say, and Aris
totle should not be taken to mean, that whenever a virtuous person does a virtuous
act it was open to them (they were free) not to do it (i.e. free to do the vicious act of
omission instead), and whenever a vicious person acts viciously it was open to them
(they were free) to act virtuously. He only says that when, i n some circumstance, a
given act would be virtuous or vicious, then whichever of the two, i f either, a person
decides to do, they do voluntarily: that is, he only means that whatever you decide
to do i n the given circumstances w i l l be up to you, because it was caused by your de
cision. (See also above, n. 12.) Aristotle does not take a stand, one way or the other,
on whether to act voluntarily requires being free at the time to act otherwise than
one does. I n fact, he presumably thinks a truly virtuous person's character makes it
the case that he or she cannot act otherwise than the virtuous ways they decide to act
on each occasion, and likewise the vicious (cf. 11 i4 io—21).
a
3o8 John M. Cooper
and the law assume that i t is none the less u p to t h e m to k n o w (so

they are responsible for n o t k n o w i n g , i f they fail to k n o w ) , 'since
they c o n t r o l w h e t h e r they pay a t t e n t i o n ' . B u t w h a t i f the person
48
is j u s t the sort w h o does not pay a t t e n t i o n , b u t always b l u n d e r s ahead

w i t h o u t b o t h e r i n g to notice i n c o n v e n i e n t facts ( i i i 4 2 - 3 ) ? T h e o b
a
j e c t i o n claims that i n that case they do not c o n t r o l w h e t h e r they

pay a t t e n t i o n : that is j u s t h o w they are, w h a t else c o u l d y o u expect?
A r i s t o t l e makes this challenge, w h i c h concerns one p a r t i c u l a r state
of developed character—inattentiveness—the occasion for a r g u i n g ,
w i t h f u l l generality, that we are responsible for all o u r developed
character traits. So, i n particular, we are responsible for o u r v i r t u e s
or vices.
I n his response (a v e r y l e n g t h y o n e — i t runs f r o m 1 1 i 4 3 to a
1 1 i 4 2 5 ) A r i s t o t l e reinforces the i n i t i a l a r g u m e n t s u m m a r i z e d
b
above, w h i c h speaks o n l y o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for o u r actions once we

are v i r t u o u s or vicious, b y a r g u i n g that we are ourselves the causes,
or c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t co-causes, t h r o u g h o u r earlier v o l u n t a r y ac
tions, o f h a v i n g become people w i t h the characters that we have as
m a t u r e adults. H e has argued earlier i n the treatise that we become
good or b a d people o f the various different k i n d s b y repeatedly
d o i n g , a n d d e c i d i n g to do, the actions o f v i r t u o u s people—the
actions that a v i r t u o u s p e r s o n i n a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n w o u l d do, done
i n the same ways. A c t i n g o n such decisions g r a d u a l l y solidifies
habits o f feeling a n d action that one began to f o r m early i n life, and
enables a progressively e n r i c h e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n nature
and the h u m a n good. These are the necessary p r e c o n d i t i o n s for
ever possessing the practical k n o w l e d g e o f the true n a t u r a l end
for h u m a n l i v i n g that converts mere h a b i t u a t e d states o f soul i n t o
knowledge-based true a n d f u l l v i r t u e s . 49
I t is i m p o r t a n t to notice that the earlier actions that A r i s t o t l e is

r e f e r r i n g to here are ones that we do as g r o w n - u p people, possessed
of the f u l l p o w e r o f d e l i b e r a t i o n about w h a t is good a n d b a d for
h u m a n beings, and so for oneself, a n d o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g o n the
4 8
Hence, Aristotle approves the law's imposing double penalties i n the similar
case of doing something harmful or shameful while ignorant of that fact, due to be
ing drunk or in a fury: one for doing the bad thing, another for doing it i n ignorance.
4 9
I summarize here a view, for which I argue i n Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of
Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus (Princeton, 2012), ch. 3, sects.
3.4—3.8, about the relationship, for Aristotle, between habituation in right feeling
and action, and full virtue. I argue there that Aristotle requires for full virtue com
plete practical knowledge of the human good.
basis o f i t . H e is n o t speaking about o u r i n i t i a l actions, u n d e r the

direct guidance o f o u r parents, as c h i l d r e n , i n w h i c h we b e g i n to
acquire habits o f feeling and action—at a t i m e w h e n we do n o t yet
possess the f u l l p o w e r o f p r a c t i c a l reasoning. A r i s t o t l e makes this
clear w h e n he p o i n t s o u t that, i n d o i n g the earlier actions he is refer
r i n g to, ones for example t h a t w i l l make a p e r s o n an u n j u s t cheater
a n d thief, the agent m u s t have k n o w n — i n d e e d , w o u l d have to be
a t o t a l b l o c k h e a d (KO/XISJJ avaioBrjTos, 11 i 4 i o ) n o t to k n o w — t h a t to
a
keep o n d o i n g t h e m for a l l t h a t t i m e w o u l d make t h e m u n j u s t ; a n d i f

someone does w h a t they k n o w w i l l make t h e m u n j u s t , they are v o
l u n t a r i l y u n j u s t once they have become t h a t sort o f p e r s o n ( i 2-13). a
B y contrast, s m a l l c h i l d r e n a n d animals o f any other type besides

g r o w n - u p h u m a n s ( w h e t h e r eighteen years o l d or sixty) m i g h t w e l l
n o t k n o w this w i t h o u t b e i n g t o t a l blockheads. O t h e r animals defi
n i t e l y do n o t have the capacity to k n o w any such t h i n g , a n d n o r do
c h i l d r e n before the 'age o f reason'. T h e y are n o t blockheads for n o t
k n o w i n g i t . H e n c e , i f an a n i m a l comes to have a settled b a d charac
ter, or a settled g o o d a n d o b e d i e n t one, a n d t h a t character resulted
f r o m its d o i n g a w h o l e series o f acts v o l u n t a r i l y w h i l e b e i n g t r a i n e d
at a y o u n g age, A r i s t o t l e ' s t h e o r y does n o t h o l d t h e m responsible for
b e i n g a recalcitrant or a restrained and attentive k i n d o f a n i m a l . 5 0
However, any nearly g r o w n - u p person o f sixteen or eighteen does

k n o w i t , A r i s t o t l e insists—or can reasonably be expected to k n o w i t .
5 0
They do voluntarily do acts of self-restraint or service to their owners (or refuse
to) when i n training, since they know (not of course, i n those, or any, words) that
that is what they are doing. A n d those actions of theirs gave them, later, their char
acter as restrained and attentive to some of their owner's needs, or recalcitrant. But
because they did not and could not know that i n doing them they were making them
selves turn out that way, they did not at the same times do voluntarily any actions
of making themselves be like that as mature dogs or cats, as human adults are assumed
to have done when forming their characters. I t is true that, because mature animals
are not responsible for their characters, one could attempt to run the objector's ar
gument concerning the inattentive human agent for the case of an adult cat or dog
that, say, urinates on the floor, not i n a box or not waiting to be taken outdoors, in ir
ritation w i t h its owner. You might argue that it 'could not help' doing that, because
its character is such that that is just how it sees things under such circumstances.
Plainly, this argument could not be rebutted in precisely the way Aristotle rebuts
the corresponding one for the inattentive person (see below i n my main text). But
that does not mean it is a good argument. I t is reasonable to hold, as Aristotle does,
that adult animals are responsible in just the same way as adult humans for the ranges
of their behaviour that count as actions of theirs. T h a t it was the animal's desires and
knowledge that caused its action is enough to make it a voluntary one, for which it is
responsible (and, presumably, blameworthy, i n the ordinary, non-judgemental, way
of blaming). I t is irrelevant that it 'could not help' seeing things the way it did when
it acted.
3io John M. Cooper
A r i s t o t l e seems to t h i n k this is obvious and u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l , b u t i n

fact i t follows f r o m his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f adults, even these y o u n g
ones, as h a v i n g a c q u i r e d the p o w e r o f d e l i b e r a t i o n and decision.
T o have those powers requires the a b i l i t y to see a n d w e i g h l o n g -
t e r m consequences, a n d p a r t l y consists i n b e i n g able to reflect o n
overall ends and goals i n life, a n d c o n f o r m one's b e h a v i o u r to such
value j u d g e m e n t s . Hence, even i f we s h o u l d g r a n t to the objector
that a lax and i n a t t e n t i v e person does n o t now c o n t r o l w h e t h e r they
pay a t t e n t i o n (we m i g h t n o t w a n t to g r a n t that, o f course), they are
responsible for b e i n g lax a n d i n a t t e n t i v e people. T h e r e f o r e , they
are also responsible for whatever b a d things they do as a result o f
b e i n g people like that (even i f they do n o t c u r r e n t l y ' c o n t r o l ' be
i n g like t h a t ) . A n d s i m i l a r l y for a l l other character traits. People's
earlier a d u l t actions o f j u s t i c e or injustice were i n d i s p u t a b l y v o l u n
tary, a n d ones they were responsible for (the o b j e c t i o n does n o t dis
pute t h a t ) . A t the same t i m e , because o f this k n o w l e d g e about the
consequences, each earlier act o f injustice, o n A r i s t o t l e ' s analysis,
since i t was k n o w n b y those w h o d i d t h e m to be h e l p i n g to cause
t h e m to be u n j u s t people later, is accompanied b y a v o l u n t a r y act
of m a k i n g themselves be u n j u s t people. Since they k n e w about the
p a r t i c u l a r s o f t h e i r s i t u a t i o n i n d o i n g t h e m that this w o u l d be the
l i k e l y result, they are n o w responsible for b e i n g the k i n d s o f people
they are, w h e t h e r good or bad, w i t h the result that the actions they
now decide to do as people o f those k i n d s are v o l u n t a r y too.
I t is true, as A r i s t o t l e notes towards the end o f the chapter
( i i i 4 3 i - i 6 ) , that p a r t o f w h a t happens to a p e r s o n as a result o f
a b
b e i n g one or another k i n d o f m o r a l l y good or decent, or m o r a l l y

b a d person, is that they come to conceive themselves and t h e i r good
i n ways characteristic o f people o f the g i v e n sort. ' T h e e n d appears'
to t h e m i n determinate ways, caused b y t h e i r b e i n g p a r t i c u l a r k i n d s
of person. T o u n j u s t people m o n e y a n d other goods o f the sort that
u n j u s t people u n j u s t l y t r y to get appear o f especially great value i n
life, a value that makes i t seem to t h e m j u s t i f i e d to m i s t r e a t others
i n order to o b t a i n t h e m . I t is f r o m that appearance o f the 'end'
that they do t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i n g a n d d e c i d i n g , a n d t h e i r consequent
actions o f v i r t u e or vice. N o matter: they have k n o w i n g l y caused
themselves, i n the w a y we have seen, to be that way, a n d so they
have k n o w i n g l y caused themselves to have the e n d 'appear' to t h e m
as i t does. So, b e i n g responsible for the w a y the e n d appears to
t h e m , they are also responsible for those deliberated a n d decided
Aristotelian Responsibility 3ii
actions. Or, he adds, even if, m e r e l y for the sake o f the a r g u m e n t ,
one g r a n t e d t h a t the w a y the e n d 'appears' to people is not caused
t h a t way, b u t o n l y comes about somehow ' b y n a t u r e ' a n d b i r t h , or
even b y some sort o f d i v i n e dispensation (a r i d i c u l o u s idea, as A r i s
totle reasonably t h i n k s ) , his i n i t i a l a r g u m e n t for the voluntariness
o f v i r t u e (see the first p a r a g r a p h o f this section) w o u l d stand: the
regular activities of v i r t u e or vice, i n w h i c h o u r b e i n g v i r t u o u s or
vicious consists ( i n a w a y ) , b e i n g ones we decide o n d o i n g , case b y
case, w o u l d c o u n t s t i l l as v o l u n t a r y . Regardless o f the w a y the e n d
appears, i t is o u r deliberations a n d decisions, o n the basis o f that
appearance, t h a t cause o u r v i r t u o u s or v i c i o u s actions, and those
deliberations a n d decisions are i n t e r n a l to us i n the w a y r e q u i r e d ,
a n d sufficient, for t h e m to be v o l u n t a r y — g i v e n A r i s t o t l e ' s account
o f the v o l u n t a r y .
A r i s t o t l e ' s response i n NE 3. 5 to these objections is o f special
interest i n the present c o n n e c t i o n because o f the w a y i t reinforces
m y a r g u m e n t t h a t A r i s t o t l e ' s account o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f agents for
t h i n g s t h a t they do neither does, n o r has any need to, make r o o m for
ideas o f any special ' m o r a l ' responsibility, reserved for a d u l t h u m a n
agents alone. I n r e s p o n d i n g to these objections, he does indeed rely
o n the crucial fact t h a t a d u l t h u m a n s deliberate a n d make decisions.
B u t i t is the k n o w l e d g e t h a t actions are causes o f states o f charac
ter, w h i c h possessing t h a t a b i l i t y opens u p to us, that, for A r i s t o t l e ,
makes the difference b e t w e e n us and other agents so far as responsi
b i l i t y for o u r characters goes. Possessing t h a t k n o w l e d g e i n the rele
v a n t past, w h i l e we f o r m e d o u r characters, makes us responsible for
t h e m ; l a c k i n g i t makes animals n o t responsible for t h e i r characters.
So w h e n he recognizes the special i m p o r t a n c e o f the capacity for
d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d decision i n a d u l t v o l u n t a r y actions, A r i s t o t l e does
n o t alter, or open the door to any alteration i n , his single a n d equal
account o f w h a t i t is for animals a n d us to be responsible for those
t h i n g s t h a t we do t h a t we are i n fact responsible for. B o t h animals
a n d c h i l d r e n , a n d we a d u l t h u m a n s too, are responsible s i m p l y a n d
equally for whatever o f the t h i n g s we do t h a t o u r desires, decisions,
a n d k n o w l e d g e or t h o u g h t are the o r i g i n a t i n g sources a n d causes
o f o u r doing. W e do n o t have to recognize any special sort, or h i g h
grade, o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( ' m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' ) t h a t adults possess,
b u t animals a n d c h i l d r e n lack.
Princeton University
312 John M. Cooper
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cooper, J. M . , Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy

from Socrates to Plotinus (Princeton, 2012).
Eshleman, A . , 'Moral Responsibility', i n The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi
losophy (Winter 2009 Edition), ed. E. N . Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/).
Goldman, A . I . , 'The Individuation of Action', Journal of Philosophy, 68
(1971), 761-74.
I r w i n , T. H . , Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd edn. (Cambridge and
Indianapolis, 1999).
'Reason and Responsibility i n Aristotle', i n A . Rorty (ed.), Essays on
Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980), 117-55.
Rowe, C , and Broadie, S. (trans, and comm.), Aristotle: Nicomachean
Ethics (Oxford, 2002).
M A K I N G SENSE OF A R C E S I L A U S
CASEY PERIN
S O M E time a r o u n d 265 BCE, SO the usual story goes, the A c a d e m y

f o u n d e d i n A t h e n s b y Plato over a h u n d r e d years earlier became
an i n s t i t u t i o n devoted to the s t u d y and practice o f a f o r m o f p h i
losophical scepticism. T h e A c a d e m y ' s n e w director, Arcesilaus
(c.315-240 BCE), altered its m i s s i o n . A c c o r d i n g to L o n g and Sed
ley, the A c a d e m y u n d e r Arcesilaus' leadership 'gained the status
o f the chief sceptical school' i n H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y . M a l c o l m
1
Schofield has w r i t t e n that 'early i n the H e l l e n i s t i c p e r i o d the

A c a d e m y w e n t sceptical' and that 'the p h i l o s o p h e r w h o effected
this change o f o u t l o o k i n the A c a d e m y was A r c e s i l a u s ' . T h e 2
p r o b l e m w i t h the usual story, however, is that i t is largely u n i n -

formative. A n d this because there is n o consensus about h o w to
u n d e r s t a n d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l scepticism Arcesilaus b r o u g h t to the
Academy. O n one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — c a l l i t the dogmatic interpreta
tion—Arcesilaus h e l d , a m o n g other p h i l o s o p h i c a l views, the v i e w
that n o t h i n g can be k n o w n a n d the v i e w that one o u g h t to suspend
j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . O n another i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — c a l l i t the
dialectical interpretation—although Arcesilaus argued for or against
any n u m b e r o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l claims, he h a d no p h i l o s o p h i c a l views
o f his o w n . Instead he adopted the practice o f suspending j u d g e
m e n t about a l l , or at least all p h i l o s o p h i c a l , matters. A c c o r d i n g to
© Casey Perin 2013

For comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am very grateful to audiences at the
University of Western Ontario and the Universities of California at Berkeley, Irvine,
and Riverside and, i n particular, to Joseph Barnes, Jozef Muller, Karen Nielsen, and
Eric Schwitzgebel. I received especially helpful comments on the penultimate ver
sion from Brad Inwood and an anonymous referee for OSAP. Special thanks, finally,
to N i s h i Shah, who read and discussed multiple versions of the paper w i t h me and
whose help, once again, proved to be invaluable.
1
See A . A . Long and D. N . Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cam
bridge, 1987), i . 5.
3
M . Schofield, Academic Epistemology', i n K . Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and
M . Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge,
1999), 323-Si at 323.
3H Casey Perin
the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h i s practice, n o t any p h i l o s o p h i c a l

view, was the s u m a n d substance o f his s c e p t i c i s m . 3
H e r e I argue t h a t these t w o r i v a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e an i n
t e r p r e t a t i v e d i l e m m a : n e i t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is adequate a n d there
is n o t h i r d o p t i o n . Arcesilaus e i t h e r d i d o r d i d n o t have p h i l o s o
p h i c a l v i e w s . I f he d i d , as the d o g m a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n claims, t h e n
he is i n c o n s i s t e n t a n d there is n o clear w a y to rescue h i m f r o m t h i s
inconsistency. I f Arcesilaus d i d n o t have p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s , t h e n
the practice o f u n i v e r s a l suspension o f j u d g e m e n t i n w h i c h , o n the
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , his s c e p t i c i s m is s u p p o s e d to consist is
i n e x p l i c a b l e . T h e u p s h o t is t h a t we have n o t y e t m a n a g e d to make
sense o f A r c e s i l a u s as a p h i l o s o p h e r .
T h i s d i s c o u r a g i n g c o n c l u s i o n is n o t one we can resist b y read
i n g m o r e c a r e f u l l y e i t h e r w h a t Arcesilaus w r o t e (for i t appears he
w r o t e n o t h i n g ) or w h a t C i c e r o a n d others i n a n t i q u i t y w r o t e a b o u t
h i m . T h e task o f m a k i n g sense o f A r c e s i l a u s is n o t i n t e r p r e t a t i v e
b u t s t r i c t l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l . T h i s task comes i n t w o parts. F i r s t , we
m u s t f i n d a place i n l o g i c a l space for A r c e s i l a u s t o occupy. Second,
3
For versions of the dogmatic interpretation see D. Sedley, ' T h e Motivation of
Greek Skepticism', i n M . Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1983), 9—29 at 11—16; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, i .
447; R. J. Hankinson, The Sceptics (London, 1995), 85—6; and Schofield, Academic
Epistemology', 326—34. For versions of the dialectical interpretation see P. Couissin,
'The Stoicism of the N e w Academy', i n Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition,
31—63 at 32—41; G. Striker, 'Sceptical Strategies', i n ead., Essays on Hellenistic
Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge, 1996), 92—115 at 99—104; and H . Thorsrud,
Arcesilaus and Carneades', i n R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient
Scepticism (Cambridge, 2010), 58—80 at 58—70. T h e interpretations of Arcesilaus
offered by M . Frede i n ' T h e Sceptic's T w o Kinds of Assent and the Question of
the Possibility of Knowledge' ['Two Kinds of Assent'], i n M . Burnyeat and M .
Frede (eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Indianapolis, 1997), 127—51,
and J. Cooper, Arcesilaus: Socratic and Skeptic' ['Arcesilaus'], in i d . , Knowledge,
Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy (Princeton, 2004), 81—103, a r e
difficult to classify as either dogmatic or dialectical. T h i s is because Frede and

Cooper each t r y (unsuccessfully, I w i l l argue) to have i t both ways. Frede claims
that Arcesilaus (or the figure he calls more generally 'the classical sceptic') both
argues in every case dialectically and has certain views—including those I dub N K
and USJ—where, Frede says, having a view is different from, and weaker than,
'taking a position or making a claim' i n the way the non-sceptical philosopher
does. So Frede attributes to Arcesilaus a kind of attenuated dogmatism. So too
does Cooper, who, while agreeing w i t h Striker that Arcesilaus' arguments are
'wholly dialectical', none the less insists that Arcesilaus is 'committed to' a thesis
about the correctness of suspension of judgement under certain conditions. T h i s
and related commitments constitute what Cooper calls 'a very deep conviction'
of Arcesilaus', but that conviction falls short of being a philosophical view that
Arcesilaus holds.
Making Sense of Arcesilaus 315
we m u s t e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus occupies the place i n logical space
we find for h i m . A n i n t e p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus (or any figure i n the
h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y ) is adequate o n l y i f i t yields u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
A n d we u n d e r s t a n d Arcesilaus as a p h i l o s o p h e r o n l y i f we can ex
p l a i n why he h e l d a c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w or engaged i n a cer
t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r a c t i c e . W e m u s t be able to e x p l a i n w h y a n d i n
4
w h a t sense Arcesilaus either h e l d the v i e w that one o u g h t to suspend

j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g or adopted the practice o f suspending
j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . W e can do this, i f we can, a n d so make
sense o f Arcesilaus, o n l y b y w o r k i n g t h r o u g h those p h i l o s o p h i c a l is
sues that the dogmatic and dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f Arcesilaus
raise b u t that t h e i r advocates have n o t resolved or even m u c h dis
cussed.
1. T h e dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
A c c o r d i n g to Cicero, at Acad. 1. 45, Arcesilaus claims both that
( N K ) N o t h i n g can be k n o w n
and that, since this is so,
( U S J ) One o u g h t n o t to assent to a n y t h i n g b u t to suspend j u d g e

m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g .
I f to believe s o m e t h i n g is to assent to i t , t h e n U S J — t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
u n i v e r s a l suspension o f j u d g e m e n t — i s equivalent to the c l a i m that
one o u g h t n o t to believe a n y t h i n g at all. I n the same passage Cicero
tells us that Arcesilaus also claims that
( A S ) One o u g h t to assent to a p r o p o s i t i o n p o n l y i f b y d o i n g so
one comes n o t m e r e l y to believe, b u t also to know, that p. 5
T h e c l a i m that one o u g h t to believe s o m e t h i n g o n l y i f d o i n g so satis-

4
See Michael Frede's remarks i n M . Frede, 'Introduction', in i d . , Essays in An
cient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987) ix—xxvii at xi—xv, on the kinds of explanation
the historian of philosophy can give of the fact that a particular philosopher i n the
past held a particular philosophical view. Frede argues, rightly in my view, that the
task of the historian of philosophy is to understand, and so explain, why the philo
sopher under study held the views he did.
5
A t Acad. 1. 45 Cicero attributes to Arcesilaus the claim that 'nothing is more
shameful than for one's assent or acceptance to outrun knowledge or apprehension'
('neque . . . quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem ap-
probationemque praecurrere'). ( I use, sometimes modified, Charles Brittain's trans-
3i6 Casey Perin
fies the c o n d i t i o n s o n k n o w l e d g e ( = A S ) , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the

c l a i m t h a t i n n o case does b e l i e v i n g s o m e t h i n g satisfy these c o n d i
t i o n s ( = N K ) , entails t h a t one o u g h t n o t t o believe a n y t h i n g b u t t o
suspend j u d g e m e n t a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g ( = U S J ) .
A t Acad. i . 45, t h e n , C i c e r o offers a d o g m a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
Arcesilaus. H e depicts A r c e s i l a u s as assenting to, a n d so b e l i e v i n g ,
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l theses I have d u b b e d N K , U S J , a n d A S . C o m 6
m e n t a t o r s are q u i c k t o n o t e t h a t Cic e r o' s A r c e s i l a u s is i n c o n s i s t e n t .

H o w e v e r , i t is i m p o r t a n t t o be clear a b o u t the sense i n w h i c h
A r c e s i l a u s is i n c o n s i s t e n t o n Cic e r o' s t e s t i m o n y at Acad. i . 45.
A r c e s i l a u s is said b y C i c e r o t o assent t o s o m e t h i n g — n a m e l y , the
p r o p o s i t i o n U S J , t h a t one o u g h t n o t t o assent t o a n y t h i n g — w h i l e
also b e l i e v i n g , as a r e s u l t o f assenting t o t h a t v e r y p r o p o s i t i o n , t h a t
one o u g h t n o t t o assent t o a n y t h i n g . M o r e o v e r , A r c e s i l a u s is said
by C i c e r o t o assent t o o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s — N K a n d A S — w h i l e
also b e l i e v i n g , as a r e s u l t o f assenting t o U S J , t h a t one o u g h t
n o t t o assent t o a n y t h i n g . H e n c e , i t is not the case t h a t , as J o h n
C o o p e r has r e c e n t l y c l a i m e d , the A r c e s i l a u s o f Acad. 1. 45 'grossly
contradicts h i m s e l f a n d so fails t o preserve w h a t C o o p e r calls
'logical consistency'. 7
I n its s t a n d a r d l o g i c a l sense i n c o n s i s t e n c y
lation of the Academica i n C. Brittain, OnAcademic Scepticism (Indianapolis, 2006).)

See also Acad. 2. 77, where Cicero reports that Arcesilaus accepts the claim made by
Zeno the Stoic that i t is necessary for the wise person not to have opinions or mere
beliefs ('nihil opinari . . . necesse esse sapienti'). Since what the wise person does,
or must do, is what those of us who are not wise ought to do, Zeno's claim is equi
valent to the claim that one ought not to have opinions or mere beliefs—where that,
in turn, is the claim that one ought to believe something only i f doing so satisfies the
conditions on knowledge.
6
See also De oratore 3. 67, where Cicero attributes N K to Arcesilaus. Plutarch,
Adv. Col. 1121 E—1122 A , reports that certain contemporary critics of Arcesilaus—
whom Plutarch calls oo<j)iorai and who might be or include the Cyrenaic Theodorus
and the Cynic Bion—attribute both U S J and N K to Arcesilaus. They claim that
Arcesilaus, i n turn, attributed his 'doctrines about suspension of judgement and
the impossibility of knowledge' (rot ire pi rf/s eiro^rj's h6yjxo.ro, KOI rf/s oKOToXr/ijjios)
to Socrates, Plato, Parmenides, and Heraclitus as a way of arguing by appeal to
authority for their truth. T h e Platonist philosopher Numenius ( i n Euseb. PE
14. 6, 730c—731 B) attributes N K to Arcesilaus. Sextus Empiricus, PH 1. 233,
attributes something close to U S J to Arcesilaus. According to Sextus, Arcesilaus
'says' (Aeyei) suspension of judgement is good and assent is bad, and i n saying
this Arcesilaus, unlike the Pyrrhonist, is not merely reporting how things appear
to h i m to be but is speaking ' i n relation to the nature of things' (npos TTJV <f>v-
oiv).
7
Cooper, Arcesilaus', 87 n. 11. Cooper may here be following Frede, ' T w o Kinds
of Assent', 132, who writes that 'the sceptic' cannot assent to U S J 'without involving
himself i n immediate contradiction'. Frede rightly suggests that in the absence of a
Making Sense of Arcesilaus 3i7
is a m a t t e r o f t w o statements b e i n g i n c o m p a t i b l e , a n d t w o state
ments are i n c o m p a t i b l e i f a n d o n l y i f i t is n o t possible for b o t h
statements to be true. Someone w h o claims or believes that p is
g u i l t y o f inconsistency i n this sense—and so fails to preserve ' l o
gical c o n s i s t e n c y ' — i f a n d o n l y i f he claims or believes s o m e t h i n g
else q such that i t is n o t possible for b o t h p a n d q to be true. B u t ,
as Cicero presents h i m at Acad. 1 . 45, Arcesilaus does n o t make
i n c o m p a t i b l e claims or h o l d i n c o m p a t i b l e beliefs—as he w o u l d if,
for example, Cicero h a d described h i m as c l a i m i n g or b e l i e v i n g
b o t h that n o t h i n g can be k n o w n and that he k n o w s that this is so
(and, therefore, that s o m e t h i n g is, a n d so can be, k n o w n ) . N o r
is i t the case that, as M a l c o l m Schofield has w r i t t e n , Arcesilaus
refutes h i m s e l f . I n assenting to, and so b e l i e v i n g , N K , U S J ,
8
a n d A S , Arcesilaus does n o t thereby establish that any o f these

theses is false. O n Cicero's dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i m at Acad.
1. 45, Arcesilaus is inconsistent j u s t i n the sense that he believes
s o m e t h i n g — i n the first instance, U S J — h e believes he o u g h t n o t to
believe.
A n y o n e w h o assents to U S J believes, as a result o f d o i n g so, that
he o u g h t n o t to assent to, a n d so believe, a n y t h i n g . Hence, he be
lieves he o u g h t n o t to believe U S J . M o r e generally, he believes he
o u g h t n o t to believe a n y t h i n g he i n fact believes. So i t at least ap
pears that Arcesilaus cannot assent to, a n d so believe, U S J w i t h o u t
thereby v i o l a t i n g i t — w i t h o u t , that is, b e l i e v i n g s o m e t h i n g and so
b e i n g i n the v e r y state U S J says one o u g h t n o t to be i n . H e can sa
9
tisfy U S J — t h a t is, he can do w h a t U S J says he o u g h t to do, namely,
distinction between two kinds of assent, 'the sceptic' cannot assent to USJ without
thereby violating it. But he is mistaken, or perhaps simply careless, i n characterizing
the violation of USJ as a contradiction.
8
Schofield, 'Academic Epistemology', 331.
9
This is a case of epistemic irrationality w i t h the following special feature. I n ge
neral someone subject to a conflict between two attitudes A and B can resolve that
conflict in two ways: he can eliminate either A or B. But i n Arcesilaus' case the eli
mination of the one conflicting attitude requires the elimination of the other. As a
result, Arcesilaus can resolve the conflict between attitudes to which he is subject
only by eliminating both attitudes. Let A be the belief that USJ, and let B be the
belief that one ought not to believe that USJ. Arcesilaus has belief B solely because
he has belief A: A is the sole grounds or basis for B. Consequently, if Arcesilaus eli
minates A, he thereby eliminates B. Moreover, A is the basis for B because A entails
B by universal instantiation. T o believe USJ is to believe that for any proposition^),
one ought not to believe that^>. T h e content of this belief entails the content of B:
that one ought not to believe that USJ. So the elimination of B requires on pain of
inconsistency the elimination of A.
3i8 Casey Perin
suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g — o n l y i f he w i t h h o l d s assent

f r o m and suspends j u d g e m e n t about U S J itself. O n the dogmatic
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Arcesilaus appears to be i n the unsatisfactory p o s i
t i o n o f assenting to, and so b e l i e v i n g , a n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e , U S J ,
that he violates b y assenting to, a n d so b e l i e v i n g , i t . Cicero's testi
m o n y at Acad, i . 45, therefore, raises w i t h o u t answering a q u e s t i o n
that the dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus m u s t answer. Is i t
possible for Arcesilaus to have the v i e w that one o u g h t to suspend
j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g — o r , for that matter, any other p h i l o
sophical v i e w — w i t h o u t thereby v i o l a t i n g USJ?
A n s w e r i n g this q u e s t i o n i n the affirmative requires d r a w i n g a dis
t i n c t i o n between the a t t i t u d e specifically p r o s c r i b e d b y U S J and
an a t t i t u d e p e r m i t t e d b y U S J whose a d o p t i o n is sufficient for hav
i n g a p h i l o s o p h i c a l view. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n can be d r a w n , as i t is b y
Cicero at Acad. 2. 104, i n different b u t equivalent t e r m s . I t can 10
be d r a w n as a d i s t i n c t i o n between t w o k i n d s o f assent—strong vs.

weak assent—and U S J i n t e r p r e t e d as the thesis that one o u g h t n o t
to give strong assent to a n y t h i n g . Arcesilaus, as Cicero presents h i m
atAcad. 1. 45, does n o t give s t r o n g assent to U S J or to a n y t h i n g else.
B u t he does give weak assent to U S J and to m u c h e l s e — i n c l u d i n g
N K a n d A S . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n can be d r a w n as the dis
t i n c t i o n between assenting to a p r o p o s i t i o n a n d m e r e l y a p p r o v i n g
of i t . Arcesilaus does n o t assent to U S J or to a n y t h i n g else, b u t he
does approve o f U S J as w e l l as o f N K , A S , and m u c h else. I n do
i n g so he does n o t violate U S J . F o r U S J p r o h i b i t s one o n l y f r o m
g i v i n g assent to itself or a n y t h i n g else. I w i l l n o w argue that, re
gardless o f the terms e m p l o y e d , recent attempts to make a d i s t i n c
t i o n o f this sort b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y plausible a n d c o n v i n c i n g as an
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus or other Academics such as Carneades
fail.
M i c h a e l Frede has p r o p o s e d that s t r o n g assent to a p r o p o s i t i o n ,
u n l i k e weak assent, involves t a k i n g that p r o p o s i t i o n to be true. O n
1 0
Cicero takes this distinction from a work of Clitomachus, who, in turn, takes it
from Carneades. Clitomachus initially talks of two senses in which one can be said
to withhold assent ('adsensus sustinere'), and claims that i n only one of these two
senses does the wise person withhold assent. I f this is so, then there is a sense i n
which the wise person does assent, or a kind of assent he does give to some impres
sions. Clitomachus then says that the wise person assents to an impression i n so far
as he 'approves' ('adprobet') of it. So the distinction between two kinds of assent is
characterized as a distinction between assenting to an impression—giving to it the
kind of assent the wise person withholds from every impression—and merely ap
proving of it.
Making Sense of Arcesilaus 3i9
this proposal Arcesilaus gives weak assent to U S J , a n d i n d o i n g
so comes to have the v i e w that one o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t
about e v e r y t h i n g , b u t he does n o t take U S J to be true. F o r Frede,
t a k i n g p to be true is s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g that p is t r u e . 11
T h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n , is h o w or i n w h a t sense one can have the v i e w

that p w i t h o u t b e l i e v i n g that p is true. Frede provides m o r e t h a n
one answer to this question. Sometimes he identifies t a k i n g a p r o
p o s i t i o n to be true w i t h explicitly or consciously b e l i e v i n g that p is
t r u e . T h e c l a i m w o u l d t h e n be that one can have the v i e w th&tp
1 2
w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t l y or consciously b e l i e v i n g that p is true, and this

is so because implicitly or unconsciously b e l i e v i n g that p is true is
sufficient for h a v i n g the v i e w th&tp. Yet the difference between ex
p l i c i t a n d i m p l i c i t , or conscious and unconscious, beliefs—real as
the difference is—is c o m p l e t e l y irrelevant to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
Arcesilaus. T h e r e is n o i n d e p e n d e n t reason to t h i n k that U S J is
to be u n d e r s t o o d as p r o h i b i t i n g one f r o m h a v i n g e x p l i c i t or c o n
scious beliefs w h i l e p e r m i t t i n g one to have i m p l i c i t or unconscious
beliefs.
A t other times, however, Frede w r i t e s that h a v i n g a v i e w requires
n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n ' b e i n g left w i t h an i m p r e s s i o n ' or w h a t he calls
'passive acquiescence' i n an i m p r e s s i o n . N o w the psychological
13
state these expressions are supposed to denote either is or is n o t a

belief. I f b e i n g left w i t h , or acquiescing i n , an i m p r e s s i o n that p is
not a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g th&tp, t h e n i t is v e r y difficult to see h o w i t
is sufficient for h a v i n g the v i e w th&tp. However, i f b e i n g left w i t h ,
or acquiescing i n , an i m p r e s s i o n th&tp is a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g that
p, t h e n i t is also, a n d for that reason, a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g that p
is true. O r at least this is so g i v e n the standard c o n c e p t i o n o f be
lief a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h to believe that p j u s t is to believe that p is
t r u e . Frede seems to reject the standard c o n c e p t i o n o f belief, b u t
14
1 1
T h o u g h this is not nearly as clear in Frede's discussion as one would like it
to be. But at one point ( ' T w o Kinds of Assent', 135) Frede contrasts having the
view that p i n his minimal sense w i t h 'thinking that it is the case that p or that it
is true that^>', where this, i n turn, seems to be tantamount to believing that p is
true.
1 3
See ' T w o Kinds of Assent', 135—6, where Frede talks of 'the further thought
that it is true that^>' and gives the example of the craftsman who, i n practising his
craft, relies on his implicit expert beliefs.
1 3
Frede, ' T w o Kinds of Assent', 132—5.
1 4
See e.g. B. Williams, 'Deciding to Believe', i n i d . , Problems of the Self (Cam
bridge, 1973), 136-51 at 137.
320 Casey Perin
I t h i n k i t is fair to say that his grounds for d o i n g so are o b s c u r e . 15
He writes:
It might be the case that action does not require that one take the impres
sion one is acting on to be true. I t might be the case that action does not,
in addition to the impression that p, require a positive act of assent or the
further thought that i t is true that£. A l l that may be needed is one's acqui
escence i n the impression, and all this may amount to is that i n the series of
impressions one has reached an impression which produces an action rather
than the kind of disquiet which would make one go on to consider the mat
ter further t i l l one reached an impression which one no longer resists and
which produces action. Indeed, one may have the view that£ without even
entertaining the thought that£, let alone the further thought that£ is true.
Things may have left us w i t h the impression that£, and we may act on that
view, without being aware of i t . 1 6
Frede runs together here t w o v e r y different considerations, and

neither consideration supports a rejection o f the standard concep
t i o n o f belief. A s far as I can see, the phrase 'the i m p r e s s i o n one is
acting o n ' m u s t denote a psychological state that motivates, and so
causes, an agent to act. F o r that reason i t is a psychological state to
w h i c h an e x p l a n a t i o n o f the agent's action w i l l appeal. I t is true, as
Frede suggests, that a psychological state o f this sort need n o t be
one the agent is aware o f h a v i n g . I t is also true that i n c e r t a i n sorts
of cases we can e x p l a i n an agent's actions w i t h o u t a t t r i b u t i n g to her
the belief that some p r o p o s i t i o n or other is true. N e i t h e r o f these
considerations, t h o u g h , is a reason to t h i n k i t is possible to believe
that p, a n d so to have the v i e w that p, w i t h o u t b e l i e v i n g that p is
true. T h e first consideration s i m p l y amounts to the p l a t i t u d e that
1 5
Striker, i n 'Sceptical Strategies', 113, rejects the standard conception of belief
on the grounds that it cannot accommodate partial belief. I n her view a partial belief
that^> is not to be identified w i t h believing that^> is true (or what Striker terms 'as
senting or accepting as true' or 'taking to be true'). So one possibility is to understand
USJ as proscribing all-out belief but permitting partial belief. M u c h here turns on
how the notion of partial belief is understood. I f partial belief is credence—the atti
tude of assigning a value between o and 1 to a proposition—then I do not think we
can save Arcesilaus from inconsistency by attributing to h i m a partial belief i n USJ.
I f the value he assigns to USJ is too high, then it is unclear why his attitude to USJ
is a partial rather than an all-out belief. Yet if the value is too low, then it is unclear
why his attitude of partial belief i n USJ should count as his having the view that
USJ. There are countless philosophical propositions to which I do or would assign
a value greater than o, but very few of these represent philosophical views I have.
Of course, the notion of partial belief might be developed i n other ways. See e.g. R.
Holton, 'Partial Belief, Partial Intention', Mind, 117 (2008), 27-58 at 35-40.
1 6
Frede, ' T w o Kinds of Assent', 135.
unconscious or i m p l i c i t psychological states, no less t h a n conscious
or e x p l i c i t ones, can move us to act. A n d the second consideration
reveals o n l y that psychological states other t h a n belief—states like
i m a g i n a t i o n , hypothesis, a n d assumption—can p l a y the same role
that belief usually plays i n the m o t i v a t i o n , a n d so explanation, o f
action. 17
Frede seems to t h i n k that one can have the v i e w that p i f one is

m o v e d to act not b y the b e l i e f th&tp is true b u t b y the mere i m p r e s
sion th&tp. I n the context o f a discussion o f Carneades' d i s t i n c t i o n
between assent and a p p r o v a l , R i c h a r d Bett, too, has made use o f the
n o t i o n o f a l l o w i n g one's actions to be g u i d e d b y an i m p r e s s i o n one
does n o t take to be t r u e . B u t w h a t exactly is i t , or c o u l d i t be, to be
18
m o v e d b y the mere i m p r e s s i o n that p, or to allow one's actions to

be g u i d e d b y the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t £ , i n the absence o f the belief that
p is true? T h e o n l y way to answer this q u e s t i o n is b y appeal to the
d i s t i n c t i o n between d o i n g a p a r t i c u l a r action x because one believes
that p and d o i n g x because one is acting as if one believed that p.
T o be m o v e d to act b y the mere i m p r e s s i o n t h a t £ , or to a l l o w the
i m p r e s s i o n t h a t £ to guide m y action w h e n I do n o t believe t h a t £ ,
is to act as i f I believed that p where that, i n t u r n , is to do j u s t w h a t
someone w h o believes that p w o u l d do. I f I do w h a t someone w h o
believes that p w o u l d do, t h e n I do an action that is n o r m a l l y ex
p l a i n e d b y a t t r i b u t i n g to the agent w h o does i t the b e l i e f that p. I f
I lack this belief, t h e n m y action is inexplicable unless i n some way
or other I a m t r e a t i n g p as true for the purposes o f action. I f this is
r i g h t , t h e n the n o t i o n o f b e i n g m o v e d to act b y a mere i m p r e s s i o n ,
or o f b e i n g g u i d e d i n action b y an i m p r e s s i o n I do n o t believe to be
true, is i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y as the n o t i o n o f acting as i f I h a d a certain
belief. A n d this n o t i o n is i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y as the n o t i o n o f t r e a t i n g
a certain p r o p o s i t i o n as true for the purposes o f action. B u t — a n d
here, finally, is the p o i n t — t h e n o t i o n o f t r e a t i n g p as true for the
purposes o f action has a p p l i c a t i o n j u s t i n those cases i n w h i c h one
does not i n any sense have the v i e w t h a t £ . I f I have the v i e w t h a t £ ,
m y treating^) as true for the purposes o f action is r e d u n d a n t . I treat
p as true for the purposes o f action w h e n , for whatever reason, I
17
For additional criticisms of Frede see G. Fine, 'Sceptical Dogmata: Outlines
of Pyrrhonism I 13', Methexis, 13 (2000), 81—105 82—8. Some of my criticisms of
a t
Frede are similar to some of Fine's, and I have benefited greatly from reading her
discussion.
18
R. Bett, 'Carneades' Distinction between Assent and Approval', Monist, 73
(1990), 3—20 at 10—15.
322 Casey Perin
p r e t e n d or imagine th&tp, or f o r m the hypothesis th&tp, or assume

th&tp: w h e n , l a c k i n g the v i e w th&tp, I act as if I h a d the v i e w that
p.
19
T r e a t i n g p as true for the purposes o f a c t i o n is n o t an instance
of, b u t a surrogate for, h a v i n g the v i e w t h a t £ .
Suppose, however, that t r e a t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n as true is sufficient
for h a v i n g a view. So suppose that Arcesilaus has the v i e w that
one o u g h t n o t to believe a n y t h i n g b u t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about
e v e r y t h i n g j u s t i n the sense that he treats U S J as true b u t does n o t
believe i t to be true. Arcesilaus can satisfy U S J , a n d so a v o i d i n
consistency, o n l y i f he suspends j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g and
so has n o beliefs at a l l . Yet i f Arcesilaus has no beliefs at a l l , t h e n
we cannot e x p l a i n w h y he treats U S J as true rather t h a n believes
i t to be true. T h e fact that he takes the one a t t i t u d e towards U S J
rather t h a n the other w i l l be, for us, a mystery. T h e p r o b l e m here
is that any a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n , without attributing any beliefs at all to
Arcesilaus, w h y he treats U S J as true generates a regress that leaves
u n e x p l a i n e d w h y the p r o p o s i t i o n s he treats as true are p r o p o s i t i o n s
he m e r e l y treats as true rather t h a n believes to be true. W e can ex
p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus treats U S J as true b y appealing to the fact that
he treats certain other propositions—namely, N K a n d AS—as true.
A n d we can e x p l a i n w h y he treats these p r o p o s i t i o n s as true b y ap
pealing to the fact that he treats c e r t a i n other p r o p o s i t i o n s as true.
F o r any p r o p o s i t i o n Arcesilaus treats as true, we can e x p l a i n w h y he
treats that p r o p o s i t i o n rather t h a n some other as true. B u t to e x p l a i n
this m u c h is n o t yet to e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus treats certain p r o p o
sitions as true rather t h a n believes t h e m to be true. A n d this is some
t h i n g that requires an e x p l a n a t i o n . T o make sense o f Arcesilaus we
need to be able to e x p l a i n n o t o n l y w h y he takes the a t t i t u d e o f treat
i n g as true towards c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s b u t n o t others, b u t also w h y
he takes towards these p r o p o s i t i o n s the a t t i t u d e o f t r e a t i n g as true
rather t h a n the a t t i t u d e o f b e l i e v i n g to be true.
T r e a t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n as true is s o m e t h i n g we do a n d do for a
purpose. W e can treat a p r o p o s i t i o n as true i n order to c o n d u c t an
As I am using the notion here, treating a proposition as true is an attitude one

1 9
adopts as an alternative to believing that it is true. I t is a generic attitude whose spe

cies include, inter alia, assumption, hypothesis, and imagination. Hence, treating a
proposition as true is not to be confused w i t h the subdoxastic attitude of regarding
a proposition as true that some philosophers think is common to all so-called cogni
tive attitudes, and is that component of any cognitive attitude i n virtue of which it is
a cognitive rather than a conative attitude. See e.g. J. D. Velleman, 'On the A i m of
Belief, i n i d . , The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford, 2000), 244—81 at 248—50.
e x p e r i m e n t ( h y p o t h e s i s ) , or to make an a r g u m e n t o r to f o r m an i n
t e n t i o n ( a s s u m p t i o n ) , o r to e n t e r t a i n a c h i l d ( i m a g i n a t i o n ) . So to
e x p l a i n w h y someone treats a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n as t r u e , we m u s t
a t t r i b u t e to t h a t p e r s o n some a i m o r goal he p u r s u e s i n t r e a t i n g t h a t
p r o p o s i t i o n as t r u e . B u t i f we a t t r i b u t e an a i m o r goal t o someone,
we t h e r e b y a t t r i b u t e a desire t o h i m : h a v i n g an a i m o r goal j u s t is,
at least i n the p r i m a r y cases, h a v i n g a d e s i r e . 20
M o r e o v e r , to ex
p l a i n w h y someone p u r s u e s the satisfaction o f this desire b y t r e a t i n g
a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n as t r u e , we m u s t a t t r i b u t e t o t h a t p e r s o n the
b e l i e f t h a t he can satisfy t h i s desire b y t r e a t i n g a c e r t a i n p r o p o s i
t i o n as t r u e , a n d the beliefs o n w h i c h t h i s b e l i e f depends. H e n c e , i f
A r c e s i l a u s treats U S J o r any o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n as t r u e , his d o i n g so
is i n t e l l i g i b l e o n l y i n v i e w o f the fact t h a t he has c e r t a i n b e l i e f s — t h a t
is, o n l y i n v i e w o f the fact t h a t he believes c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s to be
t r u e r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y treats t h e m as t r u e . N o w i f A r c e s i l a u s be
lieves any p r o p o s i t i o n to be t r u e , he violates U S J . B u t i f he does n o t
believe any p r o p o s i t i o n to be t r u e , a n d so satisfies U S J , we cannot
e x p l a i n w h y he treats U S J or any o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n as t r u e r a t h e r
t h a n believes i t to be t r u e . 2 1
A dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Arcesilaus
can rescue h i m f r o m i n c o n s i s t e n c y o n l y b y m a k i n g h i m a puzzle to
3 0
For a defence of this claim see M . Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford, 1994),
116—25. There are details I pass over here. I t might be the case that having any of
a number of other attitudes—e.g. hope, wish, intention—constitutes having a goal.
But i f this is so, i t is plausible to think that having any of these attitudes requires
having a desire as well (perhaps each of these attitudes consists, in part, of a de
sire).
3 1
I have argued here that (1) if we do not attribute any beliefs to Arcesilaus, then
we cannot explain why he treats U S J or any other proposition as true rather than
believes i t to be true. B u t one might also argue, more ambitiously, that (2) if we do
not attribute any beliefs to Arcesilaus, then we cannot even coherently think of h i m
as treating U S J or any other proposition as true rather than believing i t to be true.
The argument for (2) would purport to show that we cannot even attribute the atti
tude of treating a proposition to be true to someone without also attributing beliefs
to h i m . T h e argument might take as its starting-point Paul Boghossian's claim (in
' T h e Normativity of Content', Philosophical Issues, 13 (2003), 31—45 at 41—3) that
there is an asymmetric dependence of our grasp of the concept of other proposi-
tional attitudes such as desire on our grasp of the concept of belief. According to
Boghossian, we cannot coherently think of someone as desiring something without
also thinking of h i m as believing something. A n d this because to think of someone as
desiring something involves thinking of h i m as wanting things to be different from
the way they are believed by h i m to be. I f our concept of desire is dependent i n this
way on our concept of belief, and i f attributing the attitude of treating a proposition
as true to someone requires attributing a desire to h i m , then we cannot coherently
think of someone treating a proposition as true without also thinking of h i m as be
lieving certain propositions to be true.
324 Casey Perin
us. B u t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h Arcesilaus is i n e x p l i c
able is as inadequate as one a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h he is inconsistent.
So, to s u m u p this p a r t o f the paper, i t is possible to have a v i e w
i n a sense that does n o t violate U S J o n l y i f there is some a t t i t u d e
that is (a) s o m e t h i n g less t h a n b e l i e v i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n to be true,
b u t (b) s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n indifference to the t r u t h o f that p r o
p o s i t i o n , a n d (c) n o t a m a t t e r o f m e r e l y t r e a t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n as true
(whether for p r a c t i c a l or for theoretical purposes). T h e p r o b l e m for
the dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus is that there s i m p l y does
n o t seem to be any a t t i t u d e o f this sort. I f there is n o t , t h e n o n the
dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Arcesilaus is inconsistent i n the sense that
he has a belief (and so a v i e w ) that, as a result o f b e l i e v i n g (and so
h a v i n g the v i e w ) that one o u g h t n o t to have any beliefs (and so any
views), he believes he o u g h t n o t to have. T h e v i e w that one o u g h t to
suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g j u s t is the v i e w that one o u g h t
n o t to have any views at all. A n d i t is n o t possible to h o l d this v i e w
c o n s i s t e n t l y — i t is n o t possible to h o l d i t w i t h o u t also b e l i e v i n g that
one o u g h t n o t to h o l d i t . So Arcesilaus can a v o i d inconsistency o f
this k i n d o n l y i f he suspends j u d g e m e n t about U S J and, as a result,
lacks the v i e w that one o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about every
thing.
2. T h e dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
I f Arcesilaus has any p h i l o s o p h i c a l view, however, i t is the v i e w that

one o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g a n d the views
N K and A S o n w h i c h this v i e w is based. T h e r e are no other views
o u r ancient sources so consistently a t t r i b u t e to Arcesilaus. T h i s is
w h y the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus is the o n l y alterna
tive to the dogmatic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f h i m . A consistent Arcesilaus
is one w h o n o t o n l y suspends j u d g e m e n t about U S J b u t , as the dia
lectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n claims, has no p h i l o s o p h i c a l views at all. T h i s
is so despite (or maybe because of) the fact that he constructs a r g u
ments for or against any n u m b e r o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l theses. O n the
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about Arcesilaus as a
philosopher, and w h a t his scepticism consists i n , is n o t any p h i
losophical v i e w he holds, b u t rather an a t t i t u d e that, as a result
of his p h i l o s o p h i c a l practices, he adopts. T h i s a t t i t u d e is u n i v e r
sal suspension o f j u d g e m e n t . Arcesilaus does n o t believe that one
o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g ; he s i m p l y does sus-
p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . I n this context t w o p r e l i m i
22
n a r y p o i n t s are w o r t h m a k i n g .
F i r s t , the a t t i t u d e o f u n i v e r s a l suspension o f j u d g e m e n t that,
according to the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Arcesilaus adopts can
be taken to have either a w i d e or a n a r r o w scope. I n the f o r m e r
case the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n gives us an Arcesilaus w h o
suspends j u d g e m e n t about a l l matters, p h i l o s o p h i c a l and n o n -
p h i l o s o p h i c a l alike, a n d has no views or beliefs o f any sort. I n the
latter case Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l
matters—his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is u n i v e r s a l w i t h respect
to those m a t t e r s — b u t he has views or beliefs about a variety o f
n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters. Regardless o f w h e t h e r the dialectical
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n assigns a w i d e or a n a r r o w scope to Arcesilaus' sus
p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t , however, o n that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Arcesilaus
suspends j u d g e m e n t about U S J — a p h i l o s o p h i c a l thesis—and
thereby avoids the inconsistency o f w h i c h he is g u i l t y o n the d o g
matic interpretation.
Second, suspension o f j u d g e m e n t consists i n a k i n d o f failure to
believe that requires a special sort o f e x p l a n a t i o n . Suppose that I
suspend j u d g e m e n t (as, i n fact, I do) about w h e t h e r the n u m b e r o f
stars is even or o d d . M y d o i n g so is i n p a r t a m a t t e r o f m y l a c k i n g
c e r t a i n beliefs, namely, the belief that the n u m b e r o f stars is even
a n d the belief that the n u m b e r o f stars is o d d . B u t the fact that I lack
these t w o beliefs is n o t b y itself sufficient for me to suspend j u d g e
m e n t about w h e t h e r the n u m b e r o f stars is even or o d d . I m u s t also
recognize these t w o beliefs, or t h e i r contents, as candidates for be
lief, that is, as things I c o u l d come to believe. I n general, I suspend
j u d g e m e n t about whether^) is the case o n l y i f I believe neither^) n o r
its n e g a t i o n despite the fact that I recognize p, and so its n e g a t i o n ,
as candidates for belief. T h a t is w h y i t makes n o sense to t h i n k o f
Arcesilaus as suspending j u d g e m e n t about whether, for example,
O s w a l d acted alone i n k i l l i n g K e n n e d y . Arcesilaus d i d n o t recog
nize, a n d c o u l d n o t have recognized, either the p r o p o s i t i o n that Os
w a l d acted alone i n k i l l i n g K e n n e d y or its n e g a t i o n as candidates for
belief. So w h i l e he believed n e i t h e r that O s w a l d d i d n o r that he d i d
not act alone i n k i l l i n g K e n n e d y , Arcesilaus d i d n o t suspend j u d g e -
33
Texts in which not the view expressed by USJ, but universal suspension of
judgement itself, is attributed to Arcesilaus include D . L . 4. 28 and 4. 32; Plut. Adv.
Col. 1120 c and 1122c (where Arcesilaus and the Academics around h i m are simply
called 'those who suspend judgement about everything', ol Trepl Travraw eir(-)(ovTe<;);
and S.E. PH 1. 232.
326 Casey Perin
m e n t about the matter. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for m y purposes here is

that to e x p l a i n w h y someone suspends j u d g e m e n t about s o m e t h i n g
is to e x p l a i n w h y he lacks certain beliefs i n the d i s t i n c t i v e w a y that
constitutes suspension o f j u d g e m e n t . T o e x p l a i n this, i n t u r n , is to
e x p l a i n w h y someone fails to believe s o m e t h i n g he h i m s e l f recog
nizes as s o m e t h i n g he c o u l d believe—as a possible object o f belief
or w h a t I a m c a l l i n g a candidate for belief.
A n y o n e w h o r a t i o n a l l y suspends j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r p is
the case does so because he believes he lacks sufficient reason to be
lieve either p or its n e g a t i o n . Consequently, we can e x p l a i n w h y
Arcesilaus (or anyone else) r a t i o n a l l y suspends j u d g e m e n t about
s o m e t h i n g o n l y b y a t t r i b u t i n g to h i m at least one belief, namely,
a belief about his reasons for b e l i e f . T h i s p o i n t is, I t h i n k , i m p l i c i t
23
i n Cicero's d e s c r i p t i o n at Acad, i . 45 o f the source o f Arcesilaus'

suspension o f j u d g e m e n t . A c c o r d i n g to Cicero's dogmatic inter
p r e t a t i o n , Arcesilaus recommends suspension o f j u d g e m e n t o n the
basis o f views he holds about the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e and
the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h assent is p e r m i s s i b l e . I t is one t h i n g
24
to r e c o m m e n d suspension o f j u d g e m e n t , however, a n d s o m e t h i n g
m o r e to b r i n g i t about i n either oneself or others. Cicero tells us that
Arcesilaus b r o u g h t about suspension of j u d g e m e n t i n others, a n d so
p r e s u m a b l y i n himself, w h e n , as the result o f his arguments, 'rea
sons o f equal w e i g h t were f o u n d o n opposite sides o f the same sub
j e c t ' ( ' i n eadem re paria c o n t r a r i i s i n p a r t i b u s m o m e n t a r a t i o n u m
i n v e n i r e n t u r ' ) . A c c o r d i n g to Cicero here, Arcesilaus induces sus
25
pension o f j u d g e m e n t i n someone ( w h e t h e r h i m s e l f or another) b y
33
I t is plausible that a full explanation of why Arcesilaus (or anyone else) suspends
judgement about whether^) is the case requires attributing to h i m additional beliefs
as well. These would include beliefs about what he does or does not know, beliefs
about what sorts of considerations are or are not relevant to the question whether p
is the case, and beliefs about what constitutes a sufficient reason to believe either^)
or its negation.
3 4
On the dialectical interpretation, obviously, Arcesilaus cannot recommend sus
pension of judgement on the basis of philosophical beliefs he holds about knowledge
and assent. For on this interpretation he holds no beliefs of this sort (perhaps be
cause he holds no beliefs at all). So an important question is: how, or on what basis,
and in what sense, could Arcesilaus, on the dialectical interpretation, treat suspen
sion of judgement as something one ought, i n some sense of 'ought', to do? I take up
this question below i n connection w i t h the narrow-scope version of the dialectical
interpretation since, as I w i l l argue, other considerations give us decisive reason to
reject the wide-scope version of the dialectical interpretation.
35
See also Diogenes Laertius, who reports that Arcesilaus suspends judgement
'on account of the opposition of arguments' (4. 28: hid ra? evavTiorr/Ta? TOJV Xoyaw).
c o n v i n c i n g that person that the reasons for b e l i e v i n g that p (for
some value of p) neither o u t w e i g h n o r are o u t w e i g h e d b y the reasons
for b e l i e v i n g its negation. So Cicero's t e s t i m o n y c o n f i r m s w h a t is,
i n any case, r e q u i r e d b y the logic o f r a t i o n a l suspension o f j u d g e
m e n t . Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r p is the case
u n d e r w h a t he believes to be c o n d i t i o n s o f p a r i t y a m o n g c o m p e t
i n g reasons for belief. T h e s e are c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h , as he believes,
there is n o t sufficient reason to believe either p or its n e g a t i o n . 26
T h e first p r o b l e m w i t h the wide-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialecti

cal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that i t cannot e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus suspends
j u d g e m e n t about everything because i t cannot e x p l a i n w h y he sus
pends j u d g e m e n t about anything. O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Arcesilaus
does n o t assent to any p r o p o s i t i o n and so has no beliefs at all. Since
he does n o t s i m p l y lack beliefs, b u t does so i n a w a y that c o n s t i
tutes suspension o f j u d g e m e n t , he m u s t recognize an i n d e f i n i t e l y
large n u m b e r o f candidates for belief. B u t w h y does Arcesilaus sus
p e n d j u d g e m e n t about everything? W h y , that is, does he fail to be
lieve any o f the v e r y m a n y things he h i m s e l f recognizes as things
he c o u l d believe? T h e wide-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical inter
p r e t a t i o n cannot answer this question. T h i s is so because u n i v e r s a l
suspension o f j u d g e m e n t w i t h w i d e scope is, i n fact, i n e x p l i c a b l e .27
Someone w h o suspends j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g i n the sense

that he has no beliefs at a l l lacks those beliefs r e q u i r e d to e x p l a i n
w h y he suspends j u d g e m e n t about anything, let alone everything.
Yet, o n the wide-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , u n i
versal suspension o f j u d g e m e n t w i t h w i d e scope is supposed to be
w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e o f Arcesilaus as a p h i l o s o p h e r a n d to be w h a t
3 6
Cicero i n this passage describes suspension of judgement under these condi
tions as what it is 'easier' ('facilius') to do. I t is a good question i n what sense it
is supposed to be easier to suspend judgement about whether p when one believes
there is not sufficient reason to believe either^) or its negation. One possibility is that
believing that^> under these conditions requires, on pain of inconsistency, giving up
a belief about the conditions under which one ought to form or hold a belief. This
would be the belief, very roughly, that one ought to believe that^> only if one believes
one has sufficient reason to believe that^>. The thought would be that it is easier to
suspend judgement than to give up this belief.
3 7
I t should be clear that I mean that it is rationally inexplicable—inexplicable
as a rational response or doxastic stance. Universal suspension of judgement w i t h
wide scope might be explicable as a form of irrationality (as individual instances of
suspending judgement surely are, e.g. the cuckold who suspends judgement about
his wife's fidelity in the face of clear evidence of her infidelity). But I am assuming
that any interpretation that makes Arcesilaus explicable at the price of rendering h i m
irrational—and systematically so—is as inadequate as an interpretation that makes
h i m rational only at the price of rendering h i m inexplicable.
328 Casey Perin
his scepticism consists i n . Hence, this v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n

t e r p r e t a t i o n renders Arcesilaus h i m s e l f and his scepticism i n e x p l i c
able. A g a i n , any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that does this is inadequate.
T h e r e is a second, and i f a n y t h i n g m o r e serious, p r o b l e m w i t h
the wide-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t attributes
to Arcesilaus suspension o f j u d g e m e n t o n a w i d e range o f matters.
Yet even attributing suspension o f j u d g e m e n t about s o m e t h i n g to
someone requires a t t r i b u t i n g to that p e r s o n c e r t a i n beliefs as w e l l .
These i n c l u d e h i g h e r - o r d e r beliefs to the effect that s o m e t h i n g is a
candidate for belief a n d so s o m e t h i n g one c o u l d b e l i e v e . Part o f
28
w h a t i t is to suspend j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r p is the case is to

believe that hothp and its n e g a t i o n are things one c o u l d believe. I n
this w a y suspension of j u d g e m e n t presupposes certain beliefs about
one's doxastic options. T h i s is why, as I have suggested, Arcesilaus
c o u l d n o t suspend j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r O s w a l d acted alone i n
k i l l i n g K e n n e d y . H e lacks the belief that certain things are things
he c o u l d believe about O s w a l d a n d the k i l l i n g o f K e n n e d y . I f this
is r i g h t , t h e n regardless o f its e x p l a n a t o r y inadequacies, the w i d e -
scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is incoherent. I t at
tributes to Arcesilaus u n i v e r s a l suspension o f j u d g e m e n t w i t h w i d e
scope, a n d i n d o i n g so i t claims, b y i m p l i c a t i o n , b o t h that Arcesilaus
has n o beliefs a n d that he has some beliefs.
Suppose, t h e n , that the u n i v e r s a l suspension o f j u d g e m e n t that
the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n attributes to Arcesilaus has n a r r o w
scope: Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t n o t about a l l matters b u t
o n l y about a l l p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters, and, as a result, has n o p h i
losophical beliefs or views at a l l . I t is clear f r o m the t e s t i m o n y o f
Cicero and others that Arcesilaus argued for N K and U S J and that
i n d o i n g so he appealed to A S . B u t o n the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a
t i o n Arcesilaus argued n o t that these p h i l o s o p h i c a l theses are true
b u t that, regardless o f w h e t h e r they are true, the Stoics are c o m
m i t t e d to t h e m . T h e Stoics h e l d the v i e w that k n o w l e d g e consists
i n assent to a k i n d o f i m p r e s s i o n that they called a ' c o g n i t i v e i m
pression' (K<XT<XATJ7TTLKTJ <j>avTaola). Arcesilaus argued that n o i m p r e s -
3 8
Here, as in the context of its narrow-scope version, it might seem tempting
to restrict the suspension of judgement the dialectical interpretation attributes to
Arcesilaus to first-order beliefs. Higher-order beliefs about candidates for belief
would then fall outside its scope. But this is a temptation we should resist as blatantly
ad hoc. Morever, and again, it is plausible to think that attributing suspension of
judgement about something to someone requires attributing various first-order be
liefs to h i m , e.g. beliefs about Oswald and the killing of Kennedy.
sion is, or can be, a c o g n i t i v e i m p r e s s i o n — t h a t n o i m p r e s s i o n does,
or can, satisfy the Stoic d e f i n i t i o n o f a c o g n i t i v e i m p r e s s i o n . C o n
sequently, Arcesilaus argued, those w h o , like the Stoics, take k n o w
ledge to consist i n assent to a c o g n i t i v e i m p r e s s i o n are c o m m i t t e d
to the c l a i m that n o t h i n g is, or can be, k n o w n . M o r e o v e r , o n the
2 9
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t is the Stoics, n o t Arcesilaus, w h o h o l d

the v i e w that one o u g h t to assent to s o m e t h i n g o n l y i f one thereby
comes to have k n o w l e d g e rather t h a n mere belief. Since the Stoics
accept this n o r m for g i v i n g and w i t h h o l d i n g assent, a n d since (as
Arcesilaus has argued) they are c o m m i t t e d to the v i e w that n o one
does, or can, have k n o w l e d g e rather t h a n mere belief, the Stoics are
c o m m i t t e d to the c l a i m that one o u g h t n o t to assent to a n y t h i n g b u t
to suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . O n the dialectical inter
p r e t a t i o n , t h e n , Arcesilaus argues as a c r i t i c o f the Stoics, and i n
that role he does n o t advance any p h i l o s o p h i c a l views o f his o w n —
for he has n o n e — b u t s i m p l y identifies certain i m p l i c a t i o n s o f Stoic
doctrine.
T h e narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is ad
equate o n l y i f i t can e x p l a i n why, as i t claims, Arcesilaus suspends
j u d g e m e n t about the t r u t h o f N K , A S , U S J , a n d any other p h i l o
sophical thesis he recognizes as a candidate for belief. I f , as I a m
assuming, Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is r a t i o n a l , t h e n he
suspends j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r p because he believes there is
n o t sufficient reason to believe either p or its negation. B u t to be
lieve that there is insufficient—that is, not enough—reason to believe
either p or its n e g a t i o n j u s t is, inter alia, to believe that one ought
n o t to believe either^) or its negation. A n d to believe this, i n t u r n , is
j u s t to believe that one o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r
p. So i t appears that we can e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e
m e n t about any matter, p h i l o s o p h i c a l or n o t , o n l y i f we a t t r i b u t e to
h i m certain n o r m a t i v e beliefs about belief and suspension o f j u d g e
m e n t . A n d these n o r m a t i v e beliefs are c o m p l e t e l y general. Suppose
Arcesilaus believes he o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about a p a r t i c u
lar p h i l o s o p h i c a l thesis because, as he believes, there is n o t sufficient
reason to believe either i t or its negation. H e believes suspension o f
j u d g e m e n t is the doxastic stance he o u g h t to take towards this p h i
losophical thesis because he believes, q u i t e generally, that he o u g h t
3 9
For Arcesilaus' arguments against the existence of cognitive impressions see C.
Perin, Academic Arguments for the Indiscernibility Thesis', Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 86 (2005), 493—517.
33Q Casey Perin
to suspend j u d g e m e n t about any candidate for belief, p h i l o s o p h i c a l

or n o t , i f there is n o t sufficient reason to believe either i t or its ne
gation. I f all o f this is r i g h t , t h e n i t appears that we can e x p l a i n w h y
Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about any m a t t e r o n l y i f we a t t r i
bute to h i m the general n o r m a t i v e belief:
(a) One o u g h t to suspend j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r ^ ) i f there is

n o t sufficient reason to believe either p or its negation.
(a) presupposes the m o r e basic belief:
(/3) One o u g h t n o t to believe th&tp i f there is n o t sufficient reason

to believe th&tp.
(a) is the belief one has i n v i r t u e o f h a v i n g the belief (j3) w i t h respect

to hothp a n d its negation.
T h e ' o u g h t ' i n (a) a n d (ft) expresses a f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f
doxastic rationality. W h a t one has sufficient reason to believe j u s t
is the t h i n g i t is r a t i o n a l for one to believe; a n d w h a t one lacks suf
ficient reason to believe j u s t is s o m e t h i n g i t is i r r a t i o n a l for one to
b e l i e v e . Doxastic r a t i o n a l i t y s i m p l y requires one to believe some
30
t h i n g j u s t i n case there is sufficient reason to do so. Hence, (j3)—the

basic r e q u i r e m e n t — i s equivalent to:
(/3*) R a t i o n a l i t y requires one n o t to believe that p i f there is n o t

sufficient reason to believe th&tp.
I f Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is based o n (a) and (ft), t h e n

he suspends j u d g e m e n t i n order to a v o i d b e l i e v i n g s o m e t h i n g that,
as he believes, i t w o u l d be i r r a t i o n a l to believe. B u t here t w o p o i n t s
are i m p o r t a n t . F i r s t , since (a) a n d (ft) are f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f
doxastic rationality, they are n e u t r a l o n the issue o f w h a t sort o f
c o n s i d e r a t i o n — e v i d e n t i a l , pragmatic, ethical—counts as a reason
3 0
This is so given what is sometimes called the 'objective' use of the term 'ra
tional'. So used the rational thing for one to do or to believe just is the thing one
has sufficient, or most, reason to do or to believe. I n its 'subjective' use, the term
'rational' refers not to the relation between a person's actions or attitudes and the
reasons for them, but, as Niko Kolodny has said, to the relations between a per
son's attitudes or actions 'viewed i n abstraction from the reasons for them'. (See N .
Kolodny, 'Why Be Rational?', Mind, 114 (2005), 509—63 at 509—10 w i t h n. 1.) M y
failure to believe that q is subjectively irrational i f I believe thatp and thatp entails
q. But my belief that q, though subjectively rational, is objectively irrational if I lack
sufficient reason to believe that q, i.e. if no consideration of the sort that counts as a
reason for belief sufficiently supports my believing that q.
Making Sense of Arcesilaus 33i
for belief. Hence, (a) and (j3) say n o t h i n g substantive about the c o n
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t is i r r a t i o n a l to believe s o m e t h i n g , (a) a n d (j3)
are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h its b e i n g i r r a t i o n a l to believe that p because the
evidence indicates, or makes i t likely, that p is false, or because i t
w o u l d be h a r m f u l to one, or shameful for one, to believe that p.
Second, beliefs (a) a n d (j3) can f u n c t i o n as the basis u p o n w h i c h
Arcesilaus (or anyone else) suspends j u d g e m e n t o n l y i n c o n j u n c
t i o n w i t h beliefs about w h a t sort o f consideration counts as a rea
son for belief (and about w h a t i t is for a consideration o f this sort
to be sufficient). So we can e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e
m e n t about s o m e t h i n g o n l y i f we a t t r i b u t e to h i m beliefs (a) and (j3)
as well as a d d i t i o n a l beliefs that together f o r m a substantive c o n
c e p t i o n o f doxastic rationality. T h i s is precisely w h a t Cicero does
at Acad. 1. 45 w h e n he attributes to Arcesilaus the belief that i t is
shameful ( ' t u r p e ' ) to believe s o m e t h i n g u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s .
F o r Cicero's Arcesilaus the fact that i t is shameful to believe that
p u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s is a sufficient reason n o t to believe that
p, and so a consideration that renders i t i r r a t i o n a l to believe th&tp,
u n d e r those c o n d i t i o n s .
C a l l the c o l l e c t i o n o f beliefs (whatever they are) that f o r m
Arcesilaus' substantive c o n c e p t i o n o f doxastic r a t i o n a l i t y ( D R ) .
I f either (a) and (|9) or D R are p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs, t h e n either
the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is false
(because Arcesilaus has p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs, namely, (a) a n d (j3)
or D R or b o t h ) or i t is true b u t renders Arcesilaus' suspension o f
j u d g e m e n t inexplicable (because, o n that i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Arcesilaus
lacks some beliefs r e q u i r e d to e x p l a i n i t , namely, (a) and (|9) or D R
or b o t h ) . So the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a
t i o n m u s t argue that neither (a) a n d (|9) n o r D R are p h i l o s o p h i c a l
beliefs. A n d this i t can do i n either o f t w o ways: i t can argue that
n e i t h e r (a) a n d (|9) n o r D R are beliefs, or, c o n c e d i n g t h e i r status as
beliefs, i t can argue that they are n o t philosophical beliefs.
T h e first o p t i o n consists i n a r g u i n g that we can i n t e r p r e t
Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e m e n t as r a t i o n a l , and so as go
v e r n e d b y n o r m s o f doxastic rationality, w i t h o u t a t t r i b u t i n g any
n o r m a t i v e beliefs to h i m . T h e idea is that b e i n g governed b y a
n o r m requires o n l y accepting that n o r m where accepting a n o r m
is n o t a m a t t e r o f h a v i n g a n o r m a t i v e belief. So the narrow-scope
v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can argue that i n his sus
p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t Arcesilaus is governed b y the n o r m s (a)
332 Casey Perin
and (/3) as w e l l as those that constitute D R , and this is because

he accepts these n o r m s , b u t he has n o n o r m a t i v e beliefs. H e r e ,
obviously, e v e r y t h i n g t u r n s o n w h e t h e r we can make sense o f the
n o t i o n o f accepting a n o r m . A c c e p t i n g a n o r m is supposed to be
a psychological state i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h a p e r s o n is governed i n
w h a t he t h i n k s , feels, or does b y that n o r m . B u t how, exactly, is
3 1
this psychological state different f r o m a belief? U n t i l a n d unless

this q u e s t i o n receives an answer, the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can do l i t t l e m o r e t h a n issue a p r o m i s s o r y
note a n d insist o n a c o n d i t i o n a l conclusion. If we can make sense
of the n o t i o n o f accepting a n o r m , we can make sense o f Arcesilaus.
H e r e m a k i n g progress i n the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y m i g h t require
m a k i n g progress i n philosophy.
T h e second o p t i o n open to the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dia
lectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n consists i n a r g u i n g that any n o r m a t i v e belief
we m u s t a t t r i b u t e to Arcesilaus to e x p l a i n his suspension o f j u d g e
m e n t is n o t a philosophical belief a n d so falls outside the scope o f
that suspension o f j u d g e m e n t . H e r e the issue is j u s t w h a t i t is that
makes a belief a p h i l o s o p h i c a l rather t h a n a n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l be
lief. J o h n Cooper attributes to Arcesilaus n o t o n l y (j3) b u t also, as
p a r t o f a substantive c o n c e p t i o n o f doxastic rationality, A S — t h e be
lief that one o u g h t to assent to s o m e t h i n g o n l y i f one thereby comes
to have k n o w l e d g e rather t h a n mere belief. M o r e o v e r , he attributes
to Arcesilaus the belief, w h i c h he suggests Arcesilaus a c q u i r e d f r o m
his r e a d i n g o f Plato's Socratic dialogues, that the best h u m a n life is
a life g u i d e d b y reason towards its p e r f e c t i o n i n the possession o f
a certain k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e . A c c o r d i n g to Cooper, Arcesilaus' be
lief i n the t r u t h o f this Socratic p r i n c i p l e u n d e r w r i t e s his belief i n
A S . A n d his belief i n the t r u t h o f the Socratic p r i n c i p l e is under
w r i t t e n , i n t u r n , b y his beliefs ( i ) that reason is the highest h u m a n
faculty, a n d (2) that, consequently, a h u m a n b e i n g j u s t is his or her
reason. Yet, Cooper claims, none o f these beliefs, at least i n the
32
way i n w h i c h Arcesilaus h o l d s t h e m , is a philosophical belief.

One w a y to s u p p o r t a c l a i m o f this sort is b y a r g u i n g that the
3 1
For this conception of accepting a norm see A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt
Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass., 1990) 74—5. G i b
bard himself says that accepting a norm 'is a significant kind of psychological state
that we are far from understanding' (55).
3 3
Cooper, Arcesilaus', 100—1, writes that Arcesilaus believes that reason is 'the
one and only thing w i t h which we should i n the strongest and deepest sense identify
ourselves' and that it constitutes 'the very essence of our being'.
content o f a belief determines w h e t h e r i t is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l or a
n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. O n this sort o f v i e w p h i l o s o p h y has a dis
t i n c t i v e subject-matter or consists o f a certain set o f related t o p i c s . 33
T h e task here, n o t easy to discharge, is to p r o v i d e an i n f o r m a t i v e

a n d sufficiently comprehensive characterization o f p h i l o s o p h y ' s
d i s t i n c t i v e subject-matter rather t h a n a mere catalogue o f those
m a n y topics philosophers past and present have discussed. A n y 34
such catalogue fails to say w h a t i t is these topics have i n c o m m o n

a n d that qualifies t h e m for i n c l u s i o n i n the catalogue. Cooper, h o w
ever, does not argue that those beliefs he attributes to Arcesilaus
fail to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs because o f t h e i r contents. H e h i m
self seems to t h i n k that beliefs w i t h these contents—beliefs about
the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h one o u g h t to believe s o m e t h i n g , the
best h u m a n life, a n d w h a t a h u m a n b e i n g is essentially or m o s t o f
a l l — c o u l d be p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs even i f as h e l d b y Arcesilaus
they are n o t . Cooper w r i t e s that p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs or views are
'views for w h i c h y o u are o b l i g e d , a n d prepared, to argue—views
that y o u r o u n d l y assert as true, as things y o u b e l i e v e ' . Arcesilaus'
35
beliefs i n (/3), A S , the Socratic p r i n c i p l e about the best life, a n d the

thesis that a h u m a n being's reason is his or her essence each fail to
be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief because Arcesilaus ' w i l l never announce i t
as his o p i n i o n , a n d he does n o t h o l d i t i n a w a y that places a b u r d e n
o n h i m to defend i t w i t h arguments o f his o w n or w i t h rebuttals
against its denial to a n y o n e ' . Cooper does n o t say w h a t that w a y o f
36
h o l d i n g a belief is that places a b u r d e n o n one to defend its t r u t h i n

a r g u m e n t . I t is clear, t h o u g h , that Cooper t h i n k s i t has n o t h i n g to
do w i t h the s t r e n g t h o f the belief—since he insists that Arcesilaus'
belief i n the t r u t h o f the Socratic p r i n c i p l e is 'a v e r y deep c o n
v i c t i o n ' . T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t , however, is that Cooper seems to
3 3
See e.g. Arthur Danto's claim in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1981), 54, that philosophy 'has a special subject matter' that consists
in a 'whole cycle of internally related topics'.
34
Relevant here is Frede's attempt i n M . Frede, ' T h e Sceptic's Beliefs', i n
Burnyeat and Frede (eds.), The Original Sceptics, 1—24 at 9—14, to describe the kind
of belief—dogmatic philosophical belief—the Pyrrhonian sceptic (as described by
Sextus Empiricus in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism) claims to live without. Belief of
this kind, Frede suggests, is distinguished by its content: it is belief not about how
things are but, i n Frede's elusive formulations, about 'how things really are' or 'the
essence of things' or 'the nature of things'. For discussion and criticism of Frede's
view see C. Perin, The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism
(Oxford, 2010), 62—75. Cooper, Arcesilaus', 100.
35
3 6
Ibid. 101.
334 Casey Perin
t h i n k t h a t a belief, regardless o f its content, is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief

o n l y i f a person stands u n d e r certain obligations w i t h respect to
i t . These i n c l u d e obligations to express, i n sincere assertion, t h a t
belief as one's o w n and to defend i t i n a r g u m e n t . Cooper also seems
to t h i n k , t h o u g h this is less clear i n his discussion, t h a t i n order
to fulfil these obligations one m u s t h o l d the belief i n q u e s t i o n o n
the basis o f g r o u n d s or reasons to w h i c h one can appeal i n order to
defend i t i n a r g u m e n t .
A t a m i n i m u m there is some reason to t h i n k t h a t Cooper's c o n
c e p t i o n o f w h a t i t is for a belief to be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief is too
restrictive. Cooper h i m s e l f says l i t t l e b y w a y o f s u p p o r t for the c l a i m
that there is, as he t h i n k s , a necessary c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n (a) hav
i n g a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief a n d (b) b e i n g w i l l i n g or p r e p a r e d or o b
ligated to assert the content o f t h a t belief as s o m e t h i n g one believes
and to defend i t i n a r g u m e n t . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t i t is to have
a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y — o n e w h i c h seems
all too actual to at least some o f us some o f the t i m e — o f f i n d i n g
oneself w i t h a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief one is n o t w i l l i n g or p r e p a r e d
to assert as s o m e t h i n g one believes precisely because one does n o t
t h i n k one can defend i t i n a r g u m e n t . Or, to take a p o s s i b i l i t y raised
i n Plato's Gorgias (461 B 4 - 6 ) , one has a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief one is
n o t w i l l i n g to assert or defend i n a r g u m e n t because one w o u l d be
ashamed to do so. T h e narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical inter
p r e t a t i o n m u s t do m o r e t h a n Cooper does to defend the c l a i m t h a t
the n o r m a t i v e beliefs i t attributes to Arcesilaus are n o t p h i l o s o p h i
cal beliefs. I t can argue t h a t the content o f these beliefs precludes
t h e m f r o m b e i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs. B u t to make this a r g u m e n t
i t m u s t articulate a n d defend a general v i e w about the d i s t i n c t i v e
subject-matter o f p h i l o s o p h y and so the d i s t i n c t i v e content o f p h i
losophical belief. Or, alternatively, the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can argue (as Cooper does) t h a t Arcesilaus
fails to h o l d these beliefs i n the w a y one m u s t i n order for a belief
to be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. B u t to make this a r g u m e n t i t m u s t ar
ticulate and defend (as Cooper does n o t ) a general v i e w about the
distinctive w a y o f h o l d i n g a belief t h a t makes t h a t belief a p h i l o s o
p h i c a l belief.
Suppose t h a t the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e

t a t i o n can p l a u s i b l y argue t h a t the n o r m a t i v e beliefs i t attributes to
Arcesilaus are n o t philosophical beliefs (perhaps because they are
n o t beliefs at all). N o n e the less, there is s t i l l a p r o b l e m for this i n -
t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Arcesilaus. T h e question w h e t h e r (/3) or any other
n o r m a t i v e belief a t t r i b u t e d to Arcesilaus is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief
is itself a p h i l o s o p h i c a l question. A n y answer to this q u e s t i o n re
lies o n , a n d expresses, some c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t i t is, or w h a t is re
q u i r e d , for a belief to be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. A n d any c o n c e p t i o n
o f this sort is, at least i n part, a c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t p h i l o s o p h y i s —
a c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t the boundaries o f p h i l o s o p h y are, a n d so o f
w h a t topics, subjects, questions, concerns, m e t h o d s o f reasoning,
a n d ways o f f o r m i n g a n d r e t a i n i n g beliefs do or do n o t fall w i t h i n
those boundaries. B u t any c o n c e p t i o n o f this sort j u s t is itself a p h i
losophical belief. F o r h o w c o u l d any view, however crude, m i s i n
f o r m e d , or undeveloped, about w h a t p h i l o s o p h y is fail to be itself a
p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief?
T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r o n the narrow-scope version o f the
dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Arcesilaus h i m s e l f employs a d i s t i n c t i o n
between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l . I f he does,
t h e n he m u s t have a belief about w h a t p h i l o s o p h y is and w h a t its
boundaries are, a n d so he m u s t have at least one p h i l o s o p h i c a l
belief. A belief o f this sort is the basis u p o n w h i c h one makes a dis
t i n c t i o n between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l . So i f
the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n attributes
a d i s t i n c t i o n between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
to Arcesilaus, i t u n d e r m i n e s itself. I t is an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n according
to w h i c h Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about all p h i l o s o p h i c a l
matters, and so has no p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs at a l l , and does so o n
the basis o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief he has about w h a t p h i l o s o p h y
is a n d w h a t its boundaries are. B u t any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that b o t h
denies Arcesilaus has any p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs and yet requires
that he have at least one p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief is incoherent.
Suppose, t h e n , that o n the narrow-scope version o f the d i a l e c t i
cal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Arcesilaus h i m s e l f does not e m p l o y a d i s t i n c t i o n
between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l . T h e d i s t i n c
t i o n is instead an artefact o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : s o m e t h i n g
it employs to define the scope o f Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e
m e n t . T h e t h o u g h t here is that Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e m e n t
was u n i v e r s a l w i t h respect to one class o f candidates for belief K
where K is i n fact a class o f candidates for belief whose acceptance
constitutes the h a v i n g o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. C a l l these candi
dates for philosophical belief. 37
Arcesilaus himself, however, d i d n o t
3 7
K is a subset of the class of candidates for philosophical belief. I t includes only
336 Casey Perin
recognize K as a class o f candidates for p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. H e re

cognizes each m e m b e r o f K as a candidate for belief—as he m u s t i f
he suspends j u d g e m e n t about i t — b u t n o t as a candidate for philo
sophical rather t h a n non-philosophical belief. So Arcesilaus' suspen
sion o f j u d g e m e n t was i n fact restricted to p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters,
b u t i t was n o t g u i d e d b y a d i s t i n c t i o n between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and
the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l . B u t i f a d i s t i n c t i o n between the p h i l o s o p h i
cal a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l does n o t guide Arcesilaus' suspension
of j u d g e m e n t , w h y is his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t restricted i n the
way i t is? W h y is i t u n i v e r s a l o n l y w i t h respect to a certain class o f
candidates for belief? T h e r e are o n l y t w o possible answers to this
question. T h e first is t h a t i t is j u s t a coincidence t h a t Arcesilaus
suspends j u d g e m e n t about any candidate for belief he recognizes
as such t h a t is also, t h o u g h he fails to recognize this, a candidate for
p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. B u t this answer is scarcely credible.
T h e other possible answer—and so the o n l y credible answer—is
that the candidates for belief i n class K have s o m e t h i n g i n c o m
m o n t h a t explains w h y Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about each
of t h e m . One t h i n g the candidates for belief i n K have i n c o m m o n is
that Arcesilaus believes about each o f t h e m t h a t there is insufficient
reason to believe either i t or its n e g a t i o n . Several p o i n t s are i m p o r
tant here. F i r s t , a candidate for belief is n o t a m e m b e r o f K be
cause Arcesilaus believes t h a t there is insufficient reason to believe
either i t or its negation, b u t because i t is a candidate for philosophical
rather t h a n non-philosophical belief. K j u s t is a class o f candidates
for p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. Second, Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e
m e n t is systematic a n d u n i v e r s a l o n l y w i t h respect to p h i l o s o p h i
cal matters. H o w e v e r , his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is n o t restricted
to matters o f this sort. H e , like anyone else, suspends j u d g e m e n t
about a range o f candidates for n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. A n d i n at
least some cases Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about a candidate
for n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief because he believes there is insufficient
reason to believe either i t or its n e g a t i o n . Hence, K is o n l y a subset
of the set o f candidates for belief about w h i c h Arcesilaus r a t i o n a l l y
suspends j u d g e m e n t . T h i r d , Arcesilaus' suspension o f j u d g e m e n t
is u n i v e r s a l w i t h respect to K precisely because he believes about
each candidate for belief i n K t h a t there is insufficient reason to
believe either i t or its negation. Arcesilaus' j u d g e m e n t about the
those candidates for philosophical belief that Arcesilaus recognizes as candidates for
belief. Hence, it is only a class of candidates for philosophical belief.
doxastic m e r i t o f the candidates for belief i n K is j u s t as u n i v e r
sal a n d systematic as his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t w i t h respect to
K. B u t e x p l a i n i n g the latter b y appeal to the f o r m e r j u s t raises the
q u e s t i o n w h y i t is that Arcesilaus believes about each candidate for
belief i n K t h a t there is insufficient reason to believe either i t or its
n e g a t i o n . A n d we can answer this q u e s t i o n o n l y b y appeal to some
t h i n g else the candidates for belief i n K have i n c o m m o n .
Y e t w h a t the candidates for belief i n K have i n c o m m o n is, before
all else, t h a t each is a candidate for philosophical belief. A g a i n , u n
less i t is j u s t a coincidence that Arcesilaus' suspension of j u d g e m e n t
is u n i v e r s a l w i t h respect to K, t h a t feature o f a candidate for belief
t h a t qualifies i t for i n c l u s i o n i n K m u s t also be the feature t h a t ex
plains, u l t i m a t e l y , w h y Arcesilaus suspends j u d g e m e n t about i t . K
is supposed to be a class o f candidates for p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief. T h e
fact that the m e m b e r s o f K are candidates for belief o f this sort ex
plains (a) w h y Arcesilaus believes about each o f t h e m t h a t there is
insufficient reason to believe i t , and so (b) w h y he suspends j u d g e
m e n t about all o f t h e m . B u t i f Arcesilaus h i m s e l f does n o t e m p l o y
a d i s t i n c t i o n between the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l ,
a n d so does n o t recognize K as a class o f candidates for p h i l o s o p h i
cal belief, t h e n he cannot e x p l a i n , a n d so cannot u n d e r s t a n d , w h y
his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is u n i v e r s a l w i t h respect to this class
o f candidates for belief. Arcesilaus recognizes each m e m b e r o f K
as a candidate for belief, a n d he suspends j u d g e m e n t about i t , b u t
he cannot e x p l a i n w h y he does so. Arcesilaus cannot see w h a t the
narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n claims to see,
namely, t h a t he suspends j u d g e m e n t about a candidate for belief
i n this class because i t is a candidate for philosophical belief. A s a
result, Arcesilaus is b l i n d to the g r o u n d s for his o w n suspension
o f j u d g e m e n t . So, i f the narrow-scope v e r s i o n o f the dialectical i n
t e r p r e t a t i o n does n o t a t t r i b u t e to Arcesilaus a d i s t i n c t i o n between
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d the n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l , i t renders his suspen
sion o f j u d g e m e n t , a n d so his scepticism, explicable to us o n l y b y
r e n d e r i n g i t inexplicable to him. B u t an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t makes
Arcesilaus a m y s t e r y to h i m s e l f is as inadequate as one that makes
h i m a m y s t e r y to us.
338 Casey Perin
3. C o n c l u s i o n
T h e r e are t w o lessons here. T h e first is that we cannot make sense

of Arcesilaus as a dogmatist—that is, as someone with a view of any
sort—without a t t r i b u t i n g at least some beliefs to h i m . T h e dogmatic
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rescues Arcesilaus f r o m inconsistency b y replacing
all o f his beliefs w i t h some weaker a t t i t u d e that falls outside the
scope o f U S J . B u t we can e x p l a i n w h y Arcesilaus (or anyone else)
adopts any a t t i t u d e o f this sort instead of belief o n l y b y a t t r i b u t i n g
some beliefs to h i m . A dogmatic Arcesilaus, then, has some beliefs.
B u t he also has the v i e w that one o u g h t n o t to have any beliefs b u t to
suspend j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . T h i s v i e w is j u s t w h a t c o n
stitutes, i n p a r t , his d o g m a t i s m . So a dogmatic Arcesilaus has some
beliefs that, i n his view, he o u g h t n o t to have. T o this extent he is,
unavoidably, inconsistent.
T h e second lesson is that we cannot make sense o f Arcesilaus as
a philosopher w i t h o u t a t t r i b u t i n g at least some philosophical beliefs
to h i m . T h i s is perhaps as m u c h a lesson about p h i l o s o p h y as i t
is about Arcesilaus. O n the dialectical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , Arcesilaus is
supposed to be a p h i l o s o p h e r w i t h o u t any p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs at
all. B u t there can be n o p h i l o s o p h e r o f this sort. Arcesilaus cannot
lack p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs i n the way those w h o are n o t philosophers
t y p i c a l l y do. H e , u n l i k e t h e m , suspends judgement about p h i l o s o
p h i c a l matters, a n d his suspension o f j u d g e m e n t is universal w i t h
respect to these matters. W e can e x p l a i n w h y this is so o n l y i f we
a t t r i b u t e to h i m , at a m i n i m u m , those beliefs about p h i l o s o p h y that
are r e q u i r e d to d i s t i n g u i s h p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r o m n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
matters. These are beliefs about w h a t p h i l o s o p h y is a n d is n o t , and
for this reason they are p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs. A n y a t t e m p t to a v o i d
p h i l o s o p h i c a l belief presupposes that one already has some beliefs
of the v e r y k i n d one is t r y i n g to avoid.
University of California, Irvine
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ESSENCE A N D B E I N G
A D i s c u s s i o n o f M i c h a i l Peramatzis,
Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics 1
MARKO MALINK
P R I O R I T Y , for A r i s t o t l e , i s s a i d i n m a n y ways. A t h i n g m a y b e p r i o r
to another i n t i m e , i n d e f i n i t i o n , i n b e i n g , and i n a n u m b e r o f other
ways. F o r example, A r i s t o t l e holds that substances are p r i o r i n de
f i n i t i o n a n d i n b e i n g to non-substances, that actuality is p r i o r i n
d e f i n i t i o n a n d i n b e i n g to potentiality, and that forms are p r i o r i n
d e f i n i t i o n to m a t e r i a l c o m p o u n d s . S u c h claims p l a y a central role
i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t h o u g h t . E x a m i n i n g these claims a n d the various c o n
cepts o f p r i o r i t y e m p l o y e d i n t h e m is v i t a l to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f his
metaphysics. M o r e o v e r , such an e x a m i n a t i o n is relevant to recent
discussions o f o n t o l o g i c a l dependence a n d g r o u n d i n g i n c o n t e m
p o r a r y metaphysics—discussions for w h i c h A r i s t o t l e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f
p r i o r i t y i n b e i n g has been an i m p o r t a n t source o f i n s p i r a t i o n . 2
M i c h a i l Peramatzis's book, t h e n , is a v e r y welcome a d d i t i o n to

the O x f o r d A r i s t o t l e Studies. I t is the first m o n o g r a p h devoted to its
topic, p r e s e n t i n g a c h a l l e n g i n g a n d o r i g i n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A r i s
totle's v i e w o f p r i o r i t y . Peramatzis's focus is m o s t l y o n Metaphysics
Z, b u t he also discusses a w i d e range o f passages f r o m Metaphysics
A and 0 a n d f r o m w o r k s such as the Physics, De anima, a n d Sophi-
stici elenchi.
© Marko Malink 2013

I n writing this review I have benefited from discussions with David Charles, Chris
Frey, Jacob Rosen, and the participants of a workshop on hylomorphism in Aris
totle and Kant held at the University of Toronto in November 2012. I am grateful
to them for their helpful comments.
1
Michail Peramatzis, Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford Aristotle Stu
dies; Oxford, 2011), pp. xi + 329.
3
See e.g. K . Fine, 'Ontological Dependence', Proceedings of the Aristotelian So
ciety, 95 (1995), 269—90; J. Schaffer, 'On What Grounds What', in D. J. Chalmers,
D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foun
dations of Ontology (Oxford, 2009), 347—83; K . Koslicki, 'Varieties of Ontologi
cal Dependence', i n F. Correia and B. Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding:
Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge, 2012), 186—213.
342 Marko Malink
T h e b o o k is i n t w o parts, preceded b y an i n t r o d u c t i o n . T h e first

p a r t deals w i t h p r i o r i t y i n d e f i n i t i o n (pp. 2 3 - 2 0 0 ) , the second w i t h
p r i o r i t y i n b e i n g (pp. 201-311). I w i l l discuss the i n t r o d u c t i o n and
the t w o parts i n order.
1. T h e conceptual f r a m e w o r k
I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n Peramatzis lays o u t a r i c h conceptual frame

w o r k for his subsequent discussion (pp. 3-6). T h e f r a m e w o r k is
based o n a d i s t i n c t i o n between t w o classes o f items. T h e first class
contains w h a t Peramatzis calls token-objects a n d types o f object.
Examples o f token-objects are p a r t i c u l a r substances, that is, par
ticular h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s such as Socrates a n d Bucephalus.
Examples o f types o f object are u n i v e r s a l h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s
consisting o f a f o r m a n d 'matter taken u n i v e r s a l l y ' (see Metaph.
Z 10, 1035^27—30; Z 11, 1037 5~7). T h e species h u m a n a n d the spe
a
cies horse, for instance, are such u n i v e r s a l c o m p o u n d s . W h i l e Soc

rates is a c o m p o u n d consisting o f a f o r m a n d some t o k e n - m a t t e r
(this p a r t i c u l a r b o d y ) , the species h u m a n is a c o m p o u n d consisting
of a f o r m and a u n i v e r s a l type o f m a t t e r (a c e r t a i n type o f b o d y ) .
Peramatzis's second class o f items contains w h a t he calls 'fea
tures, attributes, ways or modes o f b e i n g ' (3). Examples are
accidental features such as b e i n g pale a n d w a l k i n g , a n d essential
features such as b e i n g h u m a n . T h u s , the essence (to ti en einai) o f
an object is an essential feature or way o f being. Since A r i s t o t l e
identifies the essence o f an object w i t h its f o r m (eidos), essences 1
and forms are features or ways o f b e i n g falling i n t o the second class

of items.
Objects a n d types o f object have essences. B o t h Socrates a n d the
species h u m a n have an essence, namely, t h e i r f o r m . T h i s essence
is t y p i c a l l y i n d i c a t e d b y a d e f i n i t i o n (logos or horismos). C r u c i a l l y ,
the essence is n o t i d e n t i c a l to the object or type o f object whose es
sence i t is; for the latter is a h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d f r o m the first
class o f items, whereas the essence is a w a y o f b e i n g f r o m the second
class. N o w , Peramatzis takes i t that forms and essences, too, have
4
3
See Metaph. Z 7, i 0 3 2 i - 2 ; Z 10, I 0 3 5 i 4 - i 6 , I035 32.
b b b
4
Peramatzis's use of the phrase 'way of being' is somewhat unusual (3—5). I t is
different from the sense i n which, for example, being i n actuality and being in po
tentiality are often referred to as 'ways of being'. Nor does his use coincide w i t h the
Essence and Being 343
an essence, o n the g r o u n d s that they are definable a n d t h e i r defini-

ens signifies t h e i r essence (5). I n contrast to the case o f c o m p o u n d s ,
this essence is i d e n t i c a l to the i t e m whose essence i t is. E v e r y f o r m
a n d essence is i d e n t i c a l to its o w n essence. T h u s , w h e n a f o r m or
5
essence is defined, the definiendum a n d the definiens signify the same

item.
Peramatzis presents this f r a m e w o r k as s o m e t h i n g presupposed
b y his study a n d does n o t u n d e r t a k e to e x p l a i n or j u s t i f y i t i n any de
t a i l (3-5). However, some a d d i t i o n a l explanation w o u l d have been
h e l p f u l because parts o f the f r a m e w o r k are novel a n d couched i n
t e r m i n o l o g y n o t c o m m o n l y used i n A r i s t o t e l i a n scholarship. F o r
example, the basic d i s t i n c t i o n between the t w o classes o f items, as
presented b y Peramatzis, is n o t f o u n d i n A r i s t o t l e or i n the secon
d a r y literature. T h u s , one m a y be left w o n d e r i n g h o w the d i s t i n c
t i o n is m o t i v a t e d and h o w i t relates to A r i s t o t l e ' s text. These ques
tions are all the m o r e p e r t i n e n t since the d i s t i n c t i o n plays an i m
p o r t a n t role i n Peramatzis's discussion o f p r i o r i t y i n d e f i n i t i o n i n
the first p a r t o f the b o o k .
2. P r i o r i t y i n d e f i n i t i o n
Peramatzis characterizes this k i n d o f p r i o r i t y as follows: A is p r i o r

i n d e f i n i t i o n to B j u s t i n case A is (correctly) defined w i t h o u t m e n
t i o n i n g B , b u t B is n o t (correctly) defined w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g A
(6: see Metaph. Z 1, i o 2 8 3 4 - 6 ) . H e does n o t give a general account
a
o f d e f i n i t i o n a l p r i o r i t y t h r o u g h o u t A r i s t o t l e ' s works. Instead, he fo

cuses o n a specific question c o n c e r n i n g d e f i n i t i o n a l p r i o r i t y i n the
context o f A r i s t o t l e ' s h y l o m o r p h i s m , the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r f o r m is
p r i o r i n d e f i n i t i o n to matter. Peramatzis argues that there is an ap
p a r e n t conflict i n A r i s t o t l e ' s w o r k s between passages that suggest
use established by M . Frede, according to which humans and horses share the same
way of being, namely, that of natural substances, as opposed to that of, for example,
numbers; see M . Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987), 85. For
Peramatzis, humans and horses have different ways of being, since they have differ
ent essences.
5
Peramatzis, 5, 158, and 199—200. See Metaph. Z 6, I 0 3 i n — i 4 ; Z n , 1037^3—
b
b
7; cf. also M . Burnyeat et al., Notes on Book Zeta of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford,
1979), 97; M . Frede and G. Patzig (ed., trans., and comm.), Aristoteles: Metaphysik
Z [Z], 2 vols. (Munich, 1988), ii. 87; M . Burnyeat, A Map of Metaphysics Zeta (Pitt
sburgh, 2001), 26—7.
344 Marko Malink
an affirmative answer a n d passages that suggest a negative answer

to this question. F o r example, the f o l l o w i n g passage from Metaphy
sics Z i o suggests an affirmative answer:
Those parts that are material, and into which a thing is divided as into its
matter, are posterior; but those that are parts of the account [Aoyoy] and
of the substance which accords w i t h the account, are prior—some or all of
them. Now, since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of the ani
mate) is the substance which accords w i t h the account, i.e. the form and
what-it-is-to-be such a body (at least, i f each part is properly defined, i t
cannot be defined without its function, which i t cannot have without sense
perception), i t follows that the parts of the soul are prior—some or all of
them—to the whole compound animal, and similarly i n the particular cases,
while the body and its parts are posterior to this substance. (Metaph. Z 10,
i°35 n-2i)
b
A c c o r d i n g to this passage, the soul is the f o r m and essence o f a n i

mals. A t the e n d o f the passage, A r i s t o t l e states that the soul is p r i o r
to the animal's b o d y and m a t e r i a l parts. I t is clear f r o m the c o n t e x t
that he has i n m i n d p r i o r i t y i n d e f i n i t i o n . T h u s , Peramatzis takes
6
the passage to i m p l y that f o r m is p r i o r i n d e f i n i t i o n to m a t t e r ( 3 0 - 2 ,

271). F o r instance, the d e f i n i t i o n o f the m a t t e r o f an a n i m a l makes
reference to the animal's f o r m , b u t n o t vice versa. Peramatzis w r i t e s
(177-8):
Thus, for example, as essence and primary substance the human-form

seems responsible for fixing the identity not only of Socrates or Callias
but also of their particular bodies and concrete material parts. Similarly,
the human-form determines the essence not only of the kind (or species)
human but also of its 'universally taken' matter, the human type of organic
body. 7
Peramatzis argues that this v i e w is i n tension w i t h some claims A r i s

totle makes elsewhere i n Metaphysics Z. A n example is the f o l l o w -
6
See io35 4—6 and the occurrences of optêoOai
b
at io35 8, 10, 17—18.
b
7
Peramatzis presents the definitional priority of form over matter as a general
thesis applicable to all hylomorphic compounds. However, he does not explain
whether and how the thesis applies to artefacts such as a bronze statue of Socrates.
I t is reasonable to think that, i n contrast to the case of animals, the matter of
such a statue (that is, a particular lump of bronze) is identifiable and definable
independently of the statue's form; see J. L . A c k r i l l , 'Aristotle's Definitions of
Psuche\ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 73 (1972—3), 119—33 124—6; C.
a t
Frey, 'Organic U n i t y and the Matter of M a n ' , Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
32 (2007), 167—204 at 167 and 200. By contrast, Frede and Patzig argue that even
the matter of artefacts is not identifiable independently of the artefact's form; see
Frede and Patzig, Z, ii. 46—9.
i n g passage f r o m Z 1 1 , i n w h i c h A r i s t o t l e criticizes Socrates the

Y o u n g e r for d r a w i n g a m i s l e a d i n g c o m p a r i s o n between animals a n d
geometrical objects:
I t is therefore a vain attempt to t r y to reduce everything i n this way, and to

eliminate the matter. For some things presumably are one thing in another,
or certain things i n a certain state. A n d the comparison which Socrates the
Younger used to draw between an animal and a circle is not sound; for
it leads away from the truth, and misleads one into supposing that there
might be a man without parts, as there can be a circle without bronze. But
the cases are not the same. For an animal is a sort of perceptible object, and
cannot be defined without change [rlvev Kivrjoeojs OVK eanv opiaaadai], nor
therefore without parts i n a certain state. (Metaph. Z 1 1 , i036 22-3o)
B
I n this passage A r i s t o t l e criticizes certain a t t e m p t e d definitions

o n the g r o u n d s that they ' e l i m i n a t e the m a t t e r ' . T h e definitions
i n q u e s t i o n concern n a t u r a l c o m p o u n d s such as animals. I n the
last sentence o f the passage A r i s t o t l e states t h a t an a n i m a l cannot
be defined ' w i t h o u t change' a n d ' w i t h o u t ' its m a t e r i a l parts. Pera-
matzis takes this to be a c l a i m about the forms o f animals a n d other
n a t u r a l c o m p o u n d s . I n his view, A r i s t o t l e ' s p o i n t is t h a t the defini
t i o n o f such a. form s h o u l d m e n t i o n m a t t e r ( 9 2 - 9 ) . F o r example, the
d e f i n i t i o n o f an animal's f o r m s h o u l d m e n t i o n the ( k i n d of) m a t t e r
i n w h i c h the f o r m is e m b o d i e d . Since m a t t e r is m e n t i o n e d i n the
f o r m ' s d e f i n i t i o n , Peramatzis argues, m a t t e r is i n some w a y p a r t o f
the f o r m ' s essence. G i v e n t h a t the f o r m is i d e n t i c a l to its essence,
i t follows t h a t m a t t e r is p a r t o f the f o r m itself. T h u s , Peramatzis
concludes t h a t f o r m s o f n a t u r a l objects have m a t e r i a l parts ( 9 6 - 7 ) .
T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i 0 3 6 2 2 - 3 0 is u n o r t h o d o x and p r o b l e m a
b
tic. I t is i n tension w i t h the v i e w stated i n Z 10 t h a t f o r m is p r i o r

i n d e f i n i t i o n to matter, a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h m a t t e r s h o u l d n o t be
m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f forms. M o r e o v e r , the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
conflicts w i t h a n u m b e r o f theses t h a t are central to A r i s t o t l e ' s h y l o -
m o r p h i s m . F o r instance, i t conflicts w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s thesis t h a t f o r m
is a 'substance w i t h o u t m a t t e r ' ( Z 7, i o 3 2 i 1-14), t h a t m a t t e r a n d
b
m a t e r i a l parts are n o t p a r t o f the f o r m ( Z 10, i o 3 5 i 7 - 3 i ) , a n d that

a
the d e f i n i t i o n o f a f o r m does n o t m e n t i o n m a t t e r or m a t e r i a l parts

( Z 11, i o 3 7 2 4 - s ) .
a
I n v i e w o f this, m o s t c o m m e n t a t o r s prefer other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s

o f the passage f r o m Z 11 j u s t q u o t e d ( i o 3 6 2 2 - 3 o ) . L e t us b r i e f l y
b
consider t w o p r o m i n e n t alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , one p u t f o r w a r d

346 Marko Malink
b y Frede a n d Patzig a n d the other b y G i l l a n d H e i n a m a n . Frede and

Patzig agree that the passage concerns definitions o f forms, b u t do
n o t take i t to state that m a t t e r s h o u l d be mentioned i n these defi
n i t i o n s . W h e n A r i s t o t l e says that the f o r m o f an a n i m a l cannot be
defined w i t h o u t matter, they m a i n t a i n , he m e r e l y means that the
d e f i n i t i o n s h o u l d be f o r m u l a t e d i n such a w a y as to i m p l y that the
f o r m cannot exist w i t h o u t b e i n g e m b o d i e d i n a c e r t a i n k i n d o f m a t
ter; b u t this does n o t require an e x p l i c i t reference to m a t t e r . T h u s ,
8
according to Frede a n d Patzig, the d e f i n i t i o n o u g h t n o t to create

the m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n that the f o r m can exist w i t h o u t b e i n g
enmattered; b u t i t does n o t e x p l i c i t l y m e n t i o n any k i n d o f matter.
O n the other h a n d , G i l l and H e i n a m a n argue that the passage
does n o t concern definitions o f forms o f m a t e r i a l c o m p o u n d s , b u t
definitions o f these c o m p o u n d s themselves. O n this view, A r i s
9
totle's p o i n t i n the passage is that the d e f i n i t i o n o f a m a t e r i a l c o m

p o u n d s h o u l d m e n t i o n b o t h its m a t t e r and its f o r m . F o r example,
the d e f i n i t i o n o f the species h u m a n s h o u l d specify n o t o n l y its f o r m
b u t also the u n i v e r s a l k i n d o f m a t t e r o f w h i c h i t is composed. B u t
the d e f i n i t i o n o f the c o m p o u n d ' s f o r m does n o t m e n t i o n any k i n d o f
matter. T h e definiens o f this latter d e f i n i t i o n signifies the essence o f
the t h i n g defined. B y contrast, the definiens o f the sort o f d e f i n i t i o n
that A r i s t o t l e has i n m i n d at Z 1 1 , i 0 3 6 2 2 - 3 0 , does n o t s i g n i f y the
B
essence o f the t h i n g defined (that is, o f the c o m p o u n d ) ; for the es

sence o f the c o m p o u n d is its f o r m , whereas the definiens as a w h o l e
does n o t s i g n i f y the f o r m b u t a c o m b i n a t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d f o r m .
( O n l y a p a r t o f the definiens signifies the f o r m , w h i l e another p a r t
signifies the matter.)
N o w , i t is also A r i s t o t l e ' s settled v i e w that a d e f i n i t i o n (Spiofios) is
an account (Aoyoy) that signifies the essence o f the t h i n g d e f i n e d . 10
O n this view, the d e f i n i t i o n o f a h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s h o u l d
8
Frede and Patzig, Z, ii. 212; cf. M . Frede, 'The Definition of Sensible Sub
stance in Metaphysics Z ['Sensible Substance'], i n D. Devereux and P. Pellegrin
(eds.), Biologie, logique et metaphysique chez Aristote (Paris, 1990), 113—29 at 117—
21. Similarly also W. Mesch, 'Die Teile der Definition (Z 10— 11)', i n C. Rapp (ed.),
Aristoteles: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbiicher (Z, H, ®) (Berlin, 1996), 135—56 at 149—
51; M . V. Wedin, Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics
Zeta [Theory of Substance] (Oxford, 2000), 327—41.
9
M . L . Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity [Paradox] (Princeton,
1989), 134—6; R. Heinaman, 'Frede and Patzig on Definition in Metaphysics Z. 10
and 11' ['Definition'], Phronesis, 42 (1997), 283—98 at 283—4 and 292—3.
10
Metaph. Z 5, 1031*11-12; Top. 7. 5, 154*31-2. Cf. Metaph. Z 4, 1030*6-7,
i030 5-7; H 1, 1042*17-21.
b
m e n t i o n o n l y its f o r m , b u t n o t its m a t t e r (cf. Z I I , i 0 3 7 2 6 - 9 ) . a
H o w e v e r , a c c o r d i n g to G i l l and H e i n a m a n , this is n o t the k i n d

o f d e f i n i t i o n A r i s t o t l e has i n m i n d i n his c r i t i c i s m o f Socrates the
Y o u n g e r at Z 1 1 , i o 3 6 2 2 - 3 0 . Instead, they take this passage to be
b
concerned w i t h a different k i n d o f d e f i n i t i o n o f c o m p o u n d s , a defi

n i t i o n t h a t m e n t i o n s b o t h t h e i r f o r m and t h e i r matter. I t is an ac
c o u n t t h a t m a y be called a ' d e f i n i t i o n ' o n l y i n a secondary sense.
A r i s t o t l e acknowledges this k i n d o f secondary d e f i n i t i o n i n Z 7,
w h e n he states t h a t the account o f a c o m p o u n d such as a bronze
circle m e n t i o n s b o t h its f o r m and its matter:
We speak both ways when we say what a bronze circle is, saying that the
matter is bronze and the form is such-and-such a shape, that being the
genus under which i t falls. So a bronze circle has matter i n its account [ev
ra Aoyo;]. (Metaph. Z 7, i033 2-5) a
A r i s t o t l e makes a s i m i l a r p o i n t about the d e f i n i t i o n o f n a t u r a l o b

jects i n Metaphysics E 1:
T h e account [Aoyoy] of none of them [that is, of natural objects,TO<j>v-

OIKCX, I025 34] is without change [avev Kivriaecos], but always includes mat
b
ter. (Metaph. E 1, 1026*2-3)
M u c h the same v i e w is expressed i n Physics 2. 2 ( i 9 3 3 S - i 9 4 7 ) . O n b a
G i l l ' s a n d H e i n a m a n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , A r i s t o t l e ' s c r i t i c i s m o f Soc

rates the Y o u n g e r i n Z 11 is closely connected to these passages f r o m
Z 7, E 1, a n d Physics 2. 2 . T h e passages c o n c e r n a secondary k i n d
11
o f d e f i n i t i o n o f n a t u r a l c o m p o u n d s , b u t n o t the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e i r
forms.
Peramatzis agrees t h a t c o m p o u n d s have definitions t h a t m e n t i o n
b o t h t h e i r m a t t e r a n d t h e i r f o r m . B u t he denies t h a t this is the
1 2
k i n d o f d e f i n i t i o n t h a t A r i s t o t l e has i n m i n d i n the passage c r i t i c i z -

11
The similarity between the passages from Z I I , E i , and Physics 2. 2 is high
lighted by the fact that the critical phrase avev Kivr/oeojs ('without change') is used i n
all of them (Metaph. Z 11, I036 29; E i , 1026*3; Phys. 2. 2, 194*5).
b
1 3
See pp. 11, 168—9, 7 8 , 190, and 196—8; cf. also 32—7. Peramatzis appeals to
:
these definitions in order to explain Aristotle's claim i n Z 10 that 'some or all parts of
the form' are prior to matter and compounds (i035 4—6, 13—14, 18—19). T h i s claim
b
seems to imply that it is possible that some but not all parts of a form are prior to
the corresponding matter and compound. Peramatzis argues that this is the case i n
definitions of compounds that mention both their matter and their form (195—7, 7 7 2
n. 9), on the grounds that in these definitions ' i t is not the whole denning essence but
only a part of it—the hylomorphic form . . .—which is prior to matter and (universal)
compound' (196). The matter that is part of what Peramatzis calls the compound's
'defining essence' is not prior to the compound. T h i s explains why only some of
348 Marko Malink
i n g Socrates the Y o u n g e r i n Z 1 1 . H o w e v e r , Peramatzis does n o t , i n

m y view, p r o v i d e c o n v i n c i n g reasons for t h i s d e n i a l and for reject
i n g G i l l ' s and H e i n a m a n ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the passage. 13
N o r does
he p r o v i d e decisive reasons for r e j e c t i n g Frede a n d Patzig's i n t e r
p r e t a t i o n (see 134-5). G i v e n the p r o b l e m s w i t h his o w n interpre
t a t i o n , each o f the t w o a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s seems preferable
to his.
I n a d d i t i o n to the passage f r o m Z 11, Peramatzis adduces f u r t h e r
evidence to s u p p o r t his v i e w t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to A r i s t o t l e , m a t t e r is
m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f c e r t a i n f o r m s a n d is i n some w a y p a r t
of these f o r m s . A n e x a m p l e is the passage f r o m Z 7 q u o t e d above
( i o 3 3 2 - 5 ) . Peramatzis takes t h i s passage to i m p l y t h a t 'just as a cer
a
t a i n t y p e o f m a t t e r is p a r t o f the c o m p o u n d , s i m i l a r l y m a t t e r m u s t
be p a r t o f the f o r m o f t h i s c o m p o u n d ' (41). A g a i n , t h i s i n t e r p r e t a
t i o n is p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e passage states t h a t b o t h m a t t e r and form
are m e n t i o n e d i n the a c c o u n t (logos) o f a c o m p o u n d such as a b r o n z e
circle. 14
B u t t h i s does n o t i m p l y t h a t m a t t e r is p a r t o f the f o r m or
m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f the f o r m . F o r the a c c o u n t i n q u e s t i o n
is o n l y a d e f i n i t i o n o f the secondary k i n d . H e n c e the definiens as a
w h o l e does n o t s i g n i f y the c o m p o u n d ' s f o r m , a n d n o t every i t e m
m e n t i o n e d i n the definiens is p a r t o f the form. 1 5
the items mentioned i n the definition are prior to the compound. However, it does
not explain why only some parts of the form are prior to it. The passage from Z 10 is
clearly concerned w i t h parts of the form (Aristotle identifies them as parts of the soul
at I035 i8—19), but not w i t h parts of a definition i n which both matter and form are
b
mentioned. Thus, Peramatzis's explanation of this passage is not satisfactory.

When he argues against those who take the passage to concern definitions of
13
compounds (as opposed to forms), his argument presupposes that their interpreta
tion is based on the 'deeper assumption . . . that definition is only of the form and
of the universal i n that what does the denning is, strictly speaking, universal form
alone' (93—4). However, G i l l and Heinaman (see n. 9 above) do not accept this as
sumption; they hold that there are definitions, albeit of a secondary kind, in which
it is not universal form alone that does the denning. Thus, Peramatzis's argument is
not effective against them.
14
See e.g. G i l l , Paradox, 122; Heinaman, 'Definition', 292; D. Charles, A r i s
totle's Psychological Theory' ['Psychological T h e o r y ' ] , Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2008), 1—29 at 7.
Another piece of evidence adduced by Peramatzis is Aristotle's statement ' i t be
15
longs to the natural philosopher to study those aspects of the soul that are not without
matter' (Metaph. E 1, io26 5—6). The soul is a form and some aspects or parts of it
a
'are not without matter'. Peramatzis takes this to imply that 'a natural form . . . is
unambiguously thought essentially to include material and change-related features',
and thereby to confirm 'the thesis of essential enmatterment not only for compounds
but also for natural forms' (101). As before, this interpretation is controversial. The
L e t us consider one last piece o f evidence adduced b y Peramatzis
i n s u p p o r t o f his view. I t is f r o m A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion i n De anima
i . i o n h o w to define psychological states such as anger:
It is clear that the affections of the soul are enmattered accounts [Xoyoi ev-
vXoi]. Hence their definitions [ol opoi] w i l l be of the following form: for
instance, being angry is a particular movement of a body of such-and-such
a kind, or part or capacity of such a body, as a result of this thing and for
the sake of such-and-such a goal. . . . T h e natural philosopher and the dia
lectician would define each of these differently, e.g. what anger is. For the
latter would define it as a desire for retaliation or something of the sort, the
former as the boiling of the blood or hot stuff around the heart. Of these,
the natural philosopher gives the matter, the dialectician the form and ac
count. (DA I . I , 403 25- 2)a b
I n this passage A r i s t o t l e treats affections o f the soul such as anger

as h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s . T h e f o r m o f anger is a desire for re
t a l i a t i o n , its m a t t e r is a b o i l i n g o f the b l o o d a r o u n d the heart. A dia
lectician m i g h t define anger b y m e n t i o n i n g o n l y its f o r m . A n a t u r a l
p h i l o s o p h e r m i g h t define i t b y m e n t i o n i n g o n l y its matter. A r i s t o t l e
rejects b o t h o f these definitions. I n his view, an appropriate defini
t i o n o f the c o m p o u n d anger s h o u l d m e n t i o n b o t h its m a t t e r a n d
its f o r m ( 4 0 3 2 5 - 7 ) . N o w , Peramatzis adopts a somewhat stronger
a
reading o f the passage. H e w r i t e s :
Because definitions (ol opoi) are linguistic items that describe the essence
of the entity defined, i t follows that psychic functions or affections contain
material characteristics, bodily functions or affections, as parts of their very
nature. (106)
B y this he seems to m e a n that m a t e r i a l characteristics are p a r t o f the

form o f anger. T h u s , he takes A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion o f anger i n De
anima i . i to s u p p o r t the conclusion that ' n a t u r a l forms include m a
terial a n d change-related attributes as essential constituents' (106).
T h i s a r g u m e n t presupposes that ol opoi at 403 25 picks o u t defini
a
tions i n the strict sense, definitions that m e n t i o n o n l y the f o r m o f

the t h i n g defined, b u t n o t its matter. O n the other h a n d , M i c h a e l
Frede has argued c o n v i n c i n g l y that ol opoi i n this passage picks o u t
definitions o f the weaker sort, definitions that m e n t i o n b o t h f o r m
passage can plausibly be taken to state that some aspects or parts of the soul must be
realized i n certain kinds of matter, without implying that matter is mentioned in the
definition of (these parts of) the soul or is in some way an essential part of the soul
(see G i l l , Paradox, 115—16 and 131).
3SO Marko Malink
and m a t t e r ( m u c h as i n the passages f r o m Z 7, E 1, and Physics 2. 2

m e n t i o n e d a b o v e ) . I f this is correct, i t u n d e r m i n e s Peramatzis's
16
reading o f the passage. M a t t e r is m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f the

c o m p o u n d anger, b u t n o t i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f its form.
Peramatzis's reading o f De anima 1. 1 is i n agreement w i t h the i n
t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o p o s e d b y D a v i d Charles, according to w h i c h A r i s
totle requires that m a t t e r be m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f the form
of anger. I n a c r i t i c a l response to Charles, V i c t o r Caston has p o i n
17
ted o u t a n u m b e r o f p r o b l e m s w i t h this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d has re

j e c t e d i t . M a n y o f Caston's objections also a p p l y to Peramatzis's
1 8
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f De anima 1. 1 a n d other passages. U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,

Peramatzis does n o t sufficiently address these objections (Caston's
response is n o t listed i n his b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .
I n s u m , then, Peramatzis does n o t succeed i n establishing one o f
his m a i n theses, that m a t t e r is m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f some
forms and is i n some way p a r t o f these forms. A s we saw above, this
thesis conflicts w i t h some central claims o f Metaphysics Z. I n order
to resolve these conflicts, Peramatzis argues that there is an a m b i g u
i t y i n A r i s t o t l e ' s use o f the t e r m 'matter' (173-9). O the one h a n d ,
n
he maintains, the t e r m can be used to p i c k o u t the t o k e n - m a t t e r or

the u n i v e r s a l k i n d o f m a t t e r that constitutes p a r t i c u l a r or u n i v e r
sal c o m p o u n d s . Peramatzis takes m a t t e r o f this sort to be an object
or type o f object, b e l o n g i n g to his first class o f items (see 4 1 - 4 and
52). O n the other h a n d , he argues, the t e r m 'matter' can be used to
p i c k o u t m a t e r i a l features, such as the feature o f b e i n g enmattered
i n a certain type o f body. T h e s e features are n o t objects or types
of object b e l o n g i n g to the first class o f items; they are attributes
or features b e l o n g i n g to the second class o f items. W h e n A r i s t o t l e
claims that m a t t e r is m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f some forms, he
has i n m i n d , n o t m a t t e r f r o m the first class, b u t m a t e r i a l features
f r o m the second class ( 4 0 - 5 4 , 136-7, 152-3). F o r instance, the f o r m
of h u m a n s m i g h t be defined as follows: b e i n g a r a t i o n a l soul e m -
1 6
See Frede, 'Sensible Substance', 115—16.
1 7
Charles, 'Psychological Theory', 4—10.
1 8
V. Caston, 'Commentary on Charles', Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium
in Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2008), 30—49. One problem w i t h Charles's interpretation
of De anima 1. 1 is that, i f it were correct, one would expect Aristotle to criticize the
dialectician for giving an incomplete description of the form of anger (since the de
scription does not mention matter). But Aristotle does not level this charge against
the dialectician (403^9— 2). Instead, he criticizes h i m for giving an incomplete ac
b
count of the compound anger itself.

Essence and Being 3Si
b o d i e d i n a c e r t a i n type o f organic b o d y (5, 198-9). I n this defini
t i o n , the phrase ' e m b o d i e d i n a certain type o f organic b o d y ' picks
o u t a m a t e r i a l feature. T h i s m a t e r i a l feature is p a r t o f the f o r m ' s
essence a n d hence p a r t o f the f o r m itself. T h u s , Peramatzis holds
that forms o f n a t u r a l objects comprise n o t o n l y f o r m a l b u t also m a
terial features. B y contrast, w h e n A r i s t o t l e claims that f o r m is p r i o r
to matter, he has i n m i n d , n o t m a t e r i a l features f r o m the second
class o f items, b u t t o k e n - m a t t e r a n d types o f m a t t e r f r o m the first
class ( 1 2 0 - 1 , 168-9, 176-8). L i k e w i s e , w h e n A r i s t o t l e characterizes
f o r m as a 'substance w i t h o u t m a t t e r ' ( Z 7, i o 3 2 i 1-14) or w h e n he
b
states that m a t t e r is n o t m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f f o r m ( Z 1 1 ,

i 0 3 7 2 4 - 5 ) , this applies to m a t t e r f r o m the first b u t n o t f r o m the
a
second class (see 4 0 - 1 ) . T h u s , the apparent conflict w i t h i n Meta

physics Z is resolved.
W h i l e this s o l u t i o n allows Peramatzis to a v o i d a t t r i b u t i n g an
inconsistency to A r i s t o t l e , i t has some drawbacks. F o r one t h i n g ,
the s o l u t i o n seems somewhat ad hoc. T h e r e is n o direct evidence
i n the Metaphysics for the a m b i g u i t y o f 'matter' p o s t u l a t e d b y
Peramatzis. A r i s t o t l e never e x p l i c i t l y distinguishes between m a t t e r
o f Peramatzis's first class and m a t e r i a l features o f the second class,
n o r is such a d i s t i n c t i o n u s u a l l y d r a w n i n the secondary literature.
M o r e o v e r , a q u e s t i o n arises as to h o w the u n i v e r s a l types o f m a t t e r
present i n u n i v e r s a l c o m p o u n d s differ f r o m the m a t e r i a l features
that are p a r t o f the c o m p o u n d ' s f o r m . Peramatzis refers to these
1 9
features b y means o f phrases such as ' b e i n g made o f clay', ' b e i n g

composed o f b u l k y mass', ' b e i n g e m b o d i e d i n nasal m a t t e r ' , a n d
' b e i n g enmattered i n a certain type o f organic b o d y ' . H e takes 2 0
these phrases to be p a r t o f the definiens o f forms. H o w e v e r , he does

n o t e x p l a i n w h a t the terms 'clay', ' b u l k y mass', 'nasal m a t t e r ' , a n d
'a c e r t a i n type o f organic b o d y ' refer to i n these phrases. I t seems
that they s h o u l d refer, n o t to m a t e r i a l features, b u t to m a t t e r f r o m
the first class o f items; for this is the m a t t e r o f w h i c h m a t e r i a l
c o m p o u n d s are made or composed, a n d i n w h i c h t h e i r f o r m is en-
m a t t e r e d or e m b o d i e d . I f so, t h e n , c o n t r a r y to Peramatzis's view,
m a t t e r f r o m the first class o f items is m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n
o f forms. I f , o n the other h a n d , those terms are taken to refer to
1 9
Peramatzis does not give a determinate account of the sort of matter that belongs
to the first class of items, although he presents some 'views which gesture towards
the beginnings of a more positive answer' (191, see also 121).
2 0
See e.g. pp. 8-10, 32, 48-9, 77, 118, 129, 137, 143, 192.
352 Marko Malink
m a t e r i a l features, this has the c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e consequence that

m a t e r i a l c o m p o u n d s are made or composed o f these features, and
that forms are enmattered or e m b o d i e d i n t h e m . 2 1
T h e r e are f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n Peramatzis's account o f the

m a t e r i a l features that i n his v i e w are p a r t o f forms. F o r example,
he argues that these m a t e r i a l features cannot be defined w i t h o u t re
ference to the f o r m a l features that are p a r t o f the f o r m i n question,
and likewise that the f o r m a l features cannot be defined w i t h o u t re
ference to the m a t e r i a l features (127, 137, 305-8). T h u s , he holds
that ' f o r m a l a n d m a t e r i a l parts o f a n a t u r a l f o r m ' s essence are i n
extricably dependent o n each other' (127), and that 'just as f o r m
itself and its f o r m a l parts, the m a t e r i a l components o f its essence,
too, are b o t h matter- a n d f o r m - i n v o l v i n g ' (137). T h i s is difficult to
u n d e r s t a n d . I f the f o r m a l a n d m a t e r i a l parts o f a f o r m cannot be
specified w i t h o u t reference to each other, can they be specified i n
a determinate and n o n - c i r c u l a r way at all? A l s o , i f each o f t h e m is
b o t h matter- a n d f o r m - i n v o l v i n g , o n w h a t grounds can the ' f o r m a l '
parts be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m the ' m a t e r i a l ' ones? Peramatzis does
n o t f u l l y address these questions. H e proposes a 'tentative answer',
b u t does n o t undertake to ' f i l l i n the gaps i n h e r e n t i n this p r o p o s a l '
(307). 22
Peramatzis's account o f A r i s t o t l e ' s h y l o m o r p h i s m is a m b i t i o u s

and c o m p l e x . H i s arguments are sometimes difficult to follow. I t
is n o t always clear w h e t h e r and, i f so, h o w the complexities i n t r o
duced b y h i m correspond to w h a t we f i n d i n A r i s t o t l e . M o s t o f these
complexities are u l t i m a t e l y m o t i v a t e d b y the desire to v i n d i c a t e the
v i e w that for A r i s t o t l e m a t t e r is m e n t i o n e d i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f some
forms a n d is a p a r t o f t h e m . A s we have seen, this v i e w is q u e s t i o n
able a n d Peramatzis does n o t p r o v i d e c o n v i n c i n g evidence for i t . I f
the v i e w is n o t correct, t h e n m o s t o f the complexities i n t r o d u c e d
b y h i m i n the first p a r t o f the b o o k are m i s l e a d i n g a n d s h o u l d be
rejected.
3 1
Peramatzis might avoid these problems by denying that those terms refer to
anything at all; see n. 22 below.
3 3
His proposal involves the idea that ' w i t h i n a form's definiens formula, formal as
well as material terms are separately incomplete and fail to refer to any real-world en
tity without each other' (307). For example, i n the definiens formula 'being a rational
soul embodied i n a certain type of organic body', neither the formal term 'being a ra
tional soul' nor the material term 'embodied in a certain type of organic body' refers
to a real-world entity.
3. P r i o r i t y i n b e i n g
I n Metaphysics A 11 A r i s t o t l e distinguishes various k i n d s o f p r i o r

ity. One o f t h e m is w h a t he calls p r i o r i t y i n nature and substance
(kata phusin kai ousian):
Some things are called prior and posterior i n this way, while others are
called so i n nature and substance, those for which i t is possible to be without
other things, but not the latter without them. (Metaph. A 11, i o i 9 i - 4 ) a
I n this passage A r i s t o t l e describes a k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y ac

c o r d i n g to w h i c h A is p r i o r to B j u s t i n case A can be w i t h o u t B b u t
n o t vice versa. Peramatzis argues that this characterization can be
u n d e r s t o o d i n t w o ways (12-14, 204). F i r s t , i t m a y be taken to m e a n
that A is p r i o r to B j u s t i n case A can exist w i t h o u t B e x i s t i n g b u t
n o t vice versa. C a l l this p r i o r i t y i n existence ( P I E ) . A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,
he maintains, i t m a y be taken to mean that A is p r i o r to B j u s t i n
case A can be w h a t i t is i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f B b e i n g w h a t i t is, b u t n o t
vice versa. C a l l this p r i o r i t y i n b e i n g ( P I B ) . Peramatzis holds that
p r i o r i t y i n b e i n g is based o n the essences o f the items i n v o l v e d . H e
states that A is p r i o r to B i n the m a n n e r o f P I B 'just i n case A is
p a r t o f B's essence, its b e i n g w h a t i t is, b u t n o t conversely' (205).
T h u s , he regards P I B as the ' o n t o l o g i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t ' to p r i o r i t y i n
d e f i n i t i o n (204, 254, 266). I f o n l y definitions o f the p r i m a r y k i n d
are u n d e r consideration, that is, those w h i c h signify the essence o f
the t h i n g defined, t h e n P I B is equivalent to p r i o r i t y i n d e f i n i t i o n . 23
Peramatzis argues that P I B , n o t P I E , is A r i s t o t l e ' s preferred n o

t i o n o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y . I n his view, P I B is the k i n d o f p r i o r i t y
w i t h w h i c h A r i s t o t l e is concerned i n a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t pas
sages f r o m the Metaphysics, i n c l u d i n g the passage f r o m A 11 j u s t
quoted.
I n order to gain a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f Peramatzis's view, let
us consider some examples that h i g h l i g h t the significance o f P I B
i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h P I E . One o f t h e m concerns the o n t o l o g i c a l
status o f forms. A major c o n t e n t i o n o f Metaphysics Z is that forms
3 3
Thus, Peramatzis holds that A is prior to B i n the manner of P I B just i n case
A is prior to B in real definition (259, 266), where real definitions are those which
signify the essence of the thing denned (see 268—9). Despite this extensional equiva
lence, P I B is more basic than, and grounds, priority in real definition: ' i t is because of
being ontologically prior i n the manner of P I B that an item is prior i n real definition
to some other item. The converse, though, is not the case' (259).
354 Marko Malink
are p r i m a r y substances. A s such, they are o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to

24
other beings—for example, to h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d s . H o w e v e r ,

it is difficult to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y over c o m
p o u n d s along the lines o f P I E i n terms o f separability i n existence.
F o r at least the forms o f perceptible objects depend for t h e i r exis
tence o n some u n d e r l y i n g subject. T h e y cannot exist w i t h o u t be
ing enmattered, hence n o t w i t h o u t some h y l o m o r p h i c c o m p o u n d
e x i s t i n g . Instead, Peramatzis argues, forms are o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r
25
to c o m p o u n d s i n the m a n n e r o f P I B (221, 228, 2 4 4 - 8 , 308). F o r m s

make c o m p o u n d s w h a t they are b u t n o t vice versa. A f o r m is the
essence o f the c o m p o u n d i t enforms, b u t the c o m p o u n d is n o t p a r t
of the f o r m ' s essence. T h i s means that a f o r m can be w h a t i t is i n d e
p e n d e n t l y o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o m p o u n d b e i n g w h a t i t is, b u t n o t
vice versa. T h u s , P I B , u n l i k e P I E , can account for the o n t o l o g i c a l
p r i o r i t y o f forms over c o m p o u n d s .
A n o t h e r example is A r i s t o t l e ' s thesis that substances are o n t o l o
gically p r i o r to non-substances. C o m p a r i n g substances w i t h n o n -
substances, A r i s t o t l e w r i t e s :
What is primary is said i n many ways, but substance is primary in every

way—in account, i n knowledge, and i n time. For none of the other kinds
of predicate is separable but this alone [row /lev yap aXXow Karr/yoprj/IO-TOW
ovOev x P ° >
w
O-VTT] bi fiovrj]. (Metaph.
laT v
Z 1, 1028*31—4)
A c c o r d i n g to this passage, substances are p r i o r i n every respect,

hence also o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r , to non-substances. I n order to ex
p l a i n this thesis, A r i s t o t l e adds that o n l y substances are separable
(choriston). B y this he p r e s u m a b l y means that substances are se
parable f r o m non-substances b u t n o t vice versa (231). A g a i n , i t is
difficult to u n d e r s t a n d the k i n d o f separability u n d e r considera
t i o n as separability i n existence (233-6). For, w h i l e i t is true that
non-substances cannot exist w i t h o u t substances i n w h i c h they i n
here (Cat. 5, 2 3 - 6 ) , i t is n o t true that substances can exist w i t h o u t
b
any non-substances i n h e r i n g i n t h e m . F o r instance, Socrates can

n o t exist w i t h o u t any non-substance attributes i n h e r i n g i n h i m . 2 6
34
See e.g. Metaph. Z 7, i 0 3 2 i - 2 ; Z 11, 1037*5 d 1037*28-30.
b a n
35
See Metaph. H 1, 1042*26—31; cf. Gill, Paradox, 35—7; Wedin, Theory of Sub
stance, 173; Peramatzis, 221 and 228. I f forms are universal, they do not depend for
their existence on any specific compound, but only on the existence of some com
pound or other. As Peramatzis points out (228), this latter kind of dependence suf
fices to undermine PIE as a criterion for the primary substancehood of forms.
36
See D. Bostock (trans, and comm.), Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Z and H
[Z&H] (Oxford, 1994), 59.
M o r e o v e r , even i f i t is true that Socrates can exist w i t h o u t any o f
the non-substance attributes he actually has, i t is n o t true that his
non-substance attributes cannot exist w i t h o u t h i m . A t least, i t is
n o t true for a l l o f his non-substance attributes, as m a n y o f t h e m
m a y exist as attributes of, say, C a l l i a s . 27
I n v i e w o f this, Frede a n d Patzig suggest that A r i s t o t l e ' s thesis

c o n c e r n i n g the separability o f substances ( i o 2 8 3 3 - 4 ) s h o u l d be
a
u n d e r s t o o d along the lines o f P I B instead o f P I E . T h e y take the

thesis to m e a n that substances are w h a t they are i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f
non-substances, whereas i t is n o t the case that non-substances are
w h a t they are i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f substances ( o n the g r o u n d s that
every non-substance is w h a t i t is i n v i r t u e o f there b e i n g some sub
stance i n w h i c h i t i n h e r e s ) . S i m i l a r l y , Peramatzis takes the thesis
28
to m e a n that 'because o f some p a r t i c u l a r substance or other, its be

i n g the general type o f b e i n g that i t is, non-substance attributes . . .
are the general k i n d s o f b e i n g that they are ( b u t n o t vice versa)'
(242). A c c o r d i n g l y , he holds that substances are separable f r o m a n d
o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to non-substances i n that the f o r m e r make n o n -
substances w h a t they are b u t n o t vice versa (244). T h u s , substances
are p r i o r to non-substances i n the m a n n e r o f P I B , b u t n o t i n the
manner of P I E . 2 9
Finally, let us consider A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a i m i n Metaphysics 0 8 that

actuality is p r i o r i n substance (tei ousiai) to p o t e n t i a l i t y ( i o 4 9 i o -
b
11). I n order to j u s t i f y this c l a i m , A r i s t o t l e w r i t e s :
But actuality is prior to potentiality i n substance too, first because what is

posterior i n coming to be is prior i n form and i n substance; for instance, a
3 7
O n the other hand, substances are ontologically prior i n this way to individual
non-substances such as Socrates' pallor (that is, to tropes individuated by reference
to the single substance which is their bearer). Socrates can exist without his pal
lor, but his pallor cannot exist without h i m . However, since this kind of ontological
priority does not generalize to universal non-substances, it does not provide a satis
factory account of Aristotle's general thesis that substances are ontologically prior
to non-substances; see Bostock, Z&H, 58—9; Peramatzis, 236—8.
3 8
Frede and Patzig, Z, ii. 21. T h i s priority in being of substances also helps justify
Aristotle's claim that substances are prior in account or definition to non-substances
(see 1028*34-6).
3 9
This does not mean that for every non-substance B there is some substance
A such that A is prior to B i n the manner of P I B . Rather, Peramatzis's view is that
'particular substance, in general, or any particular substance whatsoever makes non-
substance attributes the general kinds of being that they are' (246, see also 248).
Peramatzis admits that 'this notion of ontological primacy is undeniably attenuated'
(246).
356 Marko Malink
man to a boy or a human being to a seed, for the one already has the form
and the other does not. (Metaph. 0 8, i050 4-7) a
A b o y is i n p o t e n t i a l i t y w h a t a m a n is i n actuality. A r i s t o t l e states
that a m a n is p r i o r i n substance to a boy. A s before, i t is n o t easy to
u n d e r s t a n d this as o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y i n the sense o f P I E ; for a m a n
cannot exist w i t h o u t a b o y h a v i n g existed, n o r can a h u m a n b e i n g
exist w i t h o u t a seed h a v i n g existed. Because o f this, Jonathan Beere
and Peramatzis (285-6) suggest t h a t the k i n d o f p r i o r i t y A r i s t o t l e
has i n m i n d here is P I B . A s Beere p u t s i t , 'there is a n o n - r e c i p r o c a l
dependence a m o n g t h e i r essences (ousiai). W h a t i t is to be a b o y de
pends o n w h a t i t is to be a m a n , b u t n o t vice versa. I f there were no
such t h i n g as w h a t i t is to be a m a n , there w o u l d be n o such t h i n g
as w h a t i t is to be a boy, b u t n o t vice v e r s a . ' 30
Based o n this a n d the other examples described above, Peramatzis

makes a c o n v i n c i n g case t h a t P I B plays an i m p o r t a n t role i n A r i s
totle's metaphysics. I n the second p a r t o f his b o o k , Peramatzis gives
a valuable account o f P I B as i t appears t h r o u g h o u t the Metaphysics.
I n some cases, however, his endorsement o f P I B is m o r e controver
sial t h a n i n the above examples. One such case concerns A r i s t o t l e ' s
c l a i m i n 0 8 t h a t eternal t h i n g s are p r i o r i n substance to p e r i s h
able t h i n g s ( i 0 5 0 6 - 7 ) . M o s t c o m m e n t a t o r s u n d e r s t a n d ' p r i o r i t y
b
i n substance' i n this c o n t e x t as r e f e r r i n g to P I E : eternal t h i n g s can

exist w i t h o u t perishable t h i n g s b u t perishable t h i n g s cannot exist
w i t h o u t eternal t h i n g s (cf. I 0 5 0 i 9 ) . T h u s , Beere holds t h a t ' p r i
b 3 1
o r i t y i n substance' refers to P I B at i o 5 o 4 - 7 b u t n o t at i o 5 o 6 - 7 .
a b 3 2
B y contrast, Peramatzis wants to defend P I B as h a v i n g u n i v e r s a l

scope i n A r i s t o t l e ' s w r i t i n g s , a n d argues t h a t P I B is applicable even
to the latter passage (16, 2 9 1 - 9 ) . T h u s he proposes a u n i f o r m read
i n g o f ' p r i o r i t y i n substance' t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e o f 0 8. H o w e v e r ,
i t is n o t easy to see h o w eternal t h i n g s m i g h t be p r i o r to perishable
30
J. Beere, Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta
[Doing and Being] (Oxford, 2009), 302. Pace Makin, who argues that Aristotle has
in mind a refined version of P I E at ® 8, io5o 4—7; see S. Makin (trans, and comm.),
a
Aristotle: Metaphysics Book ® [Metaphysics @] (Oxford, 2006), 192—6.

31
W. D. Ross (ed. and comm.), Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1924), ii. 265; M . Burnyeat et al.,
Notes on Eta and Theta of Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1984), 144; C. Y. Pana-
yides, Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality i n Substance' ['Priority'], Ancient Phi
losophy, 19 (1999), 327—44 at 341—3 (in combination with 327); C. Witt, Ways of
Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Ithaca, NY, 2003), 89—
90; Makin, Metaphysics ®, 196 and 208—9; similarly Beere, Doing and Being, 293—5.
3 3
Beere, Doing and Being, 293—5, 99 3°4> 3 4 5 -
2 — : —:
t h i n g s i n the m a n n e r o f P I B . H o w m i g h t they be p a r t o f the essence
o f perishable things? Peramatzis outlines a s o l u t i o n to this p r o b l e m
based o n the idea ' t h a t eternal actual being, its b e i n g eternal or i m
perishable, fixes the generic i d e n t i t y o f a l l s u b l u n a r y species as spe
cies' (297). H e gives o n l y a sketchy presentation o f this s o l u t i o n a n d
does n o t a t t e m p t to develop i t i n detail (as he a d m i t s o n pp. 291 a n d
2 9 8 - 9 ) . I n the absence o f this, Peramatzis's r e a d i n g o f i o 5 o 6 - 7 re b
m a i n s schematic a n d p r o g r a m m a t i c , and the t r a d i t i o n a l reading i n

terms o f P I E seems preferable.
A s m e n t i o n e d above, Peramatzis also opts for P I B as an inter
p r e t a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e ' s characterization o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y i n
Metaphysics A 11 ( i o i 9 i - 4 ) . T h e r e , A r i s t o t l e describes p r i o r i t y i n
a
substance as a p p l y i n g to those items 'for w h i c h i t is possible to be

w i t h o u t other things, b u t n o t the latter w i t h o u t t h e m ' (oaa evSexercu
etvai av(Ev aXXojv, kKava Si avcv IKHIVLDV fi-q, i o i 9 3 — 4 ) . Peramatzis o b
a
serves t h a t this f o r m u l a t i o n , considered i n itself, is n e u t r a l between

P I B and P I E (211). A t the same t i m e , he argues t h a t the c o n t e x t o f
Metaphysics A suggests t h a t the f o r m u l a t i o n s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d
i n terms o f P I B instead o f P I E ( 2 1 9 - 2 8 ) . H o w e v e r , this is i n t e n
sion w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y elsewhere i n
his w r i t i n g s . F o r example, consider his c l a i m i n Physics 8. 7 that
l o c o m o t i o n is p r i o r i n various respects to other k i n d s o f m o t i o n :
There is another point of view from which i t w i l l be clearly seen that l o

comotion is primary. As i n the case of other things, so too in the case of
motion 'primary' may be said i n several ways. A thing is said to be prior
to other things when, i f i t is not, the others w i l l not be, whereas i t can be
without the others [rrporcpov ov re pirj oVroj OVK earat rdAAa, IKCIVO oe avev
row aXXwv\; and there is also priority i n time and priority i n substance [ x a i '
ovaiav]. (Phys. 8. 7, 2 6 o i 5 - i 9 )
b
I n this passage A r i s t o t l e distinguishes three k i n d s o f p r i o r i t y : (i) a

nameless k i n d o f p r i o r i t y characterized b y the phrase ' i f i t is n o t , the
others w i l l n o t be, whereas i t can be w i t h o u t the others'; (ii) p r i o r
i t y i n t i m e ; and (iii) p r i o r i t y i n substance. H e goes o n to argue that
l o c o m o t i o n is p r i o r to the other k i n d s o f m o t i o n i n each o f these
three w a y s . T h e first, nameless k i n d o f p r i o r i t y seems to coincide
33
w i t h w h a t A r i s t o t l e calls p r i o r i t y i n substance at A 1 1 , i o i 9 i - 4 . a 3 4
3 3
A t 26o io-29, 2 6 o 2 9 - 2 6 i i 2 , and 261*13-26, respectively.
b b a
34
See R. M . Dancy, Aristotle and the Priority of Actuality', in S. Knuuttila
(ed.), Reforging the Great Chain of Being: Studies of the History of Modal Theor
ies (Dordrecht, 1980), 73—115 at 88; Beere, Doing and Being, 298.
358 Marko Malink
I n the present passage f r o m Physics 8. 7, however, the t e r m ' p r i

o r i t y i n substance' is used to refer to a different k i n d o f p r i o r i t y . 35
I t is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y clear w h a t this t h i r d k i n d o f p r i o r i t y amounts

to ( A r i s t o t l e ' s discussion o f i t at 2 6 i i 3 - 2 6 bears s i m i l a r i t i e s to his
a
discussion at 0 8, i o 5 o 4 - 6 , o f h o w a c t u a l i t y is p r i o r i n substance
a b
to p o t e n t i a l i t y ) . W h a t seems to be clear, t h o u g h , is that the first,

nameless k i n d o f p r i o r i t y does n o t coincide w i t h P I B . W h e n A r i s
totle argues that l o c o m o t i o n is p r i o r i n this w a y to other k i n d s o f
m o t i o n such as g r o w t h a n d alteration ( 2 6 o 19-29), his a r g u m e n t
b
does n o t even p u r p o r t to establish a n y t h i n g like P I B . Rather, his

a r g u m e n t seems to be i n t e n d e d to establish P I E :
Locomotion must be primary. For there is no necessity for the subject of

locomotion to be the subject either of growth or of alteration, nor need i t
become or perish; on the other hand, there cannot be any one of these pro
cesses without the continuous motion imparted by the first mover. (Phys.
8. 7, 2 6 o i 5 - i 9 )
b
I n this passage A r i s t o t l e does n o t argue that l o c o m o t i o n is i n some

way p a r t o f the essence o f g r o w t h , alteration, or generation. I n
stead, he argues that these k i n d s o f process cannot exist w i t h o u t
the l o c o m o t i o n i m p a r t e d b y the first mover, whereas l o c o m o t i o n
can exist w i t h o u t any o f the other k i n d s o f process (see also 2 6 o 2 9 - a
b
7 ) . T h u s he argues for P I E . G i v e n that the k i n d o f p r i o r i t y es
3 6
tablished here is the same that is i n t r o d u c e d at A 1 1 , i o i 9 i - 4 , this a
casts d o u b t o n Peramatzis's c l a i m that the latter passage s h o u l d be

u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f P I B rather t h a n P I E . Peramatzis does n o t
discuss A r i s t o t l e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f p r i o r i t y i n Physics 8. 7 . H e m i g h t
37
deny that the nameless k i n d o f p r i o r i t y f r o m Physics 8. 7 coincides

w i t h the one i n t r o d u c e d i n A 1 1 , or he m i g h t argue that i t can be
u n d e r s t o o d as P I B after all. B u t at least prima facie neither o f these
t w o options is attractive.
L e t us consider one m o r e p r o b l e m w i t h Peramatzis's a t t e m p t to
give P I B the w i d e s t possible scope i n the Metaphysics. T h e p r o b l e m
concerns accidental c o m p o u n d s such as a pale m a n . A r i s t o t l e holds
35
As Beere points out, this ambiguity in Aristotle's use of the term 'might cause
confusion, but it merely shows that Aristotle has a shortage of satisfactory labels'
(Beere, Doing and Being, 298 n. 21). As we have seen, the same ambiguity of the term
'priority in substance' can be observed in Metaphysics 0 8 (io5o 4—7 vs. io5o 6—7).
a b
36
See W. D. Ross (ed. and comm.), Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1936), 444; Panayides, 'Priority', 336.
Although he mentions it at p. 205 n. 2.
3 7
t h a t substances are o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to accidental c o m p o u n d s ; for

example, m a n is o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to pale m a n , and Socrates is
o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to w a l k i n g Socrates. A c c o r d i n g l y , Peramatzis
38
holds t h a t p a r t i c u l a r substances are p r i o r to accidental c o m p o u n d s

i n the m a n n e r o f P I B (242, 244, 262 n . 5). I n other w o r d s , par
t i c u l a r substances are s o m e h o w p a r t o f the essence o f accidental
c o m p o u n d s b u t n o t vice versa (cf. 205). T h i s presupposes t h a t ac
c i d e n t a l c o m p o u n d s possess an essence and a d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y i n g
t h e i r essence. N o w , A r i s t o t l e also h o l d s t h a t the non-substance
39
a t t r i b u t e pale is p r i o r i n account, b u t n o t o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r , to the

accidental c o m p o u n d pale m a n :
Not all things which are prior i n account [TOJ Xoyw] are also prior i n sub
stance [ry ovaia]. For those things are prior in substance which when sepa
rated from others surpass them i n being, but those are prior i n account out
of whose accounts the accounts of other things are compounded; and these
two properties are not coextensive. For if attributes, such as moving or pale,
do not exist apart from their substances [el yap /xi) eon TO. -naBrj napa -ray
overlay], the pale is prior to the pale man in account, but not in substance.
For i t cannot exist separately, but is always together w i t h the compound
[ov yap evoexeTat e
^ a t
Kexcopioêvov dAA' ael aâ ™ ovvoXq.) eorlv\, and by
the compound I mean the pale man. (Metaph. M 2, i 0 7 7 i - 9 )
b
A c c o r d i n g to this passage, pale is p r i o r i n account to pale m a n be

cause the f o r m e r (or its account) is m e n t i o n e d i n the account o f
the latter. T h e account i n q u e s t i o n m i g h t be 'a m a n w h o is pale'.
Peramatzis does n o t regard this account as a d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y i n g
the essence o f pale m a n . F o r w h e n A r i s t o t l e denies t h a t pale is p r i o r
i n substance to pale m a n , Peramatzis takes this to m e a n t h a t pale is
not p r i o r to pale m a n i n the m a n n e r o f P I B (256-60). O n this view,
pale m u s t n o t be p a r t o f the essence o f pale m a n a n d s h o u l d n o t
be m e n t i o n e d i n a d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y i n g the essence o f pale m a n . 4 0
Because o f this, Peramatzis h o l d s t h a t an account such as 'a m a n

3 8
See Metaph. Z i , io28 24—31; cf. also S. M . Cohen, 'Kooky Objects Revisi
a
ted: Aristotle's Ontology', Metaphilosophy, 39 (2008), 3—19 at 16; Peramatzis, 232

and 239.
3 9
I n Z 4 Aristotle argues that, strictly speaking, accidental compounds do not
have an essence or definition (io29 22— I 0 3 0 i 7 ) . However, he accepts that they have
b a
an essence and definition i n a derivative way (i030 i2—13); see M . J. Loux, Primary
b
Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H (Ithaca, NY, 1991), 86—9. A c

cording to Peramatzis, particular substances are i n some way part of this derivative
kind of essence and are mentioned i n the corresponding definition.
4 0
More precisely, pale should not be mentioned in the definition i n such a way as
to imply that it is part of the essence of pale man.
360 Marko Malink
w h o is pale' does n o t signify the essence o f pale m a n , b u t is m e r e l y

a ' n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n , w h i c h is n o t f o l l o w e d b y o n t o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y '
(259). A s we have seen, Peramatzis is c o m m i t t e d to the v i e w t h a t
pale m a n has an essence and a d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y i n g its essence (be
cause there is a substance t h a t is p r i o r to pale m a n i n the m a n n e r
of P I B ) . B u t i t remains m y s t e r i o u s w h a t this d e f i n i t i o n m i g h t look
like, given t h a t 'a m a n w h o is pale' a n d s i m i l a r accounts i n w h i c h
pale is m e n t i o n e d are n o t acceptable definitions. T h e r e is n o i n d i c
ation that A r i s t o t l e w o u l d accept a d e f i n i t i o n o f pale m a n i n w h i c h
pale is n o t m e n t i o n e d . O n the contrary, he seems to reject such a
d e f i n i t i o n i n A 11 w h e n he argues t h a t pale (or musical) is p r i o r i n
account to pale m a n (or m u s i c a l m a n ) :
The accident is prior i n account [xaid rov Xoyov] to the whole, as for i n
stance musical to musical man; for without the part the account will not be
whole, although it is not possible for the musical to be without there being
someone who is musical. (Metaph. A 11, i o i 8 3 4 - 7 ) b
A c c o r d i n g to this passage, an account o f pale m a n is n o t complete

unless pale is m e n t i o n e d i n i t . W o u l d A r i s t o t l e affirm this i f he
t h o u g h t t h a t there is a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l account o f pale m a n , a
d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y i n g its essence, i n w h i c h pale is n o t mentioned?
Peramatzis does n o t address these issues. T h u s , i t remains d o u b t
f u l w h e t h e r P I B is adequate for e x p l a i n i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a i m t h a t
non-substance attributes are n o t o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to accidental
c o m p o u n d s (whereas substances are o n t o l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to t h e m ) .
I n s u m , Peramatzis makes an i m p o r t a n t a n d t i m e l y c o n t r i b u t i o n
to the s t u d y o f A r i s t o t l e ' s metaphysics b y h i g h l i g h t i n g the role P I B
plays i n i t . I n some cases, however, he seems to go too far i n a p p l y
i n g P I B to A r i s t o t l e ' s text. W h a t seems to be called for is a m o r e
balanced approach, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g several k i n d s o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r i
o r i t y e m p l o y e d b y A r i s t o t l e and a c k n o w l e d g i n g that labels such as
' p r i o r i t y i n substance' are used b y h i m to refer to different k i n d s o f
p r i o r i t y i n different c o n t e x t s . 41
University of Chicago
4 1
See Panayides, 'Priority', 343—4.
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Loux, M . J., Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H
(Ithaca, NY, 1991).
362 Marko Malink
Makin, S. (trans, and comm.), Aristotle: Metaphysics Book & [Metaphysics

&] (Oxford, 2006).
Mesch, W., 'Die Teile der Definition (Z 10-11)', i n C. Rapp (ed.), Aristo-
teles: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbiicher (Z, H, @) (Berlin, 1996), 135-56.
Panayides, C. Y , 'Aristotle on the Priority of Actuality i n Substance' ['Pri
ority'], Ancient Philosophy, 19 (1999), 327-44.
Ross, W. D. (ed. and comm.), Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with
Introduction and Commentary, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1924).
(ed. and comm.), Aristotle's Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction
and Commentary (Oxford, 1936).
Schaffer, J., 'On What Grounds What', i n D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, and
R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations
of Ontology (Oxford, 2009), 347-83.
Wedin, M . V., Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Meta
physics Zeta [Theory of Substance] (Oxford, 2000).
Witt, C , Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphy
sics (Ithaca, NY, 2003).
INDEX LOCORUM
Albertus Magnus 403*25-7: 349

Liber III Ethicorum, ed. Borgnet 403*25: 349
tract, i , cap. x x i . 28, p. 2 2 7 : 121 4 0 3 2 9 - 2 : 350 n. 18
a b
406*2: 154
A l e x a n d e r of Aphrodisias 4 i 5 i 2 - i 4 : 235
b
ap. Simpl. In Pkys. 3 1 0 . 25—311. 1 4 1 6 * 1 5 - 1 7 : 150

Diels: 259 n. 66 4 2 4 2 9 ~ 3 o : 207 n. 26
b
Defato, ed. Bruns De caelo

180. 4 - 6 : 293 n. 39 2 6 8 2 8 - 9 : 207 n. 26
b
183. 2 6 - 3 2 : 293 n. 39 27o 26—31: 199 n. 10

b
In Aristotelis Metaphysica commenta- 3 0 4 2 3 : 197

b
ria, ed. Hayduck 3o6 9—10: 207 n. 26

b
3 - 37 4 -
i o
259 - 66 — i o I : n
De generatione animalium
349- 7 - 1 7 : 259 n. 66 717*15-16: 2 4 2
729*20-4: 252 n. 4 8
Anon. 7 3 0 i 9 - 2 3 : 230
b
In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea ii—v 7 3 0 2 4 - 3 3: 230

b
commentaria, ed. H e y l b u t 731*24: 230

154- 1 7 - 3 2 : 120 7 3 i 2 8 - 3 o : 235
b
7 3 2 * 2 5 - 7 3 3 i 6 : 238
b
Aquinas 7 3 4 i o - i 3 : 260
b
Sententia libri Ethicorum, ed. Gauthier 7 3 4 3 i - 6 : 215 n. 4 2

b
lectio 11 ( [ 7 3 2 0 1 ] Sententia Ethic., lib. 735*2-4: 2 3 1

3 1. 11 n. 2): 122 7 3 7 i 5 - 2 7 : 238
b
74o*4-5: 252
Argyropoulos, John 7 4 o i 8 - 2 4 : 260
b
ad Arist. NE n i 3 7 - 8 , in Tres b
7 4 o 2 5 - 7 4 i * 3 : 230
b
conuersiones ( 1 4 9 7 ) : 128 7 4 o 2 5 - 3 4 : 2 3 1 n. 13, 257 n. 58

b
7 4 ° 3 4 - 7 4 i 3 : 260
b a
Aristotle 7 4 i 4 - 5 : 230, 250

b
Athenaion politeia 7 4 i 7 ~ 9 : 260

b
4 3 . 5: n o n. 13 7 4 3 2 o - 5 : 230
b
Categories 7 4 4 * 3 4 ~ i : 251 n. 46
b
2 3 - 6 : 354
b
744*36: 234
6 3 6 - 8 2 4 : 52 n. 19
a b
7 4 4 i 6 - 2 7 : 230
b
6 * 6 - i o : 54
3
b
7 5 5 * n - i : 237
b
6 i 5 - i 8 : 52 n. 19
b
760*3 i - i : 258
b
6 2 8 - 7 2 i : 52 n. 19
b a
7 7 o i 5 - i 7 : 2 3 1 n. 13, 257 n. 58
b
6 2 8 - 3 5 : 52 n. 19, 54
b
7 7 7 1 6 - 7 7 8 * 9 : 258
b
6 3 4 - S : 52 n. 19
b
778*4: 230
6 3 4 : 5 9 - 6 o n. 34
b
788*14-16: 238 n. 25
7*15-17: 54 De generatione et corruptione
7 3 i - : 57, 57 n. 3 1
a b
9 329*24- 3: 221
b
7 i S f f : 54
b
;
3 2 9 * 2 4 - i : 2 2 1 n. 4 9
b
De anima 329*33-4: 221

4 o 2 5 - 2 : 349
3
a b
3 2 9 2 - 3 : 214
b
364 Index Locorum
3 2 9 3 2 — 3 3 0 i 2 : 197 n. 4
b a
6 7 S 3 3 " 4 : 233 n. 14
b
3 3 0 3 0 - 7 : 197 n. 5
a b
68o i4—21: 2 4 4 - 5
b
3 3 0 3 1 : 2 0 7 n. 26
a
6 8 2 3 2 - 3 5 : 233 n. 14
a b
3 3 0 3 4 : 2 0 7 n. 26
a
6 8 5 i 2 - i 6 : 233 n. 14
b
3 3 i 3 - 6 : 213, 214
a
6 8 5 i 3 - i / : 2 4 0 - 1 n. 29
b
3 3 i 7 : 197 n. 3
a
6 9 i 2 7 - i 5 : 231
a b
3 i i 2 - i 6 : 197
3
a
6 9 i 9 - i 5 : 232
b
3 3 i 2 3 - 2 : 198, 199
a b
6 9 5 i 7 - 2 6 : 232, 2 3 7 n. 24
b
33i 2—11: 200

b
6 9 5 i 7 - 2 5 : 233 n. 14
b
3 3 i 2 - 3 : 198
b
6 9 5 2 2 - 3 : 234
b
3 3 i i 2 — 2 4 : 202
b
6 9 6 l 2 - l 5 : 233
a
3 3 i 2 6 — 3 0 : 197 n. 6, 2 0 4
b
69& 2i—7: 2 4 0
a
3 3 i 3 0 — 6 : 205 n. 21
b
696 24—35: 258
b
332 23—4: 203 n. 17

a
Eudemian Ethics
3 3 S 4 " 7 : 257 n. 58
b
i 2 2 o 6 - 7 : 2 7 0 - 1 n. 9
a
3 3 6 3 4 - 3 3 7 6 : 199
b a
I 2 2 2 i 5 : 2 6 5 - 6 n. 1
b
De incessu animalium i 2 2 2 i 8 - 2 o : 268 n. 6

b
7 o 4 i 2 - i 8 : 225, 2 2 9 , 2 4 9 , 253 n. 50
b
i 2 2 3 i - 9 : 268 n. 6
a
7 o 6 4 - 9 : 187
a
I223 2~3: 269 n. 7
a
7 o 7 6 - i 6 : 247
a
1223*5-9: 113 »• 19
7 o 7 i g - 2 4 : 247
a
1223*5-8: 110 n. 13
- o 7 2 3 - 7 o 8 7 : 247
a a
I223 6: 269 n. 7a
/ o 8 9 - 2 o : 230, 232
a
i 2 2 3 / - 9 : 274, 274 n. 13
a
- o 8 i 1—12: 237
a
I223 8: 269 n. 7a
7 o 8 i 2 - i 4 : 246
a
i 2 2 3 9 - i o : 269 n. 7, 2 7 0 - 1 n. 9
a
De iuventute et senectute, de vita et I223 9: 269 n. 7a
morte i 2 2 3 i o - i 3 : 266 n. 3
a
4 6 8 2 o - 3 : 252
a
I 2 2 3 i 5 - i 6 : 277
a
4 6 g 2 3 - i : 2 4 7 n. 39, 252
a b
I 2 2 3 i 6 - i 8 : 267 n. 5
a
De ttiotu animalium I 2 2 3 i 6 - i 7 : 274 n. 13

a
6 g 8 i 1—13: 252 n. 48
a
i 2 2 3 i 9 - 2 o : 266 n. 3
a
De partibus animaliuin i 2 2 3 2 i - 2 : 2 6 5 - 6 n. 1
a
4 8 7 i o — 1 1 : 2 9 1 n. 36
a
I 2 2 3 2 i : 272 n. 10
a
640 1 9 - 2 4 : 253 n. 4 9
s
I 2 2 3 2 3 - / : 274
a
6 4 i 2 2 - 3 3 : 257 n. 58
a
I 2 2 3 2 3 ~ 5 : 276
a
6 4 5 9 - n : 230a
i 2 2 3 3 o : 272 n. 10
a
6 4 6 2 9 ~ 3 o : 252 n. 48
a
i 2 2 3 i - 2 : 274 n. 13
b
6 s o 2 ff.: 237
a
I 2 2 3 8 : 274 n. 13
b
6 s 2 3 i : 230
a
I 2 2 3 3 3 : 274 n. 13
b
6ss 23-8: 2 4 1
a
i 2 2 4 i 5 - 2 o : 2 7 9 - 8 0 n. 24
a
6 5 9 6 - i : 237 n. 24
b
3 I 2 2 4 2 0 ~ 3 0 : 268
a
6 6 3 3 4 - i 2 : 245-6
a b
I224 i3—15: 2 7 9 - 8 0 n. 24
b
6 6 3 2 8 - 6 6 4 2 : 238
b a
i 2 2 5 9 - i o : 113 n. 19
a
6&4 i9—24: 239

a
I225 i9—34: 266 n. 2, 287—8 n. 30

a
6 6 4 2 5 - 3 2 : 239
a
i22S 36— i: 274-5 - 4

a b n I
665 6-8: 240 a
I 2 2 5 3 7 - i : 268 n. 6
a b
66s 8: 239
a
i 2 2 5 i - i o : 268 n. 6
b
66s g-26: 2 4 0
a
I 2 2 5 i 1—16: 289 n. 32
b
6 6 g i 2 : 233 n. 14
b
I 2 2 5 i 7 - i 8 : 2 6 5 - 6 n. 1
b
67o 22-g: 242a
I 2 2 5 i 7 : 272 n. 10
b
6 7 o 2 3 - 7 : 242
b
i 2 2 5 3 5 - 6 : 113 n. 19
b
& 7 7 i 2 - i 8 : 2 4 2 n. 31
a
i 2 2 6 2 / - 8 : 113 n. 19
a
677 36- S: 242

a b
I226 30—1: 113 n. 19

b
Index Locorum 365
1 2 2 8 * 9 - 1 0 : 2 7 0 - 1 n. 9 1 0 5 0 * 4 - 1 4 : 2 6 1 n. 6 8
Metaphysics 1 0 5 0 * 4 - 7 : 3 5 5 - 6 , 3 5 6 n. 3 0 , 3 5 8 n. 3 5
9 8 8 3 o : 2 0 7 n. 2 6
b
io5o 6-7: b
3 5 6 , 3 5 7 , 3 5 8 n. 3 5
1 0 1 5 * 1 0 - 1 1 : 2 5 7 n. 5 8 i o 5 o i 9 : 356 b
i o i 7 i o — 1 1 : 2 0 7 n. 2 6
b
1075*11-25: 256
ioi8 34-7: 360
a
i o 7 7 i - 9 : 359b
1019*1-4: 353, 357,358 Meteorologies

i o i 9 3 - 4 : 357
a 3 4 6 3 6 - 3 4 7 * 8 : 199
b
1026*2-3: 347 3-S i2-i3: b

2 1 5 n. 4 0
1 0 2 6 * 3 : 3 4 7 n. 1 1 378 i3-26: b
2 5 2 n. 4 8
1 0 2 6 * 5 - 6 : 3 4 8 - 9 n. 15 38i 23-/:
b
2 1 5 n. 4 0
1 0 2 8 * 2 4 - 3 1 : 3 5 9 n. 3 8 3 8 2 * 3 - 4 : 2 1 4 n. 3 9
1028*31-4: 354 382*3i- i: b
215 n . 4 0
1028*33-4: 355 384 24-30: b
214-15
i o 2 8 3 4 - 6 : 3 4 3 , 3 5 5 n. 2 8
b
Nicomacheon Ethics
I029 22-i030*i7:
b
3 5 9 n. 3 9 1 1 0 1 * 1 2 - 1 8 : 2 7 0 - 1 n. 9
1 0 3 0 * 6 - 7 : 3 4 6 n. 1 0 1103*8-10: 1 1 4 n. 2 2
i 0 3 0 5 - 7 : 3 4 6 n. 1 0
b
1 1 0 3 * 2 0 ff.: 1 3 8
I030 i2-i3: b
3 5 9 n. 3 9 1 1 0 5 * 2 8 - 3 2 : 2 7 0 - 1 n. 9
1 0 3 1 * 1 1 - 1 2 : 3 4 6 n. 1 0 1 i o 9 3 0 - 4 : 2 6 6 n. 4
b
I03i n-i4: b
3 4 3 n. 5 n o 9 3 0 - i : 275
b
1 0 3 2 * 2 0 - 5 : 2 3 1 n. 1 3 , 2 5 7 n. 5 8 no9 3o: b
2 7 5 n. 15
i032 i-2: b
3 4 2 n. 3 , 3 5 4 n. 2 4 1 io9 31: b
2 7 9 n. 2 2
I032 n-i4: b
3 4 5 ,351 1 i o 9 3 2 - 4 : 2 7 2 n. 1 0
b
1033*2-5: 347,348 I i o 9 3 2 ~ 3 : 2 7 2 n . 10
b
i o 3 5 i 7 - 3 i : 345
a
no9 34-5: b
2 7 9 n. 2 2
I 0 3 5 4 ~ 6 : 3 4 4 n. 6 , 3 4 7 - 8 n. 1 2
b
1io9 35—1110*1: 2 7 8
b
I 0 3 5 8 : 3 4 4 n. 6
b
1 1 1 0 * 1 : 2 7 9 n. 2 2
i035 io: b
3 4 4 n. 6 1 1 1 0 * 2 - 3 : 2 7 9 n. 2 3
I 0 3 5 n - 2 i : 344 b
1 1 1 0 * 9 : 2 8 5 n. 2 7
io35 i3-i4: b
3 4 7 ~ 8 n. 1 2 1 1 1 0 * 1 5 ft'- : 2
76
I035 i4-i6: b
3 4 2 n. 3 1 1 1 0 * 1 7 — 1 8 : 1 1 0 n. 1 3 , 1 1 3 n. 1 9
I°35 i7-i8: b
344 n. 6 1 1 1 0 * 1 8 : 2 8 3 n. 2 6
I035 i8-ig: b
3 4 7 - 8 n. 1 2 1110*19-26: 285
i035 27-3o: 342 b
1 1 1 0 * 2 4 : 2 8 7 - 8 n. 3 0
io35 32: b
3 4 2 n. 3 1 1 1 0 * 2 5 - 6 : 2 8 9 n. 3 2
i036 22-3o: b
345, 346,347 1 1 1 0 * 2 5 : 3 0 3 n. 4 4
I 0 3 & 2 9 : 3 4 7 n. 1 1
b
1 1 1 0 * 2 6 - 9 : 2 8 7 n. 2 9
io37 5-7: 342 a
II io 3: b
285 n . 27
1 0 3 7 * 5 : 3 5 4 n. 2 4 II io 5: b
285 n . 27
1037*24-5: 3 4 5 ,351 I I I o 18—24: 2 7 2 n . 1 0
b
1037*26-9: 347 1 1 1 1 * 2 2 - 4 : 2 7 6 , 2 7 7 n. 1 8 , 2 7 9 n. 2 2 ,
1 0 3 7 * 2 8 - 3 0 : 3 5 4 n. 2 4 288
i o 3 7 * 3 3 - 7 : 3 4 3 n. 5 b
1 1 1 1 * 2 5 - 6 : 2 6 7 n. 5
1 0 4 2 * 8 : 2 0 7 n. 2 6 1 1 1 1 * 2 6 : 2 9 1 n. 3 6
1 0 4 2 * 1 7 - 2 1 : 3 4 6 n. 1 0 im 4—5:
b
265-6 n. 1
1 0 4 2 * 2 6 - 3 1 : 3 5 4 n. 2 4 i n i 4 : 272 n . 10
b
io42 7—8: b
1 1 0 n. 13 111 i 8 - 9 : b
267 n. 5
io46*36- 2: 260 b
I i i 3 4 - i 4 : 306
b
1048*1-15: 260
1 1 1 3 6 — 1 4 : 1 1 3 , 1 1 3 n. 2 1 , 1 1 4 , 1 2 0 ,
b
1 0 4 9 * 2 3 : 2 1 0 n. 3 2
126, 138
i o 4 9 i o - i 1: 3 5 5 b
ni3 6-7: b
114
ioso*4- 6: 358 b
1113 7—11:118 b
366 Index Locorum
ni3 7—8: 103 ff., 113 n. 21, 114,
b
2 i o i : 189
b
n 6 f f . , 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 127, 2 i o 2 6 - 7 : 189

b
128 ff., 141 ff.; Arabic version, ed. 2 i 4 i 3 - i 4 : 207 n . 26

b
Akasoy and Fidora, 207. 1—2: 123, 224 i: 152 n . 8, 168 n . 36

b
123 n. 59 225 i: 168 n . 36

a
n i 3 8 — 1 1 : 114, 124, 131, 307 n. 47;

b
2 2 6 i s - i 6 : 149 n . 4
b
Arabic version, ed. Akasoy and 234 24- 9: 180

a b
Fidora, 207. 2—3: 124, 124 n. 62 234*24: 179 n . 43

1113 i1—14: 114 b
234*32-3: 149 n . 4
H i 3 i 3 - i 4 : 114
b 234*3 3-4: 179 n . 44
I i i 3 i 3 : 306b 234*34- 5: 187 n . 59
b
1113 i4: 113 n. 20 b 2 3 4 i 1: 168 n . 36

b
n i 3 2 4 - s : 289 n. 32
b 235*33-4: 160
n i 3 3 i - 3 : 289 n. 32
b 2 3 5 6 - 3 ° : 171
b
I i i 3 3 3 - n i 4 3 : 289 n. 32
b i l 235 6-7: 168
b
1114*2-3: 308 235 7: 166

b
1114*3-1 H 4 2 5 : 308 b
235 30-236 27: 154-6, 164
b a
1114*10: 309 235 30-236 7: 156, 171, 184

b a
1114*12-13: 309 2 3 5 3 i : 166

b
1114*19—21: 307 n. 47 235 32-236 s: 171

b a
n i 4 3 i — i 6 : 310
a b
235 32-3: 159
b
1115*2-3: 113 n. 19 235 32: 156 n . 16

b
i i 2 5 2 6 : 113 n. 19, 141 n. 122

a
235 33-4: 162 n . 26
b
1 1 3 i i o : 207 n. 26
b
235 33: 156 n . 17
b
1133 6: 207 n. 26 a
235 34-236 5: IS9, 4 , 181
b a l 6
H 3 S 2 8 - 3 o : 278 n. 19
a
236*7-27: 156
H 3 S i : 275 b
n. 16 236*7-15: 164, 171
H3S 2S ff.: 272 b
236*7-10: 164-5
ii39 2i—2: 107
a
236*7-8: 157 n . 19
1143 8—9: 108, 110 n. 13
a
236*7: 157 n . 18, 159, 173
H47 34: 108 a
236*9-10: 157 n . 20, 185
Physics 236*10—11: 157
i92 8-34: 231
b
236*12: 185
i92 2o-3: 149 n. 3, 231, 259
b
236*14-15: 174, 185, 186
i 9 2 2 i - 2 : 257 - 58
b n
236*14: 157 n . 21, 185
I 9 3 2 2 - i 9 4 i 2 : 149 n. 1
b a
236*15-27: 157, 164, 171, 177, 184
I 9 3 3 5 - i 9 4 7 : 347
b a
236*15: 174 n . 40, 185
I94 5: 347 n . 11
a
236*16—20: 160, 174, 176
i 9 4 3 i - 4 : 245 n. 37
a
236*17-18: 175
i 9 S 3 i - 3 : 57 n . 31
a
236*17: 175
I 9 5 3 3 - 6 : 57 n . 3 1
a b
236*18: 180
i 9 5 i - 2 : 57 n. 31
b
236*19: 176
i 7 2 3 - 9 : 233
9
b
236*20-7: 174, 176, 178, 182
I98 2~4: 231
a
236*20—6: 160
I 9 8 i 7 - i 9 9 8 : 231 n. 12
b a
236*26-7: 174
I 9 8 i 8 : 245 n. 37
b
236*27: 176, 182
i99 2o-6: 231
a
236 i9—23: 160, 163

b
I99 26—30: 251, 260 n. 67

b
2 3 6 i 9 : 163
b
i99 26-8: 231

b
236 2o-i: 162

b
2o8 3o: 189

a
2 3 6 2 i : 163
b
2o8 8-9: 207 n. 26

b
236 2-237*i7: 178

b
3
209 3i: 162 n. 28

a
236 33~4: 167

b
209 i: 162 b
236 34~5: 169, 187, 1 9 °

b
Index Locorum 367
2 3 8 2 6 - 2 3 9 i o : 182
b a
Aspasius
2 3 8 3 6 - 2 3 9 i o : 184
b a
In Ethica Nicomachea quae supersunt
2 3 8 6 - 2 3 9 i : 184
b
3
a
commentaria, ed Heylbut
239*3-6: 182 76. 8 - 1 6 : 119 n. 4 4
239*5: 182
239*6-10: 182 Bruni, Leonardo
239*8-10: 183 ad Arist. NE n i 3 7 - 8 , i n Tres
b
239*9-10: 183 conuersiones (1497): 128

2 3 9 i o - 2 2 : 182, 184
a
2 3 9 i o - n : 181
a
Burgundius Pisanus translator A r i -

2 3 9 i o : 182, 182 n. 51
a
stotelis
2 3 9 n - i 7 : 181
a
Ethica Nicomachea: translatio antiquis-

2 3 9 n : 174 n. 4 0 , 185
a
sima librorum I I et III sine 'Ethica

239*13-14: 149 n. 4
uetus', ed. Gauthier
239*14-22: 182
Clavis: 26. 1. 1 ( M ) , liber: 3, cap.: 6,
239*17-22: 181
p. 32. 22: 121 n. 50
239*20-2: 182
239*20: 182
B u r i d a n , John
239*22: 181
Quaestiones super libros De generatione
239*23-6: 187, 190
et corruptione Aristotelis, ed.
2 S 2 i o : 168 n. 36
b
Streijger—Bakker—Thijssen
255*5-10: 274 n. 13
2 6 o * 2 9 - 7 : 358 b 197. 2 4 - 1 9 8 . 3: 2 1 5 - 1 6 n. 43
2 6 o i 5 - i 9 : 357, 358
b 230. 6—232. 5: 208 n. 29
2 6 o i 9 - 2 9 : 357 n. 33, 358
b
2 6 o i 9 - 2 i : 152 n. 9
b Camerarius, Joachim
2 6 o 2 9 - 2 6 i * i 2 : 357 n. 33
b ad Arist. NE n i 3 7 - 8 : 132
b
261*13-26: 357 n. 33
2 6 i 3 2 - 4 : 200
b
Choeroboscus, Georgius
262*12-17: 200 Prolegomena et scholia in Theodosii
2 6 4 2 4 - 8 : 200 n. 11
b
Alexandrini canones isagogicos de fle
265*13—17: 199 n. 10 xions verborum, ed. Hilgard
Politics 85. 17-18: i n n. 14
86. 29—31: i n n. 14
1253*19-30: 257 n. 57
86. 3 4 - 5 : i n n. 14
1265*1-10: 9 7
i 2 8 8 2 i - 6 : 235 b 336. 2 5 - 6 : i n n. 14
1340*25-8: 75 n. 22
i 3 4 o 2 i - 5 : 85 n. 43
b Cicero
Posterior Analytics Academica
7 6 3 5 - 9 : 249
b
1- 45: 315, 3 1 5 - 1 6 n. 5, 316, 317, 318,
77*10-12: 249 326, 331
Rhetoric 2- 77: 3 1 5 - 1 6 n. 5
i 3 S 9 3 6 : 110 n. 13
a 2. 104: 318
1366*36: 270—1 n. 9 De oratore
Sophistici elenchi 3. 67: 316 n. 6
i 7 5 9 - i o : 106
b
I 7 5 i 3 - i 4 : 106
b
Diogenes L a e r t i u s
176*10—11: 106 4. 28: 325 n. 22, 326 n. 25
176*15-16: 106 4. 32: 325 n. 22
Topics
i S 4 3 i - 2 : 346 n. 10
a
E m p e d o c l e s , 31 D K
158*15-17: 106 B 17. 9: 55 n. 28
160*33—4: 106 B 26. 8: 55 n. 28
368 Index Locorum
Eusebius Oresme, N i c o l e
Praeparatio Evangelica Quaestiones super De generatione et cor-
7 3 0 c—731 B : 3 1 6 n. 6 ruptione, ed. Caroti
2 2 1 . 76—90: 203 n. 17, 214 n. 39
Eustratius of N i c a e a 250. 56-64: 204 n. 20
Orationes, ed. Demetrakopoulos

3, 8 6 . 23—6: i n n. 15 Parmenides, 2 8 D K
B 8. 38-41: 25, 26 n. 46
Felicianus, Johannes Bernardus B 8. 38: 25, 26 n. 46
ad Arist. NE n i 3 7 - 8 : 1 3 1 b B 8. 4 1 : 25
Grosseteste, Robert P a u l , Saint

Ethica Nicomachea: libri I—III; VIII. 2 Corinthians
1. 17: 137
J—5 (6) ('recensio pura'—Burgundii
translationis recensio), ed. Gauthier
Clavis: 2 6 . 2 . 1 ( M ) , liber: 3 , cap.: 7 , Perion, I o a c h i m
p. 1 8 7 . 2 3 : 1 2 1 n. 5 1 ad Arist. NE n i 3 7 - 8 : b
129
Heliodorus Philoponus
In Ethica Nicomachea paraphrasis, ed. In Aristotelis libros De generatione et
Heylbut corruptione commentaria, ed. Vitelli
230. 27-231. 3: 2 1 4 n. 39
50. 10—11: 120
231. 18—20: 1 9 7 n. 3
234. 19—235. 18: 2 0 2 n. 16
Hermannus Alemannus
242. 1 5 - 2 2 : 203 n. 17
Summa Alexandrinorum, ed. Marchesi
ad Arist. NE I i i 3 6 - i 4 : 1 2 6 b
Plato
Charmides
Homer
167 c-168 c: 52 n. 19
Iliad
167 E 1-2: 54
168 B 2 - 3 : 54
24. 205: 79 n. 28
168 B 5-8: 54
168 c 4-5: 54
Ibn R u s h d
168 c 9 - 1 0 : 54
In Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea Gorgias
ad Arist. NE I i i 3 6 - i 4 , ap. Aristotle/
b
4 6 1 B 4-6: 334
Averroes, 2nd Juntine, 1 9 . 1 8 — 2 6 : Laws
126
6 3 1 D 2 — 6 3 2 B 1: 90
James 633C-634B: 86 n. 44
Epistle 633 D 2-3: 79 n. 30
5- 12: 137 63S c s - D 1: 7 9
6 4 3 D 1: 6 7 n. 11
Joannes X I B e c c u s 643 D 2 - 6 4 5 E 4: 67 n. 11
Four Books to Constantine Meliteniotes, 6 4 3 D 2: 94
ed. Migne 644 c: 84 n. 41
388. 16-18: i n n. 15 6 4 4 D - 6 4 5 B : 65
6 4 4 D - 6 4 5 A : 65
L a m b i n , Denys 6 4 5 A 1: 94
ad Arist. NE n i 3 b
7-8: 129 645 A 4-S: 94
645 D - E : 77 n. 25
M a n u e l I I Palaeologus 645 D: 77 n. 25, 80 n. 33
Dialogi cum mahometano, ed. Migne 6 4 5 D 7: 7 7 n . 25
2 2 1 . 29—31: i n n. 15 645 E 5-6: 75
Index Loconim 369
6 4 5 E 5: 6 7 n . 11 791 B—c: 8 6 n . 44
646 c 4: 9 4 n. 55 791 B: 84
647 A - B : 9 1 791 B 7: 86
647E 1: 9 4 n . 55 791 D: 85
648 B-E: 7 8 11. 2 6 791 D 5-9-. 86
6 4 9 A 3: 9 4 n . 55 792 B: 84
649 D: 80 n. 33 792 B 4-8: 87
653 A 7-9: 96 796 A : 85
653 B-c: 73 7 9 8 A : 83 n. 39
653 B : 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 798 D - E : 83
653 B 2-3: Si n. 35 798 D 1-4: 84
653 B 6-c 2: 73 814 D: 86
653 c 7-9: 77 814 E: 86 n . 44
653 c 7: 8 1 n . 35 815 E - 8 1 6 A: 86 n. 44
653 E - 6 5 4 A: 74 817E-820D: 94-5 n. 57
654 c 7: 8 1 n. 35 822E-832A: 90 n. 50
654 c 9 - D 3: 74 828 A-c: 96
6 5 4 D 2: 7 4 n . 2 1 , 8 1 n . 35 8 3 6 B 3: 93
655 B : 75 838 A-c: 90
6 5 5 D 7 - E 3: 7 5 n. 23 841 B 5-6: 91 n. 52
6 5 5 E 2: 8 1 n . 35 841 c: 91
656 B 4-7: 75 841 E - 8 1 5 A : 85
6 5 6 B 5: 8 1 n . 35 857 D - E : 89-90 n. 49
659 D : 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 8 5 7 D 7: 8 9 - 9 0 n . 49
659 D 1-3: 73 8 5 7 E 3: 8 9 - 9 0 n . 49
6 5 9 D 2: 94 8 6 3 B - 8 6 4 c: 80 n. 33
6 5 9 D 5: 8 1 n . 35 863 B: 63, 66
6 6 3 B 5: 8 1 n . 35 863 B 1-9: 80 n. 33
6 6 6 B 6: 9 4 n . 55 863 E 6-8: 80 n. 33
666 B 7-c 2: 79 864 B 3-6: 80 n. 33
6 7 1 B 8 - D 3: 77-8 869 A: 66
671 D - 6 7 2 D : 78 n. 26 8 7 4 E - 8 7 5 D : 98 n . 66
6 7 2 D 5: 9 4 n . 55 8 8 0 D 8 - E 3: 7 9 n . 30
6 8 9 A - c : 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 886 B: 92 n. 54
718 C - D : 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 8 8 7 C - 8 8 8 B: 92 n. 54
718 D 4: 8 9 - 9 0 n . 49 8 8 8 A : 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49
7 1 8 D 6: 8 9 - 9 0 n . 49 8 8 9 A 4 - E 1: 259
720 D : 88, 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 890 E 1-3: 94
720 D 4-6: 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 8 9 2 A 2 - C 7: 259
721 c: 95-6 n. 60 896 E ff.: 86
721 D : 91 901 E 4-7: 86 n. 45
723 A : S 9 - 9 0 n. 49 9 0 3 B 5 - D 1: 255-6
723 A 4: 8 9 - 9 0 n. 49 908 B: 92 n. 54
7 2 3 A 5: 8 9 - 9 0 n . 49 908 E: 92 n. 54
731A: 91 919 B 4: 93
731 D : 66 934 A: 66, 80 n. 33
741 c 6-7: 91 934 D: 66

762 c: 9 1 935 A 3-6: 80
789 E 2-3: 79 n . 30 9 5 7 D 6: 93
790 c 5-8: 84 9 6 6 E 2—967 A 1: 9 4 - 5 n. 57
790 E-791 B: 87 Parmenides

7 9 0 E 8 - 7 9 1 B 2: 84 1 2 8 E 6: 58
791 A 4: 8 4 - 5 n. 42 130 B : 46
37o Index Locorum
130 E—131 E: 46 295 A 5 - 8 : 9 5 - 6 n . 60
131 A - E : 44 Republic
131 B: 46 376 A 6: 74 n . 21
132 A: 46 376 B 6: 74 n . 21
132 D - 1 3 3 B: 44 377 A 1 2 - B 3: 78
133 B 4 - 6 : 48 4 0 1 D—402 A : 73 n . 19
1 3 3 C - 1 3 4 E : 43 ff- 4 0 1 E—402 A : 74 n . 21
133 c 3-S: 4 4 , 4 6 n . 4 401 E 4: 81 n . 35
133 c 8 - D 2: 45 402 A 3 - 4 : 74 n . 21
133 c 8: 52, 55 4 0 2 A 3: 74 n . 21
133 D 1-2: 4 6 , 4 7 n . 7 403 E: 96
133 D 2 - 5 : 45 410 B 5 - 6 : 86
133 D 7 - 1 3 4 A 1: 4 4 4 1 0 D—411 E: 73 n . 19
133 D 7 - E 4: 58 410 D: 79
134 A-B: 54 411 A 5 - B 4: 78
134 A 3 - B 1: 4 4 411 B 6-c 2: 86
134 B I I - C 2: 48 411 D 7 - E 2: 86
134 D 9-E 6: 4 9 438 B - E : 52 n . 19
134 D 9 - E 1: 4 9 438 B 4 - c 9: 53
134 D 10: 4 9 438 c 6 - 9 : 5 9 - 6 0 n . 34
134 E 2-6: 49 438 c 9: 54
134 E 2: 4 9 438 E 5: 5 9 - 6 0 n . 34
134 E 5 - 6 : 48 4 3 9 E - 4 4 0 A : 73 n . 19
134 E 7: 4 8 441 B 3—c 2: 68
Phaedo 4 4 1 c : 73 n . 19
62 D 2-3: 49 4 4 1 E - 4 4 2 D : 69
97 B 8-98 A 2: 2 2 6 , 229 4 4 1 E - 4 4 2 A : 73 n . 19
97 D
5 - 9 8 A 2: 2 2 6 - 7 , 229 n . 8 4 4 1 E 8 - 4 4 2 A 2: 73 n . 19
98 B 1-4: 255 4 4 2 A - c : 86 n . 4 4
Pkaedrus 4 4 2 A 2: 8 0 n . 3 1 , 96 n . 6 2
230 D 6: 93 4 4 2 B - c : 63
253 D - 2 5 4 A : 73 n . 19 509 A 6-513 E 3: 228 n . 6
2 5 7 C - 2 5 8 C : 93 549 A: 73 n . 19
261 A 8: 9 4 550 B 6: 6 7 , 73 n . 19
261 E: 93 580 D - 5 8 1 c: 81 n . 34
268 c 3: 93 581 A: 73 n . 19
270 B 6: 93 590 A 9 - B 9: 86
271 B: 93 590 C - D : 98 n . 66
271 c 10: 94 606 D 1: 68
274 E 6: 93 Seventh Letter
275 A 5: 93 344 C - D : 94 n . 56
275 A 7 - B 1: 92 Sophist
275 D 4 - 9 : 93 255 c 14: 59 n . 33
276 c 8 - 9 : 93 Symposium
277 D - E : 93 199 D 1-2: 55
277 D 6 — I O : 93 199 D 5: 55
277 E - 2 7 8 A : 96 199 E 3 - 4 : 55
Pkilebus 200 A 5: 54
58 B 9-59 D 8: 228 n . 6 Theaetetus
Politicus 152 A - c : 52 n . 19
268 B: 96 15 2 A 6 - c 3: 20
294 A ff.: 94 1 5 2 c 5 - 6 : 22 n . 39
294 B 4 - 6 : 9 5 - 6 n . 60 152 D 2 - E 1: 4, 5
Index Locorum 37i
1 5 2 D 2—3: 2 , 1 6 n . 26 181 E 5 - 7 : 24
153 B : 8 n. 11 182 A 4—B 26
153 o 8 - 1 5 4 A 4: 4, 5 1 8 2 A 7 - B 3: 29
1 5 3 D 8 - 1 5 4 A 3: 6 1 8 2 A 8 - B 3: 2 9 n . 53
154 A 3-9: 7 1 8 2 A 8 - B 1: 2 7
I 54 A 3-8: 9 II. 16 1 8 2 A 8 - B 3: 26
1 5 4 A 3-4'- 7 1 8 2 B 1: 27
1
5 4 A 3: 7 n. 10 182 B 6-7: 29 n . 53
154 A 4: 8 n . 12 182 c 1 - 1 8 3 B 5: 1 8 n. 32
1
5 4 A 6-7: 7 182 c 8: 24
154 A 7-8: 25 n . 44 182 c 9 - 1 1 : 28
1 5 4 A 7: 8 n . 13 182 c 9-10: 29 n. 53
I54B 1-3: 9 182 c 10: 28
154B 2-3: 9 n. 16 1 8 2 D I - E 1 2 : 35 n . 6 1
154B 3-6: 9 1 8 2 D I - E 3: 3 5 n . 6 1
156 A 2 - 1 5 7 c 1: 4 , 5 182 D 1-5: 28
1 5 6 A 2 - C 5: I O 182 D 1-2: 28, 30, 32 n . 55
I 56 A 5 - 7 : I O 182 D 2—5: 3 1
1 5 6 A 5: 2 182 D 2-3: 32
I 56 A 8 - B 1: 11 1 8 2 D 2: 3 2 n. 55, 32 n. 56
I 56 B 1-2: I I 182D 3: 3 2 n . 55
I 56 B 2 - 7 : I I 182 D 4 - 5 : 33
1 5 6 B 7—C 3 : 1 1 182 D 6 - 7 : 35
I 5 6 C 7 - 1 5 7 A 7: I O 1 8 2 D 8 - E 6: 35
156 c 9—D I : I I 1 8 2 E 4 - 1 2 : 35 n . 6 1
1 5 6 D 1—3: 12 1 8 2 E 4 : 33 n. 58
I 56 E 2 - 4 : I 2 182 E 8-12: 36
156 E 4 - 7 : 12 1 8 2 E 1 1 - 1 2 : 35 n . 6 1
I 56 E 6 - 7 : 16 183 A 2 - 8 : 36
156 E 7 - 9 : 14 183 A I O - B 4 : 37
1 5 6 E 8: 14 n. 22 183 D 3: 3 3 n. 57
157 A 2 - 7 : 14, 17 1 8 4 B 2 - 1 8 6 E 12: 3 8 , 38 n . 6 5 , 4 0 , 4 1
1
5 7 A 7—B 2: 14 184 E 5-7: 38
1 5 7 A 7—c 3: 10 185 A 8 - E 2: 3 9
157 B 4 ~ 5 :
15 186 B 6 - 9 : 39 n . 68
157B 4: 20 186c 7-8: 39
157 B 6 - 7 : 17 186 c 9 — D 1: 3 9
:
5 7 B
7-8: 1 9 - 2 0 n . 34 201 D 2-3: 5 9 - 6 0 n. 34
157 B 8-c 1: 16 2 0 1 D 8—206 B 1 1 : 1 4 n . 21
179 c: 1 ff. 204 E 1 1 : 56
179 c I - D 1: 2 2 n. 39 Timaeus
179c 2-5: i , 25 n . 4 5 , 4 0 n . 7 1 2 7 D 5 - 2 9 D 3: 2 2 8 n . 6
179 c 5 - D 1: 1 29 A 5—B 1 : 2 5 9
179 E - 1 8 0 c: 15 n. 23 2 9 D 7 - 3 0 A 7: 2 2 6 n . 2
1 8 0 D 7 - E 5: 25 2 9 D 7—c 1: 2 5 9
180 E 1 : 2 6 n . 4 6 2 9 E 1—2: 2 2 6 n. 2
180E 3 - 4 : 25 3 0 A 3: 236
181 A 1-4: 26 4 2 A: 8 1 n . 34
l 8 l B 8-183 B
5: 40 42A 7: 68
181 c-182 A: 18 n . 3 i 46 c 7 - E 6: 259
181 c 3 - D 3: 25 53 B
7 - 6 9 A 5: 248
181 c 6-7: 23 69 C - D : 81 n. 34
1 8 1 D 8 - 1 8 2 A 2: 1 n . 1 69 D - 7 1 E: 69
372 Index Locorum
69 D 3: 68 Themistius
69 E 5 - 7 0 A 6: 68 In Aristotelis Physica parapkrasis, ed.
70 A—D: 73 n. 19 Schenkl
70 A - B : 79 n. 28 195. 8 : 1 5 7 n. 2 2
70 A 2-3: 68 232. 1—9: 2 0 0 n. 1 1
70 B 3-5: 86 n. 44
70 c I - D 6: 8 7
Theophrastus
75 A 7 - D 4: 236
Fragments, ed. F H S & G
156A: 1 5 7 n. 2 2
Plutarch
156B: 1 5 7 n. 2 2
Adversus Colotem
1 1 2 0 c: 3 2 5 n. 2 2
T h o m a s of Sutton
1 1 2 1 E — 1 1 2 2 A : 3 1 6 n. 6
1122 c: 3 2 5 n. 2 2 Expositiones D. Tkomae Aquinatis in

De Stoicorum repugnantiis libros Aristotelis De generations et
1037 F: 108
corruptions, continuatio per Tkomam
de Sutona, ed. Kelley
Sextus E m p i r i c u s 139. 2 4 - 3 8 : 208 n. 29
Pyrrkoneae kypotyposes 141. 3 4 - 1 4 2 . 2: 209 n. 30
1. 2 3 2 : 3 2 5 n. 2 2
1. 2 3 3 : 3 1 6 n. 6 W i l l i a m of Moerbeke
Aristotelis secundum exemplar Pari-
Simplicius siacum: Ethica Nicomachea {'recen-
In Aristotelis Physica commentaria, ed. sio recognita'—Roberti Grosseteste
Diels translationis recensio), ed. Gauthier
310. 25—311. 1: 259 n. 66 Clavis: 2 6 . 3 , liber: 3 , cap.: 7 , p. 4 1 8 .
986. 6: 157 n. 22 10: 1 2 1 n. 5 2
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OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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Professor Julia Annas, University of Arizona

Professor Susanne B o b z i e n , Yale University and All Souls College,

Professor D o r o t h e a Frede, University of Hamburg

Professor A . A . L o n g , University of California, Berkeley

Professor M a r t h a N u s s b a u m , University of Chicago

Professor D a v i d Sedley, University of Cambridge

Professor R i c h a r d Sorabji, King's College, University of London, and

Professor Gisela Striker, Harvard University

Professor C h r i s t o p h e r T a y l o r , Corpus Christi College, Oxford

C o n t r i b u t i o n s and books for review s h o u l d be sent to the E d i t o r ,

C o n t r i b u t o r s are asked to observe the ' N o t e s for C o n t r i b u t o r s to

U p - t o - d a t e contact details, the latest v e r s i o n o f N o t e s for C o n ­

Plato o n the I m p o r t a n c e o f ' T h i s ' a n d ' T h a t ' : T h e T h e o r y

T h e Greatest D i f f i c u l t y at Parmenides 133 C - 1 3 4 E and

M o r a l E d u c a t i o n a n d the S p i r i t e d Part o f the S o u l i n

F o u n d i n T r a n s l a t i o n : A r i s t o t l e ' s Nicomachean Ethics 3.5,

O p t i m a l i t y Reasoning i n A r i s t o t l e ' s N a t u r a l T e l e o l o g y 225

Aristotelian Responsibility 265

M a k i n g Sense o f Arcesilaus 313

Index Locorum 363

THEAETETUS I 79 c signals the b e g i n n i n g o f the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the

o u t to be irrefutable, thus l e n d i n g s u p p o r t to Theaetetus' o r i g i n a l

d o c t r i n e that Socrates n o w identifies w h a t he calls 'the m o v i n g be­

© Naly Thaler 2013

p u r p o r t s to show that the H e r a c l i t e a n p o s i t i o n carries l i n g u i s t i c

the r e f u t a t i o n contains a significant gap i n its a r g u m e n t , one w h i c h

m o r e cogent: the m u t a b i l i t y o f general properties entails t h a t the

i n fact touches at the heart o f the issues Plato i n t e n d e d his read­

s u p p o r t for b o t h Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n a n d the m a n - m e a s u r e doc­

frame a p e r f e c t l y coherent a n d v e r i d i c a l scientific t h e o r y about the

nature o f p e r c e p t i o n i n general, i n c o r p o r a t i n g i n i t abstract concepts

Socrates provides three accounts o f the secret d o c t r i n e , o f increas­

to c o r r e c t l y say about a n y t h i n g w h a t i t is or h o w i t is qualified; (3) i f

of (1), w h i c h is n o w presented as a t h e o r y w h i c h can e x p l a i n the

o r y about the nature o f reality ( 1 , 5), a t h e o r y whose t r u t h entails a

t i o n i n the affirmative. T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n begins f r o m the seemingly

j e c t at different times, since at n o t w o instants does he ever r e m a i n

I t is i m p o r t a n t to note t h a t the agreement to these three claims

q u a l i t a t i v e l y different impressions o f one and the same object,

A n d the final c l a i m , t h a t one and the same i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have

agreement to this t h i r d c l a i m i m m e d i a t e l y secures the t r u t h o f the

T h e i m m e d i a t e effect o f this series o f claims is to make the p h e n o ­

v i o u s l y we t h o u g h t t h a t this p h e n o m e n o n represents an exception

Since Theaetetus is said never (laiySeVore) to be the same as himself, Socrates'

claim must be that his perceptions are always qualitatively distinct.

pearances are alike see also M . Burnyeat, 'Conflicting Appearances' ['Appearances'],

to the r u l e (since people's p e r c e p t u a l j u d g e m e n t s u s u a l l y t e n d to

W e s h o u l d note that the account i n ( B ) justifies the c o n n e c t i o n

makes i t m o r e palatable is that the seemingly contentious highest

n o w s u b s u m e d u n d e r the category o f q u i c k change ( i 56 D 1-3). Per­

to take the role o f causal agents i n the theory's account, we w o u l d

w h i c h are f a m i l i a r objects encountered i n experience, are e x p l a i n e d

Before p r o c e e d i n g to ( C 3 ) Socrates takes care to generalize his

that a l l qualifications are relative so as to i n c l u d e n o t o n l y perceptual

I n fact, the subsequent vocabulary the t h e o r y seeks to expunge

a t t r i b u t e d , rather t h a n to denote the r e l a t i o n between abstract c o n ­

U p - t o - d a t e contact details, the latest v e r s i o n o f N o t e s for C o n

d o c t r i n e that Socrates n o w identifies w h a t he calls 'the m o v i n g be

i n fact touches at the heart o f the issues Plato i n t e n d e d his read

s u p p o r t for b o t h Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n a n d the m a n - m e a s u r e doc

Socrates provides three accounts o f the secret d o c t r i n e , o f increas

T h e i m m e d i a t e effect o f this series o f claims is to make the p h e n o

n o w s u b s u m e d u n d e r the category o f q u i c k change ( i 56 D 1-3). Per

a t t r i b u t e d , rather t h a n to denote the r e l a t i o n between abstract c o n

concentrated exclusively o n properties. H e n o w shows w h y the l i n

I t s h o u l d n o w be possible to see t h a t the r e f o r m o f language p r o

i n g the idea that Theaetetus' d e f i n i t i o n is equivalent to an u n r e s t r i c

B u t one m i g h t be w o r r i e d b y the fact that the l i n g u i s t i c restric

(for m e ) ' t h e y are b o t h c o r r e c t . W h a t he says is t h a t o n each occa

r e l a t i v i z a t i o n a n d p r i v a t i z a t i o n o f perceptual properties are insuffi

' q u a l i t y ' seems o d d a n d u n i n t e l l i g i b l e to T h e o d o r u s since i t s i g n i

( 1 ) T h e r e is a constant change to c o l o u r e d p h e n o m e n a (we can

(2) T h e r e w i l l also be a change to whiteness itself, and an altera

C l a i m (2), t h e n , is n o t m e a n t as a mere r e i t e r a t i o n o f (1) b u t as an en

o p e n i n g lines o f the r e f u t a t i o n Socrates stays t r u e to this i n t e r d e

(5) T h e names o f species o f p e r c e p t i o n , such as 'seeing' or 'hear

W h a t Socrates m u s t mean here is that since there is n o t h i n g i n p a r t i

ence. I n r e f u t i n g the t h e o r y Plato shows that this v i e w is u n t e n

B u t 184 B 2-186 E 12 also p r o v i d e s an added t w i s t to the speci