Berghahn Books

Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, University of

KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

The Limits of John Rawls' Pluralism

Author(s): Chantal Mouffe
Source: Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, Vol. 56, No. 118, Democracy, Morality
and Punishment (March 2009), pp. 1-14
Published by: Berghahn Books in association with the Faculty of Humanities, Development and
Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41802423
Accessed: 13-02-2016 19:51 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Berghahn Books and Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political
Theory.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The Limits of John Rawls' Pluralism
Chantal Mouffe

Abstract:ThisarticlearguesthatJohnRawls' liberalphilosophising is
an inadequatemeansof facingtoday'svariedsocial andpoliticalchal-
lenges,both domesticand international, because it is incapableof
the
grasping antagonistic dimension whichis constitutiveofthepolit-
ical. Focusingfirston Rawls' conceptionofpoliticsin a well-ordered
liberalsociety,and thereafter on his arguments pertaining to thefield
of international it
politics, is shown how Rawls forecloses therecog-
nitionof theproperlypolitical moment by postulating that the dis-
crimination betweenwhatis legitimateand whatis not legitimateis
dictatedby moralityand rationality. Withexclusions presentedas
rationallyjustifiedand withthe antagonisticdimensionof politics
whiskedaway,liberalismappearsas thetrulymoraland rationalsolu-
tionto theproblemofhowto organisehumancoexistence,and itsuni-
versalisationbecomes theaim of all thosewho are movedby moral
and rationalconsiderations. Againstthisconception,it is suggested
thata future,morepeacefulworldwouldbe less a cosmopolitanand
morea pluralistone.

Keywords:Rawls; rationalism;liberalism;democracy;morality;
legitimacy.

Withthecurrentintensification of ethnicand nationalisticconflicts

acrosstheworldand therisein terrorist activities,an adequateunder-
standing of thenature of thepolitical becomea pressingnecessity
has
forpoliticalphilosophy. Alas, muchof thepresenttheorising, domi-
natedas it is by a rationalistperspective,is unable to even formulate
theappositequestions.I will arguethatthemainshortcoming of the
new liberal paradigm elaborated by JohnRawls and which has
become so influential is that,althoughitcalls itself'politicalliberal-
ism', thistype of liberal philosophising,because of its incapacityto
the
grasp antagonistic dimension which is constitutiveofthepolitical,
cannotprovidethetheoretical framework neededbydemocraticsoci-
etiesin orderto facethechallengestheyare currently confronting.

2009
March
Theoria, 2009.5611802
doi:l0.3167/th.

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2 Chantal
Mouffe

My argument will be organisedaroundtheanalysisofRawls' con-

ception pluralismwhose shortcomings
of I intendtobringto thefore.
In a firstmoment,drawingon thecritiqueofPoliticalLiberalismthat
I have developedin The Returnof thePolitical and TheDemocratic
Paradox, I will centremyattention on Rawls' conceptionofpoliticsin
a well-ordered liberalsociety.Then I will move to thefieldof inter-
nationalpoliticsand examinethemainthesesputforward byRawlsin
TheLaw ofPeoples. In bothcases I intendto showhow Rawls fore-
closes therecognition oftheproperly politicalmomentbypostulating
thatthe discrimination betweenwhat is legitimateand whatis not
legitimateis dictatedby moralityand rationality. In thatway exclu-
sionsare presentedas rationally justifiedand theantagonisticdimen-
sionofpoliticsis whiskedaway.Liberalismappearsas thetrulymoral
and rationalsolutionto theproblemof how to organisehumancoex-
istenceand itsuniversalisation becomes theaim of all thosewho are
movedby moraland rationalconsiderations.

The liberal problem

At the heartof liberalismis the problemof establishingpeaceful

coexistenceamong people withdifferent conceptionsof the good.
Formanyliberalsthesolutionlies in thecreationof a modusvivendi
or,as Schumpeterwouldsay,a 'modusprocedendothatregulatesthe
conflictamong different views. Hence theirconceptionof democ-
racyas a proceduralform,neutralwithrespectto anyparticularset
of values,a meremethodformakingpublic decisions.While grant-
ing thatliberalismmustallow thepeacefulcoexistenceof different
conceptionsof thegood,politicalliberalismtakesissue withsuchan
interpretation of the liberalprincipleof neutrality. It affirmsthata
liberaldemocraticsocietyneeds a strongerformof consensusthana
simplemodusvivendion mereprocedures.Its aim shouldbe thecre-
ationof a moraland notonlyprudentialtypeof consensusaroundits
basic institutions.
JohnRawls and his followersare advocatingan approachwhose
objectiveis to providea moral,albeitminimal,consensuson political
fundamentals. Their 'politicalliberalism'aims at delineatinga core
morality that specifiesthe termsunderwhichpeople withdifferent
conceptions thegood can livetogether
of in politicalassociation.It is
an understanding of liberalismwhichclaims to be compatiblewith
the factof pluralismand the existenceof moral and religiousdis-

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits Rawls
ofJohn 'Pluralism 3

agreementand intendsdistinguishingitselffromcomprehensive
viewslikethoseof Kantand Mill. Giventhatitis neutralwithrespect
to controversialviews of thegood life,politicalliberalsbelievethat
theirliberalismcan providethe political principlesthatshould be
acceptedby all despiteof theirdifferences.
Accordingto Rawls, the problemof political liberalismcan be
formulated in thefollowingway: 'How is it possible thattheremay
existovertimea stableandjust societyof freeand equal citizenspro-
foundlydivided by reasonable religious,philosophicaland moral
doctrines?'1The problemis forhim one of politicaljustice and it
requires the establishmentof fair terms of social cooperation
betweencitizensenvisagedas freeand equal but also as dividedby
profounddoctrinalconflict.

Which pluralism?

Rawls' solutionas presentedin his book PoliticalLiberalismputsthe

emphasison thenotionof 'reasonablepluralism'.He invitesus to dis-
tinguishbetweenwhat would be a mere empiricalrecognitionof
opposed conceptionsof thegood,thefactof 'simple' pluralism,and
whatis thereal problemfacingliberals:how to deal witha plurality
of incompatibleyetreasonabledoctrines.He sees such a pluralityas
thenormalresultof theexerciseof humanreasonwithintheframe-
workof a constitutional democraticregime.This is whya conception
ofjusticemustbe able to gain thesupportof all 'reasonable'citizens
despitetheirdeep doctrinaldisagreements on othermatters.
In The Returnof thePoliticai1, I have shownhow thisdistinction
between'simple' and 'reasonable'pluralismallows Rawls to present
as a moralexigencywhatis in facta politicaldecision.It servesto
avoid acknowledgingtheantagonisticnatureof thepoliticaland the
factthatno regime,notevena liberalone,can pretendto havea priv-
ileged claim on rationality.Let us examine this question closely.
Avowedlythisdistinction aims at securingthemoralcharacterof the
consensuson justice whichprecludesthata compromiseshouldbe
made with'unreasonable'views,i.e., thosewhichwould oppose the
basic principlesof politicalmorality.For Rawls,reasonablepersons
arepersons'who haverealisedtheirtwomoralpowersto a degreesuf-
ficientto be freeand equal citizensin a constitutionalregime,and
whohavean enduringdesireto honorfairtermsofcooperationandto
be fullycooperatingmembersof society'.3However,whenwe scruti-

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
4 Chantal
Mouffe

nise thisdefinitionwhichmightseem unproblematic at firstsight,it

becomes clear thatit is an indirectway of assertingthatreasonable
personsarethosewho acceptthefundamentals of liberalism.In other
words, the function of this distinction between 'reasonable' and
'unreasonable'is to drawa frontier betweenthedoctrinesthataccept
theliberalprinciplesand theones who oppose them.It meansthatits
functionis a political one since it aims at discriminating betweena
of
permissiblepluralism religious,moral or philosophicalconcep-
tions- as long as thoseviews can be relegatedto thesphereof the
privateand satisfythe liberalprinciples- and what would be an
unacceptablepluralismbecause itwouldjeopardisethedominanceof
liberalprinciplesin thepublicsphere.
WhatRawls is reallyindicatingwithsucha distinction is thatthere
cannotbe pluralismas faras theprinciplesofthepoliticalassociation
areconcernedand thatconceptionswhichrefusetheprinciplesoflib-
eralismare to be excluded.I have no quarrelwithhimon thisissue.
But thisis theexpressionof an eminently political decision,notthe
resultof a moralrequirement. To call theanti-liberals'unreasonable'
is a ratherdisingenuousway of statingthatsuch views cannotbe
admittedas legitimatewithintheframework of a liberaldemocratic
regime. This is indeed the case and the reason forsuch an exclusion
is thatantagonistic of
principles legitimacy cannot co-existwithinthe
same political associationwithoutputtingin questionthe political
realityof thestate.However,to be properlyformulated, sucha thesis
calls fora theoreticalframework thatassertstheprimacyofthepolit-
ical association,whichis preciselywhat liberalismdenies. This is
whyRawls has to pretendthatit is a moraldistinction. And he gets
caughtin a circularformof argumentation: politicalliberalismcan
providea consensusamongreasonablepersonswho bydefinition are
personswho accepttheprinciplesof politicalliberalism.

Overlapping consensus or constitutionalconsensus

To discerntheconsequencesof thatavoidanceof theprimacyof the

political,letus turnto anotheraspectof Rawls' solutionto theliberal
problem:the creationof an 'overlappingconsensus' of reasonable
comprehensive doctrinesin whicheach ofthemendorsesthepolitical
conceptionfromitsownpointof view.In his book PoliticalLiberal-
ismhe declaresthatwhenthesocietyis well-ordered, it is aroundthe
principlesofhis theoryofjusticeas fairnessthattheoverlapping con-

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits
ofJohn
Rawls
'Pluralism 5

sensusis established.Since theyarechosenthanksto thedeviceofthe

originalpositionwithits 'veil of ignorance',thoseprinciplesof fair
termsof cooperationsatisfythe liberalprincipleof legitimacythat
requiresthattheyare endorsedbyall citizensas freeand equals - as
well as reasonableand rational- and addressedto theirpublicrea-
son. Accordingto thestandpoint of politicalliberalism,thoseprinci-
ples are expresslydesigned gain thereasonedsupportof citizens
to
who affirmreasonablethoughconflicting comprehensive doctrines.
Indeed,theverypurposeof theveil of ignoranceis to precludethe
knowledgeofcitizens'comprehensive conceptionsofthegood and to
forcethemtoproceedfromsharedconceptionsof societyandperson,
requiredin applyingtheideals and principlesof practicalreason.4
In line withhis projectof establishingthespecificityof 'political
liberalism'as a distinctliberaldoctrine,Rawls stressesthatsuch an
overlappingconsensusmustnot be confusedwitha simple modus
vivendi.He insiststhatit is notmerelya consensuson a set of insti-
tutionalarrangements based on self-interestbut the affirmationon
moralgroundsof principlesofjustice thathave themselvesa moral
character.Moreover,he indicates that an overlappingconsensus
shouldalso be distinguished froma constitutional consensuswhich,
in his view,is notdeep or wide enoughto securejusticeand stability.
In a constitutional consensus,he states,'while thereis agreementon
certain basic politicalrightsand liberties- on therightto voteand
freedomof political speech and association,and whateverelse is
-
requiredfortheelectoraland legislativeproceduresof democracy
thereis disagreement amongthoseholdingliberalprinciplesas to the
more exact contentand boundariesof these rightsand liberties,as
well as on whatfurther rightsand libertiesare to be countedas basic
and so meritlegal ifnotconstitutional protection'.5
Rawls grantsthata constitutional consensusis betterthana modus
vivendibecause thereis a real allegianceto theprinciplesof a liberal
constitutionthatguaranteescertainbasic rightsand libertiesand
establishesdemocraticproceduresformoderatingpoliticalrivalry.
Nevertheless, giventhatthoseprinciplesare notgroundedin certain
ideas of societyand personsof a politicalconception,disagreement
subsistsconcerningthestatusand contentofthoserightsand liberties
and thatcreatesinsecurityand hostilityin public life. Hence, the
importance of fixing,once and forall, theircontent.This is provided
by overlappingconsensuson a conceptionof justice as fairness
an
whichestablishesa muchdeeperconsensusthanone thatwould be
restricted to constitutionalessentials.6

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
6 Chantal
Mouffe

To be sure,in TheIdea ofPublic Reason Revisited , Rawls stresses

that,'[t]he content of public reason is givenby familyof political
a
of
conceptions justice and not by singleone. Thereare manyliber-
a
alisms and relatedviews and therebymanyformsof public reason
specifiedby a familyof reasonablepoliticalconceptions.Of these,
justiceas fairness,whateveritsmerits,is butone'.7 It seemstherefore
thathe acceptsthata societymightbe well-ordered even ifjusticeas
fairnessis notthe conceptionofjustice sharedby everybody.How-
everthisacceptanceof a pluralityof liberalismsdoes notleave much
moreroomforthekindof agonisticdebate,whichas I will arguein a
moment,is a requisitefora vibrantdemocraticsociety.
Rawls admitsthatconstitutional essentials(i.e., fundamental prin-
ciples thatspecifythegeneralstructure of government and thepolit-
ical process as well as basic rightsand libertiesof citizenship)are
moreurgentto settlebuthe considersthattheymustbe distinguished
fromtheprinciplesgoverningsocial and economicinequalities.The
aim ofjustice of fairnessis to establisha consensuson a publicrea-
son whose contentis givenby a politicalconceptionofjustice; 'this
contenthas twoparts:substantive principlesofjustice forthebasic
structure (the politicalvalues of justice); and guidelinesof enquiry
and conceptionsof virtuethatmakepublicreasonpossible(thepolit-
ical values of publicreason)'.8
The important pointto note is thatRawls seems to believe that,
whilerationalagreementamongcomprehensive moralreligiousand
philosophicaldoctrineis impossible,it can nevertheless be reached
among politicalvalues. Once the controversial doctrineshave been
relegatedto thesphereoftheprivate,itshouldtherefore be possibleto
establishinthepublicspherea typeofconsensusgroundedon Reason
(withitstwosides: therationaland thereasonable).This is a consen-
sus thatit wouldbe illegitimate to putintoquestiononce it has been
reachedand theonlypossibilityof déstabilisation wouldbe an attack
fromtheoutsideby the 'unreasonable'forces.When a well-ordered
societyhas beenachieved,thosewhotakepartintheoverlapping con-
sensus should have no rightto questionthe existingarrangements
since theyembodythe principlesof justice. If somebodydoes not
comply,itmustbe due to irrationality or unreasonableness.
Clearlythe Rawlsian well-orderedsocietydoes not leave much
roomfordissent.True,Rawls recognisesthata fulloverlappingcon-
sensus mightneverbe achievedbut at best approximatedsince it is
morelikelythatthefocusof an overlappingconsensuswill be a class
of liberalconceptionsactingas politicalrivals.9However,evenin his

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits 'Pluralism
ofJohn
Rawls 1

laterwork,he does not put into questionthe view thatwe should

strivefor a society where, given that there is no more conflict
betweenpolitical and economic interests,such a rivalryhas been
overcomeand thatthe ideal would be to reach an overlappingcon-
sensuson justice as fairness.

Political liberalism and the end of politics

As I arguedin TheDemocraticParadox,10theconclusionthatwe can

drawfromscrutinising thenatureoftheoverlappingconsensusis that
Rawls' ideal societyis a societyfromwhichpoliticshas been elimi-
nated.A set of liberalconceptionsofjustice are mutuallyrecognised
by reasonableand rationalcitizenswho act accordingto its injunc-
tions.They probablyhave verydifferent and even conflictingcon-
ceptions of thegood butthoseare privatemattersand theydo
strictly
not interfere withtheirpublic life. Conflictsof interestsabout eco-
nomicand social issues- iftheystillarise- are resolvedsmoothly
through discussionswithintheframework ofpublicreason,byinvok-
ing the of
principles justice thateverybodyendorses.If an unreason-
able or irrationalpersonhappensto disagreewiththatstateof affairs
and intendsto disruptthe consensus,she mustbe forced,through
coercion,to submitto theprinciplesofjustice. In a ratherdisingenu-
ous way,Rawls claims that,giventhatthepersonsover whomit is
exercisedare 'unreasonable',thisis a typeof coercionthatdoes not
entailoppression.Thisallowshimto concludethatliberalscan coerce
people who disagree with them while remaining,as he puts it,
'beyondreproach'!
This is, I think,a veryproblematicway fora liberalpluralistto
envisagethe well-orderedsociety.The problemlies, in myview,in
Rawls' flawedconceptionof politics,which is reducedto a mere
activityof allocating among competinginterestssusceptibleto a
rationalsolution.This is whyhe believesthatpoliticalconflictscan be
eliminatedthanksto a conceptionofjustice thatappeals to individu-
als' idea of rationaladvantagewithinthe constraints establishedby
the reasonable.Accordingto his theory,citizensneed as freeand
equal personsthesame goods because theirconceptionsof thegood
- howeverdistincttheircontent - 'require fortheiradvancement
roughlythesame primarygoods,thatis, thesame basic rights,liber-
ties, and opportunities,and the same all-purpose means such as
incomeand wealth,withall of these supportedby the same social

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
8 Chantal
Mouffe

bases ofself-respect'.11Therefore,once thejust answertotheproblem

ofdistribution ofthoseprimarygoods has been found,therivalrythat
previouslyexistedin thepoliticaldomaindisappears.
Besides postulatingthe possibilityof an agreementon justice,
such a scenariopresupposesthatpoliticalactorsare onlydrivenby
whattheysee as theirrationalself-advantage.Passions are erased
fromthe realm of politics,which is reduced to a neutralfield of
competinginterests. As some criticsof Rawls have pointedout,it is
quiterevealingthathe had to excludethephenomenonof envyfrom
his model. It would indeed have destabilisedhis entireconstruc-
tion.12Completelymissingfromsuchan approachis 'thepolitical'in
itsdimensionof antagonism.This is indeedpreciselywhat'political
liberalism'is at pains to eliminate.It offersus a pictureof thewell-
orderedsocietyas one fromwhichantagonism,violence,powerand
repressionhave disappeared.But it is onlybecause theyhave been
made invisiblethrougha cleverstratagem:the distinctionbetween
'simple' and 'reasonable' pluralism. Exclusions are justified by
declaringthattheyare theproductof the'freeexerciseofpublicrea-
son' thatestablishesthelimitsof a possibleconsensus.Whena point
of view is excluded it is because thisis requiredby the exerciseof
reason. In thatway rationality is thekey to solvingthe 'paradox of
liberalism':how to eliminateitsadversarieswhileremainingneutral.

An agonistic conception of democracy

Rawls is no doubtrightto affirmthata 'political' conceptionof lib-

eralismneeds to distinguishitselffromthe different philosophical
conceptions that are usually associated with liberalism.This is
clearlynecessaryto envisagetheconditionsof a pluralistdemocracy.
Moreover,itis also truethata liberaldemocraticsocietyrequiresthe
existenceof a consensuson a certainnumberof basic institutions. It
is certainlythecase thatone oftheproblemsfacingdemocraticsoci-
etiestodayconcernsthelimitsof pluralism.A totalpluralismwould
indeedendangertheliberalinstitutions whichprovidetheverycon-
ditionsof possibilityof pluralism.But it is completelymistakento
presentthoselimitsas beinggroundedon moralityor rationality. No
stateorpoliticalorder,notevena liberalone, can existwithoutsome
formof exclusion.To presenttheinstitutions of liberaldemocracyas
the outcome of deliberativerationalityis to reifythemand make
theircontestationimpossible.The factthat,like any otherregime,

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits Rawls'Pluralism
ofJohn 9

pluralistdemocracyconstitutesa systemof relationsof power is

denied and the democraticchallengingof those formsof power
becomes illegitimate.
1 certainlydo notwantto arguein favourof a totalpluralismbutI
considerthattheexclusionslinkedto thelimitsof pluralismneed to
be recognisedforwhattheyare, i.e., as exclusionsthatdo entaila
formofoppression,insteadofbeingconcealedundertheveil ofratio-
nality.The specificityof pluralistdemocracydoes not residein the
absenceof dominationor violencebutin theestablishment of a setof
institutionsthroughwhichtheycan be limitedand contested.And
thisrequiresrelinquishing theveryidea thattherecould existsuch a
thingas a rationalpoliticalconsensus,a consensusthatwouldnotbe
based on anyformof exclusion.To presenttheaim of a well-ordered
societyas reachingsucha consensusis profoundly inimicalto democ-
racy. What such a view implies is once
that, such a consensushas
been obtained,itcannotbe legitimately challenged.My contention is
thatthekindof consensusneededin a pluralistdemocracyis a 'con-
flictualconsensus'.WhatI mean is that,whilethereshouldbe con-
sensus on whatI call the 'ethico-political'principlesof the liberal
democraticregime,i.e., libertyand equality for all, thereshould
alwaysexistthepossibilityof seriousdissentabout theirinterpreta-
tion,a dissentthatcan neverbe overcomethanksto rationalproce-
dures. It is the tensionbetween consensus on the principlesand
dissensusabouttheirinterpretation whichconstitutes theverydynam-
ics ofpluralistdemocracy.Such a tensioncan neverbe reconciledand
theprojectofdeliberative democratslikeRawls (and Habermasalbeit
in a different way) of tryingto reconcilethe logics of libertyand
equality,of humanrightsand popularsovereignty, of liberalismand
democracy- whose articulationis constitutiveof liberal democ-
racy- notonlyis boundto fail,italso has verynegativeconsequences
forthewaywe envisagedemocraticpolitics.
My ownpositionis thatwe shouldacknowledgewhatI taketo be
the'paradoxofdemocracy'and thatinsteadoftrying to eliminatedis-
sent,we shouldenvisagethecategoryofthe'adversary'as centralfor
democraticpolitics. Contraryto 'enemies' who do not have any
shared principlesand whose confrontationis of an antagonistic
nature,'adversaries'have different interpretations of sharedprinci-
ples and they fight fortheirinterpretation to become hegemonic.This
struggle among adversaries, which I have proposed to call 'agonistic',
is whatdemocraticpoliticsis reallyaboutand one shouldnevertryto
putan end to theagonisticconfrontation. Now,as we have seen,this

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
10 Chantal
Mouffe

is preciselywhatRawls is attempting whenhe declaresthatone needs

to go beyonda constitutional consensusbecause in sucha consensus
disagreement stillexistsconcerningthestatusand contentofthebasic
politicalrightsand libertiesand thatthiscreatesinsecurity and hos-
in
tility public life. In fact,whathis approach aims at erasingis the
veryplace of the 'adversary'.This is why,if it wereever realised,his
ideal democraticsocietywould be one wherethe agonisticstruggle
has come to an end.
I believe thatthisis a deeply inadequateconceptionof pluralist
democracywhichcan haveverynegativeconsequencesfordemocra-
tic politics. Indeed we are alreadywitnessingthe consequencesof
advocatinga consensual formof politics. In my recentwork for
instanceI have arguedthatthegrowthof right-wing populistparties
inmanyEuropeancountriesshouldbe seen as theresultofthetypeof
'politicsat thecentre'whichhas becomepredominant in recentyears.
Withtheblurring ofthefrontiersbetweenleftand right, conflictscan-
notbe expressedanymorethroughthetraditional democraticchan-
nels hitherto providedby partypolitics.Contraryto theclaim made
by ThirdWay theoriststhatthe adversarialmodel of politics has
become obsolete,thislack of a trulyagonisticdebatebetweenadver-
saries does not representprogressfordemocracy- whichwould
supposedlyhave become more mature- but somethingthatcan
reallyendangerdemocraticinstitutions. The factthatdemocraticcit-
izens do not have any morethepossibilityof choosingamongreal
alternatives withinthepoliticalsystemis at theoriginof thedissatis-
factionthatright-wing demagoguesare busy exploiting,presenting
themselvesas theonlyalternative to theestablishment.

The Law of Peoples

Movingnow to thefieldof international politics,I wantto showthat,

whenhe applieshis approachto thisfield,Rawlsproceedsinthesame
problematicway as in Political Liberalism when distinguishing
betweensimpleand reasonablepluralism.In TheLaw ofPeoples the
distinction
thathe makesbetween'liberalpeoples' and 'decentpeo-
ples', when it is examinedclosely,revealsthatthe conditionto be
recognisedas 'decent' peoples by the liberals amountsin fact to
acceptingliberalprinciples,even if it is a weak version.When he
determinesthe criteriafor 'decent hierarchicalsocieties' Rawls
declaresthat,

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits Rawls'Pluralism
ofJohn 11

A decentsocietyis notaggressiveandengagesin warandonlyin self-

Ithasa commonideaofjusticethatassignshumanrights
defense. toall
itsmembers;itsbasicstructureincludesa decentconsultation
hierarchy
thatprotects
theseandotherrights andensures thatall groupsinsociety
aredecently
represented byelectedbodies inthesystem ofconsultation.
theremustbe a sincereandnotunreasonable
Finally, beliefonthepartof
thejudgesandofficialswhoadminister thelegalsystem thatthelawis
indeedguidedbya common goodideaofjustice.13

There are in fact two main criteriato be fulfilled,firstto accept

humanrights,second to have a decentconsultationhierarchy. The
main difference withliberalsocieties is that'a decenthierarchical
society'sconceptionof thepersonas impliedbythesecondcriterion,
does notrequireacceptanceof the liberalidea thatpersonsare citi-
zens firstand haveequal basic rightsas equal citizens.Ratheritviews
personsas responsibleand cooperatingmembersof theirrespective
groups'.14 Accordingto Rawls themaincharacteristic ofthosedecent
societiesis thattheyare 'associationisťin form,i.e., theirmembers
are viewed in public life as membersof different groupsand each
groupis represented in the legal systemby a body in a decentcon-
sultationhierarchy. In a veryrevealingway he makes referenceto
Hegel and declaresthata decenthierarchicalsocietymighthold a
view similarto Hegel's: personsbelongfirstto estates,corporations,
and associations,i.e., groups.Now,ifthedifference between'reason-
able' and 'decent'societiesamountsto a difference betweenKantand
Hegel, it is clear thatwhatis reallyat stakeis a difference between
differentformsof liberalism.This is confirmedby Rawls declaring
thatin a decent hierarchicalsociety (comprehensive)religiousor
philosophicaldoctrinemustnotbe fullyunreasonableand thatthese
doctrines mustadmita sufficient measureoflibertyofconscienceand
freedomof religionand thought, evenifthesefreedomsare notequal
forall membersof thedecentsocietyas theyare in liberalsocieties.
The conclusionthatwe can drawfromthoseconsiderationsis that,
whatthisdistinction betweenliberaland non-liberaldecentpeoples
reallyexpresses, is a distinctionbetweena strongand a weak formof
liberalismor ratheran individualist liberalismversusa communitar-
ian one. No wonderthatRawls can assertthatdecentsocietieswould
acceptand followtheLaw of Peoples stipulatedby theliberals.
Whatabouttheothersocieties?Rawls assertsthattheyare either
to be treatedas outlaws- whichjustifiesthe use of forceto make
themcomply- or inducedto become liberalor decent.Who decides
whereto drawthefrontier? Of courseitis theliberalsand therefusal

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
12 Chantal
Mouffe

to toleratesome societiesis presentedas a 'consequence of liberal-

ism and decency'. Here again thefrontier is drawnin a politicalway
while the political natureof the discrimination is denied. Liberals
dictatewhatis legitimateand theydo it accordingto whatfitswith
theirbasic premisesbut,since those premisesare presentedas the
expressionof the 'reasonable',theycannotbe challengedand those
who are outlawedcannoteven 'protesttheircondemnationby the
worldsociety'.15
This timeI am unableto followRawls evenpartof theway and I
findhis 'realisticutopia',as he putsit,profoundly alarming.I believe
thatin theinternationalarenasuchviewsareverydangerousbecause,
farfromfostering peace, theyare likelyto lead to warin thenameof
spreadingthe reasonable.Any ideal of the unificationof the world
undera singlesystemcan onlysuscitateviolentreactions.Hereagain
thelack of 'agonisticchannels'fortheexpressionof grievancestends
to createtheconditionsfortheemergenceof antagonismswhich,as
recenteventsindicate,can takeextremeformswithdisastrousconse-
quences. The situationat the internationallevel is today in many
respectssimilarto theone I pointedout earlierin domesticpolitics:
theabsenceofan agonisticdebatedoes notpermitlegitimate formsof
expression of conflicts.It is no wonder that antagonisms therefore
emerge,takingextremeformswhichputintoquestiontheverybasis
of the existingorder.Even liberalcosmopolitanslike RichardFalk
andAndrewStraussrecognisethiswhentheysay,

Withthepossibility ofdirectandformalised participationintheinterna-

tionalsystem foreclosed,frustrated andgroups... havebeen
individuals
turningto variousmodesofcivicresistance, bothpeacefulandviolent.
Globalterrorism is at theviolentendofthisspectrum oftransnational
and
protest, itsapparent be
agendamay mainly driven ide-
byreligious,
ologicaland regionalgoals rather thanbyresistance linkedto
directly
Butitsextremist
globalisation. is partlyat theveryleast,an
alienation
indirect
resultofglobalising impactthatmaybe transmuted inthepolit-
ical unconsciousof thoseso afflicted intogrievances associatedwith
cultural
injustices.16

Whatis reallyat stakeis thenegationofthedimensionofthepolit-

ical and thebeliefthattheaim of politics- be it at thenationalor
internationallevel - is to establishconsensus on a single model,
therebyforeclosingthe possibilityof legitimatedissent.Terrorism
shouldwarnagain thedangersimpliedin thedelusionsof theuniver-
salistglobalistliberaldiscoursewhichpostulatesthathumanprogress

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheLimits ' Pluralism 13
ofJohn
Rawls

requirestheestablishment of worldunitybased on the implementa-

tionof Westernvalues,even ifone accepts,as does Rawls,thatcom-
munitarian formsof liberalismare to be tolerated.
The thoughtthatI wantto share withyou is that,if we wantto
establisha morepeacefulworld,itis notundercosmopolitanlinesthat
we shouldbe envisagingit because, whatevertheirform(and in my
view Rawls can be seen as advocatinga weak versionof cosmopoli-
tanism),such a perspectiveis unableto make roomfora real plural-
ism. I believethatwhatwe need is to worktowardsthecreationof a
multipolarworldorderwherea sortof equilibriumcould be created
amonga multiplicity ofregionalhegemonicpoles. We heara lottoday
abouttheneed to restorean effective But a real mul-
multilateralism.
tilateralismrequiresthe existenceof a of
plurality centresofdecisions,
constituted by a certainnumber greatregionalspaces ad genuine
of
culturalpoles. It is a mistaketo believeforinstancethatthemoderni-
sationof Islam shouldtakeplace throughWesternisation. Tryingto
imposeourmodelon thewholeplanetcan onlymultiply local conflicts
of resistance,whichfomentterrorism. We have to acknowledgethe
pluralistcharacterof theworld;thefactthat,contrary to whatmany
liberalspostulate,theworldis a pluriverse, nota universe.

Chantal Mouffe is Professorof PoliticalTheoryat theCentrefor

the Studyof Democracyat the University of Westminster.A corre-
spondingmemberof the Collège Internationalde Philosophie in
Paris,she is authorof Hegemonyand Socialist Strategy(1985, with
ErnestoLaclau), TheReturnof thePolitical(1993), TheDemocratic
Paradox (2000) and On thePolitical (2005), and editorof Gramsci
and Marxist Theory(1979), Dimensions of Radical Democracy
(1992), Deconstruction and Pragmatism(1996) and TheChallengeof
Carl Schmitt(1999).

Notes

1. JohnRawls,Political xviii.
Liberalism,
2. Chantal
Mouffe,TheReturn London:
ofthePolitical, 1993.
Verso,
3. JohnRawls,Political NewYork:
Liberalism, Columbia 55.
1993,
Press,
University
4. Political 141.
Liberalism,

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 Chantal
Mouffe

5. Political
Liberalism,159.
Liberalism
6. Political , 227.
7. JohnRawls,' TheIdeaofPublic Reason inTheLawofPeoples,
Revisited' Cambridge
MA:Harvard Press,
University 1999,140-141.
8. Political
Liberalism,253.
9. Political
Liberalism,164.
10. ChantalMouffe,TheDemocratic London:
Paradox, 2000.
Verso,
11. Political
Liberalism,180.
12. Seeforexample theanalysis
presentedbyJean-Pierre
Dupuy inhisbookLesacrifice
Paris:
etVenvi, Calmann-Lévy, 1992, V
Chapter
13. TheLawofPeoples, opuscit.,88.
66.
14. Ibid.,
38.
15. Ibid.,
16. RichardFalkandAndrew Strauss,'TheDeeper ofGlobal
Challenges A
Terrorism:
DemocratisingResponse',inDaniele (ed.).
Archibugi Debating Lon-
Cosmopolitics,
don:Verso,2003,206.

This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Sat, 13 Feb 2016 19:51:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions