REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNCIL (AMLC), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34,
PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.

Facts:

 An investigation with regard to the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO

were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the CIS of petitioner AMLC.

 The OSG wrote the AMLC requesting the latter’s assistance in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption in the NAIA 3
project.

 CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transaction of

certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent Alvarez who had
been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee, in the NAIA-IPT3 project.

 That Alvarez has been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j)
of RA 3019 in which he maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks.

 The AMLC issued Resolution No. 75 whereby the Council resolved to authorize
the Executive Director of the AMLC to sign and verify the application to inquire
into and or examine the deposit or investment of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo
Trinidad, Alfredo Liongson and Chen Yong including their related accounts.

 That the said resolution was founded on the findings of the CIS that the amounts
were transferred from a Hongkong bank account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd
and the said account was maintained by Liongson and Yong in the Philippines.

 That Alvarez caused undue injury to the government by giving PITACO

unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative function in violation of Sec 3e of RA 3019.

 AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments

of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong.

 Makati RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and
examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng
Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed probable cause to believe
that the deposits in various bank accounts are related to the offense of violation
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

 CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related
web accounts of the four.

 Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman wrote a letter requesting the
AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities
 involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe
that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that
were committed in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan.

 AMLC promulgated Resolution No. 121 which authorized the executive director
of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter,
including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in
the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank.

 Republic, through the AMLC, filed an application to inquire into and/or examine
13 accounts and 2 related web of accounts alleged as having been used to
facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. Among said accounts were the DBS
Bank account of Alvarez and the Metrobank accounts of Cheng Yong.

 Authority was granted to the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts listed
therein.

 Alvarez, through counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of

the said Order arguing that nothing in R.A. No. 9160 authorized the AMLC to
seek the authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte. The Manila RTC issued
an Order staying the enforcement of its bank inquiry order and giving the
Republic 5 days to respond to Alvarez’ motion.

 The Republic filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by
the Manila RTC denying Alvarez’s motion to dismiss and reinstating in full force
and effect the stayed order.

 The Manila RTC issued an Order directing the AMLC to refrain from
enforcing the order until the expiration of the period to appeal, without any
appeal having been filed. On the same day, Alvarez filed a Notice of Appeal.
The Republic filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration urging that it
be allowed to immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and
that Alvarez’s notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from
an order of inquiry is disallowed under the AMLA.

 Lilia Cheng filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati and
Manila RTCs in granting AMLCs ex parte applications for a bank inquiry order,
arguing among others that the ex parte applications violated her constitutional
right to due process, that the bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be
granted in connection with violations of the AMLA and that the AMLA can not
apply to bank accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA or to bank accounts located outside the Philippines.

 CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

Issue:
 Whether or not AMLA is an exception to Sec 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act

Ruling:

Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically

legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank
accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or office; namely when:
(1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination
of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized
by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality and
there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the
AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation
of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a
money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom
certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 hijacking and other
violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order
under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a
provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-
blown trial.
Just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it
does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the
older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines are considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of
statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by
the legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these
exceptions in such a manner that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the
government or of any party seeking to enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank
deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of
bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then
such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless
Congress passes a law reversing the general state policy of preserving the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.
While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Cheng’s accounts finds root in
Section 11 of the AMLA, it cannot be denied that the authority to inquire under Section 11 is
only exceptional in character, contrary as it is to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank
deposits. Even though she may not have been the subject of the inquiry orders, her bank
accounts nevertheless were, and she thus has the standing to vindicate the right to secrecy that
attaches to said accounts and their owners. This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the
courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth
under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the
owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were indeed
complied with.
Petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
Facts:

 An information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, and another information was filed for illegal use of alias.
 A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was created in order to try, hear and
decide the charges of plunder and the illegal use of alias and perjury against
respondent Estrada.
 That the people presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
allegations for plunder, illegal use of alias and perjury.
 That on Feb 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered Trust Account with PCIB and
signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and
Curato also testified that Lacquian and Chua were present on that occasion.
 That a certain Baby Ortaliza transacted several times with her and that Ortaliza
deposited several checks in PCIB Savings under the account name of Jose
Velarde.
 The people filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, while the accused moved to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution. The people filed Consolidated
Comment/Opposition to the motion. The defense moved to file a demurrer to
evidence.
 The Sandiganbayan only granted the demurrer to evidence in which Estrada filed
separated Demurrer to Evidence for the 2 Criminal Cases.
  The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution regarding the coverage of Estrada’s
indictment that it pointed that the use of the disjunctive “or” prevented it from
interpreting the Information any other way and that the people’s failure to present
evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense, in which Estrada did
not publicly used the alias Jose Velarde and lastly, the effect of the enactment of
the RA 9160.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of
his alias “Jose Velarde” was not public despite the presence of Laquian and Chua on Feb 4,
2000.
Ruling:
No. There must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name
(the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth for the use of alias to fall within the
prohibition contained in Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 142 as amended. How this law is
violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of an alias—“a name or names used by
a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first
time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority.” There must be, in the words of
Ursua, a “sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition
to his real name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in
C.A. No. 142 as amended.
The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened
Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known
henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of
the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential matters that
transpired in Malacañang where he sat as President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom
he shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend
bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy
of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to
be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the room
at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with Ortaliza and
Dechavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of
publicity.
 PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MANU GIDWANI,
Respondent.
Facts:

 Respondent Manu, together with his wife Champa Gidwani and 86 other
individuals represented themselves to be the owners of 471 deposit accounts
with the Legacy Banks and filed claims with the PDIC.
 The claims were processed and granted, which resulted in the issuance of 683
Landbank checks in favor of the 86 individuals excluding the spouses Gidwani in
the amount of 98M.
 They were crossed-checks payable to the payee’s account only however, the
individuals did not deposit the crossed checks in their respective bank accounts
and with that the value of all the checks were credited to a single account with
the RCBC owned by Manu.
 That the PDIC only discovered this when the checks were cleared and returned
to it which prompted them to conduct an investigation on the true nature of the
deposit placement of the 86 individuals.
 That out of 471 deposit accounts, 142 of these accounts with an amount of 20M
were in the names of the helpers and rank-and-file employees of the Gidwani
spouses in which they did not have any financial capacity to deposit the amounts
recorded under their names.
  That the PDIC contends that the spouses and the 86 individuals deceived the
PDIC into issuing the 683 checks with the total face value of 98M and that the 86
individuals are not entitled to the proceeds of the deposit insurance since they
are not the true owners of the accounts although it is recorded under their
names and it is the spouses who are the beneficial owners.
 PDIC filed a complaint to the DOJ for estafa through falsification under Art. 315
(2)(a) in relation to Art. 172(1) and Art. 171(4) of the RPC and for money
laundering in Sec 4(a) of the AMLA against the spouses and the 86 other
individuals.
 The DOJ promulgated a resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of probable
cause.
 PDIC’s motion for recon was denied by the DOJ Task Force and they interposed
a petition for review which was denied by USEC Justice Justiniano.
 However, SOJ Caparas reversed and set aside the resolution of Justice
Justiniano and ordered the prosecutor general to file separate information for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification under Art. 315 (2)(a) in relation to
Art. 172(1) and Art. 171(4) of the RPC; file the corresponding information for
violation of Art. 183 of the RPC against the respondents, excepts RCBC and
Jereza and spouses Gidwani; file the corresponding information for violation of
Sec 4(a) of the AMLA against 86 respondents and spouses Gidwani and for
vioalation of Sec 4(c) of the AMLA against Jereza.
 Respondent Manu elevated it to the CA which set aside the resolution of
Caparas and dismissing the complaint of PDIC.

Issue:
Whether or not there indeed existed an agreement between respondent Manu and the
individual depositors.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. In resolving the motion for reconsideration lodged with his
office and in exercising jurisdiction, SOJ Caparas has the power and discretion to make his own
personal assessment of the pleadings and evidence subject of review. He is not bound by the
rulings of his predecessors because there is yet to be a final resolution of the issue, the matter
is still pending before his office after all. Respondent seeks to exonerate himself from the
charges by claiming that PDIC was negligent in processing the insurance claims. The
proposition, however, deserves scant consideration. For negligence on the part of the PDIC
does not preclude the commission of fraud on the part of the claimants, and could have even
made the agency even more susceptible to abuse. Respondent did not deny opening and
funding some of the accounts for the individual creditors, and even admitted to receiving
advance interests for the subject bank accounts that were meant for the actual depositors.
Anent this contention, it is a matter best left ventilated during trial proper, where evidence can
be presented and appreciated fully. Suffice it to state for now that the Court herein finds
probable cause for estafa and money laundering.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, petitioner,
vs.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK,
INC., respondents.
Facts:

 Republic filed a complaint for civil forfeiture of assets and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against the bank deposit in account number maintained by Glasgow in
CBI and the case was filed pursuant to RA 9160.
 The executive judge issued a 72-hour TRO and the case was raffled to Branch
47 and after hearing the judge issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
 The summons to Glasgow was returned unserved as it could not longer be found
at its last known address.
 In 2003, petitioner filed a verified omnibus motion for a.) issuance of alias
summons and b) leave of court to serve summons by publication. No mention
 was made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication to
which the court archived the case for its failure to serve alias summons.
 The trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case directing the petitioner to
serve the alias summons to the respondent within 15 days. A month later, the
petitioner received a copy of the sheriff's return stating that the alias summons
was returned "unserved".
 In 2005, the petitioner filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication. The OSG received a
copy of GLASGOW's motion to dismiss by way of special appearance alleging
that: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet
been served; 2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action and;
3) there was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.
 On October 17, 2005, the trial court dismissed the case on the grounds of: 1)
Improper venue; 2) Insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance; and 3)
Failure to prosecute.
 The petitioner filed a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed on grounds of improper
venue, insufficiency in form and substance and failure to prosecute.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where the
monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful
activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to
be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR).
Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR.
Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republic’s
complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.
The form and substance of the Republic’s complaint substantially conformed with
Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture in which they alleged the
(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein, Glasgow; b) a description of the
proceeds of Glasgow’s unlawful activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof,
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount of P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI; (c)
the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA 9160, as amended, constituting the
grounds for the forfeiture of the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports
showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the Securities
Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the proceeds of the
unlawful activities were transacted and deposited with CSBI in account no. CA-005-10-000121-
5 thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow
engaged in money laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC
subjected the account to freeze order and (d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a
TRO or writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in favor of the government
as well as other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
 RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two
conditions when applying for civil forfeiture:
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed
suspicious after investigation by the AMLC and
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary
instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several
suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in Section 12(a) of RA
9160, as amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC, properly
instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.

RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, ERLINDA Y. LIGOT, PAULO Y. LIGOT, RIZA Y.
LIGOT, and MIGUEL Y. LIGOT, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Respondent.
Facts:

 Lt. Gen. Ligot served in the AFP for 33 years and 2 months as a cadet until his
retirement on 2004. He and Mrs. Ligot have 4 children.
 That he declared in his SALN that as of Dec 2003 he had assets in total amount
of 3.8M. while in his 1982 SALN he declared 105k.
 That the Ombudsman investigated and revealed that Ligot and his family had
other properties and bank accounts which are not declared in his SALN
amounting to 54M.
 That the Ombudsman declared the assets of Ligot and his wife’s and children’s’
names to be illegally obtained and unexplained wealth.
  That Edgardo Tecson Yambao, the brother of Mrs. Lugot revealed that Yambao
had been employed in private sector from 1977-1994 and based on his
contribution to SSS he did not have a substantial salary during his employment.
 That while Yambao had an investment with Mabelline Foods, the Ombudsman
noted that this company had a net income of 5k and 693 in 2003 and a
certification from the BIR that Yambao had no record of any individual income.
 That despite his substantial income he had real properties and vehicles
registered in his name amounting to 8M which he acquired from 1993 onwards
and that Yambao declared 3 of Ligot’s addresses as his own.
 That the Ombudsman concluded that Yambao acted as a dummy and/or
nominee of Ligot spouses and all the properties registered in the name of
Yambao actually belong to Ligot family.
 The Ombudsman for Military and other Law Enforcement Officers issued a
resolution holding that probable cause exist that Ligot violated Sec 8 in relation to
Sec 11 of RA 6713 ad well as Art 183 of RPC.
 The AMLC issued Resolution 52 directing the Exec. Director of the AMLC to file
an application for freeze order against the properties of Ligot and the family
members.
 The CA issued freeze order against the bank accounts, web accounts and
vehicles valid for a period of 20 days.
 Republic filed a motion for extension of freeze order which was granted by the
CA.
 The Ligots filed a motion to lift the extension of freeze order and argued that they
were deprived of their property without due process.
 That under the Rule of Procedure in Civil Forfeiture Cases, a freeze order could
be extended for a maximum period of 6 months.
 The Ligots then filed a motion for recon.
Issue:
Whether or not probable cause exist for the issuance of freeze order.
Whether or not the extension was valid.
Ruling:
1. The legal basis for the issuance of a freeze order is Section 10 of RA No. 9160, as
amended by RA No. 9194, which states that the Court of Appeals, upon
application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable
cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which
shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20)
days unless extended by the court. Based on Section 10, there are only two
requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the application ex parte by the
AMLC and (2) the determination of probable cause by the CA. The probable cause
required for the issuance of a freeze order differs from the probable cause required
for the institution of a criminal action, and the latter was not an issue before the CA
nor is it an issue before us in this case. The probable cause required for the issuance
 of a freeze order refers to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity
and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or has been committed
and that the account or any monetary instrument or property subject thereof
sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering. In resolving the issue of whether probable cause exists, the CA’s
statutorily-guided determination’s focus is not on the probable commission of an
unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has
already determined to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other
monetary instruments sought to be frozen are in any way related to any of the
illegal activities enumerated under RA 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated,
probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an unlawful activity
and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of Sec. 10 of RA
9160, as amended.
2. No. A freeze order is an extraordinary and interim relief issued by the CA to prevent
the dissipation, removal, or disposal of properties that are suspected to be the
proceeds of, related to, unlawful activities. Its primary objective is to temporarily
preserve monetary instruments or property that are in any way related to an unlawful
activity or money laundering by preventing the owner from utilizing them during the
duration of the freeze order. The AMLA is silent on the maximum period of time that
the freeze order can be extended by the CA. The final sentence of Section 10 of the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 provides, “the freeze order shall be for a period
of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.” In contrast, Section 55 of the Rule
in Civil Forfeiture Cases qualifies the grant of extension “for a period not exceeding
six months” “for good cause” shown. The court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, limiting
the effectivity of an extended freeze order to six months―to otherwise
leave the grant of the extension to the sole discretion of the CA, which may extend a
freeze order indefinitely or to an unreasonable amount of time―carries serious
implications on an individual’s substantive right to due process. The CA extended the
freeze order “until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations being
conducted are terminated.” This effectively bars the Ligots from using any of the
property covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture proceeding
is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been adjudged not guilty of the
crimes, they are suspected of committing. These periods of extension are way
beyond the intent and purposes of a freeze order which is intended solely as an
interim relief. The freeze order has been in effect since 2005 which the civil forfeiture
case was filed only in 2012. This means that the Ligots have not been able to access
the properties subject of the freeze order for 6 years or so simply on the basis of the
existence of probable cause to issue a freeze order, which was intended mainly as
an interim pre-emptive remedy. The 6-month extension period is ordinarily
sufficient for the government to act against the suspected money launderer and to
file the appropriate forfeiture case against him, and is a reasonable period as well
that recognizes the property owner’s right to due process. In this case, the period of
inaction of 6 years already exceeded what is reasonable. The continued extension
beyond 6 months violated the Ligots’ right to due process.