PREVIEW

• PHASE I POLITICAL BACKGROUND

• PHASE II OP LEGHORN
• PHASE III BATTLES IN NEFA
• PHASE IV BATTLES IN LADAKH SECTOR
• PHASE V LESSONS LEARNT
 WAR IN OUTLINE

The War broke out with an Indian offensive on 10

Oct 1962 in Namka Chu valley in NEFA
The Battle of Namka Chu: 10 Oct to 22 Oct
The Battle of Walong (Lohit Valley)
The Battle of Se La and Bomdi La: 17 to 20 Nov
The Battle of Rezang La: 17 to 20 Nov
Chinese declared a unilateral Cease Fire on 21 Nov
1962 and withdrew to positions 20 Kms Behind LAC
which existed since 1959
 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
OCT 1950 China invaded Tibet
JUN 1951 Tibet signed treaty with China
1954 India - China Agreement – Tibet recog as part of
China (India gave up rights, trading posts, withdrew mil
escorts from Yatung and Gyantse).
17 JUL 1954 China raises border issue (Indian tps
crossed Niti pass and Wuje in Tibet)
OCT 1954 Nehru makes goodwill vis to China.
Question of Indian territories raised.
01 SEP 1956 Differences on ‘Shipki La’ – main Pass on
Pilgrim Route to Kailash & Mansarovar.
PANDIT NEHRU ON HIS GOODWILL VISIT TO CHINA
WITH CHOU EN-LAI in 1954
 POLITICAL BACKGROUND

CHINESE INTRUSIONS IN INDIA

(a) LADAKH:
(i) MAR 1956 to OCT1957 Intrusion In
Aksai Chin & Construction Of 180 Km
Long rd.
(ii) JUL 1958 at Khurnak Fort (Pangong
Lake). On 18OCT 1958 India formally
drew Chinese attention to construction
of rd.

(b) NORTH EAST:

(i) Intrusion of 50 Chinese soldiers in
Walong in the Lohit Valley in NEFA
CHINESE INTRUSION IN LADAKH
NEFA
 CHINESE STAND ON BORDER ISSUES
23 JAN 1959 LETTER OF CHINESE PREMIERE CHOU EN-LAI
HIGHLIGHTS THE CHINESE STAND AS UNDER :-
✓Sino-Indian border never formally delimited.
✓Historically no agreement signed between the
two govts.
✓Chinese maps may be changed after surveys and
understanding with other countries ( in this case
Tibet).
✓Asked for status quo.
INDIAN STAND ON BORDER ISSUES
✓ NO TO CHINESE PROPOSAL OF ACCEPTING THE ‘Mc Mahon
LINE’ AS IB IN NEFA, IN EXCHANGE OF ‘AKSAI CHIN’.
✓ No To Proposal Of Reciprocal Acceptance Of Present Actualities
In Both Sectors (As It Would Compromise Territorial Integrity Of
Country).
THE MCMOHAN LINE
 POLITICAL BACKGROUND
19 APR 1960: DELHI SUMMIT
(a) Both sides to keep to LAC; no fwd
territorial claims as precondition
(b) Geographical principles as watersheds,
river valleys for all sectors to be considered.
(C) There exists disputes with regard to the
boundary between the two countries.
(D) To ensure tranquility both sides should
refrain from patrolling.
(E) Pending a settlement of the boundary
question between the two countries through
discussion, both sides should keep to the LAC
and should not put fwd claims as precond, but
individual adjustments be made.
 FORWARD POLICY

The failure of Delhi Summit resulted in the

adoption of the ‘Forward Policy’.
The objectives of this policy were:
(a) Block potential lines of further Chinese
advance.
(b) Estb Indian presence in Aksai chin.
The forward policy had its inherent flaws based on
the unfounded assumption that the provocation of
the Chinese in Aksai Chin and the middle sectors
would evince no mil response.
 STATE OF ARMED FORCES
ARMED FORCES NEGLECTED ( CONGRESS RESENTED ARMY
PERS WHO SERVED BRITISH)
ONE OF ITS POLICY CONCLUSIONS WAS THAT THERE WAS NO
DANGER TO INDIA EXCEPT FROM PAK
DEF EXPENDITURE MIN, MAX FOR DEV
BY 1953 3,50,000 MEN ORG INTO 6 INF DIV & 1 ARMD DIV
LATE 1959 SUDDEN REALISATION OF BDY DISPUTE LED TO
EXPANSION OF ARMY
NEW DIV (17 INF DIV) PLACED UNDER NEW FMN - XXXIII
CORPS (Responsible for Sikkim, bdy of Bhutan, NEFA & Mc
Mohan line, E Pak, Nagaland) AND 4 INF DIV TRANSFERRED
FROM PUNJAB TO NE (Responsible for McMohan line/360 Miles)
 EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISES
03 Jun 1962: Sino Ind Treaty of 1954 lapsed because Ind refused
the Chinese offer for renewal.
Apr 1962: China resumed patrolling in fwd areas
May1962: China threaten to attack in Chip Chap valley but did not
lending credence to Fwd Policy.
04 Jun 1962: Siting of the Dhola Post by Ind Pl ex Assam Rifles
08 Sep 1962: Str of 60 Chinese troops Adv from Thag La ridge and
settled into dominating position around Dhola Post
09 Sep 1962: OP LEGHORN PLANNED
16 Sep 1962: China lodged complaint with India
Ind Govt maintained that Thag La Ridge was the boundary
09 Oct 1962 : Ind offensive at the Thag La Ridge
10 Oct 1962 : Sino-India war broke out in Namka Chu valley in
NEFA
SITING OF DHOLA POST
 PHASE II
OP LEGHORN
 OP LEGHORN: IND OFFENSIVE ON THE THAG LA
09 Sep 1962: OP Planned
12 Sep 1962: GOC XXXIII Corps highlighted salient
problems of launching OP LEGHORN to GOC-IN-C Eastern Comd
and did not recommend the attack on Thag La Ridge from Dhola Post.
ORG OF EASTERN COMD OF IND ARMY AS ON 02 OCT 1962
HQ EASTERN COMD - GOC-IN-C LT GEN LP SEN
XXXIII CORPS, Shillong - LT GEN UMRAO SINGH
4 INF DIV, Tezpur - MAJ GEN NIRANJAN PRASAD
7 INF BDE, Tawang - BRIG J P DALVI
HQ & 01 BN AT TAWANG
2nd BN AT DIRANG DZONG
3rd AT BOMDI LA
5 INF BDE - THREE BN SCATTERED IN NEFA
11 INF BDE - DETACHED FROM 4 INF DIV IN NAGALAND
04 Oct 1962: IV Corps raised under LT GEN BM kaul was entrusted
with conduct of the OP by 7 Inf Bde
 OP LEGHORN
- OP to evict Chinese from Thag La Code
Named “OP LEGHORN” By AHQ On Orders
from Govt On 09 Sep 1962.
- 7 Inf Bde of XXXIII Corps given Task.
- Tps to be ready for battle and if possible
to encircle the Chinese investing the post.
- Without any regard for mil considerations,
an Inf Bde ordered into extremely difficult
and unknown country.
- No recce or plg on how tps were to be
supplied.
- Mil planning and conduct of mil ops took a
back seat to pol considerations.
• Salient problems highlighted by GOC XXXIII Corps and
subsequent rfts asked for not considered by the GOC-in-C
Eastern Command.
• A new Corps raised – IV Corps under the command of Lt
Gen BM Kaul to sideline LtGen Umrao Singh.
• Trn:
- The river fast flowing and deep.
- On Ind side the ground rose from the river bank steeply to
Hathungla
- DZ at Tsangdhar was at the crest of the ridge
- Ind positions and lines of commn dominated by the
Chinese.
• OP:
- 9 Punjab with one coy of 2 Rajput already at Dhola
- On 6 Oct 1/9 GR and 2 Rajput(still in cotton uniforms)
march over Karpo La at 16000 ft to Tsangdhar at 14500 ft
- On 9th the two bns positioned at III and IV Bridges
- At 0430 hrs on 10th as the Rajputs marches ahead the
Chinese emerged from their position and attk on Tseng-jong.
- Ind troops suffered hvy cas and offensive suspended.
OP LEGHORN

1/9 GR, 2 RAJPUT, 4 Grenadieras

 PHASE III
NEFA SECTOR
BATTLE OF NAMKA CHU
BATTLE OF TAWANG, SELA AND BOMDI LA

62 INF
BDE

48
INF
BDE
BATTLE IN WALUNG
 PHASE IV
LADAKH SECTOR
 LESSONS LEARNT

o NEED TO MODERNISE ARMED FORCES AND MAINTAIN

ADEEQUATE FORCE LEVEL AT ALL TIME REALISED

o LACK OF CAPABILITIES OF IAF IN SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES

STRONGLY FELT,MODERISATION OF IAF AND BETTER INTEGRATION
WITH OPS ON GROUND MOOTED.

o RELEGATION OF MIL INT SIDE LINED IN FAVOUR OF IB RESULTED

IN POOR INT. NEED TO DEVELOP MIL INT WING OF ARMY FELT.
 LESSONS LEARNT

⚫ WAR SAW RAPID CHANGE IN CDRS AND

FREQUENT ORG CHOPPING AND CHANGING
ADDED CONFUSION.

⚫ NEGLECT OF ARMED FORCES WHEN

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
CONCERNED,CORRECTIVE MEASURES ON WAR
FOOTING INITIATED.

⚫ POLITICISING OF HIGHER ECHELONS OF ARMY

AND MAJOR IMPACT ON EVENTS LEADING TO
DEFEAT IN CONFLICT HIGH LIGHTED.

⚫ INTERFERENCE OF CIV IN ARMY MATTERS

REDUCED
 LESSONS LEARNT

o DECISION TO FORM NEW CORPS OVERNIGHT AND

DESIGNATING OFFR FROM SERVICES WITH NO COMBAT
EXPERIENCE.

o INTERFERENCE BY HIGHEST ECHELONS OF ARMY IN BN LEVEL

BATTLES,DISREGARDING OPINION OF CDRS IN FD MAJOR CAUSE
FOR DEFEAT AT NAMKA CHU.

o NO RD COMN NETWORK ,LIMITED NO OF AIR FIELDS\ DZS IN

TACTICAL BATTLE AREA.