Art. 17. Principals.

— The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act:
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished.

Two or more persons participating in the crime.

But when two or more persons are involved in killing another, it is necessary to
determine the participation of each. If they are all principals, all of them may be principals
by direct participation (par. 1); or one may be a principal by induction (par. 2); and the
other a principal by direct participation; or one may be a principal by direct participation
and the other a principal by indispensable cooperation, (par. 3)

Illustration of the three types of principals

e.g. A, induced B to kill C for a reward. B and D planned out the said crime and D
agreed to become the Driver B in killing C. In a street wherein C walks every day, B
stabbed C to death alone. In this situation A becomes the principal of the crime since he
induced B directly to kill C for a reward. B also a principal because he directly killed C and
D also became a principal because he cooperated in the commission of the offense by
another act (transporting the actual killer) without which the commission of the offense
would not have been accomplished.

Difference between a principal under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 and
a co-conspirator.
The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three
categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is
also a principal is that while the former's criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a
general rule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.

PAR. 1. - PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION. "Those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act."

"Take a direct part in the execution of the act."

The principal by direct participation personally takes part in the execution of the act
constituting the crime.
e.g. A is angry to B and he personally performs the act of killing B.

Two or more offenders as principals by direct participation.

Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct
participation, when the following requisites are present:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution;
2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts
which directly tended to the same end. That the culprits "carried out their plan and
personally took part in its execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end."

Explanations:
1. That they participated in the criminal resolution;
E.g. A and B are brothers and they are both angry to C. A and B planned out to
kill C by stabbing him. A and B carried out their plan and both of them became the
principal by direct participation in the crime of murder.
a. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution
when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime.
(Conspiracy- A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.)
i. Silence does not make one a conspirator.
1. Silence is not a circumstance indicating participation in the
same criminal design.
ii. Conspiracy transcends companionship.
1. Hence, the fact that the two accused may have happened to
leave together, and one of them left a closing warning to the
victim, cannot instantly support a finding of conspiracy.
iii. Proof of conspiracy.
1. The direct evidence of conspiracy may consist in the
interlocking extrajudicial confessions of several accused and
the testimony of one of the accused who is discharged and
made a witness against his co-accused who did not make any
confession.
iv. When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for
the act performed by him.
1. E.g. A and B are arguing if who is right and wrong, when their
argument heated up, B gets a knife and stabbed A. D the brother
of A have seen the incident and ran towards B in order to get B
and to bring him to the police station. While D and B are
running, E and F, the brothers of B saw them. When D caught B
and gets the knife he use to kill A, E became furious and
suddenly get the knife to D and stabbed him to death. In this case
only E who shot stabbed to death D, was found guilty of
murder.
v. Participation in criminal resolution essential.
1. The cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance which
is knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible
without previous knowledge of the criminal purpose.
vi. Unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime is
shown in the following cases:
1. Spontaneous agreement at the moment of the commission of the
crime is sufficient to create joint responsibility.
a. E.g. A challenged B and C to fight him; if B and C will
not fight him A will kill him by the gun he is holding.
Instead of running, B and C accepted the challenge and
fight A, when they have the chance B and C punched A to
death. The acceptance of the challenge by the two
 accused and their concert of attack clearly showed a
community of purpose and design.
2. Active cooperation by all the offenders in the perpetration of the
crime will also create joint responsibility.
a. People vs. Macabuhay, 46 O.G., No. 11.
i. Facts: A, B, C, D, and E were in the house of F.
Someone threw a stone towards that house.
Then, all the five marched to the residence of G,
40 yards away, to avenge the stone-throwing. In
the house of G, they found the deceased.
Suspecting the deceased as the person who threw
the stone, the four of them suddenly seized and
held fast the said victim and the 5th stabbed the
victim who died thereafter. The common motive
is to avenge the stone-throwing.
ii. Held: A, B, C, D, and E were all liable as
principals by direct participation for the death of
thedeceased.

3. Contributing by positive acts to the realization of a common

criminal intent also creates joint responsibility.
a. People vs. Mancao, 49 Phil. 887.
i. The accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator
and aggressor, Roberto Villela having done
nothing but to defend himself, first disarming
the former of his stick with which he was
assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used
after having been deprived of his stick. Roberto
Villela might have had the advantage in the fight
had not one of Crispino Mancao's laborers come
to his rescue, upon his cry for help, and struck
Roberto Villela on the thigh; then another man
of Mancao struck Roberto Villela several times
on the left knee, and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco
Aguilar struck Roberto Villela several blows on
the back with his sickle, one of which nearly
severed his spine in the lumbar region which
later caused his death.
ii. Held: While it is true that the wounds which
caused Roberto Villela's death were not inflicted
by Crispino Mancao but by his co-accused
Ciriaco Aguilar, yet said Crispino Mancao,
having been the instigator and aggressor and
having called his harvesters to his aid, among
them the said Ciriaco Aguilar, wanted them to
carry out, as in fact they did, the criminal act
 started by him and, therefore, he is liable not only
for his own acts, but also for the acts of those
who aided him. Mancao contributed the
following positive acts: (1) his being the
instigator, (2) his being the aggressor, and (3) his
having called his harvesters. The common
criminal intent is shown by the unity of purpose
and intention of all the offenders.

4. Presence during the commission of the crime by a band and

lending moral support thereto, also create joint responsibility
with the material executors.
a. U.S. vs. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165.
i. There were 7 defendants in this case. They had
conducted the deceased to a certain place and
there, by order of A and B, the deceased was
killed by C, D and E. F and G posted themselves
with A and B at some distance to watch the
approach of any one, in order to prevent the
discovery of the crime.
ii. Held: All of them by previously concerted action,
met together and witnessed the capture and
later, the violent killing of the deceased. Some
took a direct part in the actual commission of the
crime, others were determined instigators who
induced the former to commit it, while the
remainder cooperated in the same by their
presence and lending their moral support. The
four who were not the actual perpetrators
thereof, witnessed the commission of the crime,
lending to the murderers their moral support
and, therefore, all are thus directly responsible
for the consequences and incidents of the same.
5. Where one of the accused knew of the plan of the others to kill
the two victims and he accepted the role assigned to him, which
was to shoot one of the victims, and he actually performed that
role, he is a co-principal by direct participation in the double
murder.
vii. Liability of a conspirator for another conspirator's acts which differ
radically and substantially from that which they intended to commit.
viii. Where there is conspiracy to commit a felony, all the conspirators are
liable for its consequences.
ix. A conspirator is not liable for another's crime which is not an object
of the conspiracy or which is not a necessary and logical consequence
thereof.
 x. A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the crime
was committed by the others, is not criminally liable.
xi. In multiple rapes, each rapist is equally liable for the other rapes.
xii. There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through
negligence. In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by
special law, allowing or failing to prevent an act to be performed by
another, makes one a co-principal.

3. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts
which directly tended to the same end. That the culprits "carried out their plan and
personally took part in its execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end."
a. The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the crime,
personally taking part in its execution.
i. A principal by direct participation must personally take part in
executing the criminal plan to be carried out. This means that he must
be at the scene of the commission of the crime, personally taking part in
its execution.
b. The acts of each offender must directly tend to the same end.
i. While the principals by direct participation personally take part in
the execution of their common purpose, it is not necessary that each of
them should perform a positive act directly contributing to the
accomplishment of their common purpose.
c. One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal by direct
participation.
d. When the second requisite is lacking, there is only conspiracy.

PAR. 2. - PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION. "Those who directly force or induce others to

commit it."
E.g. A induced B and C to have a challenge with him
 Paragraph No. 2 of Art. 17 provides for the second class of principals.
o The second class of principals, according to Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, comprises "those who directly force or induce others to commit it (the
act)."

 The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct
participation committed the act induced.

 Two ways of becoming principal by induction.There are two ways of becoming a

principal by induction under the second paragraph of Art. 17, namely:
(1) by directly forcing another to commit a crime, and
(2) by directly inducing another to commit a crime.

 By directly forcing another to commit a crime. There are two ways of directly
forcing another to commit a crime. They are:
a. By using irresistible force.
b. By causing uncontrollable fear.
  By directly inducing another to commit a crime. There are two ways of directly
inducing another to commit a crime. They are:
a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise. Both the one giving the
price or offering reward or promise and the one committing the crime in
consideration thereof are principals — the former, by inducement; and the latter,
by direct participation. There is collective criminal responsibility.
A wife, who induced the killing of the mistress of her husband by giving
money to the killer, is a principal by induction. The killer is a principal by direct
participation.

b. By using words of command.

Both the person who used the words of command and the person who
committed the crime, because of the words of command, are equally liable.
There is also collective criminal responsibility.

 Requisites:
o In order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement, the
following requisites must be present:
1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime;
a. E.g. A battered woman kill her husband in order for him to
be free. In this case the motive is strong enough to induce
the woman to take the life of her husband.

2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission

of the crime by the material executor.

Explanations