CONSTI1 STUDY GUIDE- Structure of the Government

I. Inherent powers of the government- There are three of them and they are not found in
the constitution, hence, “inherent”
The 3 inherent powers of the government are:
1. Police power- the most oppressive of the powers. Hinges on the curtail of liberty for
the common good/ betterment of society. "as the power of promoting public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
2. Taxation- constant. The goal of this power is to generate revenue for the
government. Legally considered as “lifeblood of the state/ government”
3. Eminent domain- the government can get private property following these two
requisites: 1) for public use or for public purpose and 2) providing just
compensation to the private person who lost the property

II. GR 1051- United States v Dorr

Issue: Whether the statements by the accused are considered seditious to the government
Held: No, the issuers aren’t seditious because they aren’t directed to the government as
an institution.

Administration was defined as the aggregate of those persons in whose hands

the reins of government are for the time being. The government on the other hand is
described as the aggregate of authorities or administration which rule a society.
Sedition can never be against a single person. It must always be directed towards the
government using the aforementioned definition.

III. GR L-5 Co Cham v Valdez

Issue: Should the court take cognizance of the case despite McArthur’s clear orders?
Held: Yes, because the Japanese-sponsored government during the time of the case was
in fact the defacto government of the Philippines

The word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas

MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes
rather the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive
Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same
class as the laws and regulations with which the world "processes" is associated.
Hague Conventions imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue
the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely
prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I’ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public
order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted,
not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people, unless
a legislative action is done by the conqueror in order to negate the country’s political
powers. The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was,
does not, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor
does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the
territory occupied. Thus the Philippine courts did not become owned by Japanese courts. 

There are several kinds of de facto governments:

1. Government in a proper legal sense- government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by voice of the majority the rightful and
legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter
2. Government of paramount force- military occupation enforcing their own
government. Must include these requisites: 1) that its existence is maintained
by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of
an established and lawful government. 2) while it exists it necessarily be obeyed
in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in
submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those
 acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful country. (a third person
appears and takes control. (Philippines During Japanese Occupation)
3. Rebellion- established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
The Hague convention is the legal basis.
IV. Republic V Sandiganbayan
Issue: Do you lose your constitutional rights (the right against illegal seizures) when there
is no active government and no constitution that governs the land?
Held: No, because the bill of rights exist in international law (Declaration of Human
Rights), the Covenant of Nations.

The EDSA revolution according to Justice Carpio, was done in defiance of the
1973 constitution. This means that the government under Cory Aquino was of the third
kind, according to the previous case. Since the population is in active defiance of the
constitution, by technicality, there are no laws that govern the land except those
international treaties and agreements the Philippines is bound to.
With regards to the right of revolting, There are two views upon it. Justice Carpio
places it as a constitutional right which follows a positivist theory- wherein the
constitution is the supreme law which must not be broken while Justice Puno believes
that it is an inherent right of the people to cast out their governments when they believe
that the government’s policies are against their own (naturalist theory).

V. Republic V Feliciano
Issue: Can the private person sue the government for property?
Held: No, there needs to be a congressional/ legislative act which waives the
government’s immunity from being sued first before a suit can prosper

Doctrine of non-suability of the State- The state cannot be held liable for action in
personam (these are actions that make the government as a private person). A state may
otherwise be sued for any action in rem (action regarding rights).
When talking about the immunity of the state, it is important to construe it
CLEARLY and STRICTLY (Strictissimi juris). That is why there must be a CLEAR
legislative act which must first happen before the case could prosper.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the
respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory
information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession.
Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem.

VI. Meritt V Government

Issue: Assuming that the state can be sued (refer to above), is the state liable for
damages?
Held: No, waiving the immunity to be sued does not place liability to the government.
There just exists a method for the case to be heard by the judge

With regards to liability- No claim arises against any government in favor of

an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of
powers by its officers or agents.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives
remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
There should be a distinction here. A state can only be held “liable” for acts of
its special agents (those with a commission- to do a specific task or appointed by the
 government) and the chauffeur driving the ambulance is not a special agent but merely
an employee doing administrative tasks.

VII. Arigo V Swift

Issue: can the US be sued for the acts of its agent?
Held: No, because of the immunity from suit of the different states

Swift was the commander and was acting on its duties when he commited a
mistake which cost damages. He falls under an executive official in the performance of
his duty and is thus found to be immune from suit according to our laws. HOWEVER,
they are liable under UNCLOS- which the Ph and US are both bound to follow.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in
the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. 
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. In
this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself.

VIII. Rubi V Provincial Board

Issue: Police Power, May the Government place the Mangyans in a specified area for
them without the Mangyan’s concurrence?
Held: Yes, this being an action made under the State’s Police Power which aims at "
promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
Particularly in this case, liberty.

"The police power of the State, is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is
not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society. The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on
reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of
the general welfare and the public interest.
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being. And this is what the Mangyans did not have – a proper understanding of
freedom for they understood freedom as doing as they please. "Thus it is right for the
Government to follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To
permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they
will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them." Not
knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully.

IX. Agustin V Edu

Issue: Police Power, Is the LOI of President Marcos regarding the providing for an early
seaming device for motor vehicles, unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violates
the provisions and delegation of police power?
 Held: Police Power, being the remedy for the duty of the state to regulate and promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property, is properly
applied in the LOI as it aims at reducing the number of accidents due to vehicles that do
not have early warning devices.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. The
police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."

X. People V Siton
Issue: Police Power, Is the Anti-Vagrancy law unconstitutional for being vague as it is
alleged to allow arbitrary imprisonment?
Held: The Anti-Vagrancy law is not unconstitutional
The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the State's police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est
suprema lex, (the good of the people is the supreme law)" which calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus: Our law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on
police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of
promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."
This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater
number.
We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace,
civility, decency and morality in them. This is exactly why we have public order laws, to
which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain minimum
standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be
traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated
with the struggle to improve the citizens' quality of life, which is guaranteed by our
Constitution.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm
and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
As with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides an
acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation
to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited
by the respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands
of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional
requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than
suspicion or possibility. As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police
authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to
their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our
Constitution.

XI. Mactan Cebu International Airport V. Marcos

Issue: Can Cebu City lay property tax on two lots owned by the MCIA?
Held: MCIA being a government owned corporation and with the advent of the Local
Government Code which repeals its (MCIA) previous Tax exemption
 Verily, taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and
property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the
support of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are
what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns
against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on
language in the law too plain to be mistaken. (Strictissimi Juris)
Petitioner’s claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on
Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities.”
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not
interchangeable. "Republic of the Philippines" is broader and synonymous with
"Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of
1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made affective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of
local government." These "autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions" are the political subdivisions. On the other hand, "National Government"
refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the
different forms of local governments." 29 The National Government then is composed of
the three great departments: the executive, the legislative and the judicial.
An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" while
and "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and
controlled corporations."
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government
Units. — Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the
following: (o) TAXES, FEES OR CHARGES OF ANY KIND ON THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, ITS AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS.
SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. — A province or city or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on
real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvements not hereafter
specifically exempted.
Section 234 of the LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real
property taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and
juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except as
provided therein. It provides:
Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon
the effectivity of this Code. These exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and
use of the property. Thus:
(a) Ownership Exemptions. Exemptions from real property taxes on the basis of
ownership are real properties owned by: (1) the Republic, (ii) a province, (iii) a city, (iv)
a municipality, (v) a barangay, and (vi) registered cooperatives.
(b) Character Exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of their
character are: (i)charitable institutions, (ii) houses and temples of prayer like churches,
 parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and (iii) non-profit or religious
cemeteries.
(c) Usage exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of the
actual, direct and exclusive use to which they are devoted are: (i) all lands, buildings and
improvements which are actually directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes; (ii) all machineries and equipment actually, directly and
exclusively used by local water districts or by government-owned or controlled
corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or generation and
transmission of electric power; and (iii) all machinery and equipment used for pollution
control and environmental protection.

SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. — Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.

Thus, reading together Sections 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that
as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government
units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities , and local government units" ;
however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the
Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise,
to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234. Since
the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the
LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in
the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its
Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn.

XII. Eslaban Jr. V De Onorio

Issue: Imminent Domain, In what instance should the compensation be paid; is it on the
time of taking of property or at the time that the petitioner takes legal action?
Held: Whichever comes first between the two has to be honored in terms of paying the
just compensation.

WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE

DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF THE
FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property
was built only on October 6, 1981, several years after the property had been registered on
May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and
just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use.
With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or
"that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner,
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received
therefor." Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for
then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation
to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990,
and not the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was allegedly remiss
 in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was respondent who filed the complaint. The
owner of private property should be compensated only for what he actually loses; it
is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is the
only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the
individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it."
Compensation is based on whatever comes first, the taking of the property or the
time when something is already built on the property.
4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM MAKING
PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.
Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying any amount to respondent
because the latter executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees of any
compensation due in favor of the Municipal Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Nino, South
Cotabato. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held:
[I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not even have
bothered to give her any amount for damages caused on the improvements/crops within
the appellee’s property. This, apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned from the
disbursement voucher in the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the Folder of Exhibits in
Civil Case 396) issued on September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from
the Office of the Solicitor General recommending the giving of financial assistance in the
amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
XII. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC
Issue: Imminent Domain, Petitioners contend that 92 of BP Blg. 881 violates the due
process clause  and the eminent domain provision  of the Constitution by taking air time from
radio and television broadcasting stations without payment of just compensation
Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign.  A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance
with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do
not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a
mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance
by the grantee of some form of public service. Art. XII, of the Constitution authorizes the
amendment of franchises for "the common good." "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 
As to the additional amount of P6,600,850, it is claimed that this is the cost of producing
a program and it is for such items as "sets and props," "video tapes," "miscellaneous (other
rental, supplies, transportation, etc.)," and "technical facilities (technical crew such as director
and cameraman as well as 'on air plugs')." There is no basis for this claim. Expenses for these
items will be for the account of the candidates. COMELEC Resolution No. 2983, 6(d)
specifically provides in this connection:
(d) Additional services such as tape-recording or video-taping of programs, the
preparation of visual aids, terms and condition thereof, and consideration to be paid therefor may
be arranged by the candidates with the radio/television station concerned. However, no
radio/television station shall make any discrimination among candidates relative to charges,
terms, practices or facilities for in connection with the services rendered.

Difference between Print and Broadcast Media

In the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions may validly be imposed on the
grantees or licensees. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends
 public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not
do in the case of the print media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to
provide free air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

XIII. Gerochi V Department of Energy

Issue: Police Power/Imminent Domain, Is the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001" (EPIRA), imposing the Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and
Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said imposition, unconstitutional as it
imposes double taxation on the public?
Held: The EPIRA and Universal Charge are Constitutional and are not expressions of the
State’s Taxation Power but Police Power.

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and
is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. In said cases, the respective funds were
created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to
counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables
which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a
need to delegate powers to administrative bodies.
Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as
support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the
assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure
the viability of the country's electric power industry.
Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the
essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the
electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on
electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's
ability to pay.
The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,
acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found
only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that
is to pay it. It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and
their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. On the other hand, police
power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. The conservative and pivotal distinction between these
two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue
is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax;
but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.