CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION
A. DEFINITION, NATURE,
AND CONCEPTS
1. Political Law — branch of public law which
deals with the organization and operations of
the governmental organs of the State and
defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory [People v. Perfecto,
43 Phil 88 (1922)].
2. Constitutional Law — branch of
jurisprudence which treats of Constitutions,
their nature, formation and amendment,
operation and interpretation [De Leon,
Philippine Constitutional Law, Volume I [2017]].
This is the law embodied in the Constitution
and the legal principles growing out of the
interpretation and application of its provisions
by the courts in specific cases. It is the study of
the maintenance of the proper balance
between the authority as represented by the
three inherent powers of the State and liberty
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
3. Constitution Defined
It is the document which serves as the
fundamental law of the state; that written
instrument enacted by the direct action of the
people by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited, and
defined, and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for
their safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of
the body politic [MALCOLM, Phil.
Constitutional Law].
“A law for the government, safeguarding
individual rights, set down in writing”
[Hamilton].
A written instrument by which the fundamental
power of the Government is established,
limited, and defined and by which these powers
are distributed among the several branches for
Page 1 of 116
the people [De Leon].
Date of Ratification of the 1987
Constitution:
The 1987 Constitution was ratified on February
2, 1987. It became effective on February 2,
1987, rather than on the date the proclamation
of its ratification was promulgated (or on
February 11, 1987). [De Leon v. Esguerra,
G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987].
Permanence of the Constitution
1. Constitution intends to govern far into the
indefinite future
● It can govern not just the life of the
people at the time of framing, but also
in the future, as social and economic
conditions change
2. Constitution intended to have an indefinite
life
● It must be permanent, but only subject
to amendments and revisions done
constitutionally
● It must not be transitory – this goes
against its attribute of being permanent
and supreme
3. Constitution intended to be adapted to
changing conditions
● Intended to ensure for ages and
adapted to various crisis of human
affairs – it is a continuing instrument of
government
● It must contain not rules for the present
but principles for the expanding future
4. Constitution intended to be construed with a
measure of flexibility
● The words employed by it are not to be
construed to yield fixed and rigid
answers but with necessary attributes
of flexibility and accommodation to
enable them to meet adequately
whatever future problems.
● Not a brief finality but a dynamic
process [De Leon]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
The Supremacy of the Constitution and the
Role of the Courts
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the
land to which every statute must conform; laws,
statutes, or treaties may be nullified if in conflict
with the Constitution [Gatmaytan, Legal
Method Essentials 3.0 (2017)].
Branches of the government must discharge
their functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution; Courts have the
duty to ensure this is so.
B. PARTS OF A
CONSTITUTION
1. Constitution of Government: establishes
the structure of government, its branches
and their operation; e.g. Art. VI, VII, VIII, IX
2. Constitution of Sovereignty: Provides
how the Constitution may be changed; i.e.
Art. XVII
3. Constitution of Liberty: states the
fundamental rights of the people; e.g. Art.
III [Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
174153. October 25, 2006]
C. AMENDMENTS AND
REVISIONS
Refer to ART. XVIII – AMENDMENTS OR
REVISIONS
Amendments: An addition or change within
the lines of the original constitution as will effect
an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed; a change that
adds, reduces or deletes without altering the
basic principles involved; affects only the
specific provision being amended [Lambino v.
COMELEC, supra].
Revisions: A change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system
of checks-and- balances; alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change
Page 2 of 116
affects substantial provisions of the constitution
[Id.].
Difference: Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended [Id.]. This distinction
is significant because the 1987 Constitution
allows people’s initiative only for the purpose of
amending, not revising, the Constitution [See
Lambino v. COMELEC, supra].
Legal Tests
Lambino considered the two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test.
a. Quantitative test: The court examines
only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of
the change.
b. Qualitative test: The court inquires
into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change
will “accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a
revision.” The changes include those to
the “fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches,”
and those that “jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the
system of check and balances.”
Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry [Lambino v.
COMELEC, supra].
Procedure
There are two steps in the amendatory
process:
a. Proposal: This refers to the adoption
of the suggested change in the
Constitution.
1. Congress (as a Constituent
Assembly) – a vote of 3/4 of ALL its
members.
2. Constitutional Convention –
Called into existence by (i) 2/3 of all
members of Congress OR (ii) the
electorate, in a referendum called
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

for by a majority of all members of Note: The process of revision is the same in all
Congress [Sec. 3, Art. XVII] respects except that it cannot be proposed via
3. People (through a People’s a People’s Initiative [See Lambino v.
Initiative) – petition of at least 12% COMELEC, supra].
of the total number of registered
voters; every legislative district Judicial Review of Amendments: The
must be represented by at least 3% validity of the process of amendment is not a
of the registered voters therein political question because the Court must
i. Limitation on Initiative: No review if constitutional processes were
amendment in this manner followed [See Lambino v. COMELEC, supra].
shall be authorized (1) within
5 years following the TWO STAGES OF
ratification of the 1987 Const. AMENDATORY/REVISION PROCESS
nor (2) more often than once By Proposal Ratification
every 5 years thereafter.
ii. Enabling Law:
Congress By a vote Via
Constitutional provision on
(as Consti- of ¾ of all Plebiscite,
amendments via People’s tuent its 60-90 days
Initiative are not self- Assembly) members after
executory [Defensor- submission of
Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 Constitu- Per the
SCRA 170 (1997)] tional internal amendments
Conven- rules,
tion limited by
b. Ratification: The Proposed Amendments the
shall be submitted to the people and shall be Doctrine of
deemed ratified by the majority of the votes Amend- Proper
cast in a plebiscite, held not earlier than 60 ments Submis-
sion
days nor later than 90 days:
1. After approval of the proposal by People’s Upon
Congress or ConCon; Initiative COME-
2. After certification by the COMELEC of LEC’s
sufficiency of petition of the people. certifica-
tion of the
sufficiency
Doctrine of Proper Submission of the
A plebiscite may be held on the same day as a petition
regular election [Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-28196 (1967)]. The entire Constitution
Congress By a vote Via
must be submitted for ratification at one as Consti- of ¾ of all Plebiscite,
plebiscite only. The people must have a proper tuent its 60-90 days
“frame of reference” [J. Barredo’s Dissent in Assembly members after
Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150 submission of
(1971)]. No “piecemeal submission” is allowed Constitu- Per the revision
tional internal
e.g. submission of age amendment ahead of Revision Conven- rules,
other proposed amendments [Lambino v. tion limited by
COMELEC, supra]. the
Doctrine of
Proper
Submis-
sion

Page 3 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

TABLE OF CASES RE: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT

Title Facts Held and Ratio

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Resolution of Congress proposing DISMISSED; Proposal of

(Congressional Resolution the Parity Amendment was assailed amendments to the Constitution is a
on the grounds that it did not comply political question. The enrolled copy
proposing the Parity
with the ¾ rule prescribed by the of the resolution in which it was
Amendment) Constitution certified that the proposal had been
approved by the required vote was
Note: Expressly overturned in conclusive upon the Courts
Gonzales v. COMELEC

Gonzales v. COMELEC RBH No. 1 called for an increase in DENIED; (1) Proposal of
(Resolutions of both Houses membership of the HOR; RBH No 2 amendments is not a political
called for a Constitutional question and it is subject to judicial
calling for the 1971
Convention RBH No. 3 called for the review. (2) Congress may propose
Constitutional Convention and amendment of Sec 16, Art. VI to amendments and at the same time
amendments to the 1935 allow members of the Congress to be call for a Constituent Assembly. (3)
Constitution) delegates to the ConCon without Ratification may be done
losing their seats. Petitioners sought simultaneously with a general
to restrain respondents from election or in a special election called
enforcing the law passed by specially for that purpose. There was
Congress submitting RBH Nos. 1 proper submission.
and 2 for ratification during the
general elections of 1967.

Tolentino v. COMELEC ( 1973 The validity of the ConCon GRANTED. All amendments
Constitutional Convention Resolution (submitting, for proposed by the ConCon shall be
ratification the proposal to lower the submitted to the people in a single
convened)
voting age to 18) was assailed. election.
Issue: W/N piecemeal amendments
to the Constitution could be
submitted to the people for
ratification or rejection.

Planas v. COMELEC Petitioners sought to enjoin DISMISSED. The validity of calling

(Plebiscite cases)
respondents from implementing PD for a plebiscite is justiciable BUT, the
73 which called for a plebiscite (to be issue became moot
held on Jan. 15, 1973) for the
Constitution to be approved by the
ConCon on 1972, on the theory that:
(a) The power to submit is lodged
exclusively in Congress and (b) there
is no proper submission to the
people

Javellana v. Executive Petitioners sought to enjoy Although the question of whether

Secretary (Ratification cases)
implementation of any of the
provisions of the “new constitution”
which are not found in the 1935
Constitution, on the theory that it was
not validly ratified in accordance with
Art. 1, Sec XV.
Constitution was validly ratified is a
justiciable question, the question of
whether a Constitution has come into
force and effect is a political question
beyond the Court’s competence.

Sanidad v. COMELEC (1976 Petitioners question the authority of The amending process, both as to
Amendments) the President in issuing several PDs proposal and ratification is
proposing amendments to the New justiciable. In a crisis government,
Constitution and calling for a national the President shall have the power to

Page 4 of 116

Mitra v. COMELEC (1973 Petitioners argue that the 1973
Constitution)
Lawyer’s League v. Aquino Petitioners question the legitimacy of
(EDSA Revolution)
De Leon v. Esguerra (1987
Constitution ratified)
Defensor Santiago
COMELEC (PIRMA case)
Estrada v. Desierto (EDSA II)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
referendum-plebiscite for the said
amendments.
Constitution never validly took effect,
on the theory that the 1973
Constitution was still and is still at the
stage of proposal. They ask the
Court to order a plebiscite for the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution
the Aquino Government
Petitioners question the appointment
of respondents as barangay officials
and maintain that with the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution, the OIC did
not have authority to simply appoint
their replacements
v. Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent
COMELEC from acting on the
petition by the PIRMA group asking
for an order fixing details on how to
collect signatures for the people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution.
Estrada questions legitimacy of
Arroyo government and claims that
he did not resign from position and
that Arroyo is merely an acting
president
Page 5 of 116
assume the constituent power to
propose amendments lodged in the
Legislative body.
Even without valid ratification, a new
Constitution could come into force
and effect by the acquiescence of the
people. Popular acquiescence to a
new Constitution gives the document
the force and effect of the
Fundamental Law of the Land
regardless of the method of
ratification. If it is accepted by the
people (as shown in their
participation in several elections and
referenda since then), in whom
sovereignty resides according to the
Constitution, the Courts cannot
refuse to yield assent to such political
question
The question of legitimacy of a new
government arising from a
successful revolution is a political
question beyond review by the
Courts
Date of effectivity of the 1987
Constitution retroacts to the date of
the plebiscite (Feb 2, 1987).
Provisional Constitution deemed to
have been superseded by 1987
Constitution on said date of
effectivity
COMELEC was permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for
initiative until a sufficient law shall
have been validly enacted to provide
for the implementation of the system
The system of initiative under Art
XVII, Sec 2 is not self-executory and
needs an enabling law before the
right of the people could be
exercised. However, an examination
of its provisions reveals that RA 6735
is incomplete, inadequate or wanting
in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned.
The Government arising from EDSA
I was extra-constitutional while
EDSA II was a constitutional
exercise of the right to free speech,
freedom of assembly, and to petition
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

the government for redress

Lambino v. COMELEC (Labino
Group People’s Initiative)
Petitioners seek review of
COMELEC decision denying due
course to a people’s initiative to
amend the 1987 Constitution
The constituent power reserved to
people under Art. XVII Sec 2 is
limited to the power to propose
amendments to, not revision of , the
Constitution
Moreover, “direct proposal by the
people” means that the petition
signed by the people should contain
full text of the proposed amendments
to the Constitution

and local position is deemed the latest

D. METHODS OF INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION
Words given their ordinary meaning [Verba
Legis] —!Then there is no occasion for
resource to other means of interpretation. It is
presumed that words in construction have
been carefully selected to give a definite
meaning and the framers and the people
adopting it intended what they said.
In case of ambiguity, the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of the framers
[Ratio Legis Est Anima] — Intent must be
gathered from the letter and spirit of the
document.
Construction as a whole [Ut Res Magis
Valeat Quam Pereat] — If there is
repugnance, Courts must harmonize them.
This is on the theory that the document was
prepared and intended as a consistent whole.
Every part must be given effect — Court
should avoid construction which renders any
provision meaningless or inoperative and must
lean in favor of construction rather than
idle/nugatory.
Conflicting provisions harmonized — If
there is conflict between a general and a
specific provision, the special provisions must
prevail since it will be considered as a limitation
on the general rule. Where one provision
cannot be considered an exception to another,
and there is conflict, the last in order of time
Page 6 of 116
expression of the will of the people.
Doctrine of Necessary Implication —
Whatever is necessary to render effective a
provision, whether a grant of power of right or
prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed
implied or intended in the provision itself
[Nitafan v. COMELEC, Gatmaytan].
BASIC CONCEPTS
A. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
Art. II, 1987 Constitution: Declaration of
Principles and State Policies
- Sections 1-6: Binding rules which must be
observed in the conduct of government
[Bernas].
- Sections 7-28: Guidelines for the
Orientation of the State [Bernas]
The Philippines is a Democratic and
Republican State
Section 1: The Philippines is a democratic
and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
The Philippines, under the 1987 Constitution,
is not just a representative government but also
shares some aspects of direct democracy such
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

as, for instance, the “initiative and referendum” 4. Pacta sunt servanda (international
under Art. VI, Sec. 32 [Bernas] agreements must be performed in good
faith)
Renunciation of War
The classical formulation in international law
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as
sees those customary rules accepted as
an instrument of national policy, adopts the
binding result from the combination of two
generally accepted principles of international
elements:
law as part of the law of the land and adheres
1. The established, widespread, and
to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
consistent practice on the part of States;
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
and
nations.
2. A psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as
Only refers to wars of aggression, not to law or necessity) [Mijares v. Rañada,
defensive war. G.R. No. 139325 (2005)].

Adoption of Generally Accepted Principles International customary rules are accepted as

of International Law binding as a result from the combination of two
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law elements:
can become part of the sphere of domestic law 1. The established, widespread, and
either by transformation or incorporation. consistent practice on the part of States;
and
Transformation: Requires that an 2. A psychological element known as the
international law be transformed into a opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as
domestic law through a constitutional to law or necessity) [Poe-Llamanzares v.
mechanism such as local legislation. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].

Incorporation: When, by mere constitutional Civilian Supremacy

declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times,
[Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. Of supreme over the military. The Armed
the Philippines v. Duque III, G.R. No. 173034 Forces of the Philippines is the protector of
(2007)] the people and the State. Its goal is to secure
the sovereignty of the State and the integrity
Generally accepted principles of international of the national territory.
law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the The supremacy of civilian authority over the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land military is implemented under the 1987
even if they do not derive from treaty Constitution with the President as
obligations. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
"Generally accepted principles of
international law" - norms of general or Civilian authority (Section 3, Article II) is not
customary international law which are binding defeated in a joint task force between the PNP
on all states, i.e, and Marines for the enforcement of law and
1. Renunciation of war as an instrument of order in Metro Manila as long as control is left
national policy, to the PNP [IBP v. Zamora (2000)].
2. The principle of sovereign immunity,
3. A person's right to life, liberty and due Role of the Armed Forces
process, and a. Protector of the people and the State
b. Secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory
Page 7 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Compulsory military and civil service
Section 4. The prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military or civil service.
N.B. Under conditions provided by law.
Maintenance of Peace and Order,
Promotion of General Welfare
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.
Recognition of Hierarchy of Rights [Bernas;
Sec. 5, supra]
a. Life
b. Liberty
c. Property
Separation of Church and State
Section 6. The separation of Church and
State shall be inviolable.
The fact that R.A. No. 3350 grants a privilege
to members of said religious sects cannot by
itself render the Act unconstitutional, for the Act
only restores to them their freedom of
association which closed shop agreements
have taken away and puts them in the same
plane as the other workers who are not
prohibited by their religion from joining labor
unions [Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers,
G.R. No. L-25246, 1974].
The duty of the state to inculcate values of
patriotism and nationalism such as a flag salute
cannot intrude into other fundamental rights,
such as the right to religion [Ebralinag v.
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,
G.R. No. 95770, 1993].
Page 8 of 116
Independent Foreign Policy
Section 7. The State shall pursue an
independent foreign policy. In its relations
with other states, the paramount
consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.
Paramount consideration: national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national
interest, and the right to self-determination
Freedom from Nuclear Weapons
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with
the national interest, adopts and pursues a
policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.
Promote a Just and Dynamic Social Order
Section 9. The State shall promote a just
and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation
and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social
services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of
life for all.
Promote Social Justice in All Phases of
National Development
Section 10. The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development.
Personal Dignity and Human Rights
Section 11. The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Family as Basic Social Institution and
Natural and Primary Right and Duty of
Parents in the Rearing of the Youth
Section 12. The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
The right and duty referred to here is primary,
not exclusive.
The State, as parens patriae, has an inherent
right to aid parents in the moral development of
the youth. Hence, the provision in the RH Law
mandating the teaching of age- and
development- appropriate reproductive health
education is not per se unconstitutional; a
ruling on its constitutionality would be
premature absent an actual curriculum
formulated by the Dept. of Education [Imbong
v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, Apr. 8, 2014, on
the constitutionality of the RH Law].
Quezon City’s imposed curfew does not violate
Section 12, Art. II of the Constitution because
the curfew was done within the role of the State
as parens patriae. While parents have a
primary role in raising a child, “when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
State may act to promote these legitimate
interests”, especially in cases that may bring
harm to a child or to public safety. This
overrides a parent’s right to control upbringing
of a child. The state is mandated to support
parents in exercise of rights and duties, and
state authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather complementary to parental supervision.
The Curfew Ordinances merely serve as legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in
promoting their child’s welfare. Though these
are inherently limiting on the part of the minor,
this is necessary because the youth is
vulnerable and inexperienced, and “their moral
Page 9 of 116
well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental
decisions.” [SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, August 8, 2017].
Protection of the Life of the Mother and the Life
of the Unborn from Conception
The question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided
[in the RH petitions] without proper hearing and
evidence [Imbong v. Ochoa, supra].
Vital Role of Youth in Nation-Building
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Role of Women in Nation Building
Fundamental Equality Before the Law of
Women and Men
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of
women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men.
Right to Health
Section 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology
Section 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Priority to Education, Science, and
Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports
Section 17. The State shall give priority to
education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and
development.
Labor as a Primary Social Economic Force
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a
primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their
welfare.
Self-Reliant and Independent National
Economy
Section 19. The State shall develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Role of Private Sector
Section 20. The State recognizes the
indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investments.
Comprehensive Rural Development and
Agrarian Reform
Section 21. The State shall promote
comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.
Recognition and Promotion of Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 22. The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Page 10 of 116
Community-Based, Sectoral Organizations
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-
governmental, community-based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation.
Rule of Communication and Information in
Nation-Building
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital
role of communication and information in
nation-building.
Autonomy of Local Governments
Section 25. The State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments.
Equal Access for Public Service and
Prohibition of Political Dynasties
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law.
The state policy against political dynasties is
not self-executing. It does not provide a
judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. [Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, Nov. 19, 2013]
Honesty and Integrity in Public Service
Section 27. The State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.
Policy of Full Public Disclosure
Section 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
B. SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty is the supreme and
uncontrollable power inherent in the State by
which the state is governed.
Two kinds of sovereignty:
1. Legal Sovereignty — authority which has
the power to issue final commands
2. Political Sovereignty — power behind the
legal sovereign, or the sum total of all the
influences that operate upon it
Sovereignty may also be internal or
external:
1. Internal Sovereignty — refers to the power
of the state to control its domestic or
internal affairs
2. External Sovereignty — the power of the
State to direct its relations with other states,
also known as independence
Section 1, Article II. The Philippines is a
democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Territorial Jurisdiction — authority of State to
have all within its [territorial] bounds to be
subject to control and protection.
Personal Jurisdiction — authority of the state
over all its nationals, their person, property,
and acts, whether within or outside its territory
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction — authority of
state over persons, things, and acts outside of
its territorial limits as it affects the people of the
state
C. STATE IMMUNITY
Summary of Rule
General Rule: The State cannot be sued
Exception: When the State consents to be
sued. How consent is given:
1. Express
Page 11 of 116
a. Through general law; or
b. Through special law
2. Implied
a. When the State enter into business
contracts with individuals
(performing proprietary functions);
b. When the State commences
litigation and becomes vulnerable
to counterclaim;
c. When it would be inequitable for
the State to invoke immunity; and
d. In eminent domain cases.
In instances of Money claims:
When a money judgment is given against the
government, the ordinary rule for execution
would not apply, for the consent of the
government to be sued is only up to the point
of judgment. If it does not pay, it cannot be
compelled to pay by attachment or otherwise
CONCEPTS
STATE
A community of persons, more or less
numerous, permanently occupying a definite
portion of territory, independent of external
control, and possessing a government to which
a great body of the inhabitants render habitual
obedience; a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control
bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Campos Rueda, G.R. No.
13250 (1971)].
The state as a person of international law
should possess the following qualifications: (a)
a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other states [Art. 1,
Montevideo Convention].
Constitutional Basis
Section 3, Article XVI. The State may not
be sued without its consent.
International Law Basis
“Par in parem non habet imperium.”
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Jurisprudential Basis
1. Positivist Theory – There can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes
the laws on which the right depends. Also
called the doctrine of Royal Prerogative of
Dishonesty. [Department of Agriculture v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 104269 (1993)]
2. Sociological Theory – If the State is
amenable to suits, all its time would be
spent defending itself from suits and this
would prevent it from performing its other
functions [Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. L-
30671 (1973)].
Two Theories of Sovereign Immunity (US v.
Ruiz)
1. Absolute Theory — A sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent
in the courts of another sovereign.
○ This derives from the principle of
sovereign equality found in Article
2(1) of the UN Charter as well as
generally accepted principles of
international law.
2. Restrictive Theory — The immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts (jure imperii) of state, but
not regard to private acts or acts (jure
gestionis)
● The Philippines follows the
restrictive theory.
Suits Against the State
A suit against the state will only prosper if the
state gives its express consent.
When is a suit against the State?
1. If it produces adverse consequences to
public treasury in terms of disbursement as
well as loss of government property,
regardless of the defense;
2. When the Republic is sued in its name;
3. When the suit is against an unincorporated
government agency; and
4. Even when the suit, on its face, is against
an officer but liability will belong to/fall on
the government.
When is a suit NOT against the State?
1. When suits engage in matters partaking
more of the nature of ordinary business
Page 12 of 116
rather than functions of a governmental or
political character;
2. When the purpose of the suit is to compel
an officer charged with the duty of making
payments pursuant to an appropriation
made by law in favor of the plaintiff to make
such payment, since the suit is intended to
compel performance of a ministerial duty
[Begosa v. Philippine Veterans
Association, G.R. No. L-25916(1970)];
3. When, from the allegations in the
complaint, it is clear that the respondent is
a public officer sued in a private capacity;
4. When the action is not in personam with the
government as the named defendant, but
an action in rem that does not name the
government in particular.
Action in personam v. Action in rem
1. Action in personam — the government as
the named defendant.
2. Action in rem — does not name the
government in particular.
Official Capacity v. Personal Capacity
The doctrine of non-suability applies only in
cases wherein the complaint is against officials
of state for acts performed in discharge of
duties or his official capacity. When officials
abuse this authority gravely (like discriminatory
behavior), this is no longer an official state act
and the official may now be sued in his
personal capacity [Shauf v. CA].
Beyond Scope of Authority
When officials, while discharging their official
functions, commit acts that are beyond their
scope of authority (i.e. police forces firing upon
civilians and killing them, mistakenly believing
they were Communists), they will be liable in
their personally capacity and thus will not be
covered by state immunity [Republic v.
Sandoval].
Waiver of Immunity
When the State expressly states their consent
to be sued through legislation (including
treaties), it waives its immunity from suit.
However, this waiver of immunity may be
limited to certain legal actions (i.e. under the
VFA, there is a waiver of immunity by the US
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
under criminal jurisdiction but not to civil
actions) [Arigo v. Swift].
CONSENT TO BE SUED
Express Consent
Effected only by the will of the legislature
through the medium of a duly enacted statute;
may be embodied either in a general law or a
special law.
General Law
Authorizes any person who meets the
conditions stated in the law to sue the
government in accordance with the procedure
in the law; e.g.
a. Money claims arising from contract
express or implied
Act No. 3083: An Act Defining the Conditions
under which the Government of the Philippines
may be sued.
Sec. 1. Subject to the provisions of this Act,
the Government of the Philippines hereby
consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties.
Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of
the privilege herein conferred must show that
he has presented his claim to the
Commission on Audit and that the latter did
not decide the same within two months from
the date of its presentation. xxx
Sec. 5. When the Government of the
Philippines is plaintiff in an action instituted
in any court of original jurisdiction, the
defendant shall have the right to assert
therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a
similar action between private parties. xxx
b. Torts
1. Liability of local government units
● Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for damages for the
Page 13 of 116
death or injuries suffered by any
person by reason of the defective
conditions of roads, streets, public
buildings and other public works under
their control and supervision [Art.
2189, CC].
2. Vicarious liability for special agents
• The Government is only liable for the
acts of its agents, officers and
employees, when they act as special
agents within the meaning of the
provision [Art. 2180(6), CC].
3. Liability under the Local Government Code
4. Local government units and their officials
are not exempt from liability for death or
injury to persons or damage to property
[Sec. 24, LGC].
Special Agent — One who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official [Merritt v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L- 11154(1916)].
One who performs his regular functions, even
if he is called a “special agent”, is not a special
agent within the context of Government liability
[USA v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, (1990)].
Special Law — May come in the form of a
private bill authorizing a named individual to
bring suit on a special claim
Implied consent
a. In instances when the State takes private
property for public use or purpose (eminent
domain)
b. When the State enters into a business
contract (in jure gestionis or proprietary
functions)
c. When it would be inequitable for the State
to invoke its immunity.
d. If the government files a complaint, the
defendant may file a counterclaim against
it. When the state files a complaint,
suability will result only where the
government is claiming affirmative relief
from the defendant.
Note: When the DOTC constructed the
encroaching structures and subsequently
entered into the FLA with Digitel for their
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign
function. Therefore, these are acts jure imperii
that fall within the cloak of state immunity.
However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen. The SC, citing Ministerio v
CFI (1971), held that when the government
takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it
makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. The Department's entry
into and taking of possession of the
respondents' property amounted to an implied
waiver of its governmental immunity from suit
[DOTC v. Sps. Abecina, G.R. No. 206484
(2016)].
SPECIFIC RULES
Suits against Government Agencies:
Depends on whether the agency is
incorporated (i.e. there is a separate charter) or
unincorporated (i.e. no separate personality).
a. Incorporated: If the charter provides that
the agency can sue, then the suit will lie.
The provision in the charter constitutes
express consent [See SSS v. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 707 (1983)].
b. Unincorporated: There must be an inquiry
unto the principal functions of government.
i. If governmental: No suit without
consent [Bureau of Printing v.
Bureau of Printing Employees
Association (1961)].
ii. If proprietary: Suit will lie, because
when the state engages in
principally proprietary functions, it
descends to the level of a private
individual, and may, therefore be
vulnerable to suit. [Civil
Aeronautics Administration v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
51806 (1988)]. State may only be
liable for proprietary acts (jure
gestionis) and not for sovereign
acts (jure imperii).
Page 14 of 116
Type Function Rule
Governmen CAN be sued
tal or ONLY IF
Incorporated
proprietary charter
allows
Governmen CANNOT be
tal sued unless
Unincorpora- consent is
ted given
Proprietary CAN be sued
Note: The mantle of the State's immunity from
suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being
a government-owned and -controlled
corporation. Under Sec. 6(i) of PD No. 757,
which was its charter, the NHA could sue and
be sued. There is no question that the NHA
could sue or be sued, and thus could be held
liable under the judgment rendered against it.
But the universal rule remains to be that the
State, although it gives its consent to be sued
either by general or special law, may limit the
claimant's action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution.
The power of the court ends when the
judgment is rendered because government
funds and property may not be seized pursuant
to writs of execution or writs of garnishment to
satisfy such judgments. The functions and
public services of the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public fund from their legitimate and specific
objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule
is based on obvious considerations of public
policy [National Housing Authority v. Roxas,
G.R. No. 171953 (2015)].
Suits against Public Officers
General Rule: The doctrine of state immunity
also applies to complaints filed against officials
of the State for acts performed by them in the
discharge of their duties within the scope of
their authority.
Exception: The doctrine of immunity from suit
will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his (1) private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

for (2) acts without authority or in excess of the effective operation of a policy adopted to
powers vested in him [Lansang v. CA, G.R. No. protect the public, or in those special cases
102667 (2000)]. where the interest of justice clearly required it.

Note: Acts done without authority are not acts
of the State (see Beyond Scope of Authority).
Exceptions to Prior Consent Rule
Jurisprudence provides these exceptions,
when the State or public officer may be sued
without prior consent:
1. To compel the State or public officer to do
an act required by law;
2. To restrain the State or public officer from
enforcing an act claimed to be
unconstitutional
3. To compel the payment of damages from
an already appropriated assurance fund or
to refund tax over-payments from a fund
already available for the purpose;
4. To secure a judgment that the officer
impleaded may satisfy by himself without
the State having to do a positive act to
assist him;
5. Where the government itself has violated
its own laws [Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R.
No. L-46930 (1988)].
SCOPE OF CONSENT
Consent to be sued is not a concession of
liability: Suability depends on the consent of
the state to be sued, and liability on the
applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable, but it can
never be held liable if it does not first consent
to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove that it is liable [United
States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
(1990)].
ESTOPPEL
General Rule: The State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials
or agents. [Republic v. Galeno, G.R. No.
215009 (2017)].
Exception: Estoppel may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the
Page 15 of 116
Respondent had already acquired a vested
right on the tax classification of its San Mig
Light as a new brand. To allow petitioner to
change its position will result in deficiency
assessments in substantial amounts against
respondent to the latter's prejudice
[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San
Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 205045 &
205723 (2017)].
D. SEPARATION OF
POWERS
Ordains that each of the 3 branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and
is supreme in matters falling within its
constitutionally allocated sphere; each branch
cannot invade the domain of others. Powers of
the government are separated to avoid
concentration of powers in any one branch
[Gatmaytan].
The government established by the
Constitution follows the theory of separation of
powers. Separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government and is
founded on the belief that, by establishing
equilibrium among the three (3) power holders,
harmony will result and power will not be
concentrated and tyranny will be avoided
[Bernas]. Any system that is violative of the
principle of separation of powers is
unconstitutional and void [See Belgica v.
Ochoa on the unconstitutionality of the PDAF].
The Philippine government is divided into three
(3) branches of government, namely:
1. Legislative
2. Executive; and
3. Judiciary
The principle of separation of powers ordains
that each of the three government branches
has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. It intends to secure action, to
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
forestall over-action, to prevent despotism, and
to promote efficiency
While the separation of powers is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it obtains from
actual division in the Constitution (found in Sec.
1 of Arts. VI, VII, and VIII). Each department
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere (see Angara v. Electoral Commission).
Political Question Doctrine
A question of which a resolution has been
vested by the Constitution exclusively in the
people, or in which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to a co-equal branch of the
government (separation of powers) cannot be
decided upon by the Courts.
This is as opposed to a justiciable question
which deals with matters re: the law and its
interpretation, not left to the wisdom of the
people.
Application
A. Belgica v. Ochoa
The Pork Barrel System violates the separation
of powers because it is a form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget.
1. The system permits legislative
encroachment upon the executive
prerogative of implementing the law, by
giving individual legislators: (a) The power
to determine projects after the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) is passed; and
(b) through congressional committees,
authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment, the system encroaches on the
Executive’s power to implement the law.
2. Furthermore, identification of a project by a
legislator being a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a source
of funds, his act becomes indispensable in
the entire budget execution process.
B. Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973
(2016)
In the exercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Executive Order No. 292
Page 16 of 116
(Administrative Code of 1987), to allow the
internment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a
land of the public domain devoted for national
military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy
based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness. There being
no taint of grave abuse of discretion, as
discussed below, President Duterte’s decision
on that political question is outside the ambit of
judicial review.
C. Forietrans Manufacturing Corporation v.
Davidoff Et Cia. SA, G.R. No. 197482 (2017)
The task of determining probable cause is
lodged with the public prosecutor and
ultimately, the Secretary of Justice. Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, courts have
no right to directly decide matters over which
full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Executive Branch of the Government.
D. OCA v. Reyes, A.M. No. P-08- 2535 (2010)
The legislative power imposing policies
through laws is subject to the substantive and
constitutional limitations. It cannot limit the
Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions
against erring justices, judges and court
personnel. Neither should such policy be used
to restrict the Court’s power to preserve and
maintain the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and
integrity and public confidence that can only be
achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards
of decency and propriety governing the
conduct of justices, judges and court
employees
E. CHECKS AND
BALANCES
Corollary to Separation of Powers: Prevent
authority from being concentrated in one
branch. Each branch is supreme within their
own sphere
It does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government [Angara v.
Electoral Commission].
Congressional oversight is not per se violative,
but is integral to separation of powers.
However, for a post-enactment congressional
measure to be valid, it must be limited to:
1. Scrutiny: Congress’ power of
appropriation, i.e. budget hearings, and
power of confirmation
2. Investigation and monitoring of
implementation of laws: using its power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
[Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R.
No. 166715, August 14, 2008]. Note: A
fuller discussion on congressional
oversight is provided in Macalintal v.
COMELEC, which concludes with the
Supreme Court "[adopting] the separate
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part
of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of
Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189
insofar as they relate to the creation of and
the powers given to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee."
Suggest to confine oversight discussion
under Part V on the Legislative
Department.
A legislative veto, i.e. statutory provision (which
may take the form of a congressional oversight
committee) that requires the President or an
agency to submit the proposed implementing
rules and regulations of a law to Congress for
approval, is unconstitutional. It encroaches on:
1. The Executive: it allows Congress to take
a direct role in the enforcement of its laws;
2. The Judiciary: administrative issuances
enjoy a presumption of validity, and only
the courts may decide whether or not they
conform to statutes or the Constitution
[Abakada Guro Partylist v. Purisima, G.R.
No. 166715, August 14, 2008]
Page 17 of 116
Application
The Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional,
among others, because it violates the system
of checks and balances.
1. It deprives the president of his item-veto
power. As lump-sum appropriations, the
actual projects under each congressman’s
PDAF are determined (by the
congressman) only after the GAA is
passed. The president, then, would not be
able to discern whether or not he should
veto the appropriation.
2. It has a detrimental effect on
Congressional Oversight. Because
legislators effectively intervene in project
implementation, it becomes difficult for
them to exercise their (valid) post-
enactment role of scrutinizing,
investigating, or monitoring the
implementation of the law, when they are
no longer disinterested observers [Belgica,
supra].
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, providing that the
President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman,
is unconstitutional. Subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials
in the Executive department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot
but seriously place at risk the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the
constitutionally-granted independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence
that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of
the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the
creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman
must equally and necessarily be true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties.
The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to
place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is,
if only because they are subject to pressures
and controls external to her Office [Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231,
Jan. 28, 2014].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
F. DELEGATION OF
POWERS
Rule of Non-Delegation of Legislative
Power
Principle: Delegata potestas non potest
delegari – What has been delegated can no
longer be delegated.
Rationale: Since the powers of the government
have been delegated to them by the people,
who possess original sovereignty, these
powers cannot be further delegated by the
different government departments to some
other branch or instrumentality of the
government.
The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely
legislative power which can never be delegated
is the authority to make a complete law -
complete as to the time when it shall take effect
and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to
determine the expediency of its enactment. It is
the nature of the power and not the liability of
its use or the manner of its exercise which
determines the validity of its delegation.
General Rule: Only Congress (as a body) may
exercise legislative power.
Exceptions
a. Delegated legislative power to local
governments: Local governments, as an
immemorial practice, may be allowed to
legislate on purely local matters [See Rubi
v. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-14078
(1919) cited in Belgica, supra. See also
Const., Art. X, Sec. 9, explicitly mentioning
“legislative bodies of local governments;”
and Sec. 20 providing for the coverage of
legislative powers delegated to
autonomous regions via the latter’s organic
acts].
b. Constitutionally-grafted Exceptions
i. Emergency power delegated to the
Executive during the State of War
Page 18 of 116
or National Emergency [Sec. 23(2),
Art. VI]; and
ii. Certain taxing powers of the
President [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI]. The
Congress may authorize the
President to fix, within specified
limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the
national development program of
the Government.
c. The extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum [Sec.
1, Art. VI].
Subordinate legislation made by
administrative agencies
The principle of non- delegability should not be
confused with the delegated rule-making
authority of implementing agencies [Belgica,
supra]. Strictly speaking, what is delegated is
not “law-making” power, but rule-making
power, limited to (a) filling up the details of the
law; or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law
into actual operation.
Traditional/Simplified Formulation: Who
may exercise legislative powers:
General Rule: Congress only.
Exceptions (PLATE):
(P) Delegation to the people (by initiative and
referendum)
(L) Delegation to the local governments
(A) Delegation to the administrative bodies
○ Increasing complexity of the task of
government
○ Lack of technical competence of
Congress
○ Administrative bodies may fill up details
of statute for implementation
○ Legislature may pass “contingent
legislation”, which leaves to another
body the business of ascertaining facts
(T) Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Constitution (Art. 6, Sec. 28(2))
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

(E) Delegation of emergency powers to the ● Simplicity, sufficiency, and

President under Constitution (Art. 6, Sec. economy
23(2))
Note: Acts which are purely legislative in
Note: The President did not proclaim a national character (e.g. making of laws) cannot be
emergency, only a state of emergency in the delegated to an administrative body (in
three places in ARMM. And she did not act contrast to the ascertainment of facts or the
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that filling in of details which can be delegated to
authorized her to exercise extraordinary administrative agencies).
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly G. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
vests in the President. She did not need a OF THE STATE
congressional authority to exercise the same
[Ampatuan v. Puno, G.R. No. 190259 (2011)].
The following are inherent in a State,
There is neither an express prohibition nor an inseparable from its sovereignty; hence, can be
express grant of authority in the Constitution for exercised even without being expressly
Congress to delegate to regional or local granted in the Constitution or laws. However,
legislative bodies the power to create local the conditions for their exercise can be
government units. However, under its plenary regulated and limited [De Leon].
legislative powers, Congress can delegate to 1. Police Power;
local legislative bodies the power to create 2. Eminent Domain; and
local government units, subject to reasonable 3. Taxation
standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution [Sema v.
1. Police Power
COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597 (2008)].
Definition
Test for Valid Delegation
It is the inherent and plenary power of the state
Rule: There is a valid delegation of legislative
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to
power when it passes the following tests –
the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
a. Completeness test: The law sets forth the
[Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
policy to be executed, carried out, or
Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, G.R. No.
implemented by the delegate (Abakada,
L-24693 (1967)]
supra), such that there is nothing left for the
delegate to do but to enforce the law
The police power of the state is a power
[Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-
coextensive with self-protection, and is not
23825(1965)]; and
inaptly termed the “law of the overruling
b. Sufficient Standard Test: The standard is
necessity” [Rubi v. Provincial Board of
sufficient if it defines legislative policy,
Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078 (1919)]
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
Police power, while incapable of an exact
It indicates the circumstances under which
definition, has been purposely veiled in general
the legislative command is to be effected
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
[Edu v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-32096 (1970)].
meet all exigencies and provide enough room
The standard must specify the limits of the
for an efficient and flexible response as the
delegates authority, announce the
conditions warrant” [White Light Corporation v.
legislative policy and identify the conditions
City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846 (2009)].
under which it is to be implemented, e.g.:
● Public interest
● Justice and equity
Page 19 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Scope and Limitations
“The state in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons may be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general c.omfort, health and
prosperity of the state and to this fundamental
aim of our Government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated” [Ortigas and Co.,
Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust
Co., G.R. No. L- 24670 (1979)].
As police power derives its existence from the
very existence of the State itself, it does not
need to be expressed or defined in its scope.
XXX So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State;
what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the
due process clause and the equal protection
clause. [Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995
(1957)].
Police power has been characterized as the
most essential, insistent, and the least limitable
of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs [Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila,
supra)].
Taxation and Eminent Domain as
Implements on Police Power
Taxation may be used as an implement of
police power [Lutz v. Araneta, G.R. No. L-7859
(1955)].
Eminent domain may be used as an implement
to attain the police objective. [Association of
Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 78742, (1989)]
Specific Coverage
1. Public Health
2. Public Safety
3. Public Morals
4. General Welfare [Abe v. Foster Wheeler
Corporation, G.R. No. L-14785 & L-14923
(1960)]
Page 20 of 116
Who may Exercise Police Power
Generally: Legislature
Delegated
1. President
2. Administrative Bodies
3. Law-making Bodies of LGUs
Limitations on Delegation of Police Power
1. Express grant by law;
2. Within the territorial jurisdiction of LGUs;
and
3. Must not be contrary to law
TEST OF VALID EXERCISE
A. Means Purpose Test
1. Lawful Subject - the interests of the public,
generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference
and that the subject of the measure is
within the scope of the police power
[Ichong v. Hernandez, supra].
2. Lawful Means - the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals
[National Development Company v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 84132-
33 (1990)]
B. Reasonability Test
The limit to police power is reasonability. The
Court looks at the test of reasonability to decide
whether it encroaches on the right of an
individual. So long as legitimate means can
reasonably lead to create that end, it is
reasonable [Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387,
(1968)].
Application
The PWD mandatory discount on the purchase
of medicine is supported by a valid objective or
purpose as aforementioned. It has a valid
subject considering that the concept of public
use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held
synonymous with public interest, public benefit,
public welfare, and public convenience. As in
the case of senior citizens, the discount
privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is
actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

to which these citizens belong. The means branded or generic, is valid [Carlos Superdrug
employed in invoking the active Corporation v. DSWC et al. G.R. No. 166494,
participation of the private sector, in order (2007)].
to achieve the purpose or objective of the
law, is reasonably and directly related. 2. Eminent Domain
Also, the means employed to provide a fair,
just and quality health care to PWDs are Definition
reasonably related to its accomplishment, The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right
and are not oppressive, considering that as a of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only
form of reimbursement, the discount extended the public but the private property of all citizens
to PWDs in the purchase of medicine can be within the territorial sovereignty, to public
claimed by the establishments as allowable tax purpose [Republic v. Heirs of Borbon, G.R. No.
deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 165354 (2015)].
9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF
Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009. Otherwise Scope and Limitations
stated, the discount reduces taxable income The exercise of such right is not unlimited, for
upon which the tax liability of the two mandatory requirements should underlie
establishments is computed [Drugstores the Government’s exercise of the power of
Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. National eminent domain, namely:
Council on Disability Affairs, G.R. No. 194561, (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and
(2016)]. (2) that just compensation be paid to the
property owner [Mactan-Cebu International
Exercise of Police Power is subject to
Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., G.R. No.
judicial inquiry
176625 (2010)].
Legislature’s determination as to what is a
proper exercise of its police powers is not final
The power of eminent domain is the inherent
or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision
right of the State to condemn private property
of the court [US v. Toribio, G.R. No. L-5060
to public use upon payment of just
(1910)].
compensation.
However, courts cannot delimit beforehand the
It is well settled that eminent domain is an
extent or scope of the police power, since they
inherent power of the State that need not be
cannot foresee the needs and demands of
granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9,
public interest and welfare. So it is that
Art. III merely imposes a limit on the
Constitutions do not define the scope or extent
government’s exercise of this power [Republic
of the police power of the State; what they do
v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079 (1998)].
is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most
important of these are the due process clause
Who may Exercise Eminent Domain
and the equal protection clause [Ichong v.
Generally: Legislature
Hernandez, supra]
Delegated (through charter):
Example of a Legitimate Exercise of Police
1. LGUs
Power
2. Other Government entities
RA 9257, the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of
2003, is a legitimate exercise of police power.
The repository of eminent domain powers is
Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the
the legislature, i.e. exercised through the
Department of Health, providing that the 20%
enactment of laws. But power may be
discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be
delegated to LGUs and other government
limited to the purchase of unbranded generic
entities (via charter); still, the delegation must
medicine but shall extend to both prescription
be by law [Manapat v. CA, G.R. No. 110478
and non-prescription medicine, whether
(2007)].
Page 21 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Requisites for the Valid Exercise of Eminent
Domain
1. Necessity
2. Private Property
3. Public Use
4. Taking
5. Just Compensation
6. Due Process
1. Necessity
There must be a necessity which must be of
public character [Manapat v. CA, supra].
Difference as to the exercising officer
a. If Congress exercises the power of eminent
domain, the question of necessity is a political
question.
b. If a delegate exercises such power under a
general authority, the question of necessity is a
justiciable question.
c. If a delegate exercises such power under a
special authority for a special purpose, the
question of necessity is a political question
[Manapat v. CA, supra].
2. Private Property
General Rule: All private property capable of
ownership may be expropriated and it may
include public utility and services [Republic v.
PLDT, G.R. No. 18841, January 27, 1961].
Exceptions
a. Money
b. Choses in Action
Chose in Action
It is a personal right not reduced into
possession such as debts owed by another
person; it is the right to recover a debt,
demand, or damages on a cause of action ex
contractu or for a tort or omission of a duty.
[Black’s Law Dictionary].
3. Public Use
Public use includes not only use directly
available to the public but also those which
redound to their indirect benefit [Heirs of
Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553-
55 (1983)].
Page 22 of 116
As long as the public has the right of use,
whether exercised by one or many members of
public, a public advantage or public benefit
accrues sufficient to constitute a public use
[Manosca v. CA, G.R. No. 106440 (1995)].
4. Taking
There is taking of property when the following
are present [Republic v. Castellvi, G.R. No. L-
20620 (1974)]:
1. the expropriator must enter a private
property
2. the entrance into private property must be
for more than a momentary period
3. the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority
4. the property must be devoted to a public
use
5. the utilization of the property ousts the
owner and deprives him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property
Not an instance of taking
Imposition of restrictions on the use of property
to protect the public health safety or morals
from danger is not taking as there is no
dedication to public use [Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742 (1989)].
5. Just Compensation
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the
word "compensation" and to convey thereby
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, and ample [National
Transmission Corporation v. Oroville
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 223366
(2017)].
Determination of Just Compensation
General Rule: Computed at the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation (Sec. 4,
Rule 67, ROC)
Exception: At the time of taking, when taking
precedes filing of the complaint.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
It is also important to note that inflation will not
be considered in determining what the value is
[Nepomuceno v CA, G.R. No. 166246 (2008)].
Determination of Just Compensation is a
Judicial Function
The determination of just compensation is a
judicial function. The executive or legislature
may make the initial determination but when a
party claims a violation in the Bill of Rights, no
statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court’s mandate [EPZA v.
Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, (1987)]
Difference between Eminent Domain and
Regulatory Taking
1) Eminent domain is an inherent power of the
State based on the Constitution. Just
compensation must be paid.
2) Regulatory taking is the exercise of the State
of its police power. In this case, just
compensation need not be paid.
Two stages of Eminent Domain
1. Determination of the authority of the
expropriator to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise
2. Determination by the court of the just
compensation
[Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No.
69260 (1989)]
3. Taxation
Definition
It is the power by which the State raises
revenue to defray the necessary expenses of
the Government. It is the enforced proportional
contributions from persons and property, levied
by the State by virtue of its sovereignty, for the
support of the government and for all public
needs.
It is as broad as the purpose for which it is
given.
Purpose:
1. To raise revenue
2. Tool for regulation
3. Protection/power to keep alive
Page 23 of 116
Lifeblood theory and Necessity theory
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for
without taxes, the government can neither exist
nor endure. A principal attribute of
sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power
derives its source from the very existence of
the state whose social contract with its citizens
obliges it to promote public interest and
common good. The theory behind the exercise
of the power to tax emanates from
necessity; without taxes, government cannot
fulfill its mandate of promoting the general
welfare and well-being of the people. [NPC v.
Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, (2003)]
Tax for special purpose
Treated as a special fund and paid out for such
purpose only; when purpose is fulfilled, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the
general funds of the Government [Sec. 29 (3),
Art. VI].
Requisites [Sec. 28(1), Art. VI]
a. Uniform and Equitable
Taxes should be (a) uniform (persons or things
belonging to the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate) and (b) equitable (taxes should
be apportioned among the people according to
their ability to pay)
b. Progressive system of taxation
The rate increases as the tax base increases,
with social justice as basis (Taxation here is an
instrument for a more equitable distribution of
wealth).
c. Delegated tax legislation
Congress may delegate law-making authority
when the Constitution itself specifically
authorizes it.
Scope and Limitation
General Limitations
(1) Power to tax exists for the general welfare;
should be exercised only for a public purpose
(2) Might be justified as for public purpose even
if the immediate beneficiaries are private
individuals
(3) Tax should not be confiscatory: If a tax
measure is so unconscionable as to amount to
confiscation of property, the Court will
invalidate it. But invalidating a tax measure
must be exercised with utmost caution,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
otherwise, the State’s power to legislate for the
public welfare might be seriously curtailed.
(4) Taxes should be uniform and equitable
[Sec. 28(1), Art. VI]
Judicial review for unconscionable and
unjust tax amounting to confiscation of
property
The legislature has discretion to determine the
nature, object, extent, coverage, and situs of
taxation. But where a tax measure becomes so
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to
confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate
to strike it down; the power to tax cannot
override constitutional prescriptions. [Tan v. del
Rosario, G.R. No. 109289 (1994)]
Specific Limitations
a. Uniformity of taxation
General Rule: Simply geographical uniformity,
meaning it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is
found
Exception: Rule does not prohibit
classification for purposes of taxation, provided
Page 24 of 116
the requisites for valid classification are met
[Ormoc Sugar v. Treasurer of Ormoc, G.R. No.
L- 23793 (1968)].
b. Tax Exemptions
No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of Congress [Sec. 28 (4), Art.
VI].
There is no vested right in a tax exemption.
Being a mere statutory privilege, a tax
exemption may be modified or withdrawn at will
by the granting authority [Republic v. Caguioa,
G.R. No. 168584 (2007)].
Exemptions may either be constitutional or
statutory:
1. Constitutional exemptions [Sec. 28(3), Art.
VI]
2. If statutory, it has to have been passed by
majority of all the members of Congress [Sec.
28 (4), Art. VI]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Police Power Eminent Domain Taxation

1. As to concept Power to make and Power to take private Power to enforce
implement laws for property for public use contribution to raise
the general welfare with just government funds
compensation
2. As to scope Broad in application Merely a power to Plenary,
as it pertains to the take private property comprehensive and
general power to for public use supreme
make and implement
laws
3. As to the Government and its Generally, by the Government and its
exercising political subdivisions government but the political subdivisions
authority power may be granted
to public service or
public utility
companies
4. As to the Promotion of general The taking of private Enforced contribution
purpose welfare property is for public is to support the
use government
5. As to Upon valid delegation, Upon valid delegation, Upon valid delegation,
delegation it may be exercised by it may be exercised by the President and the
the President, Law- the President, Law- Law-making bodies of
making Bodies of making bodies of the LGUs can exercise
LGUs, and LGUs, Public it
Administrative corporation, Quasi-
Agencies public corporation and
Administrative
agencies
6. As to the Relatively free from Superior to and may Subject to
relationship to the constitutional override constitutional Constitutional and
Constitution limitations and is impairment provision Inherent Limitations;
superior to the non- because the welfare Inferior to non-
impairment clause of the State is superior impairment clause
to any private contract
7. As to Limitation Limited by the Bounded by public Constitutional and
demand for public purpose and just Inherent Limitations
interest and due compensation
process

[VALENCIA ROXAS, Income Taxation, 7th Edition]

Page 25 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory is comprised of —
(1) Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein;
Internal waters – waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of breadth and dimension; and
(2) All other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. It
consists of —
(a) Territorial sea, seabed, subsoil,
insular shelves, and other submarine
areas
(b) Terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial
domains [Article I, 1987 Constitution]
Archipelagic Doctrine
A body of water studded with islands, or the
islands surrounded with water, is viewed as a
unity of islands and waters together forming
one integrated unit. [N.B. Embodied in Art. I,
specifically by the mention of the “Philippine
archipelago” and the specification on “internal
waters.”].
Treaty limits of the Philippine archipelago
(1) Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898:
“Spain cedes to the United States the
archipelago known as the Philippines Islands,
and comprehending the islands lying within the
following line” xxx
Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the
archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees
and seconds.
(2) Treaty of Washington of 7 November
1900 between the United States and Spain:
Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.
(3) Treaty of 12 January 1930 between the
United States and Great Britain: Ceding the
Turtle and Mangsee Islands [BERNAS (2003),
cited in Justice Velasco’s concurring opinion in
Magallona v. Ermita (2011)].
Page 26 of 116
Methods of Baseline Determination
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted
by United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Seas III (UNCLOS III) States parties to
mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts
from which baselines are drawn, either straight
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime
zones and continental shelf. UNCLOS III and
its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles
from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-
long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world's oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States' graduated authority over a
limited span of waters and submarine lands
along their coasts. XXX Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or
conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to
delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are
outside UNCLOS III and are instead governed
by the rules on general international law
[Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167 (2011)].
RA 9522 (March 10, 2009) - The current
baselines law created 101 base points around
the Philippines to determine the baseline. This
aims to demarcate the country's maritime zone
and continental shelf in accordance with
UNCLOS III and is not meant to delineate
Philippine territory. Under the Treaty of Paris,
baselines cannot be drawn from the
boundaries or other portions of the rectangular
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

area but the outermost islands and drying reefs

of the archipelago.
R.A. 9522 is not unconstitutional: (1) it is a
statutory tool to demarcate the maritime zone
and continental shelf of the Philippines under
UNCLOS III and does not alter the national
territory. (2) While UNCLOS III does not bind
the Philippines to pass a baselines law,
Congress may do so. (3) The law also does not
abandon the country's claim to Sabah, as it
does not expressly repeal the entirety of R.A.
No. 5446.
RA 9522 uses the framework of regime of
islands in determining the maritime zones of
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and
Scarborough Shoal. Regime of islands refers
to any natural formed area of land surrounded
by water that generate their own applicable
maritime zone [UNCLOS III].
Straight baseline method — consists of
drawing straight lines connecting appropriate
points on the coast without departing to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of
the coast, in order to delineate the internal
waters from the territorial waters of an
archipelago. [Note: This is the method
prescribed under the UNCLOS]
RA 9522 amends RA 3046 (as amended by RA
5446). RA 3046 determined appropriate points
of the outermost islands of the archipelago,
then connected them by means of a straight
line until all islands were surrounded or
enclosed by the imaginary lines. RA 5446
states that the definition of the baselines of the
territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago is
without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo,
over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty.
CITIZENSHIP
A. KINDS OF CITIZENSHIP AND
PURPOSE OF DISTINGUISHING
CITIZENSHIP
Art. IV, Sec. 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Classification of Citizens:
1. Natural-born citizens
2. Naturalized citizens
Natural-born Citizens
Sec. 2, Art. IV. Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph
(3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
Who are natural-born citizens
A. Citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship [Sec. 1(1) and Sec. 1(2), Art.
IV]; and
B. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Sec. 1(3), Art. IV

Page 27 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
A person who renounces all foreign citizenship
under Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 recants this
renunciation by using his foreign passport
afterwards. [Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
195649 (2013)].
Having the status of a natural-born citizen is
important for the purpose of certain political
and economic rights open only to such citizens.
Political Rights
Who must be natural-born?
(1) President [Sec. 2, Art. VII]
(2) Vice-President [Sec. 3, Art. VII]
(3) Members of Congress [Sec. 3 and 6, Art.
VI]
(4) Justices of SC and lower collegiate courts
[Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII]
(5) Ombudsman and his deputies [Sec. 8, Art.
XI]
(6) Members of Constitutional Commissions
(A) CSC [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-B]
(B) COMELEC [Sec.1, Art. IX-C]
(C) COA [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D]
(7) Members of the central monetary authority
[Sec. 20, Art. XII]
(8) Members of the Commission on Human
Rights [Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII]
The Constitutional provision (i.e. “whose
fathers are citizens”) does not distinguish
between “legitimate” or “illegitimate” paternity.
Civil Code provisions on illegitimacy govern.
Economic Benefits of Citizens
Sec. 8, Art. XII. A natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may still be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Naturalized Citizens
Those who are naturalized in accordance with
the law [Sec. 1 (4), Art. IV].
See modes of acquiring citizenship for more
details
Page 28 of 116
B. WHO ARE CITIZENS
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
[Sec. 1, Art. IV, Const.]
1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers OR mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those who elected to be citizens. This is
available only to:
a. Those born before Jan 17, 1973;
b. To Filipino mothers; AND
c. Elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
4. Those naturalized in accordance with law.
Sec. 1 (3), Art. IV is also applicable to those
who are born to Filipino mothers and elected
Philippine citizenship before February 2, 1987.
This is to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of
a natural-born citizen, while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship [Co v.
House Electoral Tribunal (1991)].
Who were the citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution?
1. Citizens under the 1973 Constitution
a. Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;
b. Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
c. Those who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of 1935; and
d. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law [Sec. 1, Art. III].
2. Citizens under the 1935 Constitution
a. Those who are citizens at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution;
b. Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands; This is known as the Caram
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Rule, and is only applicable to elective
positions, not appointive ones
[Chiongbian v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-
2007, January 3, 1949];
c. Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship;
d. Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law [Sec. 1, Art. IV].
The following persons were citizens of the
Philippines on May 14, 1935 – the date of the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution:
1. Persons born in the Philippine Islands who
resided therein on April 11, 1899 and were
Spanish subjects on that date, unless they
had lost their Philippine citizenship on or
before May 14, 1935;
2. Natives of the Spanish Peninsula who
resided in the Philippines on April 11, 1899,
and who did not declare their intention of
preserving their Spanish nationality
between that date and October 11, 1900,
unless they had lost their Philippine
citizenship on or before May 14, 1935;
3. Naturalized citizens of Spain who resided
in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and did
not declare their intention to preserve their
Spanish nationality within the prescribed
period (up to October 11, 1900);
4. Children born of (1), (2) and (3) subsequent
to April 11, 1899, unless they lost their
Philippine citizenship on or before May 14,
1935; and
5. Persons who became naturalized citizens
of the Philippines in accordance with
naturalization law since its enactment on
March 26, 1920.
“xxx. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Poe could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Poe would have benefited from
Page 29 of 116
the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902 (Tecson v.
COMELEC, GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004].
Are foundlings natural-born citizens?
Yes. As a matter of law, foundlings are, as a
class, natural-born citizens. The presumption
of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems
from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings
either. No such intent or language permits
discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions (1935, 1973,
1987) guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to
render social justice [Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].
Application
To illustrate, If X was born and elected before
17 January 1973, his status under the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions is that of a natural-born
citizen, because although he had to perform an
act to perfect his citizenship, he could not
otherwise be classified since there was no
definition of natural-born citizens in the 1935
Constitution.
If X was born before and elected after 17
January 1973, whether before or after 2
February 1987, he was not a natural-born
citizen under the 1973 Constitution, because
he had to perform an act to be a citizen. If not
for the provision in the 1987 Constitution, he
would not have been deemed a natural-born
citizen either.
Case A: A Filipino woman married B, an
American in 1961. The marriage made A an
American citizen (which under CA 63, stripped
her of her Philippine citizenship, the marriage
having been celebrated before 17 January
1973). A and B lived in the US since then and
in 1962, begot C, who was automatically an
American citizen by jus soli and jus sanguinis.
In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect
Philippine citizenship?
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Yes, according to obiters in Cu v Republic and
Villahermosa v CID, in order to elect Philippine
citizenship, at least for election purposes, it is
enough that (1) the person's mother was a
Filipino at the time of her marriage to the alien
father, even if she subsequently lose her
citizenship by virtue of the marriage and (2) the
person be a child of that marriage, for him to
elect Philippine citizenship.
If C wants to run for Congress, is he considered
a natural born Filipino? Under the 1973
Constitution, no. But under the 1987
Constitution, yes.
Note: If he were born after 17 January 1973,
the child would not even be a Filipino. You can
only be a Filipino if you are born to a Filipino
mother or father (Sec. 2 par. 2).
C. WHO CAN BE CITIZENS
Naturalization [CA 473]
Process by which a foreigner is adopted by the
country and clothed with the privileges of a
native-born citizen. The applicant must prove
that he has all of the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for citizenship.
Qualifications [Sec. 2, C.A. 473]
a. Not less than twenty-one years of age on
the day of the hearing of the petition;
b. Resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of 10 years or more;
c. Of good moral character; believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence towards the
government and community
d. Must own real estate in the Philippines
worth P5,000 or more OR must have
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation;
e. Able to speak or write English or Spanish
or anyone of the principal languages; and
f. Enrolled his minor children of school age in
any of the recognized schools where
Page 30 of 116
Philippine history, government and civics
are taught or prescribed as part of the
school curriculum, during the entire period
of the residence in the Philippines required
of him.
Special Qualifications [Sec. 3, C.A. 473] –
ANY will result to reduction of the 10-year
period to 5 years
a. Having honorably held office under the
Government of the Philippines or under
that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions
thereof;
b. Established a new industry or introduced a
useful invention in the Philippines;
c. Married to a Filipino woman;
d. Engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in
a public or recognized private school not
established for the exclusive instruction of
children of persons of a particular
nationality or race, in any of the branches
of education or industry for a period of 2
years or more; or
e. Born in the Philippines.
Disqualifications [Sec. 4, C.A. 473]
a. Persons opposed to organized government
or affiliated with groups who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
b. Persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success of
their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in polygamy;
d. Persons convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude;
f. Persons suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases;
g. Persons who during the period of their stay,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
h. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom
the Philippines is at war; or
i. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country
other than the United States, whose laws
do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subject thereof.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Burden of Proof
The applicant must comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her
possession of the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications enumerated under the law,
and present at least two (2) character
witnesses to support his allegations [Go v.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202809
(2014)].
Petition for Judicial declaration of
Philippine Citizenship
The petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen
and asks a court to declare or confirm his
status as a Philippine citizen.
Petition for Judicial Naturalization under
CA 473
The petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen
based on requirements required under CA 473
[Republic v. Batuigas, supra].
Denaturalization
Process by which grant of citizenship is
revoked.
Grounds [Sec. 18, C.A. 473]
Upon the proper motion of the Sol. Gen. or the
provincial fiscal, naturalization may be
cancelled when:
a. Naturalization certificate was fraudulently
or illegally obtained [See Po Soon Tek v.
Republic, 60 SCRA 98 (1974)];
b. If, within the five years next following the
issuance, he shall return to his native
country or to some foreign country and
establish his permanent residence there;
c. Remaining for more than one year in his
native country or the country of his former
nationality, or two years in any other
foreign country, shall be considered as
prima facie evidence of his intention of
taking up his permanent residence in the
same;
d. Petition was made on an invalid declaration
of intention;
e. Minor children of the person naturalized
failed to graduate from the schools
Page 31 of 116
mentioned in Sec. 2, through the fault of
their parents, either by neglecting to
support them or by transferring them to
another school or schools; or
f. If he has allowed himself to be used as a
dummy in violation of the Constitutional or
legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.
Naturalization is never final and may be
revoked if one commits acts of moral turpitude
[Republic v. Guy (1982)].
Judgment directing the issuance of a certificate
of naturalization is a mere grant of a political
privilege and that neither estoppel nor res
judicata may be invoked to bar the State from
initiating an action for the cancellation or
nullification of the certificate of naturalization
thus issued [Yao MunTek v. Republic (1971)].
D. MODES OF ACQUIRING
CITIZENSHIP
Generally, two modes of acquiring citizenship:
1. By Birth
a. Jus Soli — “right of soil;” person’s
nationality is based on place of birth;
formerly effective in the Philippines
[see Roa v. Collector of Customs, G.R.
No. L-7011 (1912)].
b. b. Jus Sanguinis — “right of blood;” a
person's nationality follows that of his
natural parents. The Philippines
currently adheres to this principle.
2. By Naturalization
Naturalization signifies the act of formally
adopting a foreigner into the political body of a
nation by clothing him or her with the privileges
of a citizen.
Under existing laws, there are three modes by
which an alien may become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization:
1. Administrative naturalization pursuant to
RA 9139;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
2. Judicial naturalization pursuant to CA 437;
and
3. Legislative naturalization in the form of a
law enacted by Congress granting
Philippine citizenship to an alien [So, v.
Republic, GR No.170603, January 29,
2007].
Derivative Naturalization
Under this provision, foreign women who are
married to Philippine citizens may be deemed
ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time
of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization [Republic
v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110 (2013)].
Pursuant to the principle of derivative
naturalization, Section 15 of CA 437, extends
the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor
children of those naturalized thereunder.
The following are requisites should be applied
to the minor children in order to be entitled to
Philippine citizenship:
1. They are legitimate children of petitioner
2. They were born in the Philippines, and
3. They were still minors when petitioner was
naturalized as Filipino citizen [Tan Co v.
Civil Register of Manila, 423 SCRA 665].
Election of Filipino Citizenship
The constitutional and statutory requirements
of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to
legitimate children and not to one who was
concededly an illegitimate child, as her
Chinese father and Filipino mother were never
married. Being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent is a Filipino since birth,
without having to elect Filipino citizenship when
she reaches the age of majority [Republic v.
Lim, 420 SCRA 123, GR No. 153883, January
13, 2004].
Reglementary Period
Under Art. IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate
child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the
Page 32 of 116
child elected Philippine citizenship. The 1935
Charter only provides that the election should
be made “upon reaching the age of majority.”
The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma is resolved by basing the time period
on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship, should be made
within “reasonable time” after attaining the age
of majority. This phrase “reasonable time” has
been interpreted to mean the election should
be made within three years from reaching the
age of majority [Re: Application for Admission
to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar
Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999].
Eligibility under the Administrative
Naturalization Law; Rationale
RA 9139 is an act providing for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship for 1) aliens born in the
Philippines and 2) residing therein since birth
by administrative naturalization subject to
certain requirements dictated by national
security and interest. RA 9139 was enacted as
a remedial measure intended to make the
process of acquiring Philippine citizenship less
tedious, less technical and more encouraging.
It also addresses the concerns of degree
holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship
requirement, cannot practice their profession,
thus promoting "brain drain for the Philippines
[So v. Republic, supra].
Qualifications prescribed under Act 473
NOT applicable to RA 9139
The qualifications and disqualifications of an
applicant for naturalization by judicial act are
set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of CA 473. On the
other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of RA 9139
provide for the qualifications and
disqualifications of an applicant for
naturalization by administrative act.
First, CA 473 and RA 9139 are separate and
distinct laws- the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
native-born aliens who lived here in the
Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they
were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love
and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to
customs and traditions.
Second, if the qualifications prescribed in RA
9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would
be broadened since it would then apply even to
aliens who are not native-born.
Third, applying the provisions of RA 9139 to
judicial naturalization is contrary to the
intention of the legislature to liberalize the
naturalization procedure in the country (Ibid.).
E. MODES OF LOSING AND
REACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP
Loss –
Grounds
a. Naturalization in a foreign country [C.A. 63,
sec.1(1)];
b. Express renunciation or expatriation
[Sec.1(2), CA 63];
c. Taking an oath of allegiance to another
country upon reaching the age of majority;
d. Marriage by a Filipino woman to an alien, if
by the laws of her husband’s country, she
becomes a citizen thereof. (Now qualified by
Art. IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.)
e. Accepting a commission and serving in the
armed forces of another country, unless there
is an offensive/defensive pact with the country,
or it maintains armed forces in RP with RP’s
consent;
f. Denaturalization (The court, upon its
discretion, may cancel certificate of
naturalization subsequent to the requirements
provided. This is because naturalization is not
a natural right but a political privilege);
g. Being found by final judgment to be a
deserter of the AFP.
Page 33 of 116
General Rule: Expatriation is a constitutional
right. No one can be compelled to remain a
Filipino if he does not want to [Go Julian v.
Government, G.R. No. 20809 (1923)].
Exception: A Filipino may not divest himself of
Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any
country [C.A. 63, sec. 1(3)].
Loss of Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed. Considering the fact that
admittedly, Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a
certificate stating that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, since
there has been NO EXPRESS renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship [Aznar v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 83820(1995)].
Reacquisition
a. Naturalization [C.A. 63 and C.A. 473]
Now an abbreviated process, no need to wait
for 3 years (1 year for declaration of intent, and
2 years for the judgment to become executory)
Requirements:
1. be 21 years of age
2. be a resident for 6 months
3. have good moral character
4. have no disqualification
b. Repatriation
Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. Therefore, if he is a natural-
born citizen before he lost his citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino [Bengson III v. HRET,
G.R. No. 142840 (2001)].
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy is not a
sufficient act of repatriation. Repatriation
requires an express and equivocal act [Frivaldo
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295(1989)].
In the absence of any official action or approval
by proper authorities, a mere application for
repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s
Philippine citizenship [Labo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No, 86564 (1989)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
c. Legislative Act: Both a mode of acquiring
and reacquiring citizenship
R.A. No. 9225 (CITIZENSHIP RETENTION
AND REACQUISITION ACT OF 2003)
Sec. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. —
Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic: xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Sec. 4 Derivative Citizenship. — The
unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate
or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age,
of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
— Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:
1. Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under
Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution, RA 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
2. Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath;
3. Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the
Page 34 of 116
Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of
office: provided, that they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath;
4. Those intending to practice their profession
in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and
5. That right to vote or be elected or appointed
to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to,
those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying
any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or
b. are in active service as
commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the
armed forces of the country in
which they are naturalized citizens.
Repatriation under RA 8171
RA No. 8171, which lapsed into law on October
23, 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation
(a) of Filipino women who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
(b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, including their minor
children [Angat v. Republic, GR No. 132244,
September 14, 1999]. Included in the second
group are minor children at the time of
repatriation and does not include one who is no
longer minor at the time of his repatriation or
one who lost his Philippine citizenship by
operation of law. The loss of Philippine
citizenship must be on account of political or
economic necessity and not by operation of law
such as derivative naturalization, or for the
purpose of avoiding deportation and
prosecution in the US [Tabasa v. CA, 500
SCRA 9].
Repatriation as a mode of reacquiring
Philippine citizenship does not require the filing
of a petition in court. All that an applicant had
to do is to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
where the person concerned resides or last
resided [Angat, supra]. In addition thereto,
registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in
the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in
effecting the repatriation of a citizen [Altarejos
v. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655]. But in Tabasa,
supra, the Supreme Court ruled that a petition
for repatriation shall be filed with the Special
Committee on Naturalization (SCN) which was
designated to process petitions for repatriation
pursuant to AO 285 dated August 22, 2006.
Repatriation Under RA 9225
It allows former natural-born Filipino citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country to reacquire Filipino citizenship.
It also allows Filipino citizens to retain their
Filipino citizenship even if they acquire another
citizenship in a foreign country. Retention or
reacquisition is accomplished by simply taking
the oath of allegiance as prescribed by RA
9225. The required oath of allegiance does not
contain the usual renunciation of allegiance to
any and all other states, thereby impliedly
allowing continued allegiance to the adopted
state. The usual absolute renunciation is,
however, required from those seeking public
elective office or appointed to public office in
the Philippines. Likewise, under the principle of
derivative citizenship, the unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below 18 years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon the effectivity of RA
9225, shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
RA 9225 NOT violative of Section 5 of
Article IV of the Constitution prohibiting
dual allegiance
Section 5 of Article IV of the Constitution is a
mere declaration of policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Section 2
and 3 of RA 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship, per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters as to what really
Page 35 of 116
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department
to rule on the issues pertaining to dual
allegiance [Calilung v. Datumanong, GR
160869, May 11, 2007].
Citizenship Reacquired by Repatriation
Under Repatriation Laws
Repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino
[Bengson III v. HRET, et. al. GR No. 142840,
May 7, 2001].
Note: The issue of Citizenship may be threshed
out as the occasion demands. Res judicata
only applies once a finding of citizenship is
affirmed by the Court in a proceeding in which:
(a) the person whose citizenship is questioned
is a party; (b) the person's citizenship is raised
as a material issue; and (c) the Solicitor
General or an authorized representative is able
to take an active part.
When a person has already been declared and
recognized as a Philippine Citizen, by the BI
and the DOJ, he must be protected from
summary deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation
from any official or authority, and if he is
disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has
the unquestionable right to resort to the courts
for his protection, either by a writ of habeas
corpus or of prohibition on the ground that the
BI lacks jurisdiction [Republic v. Harp, G.R. No.
188829 (2016)].
F. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
DUAL ALLEGIANCE
Dual Citizenship
Allows a person who acquires foreign
citizenship to simultaneously enjoy the rights
he previously held as a Filipino citizen. This is
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
completely voluntary, and results in the
application of different laws of two or more
states to a dual citizen.
Dual Allegiance
a. Aliens who are naturalized as Filipinos
but remain loyal to their country of
origin;
b. Public officers who, while serving the
government, seek citizenship in
another country.
Dual citizenship v. Dual Allegiance
Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
is born in a state which follows the doctrine of
jus soli. Such person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive acts, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is
voluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition [Mercado v. Manzano, 307
SCRA 630, May 29, 1999].
“Dual citizens” are disqualified from running for
any elective local position [Sec. 40(d), Local
Government Code]; this should be read as
referring to “dual allegiance.”
Once a candidate files his candidacy, he is
deemed to have renounced his foreign
citizenship in case of dual citizenship [Mercado
v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083(1999)].
Clearly, in including Sec. 5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual
citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, sec. 40(d) and in
Page 36 of 116
R.A. No. 7854, sec. 20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. For candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT
A. LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. Scope and Limitations
Legislative power is the authority to make laws
and to alter and repeal them.
Who May Exercise Legislative Power
1. Congress
Legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress, which consists of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. [Sec. 1, Art. VI].
Grant of legislative power to Congress is
plenary. Congress may legislate on any subject
matter provided that constitutional limitations
are observed.
2. Regional/Local Legislative Power
N.B. A regional assembly exists for the ARMM.
Exercise of Legislative Powers by Local
Government
Requirements of a valid ordinance [CUPPU-
GC]:
a. It must not CONTRAVENE the Constitution
or any statute;
b. It must not be UNFAIR or oppressive;
c. It must not be PARTIAL or discriminatory;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
d. It must not PROHIBIT but may regulate
trade;
e. It must not be UNREASONABLE;
f. It must be GENERAL and CONSISTENT
with public policy [Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties, G.R. No. 111097 (1994)].
People’s Initiative on Statutes
Legislative power is also vested in the people
by the system of initiative and referendum
[Sec. 1, Art. VI]. The power of initiative and
referendum is the power of the people directly
to “propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body” [Sec. 32,
Art. VI]. The provision is not self-executing
[Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
127325 (1997)].
R.A. 6735: “An Act Providing for a System
of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor” This is valid
for (a) laws, (b) ordinances, and (c) resolutions,
but not amendments to the Constitution
[Defensor-Santiago, supra].
Congress may delegate legislative powers to
the president in times of war or in other national
emergencies [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].
The President Under Martial Law or in a
Revolutionary Government
Sec. 23, Art. VI.
(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
Congress may delegate legislative powers to
the president in times of war or in other national
emergencies [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].
Page 37 of 116
2. Principle of non-delegability;
exceptions
Principle: Delegata potestas non potest
delegari – what has been delegated cannot be
further delegated.
Rationale: Since the powers of the
government have been delegated to them by
the people, who possess original sovereignty,
these powers cannot be further delegated by
the different government departments to some
other branch or instrumentality of the
government.
General Rule: Only Congress (as a body) may
exercise legislative power.
Exceptions
a. Delegated legislative power to local
governments:
b. Constitutionally-grafted Exceptions
i. Emergency power delegated to the
Executive during State of War or
National Emergency [Sec. 23(2),
Art. VI]; and
ii. Certain taxing powers of the
President [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].
iii. The extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and
referendum [Sec. 1, Art. VI]
N.B. Subordinate legislation made by
administrative agencies – The principle of non-
delegability should not be confused with the
delegated rule-making authority of
implementing agencies [Belgica, supra].
Strictly speaking, what is delegated is not “law-
making” power, but rule-making power, limited
to (a) filling up the details of the law; or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation.
Traditional/Simplified Formulation: Who
may exercise legislative powers:
General Rule: Congress only.
Exceptions (PLATE):
1. Delegation to the People (by initiative and
referendum)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

2. Delegation to the Local governments filing of details which can be delegated to

3. Delegation to the Administrative bodies administrative agencies).
4. Delegation of Tariff powers to the President
under Constitution
5. Delegation of Emergency powers to the
B. CHAMBERS OF CONGRESS;
COMPOSITION; QUALIFICATIONS
President under Constitution

The President did not proclaim a national

emergency, only a state of emergency in the Senate v. House of Representatives
three places in ARMM. And she did not act House of
Senate (Secs. 2-
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that Representatives
14, Article VI)
authorized her to exercise extraordinary (Secs. 5-8, Art. VI)
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to Composition
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such Not more than 250
places is a power that the Constitution directly members, unless
vests in the President. She did not need otherwise provided by
congressional authority to exercise the same 24 senators law, consisting of:
[Ampatuan v. Puno, G.R. No. 190259 (2011)]. elected at large a. District
Representatives
Under its plenary legislative powers, Congress b. Party-List
can delegate to local legislative bodies the Representatives
power to create local government units, subject Qualifications
to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the a. Natural-born
a. Natural-born citizen
Constitution [Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. citizen
b. At least 25 years
177597 (2008)]. b. At least 35
old on the day of the
years old on the
election
Tests for valid delegation day of the
c. Able to read and
Rule: There is a valid delegation of legislative election
write
power c. Able to read
d. A registered voter
when it passes the following tests — and write
in the district he seeks
d. A registered to represent
a. Completeness test: The law sets forth the voter
e. A resident of the
policy to be executed, carried out, or e. Resident of the
said district for at
implemented by the delegate [Abakada, Philippines for at
least 1 year
supra], such that there is nothing left for the least 2 years
immediately
delegate to do but to enforce the law [Pelaez v. immediately
preceding the day of
Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825(1965)]; and preceding the day
the election
of the election
b. Sufficient Standard Test: The standard Term of Office
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps 6 years 3 years
out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the Term Limits
circumstances under which the legislative 2 consecutive
3 consecutive terms
command is to be effected [Edu v. Ericta, G.R. terms
No. L-32096 (1970)].
Note: Frivaldo v. COMELEC — Citizenship
Note: Acts which are purely legislative in must be Filipino at the time of assumption of
character (e.g. making of laws) cannot be office [G.R. NO. 120295 (1996)].
delegated to an administrative body (in
contrast to the ascertainment of facts or the
Page 38 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Residence — physical presence of a person in
a given area, community or country
Domicile — place of habitual residence
• A man must have a domicile somewhere
• Once established, it remains until a new
one is acquired
• A man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.
Acquisition of domicile
• Bodily presence
• Animus manendi (intent to stay)
• Animus non revertendi (no intent to return)
Requisites to change domicile
• Actual change of domicile
• Bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of origin and establishing a
new one
• Acts which correspond with the purpose
Residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile
1. Senate
The Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it. Due to the termination of
the business of the Senate during the
expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending
matters and proceedings, such as unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time.[Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. 234608, July 3, 2018].
Page 39 of 116
2. House of Representatives
a. District Representatives and
Questions of Apportionment
District Representatives — Elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and Metro Manila area.
Rules on Apportionment of Legislative
Districts
1. Apportionment of legislative districts
must be by law which could be a:
a. General Apportionment Law; or
b. Special Law (i.e. creation of new
provinces)
Note: The power to apportion legislative
districts is textually committed to Congress by
the Constitution. Thus, it cannot be validly
delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly
[Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597 (2008)].
Under the Constitution and the LGC,
apportionment and reapportionment do not
require a plebiscite [Bagabuyo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 176970 (2008)].
2. Proportional representation based on
number of inhabitants:
a. Each city with a population of at
least 250,000 shall have at least 1
representative.
b. Each province, irrespective of the
number of inhabitants, shall have
at least 1 representative.
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. (N.B. Anti-
gerrymandering provision)
4. Re-apportionment by Congress within 3
years after the return of each census.
Note: “Apportionment” refers to the
determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county, or
other subdivision may send to a legislative
body, while “reapportionment” refers to the
realignment or change in legislative
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of
representation [Bagabuyo v. COMELEC,
supra].
b. Party-List System
Party-List Representatives
They shall constitute 20% of the total number
of representatives, elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Sectoral Representatives
For 3 consecutive terms from 2 February 1987,
1⁄2 of the party-list seats shall be allotted to
sectoral representatives to be chosen by
appointment or election, as may be provided by
law. Until a law is passed, they are appointed
by the President from a list of nominees by the
respective sectors [Sec. 7, Art. XVIII].
Note: The party-list system is not synonymous
with sectoral representation [Atong Paglaum v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766 (2013), citing the
1986 Constitutional Commission Records].
Atong Paglaum Guidelines
1. Three different parties or organizations
may participate in the party-list system:
a. National;
b. Regional;
c. or sectoral;
2. National and regional parties or orgs do
not need to (a) organize along sectoral
lines, or (b) represent any “marginalized or
underrepresented” sector;
3. Political parties may participate in the
party-list system provided:
a. they register under the party-list
system;
b. they do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
i. A party that participates in the
legislative district elections may
still participate in the party-list
through a sectoral wing.
ii. The sectoral wing can be part of
the political party’s coalition, but
the former must be registered
Page 40 of 116
independently in the party-list
system.
4. Sectoral parties or orgs may either be (a)
“marginalized or underrepresented” (e.g.
labor, peasant, fisherfolk); or (b) “lacking in
well-defined political constituencies” (e.g.
professionals, women, elderly, youth)
5. The nominees of sectoral parties or orgs,
of either type, must (a) belong to their
respective sectors, or (b) have a track
record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. Majority of the members of a
sectoral party, of either type, must belong
to the sector they represent.
6. National, regional, or sectoral parties or
orgs shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided
they have at least 1 nominee who remains
qualified [AtongPaglaum, supra].
DISQUALIFICATIONS AND
QUALIFICATIONS
See R.A. 7941: An Act Providing For The
Election Of Party-List Representatives
Through The Party-List System, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor
Disqualified Parties:
1. Religious sects
2. Foreign organizations
3. Advocating violence or unlawful means
4. Receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes.
5. Violating or failing to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections;
6. Declaring untruthful statements in its
petition;
7. Ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
8. Failing to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least 2 per centum of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Qualified Sectors
Note: This qualification applies only to sectoral
parties. Participating national or regional
parties need not fall under any of these sectors
[Atong Paglaum, supra].
1. Labor
2. Peasant
3. Fisherfolk
4. Urban Poor
5. Indigenous Cultural Communities
6. Elderly
7. Handicapped
8. Women
9. Youth
10. Veterans
11. Overseas Workers
12. Professionals
Four parameters of the party-list system:
1. 20% Allocation - 20% of the total number
of the membership of the House of
Representatives is the maximum number
of seats available to party-list
organizations
2. 2% Threshold - Garnering 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections
guarantees a party- list organization one
(1) seat
3. Additional Seats - The additional seats,
that is, the remaining seats after allocation
of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations
including those that received less than two
percent of the total votes. This distribution
will continue until all the seats have been
filled
4. 3-Seat Cap - The three-seat cap is
constitutional
Note: It is intended by the Legislature to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system. There is no violation of the Constitution
because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the party-list
system [BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179271 (2009)].
Rules on Computation of Seats: Two-
Round Allocation
Step 1: Compute total number of seats
allocated for party-list representatives
Page 41 of 116
Step 2: Rank all party-list candidates from
highest to lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered.
Step 3: Compute for each party-list candidate’s
percentage of votes garnered in relation to the
total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates.
Step 4: Round 1 – Allocate one (1) seat each
for a party-list that garnered at least 2% of the
total number of votes.
Step 5: Round 2 – Assign additional seats
from the balance (i.e. total number of party-list
seats minus Round 1 allocations) by:
a. Allocating one (1) seat for every whole
integer (e.g. if a party garners 2.73% of the
vote, assign it two (2) more seats; if 1.80%,
assign it one (1) more seat); then
b. Allocating the remaining seats (i.e. total
seats minus Round 1 and Round 2a
allocations) to those next in rank until all seats
are completely distributed.
Step 6: Apply the 3-Seat Cap, if necessary
[See BANAT v. COMELEC, supra].
In ARARO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192803,
December 10, 2013, the Supreme Court
further modified the formula used and
interpreted in BANAT v. COMELEC. Thus, the
formula to determine the proportion garnered
by the party-list group would now henceforth
be:
(Number of votes of party list)/(Total number of
valid votes for party-list candidates =
Proportion or percentage of votes garnered by
party-list
The formula to determine the additional
seats to be awarded would be:
(Total number of Party-list seats available) -
(Number of seats allocated in the first round) x
(Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by
the Party) = Additional seats awarded
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
C. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGES,
INHIBITIONS, AND
DISQUALIFICATIONS
1. Privileges
a. Salaries
Section 10, Art. VI. The salaries of Senators
and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law.
No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives approving such
increase.
Section 17, Art. XVIII. Until the Congress
provides otherwise, the President shall
receive an annual salary of three hundred
thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred
forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the
Members of the House of Representatives,
the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions, two hundred
four thousand pesos each; and the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, one
hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
“Expiration of the full term of all Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives” is
singular and means that the increase may only
take effect upon the expiration of the terms
of both houses who passed the law
increasing said salary. This means that even
if the House of Representatives term has
already expired but the senate has not, the
salary increase cannot yet take effect even if
the increase is different for each house
[PHILCONSA v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-25554
(1966)].
Page 42 of 116
This prohibition also applies to the benefits a
member of congress will attain upon
retirement. Thus, a member of congress may
not compute his retirement benefits based on
the salary increase which he was not able to
reach because his term has already expired
before said increase took effect [Ligot v.
Mathay, G.R. No. L-34676 (1974)] .
b. Freedom from Arrest
A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session [...] [Sec. 11, Art. VI].
Regardless of the whereabouts of a Senator or
Member of the House, freedom from arrest
holds, so long as Congress is in session.
Freedom from arrest applies only to offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty. Order
of suspension under R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own
members and did not exclude members of
Congress from its operation [Defensor-
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055
(2001)].
In People v. Jalosjos [G.R. No. 132875,
February 3, 2000], the SC denied the request
of Cong. Jalosjos that he be allowed to attend
legislative sessions. The denial was premised
on the following: (a) membership in Congress
does not exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons; (b) one rationale behind confinement
is public self-defense; (c) it would amount to
creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason; and (d) he was provided
with an office in the New Bilibid Prison.
c. Speech and Debate Clause
[...] No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof [Sec. 11, Art. VI].
This means the Senator or Member of the
House can still be questioned and held liable in
Congress.
To come under the guarantee, the speech or
debate must be one made "in Congress or in
any committee thereof." Publication of an
allegedly libelous letter is not covered by the
privilege [Jimenez v. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-
15905 (1966)].
What is covered under this provision?
Anything a member of Congress says in line
with his legislative functions (Jimenez v.
Cabangbang, supra)
a. Speeches
b. Utterances
c. Bills signed
d. Votes passed
While the immunity of a Member of Congress
is absolute and thus even the Supreme Court
cannot discipline a lawyer-senator for remarks
made against the court, it does not shield said
member from the authority of Congress to
discipline its own members [Defensor-Santiago
v. Pobre, A.C. No. 7399 (2009)].
2. Inhibitions and
Disqualifications
a. May not hold any other office or
employment in the government
during his term without forfeiting his
seat [Sec. 13, Art. VI]
Incompatible Office — The forfeiture of the
seat in Congress shall be automatic upon a
member’s assumption of such office deemed
incompatible. Thus, when a governor-elect ran
for the Batasang Pambansa and won, he could
not hold both offices [Adaza v. Pacana, G.R.
No. L-68159 (1985)]
Note: The office of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or -
controlled corporation for purposes of the
Page 43 of 116
prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI [Liban v. Gordon,
G.R. No. 175352 (2009 & 2011); but note that
the structure of the PNRC is sui generis being
neither strictly private nor public in nature].
b. May not be appointed to any office
created or whose emoluments were
increased during the term for which
he was elected [Sec. 13, Art. VI]
Forbidden Office — One to which a member
cannot be appointed even if he is willing to give
up his seat in Congress. The effect of his
resignation from the Congress is the loss of his
seat therein but his disqualification for the
forbidden office nevertheless remains.
c. Shall not be financially interested,
directly or indirectly, in any contract
with, or franchise or special
privilege granted by the government
during his term of office [Sec. 14,
Art. VI]
d. Shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government
when it is for his pecuniary benefit
or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office [Sec. 14,
Art. VI]
The Pork Barrel System “runs afoul” of Sec. 14,
Art. VI, because in “allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project
implementation – a matter before another
office of government – [Pork Barrel] renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office” [Belgica, supra].
e. Cannot personally appear as
counsel before any court, electoral
tribunal, quasi judicial and
administrative bodies during his
term of office [Sec. 14, Art. VI]
This prohibition is absolute. Thus, when an
assemblyman acting as counsel for one group
in an internal dispute in a company was denied
leave to intervene, the court held that his action
of buying 10 stocks in order to be able to
intervene in the company’s dispute as a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
stockholder was an indirect violation of this rule
and still unconstitutional [Puyat v. De Guzman
Jr., G.R. No. L-51122 (1982)]
3. Duty to Disclose
a. SALN
Sec. 17, Art. XI. A public officer or employee
shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit
a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of
the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
When to disclose:
1. Within 30 days after assuming office
2. On or before April 15 after the closing of the
calendar year
3. Upon expiration of term of office, resignation
or separation from office
Who must declare:
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Members of the Cabinet
4. Members of Congress
5. Members of the SC
6. Members of the Constitutional Commission
and other Constitutional Offices
7 Officers of the Armed Forces with general or
flag rank [Art XI, Sec 17]
b. Financial and Business Interests;
Potential Conflicts of Interest
Sec. 12, Art. VI. All Members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall,
upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business
interests. xxx
Page 44 of 116
c. Amounts paid to/expenses incurred
by each member
Sec. 20, Art. VI. The records and books of
accounts of the Congress shall be preserved
and be open to the public in accordance with
law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to
and expenses incurred for each Member.
D. QUORUM AND VOTING
MAJORITIES
1. Quorum
Sec. 16(2), Art. VI. A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business, but
a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide.
In computing a quorum, members who are
outside the country, thus outside of each
House’s coercive jurisdiction, are not included.
“Majority” shall take into consideration the
number of members within the “jurisdiction” of
the Congress (those it can order arrested for
the purpose of questioning). In Avelino v.
Cuenco [G.R. No. L-2821 (1949)], one Senator
was out of the Philippines which is not within
the “jurisdiction” of the Senate, so that the
working majority was 23 Senators. There is a
difference between a majority of "all members
of the House" and a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all
members of the Senate less one (23)
constitutes a constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of the quorum.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

2. Voting Majorities
in case of Art.
Doctrine of Shifting Majority: For each tie VII
House of Congress to pass a bill, only the votes
of the majority of those present in the session, Confirm Majority Separately Sec.
there being a quorum, is required. appointme 9,
nt of VP Art.
Exceptions to Doctrine of Shifting Majority: VII
A. Votes where requirement is based on “ALL
THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS”: Congress 2/3 Congress
requirement is based on the entire affirming
composition of a House or Congress (in that the
its entirety), regardless of the number of President
Members present or absent is unable to
discharge
powers and
ACTION VOTES HOUSE BASI
duties
REQUI VOTING S
RED Revoke or Majority Jointly Sec.
(ALL extend (a) 18,
MEMB Martial Law Art.
ERS) or (b) the VII
suspension
Senate Majority Separately; Sec.
of the
shall elect All 16
privilege of
its respective (1),
members the writ of
President Art.
Habeas
and the VI
Corpus
Speaker of
the House Amnesty Majority Silent Sec.
Grant 19(2)
Punish for 2/3 Separately; Sec. , Art.
disorderly All 16 VII
behavior respective (3),
and may members Art. Submit a Majority (Silent) Sec.
SUSPEND VI question of 3,
or EXPEL calling a Prevailing Art.
Const. view: by XVII
Override 2/3 Separately Sec. Convention default,
Presidentia (House 27 to the houses
l Veto where the (1), electorate vote
bill Art. separately
originated VI Call for 2/3 Sec.
(because
votes first)
Constitutio Congress is 3,
Grant Tax Majority Silent Sec. nal bicameral) Art.
Exemption 28 Convention XVII
s (4), Propose 3/4 Sec.
Art. amendmen 1(1),
VII ts as Art.
Elect Constitutio XVII
Majority Separately Sec.
President 4 (5),

Page 45 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

The suspension contemplated in the

nal
Constitution is different from the suspension
Assembly
prescribed in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
B. Other Cases (NOT out of all members) Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). The former is
ACTION VOTES BASIS punitive in nature while the latter is preventive.
REQUIRED [Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
(ALL No. 118364, (1995)].
MEMBERS)
The determination of Congress when it comes
Determine ⅔ of both Sec. to disciplining its members is respected by the
President’s houses, 11(4), court. As such, the Supreme Court does not
disability voting Art. VII have the power to compel congress to reinstate
separately a member who has been expelled by it
[Alejandrino v. Quezon, G.R. No. 22041
Declaring a State of ⅔ of both Sec. (1924)].
War houses (in 23(1),
joint Art. VI The immunity for speech given to a member of
session) Congress is not a bar to the power of Congress
voting to discipline its members [Osmeña v.
separately Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144 (1960)].

Validity of ⅔ members Sec.

Treaty/International of SENATE 21, Art. F. PROCESS OF LAW-
Agreement VII MAKING
Requirements as to bills
E. DISCIPLINE OF
MEMBERS 1. As to titles of bills

Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days [Sec. 16
(3), Art. VI].
Each house may punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence
of 2/3 of ALL its members, with: [SED-FIC]
• Suspension
• Expulsion
Other measures:
• Deletion of unparliamentary remarks from
the record
• Fine
• Imprisonment
• Censure
Page 46 of 116
Sec. 26, Art. VI.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. xxx
One Subject One Title Rule
1. To prevent hodge-podge, "log-rolling", or
the smuggling in of "riders", that is, "any act
containing several subjects dealing with
unrelated matters representing diverse
interests.
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature
3. To fairly apprise the people of the subjects
of legislation that are being considered in
order that they may have the opportunity of
being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they should so desire.
4. But the title need not be a complete
catalogue of a bill. In any case, a title must
not be "so uncertain that the average
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment.
5. The title of the bill is controlling over the
text. [Dela Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No. L-
42571-72(1983)].
2. Requirements as to Certain
Laws
Appropriations Laws – created to regulate
spending
Sec. 22, Art. VII. The President shall submit
to the Congress within thirty days from the
opening of every regular session, as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures.
Sec. 24, Art. VI. All appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Sec. 25, Art. VI.
(1) The Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The
Procedure for Passage of Bills
form, content, and manner of preparation of
the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it
relates. (3) The procedure in approving
appropriations for the Congress shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving
appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall
specify the purpose for which it is intended,
Page 47 of 116
and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for
particular officials shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported
by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the
Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing
fiscal year, the general appropriations law
for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force
and effect until the general appropriations bill
is passed by the Congress.
Sec. 29, Art. VI. (1) No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Sec. 27, Art. VI
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall
sign it; otherwise,he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed
to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

that no public hearing is needed, it

approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
schedules the bill for Committee
that House, it shall become a law. In all such
discussion/s.
cases, the votes of each House shall be
○ Based on the result of the public
determined by yeas or nays, and the names
hearings or Committee
of the Members voting for or against shall be
discussions, the Committee may
entered in its Journal. The President shall
introduce amendments,
communicate his veto of any bill to the House
consolidate bills on the same
where it originated within thirty days after the
subject matter, or propose a
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
substitute bill. It then prepares the
become a law as if he had signed it.
corresponding committee report.
○ The Committee approves the
Generally, there are 3 ways for the bill to Committee Report and formally
become a law: transmits the same to the Plenary
(1) When it is approved by the President; Affairs Bureau.
(2) When the vote of the President is 4. Second reading
overridden by a two-thirds vote of all the ○ The Committee Report is
members of both houses; registered and numbered by the
(3) Upon failure of the President to veto the bill Bills and Index Service. It is
and to return it with his objections, to the included in the Order of Business
House where it originated, within 30 days and referred to the Committee on
after the date of receipt Rules.
○ The Committee on Rules
House Rules schedules the bill for consideration
1. Preparation of the bill on Second Reading.
○ The Member or the Bill Drafting ○ On Second Reading, the Secretary
Division of the Reference and General reads the number, title and
Research Bureau prepares and text of the bill and the following
drafts the bill upon the Member's takes place:
request. ■ Period of Sponsorship and
2. First reading Debate
○ The bill is filed with the Bills and ■ Period of Amendments
Index Service and the same is ■ Voting which may be done
numbered and reproduced. by:
○ Three days after its filing, the same 1. viva voce
is included in the Order of Business 2. count by tellers
for First Reading. 3. division of the
○ On First Reading, the Secretary House; or
General reads the title and number 4. nominal voting
of the bill. The Speaker refers the 5. Third reading
bill to the appropriate Committee/s. ○ The amendments, if any, are
3. Committee consideration / action engrossed and printed copies of
○ The Committee where the bill was the bill are reproduced for Third
referred to evaluates it to Reading.
determine the necessity of ○ The engrossed bill is included in
conducting public hearings. If the the Calendar of Bills for Third
Committee finds it necessary to Reading and copies of the same
conduct public hearings, it are distributed to all the Members
schedules the time thereof, issues three days before its Third
public notice and invites resource Reading.
persons. If the Committee finds

Page 48 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
○ On
Third Reading, the Secretary
General reads only the number and
title of the bill.
○ A roll call or nominal voting is called
and a Member, if he desires, is
given three minutes to explain his
vote. No amendment on the bill is
allowed at this stage.
■ The bill is approved by an
affirmative vote of a
majority of the Members
present.
■ If the bill is disapproved,
the same is transmitted to
the Archives.
6. Transmittal of the approved bill to the
Senate
○ The approved bill is transmitted to
the Senate for its concurrence.
7. Senate action on approved bill of the
House
○ The bill undergoes the same
legislative process in the Senate.
8. Conference committee (Bicameral)
○ A Conference Committee is
constituted and is composed of
Members from each House of
Congress to settle, reconcile or
thresh out differences or
disagreements on any provision of
the bill.
○ The conferees are not limited to
reconciling the differences in the
bill but may introduce new
provisions germane to the subject
matter or may report out an entirely
new bill on the subject.
○ The Conference Committee
prepares a report to be signed by
all the conferees and the
Chairman.
○ The Conference Committee Report
is submitted for
consideration/approval of both
Houses. No amendment is
allowed.
9. Transmittal of the bill to the President
○ Copies of the bill, signed by the
Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives
and certified by both the Secretary
Page 49 of 116
of the Senate and the Secretary
General of the House, are
transmitted to the President.
10. Presidential action on the bill
○ If the bill is approved by the
President, the same is assigned an
RA number and transmitted to the
House where it originated.
○ If the bill is vetoed, the same,
together with a message citing the
reason for the veto, is transmitted
to the House where the bill
originated.
11. Action on approved bill
○ The bill is reproduced and copies
are sent to the Official Gazette
Office for publication and
distribution to the implementing
agencies. It is then included in the
annual compilation of Acts and
Resolutions.
12. Action on vetoed bill
○ The message is included in the
Order of Business. If the Congress
decides to override the veto, the
House and the Senate shall
proceed separately to reconsider
the bill or the vetoed items of the
bill. If the bill or its vetoed items is
passed by a vote of two-thirds of
the Members of each House, such
bill or items shall become a law.
A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage
does not enact the joint resolution into a law
even if it follows the requirements expressly
prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill
into law. However, a joint resolution can be part
of the implementation of a law as provided in
the law itself. A joint resolution can also be
treated as a recommendation to the Executive
on how the law can be implemented. Further,
neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules
of the House of Representatives can amend
the Constitution which recognizes only a bill
can become law. [Ang Nars Party-List v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746 (2019)]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Sec. 26, Art. VI
(2) No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
The President’s Veto Power
Section 27, Article VI defines the only way for
the President to veto a bill.
When the President vetoes a measure, he
should return the measure to the House of
origin, indicating his objections thereto in what
is commonly known as a veto message so that
the same may be studied by the members for
possible overriding of his veto.
General rule: The President must approve a
bill in its entirety or disapprove it in toto.
Exception: The exception applies to
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, any
particular item or items of which may be
disapproved without affecting the item or items
to which he does not object.
To override the President’s veto, at least ⅔ of
ALL members of each house must agree to
pass the bill. In such case, the veto is
overridden and the bill becomes law without
need of presidential approval.
Doctrine of inappropriate provision
A provision that is constitutionally inappropriate
for an appropriation bill may be singled out for
veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue
item.
Page 50 of 116
Effectivity of Laws
Art. 2, Civil Code. Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Tanada v. Tuvera [G.R. No. L-63915 (1985)]:
Even when the law provides its own date of
effectivity, the publication requirement is
mandatory, in order that a law may become
effective. The object of the publication
requirement is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are
to regulate their actions and conduct—without
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim, “ignorantia legis non
excusat.” The publication requirement is a
requirement of due process.
Limitations on Legislative Power
Formal/Procedural Limitations
1. Prescribes the manner of passing bills and
the form they should take.
Rider clause: Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject,
which shall be expressed in the title [Sec.
26(1), Art. VI].
2. The title is not required to be an index of
the contents of the bill. It is sufficient
compliance if the title expresses: (1) the
general subject; and (2) all the provisions
of the statute are germane to that subject
[Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Commission,
151 SCRA 208 (1987)].
3. No bill passed by either house shall
become law unless it has passed three (3)
readings on separate days [Sec. 26(2), Art.
VI].
4. Printed copies in its final form must have
been distributed
Exception: When the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency.
Presidential certification dispenses with (1) the
printing requirement; and (2) the requirement
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
for readings on separate days [Kida v. Senate,
G.R. No. 196271 (2011), citing Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, supra].
Substantive Limitations
Circumscribe both the exercise of the power
itself and the allowable subject of legislation.
G. ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND
THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
Electoral Tribunals
Sec. 17, Art. VI. The Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Two Types
1. Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
2. House Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Note: There is a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET), but it is governed by different
provisions.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of the President,
the Vice-President, Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives was made
clear by the Constitution. [Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)].
Page 51 of 116
Composition
1. 3 Supreme Court justices, designated by
Chief Justice; Senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman
2. 6 members of the Senate or House, as the
case may be, chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from parties
Composition Rules
1. The ET shall be constituted within 30 days
after the Senate and the House shall have
been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker [Sec. 19, Art.
VI].
2. Members chosen enjoy security of tenure
and cannot be removed by mere temporary
change of party affiliation [Bondoc v.
Pineda, G.R. No. 97710 (1991)].
Valid grounds/just cause for termination of
membership to the tribunal:
1. Expiration of Congressional term of office;
2. Death or permanent disability;
3. Resignation from political party which one
represents in the tribunal;
4. Removal from office for other valid
reasons.
Note: Disloyalty to party and breach of party
discipline are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal [Bondoc
v. Pineda, supra].
1. Nature
Jurisdiction: Sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members.
When does it acquire jurisdiction:
● ET has jurisdiction only (1) when there is
an election contest, and (2) only after the
proclamation of a candidate [Lazatin v.
HRET, G.R. No. 84297(1988)].
● In the absence of an election contest, and
before proclamation, jurisdiction remains
with COMELEC [Id.]. But the proclamation
of a congressional candidate following the
election divests the COMELEC of
jurisdiction over the proclaimed
representative in favor of the HRET
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
[Tañada v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199
(2013)].
● But see Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 207264 (2013)] where the Court
held that an Electoral Tribunal acquires
jurisdiction only after (1) a petition is filed
before it, and (2) a candidate is already
considered a member of the House.
● To be considered a member, in turn, there
must be a concurrence of the following: (1)
a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath (a)
before the Speaker and (b) in open
session; and (3) assumption of office [Id.].
○ The Court in Ongsiako-Reyes
clarified the doctrine that once a
proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already
lost and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins only applies in
the context of a candidate who has
not only been proclaimed and
sworn in, but has also assumed
office [Id.].
Election Contest
One where a defeated candidate challenges
the qualification and claims for himself the seat
of a proclaimed winner.
Independence of the Electoral Tribunals
● Since the ET’s are independent
constitutional bodies, independent even of
the respective House, neither Congress
nor the Courts may interfere with
procedural matters relating to the functions
of the ET’s. [Macalintal v. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, Nov.
23, 2010]
2. Powers
The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature [Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-
92(1991), citing Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra].
The Constitution mandates that the HRET
“shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications” of its
Page 52 of 116
members. By employing the word “sole,” the
Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of
the HRET in the adjudication of election
contests involving its members is exclusive and
exhaustive. Its exercise of power is intended to
be its own — full, complete and unimpaired
[Duenas, Jr. v. HRET, G.R. No. 185401
(2009)].
Commission On Appointments
Sec. 18, Art. VI. There shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of
the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Composition
a. Senate President as ex-officio chairman
(shall not vote except in case of a tie)
b. 12 Senators
c. 12 Members of the HOR
Rule on Proportional Representation
The 12 Senators and 12 Representatives are
elected on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and
party-list organizations.
The HOR has authority to change its
representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political
alignments of its membership. It is understood
that such changes in membership must be
permanent xxx [Daza v. Singson, G.R. No.
86344(1989)].
By requiring proportional representation in the
Commission on Appointments, Sec. 18 in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

effect works as a check on the majority party in
the Senate and helps to maintain the balance
of power. No party can claim more than what it
is entitled to under such rule [Guingona, Jr. v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971(1993)].
1. Nature
The CA shall be constituted within 30 days after
the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have been organized with the election of
the President and the Speaker [Art. VI, Sec
19.].
It is NOT mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the
Commission before it can discharge its
functions. What the Constitution requires is at
least a majority of the membership [Guingona
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971 (1992)].
The CA shall act on all appointments within 30
session days from their submission to
Congress and shall rule by a majority vote of all
its members.
Audit; Members of the Regional and
Consultative Commissions); [Sarmiento v.
Mison, G.R. No. 79974 (1987)]
Congress cannot require that the appointment
of a person to an office created by law shall be
subject to CA confirmation [Calderon v. Carale,
G.R. No. 91636 (1992)].
Appointments extended by the President to the
above-mentioned positions while Congress is
not in session (ad-interim appointments) shall
only be effective:
a. Until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments; or
b. Until the next adjournment of Congress.
H. POWERS OF
CONGRESS
1. Legislative Inquiries and
Oversight Functions

The power to approve or disapprove Requisites of Legislative Inquiries:

1. Must be in aid of legislation;
appointments is conferred on the CA as a body
2. Is in accordance with duly published rules
and not on the individual members [Pacete v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, of procedure;
3. Right of persons appearing in or affected
G.R. No. L-25895(1971)].
by such inquiries shall be respected
[Bengson v. Senate Blue Ribbon
2. Jurisdiction Committee, G.R. No. 89914 (1991)]

CA shall confirm the appointments by the Comparison Between Legislative Inquiries and
President with respect to the following Question Hour [See also Senate v. Ermita,
positions: G.R. No. 169777 (2006)]
● Heads of Executive departments (except if
it is the Vice-President who is appointed to
a cabinet position, as this needs no
confirmation);
● Ambassadors, other public ministers or
consuls;
● Officers of the AFP from the rank of Colonel
or Naval Captain;
● Other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution (e.g.
Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar
Council; Chairman and Commissioners of
the Civil Service Commission, Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on

Page 53 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Legislative President’s constitutional authority over the

Question Hour military. The Supreme Court held that
Inquiries
obedience and deference to the military chain
of command and the President as commander-
Constitutional Provision
in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional
military in the firm cusp of civilian control. In the
Sec. 21, Art. VI Sec. 22, Art. VI same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that
any chamber of Congress which seeks the
Topic appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has
On any matter adequate remedies under the law to compel
In aid of legislation pertaining to the such attendance. Final judicial orders have the
subject’s department force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute. If the courts
Persons Subjected so rule, the duty falls on the shoulder of the
President, as Commander in Chief, to
Any person upon Heads of authorize the appearance of military officials
subpoena departments only before Congress.

Appearance of Executive Officials Additional Limitation: Executive Privilege

Executive privilege is the right of the President
Appearance of and high level officials authorized by her to
executive officials withhold information from Congress, from the
Appearance of 1. Via request courts, and ultimately from the public. Among
executive officials 2. Upon executive the types of information which have been
generally mandatory official’s volition judicially recognized as privileged are state
with the consent secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
of the President national security matters. Certain information in
the possession of the executive may validly be
claimed as privileged even against Congress,
The mere filing of a criminal or an
such as Presidential conversations,
administrative complaint before a court or
correspondences, or discussions during
quasi-judicial body should not automatically
closed-door Cabinet meetings. [Chavez v.
bar the conduct of a legislative inquiry
PEA, G.R. No. 133250 (2003)].
[Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173 (2007)]
Since the privilege belongs to the President,
only the President can invoke it. She may also
The requirement of securing prior consent of
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the
the President prior to appearing before either
privilege on her behalf, in which case, the
House of Congress applies only to Cabinet
Executive Secretary must state that the Act is
Members and not to other public officials and
“By order of the President,” which means that
only when either House of Congress conducts
he personally consulted with the President on
a Question Hour and not in cases of inquiries
such matters of concern. [Senate of the
in aid of legislation as the latter should be
Philippines v. Ermita, supra].
untrammelled because it is co-extensive with
the power to legislate [Senate of the
The claim of privilege must be specific, e.g.,
Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 (2006)].
whether the information sought to be withheld
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-
However, in Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No.
door Cabinet meetings, etc. A claim of
170165 (2006), the Supreme Court en banc
privilege, being a claim of exemption from an
clarified the above ruling and upheld the
obligation to disclose information must be
Page 54 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
clearly asserted. Congress has the right to
know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not
suffice to merely declare that the President, or
an authorized head of office, has determined
that it is so. If the President and Congress
cannot agree on whether the matter is
privileged or not, then the Court must come in
to determine the validity of the claim of privilege
[Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, supra].
Elements of Presidential Communications
Privilege
In Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No.
180643 (2008), the Court ruled that the claim
of executive privilege was properly invoked by
Secretary Neri, specifically under what is called
“presidential communication privilege.” The
elements of presidential communications
privilege are:
(1) The protected communication must relate
to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
(2) The communication must be authored or
“solicited and received” by a close advisor
of the President or by the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
(3) The presidential communications privilege
remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
Contempt Power
As long as there is legitimate inquiry, then the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate may
be properly exercised. Conversely, once the
legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of
the inherent power of contempt ceases and
there is no more genuine necessity to penalize
the detained witness. [Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608 (2018)].
Concept of Congressional Oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and
Page 55 of 116
influence over the implementation of legislation
it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to
determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste
and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
Categories of Congressional Oversight
Functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the
exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny,
investigation and supervision.
1. Scrutiny
a. Passive inquiry, the primary purpose of
which is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of
government activities.
b. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny,
Congress may request information and
report from the other branches of
government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions
for consideration of the agency
involved.
c. Legislative scrutiny is based primarily
on the power of appropriation of
Congress. Under the Constitution, the
"power of the purse" belongs to
Congress.
d. Legislative scrutiny does not end in
budget hearings. Congress can ask the
heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either House of
Congress on any matter pertaining to
their departments, pursuant to Section
22, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
2. Congressional Investigation
a. More intense digging of facts,
compared to scrutiny. Power of
investigation recognized by Sec.
21, Art. VI.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
↓
3. Legislative supervision (legislative
veto)
a. Connotes a continuing and
informed awareness on the part of
a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a
given administrative area.
b. Allows Congress to scrutinize the
exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to
retain part of that delegated
authority. Through this, Congress
exercises supervision over the
executive agencies.
Note: Legislative supervision is NOT allowed
under the Constitution [Abakada Guro Partylist
v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715 (2008)]. See also
discussion under Checks and Balances, supra.
2. Non-legislative
a. Informing function
Via legislative inquiries: The conduct of
legislative inquiries is intended to benefit not
only Congress but the citizenry, who are
equally concerned with the proceedings [Sabio
v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340(2006)].
b. Power of impeachment
The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment [Sec. 3(1), Art. XI].
Initiation: Regular Procedure [Sec. 3(2)(3),
Art. XI]
FILING by (a) any member of the HOR or (b)
any citizen upon endorsement by a member
of the HOR; followed by REFERRAL to the
proper HOR Committee (i.e. HOR
Committee on Justice)
↓ impeachment proceedings [Francisco v. House
COMMITTEE REPORT by proper
committee, which either favorably or
unfavorably resolves the complaint
Page 56 of 116
Above resolution is AFFIRMED (if favorable)
or OVERRIDDEN (if unfavorable) by vote of
⅓ of ALL the members of the HOR
Verified complaint or resolution [Sec. 3(4), Art.
XI] FILED by 1/3 of all the members of the
HOR; trial by Senate forthwith proceeds.
Notes on Initiation [Gutierrez v. HOR
Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459
(2011)]:
- No impeachment proceeding shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year
[Sec. 2(5), Art. XI]
- Initiation means filing coupled with
referral to the Committee on Justice
- Court cannot make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable
offense; it is a purely political question
[Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No.
160261(2003)].
- On motion to inhibit: Impeachment is
a political exercise. The Court cannot
apply (to Congressmen) the stringent
standards it asks of justices and judges
when it comes to inhibition from
hearing cases.
- Constitutional requirement that HOR
shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment [Sec. 3(8), Art. XI] is
different from the publication
requirement in Tañada v. Tuvera [G.R.
No. L- 63915 (1985)]
Trial
The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment [Sec. 3(6),
Art. XI].
By virtue of the expanded judicial review (Sec.
1[2], Art. VIII), the Court’s power of judicial
review extends over justiciable issues arising in
of Representatives, supra]. BUT the question
of whether or not Senate Impeachment Rules
were followed is a political question [Corona v.
Senate, G.R. No. 200242 (2012)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
10-3-60-10 Rule
○ 10 days: a verified complaint for
impeachment must be included in the
Order of Business within 10 session days;
○ 3 days: after the lapse of the 10 days, the
complaint must be referred to a Committee
within 3 session days;
○ 60 days: The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral;
○ 10 days: The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
I. INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM
INITIATIVE
Local initiative; voter requirements
Region Not less than x
registered voters
Autonomous regions 2000
Provinces 1000
Municipalities 100
Batangays 50
Where to file: Regional Assembly or local
legislative body, as the case may be [Sec. 13,
RA 6735].
Limitations on local initiative
Cannot be exercised more than once a year;
extends only to subjects or matters which are
within the legal powers of the local legislative
bodies to enact; and if at any time before the
initiative is held, the local legislative body
should adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled [Sec. 15, RA
6735].
Page 57 of 116
REFERENDUM
This refers to the power of the electorate to
approve or reject legislation through an
election called for that purpose [Sec. 3(c), RA
6735].
Classes of Referendum
a. Referendum on statutes: petition to
approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress;
b. Referendum on local laws: legal process
whereby the registered voters of the LGUs may
approve, amend, or reject any ordinance
enacted by the Sanggunian [Sec. 126, LGC]
Is the power to hold a referendum plenary?
No, such power is circumscribed by the
following limitations:
a. No petition embracing more than one subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; and
b. Statutes involving emergency measures, the
enactment of which is specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be
subject to referendum until 90 days after their
effectivity [Sec. 10, RA 6735].
EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
A. QUALIFICATIONS, ELECTION, AND
TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-
PRESIDENT
Qualifications
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. A registered voter;
3. Able to read and write;
4. At least 40 years of age on the day of the
election; and
5. A resident of the Philippines for at least 10
years immediately preceding such election
[Sec. 2, Art. VII].
Election
1. Regular Election: Second Monday of May
2. National Board of Canvassers (President
and Vice-President): Congress
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
a. Returns shall be transmitted to
Congress, directed to the Senate
President
b. Joint public session: not later than
30 days after election date; returns
to be opened in the presence of the
Senate and HOR in joint session
3. Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution, shall
canvass the votes
4. Person having the highest number of votes
shall be proclaimed elected
5. In case of tie, one will be chosen by the
vote of majority of all the Members of both
Houses of Congress, voting separately
Jurisprudence on Canvassing
Congress may validly delegate the initial
determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass to a
Joint Congressional Committee, composed of
members of both houses [Lopez v. Senate,
G.R. No. 163556(2004)].
Even after Congress has adjourned its regular
session, it may continue to perform this
constitutional duty of canvassing the
presidential and vice-presidential election
results without need of any call for a special
session by the President. Only when the board
of canvassers has completed its functions is it
rendered functus officio [Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint
Committee of Congress, G.R. No.
163783(2004)].
The Supreme Court as Presidential
Electoral Tribunal
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Term of Office
6 years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th
day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same day
6 years thereafter [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
Page 58 of 116
Note:
● The President is not eligible for any
reelection.
● No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more
than four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any time [Sec.
4, Art. VII].
o “Succeeded as President” — refers
to Vice President as automatic
successor or elected President by
virtue of special election, and
serves the unexpired term;
ineligible to run for President if he
has served for more than four years
o Acting President is not included. So
even if he served for more than 4
years, he can be elected as the
President.
B. PRIVILEGES, INHIBITIONS,
AND DISQUALIFICATIONS
Official residence
The president shall have an official residence
[Sec. 6, Art. VII].
Salary
This shall be determined by law. It shall not be
decreased during tenure. No increase shall
take effect until after the expiration of the term
of the incumbent during which such increase
was approved [Sec. 6, Art. VII].
1. Presidential Immunity
The President as such cannot be sued,
enjoying as he does immunity from suit. But the
validity of his acts can be tested by an action
against other executive officials [Carillo v.
Marcos, G.R. No. L-21015(1981)].
The privilege may be invoked only by the
President.
— Immunity from suit pertains to the President
by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the President's behalf. The President
may waive the protection afforded by the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction
[Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, and
Beltran v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82827(1988)].
But presidential decisions may be questioned
before the courts where there is grave abuse of
discretion or that the President acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction [Gloria v. CA, G.R. No.
119903(2000)].
Immunity co-extensive with tenure and covers
only official duties. After tenure, the Chief
Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for
civil damages arising out of acts done by him
while he was President which were not
performed in the exercise of official duties
[Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-
15(2001)].
This presidential privilege of immunity cannot
be invoked by a non-sitting president even for
acts committed during his or her tenure. [Saez
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533(2012)].
Exception: The president may be sued if the act
is one not arising from official conduct [See
Estrada v. Desierto, supra].
2. Presidential Privilege
It is "the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public" [ROZELL].
N.B. Case law uses the term presidential
privilege to refer to either (1) immunity from suit
(i.e. immunity from judicial processes, see Neri
v. Senate, infra, and Saez v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, supra); or (2) executive privilege
[Akbayan v. Aquino, infra].
THE VICE-PRESIDENT
Qualifications, election and term of office and
removal are the same as the President, except
that no Vice-President shall serve for more
than 2 successive terms.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a
member of the Cabinet; such requires no
Page 59 of 116
confirmation by the Commission of
Appointments.
Prohibitions on The Executive Department
The following prohibitions apply to:
a. President
b. Vice-President,
c. The members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants
Prohibited Acts
a. Shall not receive any other
emoluments from the government or
any other source [For President and
Vice-President, Sec. 6, Art. VII].
b. Unless otherwise provided in the
constitution, shall not hold any other
office or employment [Sec. 13, Art. VII].
Exceptions
1. The prohibition does not include
posts occupied by executive
officials without additional
compensation in an ex-officio
capacity, as provided by law or as
required by the primary functions of
the said official’s office. [National
Amnesty Commission v. COA,
G.R. No. 156982(2004)].
2. The Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the
cabinet.
3. The Vice-President acting as
president when one has not yet
been chosen or qualified [Sec.
7(2)(3), Art. VII].
4. The Secretary of Justice sitting as
ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council [Sec. 8(1), Art.
VIII; Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, supra].
c. Shall not directly or indirectly
1. practice any other profession;
2. participate in any business; or
3. be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the
government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries [Sec. 13, Art. VII].
d. Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office [Sec. 13, Art.
VII].
e. May not appoint (a) spouse; or (b)
relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree as
members of Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads
of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled
corporation and their subsidiaries.
Prohibitions
(OEPBCF - "Only Eccentric People Believe
Cockatoos Find Soulmates")
a. Hold any other office or employment
b. Practice any other profession
c. Participate in any business
d. Be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any of its
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
President's spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree cannot be appointed during his tenure
as: (COSUCH)
a. Members of the Constitutional
Commissions
b. Members of the Office of the Ombudsman
c. Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices (including
GOCCs and subsidiaries)
The stricter prohibition applied to the President
and his official family under Art. VII, Sec. 13, as
compared to the prohibition applicable to
appointive officials in general under Art. IX-B,
Sec. 7, par. 2, is proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat them as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter
prohibitions [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 83896(1991)].
Exceptions to rule prohibiting executive
officials from holding additional positions:
Page 60 of 116
a. President
1. The President can assume any or all
Cabinet posts (because the
departments are mere extensions of
his personality, according to the
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
hence no objection can be validly
raised based on Sec. 13, Art. VII).
2. The President can assume ex officio
positions (e.g. The President is the
Chairman of NEDA) [Sec. 9, Art. XII].
b. Vice-President: “The Vice-President may
be appointed as a member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no
confirmation” [Sec. 3, Art. VII].
c. Cabinet
The Constitution allows a Cabinet member to
hold another office provided:
1. It is in an ex-officio capacity and without
additional compensation;
2. Such is necessitated by the primary
functions of his position (e.g. Secretary
of Trade and Industry as Chairman of
NDC; Secretary of Agrarian Reform as
Chairman of the Land Bank); AND
3. Such is allowed by law [Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, supra].
Note: Sec. 7, Art. IX-B is the general rule for
appointed officials. It is not an exception to Sec.
13, Art. VII, which is a specific rule for members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
inter alia [See Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, supra].
De facto officer doctrine: In cases where there
is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who in
good faith has had possession of the office and
has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office,
and may in an appropriate action to recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached
to the office [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No.
191644(2013)]
A de facto officer’s acts enjoy the presumption
of regularity and are valid as far as the public
or 3rd parties are concerned [Espiritu v. del
Rosario, G.R. No. 204964(2014)]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
C. POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT
1. General Executive And
Ministrative Powers
Executive power
This refers to the President’s power to enforce,
implement, and administer laws. The President
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
[Sec. 17, Art. VII].
The President’s power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws is inherent in the President’s
powers as the Chief Executive. [T]he purpose
of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land [Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,
G.R. Nos. 192935- 36(2010)].
Summary of Presidential Powers
1. Executive Power: This is the power to
enforce and administer laws.
2. Power of Appointment: The Legislative
can create office, but only the Executive
can fill it; Congress cannot circumvent this
by setting very narrow qualifications, such
that only one person is qualified to hold
office [Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No.
104732(1993)].
3. Power of Control: The President may(a)
nullify, modify judgments of subordinates
[See Sec. 17, Art. VII]; (b) undo or redo
actions of subordinates; and (c) lay down
rules for the performance of subordinates’
duties.
4. Power of Supervision: This refers to the
oversight function. The Executive must see
to it that rules, which it did not make, are
followed.
5. Commander-in-Chief Powers [Sec. 18,
Art. VII]:
a. Call Out Power: Armed forces to
suppress lawless violence
Page 61 of 116
b. Suspension of the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus: Only (a) in times of
rebellion or invasion; AND (b) when
required by public safety
c. Martial law: Does not suspend the
Constitution
6. Power of Legislation
a. Veto Power
b. Power to Declare Emergency: Declare
only; exercise of emergency power
vested in Congress, but may be
delegated by it to the President
c. Integrative Power: powers shared with
legislative (e.g. appointments requiring
confirmation, rule-making); legislation
during times of emergency
7. Diplomatic Powers: Including Power to
Enter into Treaties
8. Residual Power: To protect the general
welfare of people; founded on duty of
President as steward of the people;
includes powers unrelated to execution of
any provision of law [See Marcos v.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211(1989)]
9. Other Powers
a. Power to Pardon: Reprieve, commute,
pardon, remit fines and forfeitures after
final judgment [Sec. 19(1), Art. VII]
b. Power to Grant Amnesty: With
concurrence of majority of all members
of Congress
c. Borrowing Power: Contract or
guarantee foreign loans with
concurrence of Monetary Board [Sec.
20, Art. VII]
d. Budgetary Power: Submit to congress
budget of bills and expenditures [Sec.
22, Art. VII]
10. Informing Power: Address Congress
during opening of session, or at any other
time [Sec. 23, Art. VII]
Note: The presidential power of control over
the Executive Branch of Government is a self-
executing provision of the Constitution and
does not require statutory implementation, nor
may its exercise be limited, much less
withdrawn, by the legislature. [Ocampo v.
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973(2016)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
2. Power Of Appointment
a. In General
Sec. 16, Art. VII. The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [...]
1. Appointment: Selection by the proper
authority of an individual who is to exercise
the powers and functions of a given office.
Appointee has a right to claim
compensation as stated in the
appointment.
2. Designation: Imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a person
already in the public service by virtue of an
earlier appointment. Does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grants
upon the person so designated [National
Amnesty Commission v. COA, G.R. No.
156982(2004)]
3. Commission: Written Evidence of the
appointment
Elements of a valid appointment:
1. Authority to appoint and evidence of the
exercise of authority;
2. Transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal (preferably
through the Malacañang Records Office);
3. Vacant position at the time of appointment;
4. Receipt of the appointment papers and
acceptance of the appointment by the
Page 62 of 116
appointee who possesses all qualifications
and none of the disqualifications [Velicaria-
Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
203372(2015)].
Four Groups of Officers whom the
President may appoint:
1. With Consent of the Commission on
Appointments:
● Heads of the executive departments
● Ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls
● Officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain
● Other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution:
● Regular Members of the JBC
(ex-officio members do not
need the confirmation of the
CA)
● Chairman and Commissioners
of the CSC, COMELEC, and
COA.
● Members of the Regional and
Consultative Commissions
2. All other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided
by law;
3. Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and (e.g.
Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights [Bautista v.
Salonga, G.R. No. 86439(1989)])
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the President
alone [Sarmiento III v. Mison, G.R. No.
79974(1987)]
Consent of the Commission on Appointments
is not required for 2, 3, and 4 as these are not
positions whose appointments are granted by
the Constitution
Note: Appointments to the Philippine Coast
Guard, which is no longer under the AFP, need
not undergo confirmation [Soriano v. Lista,
G.R. No. 153881 (2003)].
The Philippine National Police (PNP, Sec. 4,
Art. XVI, PC) is separate and distinct from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. (AFP, Sec. 6,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Art. XVI, PC). The police force is different from
and independent of the armed forces and that
the ranks in the military are not similar to those
in the PNP. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNO do not fall under
the first category of presidential appointees
requiring confirmation by the COA [Manalo v.
Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369(1999)].
Note: “Congress may by law vest in the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone.”
● The inclusion of the word “alone” was
an oversight. The Constitution should
read: “The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President.” [Sarmiento v.
Mison, supra]
Other cases where confirmation is not
required:
1. When Congress creates inferior officers
but omits to provide for appointment
thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional
manner for such appointments
2. Appointment of the Vice-President as
member of the Cabinet [Sec 3, Art. VII]
3. Appointments upon recommendation of the
Judicial Bar Council
4. Appointments solely by the President.
Appointments upon recommendation of the
Judicial and Bar Council (does not require
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments)
1. Members of the Supreme Court and all
other courts [Sec 9, Art. VIII] (Note: the
appointment must be made 90 days
from when the vacancy occurs [Sec
4(1), Art. VIII])
For lower courts, appointments shall be
issued within 90 days from submission
of the list.
2. Ombudsman and his 5 deputies (for
Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, general
and military) [Sec 9, Art. XI]
Clustering
In Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302
(2017), the Court ruled that clustering impinged
Page 63 of 116
upon the President’s appointment power in
appointing the Associate Justices in the
Sandiganbayan.
The President’s option for every vacancy was
limited to the 5 to 7 nominees in each cluster.
Once the President chose an appointee from
one cluster, he was proscribed from
considering other nominees in the same cluster
for the other vacancies. All the nominees
applied for and were qualified for appointment
to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions
in the Sandiganbayan, however, the JBC did
not explain why one nominee should be
considered for appointment to the position
assigned to one specific cluster only.
The nominees' chance for appointment was
restricted to the consideration of the one
cluster in which they were included, even
though they applied for and were qualified for
all vacancies.
Clustering is valid only when:
(1) there are multiple vacancies;
(2) vacancies refer to the same position;
(3) vacancies occur at the same time.
Steps in the appointing process:
Nomination by the President
Confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments
Issuance of the Commission
Acceptance by the Appointee
Note: In the case of ad interim appointments,
steps 1, 3 and 4 precede step 2.
An appointment is deemed complete only upon
acceptance [Lacson v. Romero, G.R. No. L-
3081(1949)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Appointment is essentially a discretionary withdrawn by the President once the

power, the only condition being that the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, that it is subject to the confirmation of the
should possess the minimum qualification CA does not alter its permanent character
requirements, including the Civil Service [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
eligibility prescribed by law for the position. 149036(2002)].
Discretion also includes the determination of
the nature or character of the appointment. Acting/Temporary Appointment
Can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure
b. Types of Appointment of the appointing power. The appointee does
not enjoy security of tenure.
Regular and Recess (Ad Interim)
Appointments Note: The President cannot designate an
acting chair in a Constitutional Commission (in
Two Kinds of Appointments Requiring order to preserve the latter’s independence).
Confirmation: However, he may designate an ad interim
1. Regular: If the CA (Congress) is in appointee as chair in the Constitutional
session; and Commission [See Brillantes v. Yorac, G.R. No.
2. Ad Interim: during the recess of Congress 93867(1990)].
(because the CA shall meet only while
Congress is in session [Sec. 19, Art VI]
APPOINTMENTS
AD INTERIM
Regular Appointment IN ACTING
APPOINTMENTS
1. Made by the President while Congress is in CAPACITIES
session Valid upon Valid upon
2. Takes effect only after confirmation by the acceptance acceptance
Commission on Appointments (CA) Temporary
3. Once approved, continues until the end of (cannot exceed one Permanent
the term. year)
Made when
Made any time
Note: The mere filing of a motion for Congress
there is a vacancy
reconsideration of the confirmation of an is not in session
appointment cannot have the effect of recalling Does not require CA Requires CA
or setting aside said appointment The confirmation confirmation
Constitution is clear — there must be a
rejection by the Commission on Appointments Temporary Designations
or non-action on its part for the confirmation to The President may designate an officer already
be recalled. in the gov’t service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of any office in
Ad Interim Appointment the executive branch, appointment to which is
1. Made by the President while Congress is vested in him by law, when:
not in session 1. The officer regularly appointed to the office
2. Takes effect immediately, BUT ceases to is unable to perform his duties by reason of
be valid (1) if disapproved by the CA or (2) illness, absence or any other cause; or
upon the next adjournment of Congress 2. There exists a vacancy.
[Sec. 16 (2), Art. VII]
3. Ad Interim appointments are permanent In no case shall a temporary designation
appointments. Ad Interim appointments to exceed 1 year [Sec. 17, Book III, Admin Code
the Constitutional Commissions (e.g. of 1987].
COMELEC) are permanent as these take
effect immediately and can no longer be
Page 64 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Congress cannot impose on the President the
obligation to appoint an Undersecretary as [the
President’s] Acting Secretary. The President
shall have the freedom to choose who shall be
his temporary alter ego [Pimentel v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 164978(2005)].
c. Limitations on the Exercise
1. Sec. 13, par. 2, Art. VII: The spouse
and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the 4th civil degree of the
President shall not, during his “tenure”,
be appointed as
a. Members of the Constitutional
Commissions;
b. Member of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
c. Secretaries;
d. Undersecretaries;
e. Chairman or heads of bureaus
or offices, including GOCCs
and their subsidiaries.
2. Recess (Ad Interim) appointments:
The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the
Congress [Sec 16(2), Art VII].
Rule on Midnight Appointments Ban
General Rule: 2 months immediately before
the next presidential elections (2nd Monday of
March), and up to the end of his “term” (June
30), a President (or Acting President) shall not
make appointments [Sec 15, Art. VII].
Exception: Temporary appointments to
executive positions, when continued vacancies
will: (a) Prejudice public service; or (b)
endanger public safety.
Limited to Executive Departments: The
prohibition against midnight appointment
applies only to positions in the executive
department [De Castro v. JBC, G.R.
191002(2010)].
Page 65 of 116
Limited to Caretaker Capacity: While
“midnight appointments” (i.e. made by outgoing
President near the end of his term) are not
illegal, they should be made in the capacity of
a “caretaker” [a new president being elected],
doubly careful and prudent in making the
selection, so as not to defeat the policies of the
incoming administration. Hence, the issuance
of 350 appointments in one night and planned
induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President
may be regarded as abuse of presidential
prerogatives [Aytona v. Castillo, G.R. No. L-
19313 1962)]. It must be shown that there is
regard for the fitness of appointees and the
filling up must be few and so spaced which
indicates there was a deliberate action taken
by the appointing power.
Applies only to the President: Ban does not
extend to appointments made by local elective
officials. There is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments
during the last day of his/her tenure [De Rama
v. CA, G.R. No. 131136(2001)].
Appointing power of the ACTING
PRESIDENT.
a. Appointments extended by an Acting
President shall remain effective unless
revoked by the elected President within 90
days from his assumption or re-assumption
of office [Sec. 14, Art. VII].
b. Midnight appointments ban applies to the
acting President.
Power of Removal
General Rule: Power of removal may be
implied from the power of appointment.
Exception: The President cannot remove
officials appointed by him where the
Constitution prescribes certain methods for
separation of such officers from public service,
e.g. Chairman and Commissioners of
Constitutional Commissions who can be
removed only by impeachment, or judges who
are subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Career Civil Service: Members of the career
civil service who are appointed by the
President may be directly disciplined by him
[Villaluz v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. L-22754(1964)].
Serve at the pleasure of the President:
Cabinet members and such officers whose
continuity in office depends upon the pleasure
of the president may be replaced at any time,
but legally speaking, their separation is
effected not by removal but by expiration of
their term of the appointee.
3. Power Of Control And
Supervision
Sec. 17, Art. VII. The President shall have
control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
Control is essentially the power to [1] alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his
duties; and to [2] substitute the judgement of
the former with that of the latter [Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935
(2010)].
The power of control includes:
• Act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate
• Direct the performance of duty
• Restrain the commission of acts
• Review, approve, reverse, modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units
• Determine priorities in the execution of
plans and programs
• Prescribe guidelines, plans and programs
• Reorganization (transfer of unit, transfer of
functions, abolish, consolidate, or merge
units)
Supervision is the overseeing or the power of
the officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties, and if the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take
such action or steps as prescribed by law to
make them perform these duties. This does not
Page 66 of 116
include the power to overrule their acts, if these
acts are within their discretion. In relation to
local government units (LGUs), supervision
includes the authority to ensure that LGUs are
operating and acting in accordance with law
and not ultra vires.
Note: The President's power of control only
extends to administrative functions. If it is
performing quasi-judicial functions, the Office
of the President has no jurisdiction [See Cruz
v. Sec of Environment & Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385 (2000)].
a. Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
All the different executive and administrative
organizations are mere adjuncts of the
Executive Department. This is an adjunct of the
Doctrine of One Executive.
The heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive [Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
G.R. No. L-45670 (1939)]. In the regular course
of business, acts of executive departments,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively acts of the Chief
Executive [Free Telephone Workers Union v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. L-
581184 (1981)].
There is a special class of powers which the
President cannot delegate (e.g. declaration of
martial law, suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, executive clemency,
among others). However, the power of review
does not fall under these exceptional
circumstances. Thus, the President can
choose not to review the decision of the DOJ
and delegate such power to the Secretary by
virtue of the Qualified Agency Doctrine [See
Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. 165276 (2009)].
b. Executive Departments and
Offices
General Rule: The multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
are performed by and through the executive
departments.
Exceptions:
1. Cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or by law to act
in person; or
2. The exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally.
The President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization
of government entities under the Executive
Department. This is also sanctioned under the
Constitution, as well as the Admin Code. This
recognizes the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his or her office "to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency," in
the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to
carry out presidential directives and policies
[Tondo Medical Employees v. CA, G.R. No.
167324 (2007)].
Power to Abolish Offices
Generally, the power to abolish a public office
is legislative. However, as far as bureaus,
offices or agencies of the executive department
are concerned, power of control may justify him
to inactive functions of a particular office [See
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. No.
142801-802 (2001)].
In establishing an executive department,
bureau, or office, the legislature necessarily
ordains an executive agency's position in the
scheme of administrative structure. Such
determination is primary, but subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure [Anak Mindanao v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052 (2007)].
Note: A distinction is made between the Office
of the President Proper and the Office of the
President. The President has the power to
abolish, consolidate, merge units of the Office
of the President Proper. On the other hand, the
President's power to reorganize offices outside
the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions [Pichay v. Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 196425
(2012)].
Page 67 of 116
c. General Supervision over Local
Government Units and the
Autonomous Regions
The President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments [Sec 4, Art
X].
The President shall exercise general
supervision over autonomous regions to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed [Sec
16, Art X].
The President may suspend or remove local
officials by virtue of the power delegated to him
by Congress through the Local Government
Code. The Constitution also places local
governments under the general supervision of
the President, and also allows Congress to
include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials [See
Sec 3, Art X and Ganzon v. CA, G.R. No.
93252 (1991)].
4. Emergency Powers
Emergency Powers are delegated by the
Congress which covers such power necessary
to carry out a declared national policy (declared
by Congress).
Nature of Grant.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to
delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it.
1. Limited period — ceases upon
withdrawal by Congress through a
resolution, or failing to adopt it upon
next voluntary adjournment.
2. Subject to restrictions from Congress.
[See Rodriguez v. Gella, G.R. No. L-6266
(1953) for Nature of Emergency Power]
Requisites for Grant of Emergency Powers
Knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to
meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
a. There must be a war or other
emergency;
b. The delegation must be for a limited
period only;
c. The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe; and
d. The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Concept of Emergency
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the
existence of conditions suddenly intensifying
the degree of existing danger to life or well-
being beyond that which is accepted as
normal. Implicit in these definitions are the
elements of intensity, variety, and perception.
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations,
classifiable under three principal heads: (a)
economic, (b) natural disaster, and (c) national
security. Emergency as contemplated in the
1987 Constitution, is of the same breadth. It
may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other
similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions
or effect.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396(2006), the Court made it clear that
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (Declaring a
State of National Emergency) was woven out
of the “calling out” and “take care” powers of
the President joined with the “temporary
takeover” provision under Sec 17, Art XII.
PP1017 purports to grant the President,
without delegation from Congress, to take over
or direct operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest.
The President may declare the existence of a
state of national emergency without
Congressional enactment however the
exercise of emergency powers requires a
Page 68 of 116
delegation from Congress which is the
repository of emergency powers.
5. Commander-In-Chief Powers
Sec. 18, Art. VII. The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular
or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within
twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without any need of
a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Graduated Powers
the functioning of the civil courts or
Sec. 18, Art. VII grants the President, as
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
“graduated power[s].” From the most to the
and agencies over civilians where civil courts
least benign, these are: (1) the calling out
are able to function, nor automatically
power, (2) the power to suspend the privilege
suspend the privilege of the writ.
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the (3) power
to declare martial law. In the exercise of the
The suspension of the privilege of the writ
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
shall apply only to persons judicially charged
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
actual invasion or rebellion, and that public
connected with the invasion.
safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, these conditions are not required in
During the suspension of the privilege of the
the exercise of the calling out power. The only
writ, any person thus arrested or detained
criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes
shall be judicially charged within three days,
necessary,’ the President may call the armed
otherwise he shall be released.
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.’ [Sanlakas v. Executive
Commander-in-Chief Powers Secretary, G.R. No. 159085(2004)].
a. He may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion.
a. Calling Out Powers
b. He may suspend the privilege of the writ of
This is merely a police measure meant to quell
habeas corpus.
disorder. As such, the Constitution does not
c. He may proclaim martial law over the entire
regulate its exercise radically.
Philippines or any part thereof.
State of Rebellion
The President is the commander-in-chief of all
Since the Constitution did not define the term
armed forces of the Philippines. The ability of
"rebellion," it must be understood to have the
the President to require a military official to
same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the
secure prior consent before appearing before
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Congress pertains to a wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authority —
In determining the existence of rebellion, the
the commander-in-chief powers of the
President only needs to convince himself that
President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the
there is probable cause or evidence showing
commander-in-chief powers of the President
that more likely than not a rebellion was
are not encumbered by the same degree of
committed or is being committed. To require
restriction as that which may attach to
him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would
executive privilege or executive control.
restrict the exercise of his emergency powers
[Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
Outside explicit constitutional limitations, the
231658(2017)].
commander-in-chief clause vests in the
President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of
authority over the persons and actions of the
Habeas Corpus:
members of the armed forces. Such authority
The requisites for suspension of the privilege of
includes the ability of the President to restrict
the writ of habeas corpus:
the travel, movement and speech of military
1. There must be an actual invasion or
officers, activities which may otherwise be
rebellion; and
sanctioned under civilian law [Gudani v.
2. Public safety requires it.
Senga, G.R. No. 170165(2006)].

Page 69 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Note that the privilege of the writ is suspended,
not the writ itself. The writ is an order from the
court commanding a detaining officer to inform
the court:
1. If he has the person in custody; and
2. His basis for detaining that person
Effects of the Suspension of the Privilege:
a. The suspension of the privilege of the writ
applies only to persons “judicially charged”
(should be read as one who is suspected
of complicity in) for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with
invasion [Sec. 18, par. 5, Art. VII].
i. Such persons suspected of the
above can be arrested and
detained without warrant of arrest.
ii. The suspension of the privilege
does not make the arrest without
warrant legal. But the military is, in
effect, enabled to make the arrest
anyway since, with the suspension
of the privilege, there is no remedy
available against such unlawful
arrest (arbitrary detention).
iii. The arrest without warrant is
justified by the emergency situation
and the difficulty in applying for a
warrant considering the time and
the number of persons to be
arrested.
iv. The crime for which he is arrested
must be one related to rebellion or
invasion. As to others, the
suspension of the privilege does
not apply.
b. During the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within
3 days, or otherwise he shall be released
[Sec. 18(6), Art. VII].
i. The effect therefore is only to
extend the periods during which he
can be detained without a warrant.
When the privilege is suspended,
the period is extended to 72 hours.
ii. What happens if he is not judicially
charged nor released after 72
hours? The public officer becomes
liable under RPC Art. 125 for "delay
Page 70 of 116
in the delivery of detained
persons."
iii. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required [Art. III, Section 13].
The suspension of the privilege does not
destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and
other violations of their constitutional rights.
[Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. L-69866(1988)].
The President may exercise the power to call
out the Armed Forces independently of the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and to declare martial law,
although, of course, it may also be a prelude to
a possible future exercise of the latter powers,
as in this case [Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658 (2017)].
Four (4) ways for the Proclamation of Martial
Law or the Suspension of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus to be Lifted:
1. Lifting by the President himself
2. Revocation by Congress
3. Nullification by the Supreme Court
4. Operation of law after 60 days
b. Declaration of Martial Law and
Suspension of the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus; Extension
Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law:
1. There must be an in invasion or rebellion
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of
martial law all over the Philippines or in any
part thereof
The power to declare martial law and to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of
civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning
to citizens that the Executive Department has
called upon the military assist in the
maintenance of law and order, and while the
emergency remains, the citizens must, under
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a
manner that will render it more difficult to
restore order and enforce the law. [Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658(2017)].
The following cannot be done by a
proclamation of Martial Law [Sec. 18, Art. VII]:
a. Suspend the operation of the Constitution;
b. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts
and legislative assemblies
c. Confer jurisdiction upon military courts and
agencies over civilians, where civil courts
are able to function
Open Court Doctrine: Civilians cannot be
tried by military courts if the civil courts are
open and functioning. Martial law usually
contemplates a case where the courts are
already closed and the civil institutions
have already crumbled, i.e. a "theater of
war." [Olaguer v. Military Commission No.
34, 150 SCRA 144(1987)].
d. Automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The President must
expressly suspend the privilege.
The Role of Congress [See Sec. 18, par. 1, 2,
Art. VII]
a. Congress may revoke the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus before the lapse
of 60 days from the date of suspension or
proclamation.
b. Upon such proclamation or suspension,
Congress shall convene at once. If it is not
in session, it shall convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call within
24 hours following the proclamation or
suspension.
c. Within 48 hours from the proclamation or
the suspension, the President shall submit
a report, in person or in writing, to the
Congress (meeting in joint session of the
action he has taken).
d. The Congress shall then vote jointly, by a
majority of all its members. It has two
options:
1. To revoke such proclamation or
suspension. When it is so revoked, the
President cannot set aside (or veto) the
Page 71 of 116
revocation as he normally would do in
the case of bills.
2. To extend it beyond the 60-day period
of its validity.
Congress can only so extend the proclamation
or suspension upon the initiative of the
President. The period need not be 60 days; it
could be more, as Congress would determine,
based on the persistence of the emergency.
Note: If Congress fails to act before the
measure expires, it can no longer extend it until
the President again re-declares the measure.
If Congress extends the measure, but before
the period of extension lapses the
requirements for the proclamation or
suspension no longer exist, Congress can lift
the extension, since the power to confer
implies the power to take back.
The Role of the Supreme Court [See Sec. 18,
par. 3, Art. VII]
a. The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of:
i. The proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of
the writ, or
ii. The extension thereof. It must
promulgate its decision thereon
within 30 days from its filing.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data
available to the President prior to or at the time
of the declaration; it is not allowed to
"undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings." On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only
data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the
power to revoke by Congress are not only
totally different but likewise independent from
each other although concededly, they have the
same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
power of the Court to review can be exercised
independently from the power of revocation of
Congress [Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658(2017)].
b. Petition for Habeas Corpus
i. When a person is arrested without a
warrant for complicity in the rebellion or
invasion, he or someone else on his
behalf has the standing to question the
validity of the proclamation or
suspension.
ii. Before the SC can decide on the
legality of his detention, it must first
pass upon the validity of the
proclamation or suspension.
Cf. RA 7055 (1991) "An Act Strengthening
Civilian Supremacy over the Military by
Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction over Certain Offenses
involving Members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, other Persons Subject to
Military Law, and the Members of the
Philippine National Police, Repealing for
the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees"
RA 7055 provides that when these individuals
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
RPC, other special penal laws, or local
government ordinances, regardless of whether
civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended
parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, they shall be tried by the proper civil
court, except when the offense, as determined
before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
connected in which case it shall be tried by
court-martial.
The assertion of military authority over civilians
cannot rest on the President's power as
Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial
law. As long as civil courts remain open and are
regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are
properly cognizable by civil courts. [Olaguer v.
Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-
54558(1987)].
Page 72 of 116
Do Letters of Instruction (LOI) and Presidential
Decrees issued by the President under the
1973 Constitution during Martial Law form part
of the laws of the land?
LOIs are presumed to be mere administrative
issuances except when the conditions set out
in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist.
To form part of the law of the land, the decree,
order or LOI must be
(1) Issued by the President in the exercise
of his extraordinary power of legislation
as contemplated in Section 6 of the
1976 Amendments to the Constitution
(2) Whenever either
(a) In his judgment there exists a
grave emergency or a threat or
imminent thereof,
(b) The interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on
any matter for any reason that
in his judgment requires
immediate action. [PASEI v.
Torres, G.R. No.
101279(1993)].
6. Executive Clemency
a. Nature and Limitations
Sec. 19, Art. VII. Except in cases of
impeachment, or as otherwise provided in
this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by
final judgment.
General Exceptions to Executive
Clemencies
1. In case of impeachment; and
2. As otherwise provided in this Constitution,
e.g. for election offenses: No pardon,
amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by
the President without the favorable
recommendation by the Commission on
Election [Sec. 5, Art. IX].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
3. In cases of legislative and civil contempt
4. Before conviction by final judgment (except
amnesty)
5. Without concurrence of a majority of all
members of Congress (in case of amnesty)
[Sec. 5, Art. IX]
b. Forms of Executive Clemency
1. Reprieves: A temporary relief from or
postponement of execution of criminal
penalty or sentence or a stay of
execution [Black’s Law Dictionary]. It is
the withholding of a sentence for an
interval of time, a postponement of
execution, a temporary suspension of
execution [People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-
45685(1937)].
2. Commutations: Reduction of
sentence [Black’s Law Dictionary]. It is
a remission of a part of the punishment;
a substitution of a lesser penalty for the
one originally imposed [People v. Vera,
supra].
3. Amnesty: A sovereign act of oblivion
for past acts, granted by government
generally to a class of persons who
have been guilty usually of political
offenses and who are subject to trial
but have not yet been convicted, and
often conditioned upon their return to
obedience and duty within a prescribed
time [Black’s Law Dictionary; Brown v.
Walker, 161 US 602].
a. Requires concurrence of
majority of all members of
Congress [Sec. 19, Art. VII]
4. Remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment
5. Pardons: Permanent cancellation of
sentence [Black’s Law Dictionary]. It is
an act of grace proceeding from the
power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual
on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for the crime
he has committed. It is a remission of
guilt, a forgiveness of the offense
[People v. Vera, supra].
6. Parole: The suspension of the
sentence of a convict granted by a
Parole Board after serving the
Page 73 of 116
minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence penalty, without granting a
pardon, prescribing the terms upon
which the sentence shall be
suspended.
Pardon
Plenary or Partial
1. Plenary: Extinguishes all the penalties
imposed upon the offender, including
accessory disabilities.
2. Partial: Does not extinguish all penalties
imposed
Conditional or Absolute
1. Conditional: The offender has the right to
reject the same since he may feel that the
condition imposed is more onerous than
the penalty sought to be remitted.
The determination of whether the
conditions had been breached rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the
Chief Executive. [Torres v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 76872(1987)].
2. Absolute: Pardonee has no option at all
and must accept it whether he likes it or
not. In this sense, an absolute pardon is
similar to commutation, which is also not
subject to acceptance by the offender.
Limitations on Pardon
1. Cannot be granted for impeachment [Sec.
19, Art. VII]
2. Cannot be granted in cases of violation of
election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the COMELEC [Sec. 5,
Art. IX-C]
3. Can be granted only after conviction by
final judgment [People v. Salle, G.R. No.
103567 (1995)].
Sec. 19, Art. VII prohibits the grant of
pardon whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefore should not be acted
upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

withdrawn. [People v. Bacang, G.R. No.

116512(1996)].
4. Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability
[People v. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-
95(1995)]
5. Cannot be granted to cases of legislative
contempt or civil contempt
6. Cannot restore public offices forfeited,
even if pardon restores the eligibility for
said offices [Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R.
No. 78239(1989)].
However, if a pardon is given because he
did not commit the crime, reinstatement
and back wages would be due [Garcia v.
COA, G.R. No. L-75025(1993)].
The right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political
right. Hence, upon acceptance of the
pardon, the pardonee regained his full civil
and political rights – including the right to
seek elective office, even though that right
is not expressly mentioned as provided
under Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code
[Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206666 (2015)].
Pardon v. Amnesty
Pardon Amnesty
Infractions of peace Addressed to
of the state political offenses
Extended after final May be extended at
judgment any stage
Differentiated from
1. Probation: Disposition where a defendant
after conviction and sentence is released
subject to (1) conditions imposed by the
court and (2) supervision of a probation
officer [PD No. 968, Sec. 3(a)].
2. Parole: Suspension of the sentence of a
convict granted by a Parole Board after
serving the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence penalty, without
granting a pardon, prescribing the terms
upon which the sentence shall be
suspended [REYES].
Application of Pardoning Powers to Admin.
Cases
1. If the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
2. However, the power of the President to
grant executive clemency in administrative
cases refers only to administrative cases in
the Executive branch [Llamas v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 99031(1991)].

Granted to To classes of Denial of Commission of Offenses

individuals persons Persons invoking the benefit of amnesty must
first admit to their complicity in the crimes
Exercised solely by Requires charged. Amnesty presupposes the
the executive concurrence of commission of a crime, and when the accused
Congress maintains that he has not committed the crime,
he cannot have any use for amnesty [Vera v.
Private act which Public act which the People, G.R. No. L-1814(1963)].
must be pleaded and courts could take
proved judicial notice Amnesty
Who May Avail
Looks forward and Looks backward and
Generally: Individuals who form part of the
relieves the puts into oblivion the
class of persons covered by an amnesty
pardonee of the offense itself
proclamation whose acts constitute the political
consequences of the
offenses covered by the same.
offense

Page 74 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Jurisprudence
Amnesty Proclamation No. 76 applies even to
Hukbalahaps already undergoing sentence
upon the date of its promulgation. The majority
of the Court believes that by its context and
pervading spirit the proclamation extends to all
members of the Hukbalahap [Tolentino v.
Catoy, G.R. No. L-2503(1948)].
The SC agreed with the Sandiganbayan that in
fact the petitioners were expressly disqualified
from amnesty. The acts for which they were
convicted were ordinary crimes without any
political complexion and consisting only of
diversion of public funds to private profit. The
amnesty proclamation covered only acts in the
furtherance of resistance to duly constituted
authorities of the Republic and applies only to
members of the MNLF, or other anti-
government groups [Macagaan v. People, G.R.
No. 77317-50(1987)].
7. Diplomatic Power
Scope of Diplomatic Power
The President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country’s sole
representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President
acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect
to international affairs.
The President is vested with the authority to:
a. Deal with foreign states and governments;
b. Extend or withhold recognition;
c. Maintain diplomatic relations;
d. Enter into treaties; and
e. Transact the business of foreign relations
[Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
158088(2005)].
Treaty-Making Power
Treaty: As defined by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, “an international
instrument concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments, and whatever
its particular designation” [Bayan v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 138570(2000)].
Page 75 of 116
Note: It is the President who ratifies a treaty
(not the Senate), the Senate merely concurs
[Bayan v. Executive Secretary, supra]. Thus,
the President cannot be compelled to submit a
treaty to the Senate for concurrence; he has
the sole power to submit it to the Senate and/or
to ratify it [Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No.
159618(2011)].
Military Bases Treaty
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII. After the expiration in
1991 of the Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America
concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
The President, however, may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if:
a. It is not the instrument that allows the
presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or
b. It merely aims to implement an existing law
or treaty.
Section 25 refers solely to the initial entry of the
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
To determine whether a military base or facility
in the Philippines, which houses or is accessed
by foreign military troops, is foreign or remains
a Philippine military base or facility, the legal
standards are:
a. Independence from foreign control;
b. Sovereignty and applicable law; and
c. National security and territorial integrity
[Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
212426(2016)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon
to provide for the joint RP-US military
exercises, is simply an implementing
agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense
Treaty. The VFA is therefore valid for it is a
presence “allowed under” the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and
concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and
the US Senate, there is no violation of the
Constitutional provision resulting from such
presence [Nicolas v. Romulo, G.R. No.
175888(2009)].
Executive Agreements
a. Entered into by the President
b. May be entered into without the
concurrence of the Senate.
c. Distinguished from treaties — International
agreements involving political issues or
changes in national policy and those
involving international agreements of
permanent character usually take the form
of treaties. But the international
agreements involving adjustments in detail
carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving
a more or less temporary character usually
take the form of executive agreements
[Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading, G.R. No. L-14279(1961)].
However, from the point of view of
international law, there is no difference
between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon
states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained
within their powers. [USAFFE Veterans
Assn. v. Treasurer, G.R. No. L-10500
(1959)].
Note: An executive agreement that does
not require the concurrence of the Senate
for its ratification may not be used to amend
a treaty that, under the Constitution, is the
product of the ratifying acts of the
Executive and the Senate [Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, supra].
Page 76 of 116
Two (2) Classes of Executive Agreements
1. Agreements made purely as executive acts
affecting external relations and
independent of or without legislative
authorization, which may be termed as
presidential agreements; and
2. Agreements entered into in pursuance of
acts of Congress, or congressional-
executive agreements.
Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system, enter into
executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that
have acquired the status of law by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the
very act prohibited by said laws. [Gonzales v.
Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897(1963)].
Deportation of Undesirable Aliens
The President may deport only according to
grounds enumerated by law, otherwise it would
be unreasonable and undemocratic [Qua Chee
Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-
10280(1963)].
Two (2) Ways of Deporting an Undesirable
Alien
1. By order of the President after due
investigation [Ch. 3, Bk. III of the Admin.
Code of 1987];
2. By the Commissioner of Immigration under
Section 37 of the Immigration Law [Qua
Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, supra]
Scope of the Power
a. The President’s power to deport aliens and
to investigate them subject to deportation
are provided in Chapter 3, Book III, of the
Admin. Code of 1987.
b. There is no legal or constitutional provision
defining the power to deport aliens
because the intention of the law is to grant
the Chief Executive the full discretion to
determine whether an alien’s residence in
the country is so undesirable as to affect
the security, welfare or interest of the state.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
c. The Chief Executive is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of facts
which would warrant the deportation of
aliens [Go Tek v. Deportation Board, G.R.
No. L-23846(1977)].
8. Powers Relative to
Appropriation Measures
Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
Requisites for contracting and guaranteeing
foreign loans:
a. With the concurrence of the monetary
board [Sec. 20, Art. VIII]
b. Subject to limitations as may be
provided by law [Sec. 2, Art. XII]
c. Information on foreign loans obtained
or guaranteed shall be made available
to the public [Sec. 2, Art. XII]
Cf. R.A. 4860
Role of Congress in such Foreign Loans:
The President does not need prior approval by
Congress
a. Because the Constitution places the
power to check the President’s power
on the Monetary Board;
b. BUT Congress may provide guidelines
and have them enforced through the
Monetary Board
Preparing and Submitting the Budget
Sec. 22, Art. VII. The President shall submit
to the Congress within thirty (30) days from
the opening of every regular session, as the
basis of the general appropriations bill, a
budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures.
The budget is the plan indicating:
a. Expenditures of the government;
b. Sources of financing; and
c. Receipts from revenue-raising measures
The budget is the upper limit of the
appropriations bill to be passed by Congress.
Page 77 of 116
Through the budget, therefore, the President
reveals the priorities of the government.
Program of Expenditure
Even upon the enactment of the General
Appropriations Act, the release of funds from
the Treasury is still subject to a Program of
Expenditure, proposed by the Secretary of
Budget, to be approved by the President, and
such approved program of expenditure is to be
the basis for the release of funds [TESDA v.
COA, G.R. No. 204869(2014); Section 34,
Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code].
Fixing of Tariff Rates [Sec. 28, Art. VI]
The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix (1) within specified limits, and
(2) subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose:
a. Tariff rates;
b. Import and export quotas;
c. Tonnage and wharfage dues;
d. Other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development
program of the government
Rationale for delegation: Highly technical
nature of international commerce, and the
need to constantly and with relative ease adapt
the rates to prevailing commercial standards.
9. Delegated powers
Principle: The President, under martial rule or
in a revolutionary government, may exercise
delegated legislative powers [See Sec. 23(2),
Art. VI]. Congress may delegate legislative
powers to the president in times of war or in
other national emergencies [BERNAS].
Emergency powers [Sec. 23, Art. VI]
a. In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress, may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited
period, and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
b. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof
Different from the Commander-in-Chief
clause:
a. When the President acts under the
Commander-in-Chief clause, he acts under
a constitutional grant of military power,
which may include the law- making power.
b. When the President acts under the
emergency power, he acts under a
Congressional delegation of law-making
power.
Meaning of “power necessary and proper”:
Power to issue rules and regulations
This power is:
a. For a limited period; and
b. Subject to such restrictions as Congress
may provide.
When Emergency Powers Cease
a. According to the text of the Constitution:
The power ceases:
1. Upon being withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress; or
2. If Congress fails to adopt such
resolution, upon the next (voluntary)
adjournment of Congress.
b. According to Cases:
i. The fact that Congress is able to
meet in session uninterruptedly
and adjourn of its own will prove
that the emergency no longer
exists to justify the delegation [See
Araneta v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-
2044(1949)]
ii. The specific power to continue in
force laws and appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise
become inoperative is a limitation
on the general power to exercise
such other powers as the executive
may deem necessary to enable the
government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and
enforce its authority [Rodriguez v.
Gella, G.R. No. L- 6266(1953)].
Page 78 of 116
Inconsistency between the Constitution
and the cases [BARLONGAY]:
a. The Constitution states that the emergency
powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment of Congress unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of Congress
b. Cases tell us that the emergency powers
shall cease upon resumption of session.
c. Reconciling the two: it would not be enough
for Congress to just resume session in
order that the emergency powers shall
cease. It has to pass a resolution
withdrawing such emergency powers,
otherwise such powers shall cease. If no
resolution withdrawing such emergency
powers is passed, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment of Congress.
10. Residual Powers
Residual powers are unstated powers
possessed by the President which are 1) not
enumerated in the Constitution, 2) implied with
the grant of executive power, and 3) not
possessed by the legislative and judiciary. It
includes powers unrelated to the execution of
any provision of law [See Marcos v.
Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211(1988)].
In Marcos v. Manglapus, the Court held that
then-President Corazon Aquino had the power
to prevent the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines on account of the volatile national
security situation. [Note: The decision was pro
hac vice.]
In MEWAP v. Romulo, the court upheld the
reorganization of the DOH through EOs 102
and 1165, as it was within the President’s
residual power to restructure the executive
departments since he has the power of control
over executive departments granted by the
Constitution [G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].
The power to create ad hoc bodies is a residual
power vested in the President in accordance
with faithful execution clause [Biraogo v. Phil.
Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935,
193036(2010)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
11. Veto Powers
Sec. 27, Art. VI. (1) Every bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves
the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall
veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names
of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
General Rule: All bills must be approved by
the President before they become law.
Exceptions
a. The veto of the President is overridden by
2/3 vote of all the Members of Congress
[President returns bill with his veto
message to House where bill originated,
which shall then enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall
be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds
of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law.];
Page 79 of 116
b. The bill lapsed into law because of the
President’s failure to act on the bill within
thirty (30) days; and
c. The bill passed is the special law to elect
the President and Vice-President.
Limitations to the Veto Power:
The President may only veto bills as a whole.
(See Legislative Power of Congress)
12. Executive Privilege
2 Kinds of Executive Privilege in Neri v.
Senate Committee [G.R. No. 180643 (2008)]:
a. Presidential Communications Privilege
(President): communications are
presumptively privileged; president must
be given freedom to explore alternatives in
policy-making.
b. Deliberative Process Privilege (Executive
Officials): refer to materials that comprise
part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. This
includes diplomatic processes [See
Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. No.
170516(2008)].
Varieties of Executive Privilege (US):
a. State secrets privilege: Invoked by U.S.
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on
the ground that the information is of such
nature that its disclosure would subvert
crucial military or diplomatic objectives.
b. Informer’s privilege: The privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law.
c. Generic privilege for internal deliberations:
Has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated [Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 163783 (2004)].
Scope: This jurisdiction recognizes the
common law holding that there is a
"governmental privilege against public
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters." Closed-door
Cabinet meetings are also a recognized
limitation on the right to information.
Note: Executive privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of information
and not to categories of persons—it attaches to
the information and not the person. only the [1]
President (and the [2] Executive Secretary, by
order of the President) can invoke the privilege
[Senate v. Ermita, supra].
The following are the requisites for
invoking presidential privilege:
a. Formal claim of privilege: For the privilege
to apply there must be a formal claim of the
privilege. Only the President or the
Executive Secretary (by authority of the
President) can invoke the privilege; and
b. Specificity requirement: A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires
a specific designation and description of
the documents within its scope as well as
precise and certain reasons for preserving
confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is
impossible for a court to analyze the claim
short of disclosure of the very thing sought
to be protected. [Senate v. Ermita, supra]
Once properly invoked, a presumption arises
that it is privileged. If what is involved is the
presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the
President on a matter clearly within the domain
of the Executive, the said presumption dictates
that the same be recognized and be given
preference or priority, in the absence of proof
of a compelling or critical need for disclosure
by the one assailing such presumption [Neri v.
Senate, supra].
Requisites for validity of claim of privilege:
a. Quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power: Power subject of the
legislative inquiry must be expressly
granted by the Constitution to the
President, e.g. commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic
powers;
Page 80 of 116
b. Operational Proximity Test: It must be
authored, solicited, and received by a
close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that
an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President (i.e. officials
who stand proximate to the President, not
only by reason of their function, but also by
reason of their positions in the Executive’s
organizational structure)
c. No adequate need to limit privilege: The
privilege may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important
evidence,” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority [Neri v. Senate,
supra; see Akbayan v. Aquino, supra, for
application of this principle].
Diplomatic Negotiations Privilege
While the final text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
may not be kept perpetually confidential, the
offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even
after the JPEPA is published. The Japanese
representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality”
would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal
not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. The
objective of the privilege is to enhance the
quality of agency decisions. In assessing
claims of privilege for diplomatic negotiations,
the test is whether the privilege being claimed
is indeed supported by public policy. This
privilege may be overcome upon “sufficient
showing of need” [Akbayan v. Aquino, supra].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Voluntary written
D. RULES OF declaration of the
Vice-President as
Acting President
SUCCESSION President
First written
declaration by Vice-President as
majority of the Acting President
Situation Who shall act as
Cabinet
President
Determination by
BEFORE THE/ AT THE BEGINNING OF 2/3 vote: Vice-
Congress by 2/3
THE TERM President as Acting
vote of all members,
Vice-President-elect President
voting separately,
President-elect fails (until the President- Otherwise: President
acting on the second
to qualify elect shall have continues exercising
written declaration
qualified) his powers and
by majority of the
Vice-President-elect Cabinet duties
(until a President
President shall not
shall have been
have been chosen What if the Senate President and Speaker
chosen and
are also not capable to act as President?
qualified)
Vacancy before the term: Congress shall, by
Beginning of the
law, provide the manner of selecting the one
term:
Vice-President-elect who will act as President until President or Vice
President-elect died
shall become President have either been chosen and
or became
President qualified pursuant to special elections.
permanently
disabled
Vacancy during the term: Congress shall, by
No President and Senate President or, law, provide who will be acting President until
Vice-President have in case of his
President or Vice President have either been
been chosen or shall inability, the Speaker
elected and qualified pursuant to special
have qualified of the House shall
elections.
Both President and act as President
Vice President died (until a President or a
or became Vice-President shall a. Vacancy in the Office of the
permanently have been chosen President
disabled and qualified)
DURING THE TERM 1. At the Beginning of Term
Death, permanent
disability, removal Vice-President to Sec. 7, Art. VII. The President-elect and the
from office, or serve the unexpired Vice-President-elect shall assume office at
resignation of the term the beginning of their terms. [...]
President
Senate President or,
Temporary or Permanent Vacancy in the
in case of his
Death, permanent Presidency before the Term
inability, the Speaker
disability, removal No hold-over capacity for President.
of the House shall
from office, or
act as President
resignation of both Hold-over capacity - official remains in office
(until a President or a
the President and until a successor shall have been elected and
Vice-President shall
Vice-President qualified to preserve continuity in the
have been chosen
transaction of official business and prevent a
and qualified)
hiatus in government pending the assumption
TEMPORARY DISABILITY RESULTING
of a successor into office.
TO VACANCY

Page 81 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Note: Where there is a constitutional limit to the
term of office in question, hold-over is not
allowed. But where there is no limit to the term
of office expressly provided in the Constitution,
such hold-over is permitted [Abas Kida v.
Senate, G.R. No. 196271(2011)].
Sec. 7, Par. 2-6, Art. VII. If the President-
elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect
shall act as President until the President-
elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen,
the Vice-President-elect shall act as
President until a president shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the
President, the President-elect shall have
died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice-President-elect shall
become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall
have been chosen or shall have qualified, or
where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall act as President until a President or a
Vice-President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the
manner in which one who is to act as
President shall be selected until a President
or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in
case of death, permanent disability, or
inability of the officials mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph.
Sec. 10, Art. VII. The Congress shall, at ten
o’clock in the morning of the third day after
the vacancy in the offices of the President
and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a
call and within seven days enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and
a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from
Page 82 of 116
the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of
this Constitution and shall become law upon
its approval on third reading by the
Congress. Appropriations for the special
election shall be charged against any current
appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,
Article VI of this Constitution. The convening
of the Congress cannot be suspended nor
the special election postponed. No special
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the
next presidential election.
2. During Term
Permanent Vacancy in the Presidency
during the Term
Sec. 8, Art. VII. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation
of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice-President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President
until the President or Vice-President shall
have been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who
shall serve as President in case of death,
permanent disability, or resignation of the
Acting President. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified, and be subject to
the same restrictions of powers and
disqualifications as the Acting President.
3. In case of Temporary Disability
Temporary Vacancy in the Presidency
during the Term
A vacancy in the Presidency arising from his
disability can occur in any of the following
ways:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
• Voluntary written declaration of the
President
• First written declaration by majority of the
Cabinet
• Determination by Congress by 2/3 vote of
all members, voting separately, acting on
the second written declaration by majority
of the Cabinet
In all these cases, the Vice-President
assumes the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.
Sec. 11, Art. VII
1. Voluntary written declaration of the
President
Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office
2. First written declaration by majority of the
Cabinet
Whenever a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office.
3. Determination by Congress by 2/3 vote of
all members, voting separately, acting on
the second written declaration by majority
of the Cabinet
Thereafter, when the President transmits to
the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit within five days to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
Page 83 of 116
For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after
receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, determines by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall act as the
President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.
Constitutional Duty of Congress in Case of
Vacancy in the Offices of the President and
the Vice- President
Sec. 10, Art. VII. The Congress shall, at
10AM of the 3rd day after the vacancy in the
offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs:
Convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call; and
Within seven days, enact a law
calling for a special election to elect
a President and a Vice- President to
be held not earlier than forty-five
days nor later than sixty days from
the time of such call.
The bill calling such special election shall be
deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section
26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appropriations for
the special election shall be charged against
any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph
4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution.
The convening of the Congress cannot be
suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen
months before the date of the next
presidential election.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Vacancy timetable: Vested in: (a) Supreme Court and (b) such
a. 0 days – vacancy occurs lower courts as may be established by law.
b. 3 days – Congress convenes
c. 10 days – Law providing for special
elections should be enacted 2. Judicial Review
d. 55 – 70 days – Elections should be held
within this period Judicial Power Judicial Review
e. 85 – 100 days – Canvassing by Congress
should be done within this period Where vested

b. Vacancy in the Office of the Vice Supreme Court Supreme Court

President Lower Courts Lower Courts

Definition
Sec. 9, Art. VII. The President shall
nominate a Vice-President from among the
members of the Senate and the House of Duty to settle actual Power of the courts
Representatives who shall assume office controversies to test the validity of
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the involving rights which executive and
members of both houses of Congress voting are legally legislative acts in
separately. demandable and light of their
enforceable, and to conformity with the
determine whether or Constitution [Angara
not there has been a v. Electoral
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT grave abuse of Commission, G.R.
discretion amounting No. L-45081 (1936)]
to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the
A. CONCEPTS part of any branch or
instrumentality of the
government [Sec.
1(2), Art. VIII,
1. Judicial Power Constitution]
Requisites for exercise
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
to:
a. Settle actual controversies involving rights Jurisdiction — Power Acting on cases
which are legally demandable and to decide and hear a within the court's
enforceable; and case and execute a subject matter
b. To determine whether or not there has decision thereof jurisdiction:
been a grave abuse of discretion (1) There must be an
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction actual case or
on the part of any branch or instrumentality controversy;
of the Government. (2) The person
challenging the act
The second clause effectively limits the must have locus
doctrine of “political question” [See Francisco standi;
(3) The question of
v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261
(2003)]. constitutionality must
be raised at the

Page 84 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
earliest opportunity;
and
(4) The issue of
constitutionality must
be the very lis mota
of the case.
Judicial Supremacy
When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of
the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081
(1936)].
a. Requisites
i. Actual case or controversy
This means that there must be a genuine
conflict of legal rights and interests which can
be resolved through judicial determination
[John Hay v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775 (2003)].
This precludes the courts from entertaining the
following:
1. Request for an advisory opinion [Guingona
v. CA, G.R. No. 125532 (1998)];
2. Cases that are or have become moot and
academic, i.e. cease to present a justiciable
controversy due to supervening events [David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396
(2006)].
ii. ii. Locus standi
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a
party’s personal and substantial interest in a
case, arising from the direct injury it has
sustained or will sustain as a result of the
challenged governmental action. Legal
Page 85 of 116
standing calls for more than just a generalized
grievance. The term “interest” means a
material interest, an interest in an issue
affected by the governmental action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
The general requirement is also referred to as
the direct and substantial injury test. [CREBA
v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No.
174697 (2010)].
May be set aside by the court as a mere
procedural technicality in view of paramount
public interest or transcendental importance of
the issues involved [Kilosbayan v. Guingona
G.R. No. 113375 (1994); Tatad v. DOE, G.R.
No. 114222 (1995); Mamba v. Lara, G.R. No.
165109 (2009)].
Forms of locus standi
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded locus standi or
standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that
the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of
obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that
the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Ordinary citizens are also recognized to have
locus standi in the following circumstances: (i)
when a public right is involved, such as the right
to information and (ii) as expressly provided in
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution
granting recognizing the suit filed by any citizen
challenging the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Special Rules on Standing (Requisites):
Taxpayer
1. Appropriation;
2. Disbursement
Citizen
1. Transcendental importance;
2. Public right; OR
3. Sec. 18, Art. VII (on the sufficiency of the
factual basis for martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Corpus)
Voter
Right of suffrage is involved
Legislator
1. Authorized;
2. Affects legislative prerogatives (i.e. a
derivative suit)
Third-Party Standing
1. Litigants must have injury in-fact;
2. Litigants must have close relation to the
third-party; and
3. There is an existing hindrance to the third
party’s ability to protect its own interest
[White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R.
No. 122846 (2009)]
Enforcement of Environmental Laws
1. Any Filipino citizen;
2. In representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn [Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tanon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No.
180771 (2015)]
Note: Despite its lack of interest, an
association has the legal personality to file
a suit and represent its members if the
outcome of the case will affect their vital
interests. Similarly, an organization has the
standing to assert the concern of its
constituents [Bayan Muna v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 190431 (2017)].
iii. Constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
Page 86 of 116
Exceptions
1. In criminal cases, at the discretion of the
court;
2. In civil cases, if necessary for the
determination of the case itself; and
3. When the jurisdiction of the court is involved.
Note: The reckoning point is the first competent
court. The question must be raised at the first
court with judicial review powers. Hence, the
failure to raise the constitutional question
before the NLRC is not fatal to the case [See
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, G.R. No.
167614, (2009)].
iv. Lis Mota
The decision on the constitutional question
must be determinative of the case itself. Its
constitutionality must be "the cause of the suit
or action.”
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature
will not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised and is necessary to
the determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented.
b. Operative Fact Doctrine
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration
of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid
law, but it can never be invoked to validate as
a constitutional, an unconstitutional act
[Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No.
L-28113 (1969)].
General Rule: The interpretation (or
declaration) of unconstitutionality is retroactive
in that it applies from the law’s effectivity.
Exception: Operative Fact Doctrine
Subsequent declaration of unconstitutionality
does not nullify all acts exercised in line with
[the law]. [Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,
G.R. No. L-28113, (1969)].
Note: Only projects, activities, and programs
that can no longer be undone and whose
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the
unconstitutional activity’s validity are objects of
the Operative Fact Doctrine. The doctrine
cannot be applied to the co-authors and co-
actors of an unconstitutional act [Araullo v.
Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287 (2014)].
Moot Questions
A case becomes moot and academic when
there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits [Quino v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 197466 (2012)]
When a case is moot, it becomes non-
justiciable [Pormento v Estrada, G.R. No.
191988 (2010)].
Ripeness of the controversy
The suit must be raised not too early that it is
conjectural or anticipatory, nor too late that it
becomes moot.
General Rule: Courts will not decide questions
that have become moot and academic.
Exception:
Courts will still decide if:
1. There is a grave violation of the
Constitution;
2. The situation is of exceptional character
and paramount public interest is involved;
3. The constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public;
and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet
evading review [David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396 (2006)].
c. Political Question Doctrine
The term “political question” refers to: (1)
matters to be exercised by the people in their
primary political capacity; or (2) those
specifically delegated to some other
department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure
[Tañada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520 (1957)].
Page 87 of 116
In recent years, the Court has set aside this
doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it
found constitutionally-imposed limits on the
exercise of powers conferred upon the
Legislative and Executive branches
[BERNAS].
Note: In Javellana v. Executive Secretary [L-
36142 (1973)], the Court ruled that the issue
of validity of the proclamation is a justiciable
question considering that Article XV of the
1935 Constitution prescribes the methods or
procedures for its amendment; the question of
WON the revised constitution has been validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV is not only
subject to judicial inquiry, but is the duty of the
Court to decide such question. However, on
deciding WON the proposed Constitution was
in force, the Court did not give a ruling on this
matter granted that it was a political question.
In 2016, the SC ruled that President Duterte's
decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB) involves a political question that is not
a justiciable controversy. The president
decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing
and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave
abuse in the exercise of such discretion, his
decision on that political question is outside the
ambit of judicial review [Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 225973 (2016)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND AUTONOMY
1. The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot
be abolished nor may its membership or
the manner of its meetings be changed by
mere legislation. [Sec. 4 (1), Art. VIII]
2. The members of the judiciary are not
subject to confirmation by the CA. [Sec. 9,
Art. VIII]
3. The members of the SC may not be
removed from office except by
impeachment. [Sec. 2, Art. XI]
4. The SC may not be deprived of its
minimum original and appellate jurisdiction
as prescribed in Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the
Constitution. [Sec. 2, Art. VIII]
5. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may
not be increased by law without its advice
and concurrence. [Sec. 30, Art. VI; Fabian
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742 (1988)]
6. The SC has administrative supervision
over all lower courts and their personnel.
[Sec. 6, Art. VIII]
The rule prohibiting the institution of
disbarment proceedings against an
impeachable officer who is required by the
Constitution to be a member of the bar as
a qualification in office, applies only during
his or her tenure and does not create
immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct or other supposed
violations. [In Re: Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-
19-SC (2009)].
7. The SC has exclusive power to discipline
judges of lower courts. [Sec. 11, Art. VIII]
The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to
the SC all cases against judges and court
personnel, so the SC can determine first
whether an administrative aspect is
Page 88 of 116
involved. The Ombudsman cannot bind the
Court that a case before it does or does not
have administrative implications [Caoibes
v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177 (2001)].
8. The members of the SC and all lower
courts have security of tenure, which
cannot be undermined by a law
reorganizing the judiciary. [Sec. 2, Art. VIII]
9. They shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. [Sec. 12, Art. VIII]
Administrative functions are those that
involve regulation of conduct of individuals
or promulgation of rules to carry out
legislative policy. Judges should render
assistance to a provincial committee of
justice (which is under DOJ supervision)
only when it is reasonably incidental to their
duties [In Re: Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-
1861-RTC, (1988)].
10. The salaries of judges may not be reduced
during their continuance in office. [Sec. 10,
Art. VIII]
11. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
[Sec. 3, Art. VIII]
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control.
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary xxx
contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility
to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require [Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No.
103524 (1992)].
It recognizes the power and authority to
levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may
be provided by law or prescribed by them
in the course of the discharge of their
functions [In re: Clarifying and
Strengthening the Organizational Structure
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
and Set-up of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC (2006)].
The provision in the Charter of the GSIS,
i.e., Section 39 of RA No. 8291, which
exempts it from “all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot
operate to exempt it from the payment of
legal fees. Unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which empowered Congress
to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of
the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, the 1987
Constitution removed this power from
Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now
has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts [GSIS v. Caballero
G.R. No. 158090 (2010)].
12. The SC alone may initiate rules of court.
[Sec. 5 (5), Art. VIII]
The separation of powers among the three
co-equal branches of our government has
erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure within the sole
province of the Supreme Court. The other
branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court. [Estipona Jr. v. Lobrigo,
G.R. No. 226679 (2017)].
13. Only the SC may order the temporary detail
of judges. [Sec. 5(3), Art. VIII]
14. The SC can appoint all officials and
employees of the judiciary. [Sec. 5(6), Art.
VIII]
Judicial Restraint
The judiciary will not interfere with its co-equal
branches when:
1. There is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
PPA v. Court of Appeals: If there is no showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a
Page 89 of 116
branch or instrumentality of the government,
the court will decline exercising its power of
judicial review [G.R. No. 115786-87 (1996)].
Chavez v. COMELEC: Judicial review shall
involve only those resulting in grave abuse of
discretion by virtue of an agency’s quasi-
judicial powers, and not those arising from its
administrative functions [G.R. No. 105323
(1992)]
2. The issue is a political question.
Even when all requisites for justiciability have
been met, judicial review will not be exercised
when the issue involves a political question.
But see Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (2004): At
the same time, the Court has the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion by any instrumentality of
government under its expanded judicial review
powers. This allowed the SC to interfere in a
traditionally purely political process, i.e.
impeachment, when questions on compliance
with Constitutional processes were involved.
Guidelines for determining whether or not a
question is political [Baker v. Carr (369 US
186), as cited in Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15 (2001)]:
1. There is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a
political department;
2. Lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it;
3. The impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion;
4. Impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;
5. An unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made;
6. Potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

experience [Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No.

C. APPOINTMENTS TO 100113 (1991)].
THE JUDICIARY Note: In the case of judges of the lower courts,
the Congress may prescribe other
qualifications. [Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII]
1. Qualifications of Members of
the Judiciary Disqualification from Other Positions or
Offices
Justices RTC Judge MTC/MCTC
of the SC (Sec. 15, Judge (Sec. Sec. 12, Art. VIII. The Members of the
and the B.P. 129) 26, B.P. 129) Supreme Court and of other courts
Collegiate established by law shall not be designated to
Courts any agency performing quasi-judicial or
Citizenship administrative functions.
Natural-born citizen
The SC and its members should not and
Age cannot be required to exercise any power or to
At least 40 At least 35 At least 30 perform any trust or to assume any duty not
years of years of age years of age pertaining to or connected with the
age administering of judicial functions [Meralco v.
Experience Pasay Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-37838
(1932)].
15 years or Has been Has been
more as a engaged for engaged for 2. Judicial and Bar Council
judge of a at least 10 at least 5
lower court years in the years in the
OR has practice of practice of a. Composition
been law OR has law OR has
engaged in held public held public Ex-officio members [Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII]
the office in the office in the a. Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
practice of PH requiring PH requiring b. Secretary of Justice
law in the admission to admission to c. One representative of Congress
PH for the the practice the practice
same of law as an of law as an Regular members [Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII]
period indispensable indispensable a. Representative of the Integrated Bar
requisite requisite b. Professor of law
c. Retired member of the SC
Tenure [Sec. 11, Art. VIII]
d. Representative of private sector
Hold office during good behavior until they
reach the age of 70 OR become Secretary ex-officio [Sec. 8(3), Art. VIII,
incapacitated to discharge their duties Const.]: Clerk of Court of the SC, who shall
Qualifications [Sec. 7(3), Art. VIII] keep a record of its proceedings; not a member
of the JBC.
Person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence In the absence of the Chief Justice because of
his impeachment, the most Senior Justice of
Note: “Practice of law” is not confined to the Supreme Court, who is not an applicant for
litigation. It means any activity in and out of Chief Justice, should participate in the
court, which requires the application of law, deliberations for the selection of nominees for
legal procedure, knowledge, training and the said vacant post and preside over the
proceedings, pursuant to Section 12 of
Page 90 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of
1948 [Famela Dulay v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202143 (2012)].
Appointment, Tenure, Salary of JBC
Members
Ex-officio members: the position in the Council
is good only while the person is the occupant
of the office.
Only ONE representative from Congress:
Former practices of giving ½ vote or 1 full vote
each for the Chairmen of the House and
Senate Committees on Justice is invalid. Any
member of Congress, whether from the upper
or lower house, is constitutionally empowered
to represent the entire Congress.
The framers intended the JBC to be composed
of 7 members only. Intent is for each co-equal
branch of government to have one
representative. There is no dichotomy between
the Senate and HOR when Congress interacts
with other branches. The lone representative
from Congress is entitled to one full vote
[Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242 (2012)].
Regular Members [Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII]: The
regular members shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments.
The term of the regular members is 4 years.
But the term of those initially appointed shall be
staggered in the following way so as to create
continuity in the council:
1. IBP representative: 4 years
2. Law professor: 3 years
3. Retired justice: 2 years
4. Private sector: 1 year
b. Powers
Primary Function: Recommend appointees to
the judiciary; may exercise such other
functions and duties as the SC may assign to
it. [Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII]
Note: Judges may not be appointed in any
acting or temporary capacity as this would
undermine the independence of the judiciary.
Page 91 of 116
Supervisory authority of SC over JBC
The supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with
its rules [Jardeleza v. Judicial and Bar Council,
G.R. No. 213181 (2014)].
Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an
inferior body; it does not include any restraining
authority over such body. [Aguinaldo v. Aquino,
G.R. No. 224302 (2016)].
Procedure of Appointment
The JBC shall submit a list of three (3)
nominees for every vacancy to the President
[Sec. 9, Art. VIII]
↓
Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
filed within ninety (90) days from the
occurrence thereof [Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII]
For lower courts, the President shall issue
the appointment within ninety (90) days from
the submission by the JBC of such list [Sec.
9, Art. VIII]
Note: The prohibition against midnight
appointments does not apply to the judiciary
[See De Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002
(2010)].
D. THE SUPREME COURT
1. Composition
a. Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices
b. May sit en banc or in divisions of three, five,
or seven members
c. Vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from
the occurrence thereof
d. Strict Composition: There is but one
Supreme Court whose membership
appointments are permanent [Vargas v.
Rilloraza, G.R No. L-1612 (1948)]
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
How many divisions can it have?
2 divisions 7 members
3 divisions 5 members
5 divisions 3 members
En banc
Note: They have full discretion on the number
of divisions. Right now, they sit in 3 Divisions.
En Banc and Division Cases
En banc: Cases decided with the concurrence
of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations and voted.
Instances when the SC Sits En Banc
a. Those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of:
1. Treaty
2. Orders
3. International or executive agreement
4. Law
5. Presidential decrees
6. Instructions
7. Proclamations
8. Ordinances
9. Other regulations
b. Exercise of the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal
[Sec. 11, Art. VIII]
c. Discipline of judges can be done by a
division, BUT En Banc decides cases for
dismissal, disbarment, suspension for
more than 1 year, or fine of more than
P10,000 [People v. Gacott, G.R. No.
116049 (1995)]
d. Cases or matters heard by a Division
where the required number of votes to
decide or resolve these is not met [Sec.
4(3), Art. VIII]
e. Modifying or reversing a doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division
[Sec. 4(3), Art. VIII]
f. Actions instituted by citizens to test the
validity of a proclamation of Martial law or
Page 92 of 116
suspension of the privilege of the writ [Sec.
18, Art. VII]
g. When sitting as Presidential Electoral
Tribunal [Sec. 4(7), Art. VII]
h. All other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard by the SC
en banc. [Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII]
Requirements and Procedures in Divisions
a. Cases decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations and voted
b. In no case without the concurrence of at
least three (3) of such Members
c. When a required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc.
i. Cases v. Matters. Only cases are
referred to En Banc for decision
when required votes are not
obtained.
ii. Cases are of first instance; matters
are those after the first instance,
e.g. MRs and post-decision
motions.
iii. Failure to resolve a motion
because of a tie does not leave the
case undecided. MR is merely lost
[See Fortrich v. Corona, G.R. No.
131457 (1998)].
The SC En Banc is not an appellate court vis-
à-vis its Divisions. The only constraint is that
any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Court, either rendered en banc or in division,
may be overturned or reversed only by the
Court sitting en banc [PUP v. Firestone
Ceramics, G.R. No. 143513 (2001)].
There is but one Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands. It is the jurisdiction of this
Supreme Court, which cannot be diminished.
The Supreme Court remains a unit
notwithstanding it works in divisions. Although
it may have two divisions, it is but a single
court. Actions considered in any one of these
divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in
effect, by the same Tribunal. The two divisions
of this court are not to be considered as two
separate and distinct courts but as divisions of
one and the same court [US v. Limsiongco, G.
R. No. 16217 (1920)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
2. Powers and Functions
Procedural Rule-Making
Sec. 5, Art. VIII. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers: […]
Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged.
The 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by
the Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive [Echegar#ay v. Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 132601 (1999)].
Limitations
a. Shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for speedy disposition of cases
b. Uniform for all courts in the same grade
c. Shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights
Administrative Supervision Over Lower
Courts
Administrative Powers of the Supreme Court
a. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts
to other stations as public interest may
require;
b. Shall not exceed 6 months without the
consent of the judge concerned;
c. Order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice;
d. Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law;
e. Supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof;
f. Discipline judges of lower courts or order
their dismissal.
Note: The qualifications of judges of lower
courts as stated by the Constitution are
minimum requirements. The JBC may
Page 93 of 116
determine or add more qualifications when
such policies are necessary and incidental to
the function conferred in the Constitution
[Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833 (2015)].
Period for Deciding Cases [Sec. 15(1), Art.
VIII]
Supreme Lower Other Lower
Court Collegiate Courts
Courts
24 months 12 months, 3 months,
unless unless
reduced by reduced by
the SC the SC
Notes:
a. Period counted from date of submission.
b. Case deemed submitted upon filing of the
last pleading, brief or memorandum required
by the Rules or the court [Sec. 15(2), Art. VIII].
Upon expiration of the period, the Chief Justice
or presiding judge shall issue a certification
stating why the decision or resolution has not
been rendered within the period [Sec. 15(3),
Art. VIII].
This provision is merely directory and failure to
decide on time would not deprive the
corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render
their decisions invalid [De Roma v. CA, G.R.
No. L-46903 (1987)].
The failure to decide cases within the 90-day
period required by law constitutes a ground for
administrative liability against the defaulting
judge. [People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 143702
(2001)].
The Sandiganbayan, while of the same level as
the Court of Appeals, functions as a trial court.
Therefore, the period for deciding cases which
applies to the Sandiganbayan is the three (3)
month period, not the twelve (12) month period
[In Re: Problems of Delays in Cases before the
Sandiganbayan, A. M. No. 00-8-05- SC
(2001)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case [US v. Limsiongco, G. R. No.
16217 (1920)].
Original Jurisdiction [Sec. 5(1), Art. VIII]
a. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls
b. Petition for certiorari
c. Petition for prohibition
d. Petition for mandamus
e. Petition for quo warranto
f. Petition for habeas corpus
Note: Original jurisdiction also extends to writs
of amparo, habeas data, and the
environmental writ of kalikasan.
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. Its jurisdiction is
concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in
proper cases [Cruz v. Judge Gingoyon, G.R.
No. 170404 (2011)].
Appellate Jurisdiction [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII]: on
appeal or certiorari (as the Rules of Court
provide), SC may review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
a. Cases involving the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation, except in
circumstances where the Court believes
that resolving the issue of constitutionality
of a law or regulation at the first instance is
of paramount importance and immediately
affects the social, economic and moral
well-being of the people [Moldex Realty v.
HLURB, G.R. No. 149719 (2007)];
b. Cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;
c. Cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower
court is in issue;
d. Criminal cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher;
Page 94 of 116
e. Cases where only a question of law is
involved;
Note: A party who has not appealed from a
decision may not obtain any affirmative relief
from the appellate court other than what he had
obtained from the lower court, if any, whose
decision is brought up on appeal [Daabay v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers, G.R. No. 199890 (2013)].
Doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference: No court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having
the power to grant the relief sought by
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded
on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders
judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment [United Alloy
Philippines v. UCPB, G.R. No. 179257 (2015)].
Finality of Judgments: A decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it was made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land
[Genato v. Viola, G.R. No. 169706 (2010)].
Exceptions
a. The correction of clerical errors;
b. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party;
c. Void judgments;
d. Whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable.
Note: “Finality of Judgment” means that while
the court loses jurisdiction to amend, alter, and
modify the decision, it does not lose its power
over the case with respect to enforcement and
execution. The Court can suspend the
enforcement of a sentence. Presidential
reprieve does not preclude Court control over
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
the enforcement of decisions after finality. This
is in the Court’s exercise of its judicial power
[Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601 (1999)].
Judicial Privilege: A form of deliberative
process privilege; Court records which are pre-
decisional and deliberative in nature are thus
protected and cannot be the subject of a
subpoena.
A document is pre-decisional if it precedes, in
temporal sequence, the decision to which it
relates.
A material is deliberative on the other hand, if it
reflects the give-and-take of the consultative
process. The key question is whether
disclosure of the information would discourage
candid discussion within the agency.
Judicial Privilege is an exception to the general
rule of transparency as regards access to court
records. Court deliberations are traditionally
considered privileged communication.
SUMMARY OF RULES
The following are privileged documents or
communications, and are not subject to
disclosure:
a. Court actions such as the result of the
raffle of cases and the actions taken by the
Court on each case included in the agenda
of the Court’s session on acts done
material to pending cases, except where a
party litigant requests information on the
result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to
Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court (IRSC);
b. Court deliberations or the deliberations of
the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before the Court;
c. Court records which are “pre-decisional”
and “deliberative” in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications
which are part of or related to the
deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions,
internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
Page 95 of 116
Additional Rules:
a. Confidential Information secured by
justices, judges, court officials and
employees in the course of their official
functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above,
is privileged even after their term of office.
b. Records of cases that are still pending for
decision are privileged materials that
cannot be disclosed, except only for
pleadings, orders and resolutions that
have been made available by the court to
the general public.
c. The principle of comity or inter-
departmental courtesy demands that the
highest officials of each department be
exempt from the compulsory processes of
the other departments.
d. These privileges belong to the Supreme
Court as an institution, not to any justice or
judge in his or her individual capacity.
Since the Court is higher than the
individual justices or judges, no sitting or
retired justice or judge, not even the Chief
Justice, may claim.
Requirements for Decisions and
Resolutions
Sec. 13, Art. VIII. The conclusions of the
Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for
decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is
assigned to a Member for the writing of the
opinion of the Court. A certification to this
effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be
issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or
dissented, or abstained from a decision or
resolution must state the reason therefor.
The same requirements shall be observed
by all lower collegiate courts.
Sec. 14, Art. VIII. No decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
shall be refused due course or denied
without stating the legal basis therefor.
A "Resolution" is not a "Decision" within the
meaning of Sec. 14 of Art. VIII. This mandate
applies only in cases "submitted for decision,"
i.e., given due course and after the filing of
Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings,
as the case may be. It does not apply to an
Order or Resolution refusing due course to a
Petition for Certiorari [Nunal v. COA, G.R. No.
78648 (1989)].
CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS
1. The Commission on Elections,
2. Commission on Audit, and
3. Civil Service Commission
The grant of a constitutional commission’s
rulemaking power is untouchable by Congress,
absent a constitutional amendment or revision.
The laws that the Commission interprets and
enforces fall within the prerogative of
Congress. As an administrative agency, its
quasi-legislative power is subject to the same
limitations applicable to other administrative
bodies [Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 182249 (2013)].
A. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO
ENSURE INDEPENDENCE OF
COMMISSIONS
1. They are constitutionally created, hence
may not be abolished by statute.
2. Each commission is vested with powers
and functions which cannot be reduced by
statute.
3. Expressly defined in the Constitution as
independent constitutional bodies.
4. The Chairmen and members may not be
removed except by impeachment.
5. Fixed term of office of 7 years.
Page 96 of 116
6. The Chairmen and members may not be
appointed in an acting capacity.
7. The salaries of the Chairmen and members
may not be decreased during their tenure.
8. The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.
9. Each Commission may promulgate its own
procedural rules, provided they do not
diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights (though subject to disapproval by
the Supreme Court).
10. The Commission may appoint their own
officials and employees in accordance
with Civil Service Law.
Promotional Appointment of Commissioner
to Chairman
Sec. 1(2), Article IX-D of the Constitution does
not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as:
1. The commissioner has not served the
full term of 7 years; and
2. The appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. [Sec. 1(2),
Article IX-D]
3. The promotional appointment must
conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission
membership [Funa v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 192791 (2012)].
Jurisprudence on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D
1. The appointment of members of any of the
three (3) constitutional commissions, after
the expiration of the uneven terms of office
of the first set of commissioners, shall
always be for a fixed term of seven (7)
years; an appointment for a lesser period
is void and unconstitutional. The
appointing authority cannot validly shorten
the full term of seven (7) years in case of
the expiration of the term as this will result
in the distortion of the rotational system
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from
certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for
the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor; such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion (as it will
disrupt the staggering).
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
3. Members of the Commission who were
appointed for a full term of seven (7) years
and who served the entire period, are
barred from reappointment to any position
in the Commission. The first appointees in
the Commission under the Constitution are
also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving
in the Commission for less than seven (7)
years is eligible for an appointment as
Chairman for the unexpired portion of the
term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the
aggregate period of the length of service
will not exceed seven (7) years and
provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. This is not a reappointment,
but effectively a new appointment
(considered a promotion).
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be
appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity [Funa v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 192791 (2012)].
Term of Office of each Commission Member
The terms of the first Chairman and
Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must start on a common date, irrespective of
the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that
the expiration of the first terms of seven (7), five
(5), and three (3) years should lead to the
regular recurrence of the two (2) year interval
between the expiration of the terms. This
common appropriate starting point must be on
February 2, 1987, the date of the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution [Gaminde v. Commission
on Audit, G. R. No. 140335 (2000)].
Term – the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.
Tenure – term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is
Page 97 of 116
not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may
be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.
B. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS;
COMPOSITION AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Sec. 3, Art. IX-B. The Civil Service
Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and
courtesy in the civil service. It shall
strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability. It shall
submit to the President and the Congress an
annual report on its personnel programs.
Functions
a. In the exercise of its powers to implement
R.A. No. 6850, the CSC enjoys a wide
latitude of discretion, and may not be
compelled by mandamus [Torregoza v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
101526 (1992)].
b. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
the Civil Service Commission has the
power to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments.
c. The Commission has original jurisdiction
to hear and decide a complaint for
cheating in the Civil Service examinations
committed by government employees
[Cruz v. CSC, G.R. No. 144464 (2001)].
d. It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in
requiring the establishment of a grievance
procedure, that decisions of lower level
officials (in cases involving personnel
actions) be appealed to the agency head,
then to the Civil Service Commission
[Olanda v. Bugayong, G.R. No. 140917
(2003)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
As the central personnel agency of the
government, the CSC has broad authority to
pass upon all civil service matters. The
mandate of the CSC should therefore be read
as the comprehensive authority to perform all
functions necessary to ensure the efficient
administration of the entire civil service,
including the Central Executive Service (CES).
[Career Executive Service Board v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762 (2017)].
Scope of the Civil Service
Embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including GOCCs with original
charters [Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B, Constitution].
The Civil Service does not include government-
owned or controlled corporations which are
organized as subsidiaries of government-
owned or controlled corporations under the
general corporation law [National Service
Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-69870 (1988)].
Composition
A Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
Qualifications: [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-B]
a. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
b. At the time of their appointment, at least 35
years of age;
c. With proven capacity for public
administration; and
d. Must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the election
immediately preceding their appointment.
Term of office
Seven (7) years (except those first appointed)
Classes of Service: [CSC v. Sojor, G.R. No.
168766 (2008)]
a. Career Service: Characterized by entrance
(a) based on merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examinations, OR (b) based
on highly technical qualifications; with
opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions and security of tenure.
Page 98 of 116
1. Open career positions: Where prior
qualification in an appropriate
examination is required.
2. Closed career positions: e.g. scientific
or highly technical in nature;
3. Career Executive Service: e.g.
undersecretaries, bureau directors
4. Career Officers: Other than those
belonging to the Career Executive
Service who are appointed by the
President, e.g. those in the foreign
service
5. Positions in the AFP, although
governed by a different merit system
6. Personnel of GOCCs with original
charters
7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled,
semiskilled or unskilled
b. Non-career Service: Characterized by
entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests utilized for the career service;
tenure limited to a period specified by law,
or which is co-terminus with that of the
appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration
1. Elective officials, and their personal
and confidential staff;
2. Department heads and officials of
Cabinet rank who hold office at the
pleasure of the President, and their
personal and confidential staff;
3. Chairmen and members of
commissions and bureaus with fixed
terms;
4. Contractual personnel;
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Note: Except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such
officers and employees [CSC v. Sojor, supra].
Appointments in the Civil Service
The role of the CSC in the appointing process
is limited to the determination of qualifications
of the candidates for appointments and plays
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
no role in the choice of the person to be
appointed [BERNAS at 1052]
General Rule: Made only according to merit
and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable, by competitive examination
Exceptions
a. Policy determining: Where the officer lays
down principal or fundamental guidelines
or rules; or formulates a method of action
for government or any of its subdivisions;
e.g. department head.
b. Primarily confidential: Denoting not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee
for the duties of the office but primarily
close intimacy which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings or betrayals on
confidential matters of state [De los Santos
v. Mallare, G.R. No. L-3881 (1950)]; OR one
declared to be so by the President of the
Philippines upon the recommendation of
the CSC, subject to judicial review [Salazar
v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061 (1976)].
c. Highly technical: Requires possession of
technical skill or training in supreme
degree [De los Santos v. Mallare, supra].
Disqualifications [Art. IX-B]:
1. No candidate who has lost in any election
shall within one (1) year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the
Government or any GOCC or in any of its
subsidiaries. [Sec. 6]
2. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure. [Sec. 7[1]]
3. Unless otherwise allowed by law OR by the
primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries. [Sec. 7(2)]
4. No officer or employee in the civil service
shall engage directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political activity.
[Sec. 2(4)]
Page 99 of 116
Removal or Suspension only for Cause
No officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law. [Sec. 2 (2)]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Powers and functions
a. Enforce all laws relating to the conduct of
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall
Initiative: The power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or
to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for that purpose. There are
3 systems of initiative: Initiative on the
Constitution, initiative on statutes, and
initiative on local legislation [Sec. 3(a), R.A.
6735].
Referendum: The power of the electorate
to approve or reject legislation through an
election called for that purpose. There are
2 classes: referendum on statutes or
referendum on local laws [Sec. 3(c), R.A.
6735].
Recall: The termination of official
relationship of a local elective official for
loss of confidence prior to the expiration of
his term through the will of the electorate.
Plebiscite: The submission of constitutional
amendments or important legislative
measures to the people for ratification.
b. Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices,
and nuisance candidacies
c. Submit to the President and the Congress,
a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall
d. Decide administrative questions pertaining
to election except the right to vote (the
jurisdiction of which is with the judiciary)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Power to declare failure of election: The
COMELEC may exercise such power motu
proprio or upon a verified petition, and the
hearing of the case shall be summary in
nature [Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
134096 (1998)].
e. File petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters
f. Investigate and prosecute cases of
violations of election laws
Note: RA 9369 (Sec. 43) of the Automated
Election System Law of January, 2007
grants to the Department of Justice
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute violations of election law.
However, the COMELEC may validly
delegate this power to the Provincial Fiscal
[People v. Judge Basilia, G.R. No. 83938-
40 (1989)].
g. Recommend pardon, amnesty, parole or
suspension of sentence of election law
violators
h. Deputize law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections
i. Recommend to the President the removal
of any officer or employee it has deputized
for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive
j. Registration of political parties,
organizations and coalitions and
accreditation of citizens’ arms
k. Regulation of public utilities and media of
information
While respondent COMELEC cited the
Constitution, laws and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin, however,
all these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. xxx COMELEC does
not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom
of expression exercised by a non-
candidate. Regulation of election
paraphernalia will still be constitutionally
Page 100 of 116
valid if it reaches into speech of persons
who are not candidates or who do not
speak as members of a political party if
they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken
as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation (a) should be provided by
law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to
meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard
and considering the primacy of the
guarantee of free expression, and (d)
demonstrably the least restrictive means to
achieve that object. The regulation must
only be with respect to the time, place and
manner of the rendition of the message. In
no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored on the basis of its content.
[The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR
No. 205728, January 21, 2015].
Note: This power may be exercised only
over the media, not over practitioners of
media. Thus, a COMELEC resolution
prohibiting radio and TV commentators and
newspaper columnists from commenting
on the issues involved in the forthcoming
plebiscite for the ratification of the organic
law establishing the CAR was held invalid
[Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640
(1976)].
l. Decide election cases
The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases.
[Sec. 3, Art. IX-C].
Cases which must be heard by division
a. All election cases, including pre-
proclamation contests originally
cognizable by the Commission in the
exercise of its powers under Sec. 2(2), Art
IX-C.
Pre-proclamation contests or controversies
are election cases which are instituted prior
to the proclamation of the winning
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
candidate. They are deemed to be still in
the administrative stage.
It includes the questions of:
1. The legality of the composition of
the Board of Canvassers, and
2. Questions of fraudulent election
returns.
a. An election contest, on the
other hand, only occurs
after the proclamation of a
winner. Only after a winner
has been proclaimed can
there be an actual
"contest", with a contestant
who seeks not only to oust
the intruder but also to
have himself installed into
office.
b. Jurisdiction over a petition
to cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
c. Even cases appealed from
the RTC or MTC have to be
heard and decided in
division before they may be
heard en banc.
If the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
functions then the case must be heard through
a division. Upon motion for reconsideration of
a decision, the case is heard en banc [Manzala
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176211 (2007)].
If the COMELEC exercises its administrative
functions then it must act en banc [Bautista v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 15496-97 (2003)].
A motion for reconsideration of a decision or
resolution of the Comelec En Banc or of a
division may be granted upon vote of a majority
of the members of the en banc or of a division,
as the case may be, who actually took part in
the deliberation of the motion. If the voting
results in a tie, the motion, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied. [Legaspi v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 21657 (2016)].
Page 101 of 116
Composition
A Chairman and six (6) Commissioners.
Qualifications
a. Must be natural-born citizens;
b. At least 35 years of age;
c. Holders of a college degree;
d. Have not been candidates in the
immediately preceding election;
e. Majority, including the Chairman, must be
members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years. [Sec. 1, Art. IX-C,
Constitution]
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Powers and Functions
Examine, audit, and settle accounts pertaining
to government funds or property: its revenue,
receipts, expenditures, and uses
Post-audit basis:
● Constitutional bodies, commissions, and
offices;
● Autonomous state colleges and
universities;
● GOCCs with no original charters and their
subsidiaries;
● Non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the Government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to
submit such an audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity.
Complementing the constitutional power of the
COA to audit accounts of “non–governmental
entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly, from or through the government” is
Section 11(1), Book V of the Administrative
Code, which authorizes the COA to audit
accounts of non–governmental entities
“required to pay xxx or have government
share” but only with respect to “funds xxx
coming from or through the government.”
COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The
framers of the Constitution were fully aware of
the need to allow independent private audit of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
certain government agencies in addition to the
COA audit [DBP v. COA, G.R. No. 88435
(2002)].
The COA has the exclusive authority to
• Define the scope of its audit and
examination;
• Establish techniques and methods
required;
• Promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations.
This includes giving the COA Assistant
Commissioner and General Counsel the
authority to deputize a special audit team [The
Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174788 (2013)].
Note: No law shall be passed exempting any
entity of the Government or its subsidiaries in
any guise whatever, or any investment of
public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit [Sec. 3, Art. IX-D,
Constitution].
Congress cannot exempt foreign grants from
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Its
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, including those funded
by donations through the Government
[Petitioner Corporations v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37 & 147811
(2012)].
Composition
A Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
Qualifications
a. Natural born Filipino citizens
b. At least thirty-five (35) years of age
c. CPAs with not less than ten (10) years of
auditing experience OR members of the
Philippine bar with at least ten (10) years
practice of law
Note: At no time shall all members belong to
the same profession.
Page 102 of 116
C. PROHIBITED OFFICES
AND INTERESTS
No member of the Constitutional Commissions
shall, during their tenure:
1. Hold any other office or employment. This
is similar to the prohibition against
executive officers. It applies to both public
and private offices and employment;
2. Engage in the practice of any profession;
3. Engage in the active management or
control of any business which in any way
may be affected by the functions of his
office; or
4. Be financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by, the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries [Sec. 2, Art. IX-A].
The CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of
the President without impairing the
independence vested in the CSC by the 1987
Constitution [Funa v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 191672 (2014)].
D. JURISDICTION
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
The CSC has been granted by the Constitution
and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over
all civil service positions in the government
service, whether career or non-career. [Civil
Service Commission v. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766
(2008)]; see CSC Resolution No. 991936
detailing the disciplinary and non-disciplinary
jurisdiction].
The Board of Regents (BOR) of a state
university has the sole power of administration
over the university. But xxx there is no showing
that such power is exclusive. The CSC has
concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a
state university [CSC v. Sojor, supra].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Appellate Jurisdiction
The appellate power of the CSC will only apply
when the subject of the administrative cases
filed against erring employees is in connection
with the duties and functions of their office, and
not in cases where the acts of the complainant
arose from cheating in the civil service
examinations [Cruz v. CSC, G.R. No. 144464,
(2001)].
In administrative disciplinary cases decided by
the COA, the proper remedy in case of an
adverse decision is an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission and not a petition for
certiorari before SC under Rule 64 [Galindo v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788
(2017)].
The Philippine National Red Cross, although
not a GOCC, is sui generis in character. The
sui generis character of PNRC requires the
court to approach controversies involving the
PNRC on a case-to-case basis. Since the issue
involves the enforcement of labor laws and
penal statutes, PNRC can be treated as a
GOCC. Thus, the CSC has jurisdiction.
Moreover, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction
on administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension of
more than 30 days or fine in an amount
exceeding 30 days’ salary [Torres v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 199440 (2016)].
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The Constitution vested upon the COMELEC
judicial powers to decide all contests relating to
elective local officials as therein provided
[Garcia v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 97108-09
(1992)].
Exclusive Jurisdiction
All contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials.
Jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
The COMELEC’s powers and functions under
the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of
the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The
power to register political parties necessarily
Page 103 of 116
involves the determination of the persons who
must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC
may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties
[Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808 (2012)].
Appellate Jurisdiction
All contests involving elected municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
a court of limited jurisdiction [Garcia v. De
Jesus, supra].
Jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
Interpreting the phrase "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction,” if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then
said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
[Bulilis v. Nuez, G.R. No. 195953 (2011)].
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy,
are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA
[Veloso v. COA, G.R. No. 193677 (2011)].
The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a
public corporation and its funds are subject to
the COA’s audit jurisdiction [Boy Scouts of the
Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 177131 (2011)].
The Constitution formally embodies the long-
established rule that private entities who
handle government funds or subsidies in trust
may be examined or audited in their handling
of said funds by government auditors [Blue Bar
Coconut Philippines, Inc. v. Tantuico, G.R. No.
L-47051 (1988)].
Primary jurisdiction over money claims
Limited to liquidated claims: The COA has
primary jurisdiction to pass upon a private
entity’s money claims against a provincial
gov’t. However, the scope of the COA’s
authority to take cognizance of claims is
circumscribed by cases holding statutes of
similar import to mean only liquidated claims,
or those determined or readily determinable
from vouchers, invoices, and such other
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
papers within reach of accounting officers.
[Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil. Inc. v. Province
of Batangas, G.R. No. 148106 (2006)]
No jurisdiction over their validity or
constitutionality: The jurisdiction of the COA
over money claims against the government
does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality or validity.
E. REVIEW OF FINAL ORDERS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND
DECISIONS
Rendered in Exercise of Quasi-Judicial
Functions
Decisions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its members (NOT only those who
participated in the deliberations) any case or
matter brought before it within 60 days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution
[Sec. 7, Art. IX-A].
Any decision, order or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the SC on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the copy thereof.
In resolving cases brought before it on appeal,
respondent COA is not required to limit its
review only to the grounds relied upon by a
government agency’s auditor with respect to
disallowing certain disbursements of public
funds. Such would render COA’s vital
constitutional power unduly limited and thereby
useless and ineffective [Yap v. COA, G.R. No
158562 (2010)].
Certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Limited to decisions rendered in actions or
proceedings taken cognizance of by the
Commissions in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers.
The Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction,
thus, the proceeding is limited only to issues
involving grave abuse of discretion resulting in
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and does not
ordinarily empower the Court to review the
Page 104 of 116
factual findings of the Commission [Aratuc v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-49705-09 (1999)].
Synthesis on the Rules of Modes of Review
1. Decisions, order or ruling of the
Commissions in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial functions may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court.
2. The mode of review is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 (not Rule 65).
3. Exception: The Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, provides for a different legal route
in the case of the Civil Service
Commission. In the case of CSC, Rule 43
will be applied, and the case will be brought
to the Court of Appeals.
Rendered in the Exercise of Administrative
Functions
Sec. 4, Art. IX-A. The Constitutional
Commissions shall appoint its own officials in
accordance with law.
Sec. 6, Art. IX-A. Each Commission en banc
may promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before
any of its offices. Such rules however shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights
Sec. 8, Art. IX-A. Each Commission shall
perform such other functions as may be
provided by law.
Note: Parts IX.-XIII. of the bar syllabus are
contained in succeeding parts of the reviewer.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
Goals [Sec. 1, Art. XII]
1. More equitable distribution of opportunities,
income and wealth;
2. Sustained increase in amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the
benefit of the people; and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

3. Expanding production as the key to raising Rules on Educational

the quality of life for all, especially the
agricultural Institutions
underprivileged.
lands [Sec. [Sec. 4(2),
3, Art. XII] Art. XIV]
Regalian Doctrine (1) Citizens Congress
Sec. 2, Art. XII. All lands of the public may lease may
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, only < 500 increase
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential ha. (2) Filipino
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, Citizens may equity
flora and fauna, and other natural resources acquire by participation.
are owned by the State. With the exception purchase,
of agricultural lands, all other natural homestead
resources shall not be alienated. [...] or grant only
< 12 ha.
Nationality and Citizenship Requirement Practice of Areas of
Provisions professions, Investment
Filipino Filipino Filipino save in as Congress
Citizens, or Citizens, or Citizens, or cases may
100% 60-40 70-30 provided by prescribe
Filipino Filipino Filipino law [Sec. (Congress
Corporation Corporation Corporation 14(2), Art. may
s s s XII] prescribe a
higher
Use and Co- Engagement percentage)
enjoyment of production, in advertising [Sec. 10, Art.
marine Joint Industry XII]
wealth, venture, and [Sec. 11, Art.
exclusive to Production XVI] Small-scale Operation of
Filipino sharing utilization of public
citizens [Sec. agreements natural utilities [Sec.
2, par. 2, Art. over natural resources, 11, Art. XII]
XII] resources as may be
[Sec. 2(1), provided by Cannot be
Art. XII] law [Sec. for longer
Agreements 2(3), Art. XII] period than
shall not 50 years
exceed a
period of 25 Executive
years and
renewable managing
for another officers must
25 years be Filipino

Note: The Constitution holds that private

corporations or associations may not hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years, and not
to exceed 1000 ha. in area, [Sec. 3, Art. XII] but

Page 105 of 116

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
the Constitution does not specify the capital
requirements for such corporations.
A joint venture falls within the purview of an
“association” pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. XII and
must comply with the 60-40% Filipino foreign
capitalization requirement [JG Summit
Holdings v. CA, G.R. No. 124293 (2000)].
What “capital” is covered – The 60%
requirement applies to both the voting control
and the beneficial ownership of the public
utility. Therefore, it shall apply uniformly,
separately, and across the board to all classes
of shares, regardless of nomenclature or
category, comprising the capital of the
corporation (e.g. 60% of common stock, 60%
of preferred voting stock, and 60% of preferred
non-voting stock) [Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No.
176579 (2012)].
Two tests are employed to determine whether
the Nationality Requirement was met:
1. Control Test - Filipinos must own at least
60% of the corporation’s capital. This test
is generally used, however when there is
doubt as to the “beneficial ownership” and
“control” of the corporation, it must be
subject to the grandfather test.
2. Grandfather Test - Where percentage of
Filipino equity in a corporation is computed
by attributing the nationality of the second
or even subsequent tier of ownership to
determine the nationality of the corporate
shareholder [Narra Nickel Mining Dev’t
Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines
Corp., G.R. No. 195580 (2015)].
Note: If the Filipino has the voting power of the
"specific stock", or the Filipino has the
investment power over the "specific stock", or
both, then such Filipino is the "beneficial
owner" of that "specific stock." Being
considered Filipino, that "specific stock" is then
to be counted as part of the 60% Filipino
ownership requirement under the Constitution.
The right to the dividends, jus fruendi - a right
emanating from ownership of that "specific
stock" necessarily accrues to its Filipino
"beneficial owner" [Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No.
207246 (2016)].
Page 106 of 116
Filipino First
Sec. 10, Art. XII. In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with
its national goals and priorities.
Such provision is per se enforceable and
requires no further guidelines or implementing
rules or laws for its operation [Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 (1997)].
The Constitution does not impose a policy of
Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. It does not rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods, and services.
While it does not encourage their unlimited
entry into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only
on foreign competition that is unfair. [Tañada v.
Angara, G.R. No. 118295 (1997)].
Sec. 12, Art. XII. The State shall promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and
adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
A. EXPLORATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, AND
UTILIZATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
The State, being the owner of the natural
resources, is accorded the primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development
and utilization thereof. As such it may
undertake these activities through four modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such
activities;
2. The State may enter into co-production,
joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or
qualified corporations;
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale FTAA (1987 Service Contract

utilization of natural resources by Filipino
Constitution) (1973 Constitution)
citizens; or
4. For the large-scale exploration, Parties
development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the
President may enter into agreements with Only the President A Filipino citizen,
(in behalf of the corporation or
foreign-owned corporations involving
State), and only with association with a
technical or financial assistance subject to
corporations “foreign person or
the following limitations:
entity”
a. As to Parties. Only the President, in
behalf of the State, may enter into Size of Activities
these agreements, and only with
corporations.
b. As to Size of the Activities. Only Only large-scale Contractor provides
large-scale exploration, exploration, all necessary
development and utilization is development and services and
allowed, i.e., very capital-intensive utilization technology and the
activities. requisite financing,
performs the
c. The natural resources subject of
exploration work
the activities is restricted to
obligations, and
minerals, petroleum and other
assumes all
mineral oils, the intent being to limit
exploration risks
service contracts to those areas
where Filipino capital may not be Natural Resources Covered
sufficient.
d. Consistency with the Provisions of
Statute. The FTAA must be in Minerals, petroleum Virtually the entire
accordance with the terms and and other mineral range of the
conditions provided by law. oils country’s natural
resources
e. The FTAA must be based on real
contributions to economic growth
Scope of Agreements
and general welfare of the country.
f. The FTAA must contain
rudimentary stipulations for the Involving either Contractor provides
promotions of the development and financial or technical financial or technical
assistance resources,
use of local scientific and technical
undertakes the
resources.
exploitation or
g. Notification Requirement. The production of a given
President shall notify Congress of resource, or directly
every FTAA entered into within 30 manages the
days from its execution. productive enterprise,
h. Scope of the FTAA. Only for operations of the
agreements involving either exploration and
financial or technical assistance exploitation of the
and does not include “service resources or the
contracts” and “management or disposition of
other forms of assistance” [La marketing or
Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Assn. v. resources
Ramos, G.R. No. 127882 (2004)].

Page 107 of 116

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Service Contracts Not Prohibited

The following are valid:
B. FRANCHISES, AUTHORITY, AND
CERTIFICATES FOR PUBLIC
1. Financial and Technical Assistance
UTILITIES
Agreements (FTAA): even supposing they
are service contracts, these are not
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
prohibited agreements in the
authorization for the operation of a public utility
contemplation of the Constitution
shall be granted except to citizens of the
2. Philippine Mining Law (RA 7942)
Philippines or to corporations or
3. Its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
associations organized under the laws of
insofar as they relate to financial and
the Philippines at least 60% of whose
technical agreements
capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be
The Constitution should be construed to grant
exclusive in character or for a longer period
the President and Congress sufficient
than fifty years [xxx] [Sec. 11, Art. XII].
discretion and reasonable leeway to enable
them to attract foreign investments and
Nature of a Franchise
expertise, as well as to secure for our people
1. It is a privilege not a right
and our posterity the blessings of prosperity
2. Shall NOT be exclusive;
and peace.
3. Shall NOT be for a period of more than 50
years;
It is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree
4. Shall be subject to amendment, alteration
of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the
or repeal by Congress [Id.].
nature and complexity of such agreements, the
humongous amounts of capital and financing
Congress does not have the exclusive power
required for large-scale mining operations, the
to issue franchises. Administrative bodies (i.e.
complicated technology needed, and the
LTFRB, Energy Regulatory Board) may be
intricacies of international trade, coupled with
empowered by law to do so. [Albano v. Reyes,
the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its
G.R. No. 83551 (1989)].
dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our
country’s competitiveness in world markets [La
What constitutes a public utility is not the
Bugal-B’laan Tribal Assn. v. Ramos, supra].
ownership but the use to the public. The
Constitution requires a franchise for the
Requisites for a valid service contract operation of public utilities. However, it does
under the Constitution
not require a franchise before one can own the
1. A general law that will set standards or
facilities needed to operate a public utility so
uniform terms, conditions, and
long as it does not operate them to serve the
requirements
public [Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222
2. The president shall be the signatory for the
(1995)], e.g. X Company may own an airline
government
without the need of a franchise. But in
3. Within thirty (30) days of the executed operating an air transport business, franchise
agreement, the President shall report it to is required.
Congress
A franchise partakes the nature of a grant
which is beyond the purview of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution. Under
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress [PAGCOR v
BIR, G.R. No. 172087 (2011)].

Page 108 of 116

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

Exceptions
C. ACQUISITION, OWNERSHIP, AND 1. Hereditary succession [Sec. 7, Art. XII]
TRANSFER OF PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LANDS 2. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to
Lands of the Public Domain are classified into:
limitations provided by law. [Sec. 8, Art. XII]
1. Agricultural Lands
2. Forest or Timber Lands
3. Mineral Lands
The primary purpose of the constitutional
4. National Park [Sec. 3, Art. XII]
prohibition disqualifying aliens from acquiring
lands of the public domain and private lands is
Note: The classification of public lands is a
the conservation of the national economy and
function of the executive branch, specifically
patrimony. [Muller v. Muller, G.R. 149615
the Director of the Land Management Bureau
(2006)].
(formerly Director of Lands). The decision of
the Director, when approved by the Secretary
Consequence of sale to non-citizens: Any sale
of the DENR, as to questions of fact, is
or transfer in violation of the prohibition is null
conclusive upon the courts [Republic v.
Imperial, G.R. No. 130906, (1999)]. and void [Ong Ching Po v. CA, G.R. No.
113472-73 (1994)]. When a disqualified
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be foreigner later sells it to a qualified owner (e.g.
Filipino citizen), the defect is cured. The
limited to agricultural lands [Sec. 3, Art. XII].
qualified buyer owns the land [See Godinez v.
Pak Luen, G.R. No L-36731 (1983)].
To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, an applicant must
Can a former owner file an action to recover the
conclusively establish the existence of a
property? Yes. The Court in Philippine Banking
positive act of the government such as a
Corp. v. Lui She [G.R. No. L-17587 (1967)]
presidential proclamation or an executive order
provided an exception to the application of the
or a legislative act or statute [Republic v.
principle of in pari delicto. Thus, the action will
Candymaker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766 (2006)].
lie.
Foreshore land is that part of the land which is
However, land sold to an alien which was later
between the high and low water, and left dry by
transferred to a Filipino citizen OR when the
the flux and reflux of the tides. It is part of the
alien later becomes a Filipino citizen can no
alienable land of the public domain and may be
longer be recovered by the vendor, because
disposed of only by lease and not otherwise
there is no longer any public policy involved
[Republic v. Imperial, supra].
[Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, G.R. No.
L-33048 (1982); Republic v. IAC, G.R. No.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
74170 (1989].
than 500 ha. or acquire not more than 12
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or
Foreigners are allowed to own condominium
grant [Sec. 3, Art. XII].
units and shares in condominium corporations
up to not more than 40% of the total and
Private Lands
outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or
General Rule: No private lands shall be
controlled corporation. Under this set up, the
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
ownership of the land is legally separated from
corporations, or associations qualified to
the unit itself. The land is owned by a
acquire or hold lands of the public domain [Sec.
Condominium Corporation and the unit owner
7, Art. XII].
is simply a member in this Condominium
Corporation. As long as 60% of the members
of this Condominium Corporation are Filipinos,
Page 109 of 116
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
the remaining members can be foreigners
[Hulst v. PR Builders, G.R. No. 156364 (2008)].
In Matthews v. Taylor, the Court upheld the
validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of
land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband. Being an alien,
the husband is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines even if he claims that he provided
funds for such acquisition. [G.R. No. 164584
(2009)].
D. PRACTICE OF
PROFESSIONS
Sec. 14, Art. XII. The practice of all
professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens, save in the case
prescribed by law.
Like the legal profession, the practice of
medicine is not a right but a privilege burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress to prescribe
the qualifications for the practice of professions
or trades which affect the public welfare, the
public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether [Imbong v.
Ochoa, supra].
The Philippines allows Japanese nationals to
practice the medical profession, provided he
has taken and passed the medical board
examination and upon submission of a proof of
reciprocity between Japan and the Philippines
in admitting foreigners into the practice of
medicine. It is enough that the laws in the
foreign country permit a Filipino to get license
and practice therein. xxx However, the power
to regulate the exercise of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised
by the State or its agents in an arbitrary,
despotic or oppressive manner [Board of
Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097 (2008)].
Page 110 of 116
E. ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION
OF CORPORATIONS, PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC
Sec. 6, Art. XII. The use of property bears a
social function, and all economic agents
shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall have the right
to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State
to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so
demands.
Sec. 18, Art. XII. The State may, in the
interest of national welfare or defense,
establish and operate vital industries and,
upon payment of just compensation, transfer
to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the
Government.
F. MONOPOLIES, RESTRAINT OF
TRADE AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION
Sec. 19, Art. XII. The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of
trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
The Constitution does not totally prohibit the
operation of monopolies. It mandates the State
to regulate them when public interest so
requires [Eastern Assurance & Surety
Corporation v. LTFRB, G.R. No. 149717
(2003)].
Monopolies are not per se prohibited by the
Constitution but may be permitted to exist to aid
the government in carrying on an enterprise or
to aid in the performance of various services
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
and functions in the interest of the public.
Nonetheless, a determination must first be
made as to whether public interest
requires a

Page 111 of 116

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
monopoly. [Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, G.R. No.
155001 (2003)].
Despite the fact that our present Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy,
nonetheless, the Government reserves the
power to intervene to promote the general
welfare. Free enterprise does not call for
removal of protective regulations. It must be
clearly explained and proven by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective
regulation would result in the restraint of trade
[Pest Management Association of the
Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
cited in Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R.
173034 (2007)].
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. CONCEPT OF SOCIAL
JUSTICE
Sec. 10, Art. II. The State shall promote
social justice in all phases of national
development.
Sec. 1, Art. XIII. The Congress shall give
highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and
remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good. To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Sec. 2, Art. XIII. The promotion of social
justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Page 112 of 116
Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on
the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all
groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number" [Calalang v.
Williams, G.R. 47800 (1940)].
B. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS
Economic and Social
Sec. 18, Art. II. The State affirms labor as a
primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare.
Sec. 3, Art. XIII. The State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law. [xxx]
Agrarian And Natural Resources Reform
Sec. 4, Art. XIII. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in
the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. [xxx]
Sec. 5, Art. XIII. The State shall recognize
the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and
other independent farmers’ organizations to
participate in the planning, organization, and
management of the program, and shall
provide support to agriculture through
appropriate technology and research, and
adequate financial, production, marketing,
and other support services.
Sec. 7, Art. XIII. The State shall protect the
rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of
local marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support
to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. [xxx]
Urban Land Reform And Housing
Sec. 9, Art. XIII. The State shall, by law, and
for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the public sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic
services to underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlements
areas. It shall also promote adequate
employment opportunities to such citizens.
Page 113 of 116
In the implementation of such program the
State shall respect the rights of small
property owners.
Sec. 10, Art. XIII. Urban or rural poor
dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance
with law and in a just and humane manner.
[xxx]
The constitutional requirement (under Sec 10,
Art XIII) that the eviction and demolition be in
accordance with law and conducted in a just
and humane manner does not mean that the
validity or legality of the demolition or eviction
is hinged on the existence of a resettlement
area designated or earmarked by the
government. What is meant by "in
accordance with law" and "just and humane
manner" is that the person to be evicted be
accorded due process or an opportunity to
controvert the allegation that his or her
occupation or possession of the property
involved is unlawful or against the will of
the landowner; that should the illegal or
unlawful occupation be proven, the
occupant be sufficiently notified before
actual eviction or demolition is done; and
that there be no loss of lives, physical
injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage
to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an
anti-squatting law affords the alleged
"squatters" the opportunity to present their
case before a competent court where their
rights will be amply protected and due process
strictly observed [People v. Leachon, G.R. No.
108725-26 (1998)].
To ensure that evictions and demolitions
are conducted in a just and human manner,
Sec. 28, Par. 2 of RA 7279 commands
officials to comply with the prescribed
procedure in executing eviction and/or
demolition orders:
i. Notice upon the effected persons or entities
at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
eviction or demolition;
ii. Adequate consultations on the matter of
settlement with the duly designated
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

representatives of the families to be resettled shall endeavor to provide free medical care
and the affected communities in the areas
to paupers.
where they are to be relocated;
iii. Presence of local government officials or Women
their representatives during eviction or Sec. 14, Art. XIII. The State shall protect
demolition; working women by providing safe and
iv. Proper identification of all persons taking part healthful working conditions, taking into
in the demolition; account their maternal functions, and such
v. Execution of eviction or demolition only facilities and opportunities that will enhance
during regular office hours from Mondays to their welfare and enable them to realize their
Fridays and during good weather, unless the full potential in the service of the nation.
affected families consent otherwise;
vi. No use of heavy equipment for demolition
In Saudia v. Rebesencio [G.R. No. 198587
except for structures that are permanent and
(2015)], Rebesencio et. al. were not granted
of concrete materials;
with their maternity leaves and were
vii. Proper uniforms for members of the
subsequently terminated by Saudia due to their
Philippine National Police who shall occupy
pregnancy. The Court ruled that Saudia's
the first line of law enforcement and observe
policy is discriminatory.
proper disturbance control procedures; and
viii. Adequate relocation, whether temporary or
There is the glaringly discriminatory nature of
permanent: Provided, however, That in
Saudia's policy since it entails the termination
cases of eviction and demolition pursuant to
of employment of flight attendants who become
a court order involving underprivileged and
pregnant. At the risk of stating the obvious,
homeless citizens, relocation shall be
pregnancy is an occurrence that pertains
undertaken by the local government unit
specifically to women. Saudia's policy excludes
concerned and the National Housing
from and restricts employment on the basis of
Authority with the assistance of other
no other consideration but sex.
government agencies within forty-five (45)
days from service of notice of final judgment
It would be the height of iniquity to view
by the court, after which period the said order
pregnancy as a disability so permanent and
shall be executed: Provided, further, That
immutable that it must entail the termination of
should relocation not be possible within the
one's employment. The respondents were
said period, financial assistance in the
illegally terminated.
amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum
daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall
Role And Rights Of Peoples Organizations
be extended to the affected families by the
local government unit concerned [Kalipunan Sec. 15, Art. XIII. The State shall respect the
ng Damayang Mahihirap v. Robredo, G.R. role of independent people’s organizations to
No. 200903 (2014)]. enable the people to pursue and protect,
within the democratic framework, their
Health legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful
Sec. 11, Art. XIII. The State shall adopt an
means. [xxx]
integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other Cultural
social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the Sec. 22, Art. II. The State recognizes and
needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
disabled, women, and children. The State communities within the framework of
national unity and development.

Page 114 of 116

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Sec. 5, Art. XII. The State, subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.
Sec. 15, Art. XIV. Arts and letters shall enjoy
the patronage of the State. The State shall
conserve, promote, and popularize the
nation’s historical and cultural heritage and
resources, as well as artistic creations.
Sec. 17, Art. XIV. The State shall recognize,
respect, and protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in
the formulation of national plans and
policies.
VII. Monitor the Philippine Government's
C. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
VIII. Grant immunity from prosecution to any
Sec. 17, Art. XIII. (1) There is hereby created
an independent office called the Commission
on Human Rights.
xxx
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the
existing Presidential Committee on Human
Rights shall continue to exercise its present
functions and powers.
xxx
Page 115 of 116
1. Powers
I. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;
II. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the
Rules of Court;
III. Provide appropriate legal measures for the
protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection;
IV. Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons,
or detention facilities;
V. Establish a continuing program of research,
education, and information to enhance
respect for the primacy of human rights;
VI. Recommend to Congress effective
measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of
violations of human rights, or their families;
compliance with international treaty
obligations on human rights;
person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence
is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;
IX. Request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance
of its functions;
X. Appoint its officers and employees in
accordance with law; and
XI. Perform such other duties and functions as
may be provided by law. [Sec. 18, Art. XIII]
The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But it cannot
try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. [Cariño v. CHR, G.R.
No. 96681 (1991)].
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

The Commission is not a court of justice or a

quasi-judicial body. The Commission cannot
try and resolve cases on merits as it is not
within its power to investigate. Its power to
investigate is only fact-finding. When providing
preventive measures, it can file a case before
a court to represent victims [EPZA v. CHR,
G.R. No. 101476 (1992)].

2. Composition and
Qualification of Members

Sec. 17, Art. XIII.

xxx (2) The Commission shall be composed
of a Chairman and four Members who must
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and
a majority of whom shall be members of the
Bar. The term of office and other
qualifications and disabilities of the Members
of the Commission shall be provided by law.

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