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Is Design Theory Possible
Is Design Theory Possible
ABSTRACT
Hooker, J. N., “Is Design Theory Possible?” Journal of Information Technology Theory and
Application (JITTA), 6:2, 2004, 73-83
John Hooker
albeit one that does not reduce to theory all the category mistake, since it confuses a
knowledge required to practice chemistry. description with what is described. A theory is
an account of the way things are, whereas a
The possibility of design theory, then,
fact is the way things are. Second, a fact need
turns on whether there are theoretical styles or
not be established. If there are sixteen
subject matters that support design practice
inhabited planets in the galaxy, then this is a
and are uniquely associated with it. I will
fact whether we know about it or not. Third, a
suggest that there are. But on this
theory (i.e., its truth) may be quite firmly
understanding, design theory is in its infancy,
established, as is Maxwell’s theory of
and my rumination about what it might
electromagnetism.
become must be treated as speculation.
A theory is more than a conceptual
I begin below with a brief discussion of
framework, even though it uses one, and even
what is meant by “theory.” After an even
though a conceptual framework is theory-
briefer definition of “design,” I argue that a
laden in the sense that it divides up the world
socio-psychological understanding of the
in a particular way. The Linnaeus system of
design process is important but is not design
species, genera, etc., is not a theory, because it
theory. I then argue at some length that one
makes no explicit claims. Rather, one uses it to
cannot reduce practical design knowledge to
make claims, as for instance, “Homo
theory. But this leaves open the possibility that
there are supporting theories unique to design,
and I suggest ways in which these can arise
from the need to understand the behavior of
CONTRIBUTION
incompletely described objects, which are A number of practical sciences are
characteristic of design. In particular, I discuss centered on design, whether it be the design of
the potential for design theory in physical artifacts, software, organizations, or
computational models, design representations, information systems. This raises the issue of
optimization models, and empirical whether there can in fact be a science of design
investigations. I also point out that since part with a theoretical basis.
of what it means to design is to concoct a
functional or teleological explanation of the This paper maintains that there cannot be
resulting artifact, teleological theories can play a theory of design in the same sense that there is
a special role in design. I defend the notion of a theory of physics or chemistry. It draws on the
teleological explanation and suggest how it thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard Quine,
might lead to design theories. Hans Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas to
show that a practice, such as design, cannot be
I make no attempt to survey reduced to theory because practice is essentially
systematically the literature that might be pretheoretical. The argument is based partly on
relevant to design theory. Several useful Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis:
surveys can be found in the literature (Cross, without pretheoretical discourse to supply the
Naughton and Walker 1980; Hubka 1980; concepts explained by theories, there would be
Simon 1969; Suh 1990). no way to understand what it means for
competing theories to offer different
WHAT IS THEORY? explanations of the same phenomenon.
A theory is an explanatory account of On the other hand, there can be a
the way things are. This means that a theory is supporting theory that is uniquely associated
not number of things it is commonly taken to with a practice, even if it does not explain the
be. practice itself. For instance, chemical theory is
uniquely associated with the practice of
What Theory Is Not chemistry (understood as what chemists do in
A theory is not (necessarily) the laboratory), even though it does not
unsubstantiated. We colloquially contrast completely explain why or how they do it.
“theory” and “fact,” as though a theory is
speculative and a fact is established. This is
wrong on several levels. First, it makes a
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Is Design Theory Possible?
they learn their craft? When several people mathematics are helpful in the identification of
produce a design, how do they interact? There isomers, and so on. A socio-psychological
is no reason one cannot build a theory around theory of chemical practice could be viewed as
these questions, at least to the extent that one one of these supporting theories. By helping us
can build psychological and sociological to understand how chemists think and how
theories of any kind. A good deal of effort has they interact with each other, it could improve
already been exerted in this direction, much of the practice of chemistry. But it would not be a
it based on analysis of “protocols,” or records theory of chemistry.
of what designers say when they talk to each
In a similar sense the practice of design
other or are asked to “think aloud” (Ericsson
can have supporting sciences. In engineering
and Simon 1980).
design, for instance, one appeals to physics
One can also ask what would happen if and materials science to determine whether a
people designed differently—a search program proposed bridge will fall down. Socio-
described by John Dixon (Dixon 1987). In psychological theories of the design process
particular, one would like to know what can comprise another supporting science. But
factors lead to good designs, where the again, they are not theories of design.
criterion of “goodness” is defined in advance
What Design Theory Is
(efficiency, cost, robustness, or whatever). I
take efforts to formulate “design procedure” or I now seem to have reached an impasse.
“steps to follow when designing” to be part of I distinguished design theory from socio-
this research program. psychological theories of design practice. But
since design is a practice, a theory of design
Socio-psychological theories of these
must be a theory of design practice, and it is
kinds are legitimate and important and can
unclear how one can have a theory of a
help one know how to design. But they are not
practice except in a socio-psychological sense.
the same as knowledge of how to design. One
Chemistry is free of this difficulty, because it
can know much about how to design while
is associated with a set of phenomena (i.e.,
knowing very little about how designers (other
chemical phenomena) distinct from the
than oneself) actually behave. Conversely, one
phenomenon of chemical practice. But design
can know much about what designers do and
seems to have no such set of associated
little about how to design, particularly if other
phenomena.
designers know equally little!
One can attempt either of two escapes
There is a significant sense in which the
from this impasse. One is to insist that it is
socio-psychological theories are not theories
possible to understand a practice theoretically
of design at all. They are like theories of how
in a way that does not reduce to socio-
chemists practice their science, or what would
psychological theories. That is, one can
happen if they practiced it differently. One
develop a theoretical ordering of practical
could study how chemists behave in the
knowledge. Another is to show that design,
laboratory, how they keep records, how they
like chemistry, has its own subject matter after
design experiments, how they train their
all—even if it is not so obvious what it is.
apprentices, and so on. In other words, one can
treat the practice of chemistry as a I will argue below that the first avenue
phenomenon to be studied, one that is quite of escape is blocked by considerations put
distinct from the chemical phenomena studied forward by philosophers of science.
by chemistry. One can also ask how chemistry
The second possible avenue of escape
should be practiced, and chemists have in fact
evolved certain practices that seem to work. in effect claims that design practice calls for
supporting theories that are peculiar to design.
The practice of chemistry is actually The theory of chemistry is not only a
served by several supporting sciences, of “supporting theory” for the practice of
which chemistry itself is only one. A chemist chemistry, but one that is uniquely tied to that
uses mass spectrometers, for instance, whose practice. In other words, among the theories
operation relies on optics and quantum useful for chemical practice are those whose
physics. Computer science and discrete subject matter is particularly associated with
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Is Design Theory Possible?
chemical practice (i.e., chemical theories), or physician must exercise judgment. This is
whose type of analysis or level of abstraction phronesis.
is uniquely suited to chemical practice. The
Phronesis, then, is the ability to use
claim here is that the same is true for design
one’s theoretical knowledge (episteme) to
practice.
determine which technique (techne) to use. It
is where theory and practice meet. Good
IRREDUCIBILITY OF PRACTICAL judgment generally takes much longer to
KNOWLEDGE TO THEORY acquire than theoretical knowledge or
technical know-how, perhaps the better part of
The issue as to whether one can
a lifetime. Apparently it cannot be taught, but
understand a practice theoretically is one of
obtained only by experience, preferably under
the central questions addressed by a school of
the supervision of an expert.
philosophy developed in the1970s and 1980s
by Jürgen Habermas, Hans Georg Gadamer, Phronesis clearly relies on techne and
Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and others episteme. Judgment without technical know-
(Habermas 1975, Gadamer 1975, Rorty 1979). how is impotent (a surgeon without a scalpel).
Bernstein provides a discussion of this Judgment without theory may be ineffective,
literature (Bernstein 1983). These thinkers as is some folk medicine, and judgment with
argue at length that practical knowledge is bad theory can be even worse. (Think of
logically prior to theoretical knowledge, and bloodletting, for which patients once traveled
that it makes no sense to speak of long distances to find a skilled and
understanding practice theoretically. I cannot experienced practitioner). But even though
convey here the full scope of this body of phronesis relies on techne and episteme, it is
thought, of which social criticism is an reducible to neither.
important component. But I can say something
about its reasons for denying that practice can I first dispose of two bad arguments for
be theoretically understood. the irreducibility of phronesis. One argument
draws the distinction between knowing that
I begin with a distinction, originally and knowing how. “Knowing that” is
drawn by the ancient Greeks (notably propositional knowledge; that is, knowing that
Aristotle), between three types of knowledge: something is true. “Knowing how” is a skill;
techne, episteme and phronesis. Techne is that is, knowing how to do something. One
technical know-how, and episteme is might maintain that phronesis involves
theoretical knowledge. Phronesis might best knowing how, whereas episteme does not. For
be translated as judgment, or the ability to instance, phronesis involves observational
apply techne and episteme to a practical skills (ability to assimilate details and
problem. distinguish the ones that matter), and the
ability to reasoning clearly under the pressure
Suppose a physician encounters a
of the moment. Thus phronesis is irreducible
patient who appears to have appendicitis. The
to episteme.
physician knows how to examine the patient,
which tests to order, and how to remove the But the irreducibility of phronesis does
appendix if necessary. This is techne. The not concern the irreducibility of “knowing
physician is also well schooled in anatomy, how” to “knowing that.” If Habermas and
pathology, and histology, and knows the company are simply telling us that possessing
etiology of the disease and its effect on bodily a skill is different from possessing
systems. This is episteme. But determining propositional knowledge, their claim is trivial
whether the patient really has appendicitis is and uninteresting. They claim, rather, that the
another matter. The patient may not have all propositional component of phronesis is
the symptoms, the laboratory tests could be irreducible to the propositional component of
borderline, and the patient’s own account episteme. In fact, they maintain that it is on
uncertain or even self-contradictory. There phronesis that all propositional knowledge is
may be no time to obtain more definitive tests ultimately based.
before the organ ruptures. At this point the
Another bad argument for the that paradigm, where by “discourse” I mean
irreducibility of phronesis is that people who not only linguistic behavior but how it
know the theory and have the “how to” skills interacts with other types of behavior.
sometimes do not know what to do in a
Yet there is a sense in which all of the
concrete situation. So there must be more to
theories talk about many of the same things,
phronesis than theoretical knowledge. But one
namely the things in our everyday experience
can explain this inability without supposing
that they attempt to explain. They talk about
the phronesis is irreducible. For instance, the
light and darkness, heat and cold, the sun and
theory may be incomplete. If blood tests do
the moon. This is possible only if these words
not determine whether the patient has
receive their meanings from some overarching
appendicitis, it may be because we are not
discourse (or “form of life,” to use
fully aware of the effect of appendicitis on
Wittgenstein’s phrase) that endures through
blood chemistry. Alternatively, the “boundary
changes in scientific worldview. This is the
conditions” may not be fully known. Given
everyday discourse that embodies our
enough information about the patient’s
common-sense understanding of the world, the
symptoms, theory predicts reliably whether he
practical knowledge that gets us through the
or she has appendicitis, but perhaps the patient
day. It is the praxis that provides the
does not report all symptoms, or perhaps the
foundation for theoria.
blood tests were not carefully done.
The irreducibility of practical
The philosophical arguments for
knowledge to theory explains our intuition that
irreducibility go deeper than these. One of
medicine or design is an “art” as well as a
them springs from the observation that while
“science.” To build medical science or design
scientific worldviews come and go, much of
science one must develop scientific knowledge
everyday, common-sense discourse stays the
that supports the practice of medicine or
same. Scientists themselves dwell in this “life
design, and is uniquely associated with it, but
world” of everyday knowledge while they
does not transform the practice itself into a
work on their theories. Everyday discourse is
science.
therefore pretheoretical, the source from which
scientific theories spring.
TOWARD THEORIES OF DESIGN
This theme was echoed by such
“postmodern” thinkers as Wittgenstein, Quine, I now turn to the task of identifying a
Habermas, Rorty, and Gadamer (see set of problem areas whose systematic study
Wittgenstein 1958; Quine 1960, 1961; Quine could yield theories uniquely associated with
and Ullian 1970). It is best known from design practice. Again, the problem of
Thomas Kuhn’s argument that science understanding the socio-psychological
undergoes “paradigm shifts” so radical that phenomenon of design is not one of them,
theories before the shift are in some sense since it is most appropriately treated as part of
incommensurable with theories after the shift sociology, psychology, cognitive science, or
(Kuhn 1970). One way in which they are some combination of these. But I will discuss
incommensurable is that a theoretical three subject areas, or types of theoretical
statement, such as “light travels in straight analysis, that could lead to sciences of design.
lines,” may assume a new meaning in the new These are computational models of design,
paradigm; in this case, euclidean straight lines understanding the properties of incompletely
became noneuclidean straight lines specified objects, and teleological explanation.
(geodesics). This alone is not upsetting, but (to Computational Models
seize on Quine’s way of putting it) there may
be no translation from the old language into If the study of the concrete designing
the new. There may be no way to pick a claim phenomenon is not peculiarly a design science
in the old paradigm, translate it into the new because it focuses on the behavior and
language, and check whether it remains true in interaction of human beings, perhaps one can
the new paradigm. This is because a statement obtain a design science by removing the
in the old paradigm receives its meaning from human element. That is, rather than ask what
the role it plays in the scientific discourse of happens when humans follow certain design
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Is Design Theory Possible?
procedures, one can ask what happens when an underlying subject matter that a study of
computers do. When one specifies procedures design algorithms might organize in the way
for humans to follow, it remains unclear what that Euclid’s axiomatic treatment organized
will happen when humans in fact follow them. geometry. It is yet to be determined what this
This calls for empirical investigation of human underlying subject matter is.
beings. But when one specifies what
New Levels of Description
procedures computers are to follow, then one
need not study the machines that carry out the A characteristic and remarkable trait of
procedures. One need only study the design is that it deals with incompletely
procedures themselves. Perhaps one can described objects. An architect, for instance,
develop theories that explain and predict what may work with schematic representations of a
sort of designs will issue from certain types of building and leave the smaller details to
procedures. Dixon refers to these as engineers and construction firms. This
“computational models” of design (Dixon suggests a type of theory that may be unique to
1987). design. Whereas science normally studies real,
concrete objects, design science would study
This maneuver, however, only
the properties and behavior of incompletely
postpones the question of what design science
described objects.
is. Presumably when one studies design
algorithms, one does not study them qua This proposal requires careful analysis.
algorithms, as a computer scientist would. One To begin with, all science abstracts certain
is not primarily interested in the finiteness or features of an object and more or less ignores
complexity of the algorithms. One is interested the rest. In fact, the sciences are defined and
in the “content” of the algorithms, namely distinguished partially by the level and type of
what they reveal about the nature of design. abstraction they employ. So, if the proposal is
But what is this content? that design science focus on only certain
features of an object—namely, those
There is a sense in which one can
belonging to the designer’s incomplete
theoretically understand a class of algorithms
description of it—then it would seem to be no
in a content-specific way. This is the project of
different in principle from any other sort of
formalist mathematics, as characterized by
science.
David Hilbert, which studies number theory,
for instance, by investigating how its theorems But design practice may well call for
follow from the Peano axioms. Thus different levels or types of abstraction than the
computational design theory might be viewed other sciences. In this way it can inspire
as a branch of formalist mathematics. (There theories that are uniquely suited to design.
is, incidentally, a branch of mathematics called
Theories Arising from Design Representations
“design theory,” but it is a very specialized
branch of geometry that only peripherally A design science can be strongly
relates to our interests here.) Yet the appeal of influenced by the way that designs are
the computational model may derive precisely represented, since the choice of representation
from an assumption that it is not to be determines what aspects of the artifact are
regarded as formalist mathematics. Hilbert considered. Some recent developments in
notwithstanding, there is a sense in which design representations may in fact embody
Euclid not only studied the formal syntactic some nascent design theories, although it must
properties of a geometric proof system (if at always be remembered that a representation
all) but studied geometry. He studied the alone, or any kind of conceptual framework
properties of objects in a certain kind of space. alone, does not comprise a theory.
I am presupposing a certain kind of Platonism
here, but I think it is this same presupposition A graph grammar or shape grammar,
that makes computational models for design for instance, pays attention to certain
attractive. What one hopes to understand by geometrical properties of an object. One could
studying computational models is not the conceivably build a geometrical theory that
formal structure of design algorithms, but understands the structure of objects at this
design. This assumes, of course, that there is level of abstraction, much as topologists have
investigated the properties of objects that are incomplete through most of the design
considered the same whenever one is a process, it may be useful to develop theories of
continuous deformation of the other. Since incompletely described objects. But if the
graph and shape grammars focus on artifact is also described functionally through
computation—that is, the generation of much of the process, it may be equally useful
geometrical objects—the resulting theory to develop theories of functionally described
could be a computational model with a subject objects.
matter. That is, it would be more than a
The Nature of Teleological Theory
“grammar” (a purely syntactic notion) but a
theory of what the grammar is “about,” just as Teleological explanation may seem an
topology (on a nonformalist interpretation) is a odd idea, due to the fact that “explanation” has
theory about topological spaces. Finger and meant finding the “efficient cause” since the
Dixon survey some other design advent of the modern era. We explain
representations that might allow theoretical something by telling what caused it, and the
treatment, such as representations that study paradigm case is that of one billiard ball
basic mechanical functions, how objects fit hitting another. But David Hume pointed out
together, and so on (Finger and Dixon 1989a, long ago that there is no way in principle to
1989b). tell whether a billiard ball’s motion is caused
by its impact with another or simply coincides
Empirical Theories of Design
with the impact. No amount of observation can
The design theories so far suggested detect a cosmic glue that joins cause and
have the character of mathematical theories, effect. What we call “causation” is actually an
but design could give rise to new empirical ordering of our experience that helps make it
theories as well. Suppose, for instance, that a intelligible.
new state sets out to design its economic
There are modes of explanation other
system. Existing economies are generally
than efficient causation that are equally useful
studied by investigating equilibrium
for making the world intelligible and therefore
conditions. But a designed economy may be so
should be regarded as equally legitimate.
heavily driven by tax incentives, regulations,
Aristotle recognized three others: material,
and social psychology that equilibrium is no
formal and teleological explanation. The last is
longer a useful idea, and new methods must be
most relevant to design. Teleological
developed. Predicting the behavior of an
explanation orders experience by assigning a
incompletely described economy may require
purpose or function to its components.
a level of analysis unique to economic
Imagine for instance that someone is shown
planning.
drawings of human anatomy for the first time.
Teleological Theories The complexity would be bewildering. But if it
is explained that this organ pumps a fluid that
Another important characteristic of
supplies nutrients to the body, and this organ
design is that it begins with a functional
converts food into those nutrients, and so on,
description of what is to be designed. In fact
then the complexity quickly begins to make
the functional description may become more
sense. In fact, this is how we all first come to
detailed as the design progresses. One may
understand human anatomy. Our grammar
begin by specifying that an automobile is to
school teachers tell us about the functions of
serve certain purposes (commutation to work,
the organs, not about chains of chemical
long-distance travel, off-road exploration, etc.)
reactions that explain the body in terms of
and continue to develop the design by
efficient causes.
specifying that part W will propel the car, part
E will power part W, part F will supply energy Teleological theories also make testable
to part E, and so on. This of course eventually predictions. If we theorize that the function of
evolves to a physical description of the wheels, a certain gland is to regulate growth, we can
engine, fuel system, and soon. remove it and see if growth rate is affected.
This in fact illustrates how teleology supports
I have already said that since the
medicine. Medicine relies on a number of
physical description of the artifact remains
supporting sciences, but the one that seems
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Is Design Theory Possible?
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AUTHOR
John Hooker is research, business ethics, philosophy, and
Professor of cross-cultural management. He is editor-in-
Operations Research chief of the International Journal of Business
and T. Jerome Ethics Education and an area editor for
Holleran Professor of INFORMS Journal on Computing. He is
Business Ethics and founding director of the Center for
Social Responsibility International Corporate Responsibility at
at Carnegie Mellon Carnegie Mellon.
University. He holds
doctoral degrees in
both operations
research and philosophy. He has published
over 90 articles and four books in operations
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