Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

[CASE DIGEST] COC and THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC v. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION (G.R.
No. 179579)

FACTS

The Comissioner of Customs (COC) issued CMO 27-2003, regulating tariffs on wheat depending on factors such as:

(1) importer or consignee;

(2) country of origin; and
(3) port of discharge. 

Hypermix sought declaratory relief, assailing the said CMO.

The RTC struck down the regulation, ruling that the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of
CMO 272003 were not complied with. This was affirmed by the CA, hence the instant petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the assailed regulation should be struck down.

RULING

YES, because under the law states that a publication within the Official Gazette or any newspaper in general
circulation must happen before a law can fully take effect. In this case, the COC failed to publish their regulation
especially the new tariff rate that can heavily affect companies that leads to unjust circumstances.
Elegado Vs Court of Appeals Case Digest – G.R. No. L-68385 – 173 SCRA 285 (255 Phil. 271)

Facts

In 1976, Warren Graham, an American national formerly resident in the Philippines, died in the USA.

In 1978, the CIR assessed the estate tax (which included stocks) at around P97,000.00, which was protested and
denied by the Commissioner in 1978, and no further action was undertaken by the petitioner.

In 1977, the decedent’s will was admitted to probate in Oregon, and the decedent’s son appointed petitioner as his
attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines.

The will was allowed in the country with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. While a protest for a 2nd assessed
estate tax (~P73,000.00) was pending, the Commissioner moved for the payment of the 1st assessed estate tax. It
was still unpaid although it had long become final and executory.

The CIR eventually canceled the 2nd protested assessment in 1982, which led to a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of being moot and academic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign lawyers have the right to ignorant of our law?

RULING:

NO, under the law, ignorance of the law excuses no one. In this case, if our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim
a similar preference because they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners
cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that
suggested by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.

Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Elvin Chan and The Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011

FACTS:
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an
information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP Blg 22), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v. Eduardo Simon.

More than three years later, on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil
action for the collection of the principal amount of ₱336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. It alleges the dishonor of Land Bank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 upon presentment
for payment with drawee bank. The check, in the amount of ₱336,000 was issued to Chan by Simon who is the
accused in the above-mentioned criminal case.

The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia which was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision and ordered the continuance of the civil case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the institution of a separate civil action based on BP Blg 22 is proper.

RULING:
No. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of an unfunded check
prohibited and punished under BP Blg 22. Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that the criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
NOTES:

Litis Pendentia

Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the
filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?

For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following requisites is
necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites,
the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil.

A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis
pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil
Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal Case No. 275381 and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
₱336,000.00 payable to “cash,” thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the
facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered
in one case would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the
same claim.

Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012

FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a
contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood poles and 20,000 of cross-
arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders The contract was awarded to him being the lowest bidder. However, NEA’s
board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the material requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin
protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted
during the pre-qualification bid were falsified. Finding a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Gov’t
Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB
80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a complaint with prayer of injunction which was grabted by RTC Manila. PNOC –
Energy Dev’t Corp issued an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC
alleging that it was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin
respondents to the proposed bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government
infrastructure are not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO except SC to gov’t projects

RULING:

YES, Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary injunctions, and
preliminary mandatory injunctions against gov’t.
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents
G.R. No. 137873                |              April 20, 2001

FACTS:
While victim Jose A. Juego together with 2 of his co-workers were performing their work as carpenters at the elevator core of
the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a platform made of steel beam with pinulid plywood flooring,
when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform, got loose, causing the
whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core thereby crushing the victim to death.

On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is precluded from filing an action for damages against petitioner considering her prior availment of
the benefits from the State Insurance Fund

RULING:

In Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the court held that as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,
Vda. de Severo vs. Feliciano-Go and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda. In the last case, the Court again recognized that a
claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said that claimants may invoke either
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy
will exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional
benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring
after he opted for the first remedy.

Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the
civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum.

There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when she accomplished her
application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39

[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must
be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon
which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a
waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence
CASE DIGEST: ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 154954; G.R.
No. 155101; G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second day of initiation rites
has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members,
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes
heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny
could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though,
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped
him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35
Aquilans.

G.R. No. 155101; Dizon v. People: Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process
when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived
of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the
other accused.

ISSUE:

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: Was Dizon deprived of due process?

RULING:

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People): The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.

Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones defense, as well
as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver
of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially
since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up
the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial
court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the
most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the
accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is called upon to see
to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In
fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the
succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and
consequences of a waiver.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines

G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012

FACTS: We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No.
196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. 197221; (c) the ex
abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino
Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in
G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order
(TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act
(RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint
officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.

Issues: (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote
and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM
regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers over
autonomous regions?

Held: YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday
of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for
six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading
“Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the
forms of local governments.

NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does
not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM
elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise
any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM elections to
legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA
No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the first
ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM
elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not
amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections
would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to reset the
date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not
among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a
plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with
this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied
in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

YES. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their
offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress
has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One significant
difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to
electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and
the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section
8, Article X of the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or
implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to suppress the
holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has clearly acted
within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of
this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the
executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from
the legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.

NO. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Although the
legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the
power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5.  Postponement of election. –  When for any serious cause such as  violence,  terrorism,  loss or destruction
of election paraphernalia  or records,  force majeure, and  other analogous causes  of such a nature that the holding
of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission,   motu
proprio  or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested
parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall  postpone the election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect  but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of  force majeure,  violence,  terrorism,  fraud, or  other analogous
causes  the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed,  or  had been suspended  before the
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of
the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof,  such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such
cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of
the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring ours]

YES. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

YES. We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the context it
was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the constitutional mandate to
synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone
the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with
governance in the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the
assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May
13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the problem
created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the expiration of their terms in
a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next
ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his
appointment powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the
vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already
established the unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of reasonableness in
responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. In other words, “given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of
the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
JESUS VIRTUCIO, GR No. 187451, 2012-08-29

Facts:

Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed Homestead Application... for a 24-hectare tract of unsurveyed land... in
1949

His application was approved... on January 23, 1952

In 1955,... however,... the land was subdivided into three (3) lots

Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140... as a consequence of a public land subdivision

Lot 139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio)

Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner

Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio)

Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved application
covered the whole area

On October 30, 1961,... he Director of Lands rendered a decision denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the
latter's application to exclude Lots 139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course. The applications of Custodio and
Virtucio for Lots 139 and 140, respectively, were... likewise given due course.[6]

Alegarbes then appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who dismissed his appeal... ought
relief from the Office of the President (OP), which, however, affirmed the dismissal order

On May 11, 1989,... an order of execution[8] was issued by the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to enforce the decision of the OP. It ordered Alegarbes and all those acting in his
behalf to vacate the subject lot,... but he refused.

On September 26, 1997

Virtucio then filed a complaint[9] for "Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the
RTC.

Alegarbes further argued, by way of special and/or affirmative defenses, that the approval of his homestead
application on January 23, 1952 by the Bureau of Lands had already attained finality and could not be reversed,
modified or set aside.

His possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139... and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept
of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.

The RTC rendered its decision on February 19, 2001, favoring Virtucio.

Alegarbes appealed his case before the CA.

CA promulgated its decision declaring Alegarbes as the owner of Lot No. 140

CA explained that even if the decision to approve Virtucio's homestead application over Lot 140 had become final,
Alegarbes could still acquire the said lot by acquisitive prescription.

Virtucio filed this petition.

Virtucio insists that the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 (or in 1954 when
Alegarbes filed the protest) when the Director of Lands rendered a decision giving due course to his homestead
application and that of Ulpiano Custodio.

Virtucio... further claims that since 1954, several extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding
that he vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand" contemplated in Article 1155, thus,
tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.
Virtucio insists that the CA gravely erred in disregarding its decision in Custodio v. Alegarbes, CA-G.R. CV 26286, for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, which involved the same factual circumstances and ruled against Alegarbes.

Issues:

The lone issue in this case is whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive
prescription.

Ruling:

The petition must fail.

Principles:

Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law,
it states that acquisitive prescription may... either be ordinary or extraordinary.[20] Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years,[21] while extraordinary
acquisitive prescription requires... uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.[22

The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil
interruption.[24]

The law, as well as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a judicial summons can effectively toll the... said
period.

In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon,[26] the Court ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse
Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of possession. In the case of Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag
v.

Gabriel,[27] which also cited the Rañon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the property for tax
purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat another's right of ownership
acquired through... acquisitive prescription.[

It must be noted that the subject property in the said case was Lot 139 allocated to Custodio and that Virtucio was
not a party to that case. The latter cannot enjoy whatever benefits said favorable judgment may have had just
because it involved similar factual circumstances.

The Court also found from the records that the period of acquisitive prescription in that case was effectively
interrupted by Custodio's filing of a complaint, which is wanting in this case.

Moreover, it is settled that a decision of the CA does not establish judicial precedent.[40] "The principle of stare
decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based
on... the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument. "

The Court agrees with the position of Alegarbes that by Virtucio's insistence that it was erroneous for the CA to
disregard its earlier decision in CA-G.R. CV 26286, he, in effect, calls upon this Court to adhere to that decision by
invoking the stare decisis principle,... which is not legally possible because only final decisions of this Court are
considered precedents.
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
INOCENCIO. G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014.

FACTS: On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an application with the RTC for judicial
confirmation of title over two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila.

On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for registration. Thereafter, following the required
publication and posting, a scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was
given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the respondent's application for registration.

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's application for registration, asserting that the lots
are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,alleging that the respondent failed to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares (Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The
subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and planted
different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975,
Jaime sold the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application for registration should be denied since the
subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at
and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake.
Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are
below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga
confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of
the subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties,
contrary to LLDA's claim, are above 12.50 m.

The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to the subject properties. The RTC found that
the respondent was able to prove that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.

The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties are very much higher than the reglementary elevation
of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to
prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the
respondent was able to present certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not disputed by the petitioner. Hence, the
instant petition.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in using previous judicial decision in making the ruling of the case?

RULING:

No, under the law, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines. In this case, CA used the ruling in T.A.N. Properties Inc since in Republic v. Roche , the
Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Furthermore, it is supported by the principle
“legis interpretation legis vim obtinet” which means the interpretation placed upon the written law by competent
court has the force of law.

ARMANDO BARCELLANO v. DOLORES BAÑAS, GR No. 165287, 2011-09-14

Facts:

Respondent Bañas is an heir of Bartolome Bañas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in Hindi,
Bacacay, Albay.  Adjoining the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina (Medina)... with an area of 1,877... square
meters. On 17 March 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale to the adjoining owners of the property, the heirs of
Bartolome Bañas, including herein respondent Dolores Bañas, Crispino Bermillo (Bermillo) and Isabela Bermillo-
Beruela (Beruela)

On 3 April 1997, Medina sold the property to herein petitioner Armando Barcellano for P60,000.00.

the heirs of Bañas learned about the sale and went to the house of Medina to inquire about it.

he heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the property but Medina replied that there was already a deed of sale
executed between the parties.[7]  Also, the Bañas heirs failed to tender the P60,000.00 redemption amount... to
Medina.

Aggrieved, the heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on 5 April 1997.

According to one of the Bañas heirs, Barcellano told them that he would be willing to sell the property but for a
higher price of P90,000.00.

On 24 October 1997, Dolores Bañas filed an action for Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial Court.   However,
on 5 February 1998, the petition was withdrawn

On 11 March 1998, Dolores Bañas, as represented by Bermillo, filed another action[12] for Legal Redemption.  It was
opposed by Barcellano insisting that he complied with the provisions of Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code but Bañas
failed to exercise her... right within the period provided by law.

On 15 March 2000, the trial court dismissed the complaint of the Bañas heirs for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent of making a formal offer to redeem and for failure to file an action in court together with the
consignation of the redemption... price within the reglementary period of 30 days.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the lower court and granted the heirs the right
to redeem the subject property.

Barcellano maintains that the written notice required under Art. 1623 to be given to adjoining owner was no longer
necessary because there was already actual notice.

Nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties shows that there was a written notice sent to the
respondents.  Without a written notice, the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption may be
exercised, does not start

Issues:

Whether or not Banas having the right to redeem is STILL entitled to the written notice
Ruling:

Yes, under the law, in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail. In this case, the law is clear in this case, there must first be a written
notice to the family of Bañas. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no
explanation of it is required.

Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. there is only room for application. 23 Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. The law is clear
in this case, there must first be a written notice to the family of Bañas.

Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget, when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. 24

We find no need to rule on the other issues presented by the petitioner.1âwphi1 The respondent Bañas has a
perfect right of redemption and was never in danger of losing such right even if there was no redemption complaint
filed with the barangay, no tender of payment or no consignation.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street when a
delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the
opposite direction at great speed.  The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant
presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering
stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to
unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and
made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the
inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

RULING: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a
custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which
the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice has acquiesced for years.

PRINCIPLE:

Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being
delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of
the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the
courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make
culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the
strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District
Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 162155

August 28, 2007

FACTS:

Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax
respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income taxes.
Respondent complied, but the claim was not acted upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for Review with
the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition having been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial
claim for tax refund or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted
return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.

Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the
NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent’s
petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
period. The CA reversed the CTA decision ruling that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish between a
regular year and a leap year.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in referring to Article 13 of the NCC as the basis in the correct computation
of time.

RULING:

NO. The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that the petition was filed within the prescriptive period but its basis is
should not be the NCC. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months;; “month” of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains;; “day”, to a day of twenty- four hours and;; “night”
from sunrise to sunset.

A calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.” It is
the “period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month,
then up to and including the last day of that month.” To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will
be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008;; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. But
being the more recent law, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
recent law and having impliedly repealed in its repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 183449, March
12, 2012. - -The Lawyer's Post. 

Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:

Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by
order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed,
falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day.

We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re:
Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension
on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads:

Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] applies in the matter of filing of
pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said
pleading on the next working day is deemed on time;

Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately
following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for
extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the
original expiration of the period.

In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,1 we said:

Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to file any pleading, even a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on
the next working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.

However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The
provision states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall be counted
from the original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for extension was filed. In Luz v.
National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to expound on the matter. In that case, we held that the extension
granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of
such period.

In the case at bar, although petitioner’s filing of the motion for extension was within the period provided by law, the
filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days within which to file
the petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead, he did so only on
May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.

Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act required by law
falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a
Saturday. Petitioner’s filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next
working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However,
petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007
within which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the
motion for extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review
for being filed out of time.
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on our clarification in
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such period.3 Thus, counting 15 days from the expiration of the
period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find
the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair
play.

Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA issued its Resolution
dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time. There was no showing that
respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of such delay. Moreover, the RTC
decision which was sought to be reversed in the petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment
convicting petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioner’s liberty.4 We do not find
anything on record that shows petitioner’s deliberate intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had filed
the petition for review within the extended period sought, although erroneously computed. These circumstances
should have been taken into consideration for the CA not to dismiss the petition outright.

We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not automatically warrant the
dismissal thereof.5 And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations
of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.

Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. 7
After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the substantive rights of the parties are protected.
Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must
be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of
technicalities

Van Dorn v. Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region
Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents

Facts:
In 1972, Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino, was married to Richard Upton, a citizen of the United States. After that, they
established their residence in the Philippines and had two children. However, in 1982, Alice and Richard were
divorced in Nevada, United States. Alice had also remarried in Nevada to Theodore Can Dorn.

In 1983, Upton filed a suit in order to transfer the management of their properties to him, which was considered
conjugal property. He contended that since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines, the divorce decree cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:
Was the divorce obtained by Alice and Richard in Nevada valid in the Philippines?

Ruling:
Yes. Even though Article 15 states that Filipinos should be governed by Philippine laws in matters of status even if
they are living abroad, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, and those would be deemed valid in the Philippines if valid
in the country where it was executed.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HO N. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino, was married to Erich Geiling, a German national, in the
Federal Republic of Germany. However, there was marital discord between them, and they separated de facto. After
more than three years into the marriage, Geiling filed for divorce in Germany, which was granted on January 15,
1986. On June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two cases of adultery against Imelda.

The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines states that in cases of adultery, the complaint should be raised by the
offended spouse. However, by the time of filing the case, Geiling had already been divorced from Pilapil.

Issue:
Can the adultery suit filed by Geiling prosper?

Ruling:
No. The law clearly provides that only the offended spouse may complain regarding adultery. Since Geiling and
Pilapil were already divorced, the former does not have the legal standing in the case. The divorce was valid in
Germany and should also be deemed valid in the Philippines since it was initiated by the foreign spouse.

Garcia v. Recio
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent

Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989,
a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992,
Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. In their
application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On October 22, 1995, Grace and
Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.

Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds of bigamy. She
contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was still subsisting at the time she contracted a marriage with him. She
claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November 1997. However, Rederick said
that he had told Grace about his previous marriage and the dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a
restriction that reads

A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson
is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian  family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no  basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving  evidence. The Court
mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of
the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents, December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children were
born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and
the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage
to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as
in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that
they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of  Arturo Padlan,
nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and 83 of
the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

ELMAR O. PEREZ v. CA, GR NO. 162580, 2006-01-27

Facts:

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The first marriage
ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second
took place at the Lourdes Catholic

Church in La Loma, Quezon City.

Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each other. Upon
advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic ratified the
divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.

Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States[7] and both
lived as husband and wife until October 2001.

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic
which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage
to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine... law.

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention[10] claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation

Issues:

the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case... between
Tristan and Lily.

Ruling:

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree
that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is
basic that laws relating to family rights and... duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.[19] Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with... respect to his or her family rights and
duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code[21]
which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano[22] we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party... by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in
the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit.

Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Principles:

Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with...
respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino
regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce
from spouse and eventually becomes... successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, GR No. 171914, 2014-07-23

Facts:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any
settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a... foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.

ATTY. LUNA... was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna

(EUGENIA), whom he initially married in a civil ceremony

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same... date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time
with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and
wife until 1987.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and
equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA's son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the... condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,[9] holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter's death on July 12, 1997. The absolute
divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA in the Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with
EUGENIA because foreign divorce between

Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x[10]

Issues:

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indiviso share in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court

Reports).

Ruling:

Atty. Luna's first marriage with Eugenia... subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September
10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality
rule. The Civil Code continued to... follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.[15] Pursuant to the... nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family

Code,[16] even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.[17] Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such...
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.

Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,... was void; properties acquired during their marriage... were
governed by the rules on co-ownership

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,[22] on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the
Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI... of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but... n the Philippines, marriages
that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous marriages as... determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.[24]

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed... by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy
the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this case proof that was required for
Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article

148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would... govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus
it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there... still exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon
adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of... money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie presumed to be equal.
However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was... required. The same rule and presumption
was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such...
valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both
parties were in bad faith.
ATCI v. Echin October 11, 2010 G.R. No. 178551 Liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency,
Probationary employment

FACTS:

Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having
allegedly passed the probationary period.

Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by
Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00,
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune
from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.

The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.

RULING:

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of OFWs which it deploys
abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or
that such foreign principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working
class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability
inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law,
under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with the Rules of Court.

These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary
employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express provision of
R.A. 8042:

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be
joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. The petition is DENIED
TUNA PROCESSING v. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, GR No. 185582, 2012-02-29

Facts:

Yamaoka... co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No.
ID0003911... and... five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc.,
Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford... entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement... pertinent provisions of which read:

Licensor... granting... wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three aforementioned
patents, granting... licenses under those patents, and collecting royalties.

Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with
Licensor.

The parties hereto agree to the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation established in the State of
California, in order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.

TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit funds that it will
collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated to spend in connection with the implementation of this Agreement.

TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor.  Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the purpose of being
elected as member of the board of directors.  The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the Sponsors according... to
their respective equity shares.

Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent Kingford, withdrew from
petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their obligations.

Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the

International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against respondent.

To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City.  The petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo
M. Alameda.

Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss.

the court denied the motion... respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for the
reconsideration... the case was re-raffled, in... turn, granted respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the
petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial
court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.

Issues:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in the
Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?... a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004?

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party in an application for recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New
York Convention, to... wit:

Article V

1.  Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only
if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or
the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country... where the award was made; or

(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of
the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration... can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

2.  Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:

(a)  The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or

(b)   The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.

Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and
enforcement of the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution,... which was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, likewise support this position.

Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and
enforce a foreign arbitral award."  The contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5.

Capacity to sue is not... included.

Indeed,  it is in the best  interest  of justice that in the enforecement of  a foreign  arbitral  award, we deny  availment by 
the  losing  party  of  the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do... business in the Philippines  from 
maintaining  a  suit in our courts.  When a party enters into  a  contract  containing  a  foreign  arbitration  clause and, as in
this case,  in  fact  submits itself... to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by  the arbitration and by the result of
arbitration, conceding thereby  the  capacity of the  other  party to enter into the contract, participate in the arbitration
and cause the implementation of the... result.

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over
domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any conflict of law question.

Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and
enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of
2004.

The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.

First. There is no need to consider respondent's contention that petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it
posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose of
determining capacity to... sue.  We reiterate that the foreign corporation's capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material
insofar as the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.

While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances,
warrants the outright dismissal of the case,... we opt to relax the rules
A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present
case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal.  In these types of questions, this Court has... the ultimate say so
that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and
decide the legal issues outright.

Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised should be seriously considered.

All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that
reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award 
before a

Philippine court.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special
Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further
proceedings.

Principles:

The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:

Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. - No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or... administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.

It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed the petition.  Thus:

Herein plaintiff TPI's "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a foreign corporation established in the State of California"
and "was given the exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent"  and "was assigned the exclusive right to
enforce the... said patent and collect corresponding royalties" in the Philippines.  TPI likewise admits that it does not have
a license to do business in the Philippines.

The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and enforcement of the subject foreign
arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004),... (New York
Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),... In several cases, this
Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law,
viz-a-viz other special laws.

Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its title -
An Actto Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office
for Alternative

Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes  - would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively promote party
autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their
disputes."

It specifically provides exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award.

In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 incorporated the New York Convention in the Act by
specifically providing:

SEC. 42.  Application of the New York Convention.  -  The New York Convention shall govern the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said Convention.

xxx

SEC. 45.  Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. -  A party to a foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court only on... those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention.  Any other ground
raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.
Intestate Estate of Amos Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of Texas. He had 5 legitimate children on his 1st wife whom he divorced. On his 2nd wife, he
had 3 legitimate children; and 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines where
he disposed his properties in the following manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. Subsequently,
Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. The executor of the will then submitted a proposed project of
partition. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE: W/N the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children

HELD: Yes. The illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., v. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., G.R. NO. 162894 February 26, 2008

Facts:

Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut,
and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of
10% of the gross receipts. Then, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI.

After 4 years, respondent filed before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST)
for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to
the SC but was dismissed.

After that, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants here in petitioner as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The
complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that respondent was not paid for his services. The complaint
also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner
also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the
laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action
and forum non conveniens. It was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine court can acquire jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the stipulation that the same shall be
governed by a foreign law.
Held:

Yes. That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from
hearing the civil action.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where
it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioner averred foreign elements present in this case which include (1) BRII and RUST are foreign corporations and
respondent Rouzie is an American citizen, and (2) The evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines. The Court
held that these are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.

Furthermore, under the law, the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed. In this case, the contract about the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows happen in the Philippines.

Tamano v.Judge Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, June 29, 1998

FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he married Estrellita in civil rites too. A
year after Sen. Tamano’s death, Zorayda and her son filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as
single, hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no jurisdiction because
only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia
courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano
were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which
ruled that it should be referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts
only when filed in places where there are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, the instant petition could
be at RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature of action.

HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. In this case, both
petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim
wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.

No, under the law, in matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special law, their deficiency shall be supplied by
the provisions of this Code. In this case, Article 13 of PD no. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites, this means that the Civil Code will supplement the law.

Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc. G.R. No. 174269 (May 8, 2009)

Facts:

1. The petitioner (Pantaleon) and his family, joined an escorted tour of Western Europe.

2. In Coster Diamond House, Amsterdam, Mrs. Pantaleon (wife) was about to bought a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, a
pendant and a chain, all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.

3. To pay these purchases, around 9:15am, Pantaleon presented his American Express Credit Card together with his
passport.

4. By 9:40am, Pantaleon was already worried about further inconveniencing the tour group, he asked the store clerk to
cancel the sale. the store manager though asked him to wait a few more minutes.

5. Around 10:00am (around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his AmexCard), Coster decided to release the items
even without American Express International, Inc.’s (herein respondent, Amex for brevity) approval of the purchase.
This was 30 minutes after the tour group was supposed to have left the store.

6. The spouses Pantelon returned. Their offers of apology were met by their tourmates with stony silence. The tour
group’s visible irritation was aggravated when the tour guide announced that the city tour of Amsterdam was to be
canceled due to lack of remaing time. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping.
 7. After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United States before returning to Manila.
While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, but with
two other incidents similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AMEX act in good faith in the delay of transaction?

RULING:

Yes, in this case, it took AMEX some time to approve Pantaleon’s purchase requests because it had legitimate concerns on the
amount being charged; no malicious intent was ever established here. It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith
is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging it.  Although it took AMEX some time before
it approved Pantaleon’s three charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with deliberate intent to cause
Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give credence
to AMEX’s claim that its review procedure was done to ensure Pantaleon’s own protection as a cardholder and to prevent the
possibility that the credit card was being fraudulently used by a third person. AMEX, after all, is running a business, not a charity,
and it would simply be ludicrous to suggest that it would not want to earn profit for its services. Thus, so long as AMEX exercises
its rights, performs its obligations, and generally acts with good faith, with no intent to cause harm, even if it may occasionally
inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for damages.

Manaloto v. Veloso III

G.R. No. 171365
October 6, 2010

Facts:
This case stems from an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda Manaloto et al., who are the lessors to of residential house,
which was leased to respondent Ismael Veloso III at the rate of Php17,000 per month. The action for unlawful detainer was
instituted because of Veloso’s failure to pay the monthly rent from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite the petitioner’s
repeated demands. Veloso, however, denied the nonpayment of rentals, alleging that he made advance payments when he
spent Php825,000 for the repairs done on the leased property.

While the case was still on appeal, the petitioner lessors published the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, who ruled in
favor of the lessors. Copies of the decision were distributed to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, which caused Veloso to be
the talk of the town and his good name to be greatly damaged.

Issue:
Were the petitioners correct in publishing the MeTC’s decision while the case was still on appeal?

Ruling:
No. The petitioners are obliged to respect the respondent’s good name even though they are opposing parties in a detainer
case. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such principle constitutes an
abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also expected to respect Veloso’s dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of
mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

Cebu Country Club Inc., v. Elizagaque 

G.R. No. 160273
January 18, 2008

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L.LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI,
RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent

Facts:
Cebu Country Club is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club. Sometime in
1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary of CCCI, designated Ricardo Elizagaque, its senior vice-president
and operations manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. In 1996, Elizagaque filed an
application for proprietary membership. He purchased a share for Php3 million. Unknown to Elizagaque, however, was that the
club had amended their by-laws in which a unanimous vote of the directors is required before an applicant may be admitted.
This amendment was not reflected in the application form Elizagaque filled up. The Board adopted a black ball system in which
the directors would drop a white ball when they approve of the applicant and a black one if they do not. During the voting, there
was one black ball, which means the unanimous decision was not satisfied.

On August 1, 1997, Elizagaque received a letter from CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that the board disapproved his
application for proprietary membership. Elizagaque, through Edmundo Misa, wrote a letter of reconsideration, but no reply
came. They wrote two more times, but CCCI still did not reply. On December 1998, Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages
against CCCI.

Issue:
Is Elizagaque entitled to payment of damages?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court cited Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in its decision.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

It was shown that Elizagaque’s letters remained unanswered and he was not even made aware of the club’s new rules. In
defense of the failure to print a new application form with the amendments added, CCCI said that it was not able to print the
updated form because of economic reasons. Being an exclusive golf club, it is unbelievable that the club would not be able to
pay for printing costs of the updated application forms.

The Court found that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations and is thus liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA

G.R. No. 127358                                  31 March 2005

Azcuna, J.

FACTS:

This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura,
were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The lower court found that
petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry.
Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to
make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.

ISSUE/S: 

1. Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh may be
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.

RULING:

1. Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged  by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the  most serious cases of
 personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.

2. No, under the law, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, by declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific
evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
willfully concealed the same.

G.R. No. 211362 – 751 SCRA 469 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom

Remedial Law – Mandamus – Ministrant vs Discretionary Function

Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013,
Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to
3pm.

However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for
her. Cudia complied and as a result, he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for being
late.

In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to
look upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR teacher said
she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits and touring hours because of said infraction.

Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he
will be appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.

In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English
class started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the
OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under
PMA rules, once a student submitted his examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the
classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed
late because again, on that day in the OR class, each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not
dismissed as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such transaction was initiated by the
teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with
Cudia at that time querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just have stated all that
instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.

Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in
his written appeal when he said his class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.

The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a
ground to separate a cadet from PMA.

Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation.
After two hearings and after the parties involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System),
a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a practice of chambering where the members,
particularly the dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”. After the chambering,
the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote
became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.

Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal
of Cudia from the PMA.

Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was
their claim that there were irregularities in the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was
referred to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham”
investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due process, education, and privacy of communication.

Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR
found in favor of Cudia.

PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
before the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy and that
the court should avoid interfering with military matters.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cudia’s petitions is proper.

2. Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.

HELD:

I.

Mandamus is not proper

Mandamus will not prosper in this case. Cudia’s prayer that PMA should be compelled to reinstate him as well as to give him his
supposed academic awards is not proper. The Courts, even the Supreme Court, cannot compel PMA to do so because the act of
restoring Cudia’s rights and entitlements as a cadet as well as his awards is a discretionary act. Mandamus cannot be availed
against an official or government agency, in this case PMA, whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. Further,
such act which PMA was sought by Cudia to perform is within PMA’s academic freedom as an educational institution – and such
performance is beyond the jurisdiction of courts.

Certiorari is allowed

The petition for certiorari is allowed because the issue herein is whether or not PMA and its responsible officers acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies
and to determine whether or not a government branch or instrumentality acted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, PMA
cannot argue that judicial intervention into military affairs is not proper as a matter of policy. Suffice it to say that judicial non-
interference in military affairs is not an absolute rule.

On the civil liberties of PMA cadets

One of the arguments raised by PMA is that cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have surrendered parts of their civil and
political liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot question the same, much less,
question it in the courts. in short, they cannot raise due process.

On this, the SC held that such argument is wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling at PMA,  must be prepared to
subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater
degree than a student at a civilian public school. However, a cadet facing dismissal from PMA, whose private interests are at
stake (life, liberty, property) which includes his honor, good name, and integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can be
deprived of such without due process of law and the PMA, even as a military academy, is not exempt from such strictures. Thus,
when Cudia questioned in court the manner upon which he was dismissed from the PMA, such controversy may be inquired
upon by the courts.

(Author’s note: PMA, in essence, raised that due process, as contemplated by the Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a
cadet yet, as can be seen in the below discussion, PMA presented evidence that due process was, in fact, complied with.)

II. Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is still worthy to be part of the institution.
Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process.  In this
case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He
was notified of the Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report against him. He
was informed about his options and the entire process that the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately
followed after he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating team submitted a written
report together with its recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned to conduct the hearing. During the
formal investigation/hearing, he was informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance
to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC
voting members, he was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the review process at
the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA
Superintendent. A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then, upon the directive
of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a
deliberate investigation of the case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these bodies.

Academic freedom of the PMA

Cudia would argue that there is no law providing that a guilty finding by the HC may be used by the PMA to dismiss or
recommend the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that Honor Code violation is not among those listed as justifications for the
attrition of cadets considering that the Honor Code and the Honor System (manner which PMA conducts investigation of Honor
Code violations) do not state that a guilty cadet is automatically terminated or dismissed from service.

Such argument is not valid. Even without express provision of a law, the PMA has regulatory authority to administratively
dismiss erring cadets. Further, there is a law (Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the President to dismiss cadets. Such power
by the President may be delegated to the PMA Superintendent, who may exercise direct supervision and control over the
cadets.

Further, as stated earlier, such power by the PMA is well within its academic freedom. Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning has been enshrined in the Constitution.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;

a. the right to determine who may teach;

b. the right to determine what may be taught;

c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;

d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA to exercise its academic freedom. If it determines that a cadet violates it, then it
has the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case, based on its findings, Cudia lied – which is a violation of the Honor Code.

But Cudia’s lie is not even that big; is dismissal from the PMA really warranted?

The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes any form of lying. It does not have a
gradation of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When Cudia enrolled at PMA,
he agreed to abide by the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus, while the punishment may be severe,  it is nevertheless
reasonable and not arbitrary, and, therefore, not in violation of due process -also considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have
known all of these.

De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110
November 28, 1933

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted
Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with a baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar
was always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen the baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to
Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that junior
might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving birth, Cesar took
Antonia to a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household
expenses during their living together. Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to
another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar Php30,000 as damages for the breach of
promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural children, and to make him
pay for the maintenance of the children worth Php500 per month.

Issues:
1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the meaning of Article 135 (1) of the (Old) Civil Code?

2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code need to be made in a single document?

3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence

A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The problem
of the recognition of the child even before he was born is no different from that when he is already born. The words used by
Syquia in his letter are not capable of two constructions, and the identity of the baby was clear.

2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one or any particular individual. The only
requirement is that the writing should be indubitable. Thus, the many letters Cesar Syquia wrote may be made proof to his
acknowledgment of Ismael Loanco.

3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil
law apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

CASE DIGEST: [ G.R. No. 54598, April 15, 1988 ] JOSE B. LEDESMA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
PACIFICO DELMO AND SANCHA DELMO (AS PRIVATE RESPONDENTS), RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors. However, this was deprived of her because
her lending of money to members of an organization of which she was a member, purportedly in violation of existing school
rules and regulations, according to the President of the State College. This was done although the Bureau of Public Schools
already intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite this, she was made to graduate as a plain student. The Supreme
Court held the President liable for damages.

ISSUE: IS THE PRESIDENT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?

HELD: Yes, the President is liable for damages.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta
Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral
damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):

"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful act or omission." (People v.
Bayln, 129 SCRA 62, 1984)
G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.

ROMEO A. JADER, respondent

Facts:

Romeo Jader was a law student at the University of the East from 1984 to 1988. In his first semester of his fourth year, he failed
to take the regular examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second
semester and on February 1, 1988, he filed an examination for the removal of his incomplete grade, which was approved by the
dean. He took the examination but was given a grade of 5 (failing).

The dean and the faculty members of the university deliberated as to who among their graduating students would be allowed to
graduate. Jader’s name was in the tentative list of candidates for graduation. The invitation for the commencement exercises
also included his name, but at the foot of the list, the following was written:

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the
University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports

During the ceremony, Jader’s name was called, and he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the law diploma.
After graduation, he took a leave of absence without pay from his job to prepare for the bar examination and enrolled in a pre-
bar review class. When he learned the deficiency in his requirements for graduation, he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar exam.

Jader filed a case in the trial court, and the latter granted him the amount of Php35,470 as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees.
At the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was upheld, but the CA added the award for moral damages amounting to
Php50,000.

Issues:

1. Can the University of the East be held liable for actual damages?

2. Is the university liable to pay Jader moral damages?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. The university could not just give the grades at any time
because law students have a deadline to meet in the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It was guilty of negligence
and for violating Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, which provide

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

2. No. The Supreme Court did not agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that Jader suffered shock, trauma, and pain
when he was informed that he could not graduate. It was his duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he
brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination.

The Court affirmed the CA’s decision with modification. It granted Jader the actual damages of Php35,470 with legal interest of 6
percent per annum computed from the date of the complaint until fully paid, as well as Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. The award
for moral damages, however, was deleted.
Allied Banking Corporation v. Lim Sio Wan

G.R. No. 133179

March 27, 2008

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner

versus

LIM SIO WAN, METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., Respondents

Facts:

On November 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan deposited a money market placement worth Php1,152,597.35 to Allied Bank for a term of
31 days to mature on December 15, 1983. On December 5, 1983, a person claiming to be Lim Sio Wan called up Cristina So, an
officer of Allied Bank, and instructed her to preterminate the money market placement and to issue a manager’s check
representing the proceeds from the placement and to give the check to one Deborah Dee Santos, who would pick up the check.

Santos arrived at the bank and signed the application form for a manager’s check to be issued. The check was cross-checked for
Payees Account Only and given to Santos. Then the check was deposited to the account of Filipinas Cement Corporation (FCC) at
Metrobank, with the forged signature of Lim Sio Wan.

Earlier, on September 21, 1983, FCC had deposited a money market placement forPhp2 million to Producers Bank. Santos was
the money market trader assigned to handle FCC’s account. The placement matured on October 25, 1983, and was rolled over
until December 5, 1983. The Allied check was deposited with Metrobank in the account of FCC as Producers Bank’s payment of
its obligation to FCC.

Metrobank stamped a guaranty on the check in compliance with the requirements of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation
(PCHC) Rules and Regulations. The guaranty read: All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed. The check
was then sent to Allied Bank through the PCHC. Upon the presentment of the check, Allied funded it even without checking the
authenticity of Lim Sio Wan’s purported indorsement. So the amount of the check was credited to the account of FCC.

On December 14, 1983, Lim Sio Wan went to Allied Bank to withdraw the money market placement. When she was informed
that the placement has been terminated upon her instructions, she took action. She filed a complaint with the RTC against Allied
to recover the proceeds of the money market placement.

Allied filed a third party complaint against Metrobank and Santos. In turn, Metrobank filed a fourth party complaint against FCC.
Then FCC filed a fifth party complaint against Producers Bank.

Six months after the funding of the check, Allied informed Metrobank that the signature in the check was forged. Thus,
Metrobank withheld the amount but later on agreed to release it to FCC after the latter executed an undertaking, promising to
indemnify Metrobank in case it was made to reimburse the amount.

Lim Sio Wan then filed an amended complaint, adding Metrobank as party-defendant along with Allied. The RTC rendered the
following decision:

1. Ordering defendant Allied Banking Corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum
from March 16, 1984 until fully paid;

2. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

3. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,792.20 by way of attorney’s fees; and,

4. Ordering defendant Allied Bank to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant Allied Banks cross-claim against defendant Metrobank is DISMISSED.

Likewise defendant Metrobanks third-party complaint as against Filipinas Cement Corporation is

DISMISSED.

Filipinas Cement Corporations fourth-party complaint against Producers Bank is also

DISMISSED.

Upon appeal, the CA promulgated the following decision:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Judgment is rendered ordering and sentencing
defendant-appellant Allied Banking Corporation to pay sixty (60%) percent and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company forty (40%) of the amount of P1,158,648.49 plus 12% interest per annum from March 16, 1984 until fully paid. The
moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit adjudged shall likewise be paid by defendant-appellant Allied Banking
Corporation and defendant-appellee Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same proportion of 60-40. Except as thus
modified, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Allied alleged that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Producers Bank.

Issue:

Was Allied Bank correct in saying that Producers Bank was unjustly enriched?

Ruling:

Yes. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when the following concur:

1.     A person is unjustly benefited

2.     Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another

In the instant case, Lim Sio Wans money market placement in Allied Bank was preterminated and withdrawn without her
consent. Moreover, the proceeds of the placement were deposited in Producers Banks account in Metrobank without any
justification. It cannot be validly claimed that FCC, and not Producers Bank, should be considered as having been unjustly
enriched. It must be remembered that FCCs money market placement with Producers Bank was already due and demandable;
thus, Producers Banks payment thereof was justified.

Clearly, Producers Bank must be held liable to Allied and Metrobank for the amount of the check plus 12% interest per annum,
moral damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which Allied and Metrobank are adjudged to pay Lim Sio Wan based on a
proportion of 60:40.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the CA’s ruling be upheld with modification. Producers Bank was ordered to pay Allied and
Metrobank the amounts.

G.R. No. 149984             November 28, 2008

SPOUSES ROLANDO M. ZOSA and LUISA Y. ZOSA,petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANTIAGO ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67, CHINATRUST
(PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK CORPORATION, NOTARY PUBLIC JAIME P. PORTUGAL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR PASIG CITY,
and CHAILEASE FINANCE CORPORATION,respondents.

On May 15, 1997, petitioners, spouses Rolando and Luisa Zosa (petitioners), obtained a loan from respondent Chinatrust (Phils.)
Commercial Bank[6] (Chinatrust) in the amount of P55,000,000.00. To secure the loan, they executed in favor of Chinatrust a
real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ugong, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 18718 (land).

Petitioners reneged on their obligation to pay the loan. Consequently, Chinatrust filed a verified petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage with respondent Notary Public Jaime P. Portugal (Portugal). A notice of sale was issued, setting the
auction sale of the land on September 28, 1999 at 10:00 a.m. at the entrance of the Pasig City Hall.

On September 24, 1999 and prior to the holding of the auction sale, petitioners filed an action against Chinatrust and Portugal
for injunction, specific performance, damages, and attorney's fees with the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 67620.

The auction sale proceeded. Respondent Chailease Finance Corporation (Chailease) emerged as the highest bidder in the auction
sale. Thus, Portugal issued a certificate of sale in favor of Chailease. Meanwhile, the RTC, on June 26, 2000, dismissed Civil Case
No. 67620 due to petitioners' failure to prosecute.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for the damages against the respondent?

No, under the law, even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. In this case, the petitioners
reneged on their obligation to pay the loan which lead to foreclosure of their property, they already know the consequence of
not paying their loan and it is only just that Chinatrust would seize the land since it is part of the contract and loan process.
ARTURO ALANO v. CA, GR No. 111244, 1997-12-15

Facts:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which
affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2]... denying petitioner's motion for the suspension of
proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano" as well as his motion for
reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa... alleges:

"That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a
parcel of... land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00,
sold the aforesaid property for the... second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S.
Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos
in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine... currency.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution
in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68... docketed as Civil Case No.
55103 and... entitled "Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et al.,"... concerns the nullity of the sale and
recovery of possession and damages.

private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second... sale of said parcel of land
made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to them.

petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the... deed of
absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent.

the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was... instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the
assailed order.

On July 26, 1993,[4] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit

Hence, this petition.

Issues:

whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Ruling:

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent was a forgery,
such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land... if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale...
to herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioner's signature in the first deed of sale, it follows
that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a... civil
action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.

apparent prejudicial question involved,... Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the trial court denying petitioner's motion
for the suspension of the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already admitted during... the
pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case... it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote
to the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid... foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation
of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the
parties[10] and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with... the introduction of additional evidence and the defense
waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.[11]... the stipulation of facts stated
in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his
behalf.
right to present evidence is guaranteed under the

Constitution,[12] this right may be waived expressly or impliedly... the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in... his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right and without detriment to the community at large.

petitioner's admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery
in the civil case.

we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy,... morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule that no proof
need be offered as to any facts... admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.[16]

Principles:

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and
there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised... in the civil action is resolved such resolution would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal action.

In other words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the... issues raised in
the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.

BELTRAN v PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 137567; 20 June 2000

TOPICS: Prejudicial Question, Bigamy, Concubinage, and Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

 Meynardo and Charmaine were married in 1973. After 24 years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with Charmaine on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine, however, alleged that it was Meynardo who
left the conjugal home, and is now living with Milagros, his paramour.

Charmaine filed a case for concubinage against Meynardo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

Meynardo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court, saying that the pendency of the petition for
nullity of his marriage with Charmaine poses a prejudicial question to the criminal case.

The lower court denied the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by Meynardo, hence he filed a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court to stop the lower court
from trying his case. The RTC denied his petition and the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: 

Whether the pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage poses a prejudicial question to a prosecution for
concubinage filed by the wife?

RULING:

No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question to a prosecution for
concubinage.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;

and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.
For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.