Theory of the Collective Agency

M.Yolles (prof.m.yolles@gmail.com),
G. Fink (gerfink@wu-wien.ac.at),
R. Frieden (friedenr@optics.arizona.edu)

Working Paper
The Organisational Orientation, Coherence and Trajectory (OCT) Project,
http://www.octresearch.net
December 2010, revised1 February 2014

Abstract

Stating from a generic model of the organisation, agency theory is linked to trait theory
within the context of the personality of the collective. Collective agency is a cybernetic socio-
cognitive theory that centres on personality in which formative traits play a major role.
Personality traits create agency orientations that define an agent’s cultural and social
tendencies. Trait dynamics are explored, and explanation is provided about how a personality
type profile develops. Under normal conditions of homeostatic equilibrium an agency
maintains a stable type profile connected with patterns of behaviour, where its behaviour is
predictable. However, its immanent dynamics provide a potential for personality change. In
post-normal conditions with the loss of equilibrium, the agency may lose its type profile
stability. Using information theory, a formal yin-yang theory of the agency is developed that
explains how type profiles can be predicted in post-normal conditions.

Key words: Generic Organisational Model, Emergent Normative Personality, Collective

Agency, patterns of Behaviour, Changing Contexts, Information Theory.

1. Understanding Personality Theory

In Human Resource Management personality indicators have become important because of

the belief that they provide a way connecting the demands of given social and task
environments with individual potential behaviour, including performance. Connecting mind
with decision-making and overt behaviour is conceptually axiomatic. The prediction (or
under complexity, the less deterministic anticipation) of orientations towards particular forms
of behaviour for either individual or collective agencies is feasible using personality
evaluations, given appropriate theory and a proper understanding of the pragmatic utility that
can be created. Most generally, this field of study can be referred to psychosocial dynamics
(Garcia, 2006), with those who work in this area often having a special interest in exploring
the pathologies that drive socially problematic behaviour (Yolles, 2009a).

In the early 1920s Jung developed a model of personality temperament. In this, personality
differences that naturally occur are constituted as temperament types, and they have an
immanent dynamic which he linked to yin-yang processes of the mind (a term which he later
replaced by the Greek word enantiomodria, though less correctly we shall use the simpler
word enantiomer2). Ryckman (2004) notes that Jung’s theory models personality as a
dynamic and organised set of characteristics possessed by a person that uniquely influences
his or her cognitions, motivations, and behaviours in various situations. By cognitions are
meant the capacity for information processing through an individual's set of psychological
“functions” and/or their related conceptual connections, and by behaviour is meant the

1
actions or reactions of cognitive individuals in relation to what they perceive within their
environment. The behaviour may be conscious-unconscious, overt-covert, or voluntary-
involuntary. Temperament theorists (like Myers et al., 1998) are interested in traits that take
preferential types values, and are involved in decision making behaviour that connects with
the mental function of judging leading directly to overt behaviour. Here, seemingly random
variation in individual behaviours is seen as orderly and consistent due to distinctions in the
ways they prefer to use their perception and judgment. Other theoretical approaches like
those of trait theorists (Heinström, 2003) or cognitive theorists (Baron, 1982) often tend to be
concerned directly with overt behaviour where judgment is not part of their consideration.

In developing his explicatory framework for personality, Jung (1923; 1957-79) articulates a
number of propositions that can be summarised as: (i) past experience and expectations about
the future influence behaviour and personality; (ii) individuals are capable of constant and
creative development; and (iii) personality is an open system, which is receptive to inputs and
exchanges. He considers behaviour to be a sub-system of personality, which can change as a
result of inputs from, and interactions with, the external environment of the individual. Thus,
the influence of others can have a significant impact on an individual’s behaviour, implicitly
thereby recognising the role of changing context.

In creating his thesis, Jung also established a basis for the development of a cognitive theory
of personality. It became the entry point for a number of other theoretical and empirical
examinations of personality, most of which centre on personality differences between
individuals. They include the Myers-Briggs Type Indicators or MBTI (Myers Briggs, 2000),
and its close relative Socionics (Müller et al., 1998), the latter linking Jung’s work with those
of Freud and Kepinski, or Mindscape theory (Maruyama, 2001), while more empirical
approaches include the Five Factor Model3 (Cattel, 1945), often referred to as FFM or the Big
5. There is a main distinction in the approaches adopted by MBTI and FFM: the former is a
type approach that indicates personality states, and the latter is a trait approach that indicates
a personality framework of indicative variables. The two approaches are not mutually
exclusive, since the states that trait variables adopt can be represented as types (Eysenck,
1957).

Support for the possibility of creating theory that links personality indicators with behaviour
has not always been as strong as it is now. Social psychologists (e.g., Mischel, 1968) argue
that behaviour is not stable but varies with context, a proposition which has been to some
extent evidenced (Krupat, 2006). Theorists in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that predicting
behaviour by personality tests was impossible (see for instance Borman et al., 2003). An
explanation for this by some behavioural theorists was that personality is a perceived
construct that people impose on others in order to maintain an illusion of consistency in the
world. However, by the 1980s, it was realised that while predicting single instances of
behaviour may be unreliable, patterns of behaviour could be identified from an aggregate of a
large numbers of observations. More generally, patterns are generically defined as an
abstraction from a concrete form that keeps recurring in specific, non-arbitrary contexts. It is
this very nature that enables a predictive capacity, even when it comes to their interaction
with personal and situational variables. Another realisation has also developed: that where it
is possible to associate personalities with stable trait values, a consistent connection to
behaviour can be discerned (as explained by de Oliveira (2008) and Hyldegård (2009) in
relation to MBTI preferences).

2
A theory of personality functioning reflects the personal narratives that individuals construct
over the course of their lives (McAdams, 1996 & 2001; Tomkins, 1979). It contains not only
a theory of persons but (at least implicitly) a theory of personality assessment through the
identification and provision of a set of personality indicators - that is, a set of beliefs about
the internal psychological structures and overt behavioural tendencies that must be measured
in an assessment of personality and the procedures that are required to measure them.
Personality theory and personality assessment are intertwined and manifested as the
likelihood for behaviour through the use of personality indicators.

There is a divide between modern socio-cognitive approaches to personality assessment, and

trait and types approaches, even though they can in principle be related (Eysenck, 1957; Van
Egeren, 2009). Human agency is complex, and modelling its effective functionality requires
theoretical pluralism (Bandura, 2008). However, the very plurality of personality schemas
that coexist (Carver, 2005) creates an uncertain fragmented paradigmatic horizon that is un-
integrated, with unrelated theories that are competitive and together demonstrate an
undeveloped theoretical understanding of the nature of personality (e.g., Sharpley, 2006). For
instance, Bandura’s (1999, p. 229) agency theory is a socio-cognitive dynamic self-schema of
personality that sees the individual as an autonomous system that interacts dynamically with
its social environments. In contrast the trait schemas of personality like FFM (Buss, 1996)
tend to be devoid of contextual connection, and have a static rather than dynamic nature
(Bandura, 1986).

Our interest in this paper is to set personality theory into a collective setting. Establishing
organisations within a (social) psychological framework is not new. For instance both Weick
(1995) and Kets de Vries (1991) are interested in the psychology of the collective, and
Bridges (1992) talks about the organisational character as a representative of a social
personality. Maruyama (1988 & 2001) has applied his Mindscape concepts of personality to
the collective. Bandura (1999) has applied his socio-cognitive concepts of the individual
personality to the collective. Yolles (2006) also discusses the relationship between the
individual and social collective, and notes that a social agency can develop a collective
psyche that operates through normative processes.

Van Egeren (2009) is interested in a metaphor for that links agency and trait/temperament
schemas. Agency theory comes from the socio-cognitive notions of Bandura (1999),
concerned cognitive attributes like self-organisation and self-reflection, with some significant
interest also placed in the notion of efficacy. This is the cognitive capability of an agency to
use its talents and abilities in its activities; it can enhance self-motivation through goal
systems, and can be affected by positive or negative emotive orientation in such attributes as
self-monitoring, cognitive representation, and recognition of capabilities in past successes and
failures (Bandura, 1991). Efficacy is therefore conditioned by emotional intelligence
(Adeyemo, 2007), itself defined as the ability of an agency to monitor its own and others'
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's
thinking and actions (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).

The nature of traits has been discussed (Carver, 2005; Van Ergeren, 2009), and when they are
associated with emotions are represented as temperaments (Strelau, 2002). Thus for instance
Mehrabian (1991) considers temperament as an emotion trait, this providing a potential for
perminantly linking trait and temperament theory with socio-cognitive theory. Van Egeren
(2009) sees temperament as trait theory based on and reflective of emotional-motivational
systems that are able to increase adaptation to classes of stimuli associated with positive and

3
negative reinforcement (Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky, 2005, p. 314). Thomas & Chess
(1977, cited in Strelau, 2002) see temperament as a general term referring to the how of
behaviour and way in which an individual behaves. Davis (2000) notes that durable
personality traits are usually tightly bound to qualities of emotions, but they may also be
defined in terms of preconscious mental dispositions that affect the reflective processes and
influence the different categories of cognitive and animated behaviour. They are focused at
the reflective layer of personality and permeate it providing the control patterns that create
stability. They are also related to performance (Fleishman et al., 1999).

Van Egeren (2009) develops a metaphor for agency, where personality traits are seen to be
related to self-regulatory controls that underlie behaviour, rather than manifesting behaviour
patterns themselves. Thus or instance he relates the central characteristics of traits to the
central characteristics of self-regulatory processes underlying goal-directed behaviour. He
also notes that personality traits appear to be connected to human action by self-regulatory
functions that are inseparable from action itself. The traits are seen to have self-regulatory
propensities or styles affecting how individuals characteristically pursue their goals. A set of
traits should be seen to work together interdependently to exert control over human
behaviour, and for him a principal task of personality theory is to describe this process of
control. Our approach moves beyond metaphor to develop the basis of a formal4 psychosocial
framework for the collective agency with a normative personality that if durable can maintain
stable trait values, when its behaviour may be predictable.

The term normative personality is not new, being usually used within the context of the
ambient normative social influences that exist during the formation of personalities, and that
mould them (Mroczek & Little, 2006)., Distinctly, our interest rather lies in recognising that
the norms in a collective may together coalesce into a unitary cognitive structure such that a
collective mind can be inferred, and from which an emergent normative personality arises. To
explain this further, consider that stable collectives develop a common dominant culture
within which shared beliefs develop in relation to the capacity of the collective power to
produce desired outcomes. Cultural anchors are developed that enable the formation of
formal and informal norms for patterns of behaviour, modes of conduct and expression,
forms of thought, attitudes and values that are more or less adhered to by its membership.
When the norms refer to formal behaviours, then where the members of the collective
contravene them, they are deemed to be engaging in illegitimate behaviour which, if
discovered, may result in formal retribution - the severity of which is determined from the
collective’s ideological and ethical positioning. This develops with the rise of collective
cognitive processes that starts with information inputs and through decision processes
results in orientation to action; and it does this with a sense of the collective mind and self.
It is a short step to recognise that the collective mind is associated with normative
personality. Where a normative personality is deemed to exist, it does not necessarily mean
that individual members of the collective will all conform to all aspects of the normative
processes: they may only do so “more or less”. In the remainder of this paper, when we
refer to normative personality, we shall mean the development of the collective mind and
its emergent normative personality.

This paper starts by formulating a generic model of the organisational agency, and then shows
that its figurative and strategic attributes constitute normative personality. We have already
indicated that in cognitive personality theory behaviour is concerned with decision making, and
it is from this and the social orientations that a collective agency has, that patterns of behaviour
develop. We take it that temperament can be defined in terms of a set of preferred personality

4
traits of an agency. Given that under normal conditions one can identify an agency’s stable
temperament, we shall take it that its patterns of behaviour are predictable. However, even
where an agency appears to maintain a tendency towards a stable temperament, its immanent
dynamics may become responsible for a shift in personality orientation that destroys normal
predictability. This is especially the case if exogenous factors come into play that destabilise
the existing temperament and move it into a post-normal condition (Ravetz, 1999). In such
situations there is a need to be able to explore immanent agency dynamics in order to try to
predict the new stable temperament. Reflective of a related paper by Yolles et al. (2008) we
shall link the theory developed here with Frieden’s (1998) mathematical information theory to
explain how it is possible to evaluate the immanent dynamics of a normative personality. This
will enable us to examine the dynamic tendencies in temperament, its trait values change, and
hence regain the possibility of predicting patterns of behaviour. An illustrative case study is
provided that hypothesises an extension to Saudinization, a policy that attempted to reverse the
disembedded nature of western companies who were in Saudi Arabia to service their resource
needs, while being aloof from its cultural and social needs.

The theory that develops here is embryonic, and does not examine methodological means by
which organisations can be evaluated and their pathologies diagnosed. Linking this with the
techniques developed by Stafford Beer (1979) in his work on Managerial Cybernetics provides
the possibility of creating appropriate diagnostic tools. Expressing Beer’s approach in terms of
the core theory here has already been started (Yolles, 2006).

2. Modelling Collective Agency

Schwarz (2003) sets out his model to describe the dynamics of more or less complex entities
defined as sets of several (at least two) interacting parts. His starting point consists of
identifying three inseparable primal categories present in all systems: objects, relations and
wholes. These three types of initial ingredients are on equal footing – in particular virtual
relations which are as "real" as objects. In his meta-model he argues that he has an extension
of the mechanist paradigm where objects have a privileged ontological status. In his new
paradigm of ultimate "reality" (that which exists), there are two complementary, inseparable
and irreducible aspects: objects and relations. Yolles (2006) has adapted Schwarz’s model to
create Knowledge Cybernetics, a propositional frame of reference that undertakes social
meta-modelling, one result of which is the development of a generic organisational model.
This theory relates to “living systems” that apply not only to biological entities (Maturana &
Varela, 1980), but also to social ones (Beer, 1980).

In Figure 1 we adopt the generic organisational model presented Fink, Dauber & Yolles
(2011) and Yolles et al (2011). This model arises from the cybernetic model developed by
Schwarz (1994), and formulated into knowledge cybernetics by Yolles (2006). Here,
externalisation and combination occur as an “operative couple” defined by the term
autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1984) and guidance and internalisation together create a
cybernetic loops represented by the term autogenesis (Schwarz, 1994). Generically
autogenesis can be taken as a form of figurative intelligence and autopoiesis as a form of
operative intelligence (Yolles, 2008), both terms having originally been introduced by Piaget
(1950). Due to the nature of the modelling process and its sensitivity to context, figurative
intelligence in this model operates with a cultural dimension through which values, attitudes
and beliefs coalescence into normative ideological and ethical standards that ultimately
defines what constitute legitimate modes and means of pragmatic behaviour. It is related to
the notion of cultural intelligence defined by Earley and Ang (2003) as a plurality of cultural

5
 beliefs, attitudes and values, which are in interaction and create a plural figurative base that
has some level of cultural conflict within it. In the case where there is no such conflict, then
operative cultural intelligence simply reduces to “the manifestation of the figurative base as
patterns of cultural knowledge”.
EXTERNALISATION through a
network of processes that
GUIDANCE through a network
constitute agency operative Artifacts
of principles that constitutes
intelligence Phenomenal domain
cultural figurative intelligence
BEHAVIOUR from
reflection of intentions

Existential domain Noumenal domain

ORGANISATIONAL
CULTURE STRATEGIC Agent
STRUCTURE
as part of a cognitive base ORGANISING OPERATIONS
Pragmatic base.
[Belief system & patterns As part of its figurative base Efficacious directed
Cognitive interest
of knowledge] Decision imperatives and action with social
Self-organisation
Cognitive intentions attitude. Cognitive purposes consequence
Operative
Self-reference Self-regulation (reaction).
MANAGEMENT
Underlying Espoused Values
Assumptions

PERFORMANCE
Confirmation or
INTERNALISATION
imperative for adjustment
through operative intelligence COMBINATION through
feedback to cognitive base, a network of information
paradigms, culture and viable processes that induce
patterns of knowledge: ADAPTATION and Socialisation Agent
RESPONSE through OPERATIONS
communication Efficacious directed
action with social
that structurally
consequence
couples the
agency with
others

Figure 1: Generic Model of a Collective Agency drawing on Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) and
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), also showing the operative systems of a connected agency.

Internalisation, externalisation and combination are terms use by Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995), but here represent networks of processes that contribute to the nature of normative
personality. These are distinct from their term socialisation which that is simply a structural
coupling process which lies beyond normative personality. From this the question arises as to
whether externalisation is connected to structure, to operations, or to the structural coupling
that exists between them? Phenomena must perhaps be represented as operational behaviour
since structure as such is “phenomenally figurative” and cannot be directly observed.
Organisational structure also acts to constrain and facilitate operations, this connection
indicated by the structural coupling between the two. In other words, performance may be
indicative that a structural adjustment is required, especially if unexpected patterns of
performance appear. Any such adjustment reflects on the need to adjust patterns of
behaviour.

3. Normative Personality as Part of the Collective Agency

The noumenal domain of Figure 1 is constituted as the cognitive part of the organisation that
is concerned with information. As such we identify that this is the seat of any emergent
normative personality system that may emerge, and it is our intention to model this.

6
In the socio-cognitive theory of the empirical personality, the mind operates as a complex
system (Bandura 1999; Cervone et al. 2004). Socio-cognitive variables develop through
socio-cultural experiences. They distinguish between cognitive capacities that contribute to
personality functioning, including skills, competencies, knowledge structures that have been
sedimented from the real life situations that have been experienced, self-reflective processes
that enable people to develop beliefs about themselves within social contexts, and self-
regulatory processes where people formulate goals, standards and motivations toward
identifiable outcomes (Bandura 1986, 1999; Williams 1992). Personality assessment
differentiates between personality structures and behavioural orientations. The internal
structures are assessed through an examination of a system of interacting psychological
mechanisms rather than a set of independent variables as in trait approaches. In social-
cognitive theory, assessments capture not only current psychological tendencies, but also
personal determinants of action that contribute to development over the course of time.
Evaluations are made of individual differences as well of the psychological attributes that
contribute to personal identity. Ways in which the structures of personality come into play are
illustrated as agents interact with the settings and challenges that make up their day-to-day
lives. Social-cognitive personality assessment seeks to explore agential personality
coherence, and assessments explore the cognitive structures that are used to interpret events,
and not only to self-reflect and self-regulate, but also to cases of change through self-
organisation. Personality assessment usually seeks to explore psychological change. It
attempts to identify psychological qualities that if appropriate can be modified or developed.

Bandura (1999) has been interested in the idea of the collective efficacy. This refers to the
shared belief that the collective agent can, as a whole, attain goals and accomplish its desired
tasks (Bandura, 1986). It affects the collective performance of a social system through its
interactive, coordinative, and synergistic dynamics from which emergent group properties
emerge (Bandura, 2006). Collective efficacy is connected with a belief or perception that
efficacious collective actions are possible in relation to a social need, and while it necessarily
differs from the self-efficacy of the empirical agent, the two concepts arise from the same
origin. A difference between self-efficacy and collective efficacy relates to both cultural
cohesion and the differences that exist between the agency members that compose the
collective. Thus, for instance, a problem of normative cultural cohesion may affect normative
performance through an individual’s lack of confidence and/or perceptual differences in
collective efficacy (Bandura, 1995). The efficacy of a collective agent will also influence its
ability to communicate, goal set, and persevere during adversity. Interestingly, it is feasible to
align the Piaget notions of intelligence and Bandura’s notion of efficacy. While intelligence is
is a network of processes through which information is migrated, efficacy relates to the belief
in the capacity that an agency has in creating that manifestation conditioned by emotional
intelligence.

It is clear then that personality theory created for the collective agent has additional caveats to
that of the empirical agent. However, normative personality processes in patent5 organisations
have observable information processes, while in empirical organisations the social psychology
theory that guides us becomes more closely aligned to the empirical personality theory of the
individual in psychology, both having a similar inferential status. In particular a collective
agent may behave independently from the empirical agents that compose it because the
normative anchors for social behaviour may be different from the anchors of empirical agent
behaviour, as has been shown by the literature on Strategic Groups (Fiegenbaum and Thomas
1995); Herding (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Welch 2000); and Groupthink (Janis 1972).

7
In order to understand more about normative personality, we may find some direction from
theories of the individual personality. There is support for this from a number of sources (e.g.
Weik and Roberts, 1993; Bandura, 1999; Hofstede et al., 2002; Brown, 1961; Gindis, 2009;
Barley, 2007), with collective agents behaving consistently as “legal corporate persons”, and
with a unitary rationality that can be explained. In Figure 2 we offer a model of socio-
cognitive normative personality. Performance involves the evaluation of directed behaviour,
and is related to the interaction between the behaviours which are embedded in personality
structures and the social environmental factors with which it is coupled. It is instructive to
relate Figures 1 and 2, the latter in principle arising from the recursive application of Figure
1, where the domain meanings are contextually adjusted. We note that at the agency level
normative personality is concerned with self-regulation. This can, however, be distinguished
into cognitive controls when explored within the context of the normative personality. Figure
2 defines the normative personality in terms of a set of personality subsystems. Personality is
constituted in terms of three classes of information. Two of these are appreciative information
which has decision imperatives that are manifested through its schemas and relate to
cognitive self-regulation, and structural information with its action orientation that drives
decision making and relates to cognitive self-organisation. The other class falls into the
category of “object oriented” beliefs (attitudes) and emotive impulses (that have emotional
attributes, like cognitive state and some cognitive dispositional imperatives) and other related
forms of conceptual information, and relates to cognitive self-reference.

Normative Personality
Sphere of personality operative intelligence
Guidance through Sphere of observable
Externalisation through
personality figurative behavior
personality operative intelligence
intelligence
Action
as a reflection of
Personality behavior Social
Personality Personality figurative operative system Operative System
Metasystem system Structural information Operational
Attitudes/emotives Appreciative information, with action Performance
and conceptual decision imperatives and information that as efficient &
information mental schemas conditions behavior. Reaction effective directed
Self-reference Self-regulation Self-organisation as an imperative action
to structural
adjustment

Combination
Internalisation

Figure 2: Normative Personality as a Cognitive System with Figurative and Operative

Intelligences, seated in the noumenal domain of the Collective Agency
Because of the context of this model, rather than using the term operative intelligence we use
the term personality operative intelligence. We recall that by operative intelligence is meant
the capacity for beliefs, values attitudes and knowledge to be assembled in a coherent way to
form personality. Attitudes are constituted as a set of values that are directed towards some
object of attention and hence have an operative function. So personality operative
intelligence is the manifestation of personality structures that facilitate and condition
behaviours from which arises performance. Further, personality figurative intelligence is the
set of figurative images (including mental models and abstractions) that have solidified to

8
form personality. The intelligence attributes would, in this way, relate to the efficacious
manifestations of beliefs, values and knowledge in collective agent as personality patterns,
including attitudes, which govern how decision imperatives can be addressed and responded
to.

4. A Basis for Yin-Yang Agency

The model that we shall develop here relates to the metaphorical arguments of Van Egeren
(2009) in his cybernetic discussion of agency and trait theory, but takes an alternative more
formal route. Bandura’s (1986) socio-cognitive theory arises through his notions of social
learning, and he recognised that socio-cognitive processes are influenced by memory and
emotions, and interactive with environmental influences. Behaviour is also seen to be guided
by cognitive processes (like the Jungian types of thinking and judging). Bandura developed a
theory of self that explored the complex psychological and subjective reality of individuals as
it impacts on goals and expectations and points towards individual strategies that are used
satisfy expectations and accomplish meaningful subjective goals, and it induces the affective
representation of the perceived problem (Scott-Murray, 2005). It can be seen as a theory of
individual differences (Bandura 1999), where processes are connected with personality traits
that condition personality processes in some invisible way. However, Bandura recognises that
they are descriptive behavioural clusters that tell one little about the determinants and
regulative structures governing the behaviours that constitute a particular cluster. In his view,
for this there is a need for process theory in which can be explored self-efficacy. Self-efficacy
beliefs determine affects how an agency thinks, motivates itself and behaves. The beliefs
produce diverse effects through the major processes of cognition, motivation, effectiveness
and selection. In contrast, from a qualitative analysis, Van Egeren (2009) has argued that
traits have a fundamental control and characterising function in the personality. It needs to be
recognized that the regulative control function, which is unique for each trait, is constituted
by distinct frameworks of principles that offers domination and functional governance.

In personality theory, a trait is usually seen as a distinguishing feature, characteristic or

quality of a personality style, creating a predisposition for a personality to respond in a
particular way to a broad range of situations (Allport, 1961). Traits arise from an interaction
between personality and situation (Chapman et al., 2000), resulting for instance in the
interaction model of personality (Stevens and Rodin, 2001). They are also described as
enduring stable patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and
oneself that are exhibited in a wide range of social and personal contexts; they are also
habitual patterns of thought, emotion and stable clusters of behaviour. Traits operate as
continuous dimensions that together may define a personality space, and the trait variables
may in theory be subject to small degrees of continuous variation. For Eysenck (1957), the
scalar value that a trait variable takes may be classed as a personality type, and there are
various manifestations of types in trait theory (Goldberg, 1993; Costa and McCrae, 1992;
Heinström, 2003). It may be noted, however, that where there are personality theories that
explore types but where no traits are deemed to exist (or vice versa) there is no reason for
traits (or types) not to be inferred.

It is possible to summarise the relationship between socio-cognitive, trait and type tendencies
in the predominant species of theories, as shown in Table 1. Support for such distinctions
might be read into Cervone et al. (2001), who notes that a social-cognitive approach to
personality yields a theory of personality assessment that differs significantly from the trait
assessment strategy that has so far predominated in the field. Connecting species of theories

9
is not unknown, as illustrated by Eysenck (1957) who created a trait theory in which trait
variables were able to adopt type states, and by Van Egeren (2009) who explored how socio-
cognitive theories may be expressed in terms of traits. The latter author uses a metaphorical
argument to recast and reinterpret personality traits as predispositions that regulate goal-
directed actions in particular ways characteristic of the individual (Van Egeren, 2009: 94). As
such, a trait describes individual differences in how people carry out tasks.

Bandura (1999) notes that the basic structure of personality is formed through supertraits,
though Van Egeren (2009) rather uses the term global traits. For us they are also traits that are
formative of personality, and are constituted as structures made up of distinct but
intercorrelated non-formative traits. Bandura recognises that different authors see different
sets of formative traits. For instance a sevenfold set is suggested by Tellegen & Waller (1987),
a sixfold set by Jackson, Ashton, & Tomes (1996), a fivefold set by McCrae & Costa (1997), a
threefold set by Eysenck (1991), a twofold set by Digman (1997), and there are other
schemas identified by Barrett & Klein (1982). This diverse collection suggests that the
number of traits selected is arbitrary if they do not derive from a generic model that
demands certain characteristics, a notion supported by Van Egeren (2009).

In this paper our intention is to develop the rationale for a fivefold set of such formative
traits for the collective agency, which we shall be referring to when we talk of traits. The
personality is seen to be composed of a collection of traits each with its orientation created by
the type-value it adopts, and we take it that the collection of type-values creates a personality
orientation that determines its patterns of behaviour.

Characteristics Socio-cognitive Trait Type

Theoretical Multiple-causative Defines a framework for Usually described in terms
Approach cognitions personality of paired opposite states
called enantiomers
Variables Continuous variables that Continuous variables Discrete states adopted by
may have states trait variables.
Data collection Quantitative and Quantitative inventories Quantitative and qualitative
tendencies qualitative inquiries inventories
Analytical Susceptible to complex Often uses simple Often uses relational
tendencies explanations classification approaches approaches.
Table 1: Overview of Major Theory Tendencies in Personality Theories

5. Formative Traits

The characteristics of the trait are central to the comparative nature of trait schemas. Let us
propose that a set of normative personality traits can arise from core properties that
commonly exist in relation to the capacity of a collective agency to survive efficaciously.
They also operate to establish stable control patterns that underlie patterns of behaviour
through control processes. Different traits therefore are associated with different control
functions and hence necessarily reflect different characteristics. It is not therefore too relevant
how the names of these traits vary, so long as there characteristics can be related. This has
been illustrated by Yolles (2009) and Yolles and Fink (2009), where trait schemas have been
set into a characteristics typology and compared and related.

We shall identify ontologically distinct core agency properties in which the traits have
characteristic control functions. They are underlying in that they may be relatable to other
traits that arise autonomously in other trait theories of personality. Here, we shall define a set

10
of underlying traits, two arising from the cybernetic principles of management systems
(viability and appreciativeness) and a third (integrativity) from cognitive science. In addition
we shall include social and cultural orientation traits. The nature for these formative traits is
as follows:

Viability (Beer, 1979) is an operative orientation trait that provides the ability of an agency to
be able to durably maintain a separate operative existence while coping with unpredictable
futures. As a trait variable it is able to take one of two enantiomer type-values. One
constitutes a flexible orientation (VƮI) to effectively respond to environmental challenges or
those that emerge from the social system. It is consistent with liberation away from
regulatory power and bureaucracy. The other enantiomer is the adherence orientation (VƮJ) to
proven rules that relates to efficient decision making, and is consistent with the subordination
to hierarchy. Challenges from the social system may require flexibility in the application of
these rules. Through this the viability trait can represent a durable and distinct personality
orientation that is able to cope with unpredictable futures. It structures appreciative
information enabling adaptation, and enables the personality to facilitate responses to its
social environment and predefine its behavioural penchant towards its operations. Agency
efficacy in relation to the social orientation trait may contribute to the realising of its full
social orientation potential, to engage with the environmental anticipations that it controls,
and adjust its own operative processes. In contrast, in-efficacy may result in an agency
inadequacy that can impact on its operative intelligence or the recognition of agency
adjustment imperatives. This may occur through self-regulation and either the subordination
to hierarchy or liberation away from power and bureaucratic regulations allowing normative
rule obedience to be defined at a sub-agency level.

Appreciativeness (adapted from Vickers, 1965) is a figurative orientation trait, has both
cognitive and evaluative aspects, is influenced by attitudes and reflection, and connects with
cognitive purpose and processes of cognitive self-regulation. As a trait variable it might take
enantiomer type-values that define a harmony orientation (AƮI) or an achievement orientation
(AƮI) relating to the appreciations or goals. This may also be related to the notions of harmony
and mastery by Sagiv and Schwartz (2007). We could further relate this to appreciations
driving goal formulation as a process that derives from data collection and involving the
careful weighing of arguments as opposed to spontaneous decisions following from the
spontaneous desires of the decision makers. This trait maintains an interconnected set of more
or less tacit standards which order and value experience, determines the way an agency sees
and values different situations, and how instrumental judgements are made and action is
taken. The trait facilitates how an agency as a decision maker observes and interprets reality,
and establishes decision imperatives about it. As such the trait regulates the appreciations and
resulting goals of the organisation with respect to its intended operations, the potential for
social interaction, and the ethical positioning that may occur as a response to opportunities
provided or indicated by the social environment. Efficacy in this trait in relation to the
viability trait can lead to self-principled agencies with aesthetical, intuitive or
ethical/ideological positioning. It can provide preferred ideological images that may facilitate
action. It orientates the agency towards a view of stages of historical development, with
respect to interaction with the external environment. In-efficacy can lead to corrupt and
sociopathic organisations (Yolles, 2009a), or more broadly agency misconduct (Greve et al.,
2010).

Integrativity is a cognitive orientation trait (GƮ) that arises from cognitive and social
psychology (Van Liere & Dunlap, 1981; Menary, 2009), is existentially connected with

11
cognitive self-reference (Hannah et al, 2008 & 2010), and maintains a relationship with
cognitive intention (Freeman, 2008). Taken as a trait variable, it might involve the effective
realising of potential recognising social and political structures and the associated constraints
imposed on the agency. The variable may be seen to take enantiomer type-values that give
the agency an autonomy orientation (GƮJ) when an agency will follow less the guidance of its
host culture, but might react more autonomously to the lessons drawn from (or opportunities
offered by) environmental impulses. The other enantiomer type-value of the variable might
be embeddedness orientation (GƮI), where a similar construct can be found in Sagiv and
Schwartz (2007). The trait is affected by attitudes, and emotive imperatives that may
orientate the agency towards cognitive coherence or dissonance. Integrativity has impact on
perspectives that are associated with strategies, ideology and ethics/morality. It also creates
imperative for the regulation of the patterns of behaviour through intention. This trait affects
the operative couple between the apreciativeness and viability traits through its network of
processes. This network has an efficacy orientation that affects an agency’s ability to
manifest information through the creation of an emotive bias. However, it can also be seen in
terms of directly affecting the viability trait (Figure 3) thereby contributing to cognitive
coherence. This is connected with a move towards homeostasis - the human capacity to
maintain or restore some physiological, psychological, or psychosocial constants despite
outside environmental variations (Pasquier et al, 2006). The development of inefficacy can
similarly lead to lack of coherence and a demonstration of collective cognitive dissonance,
and this can act as a driver for cognitive state/dispositional6 dysfunctions (Endler &
Summerfield, 1995: 255).

The set of traits have been set within Figure 3 which adopts the same trait logic offered by
Yolles (2009) in his exploration of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator model. In this figure we
note that the integrativity trait acts to constrain personality through normative self-reference
and identity. More, the appreciative trait is concerned with normative self-regulation, and the
viability trait is concerned with normative self-organisation - and the two together constitute
a first order operative couple. This defines for the agency it’s own boundaries relative to its
environment, produces its own network of processes that are themselves part of the
processes, obeys its own laws of motion, and defines for itself a set of boundaries that satisfy
its intentions. There is also a second order figurative couple that links the operative couple
with its cultural environment and involves identity and self-reference. More, we can also note
that there is an agency social orientation trait (SƮ) which operates in a given social
environment. This might be seen to exist in a social operative system directed towards action,
interaction, and reaction that (re)constitutes the cultural environment in terms of (desired,
welcome, undesired, not welcome) activities. So, an agency might put emphasis on action
(SƮI ― where its membership is convinced that it will get positive feedback, their product will
sell etc.), or have a more observation orientation (SƮJ) and collect (lots of) information before
engaging in action. Essentially, therefore, action oriented SƮI arises from an optimistic
tendency, while observation oriented VƮJ arises from a pessimistic tendency.

There is yet another trait, cultural orientation (CƮ), which has been explored at some length
in Yolles et al (2008). The type values that this trait can assume includes sensate orientation
(CƮI), which allows realities to be deemed to exist only if they can be sensorially perceived.
Sensate type members of a culture not seek or believe in a super-sensory reality, and are
agnostic towards the world beyond any current sensory capacity of perception. Needs and
aims are mainly physical, that is, that which primarily satisfies the sense organs. The
epistemic attributes include appreciating the nature of the needs and ends that are to be
satisfied the degree of strength in pursuit of those needs, and the methods of satisfaction. The

12
means of satisfaction occurs not through adaptation or modification of human beings, but
through the exploitation of the external world. It is thus practically orientated, with emphasis
on human external needs. With reality as perceived from senses, its operative nature is
highlighted in that it views reality through what can be measured and observed rather than
reasoned. Cultural orientation may also assume ideationality (CƮJ), which sees reality as non-
sensate and nonmaterial. Epistemological needs and ends are mainly spiritual, rather than
practicable, and internal rather than external. The method of fulfilment or realization is self
imposed minimization or elimination of most physical needs, to promote the greater
development of the human being as a Being. Spiritual needs are thus at the forefront of this
disposition’s aims rather than human physical needs. These enantiomer types act as yin-yang
forces that together create what Sorokin (1962, vol. 4, p590) the Principle of Immanent
Change. In this, autonomous agencies with coherent cultures experience cultural change by
virtue of its own internal forces and properties. An agency cannot help changing even if all
external conditions are constant. Sorokin (1962, vol. 4, p.600-1) tells us that any functional
sociocultural system incessantly generates consequences that are not the results of the
external factors to the system, but the consequences of the existence of the system and of its
activities. As such they are necessarily imputed to it, and this occurs without the benefit of
conscious decision. One of the specific forms of this immanent generation of consequences is
an incessant change of the system itself, due to its existence and activity. The dynamics of
change thus occur naturally as an internal process to the culture. Due the intimate relationship
between culture and personality, cultural orientation changes must necessarily be reflected
through attitude change in the normative personality. This where there is a distinction
between the personality of the non-mobile individual7 who may have little exposure to
cultural orientation shifts, and that of the durable agency that will, through immanence, will
experience its own cultural shifts that may be exacerbated by ambient cultural shifts.

These trait notions are formulated into Figure 3. While it seems axiomatic that organisations
wish to be durable and hence maintain viability, be able to assess what their requirements are
and hence engage in appreciativeness, and try to be coherent in their processes that engaging
with integrativity, there is no research that explores these notions as trait variables that
determines personality orientation. In addition two other traits are introduced that are external
to the personality, but which have an intimate relationship with it. These are cultural and
social orientation. Cultural orientation refers to agency culture, but this is in itself influenced
by the ambient host culture in which the agency is embedded. Social orientation is an
extension of the agency personality that orientates it within the social environment that hosts
it. Both cultural and social traits are therefore part of the agency personality environment, and
both are able to represent changing contexts that influence personality.

The intelligences are networks of (operative) processes or (figurative) meta-processes. The

social orientation trait, like the other traits, is taken as a variable, for which we might
distinguish agents who are “action” oriented (being convinced that they will get positive
feedback, their product will sell etc.), as opposed to others that are more “observation”
oriented and collect (lots of) information before they set action. Requisite efficacy in this trait
enables the agency to undertake behaviour that are tied to requite trait values and hence
results in requisite performance.

The type values that traits of the personality, cultural and social orientations take are referred
to here as the agency profile. Where an agency has trait values and hence an intended type
profile, these are maintained by the manifestation of requisite trait values from which arise
requisite efficacies that define type relationships. In principle, where these trait preferences

13
 are stable and empirically identifiable, there is a significant possibility of predicting its
behaviour in given contexts. There is a caveat to this however as illustrated by Yolles et al.
(2011), who has adopted the notions of Schwarz (2003) and integrated the ideas of Kuhn
(1970), Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993) and Ravetz (1999), adapted for agency profile to produce
Table 2. This explains under what conditions an agency’s stable personality orientation may
shift from its normal mode to a post-normal mode, when its immanent dynamics becomes
more volatile. It is here that the likelihood of stable agency type profile and hence
behavioural predictability becomes lost. The onset of mode 3 crisis and mode 4
transformation can create new requisite values that affect traits so that a new types appear
leading to a new agency profile.

Cultural
Figurative cultural
Environment
Cultural Orientation intelligence
trait
CƮ(CƮJ, CƮI) P3,1

Figurative Agent Personality Operative social

P2,1 intelligence
P1,1
Figurative intelligence
P4,1
Operative
intelligence
Personality
Metasystem Personality Operative
Personality Figurative Personality
Normative self- System
System Operative
reference Normative self-organisation
Normative self-regulation Environment
Integrativity trait Viability trait
Apprciativeness trait VƮ(VƮJ, VƮI)
GƮ(GƮJ, GƮI) Social Orientation
AƮ(AƮJ, AƮI)
Self-regulative trait
Self-referential intelligence imperative
for adjustment
intelligence imperative P4,2 SƮ(SƮJ, SƮI)
for adjustment
P1,2
P2,2 Imperative for
P3,2 operative social
intelligence adjustment
Impulses for cultural adjustment
Note: Pi,j(where pathology type i=1,3 and order j=1,2) refers to type pathologies that can arise through both intelligence
limitation and efficacy distinction, or where semantic blocks develop

Figure 3: Socio-cognitive Trait Model connecting the formative personality trait model with
social and cultural systems. Here, Ʈ is a trait variable with type values ƮI or ƮJ.

Where the value values we have referred to are requisite but the efficacy status is not
requisite (i.e. where the manifestation of information across traits about attitudes/emotive
impulses and/or goals and tasks is in some way perturbed), personality pathologies arise.
Illustrations of this come from Kets de Vries (1991), who has looked at the collective in
terms of its psychological tendencies such as corporate neurosis, guilt, collective
psychological defences that reduce pain through denial and cover-up, and unproductive
power processes. It is also possible that pathological breaks may occur that disconnect the
traits thus throwing the agency into major psychological mal-adjustment. In Figure 3 the
pathologies Pi,j are inhibitors to the manifestation of information between traits.

14
 6. Relating Intelligences and Efficacy

We can represent Piaget’s operative intelligence, using Bandura’s terminology, as the

efficacious capacity of a collective agent to create a cycle of activity that manifests figurative
objects as operative objects. In other words, operative intelligence occurs in a personality as
the capacity of a network of processes to efficaciously migrate appropriate information
content between two analytically distinct traits, in relation to the beliefs that the agent has in
this regard. This now leads us to the realization that efficacy contributes to the formation of
pathology.

Mode Phase Step Change

Normal Stability 1. Entry Existing durable agents have dynamically stable profile, with homeostatic
(homeost negative feedback loops that dominate. Agency profile exists with a stable
asis) belief and value system, though during normal development gradual changes
may ensue through morphogenesis.
Post- Tropic Tropic drift involves actualization of the potentialities of the system.
normal drift 2. Profile drift Dissipative processes are introduced as agency profile is seen as being
3. Tension incapable of delivering its promises. In a complex application domain, tropic
development drift takes the agency profile away from its stable position and gives rise to
4. Tension increase tensions and conflictual perspectives that create uncertainty in the ability to
and structural explain and predict situations,, and questions about its methods in relation to
criticality observations.
Crisis ALEA ALEA refers to crisis, randomness, and hazard. Here positive feedback can be
triggered. Tensions, following the tropic drift that moved the agency profile
away from its stable normal mode life, lead it to structural criticality where
work is required by the agency to maintain a stable profile. Here profile
fluctuations are amplified.
5. Fluctuations Fluctuations occur internally, or in the environment as noise. Through
amplification of fluctuations due to tensions following uncertainty drift, a
discontinuity occurs in the causal sequence of events/behaviour.
6. Bifurcations When bifurcations occur the agency is able to take a variety of possible agency
profile paths. At this point three options are possible.
7.0 Profile demise In type 7.0, decay represents a process of disorganization, regression of agency
profile. This can be seen as the start of a catastrophe bifurcation.
7.1 Type 1 change In type 7.1 the process of change begins with “more of the same” small
changes that maintain its current state but do not resolve issues.
Transforma Metamor Metamorphosis involves a cascade of mutually provoked events through self-
tion phosis organization mainly through positive feedback.
7.2 Type 2 change In type 2 change, metamorphosis occurs through emergence that begins in the
logical base of agency, and is amplified within its critical structure leading to a
new rationality that drives new propositions and consequently new forms of
profile. This is referred to as morphogenic change, occurring through
amplification and differentiation. It is a relational process that develops in the
profile through positive and negative feedback, and integration, when and the
new cognitive base is manifested figuratively and pragmatically.
8.Complexification This is accompanied by processes of complexification that can occur during
iteration of the spiral, perhaps leading to autonomy.
Table 2: Normative Collective Agency Profile Modes of Change

So, limiting operative intelligence can result in the lack of ability of a personality to
efficaciously migrate appreciativeness trait information as imperatives for the viability trait,
and vice versa. The personality metasystem is connected with this personality operative
intelligence by figurative integrative intelligence. This can be thought of as a network of
meta-processes or cognitive principles that efficaciously enables and contextualizes operative
intelligence. It also connects identity with self-processes, a notion indirectly supported by
Markus and Nurius (1986) who proposed a theory of “possible selves” which explains how
the agent develops a connection between present self, motivation, behaviour and possible or

15
future self. In addition it connects with Identity Process Theory (Breakwell 1986 and 1988;
Sullivan 2000; Twigger-Ross et al. 2003) where the conceptualization of identity is seen to
involve four distinct principles of identity (self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness and
continuity) that together enable the maintenance of a positive self-view.

We earlier referred to Piaget’s (1950) figurative intelligence. This can be defined as

providing precise information about states of reality, and involves any means of
representation used to keep in mind the states that intervene between transformations, i.e., it
involves perception, drawing, mental imagery, language and imitation. Hence, figurative
intelligence will be a reflection of patterns of knowledge, and will exist through figurative
imagery and patterns of information. In terms of the paradigm there is a figurative base that is
composed of models, which entail structured relationships and both epistemic and
informational properties. The capacity of the figurative base to adequately reflect the
cognitive base of the paradigm and maintain pragmatic interpretations constitutes its
figurative intelligence (Piaget 1950; Piaget and Inhelder 1969; Montangero and Maurice-
Naville 1997). The nature of figurative intelligence can be extended beyond Piaget’s original
notion to include the meta-dynamics arising from a meta-coupling that occurs between the
personality metasystem and the personality operative intelligence. It is then responsible for
the influence that is created by the network of cognitive principles that define “I”, and result
in the agent’s own rules of personality production that creates impulses for the viability trait.
Feedback from the operative intelligence couple to the viability trait results in its adjustment.
In future when referring to figurative intelligence, we shall mean this extended form.

As we show in Figure 3, the coupling connections between personality and the social system
is referred to as operative social intelligence, and is the network of operative processes that
enables a personality to manifest its decisions from its viability trait to be manifested socially.
Indeed, as far as other personalities in the social environment are concerned, the only trait
that is visible is that of viability. The coupling between the cultural environment and
operative social intelligence (the latter occurring as a migratory dialogue between the
personality and the social) occurs through figurative cultural intelligence.

The notion of cultural intelligence connects the integrative trait with operative intelligence,
and in its original meaning is defined as the ability for an agent to successfully adapt to a
change in cultural settings attributable to cultural context (Earley and Ang, 2003: 3; Thamas
and Inkson, 2009). This definition requires a plurality of cultural beliefs, attitudes and values,
which are in interaction and create a plural figurative base that has some level of cultural
conflict within it. However, in the case where there is no such conflict, then cultural
intelligence simply reduces to “the manifestation of the figurative base as patterns of cultural
knowledge”. Properly speaking this is actually figurative cultural intelligence - the capacity
to represent the cultural belief system (of values, attitudes and beliefs) as a coalescence of
normative ideological and ethical standards of the culture that ultimately defines what it is
that constitutes legitimate modes and means of social behaviour.

Operative intelligence may be seen as the efficacious migration of information between

analytically distinct traits of personality; the process channels that the migrations pass
through also have an efficacy status. To understand this, consider that for instance operative
intelligence can be seen in terms the efficacious migration of information between the
ontologically distinct traits of the personality of an organisation. If efficacy is seen in terms of
effectiveness, migratory effectiveness relates to how well information is migrated from the
figurative to the operative, and this is likely to be connected with knowledge and

16
understanding. As an illustration of this for instance, how well does a normative personality
manifest its appreciativeness trait information as viability trait information, or how well is it’s
viability trait information manifested as a set of social events. In contrast, efficiency relates to
the capacity of the channels (the network of trait related personality processes or meta-
processes) through which the migrations occur (i.e., the efficiency of the interactive network
of processes that manifest information between the appreciativeness and viability traits or the
latter as social action). In the latter case, what are the resources that are required to manifest
the information as social action, and how can one determine if those resources are available?
These resources may be at some level of awareness inherently or intentionally limited.
Hence, in any personality, the migratory capacities of each process channel may be more or
less efficient, and where inefficiencies occur they result in trait variable assignments. From
the variables settling on states we can derive information about preferred personality types.

A collective agency is often interested in achievement represented by a given level of context

specific performance. Performance is in part determined by the efficacy of the migrations of
information between trait systems for given personality types. So any normative personality
interested in changing trait values will also consistently want (at some preconscious level of
awareness) must recognise that it may require an efficacy status change - that is, strong or
weak efficacy. Such a change will have an impact on the semantic manifestation of
information between the traits, controlling the orientation towards say the positive or the
negative, the surmountable or insurmountable.

The nature of the model in Figure 3 supports the proposition that a normative personality is
constituted through its traits, from which stable value options types arise. We reiterate that
while the traits are important, it turns out that the states that they take (which determine
personality type) are fundamental to understanding the orientation of the personality (Yolles
and Fink 2009). Ultimately the personality types that an agent maintains is a reflection of its
attitudes, emotive imperatives and formative perspectivistic information, and it is these that
determine what has epistemic value to the personality.

A personality maintains self-reflective, self-regulative, and self-organisational processes. It

also has an appreciative system that facilitates the formation of goals, and contributes to
behavioural orientations. It has internal cognitive structures that exist as a consequence of
conditions that are represented through its traits. Personality assessment can capture (social)
psychological tendencies as well as agent determinants of action, and can look towards the
exploration of personality coherence and the cognitive structures that it uses to interpret
events.

The traits are concerned with control and the epistemic attributes of a personality. The type-
values that they adopt are normally a function of personality trait values, and result in
requisite efficacy (the ability to achieve a preferred level of performance through the control
of emotive imperatives that are best suited to create preferred achievements) through the
manifestation of information between trait systems. An agency intuits/appreciates from these
trait vaues what is requisite from its understanding of its environment in relation to the
imperatives from its values and attitudes and other emotive imperatives, and this involves the
use of its perspective. Trait values may also influence efficacy status and the nature of the
intelligences.

Intelligence is concerned with the semantic manifestation of trait related information across
domains using a network of internal processes. Taking into account the demands of its

17
environmental context, if a collective agency has figurative information directly relating to an
intention, aim or goal, then setting up an operative capacity to implement the plan viably
requires a network of processes that can manifest figurative information operatively and
meaningfully. Its capacity to do this is also influenced by the requisite efficacy through which
the network of processes operates.

Personality orientations are connected to both intelligences and efficacy, and it is possible to
develop a set of propositions appropriate to the normative personality. We have already
indicated that personality orientation arises through personality trait values. In the agency
cultural/knowledge metasystem, espoused values establish trait values, which are manifested
in: (a) the cognitive metasystem of the personality as significant attitudes, and, drawing on
temperament theory, preferences and related feelings, (b) the figurative system as
appreciative schemas, and (c) the operative systems as structural/behavioural imperatives.
These manifested preferences determine the set of trait orientations of the personality that
together create a personality orientation. Trait values are thus responsible for the nature of a
personality, being influenced by both its intelligences and efficacy, and indeed pathologies
and dysfunctions. Let us now summarise our postulated propositions.

Intelligence is constituted as a network of first and second order processes that couple two
ontologically distinct trait systems. This network of processes manifests information through
semantic channels thereby allowing local meaning to arise from the manifested content in the
receiving trait system. Operative intelligence is a first order form of autopoiesis that creates
an operative couple between the figurative and operative systems. It consists of a network of
personality processes that manifests significant figurative information operatively, but also it
creates improvement imperatives to adjust the figurative system. This network of processes is
itself defined by its appreciative schemas and decision imperatives in the figurative system
and the improvement adjustment imperatives that arise from the operative system. Figurative
intelligence is a second order form of autopoiesis (called autogenesis) that projects
conceptual information into the operative couple. However, this couple also creates
improvement imperatives to adjust the cognitive metasystem, from which figurative
intelligence emanates in the first place. This metasystem is composed of attitudes, feelings
and conceptual information that are harnessed to identify the network of meta-processes that
define it, permitting significant conceptual information to be manifested in the operative
couple. Intelligences are structured through personality perspectives and trait values.
Personality perspectives arise in the personality meta-system from attitudes, feelings and
conceptual information, and are influenced by the adjustment imperatives carried by
figurative intelligence from the operative couple. The perspectives are manifested across the
personality through perspectivistic information carried by its intelligences, to be integrated
into schemas in the figurative system, and structured into the operative system. Personality
trait values determine a personality’s orientation. The trait value may itself be conditioned in
some way by the information carried by the intelligences. The selection of information to be
manifested by the intelligences may become uncoupled from the trait values and
unrepresentative of the preferred set of orientations if such preferences exist. This causes an
intelligence limitation that can result in the development of pathologies (Figure 3) that affect
the ability of trait systems to function. This lack of representation occurs because not all of
the perspectivistic information is represented. Under such a condition the personality may:
(1) have its capacity to conceptualise, schematise or apply perspectivistic information
reduced; (2) have the orientation of its traits perturbed; and (3) be drawn towards un-
preferred or unintended conduct that may even “corrupt” its proprietary strategic ideological

18
or ethical orientations. Perspectives too may become adjusted through pathologic shifts in
trait orientations.

Efficacy is a belief about the capability of an agency by that agency, and it conditions what
the intelligences do by operating on the manifestations of information that occur between two
trait systems, modifying the semantic channelling processes of the intelligences. Efficacy
status occurs on a strong/weak scale that indicates the degree of efficacy/inefficacy that an
agency has. High efficacy status allows impediments to achievement to be seen as
surmountable by the improvement of self-regulatory skills and perseverant effort. They can
also overcome vulnerability to stress and depression, and impact on the choices people make at
important decisional points. While rigidly high efficacy status can affect the capacity of an
agency to create individual motivations that benefit its performance, low efficacy status can
influence an agency’s ability to communicate, to develop appreciations, and to set goals and
cite tasks. It happens because of the way efficacy conditions the manifestation process and
hence drives both local development and the adjustment imperatives for improvement. As
such it can affect an agency’s feeling, thinking, motivation, behaviour, and performance -
including how it perseveres under adversity. Practically it is the efficacy status that moderates
the agency towards operative performance progression and hence achievement, and the
adjustment imperatives that indicate the capability of this progression. The notion of efficacy
status assumes that every organization maintains some level of emotive impulse control that
results in capability. Requisite efficacy occurs when the ability develops to achieve a level of
performance through the control of emotive imperatives that are best suited to create
preferred achievements. Requisite efficacy constitutes a desired efficacy which serves as a
guideline for the agency. Pathologies may emerge when trait values restrain or exclude
important knowledge flows or/and when the efficacy of knowledge flows is impeded. In both
cases the agency is not in a position to follow its appreciations or achieve its own goals. If
efficacy status deviates from desired efficacy then the agency might consider some change in
its pattern of behaviour or modify its appreciations or adapt its goals it wants to achieve.
When trait values are perturbed, then a difference arises between requisite and efficacy status,
resulting in an efficacy distinction (ED) that contribute to the formation of pathologies
indicate the limited capacity of the agency to generate requisite responses to its perceived
needs for achievement under perceived environmental circumstances. The EDs of the
intelligences shown in Figure 3 may result in pathologies. Given combinations of these across
the personality may well generate distinct personality dysfunctions. If one considers that
dysfunctions arise from standards of diagnosis, then one has to try to find out what
pathologies result in which dysfunctions.

Pathologies Pi,j (Figure 3) occur in the manifestation of information between trait systems,
and this impacts both the intelligences and efficacy. There is some evidence that
combinations of these pathologies might lead to classical forms of agency dysfunction
(Dauber, 2010), leading to the possibility of anticipating pathology/dysfunction. Sperry
(1995) has identified a number of classes of corporate dysfunction that include
strategy/structure mismatch, structural problems, environmental problems, human resource
problems, strategy/structure/culture problems, and a host of other problems that might be
better expressed as problems that occur under the umbrella of corporate personality disorder
like corporate neurosis. This leads to the possibility of predicting dysfunction, and suggests a
need to track the relationships between pathology combinations and dysfunctional agency
classifications.

7. The Trait Systems

19
Each trait overseas a subsystem of the agency that controls its structural orientation, and it is
change in this that affects how its nature. The orientation arises from its immanent dynamics
that obeys the rules of Table 2. Thus for instance, in normal mode small changes in trait
values are consistent with homeostatic equilibrium that allows morphogenesis to occur in the
structures of the subsystem as indicated by its trait. In transformational mode, major changes
occur in the subsystem allowing metamorphosis to come into play as a trait value undergoes
significant change in value. Consider for instance the traits of the personality.

In the integrativity trait, any change in the type value that it takes will be linked to the
structural nature and orientation of the attitudes and emotive impulses that exist in the
personality metasystem. A small change in the value of the trait GƮ will indicate in small
changes in the type orientations that affect the attitudes and emotive impulses little, that rule
the personality, This will be put down to processes of personality self-reference, and as part
of this its identity will be adjusted little. However, big changes in the trait values are
associated with metamorphosis in the orientation of attitude and emotive impulses, and this
will create major changes in the identity of the personality.

In the appreciativeness trait, any change in the type value that it takes will be linked to the
structural nature and orientation of the decision imperative and mental schemas that allow
appreciation and goal setting to occur in the personality figurative system. A small change in
the value of the trait AƮ will indicate in small changes in the type orientations that affect the
decision imperative and mental schemas little, in the personality. This will be put down to
processes of personality self-regulation, and as part of this its rationality will be adjusted
little. However, big changes in the trait values are associated with metamorphosis in the
orientation of decision imperative and mental schemas, and this will create major changes in
the rationality of personality.

In the viability trait, any change in the type value that it takes will be linked to the structural
nature and orientation of the action imperatives that allow decisions to be made and set of
implementation in relation to environmental impulses in the personality operative system. A
small change in the value of the trait VƮ will indicate in small changes in the type orientations
that affect the decision making and action potential little, in the personality, This will be put
down to processes of personality self-organisation, and as part of this its orientation towards
action will be affected little. However, big changes in the trait values are associated with
metamorphosis in the orientation of decision making and action potential, and this will create
major changes in the viability of personality.

So, ultimately, it is the type value taken by the traits in the personality that determine how it
exists, its rationality, and how it operates. This then leads to a question about how trait values
are obtained, and if they are the result of a dynamic process, then what is the nature of the
dynamics that allows enables personality type values to develop.

The answer to this has bee explored by Yolles et al. (2008) and Yolles (2010) that created a
framework capable of exploring the immanent dynamics of personality traits. While this was
a sociocultural study exploring only the cultural trait, its principles are as well applicable to
each of the traits acting independently. This will enable explanations to develop for the
psychosocial processes of the collective mind. Using Frieden’s (1998) development of Fisher
Information Theory, a general theory will be constructed in which personality traits are seen
to take on control roles that underlie patterns of behaviour.

20
The theory begins by explaining that, as in the yin-yang approach, any normative personality
trait variable takes its type values as the result of an interaction between (enantiomer) type
potentials that results in an immanent dynamic for the agency. The basis of this theory, which
has no comparison in the type theory of the personality of individuals, arises from the dynamic
nature of culture that feeds the attitudes of durable cognitive agencies, whose life expectancy is
often greater than that of the individuals from which traits stem. This immanence shifts the
patterns of personality orientations that govern a collective mind and therefore changes its
behavioural penchant.

8. Extreme Phenomenal Information

The use of Frienden’s theory of Extreme Physical Information when applied to personality
theory becomes Extreme Physical to Extreme Phenomenal Information because of its
constructivist orientation, and when we use the term EPI we shall mean this form. The aim of
the theory is to is to construct the unknown probability laws of science as perceived within a
social construct. (Frieden and Soffer, 1995; Frieden, 1998; Frieden, 2004),

EPI has two forms of information, I and J, that as we shall see are indicators of complexity.
The premise of EPI is that data comprise information “about” an operative object of attention
that is represented figuratively in a noumenon. The noumenon contains a figurative
representation of the operative object of attention, referred to as J. This is to be compared with
how the noumenon is known through sense-based perception, namely as inconsummate8
phenomenal object of attention, which has information I.
Now J is an ideal figurative representation and hence constitutes the total amount of
information that is needed to describe the noumenon with perfect accuracy. It is therefore
called the “bound” information, in that it is “bound to” the noumenon. It also may be regarded
as a potential information, in the sense of being potentially the largest value that the acquired
information I can attain. The relationship between I and J is provided in Figure 4, which needs
some explanation. This figure can relate to any paradigmatic situation, whether it concerns a
paradigmatic agency (in which an agent is represented through its paradigm as explained in
Yolles et al., 2011) that pursues methodological inquiry in relation to some validation process
about an object of attention, or a more pragmatic satisficing in relation to modes of practice that
respond to agency appreciations/goals.

Production of Efficacious instrument κJ as

meaningful a network of self-
principles production processes
Immanent
dynamic
structural
Existential domain couple J Phenomenal domain
Paradigm and
concepts, patterns Figurative Operative structures
domain that are objects of
of knowledge and
attention
modes of practice
I

Efficacious instrument κI as a
network of self-production
Paradigmatic adjustment processes for ideate regeneration

Figure 4: The Development of Immanent (Trait) Dynamics in an Autonomous System

21
To develop the basis for the EPI principle, consider that the data are formed out of a flow of
information
J I (1)
through the phenomenal domain in a cybernetic loop from the figurative ideate to the object of
attention via a measuring instrument. As such the “acquired” information I is generally some
fraction of J. The interactive couple between I and J defines a distinction that offers a potential
for conflict. As such, the two ideate informations J and I interact through a structural couple to
generate immanent dynamics between them. This may also be regarded as enantiomic or yin-
yang interaction. Even where the efficacious instruments represented by κJ and κI are requisite
so that κJ = κI, when I ≠ J it is unclear whether ideates I or J constitute the actual situation, and
we must consider that the ideate is unknown.
Let an unknown ideate of the noumenon be sensed through its effects upon the versions of a
parameter of value a. Consider that a number of reassessments (which for the pragmatic axiom
will be constituted as measurements) of y of a are made which will randomly differ. In general
the assessment y contain an amount I of Fisher information about a defined as
I = < [ d/da(log(p(y|a))) ]2 > (2a)
The notation d/da means a mathematical derivative with respect to a, and brackets < > indicate
an expectation, i.e., multiplication by the law p(y|a) and integration over all y (not shown).
Probability law p(y|a), called the “likelihood function” in statistics, defines the probability of
each possible vector y of measurements in the presence of the ideal parameter value a. When
the data and parameter are suitably defined within the context of a cognitive agency, the
probability law p(y|a) will take on the role of defining a statistical description of the dynamics
of the agency. Our aim will then be to estimate the probability law and, therefore, aspects of the
socio-cognitive dynamics that gives rise to the re/generation process of the ideate.
Evaluations of I for various probability laws via eq. (2a) discloses that the broader and (by a
normalization requirement) lower it is as a function of the y the smaller is I. A broad, low
likelihood function indicates close to equal probability for all values of the y, i.e., a maximally
disordered system. Thus, a small value of I indicates a high level of disorder; similarly it can
be shown that a large value of I indicates a small level of disorder.
As an example, if the probability law is normal with variance  2 then I  1 /  2 . Thus, if I is
small it must be that  2 is larger, i.e. the probability law is very broad and low, indicating high
randomness or high disorder. These effects allow us to address the famous Second law of
thermodynamics within the context of Fisher information (as opposed to the usual measure
called “entropy”).
As another example, in the context of the sociocultural problem below where there are discrete
probabilities pn(t), n=1,…,N, the general information eq. (2a) becomes
N
[ p n ' (t )]2
I  I (t )   , p n ' (t )  dp n (t ) / dt. (2b)
n 1 p n (t )
The latter is the slope of the probability law at a given time. Thus, eq. (2b) shows that the
information at each time analytically increases with the slopes (either upward or downward) of
the probabilities at that time.
The Second law of thermodynamics states that disorder must inevitably increase. Disorder can
be measured in many different ways. The usual measure is “entropy.” Entropy increases when

22
disorder increases, so the Second law is usually expressed by the statement that the rate of
change of entropy with time is positive (i.e. it increases).
However, the state of disorder, as we discussed, may also be expressed in terms of Fisher
information I. For PDFs in space-time that obey a Fokker-Planck (diffusion) equation, the rate
of change of I is negative (Frieden, 1990; Plastino and Plastino, 1999).
I
 0. (3)
t
That is, with an increase in time t  0 the change in information must be negative,
I  0. (4)
Or, Fisher information monotonically decreases with time.
On the level of the observables or data y this means that ever more randomness monotonically
creeps into them. The system defined by the y becomes ever more disordered.
The information transition (1) represents a change in information obeying
I  I  J . (5)
Combining eqs. (4) and (5) gives the result I  J  0, or equivalently,
I  J , 0    1. (6)
However, given that κ may take values κI and κJ as indicated in Figure 1, eq.(6) assumes that κ= κI= κI
so that requisite manifestation occurs. In situations where agency pathology develops, this may not be
the case.
This is one of the two equations comprising the EPI principle. It shows that the constant  is a
measure of the requisite manifestation with which the information is transferred from the
figurative ideate ƮJ to its representation ƮI. The manifestation parameter κ is always between 0
(0% efficiency) and 1 (100% efficiency). Its value depends on the efficacy through which
operative objects of attention are manifested from a figurative ideate ƮI and the alternative
ideate ƮI is manifested from the object of attention.
An illustration of the utility of this, for example, in physics, occurs when observing quantum
effects, if the detectors are perfect then   1 and no information is lost. Or, by comparison,
classical effects such as gravitation or electromagnetism are presumed to arise out of imperfect
observation due to detectors that lose half the information, with   1 / 2. The data are then too
coarsely spaced in space-time to sense the much finer, quantum gravitational fluctuations. In
our socio-cognitive application the value of  will vary from one agency to another, and from
one set of pathologies to another.
Eq. (6) states that the acquired information I has the “potential” to equal the value of J at most.
This is permitted by the philosophy of Spinoza, as previously mentioned. In applications
where I = J, all the information necessary to describe the ideate in the noumenon is now
available. A result is that the noumenon, and not merely the phenomenon, can be known. That
is, the probability law p(y|a) that is the output of EPI now describes the noumenon as well as
the phenomenon.
In comparison with the fixed form of eq. (2) defining information I, information J varies in
form from problem to problem. It is always found by the use of an appropriate invariance
principle, i.e. an invariance that is appropriate in characterizing the particular measured effect.
This invariance principle must therefore be known. We will use a very simple invariance
principle in our problem below, that of unitarity (invariance of length).

23
The “phenomenal information” K is defined to be the change I in the information that is
incurred during its transit (1) from source to data collector(s),
K = I - J. (7)
By eq. (4), K is always zero or negative, indicating that it is generally an information loss. As
we saw, this means that the state of disorder of the system increases. As we shall explain in
§2.4 when we introduce the “knowledge game”, carrying through a measurement necessarily
harnesses a “demon,” where nature always wins.
An inevitable perturbation of the source event by the process of measuring or observing it
causes its potential information J to likewise be perturbed. Then, by the connection eq. (6)
between the two informations, I is perturbed as well. The perturbation may take place for an
ideal scenario with   1 indicating no loss of information. Then the two perturbations are
equal, and their difference, taken as K, is zero. This is another way of saying that K is at some
extreme value,
K = I - J = extremum. (8)
This is a principle of EPI. The extreme value is attained through variation of the likelihood
law p(y|a) and subject to the relation (6) connecting I and J. In classical problems, such as
this one, the extremum is a minimum in particular. Also, the ideal parameter a is here the
unknown time t at which a system of populations is randomly sampled, giving rise to some
observed population type n. Hence the generic datum y is here n, and the likelihood function
p(y|a) is a probability law P(n|t) on n if t, which is conventionally denoted as pn(t). This
represents the “growth law” for population component n. The totality of such growth laws
pn(t), n=1,…,N describes the overall system, which can be a sociocultural one. Hence our
aim will be to compute these laws.
Note that since the time t is general, we are not limited in this approach to seeking
equilibrium states of these probability laws. Equilibrium states are defined at the particular
limiting time t  . Instead, the EPI solutions will be expressed as functions pn(t) of a
general time value. Thus, they represent in general non-equilibrium solutions. Such functions
of the time are also termed “dynamical” solutions, as in problems of Newtonian mechanics.
EPI is eminently suited to finding such non-equilibrium solutions, having already done so in
problems of statistical mechanics (Flego et al., 2003; Frieden, 1998; Frieden et al., 1999;
Frieden et al., 2002), econophysics (Hawkins and Frieden, 2003), and cancer growth
(Gatenby and Frieden, 2002).
The EPI principle eq. (8) has a useful interpretation. The solution pn(t) that accomplishes the
extremum can represent the payoff of mathematical game called the “knowledge game”. The
game is played between the “observer” recipient of the information I and the “constructor” of
the source effect of level J (which can only be nature). This constructor is personified as an
“information demon,” in analogy to the famous “Maxwell demon” of thermodynamics. The
basis for the game is supplied by the working hypothesis of EPI, that the aim of observation
is to learn, i.e., to gain knowledge. In this “knowledge game” then, the aim of both players is
to maintain a maximum level of information to sharpen knowledge. However, the amount I of
information that the observer receives is purely at the expense of the demon’s information
level J (called a “zero-sum” game). As a result the observer tries to gain a maximum amount
of information (I) while the demon tries to pay out a minimum amount (J). Hence
information measures I and J act in opposition as enantiomers through the formation of
immanent dynamics.
9. Immanent Trait Dynamics

24
An agency normative personality is seen to operate through traits the values of which are
determined by its immanent dynamics, a notion that arises from Sorokin (1962) and which Jung
also ascribed to in his theory of individual personality. The immanence of an agency
personality occurs because it is composed of interactive sub-agencies which having their own
distinct personality types. Following Sorokin, there are only two major possible orientations of
sub-agency from which result normative sub-personalities with traits whose values are
represented by the (enantiomer) types ƮI and ƮJ. In a collective agency ƮI and ƮJ sub-agencies
are in constant interaction over ascendancy as a personality driver and determinant for
personality orientation (Figure 5) in the same way as within an agency’s cultural dynamics
(Yolles et al, 2008). Hence, at a higher level of consideration, Figure 4 can be reformulated
using Ʈ values as Figure 5.

Production of Efficacious κJ(Ʈ) as a

meaningful network of self-production
principles processes
Immanent
dynamic
structural
Existential domain couple ƮJ Phenomenal domain
Conceptual Ʈ and
its related Figurative Operative structures
information domain of Ʈ
patterns
ƮI

Efficacious instrument κI(Ʈ) as a

network of self-production
Paradigmatic adjustment processes for ideate regeneration

Figure 5: The Development of Immanent Trait Dynamics in an Autonomous System

25
The structural coupling in Figure 5 has a deeper transitive basis, which we can explore briefly
in Figure 6 at a deeper level of examination. To do this let us first distinguish between trait Ʈ
values that settle to each of the two types ƮI and ƮJ. Now ƮI is operatively grounded and tends
to be concerned with cognitive survival, connected with external relationships, and are
principally interested in operative matters. In contrast ƮJ arise from ideates that are grounded
in a figurative system, and they connected with figurative attributes that are independent of
immediate needs and internal conditions. The immanence of the agency is determined by the
interactions between ƮI and ƮJ, which should be seen to be both implicit and preconscious.
Thus, the distinction between ƮI and ƮJ is that they have ontologically distinct derivations that
arise from different driving patterns of attitudes/emotive impulses that emanate from different
cultural value systems.

Figurative efficacy: Operative efficacy: network of process to

Figurative principles produce autonomous patterns of thought; it
Figurative efficacy: may involve the elaboration of contested Trait
of cognitive interaction
Figurative principles difference between the agents, due to distinct
governance between TI and
of cognitive images or systems of thought
TJ cognitive
governance
Figurative structures
system
Perhaps unintegrated
Metasystem or uncoordinated
Collective cognitive system of thought ƮI agency
preconscious cognitive
I attitudinal/emotive Information ƮI structures &
Structural
dispositions implied
coupling with
Noumenal domain behaviours
common
conflictual
Existential domain Phenomenal domain
behaviour
having past and
Metasystem ƮJ agency future history.
J values. cognitive There may be
Figurative system facilitating or
Collective cognitive Perhaps uncoordinated structures &
preconscious implied constraining
/unintegrated effects
J attitudinal/emotive system of thought behaviours
dispositions
Information ƮJ

Operative efficacy and

Figurative efficacy.
Evolving principles of re/generation of networks of
cognitive governance rational/appreciative system
processes

Figure 6: Basis of the Immanent Dynamics between distinct sub-agency ƮI information and ƮJ
information in a given agency. The derivation of this type of figure can be found in Yolles
(2006)

Informations ƮI and ƮJ define cognitive orientations that maintain enantiomic (yin-yang)

distinctions, and enable one to differentiate between what an agency might aspire to
figuratively and what it actually achieves operatively. There is in a sense a “conflict” between
the two, in that the normative condition is can be represented as a degree of conjointness, but
beyond that degree there may be distinction. Also, perhaps more to the point, agencies
purposely don’t carry through the ƮI cognitions most of the time which might indicate the
“conflict” that they seek which balances ƮI and ƮJ orientations in any agency.

26
The natures of the ƮI and ƮJ orientations can vary absolutely or relatively. Firstly, let us
consider the absolute. The yin-yang orientations change in their levels of complexity, or at least
degrees of order, and the interest is to identify the nature of that order because this has an
impact on the way the agency orientates (typifies) itself and hence behaves. Since ƮI and ƮJ are
measures of these orientations, we wish to evaluate their change relative only to themselves. A
low value of ƮI implies a simple operative agency, and a high value of ƮJ implies a complex
figurative agency. We shall refer to these conditions as primitive, since ƮJ ―primitiveness
suggests a low operative level and hence an inability to cope well with complex change; and
ƮI―primitiveness suggests an agency that is so bound up by complexity that it dominates
peoples lives, either by its conspicuous absence or its conspicuous presence. Also, with ƮI <<
ƮJ the high order/complexity of the ƮI ―regulation is not being practiced on the ƮJ level. Here,
where the received information ƮI is very low, describing a noisy, chaotic system, sensory
experience randomly and widely diverges from the social norms of the ideational aspect. This
might be manifest in a figurative reduction. As such the trait orientates the agency personality
away from strict adherence to its own regimen, and consequently it will be too figurative to
exist. When a ƮJ trait is dominant in an agency it will be too oriented towards the ideate, and
will run out of figurative elements that may impoverish its capacity to comprehend operative
requirements. At the other extreme, when a ƮI trait is dominant in an agency it will be too
orientated towards the figurative, and be unresponsive to correcting impetuses. In either case
the agency will lose any robustness it may have and become ‘structurally critical’, increasingly
unable to cope with demands on it. In this increasing critical state even small perturbations in
the system may affect it in a major way.
In summary, ƮI and ƮJ dominated agencies will fail to meet all the needs of their membership.
This will lead to a loss of confidence by the agency in the cognitive orientation that it
maintains. The debate and conflict will re-open, other mentalities will reassert themselves, and
the chaotic state will return. This period may be described as chaotic in the sense that it appears
to have no direction, and conflict has a greater likelihood of becoming phenomenally
manifested. Since the chaos results from the inabilities of one orientation to meet that crisis,
one would expect the alternative orientation to gain adherence and ascendancy within that
chaotic period. This may not happen, and an existing dominant cognitive orientation may
simply re-assert itself, but in doing so, society will still remain structurally critical. Inevitably,
the agency will re-orientate its trait values and hence engage in a personality shift. There is
some evidence that this actually does happen in individual migrants from one culture to another
(Rosenberg, 1990). The cognitive movement that we indicate has elsewhere been represented
as a paradigm cycle (Yolles, 2010).

One of the outcomes of the innate conflict is that it can become resolved into the emergence of
a balanced cognitive orientation as the sub-agencies establish an alliance resulting in a
transformed and hence new cognitive agency. By this we are referring to Sorokin’s (1939)
integral notion, but broaden it so that it can develop a variable cultural orientation determined
not only by the ƮI and ƮJ orientations, but also by the mix that results between them. This
notion is consistent with the development of joint alliances in small-scale societies (Yolles,
2001; Iles and Yolles, 2002; Iles and Yolles, 2003a), and there is no apparent reason to argue
that it cannot also be valid for all durable collective agencies that survive sufficiently long. The
emergence of such a balance (represented as K(Ʈ) = min|ƮI – ƮJ |) occurs initially through
operative processes that enables the cognitive types for any given trait to mutually co-exist, and
which may become stable if it develops its own figurative system and metasystem. It does not
assume that the ƮI or ƮJ orientation disappears, but rather that as a yin-yang interactive couple
they each maintain their independent existence and interact with the emergent balanced form,
as illustrated in Figure 7. It is supposed here that a balance is always maintained between

27
informations ƮI and ƮJ. This continuous maintenance of balance directly means that the theory
is one of general non-equilibrium.

Structural coupling between balanced cognitive

mentality and I cognitive mentality.
Operative efficacy: network of process to
Figurative efficacy: produce autonomous patterns of behaviour; it
individual principles of may involve the elaboration of contested
governance difference with other agents, due to distinct
images
Interactive
suprasystem
Figurative system
Metasystem Images or system of
I attitudes and thought ƮI agency
emotives, Agency Information ƮI cognitive
unconscious structures/
Structural
Noumenal domain behaviours coupling with
common
interests that
Existential domain Phenomenal domain
override
conflict
ƮJ agency behaviour,
Metasystem cognitive having past and
Balanced attitudes & Figurative system structures/beha future history.
emotives, Images viours with its These interest
Agency or system of thought own fractal may facilitate
unconscious Information K(Ʈ) or constrain
conflicts

Figurative efficacy Operative efficacy and regeneration of

figurative cognitive attributes
Evolving principles of
governance
Figure 7: Relationship between ƮI and ƮJ Cognitive Orientations and a Balanced Cognitive
Orientation

Returning to eq. (6), we can set the same expressions up for each of the traits Ʈ, so that
ƮI = κ(Ʈ)ƮJ 0≤ κ(Ʈ) ≤ 1 (8a)
This is one of the two equations comprising the EPI principle. It shows that the constant κ(Ʈ) is
a measure of the feed-forward operative manifestation of information between trait systems. In
pathological agencies the value of κ is smaller that any requisite efficacy value: that is if
affective κ is less than requisite κ(Ʈ), then we have pathology. In our socio-cognitive
application the value of κ(Ʈ) will vary from one agency’s normative personality to another.
This is because an agency’s requisite efficacy is ultimately culturally determined, and different
agencies maintain distinct cultures. In the case of a social agency, the so called collectors that
we have referred to above might rather be seen as the perceived network of managed
intelligences that that link the information types.
Also, eq. (8) can be reformulated in terms of ƮI and ƮJ, so that
K(Ʈ) = ƮI - ƮJ = extremum. (8b)
This is a principle of extreme physical information (EPI). The extreme value is attained
through variation of the likelihood law p(y|a) and subject to the relation (6) connecting I and
J. In classical problems, such as this one, the extremum is a minimum in particular. Also, the

28
ideal parameter a is here the unknown time t at which a system of populations is randomly
sampled, giving rise to some observed population type n. Hence the generic datum y is here
n, and the likelihood function p(y|a) is a probability law P(n|t) on n if t, which is
conventionally denoted as pn(t). This represents the “growth law” for population component
n. The totality of such growth laws pn(t), n=1,…,N describes the overall system, which can be
a socio-cognitive one. Hence our aim will be to compute these laws.
Note that since the time t is general, we are not limited in this approach to seeking
equilibrium states of these probability laws. Equilibrium states are defined at the particular
limiting time t  . Instead, the EPI solutions will be expressed as functions pn(t) of a
general time value. Thus, they represent in general non-equilibrium solutions. Such functions
of the time are also termed “dynamical” solutions, as in problems of Newtonian mechanics.
EPI is eminently suited to finding such non-equilibrium solutions, having already done so in
problems of statistical mechanics (Flego et al., 2003; Frieden, 1998; Frieden et al., 1999;
Frieden et al., 2002), econophysics (Hawkins and Frieden, 2003), and cancer growth
(Gatenby and Frieden, 2002).
The application of EPI principles results in a number of additional socio-cognitive principles
that create constraints for the immanent dynamic possibilities of normative personality traits.
Thus for instance:
An agency in which  is close to zero or to unity is dominated either by ƮJ or ƮI type.
With a ƮJ type, the agency will not adequately respond to corrective feedback processes
and likely will be unable to respond requisitely to new challenges and may even have
difficulty conceptualising them. At the other extreme a ƮI dominated agency will likely
be unable to respond to operative requisites.
In either case the agency is likely to become ‘structurally critical’, increasingly unable to cope
with problems that it needs to address. In this increasing critical state even small perturbations
in the system may affect it in a major way.
EPI provides a physical description of a system. It is assumed that the agency is adequately
described by the frequency of occurrence values pn(t) of its major population components n =
1,…,N. Components n include the various peoples of the society, labelled in some arbitrary
way, and also its capital resources. For purposes of a practical analysis, a minimal number N of
such resources is chosen, specifically, those resources that have a significant effect upon the
populations.
The measurement problem involves establishing the occurrences pn(t) of the various population
components. However, the time-dependences of the pn(t) result from changes in position (x,y)
of the population members, and these changes in position depend upon their mass values. This
is qualitatively because mass is a metaphor for resistance to such change, and hence can be
regarded as a type of “inertia.” Hence a cubic meter of substance of general type n is assumed
to have a known mass value mn. This ignores individual variations in mass among the members
of type n. In a sense, each is regarded as a featureless “particle.”
Another physical concept is the “potential function”, a function V(x,y,t) of position and time.
This defines the cause of the motion or dynamics of a given system. For example, this source
might be a spring, in which case the potential is specified as of the form V x2.

10. Modelling Normative Personality

29
So far we have explored the epistemic relationships between ƮJ and ƮI informations that
relate to a single arbitrary trait within the personality system, with the immanent trait
dynamic that arises from the values that the trait takes.

However, because of the recursive nature of the modelling process and hence the symmetry
of the relationships, we can apply the same equations to the relationships for each of the
traits. So far we have take Ʈ to be representative of any of the agency trait that we introduced
in Figure 3, namely viability VƮ with type options (VƮJ, VƮI ), appreciativeness AƮ with type
options (AƮJ, AƮI ),, and integativity GƮ with type options (GƮJ, GƮI ).

Now, in the normative personality each of the subsystems that are defined through the traits
VƮ, AƮ and GƮ may be considered to be in ontologically distinct spaces, each having its own
epistemic processes. Since EPI is epistemic in nature, we can take it that the same EPI
principles can be established autonomously at each ontological level that we take to its frame
of reference. The only caveat is that the cybernetic processes that influence each of the
subsystems should be considered as epistemic inputs/outputs that reflect the other trait
variables. Hence, allowing that Figures 3 and 4 are equivalent but simply representing a
different ontological level of the dynamic process, the κ(Ʈ) feed-forward operative
manifestation of information between AƮ and VƮ is a first order cybernetic relationship in
which AƮ is figurative relative to its operative VƮ. As a result we can reformulate eq. (6) as:

VƮ = κ A(Ʈ) AƮ(VƮ) 0 ≤ κ A(Ʈ) ≤ 1 (9)

where κ A(Ʈ) is the operative manifestation that permits V trait and A trait communication. Note
also that A = A(V) to recognise that the relationship between AƮ and VƮ involves cybernetic
feedback and feed-forward. From Figure 3 there are two other relationships that also need to be
taken into account. These are given in eq. (9a).

GƮ = κ G(Ʈ) AƮ(GƮ) 0 ≤ κ G(Ʈ) ≤ 1 (9a)

where κ G(Ʈ) is the second order operative manifestation between the GƮ trait and the VƮ trait,
and where VƮ(AƮ) exists as an operative couple with AƮ(VƮ) in a cybernetic loop. We recall,
however, that in respect of the modelling process, any feedback processes between AƮ and VƮ,
or between VƮ and GƮ may be considered to occur in a different cycle of observation.

There is another consideration that we shall make that requires us to reconsider eq. (9). It
requires the recognition that VƮ both conditions and is conditioned by GƮ and AƮ, but it
ultimately acts on behalf of the agency in relation to the social environment. We can
recognise this by reformulating eq. (9) with a reorganisation of eq. (9b) as

VƮ = κ A(Ʈ) AƮ(GƮ, κG(Ʈ)) 0 ≤ κA(Ʈ) ≤ 1 (9b)

Noting Figures 1 and 3, we can reaffirm that the normative personality is strategically
centred, and hence the operative function of VƮ is to strategically position the agency in
relation to its social environment – as part of this it enables decisions that facilitate social
orientation to develop in a particular way, resulting in social behaviour.

At this point it is useful to recall that the traits Ʈ take values ƮJ and ƮI that represent
personality types, but they are due to agency trait values. This means that all the κ(Ʈ) are
actually indicators of requisite manifestation of information between trait systems. In other

30
words, an agency preconsciously selects requisite manifetstations such that preferred traits
can be engineered and maintained. This says nothing about how such trait values are created
or the nature of the agency immanence that may be responsible for this values.

11. The Formal Socio-Cognitive Propositions

It is assumed that the normative cognition is adequately described by the frequency of
occurrence values pn(t) of its major population components n = 1,…,N. Components n include
the various sub-agencies and their strategic resources in the normative personality, labelled in
some arbitrary way. An occurrence value pn(t) is defined to be the relative amount of strategic
resource of type n that is present in the society at the time t. This can be quantified as the
number of (say) cubic meters of type n divided by the total number of cubic meters over all
categories n = 1,…,N. The pn are then also probabilities, in the sense that if a cubic meter of
the plural agency (be it of a person or a strategic resource) is randomly sampled from it, it will
of type n with probability pn (the “law of large numbers”: see Frieden, 2001).
Our interest lies in establishing the occurrences pn(t) of the various population components.
However, the time-dependences of the pn(t) result from changes in the location coordinates
(x,y) of population members, and these changes in position depend upon their mass values.
This is qualitatively because mass represents resistance to such change, and hence can be
regarded as a type of “inertia.” Hence a cubic meter of substance of general type n is assumed
to have a known mass value mn. This ignores individual variations in mass among the members
of type n. In a sense, each is regarded as a featureless “particle.”
Another physical concept is the “potential function”, a function V(x,y,t) of position and time.
This defines the cause of the motion or dynamics of a given system. For example, this source
might be a spring, in which case the potential is specified as of the form V x2. An illustration
within a socio-cognitive context would be that cognitive information creates a potential that can
be related to some measure of social distance. In any given problem the potential must be
known, and it usually has a simple form.
An illustrative application on Socio-cognitive Dynamics
In this section we shall develop a general stochastic model of system change dynamics that is
able to explore the immanent processes of an agency. One illustration provides a representation
of population growth. A simple application of this is to consider the relationship between
ideational and sensate populations. It presupposes that cognitive type value in an agency is
determined by the relative population size of each enantiomer group, and there is a statistical
relationship between any emergent cognitive balance that may occur (and which is represented
by K) and the population sizes of each type represented by ƮI and ƮJ. In a dynamically stable
agency it is the balance, where one develops, that becomes the dominant cognitive type.
Having said this, it may be naïve to consider that domination is a statistical process.
Ideally, one might envisage that regulative power is allocated to those who uphold the values
and needs of the dominant cognitive type. The naïve argument is that population dynamics can
also establish the foundation for the dynamics of political processes from which regulative
power is assigned, especially when population is related to the capacity to mobilise regulatory
power. However ideal such a proposition might be, there may be more complex aspects at work
than this proposition would support.
Firstly we can note that people who normally achieve consensual regulative power in a given
agency do so when they have a personal cognitive disposition (seen by those who support a
given assignment) that is consistent with the values and attitudes that dominate in a given
agency culture. In other words attitudinal orientation creates a penchant from which traits take

31
their type assignments, thereby satisfying a cognitive inertia that contributes to the security for
assignators. It is also likely to support stable political processes that contribute to agency
structural stability.
Secondly, it may be supposed that a balanced culture is determined statistically by type
cognitive components. However, it can also occur when members of an executive class, who
manage the political process, hold regulatory power independently of enantiomic population
densities. This executive class does not have to be maintained in their position by popular
support that derives from processes of open meaningful/semantic communication. Following
Habermas (1987) an agency can be steered through other means (like the use of motivating
resource or direct or indirect regulatory power) while suspending the semantic communication
processes. Enforced regulatory imperatives can act as a steering medium in that they encourage
sub-agencies to structure their potential for behaviour in certain ways subject to a penalty such
as structural violence9. A form of indirect regulatory power can be provided through the
creation of powerful emotive incentives for sub-agencies to agree. Whether the use of these or
other steering media are able to enable the executive class to maintain their regulatory power
base for extended periods of time is not a question that will be considered here.
12. General Solution to the Problem of Population Growth and Motion
Let a given agency consist of n = 1,…,N population components. At this point we refer the
reader back to the defining concepts in section 5.4. Our aim is to find the probabilities, or
occurrence rates, pn(t) of the components n=1,…,N. Note that
pn (t )  p(n | t ), (10a)
where the vertical line means “if.” That is, by definition pn(t) is the probability of randomly
selecting from the society a population member type n, if the time is t. These pn(t) thereby
define the dynamical evolution of the society, and our aim is to find them.
This section has the following aims: (i) to verify that the EPI gives the known, correct answer
to this problem, which is the well-known Lotka-Volterra equations of growth; in doing so, (ii)
showing that EPI provides a framework for solving other socio-cognitive problems; (iii)
providing a new route to the L-V equations, i.e., showing that it arises out of the Schrodinger
wave equation (ordinarily a quantum effect).
We will first work on a more general problem. This is to find the general motion and growth of
each population component n. Hence, we first work with the general probability pn(x,t) of the
two-dimensional surface position x = (x,y) of the nth population type at the time t. This by
definition arises out of a generally complex probability amplitude function  n (x, t), as the
amplitude times its complex conjugate,
pn(x, t) =  n (x, t)  *
n (x, t) . (10b)
By elementary probability theory (Frieden, 2001), this probability relates to the ones we want,
pn(t), as
pn(t )=  d x pn(x| t) where (10c)

pn(x| t) = pn(x, t)/pT (t), pT (t) = U(0,T). (10d)

Eq. (9c) states that the probability of finding the nth population component at a time t is its
probability of being anywhere over space (x,y) at that time. The first eq. (9d) is by definition of
pn(x| t) and the second states the a priori probability of a time value is uniform U over the total
fixed time interval (0,T).

32
We first establish the dynamics of the pn(x, t), and then use eqs. (9c) and (9d) to get the
dynamics of the desired pn(t ).
Agencies are very complex, containing a large number N of interacting “populations” (in the
generalized sense above). Among these interactions, some are strong and some are weak. In
order to keep the calculation of the dynamics tractable, the dynamics are assumed to be defined
to a good approximation by only those populations that most strongly interact. This defines a
smallest number N of effectively interacting populations. Thus, the derived dynamics will only
describe this smallest set of populations. Also, these dynamics are necessarily approximate to
the extent that the effects of other, more minor, contributors have been ignored. It may be noted
that the N interacting populations measures the degree or scope of the interactions. In particular
it measures the complexity10 of interactions rather than their individual “strengths” in any
sense. The strengths might perhaps be measured by gradients of the populations.
Let us suppose that the dynamics are driven by N change coefficients, denoted as gn and dn,
n=1,…,N. These describe, respectively, growth and depletion as a function of time t. These
change coefficients are assumed to be known functions
gn(p1,…,pN ; t) and dn(p1,…,pN,; t) (11a)
of the probabilities and of the time. Being a “growth” coefficient, gn is positive, and likewise
the “depletion” dn must be negative,
gn  0 and dn  0. (11b)
As examples of growth dependencies, the growth g4 of population n = 4 could depend upon the
level p5 of population 5, as in the case where p4 represents the relative number of fishermen in
a developing society and p5 represents the relative number of fish that is currently available to
them. The more fish the higher the growth of fishermen, so that g4 would grow with p5. The
probabilities listed in (9d) could depend upon t or, even, upon t at previous or future times,
thereby exhibiting “memory” or “anticipation”, a concept discussed by Dubois (2001) and
Yolles and Dubois (2001).
Earlier we commented on the potential function V(x,y,t), and we shall use it here. A potential
permits the observer to input into a theory the cause or source of the dynamical changes that
will accrue to the system. Here the changes are due to the population change coefficients (11a).
Hence, a special potential function will be sought that mirrors their effects. The simplest form
of potential that depends upon these change coefficients is linear in them. Thus, assume that
the general nth population component has a “potential for population change” that is of the
linear form
Vn (x,y,t) = 2- 1i  (gn + dn ), (12)
where the symbol  denotes Planck’s constant and, i =  1 . Thus, the potential is artificially
given units of  , i.e. “physical action”. This is arbitrary, but is done so that the growth
phenomenon and the dynamics phenomenon can be treated by one unified theory. The
indicated proportionality to i in (12) is well known to give rise to general absorption (including
growth) effects, whereby particle number is not preserved. This fulfills our above requirement
that coefficients gn and dn correspond to the general growth and death of individuals of the
population. The additional proportionality to  in (12) indicates that the potential is a very
weak one. It is present so as to later cancel from the resulting wave equation for the dynamics,
thereby giving rise to classical, and not quantum, dynamics in the ensuing Lotka-Volterra
equation (14) of growth.

33
Notice that the potential (12) allows the ideational rules of the society to be quantitatively
entered into the growth theory, in the form of their effects upon the growth. (Ecological growth
theory has a similar structure, whereby the effects of the environment enter the growth
equations indirectly as population growth coefficients.)
We could also have included in the potential (12) an added term that is an explicit function of
position x,y, say a spring potential going as x2. This is the usual potential function of the
physics of purely particle motion (rather than motion plus growth as here). However, for
simplicity we choose to focus attention on growth effects alone, i.e. ignore motion and
positional structure, and, so, ignore the use of such a potential term in this analysis.
Noting section 5.1, the question of the size of the information efficiency constant  must now
be addressed. This constant generally differs from one physical effect to another. Experience
with EPI shows that, with ideal detection, only quantum effects always incur a value of  = 1.
Since a socio-cognitive agency consists of people and resources, which are certainly not purely
quantum objects, the appropriate value should then be less than 1. This is consistent with the
discussion about the relationship between ƮI and ƮI. Now, in past applications of EPI a value
κ(Ʈ) = 1/2 (13)
was found appropriate for describing classical, macroscopic objects. This describes 50% of the
total available information. The implication is that the remaining 50% of the information
describes the purely quantum aspect of the object, which is not observed under macroscopic
observation such as due to the unaided eye. It seems at first intuitive that socio-cognitive
agency, principally composed as they are of macroscopic objects, should likewise act purely
classically. However, some investigators have hypothesized that the human brain operates on
the quantum level11, so that the human components of such systems might ultimately prove to
obey a value of κ(Ʈ) closer to 1 than to ½. For such reasons there is no universal value of κ(Ʈ)
in this socio-cognitive application. It is intrinsically variable from one society to another.
Serendipitously in this regard, the EPI solution we will find below does not depend strongly
upon the size of κ(Ʈ). We note that merely for purposes of a demonstration, it will prove
convenient to assume the value in eq. (13).
In general, the EPI principle eq. (8) is more than a computational tool. It also has reality, as the
reaction of an observed system to a perturbing event. The perturbation is due either to
observation of the system or interaction of the system with other objects during the
observational time interval. In our particular application the system is a socio-cognitive
agency. The perturbation is due either to observation of the system or interaction of the system
with other objects during the observational time interval. In our particular application the
system is a socio-cognitive system. If the agency is a corporation, a stark example of a
perturbing event would be a hostile corporate take-over.
In our EPI application, we simply assume that at a given time t a population member of type n
is randomly sampled for its position. Information of level ƮI is thereby acquired about position.
This value of ƮI is a sensate level of information for the agency. It will be seen to mirror its
structure insofar as the diversities of its populations and strategic resources. These diversities
quantify the complexity of the society and therefore, by implication, that of its ideational
foundations. This is in the same indirect sense that the potential for change eq. (12) allows the
ideational rules of the society to be effectively entered into the theory. Both allow non-
quantitative rules and ideals to be measured by their observable effects.
Hence we identify this particular information level with the sensate level of the society in eq.
(6). The system is also perturbed by making the measurement and, as we saw, the EPI eq. (8) is
activated. What is its solution?

34
Interestingly, this EPI problem only slightly departs from that in Frieden (2004, Chap. 4) for
deriving the wave equations of quantum mechanics. Hence we can be brief here. The
derivations (Ibid.) are of the Klein-Gordon equation and the Schroedinger wave equation.
These equations describe the dynamics of pure motion (without growth) of a particle in a field
of potential. However, here the problem is slightly broader in scope, encompassing both the
motion and growth of a system of “particles” (population members). For brevity, we emphasize
in this derivation just the departures from the derivation (Frieden, 2004.).
As we mentioned, the level of source information ƮJ remains the same as in Frieden (2004),
since the same type of observation is made as indicated there. This is the random space and
time position x,y,t of a population member of a fixed type n. As discussed earlier, this
population member is regarded as a featureless “particle”, specified merely by its mass mn .
What is new in the theory we have presented here lies in the nature of the information
efficiency constant  . In Frieden (2004) a perfect detector was assumed to be in use, since the
aim was to describe purely the intrinsic fluctuations of the particle, i.e., those purely due to
quantum effects. By comparison, in this socio-cognitive problem we are allowing  to be any
general value. Hence, here ƮI = κ(Ʈ)ƮJ, as compared with ƮI = ƮJ . The effect upon the
derivation is that ƮI is here replaced by κ(Ʈ) times its value; fortunately, this operation and the
use of the particular potential (12) are the only departures of this derivation allowing to use
well explored resolution techniques.
Repeating that derivation with these departures simply results in a multiplication of the squared
particle mass m2 by κ (of Ʈ). The resulting Klein-Gordon equation (which is eq. (4.28) of
Frieden (2004)) is then
2 2  iV
 c  ( 2  2 ) n   2 (  n ) 2 n  mn c 4 n  0.
2 2 2
(14)
x y t 

This is the general answer for population members that are small enough to be affected by
quantum mechanics, and, generally moving at close to relativistic speeds. The notion that life
on the quantum level, i.e. “nano life”, exists is not just a fiction, however. It has been found
that they do exist, in the 50 nm – 500 nm range of sizes, and was first observed in kidney
stones and then in blood (Åkerman et al, 1993; Kajander et al, 1994; Çiftçioglu et al, 1997;
Åkerman et al, 1997; Çiftçioglu et al, 1997a ; Kajander et al, 1997). The expectation is that
this nano life will obey eq. (13) for the particular potential given by eq. (12), an imaginary
potential. How such an imaginary potential comes into existence is presently unknown,
although it could be conferred by a special particle that is not yet known. The speculation is
that such a particle confers life upon an otherwise lifeless particle analogous to the way the
Higgs particle confers mass upon an otherwise massless boson.

Of course the vast majority of peoples and resources on earth move at non-relativistic speeds,
and are massive enough to not be affected by quantum mechanics. Hence, the non-relativistic
limit of (14) should be taken. This limit is taken in Appendix G of Frieden (2004). The answer
is eq. (G8) of that Appendix, with again m2 replaced by  m2. Finally, taking the limit as the
masses mn become macroscopically large, substituting in the particular potential function (12),
and using eqs. (9b)-(9d), gives the final equation of growth
dp n
 ( g n  d n ) p n , pn = pn(t). (15)
dt

35
This is a Lotka-Volterra growth law (or a “replicator equation”), once coefficients gn ,dn are
expressed in terms of the probabilities pn (see below). Planck’s constant  has cancelled out,
as it should have since L-V growth is classical. The L-V law is well-known to describe
biological systems (Maynard Smith, 1974). Hence, the EPI approach predicts that
sociocultural systems obey L-V growth as well.
Mathematically, eq. (15) is a simple, first-order differential equation. Such an equation can
often be solved analytically, and is always soluble by numerical finite differences. Regardless
of the chosen approach to solution, the latter must always obey a condition of normalization
N

p
n 1
n (t )  1  const. (16)

This can often be used as a check on a solution.

The following is a well known solution to eq. (14) that provides insight into a particular socio-
cognitive problem. Suppose that there are effectively only N = 2 populations competing. In
this scenario it is simplest to express the change coefficients gn , dn in terms of the usual
“fitness” coefficients wn of genetic population theory as
gn = wn , dn.= - <w>= - (w1 p1 + w2 p2 ), n=1,2, where w1  w2.. (17)
For simplicity, let w1 , w2 be constants.
We have arbitrarily chosen population 1 to have the larger of the two change rates. Here the
EPI solution to eqs. (14) is analytically known, as
p1 (0)
p1 (t )  ,
p1 (0)  p 2 (0) exp[ ( w1  w2 ) t ]
(18)
p 2 (0)
p 2 (t )  .
p 2 (0)  p1 (0) exp[ ( w1  w2 ) t ]
As a check, notice that the left and right sides of both equations balance at t = 0, after
normalization eq. (17) is used. Note that eq. (18) is a unique solution. Hence, the minimum
that is achieved by the difference ƮI – ƮJ = K(Ʈ) is here the absolute minimum as well, K(Ʈ) =
K(Ʈ). However, this does not define an alliance minimum but, rather, a domination-type
minimum.

13. A Case Illustration: The Failure of Saudinzation

Agency Normal and Post-normal Conditions

In normal conditions, knowing an agency profile (through its stable type profile) provides the
likelihood of predicting its behavioural responses to its environmental events. Empirical means
can be used to estimate the type profile that an agency has, and then to determine its affective
efficacies. It should also be possible to determine whether the agency has any pathology that
might misdirect its purposes, by calculating its requisite efficacies from its agency profile
types. Given an appreciation of how patterns of pathology can lead to dysfunction, an efficacy
distinction can lead to an appreciation of likely agency dysfunction. This can also provide
indication of likely behavioural inconsistency since it cannot be known how efficacy status will
change in pathological agencies unless the derivation of the pathologies can be determined

In post-normal conditions created by changing environmental events that trigger critical

conditions in a personality, tensions arise leading to more volatile immanent dynamics. This

36
results in a reduced likelihood of estimating an agency’s behavioural response, even where it is
devoid of pathologies. Under these conditions, then, the need is to be able to explore agency
immanent dynamics to be better able to predict its responses to given situations. Where there is
a situation in which the personality is driven away from the normal to the post-normal, there is
a need to examine the enantiomer dynamics by way of estimating agency type profile. These
enantiomer dynamics are determined by the population size of each sub-agency, its access to
strategic resources, and its capacity to weald the agency’s strategic regulative power.

The Changing Situation

Consider the following situation that drives an agency personality from a normal to a post-
normal mode of being. In Saudi Arabia there are a number of Western companies who were
invited in to service the processing of its environmental resource base. In normal mode these
companies operate autonomously from their environment, bringing senior managerial staff in
from the West, and locally hiring low level principally non-managerial staff. As a result, on the
one hand local nationals have found no potential for managerial experience, and on the other
there was little economic enrichment locally since most financial returns to the agencies have
found their way abroad. The expected “trickle down” effect to the ambient populations has not
proved to have worked.

The notion of Saudinization is a policy that the Saudi’s introduced to encourage Western
agencies to become more embedded in Saudi culture, thus enriching its educational and
managerial potential. However, apparently due at least to outdated stereotypical views about
Saudi employees (Al-Bugami, 2004), this policy seems to have failed.

As a result, Western corporate operative orientations have failed to meet the expected
development needs of the country, and Saudi authorities are losing confidence in the agencies.
Consider now the hypothetical situation where the Saudi authorities seek a tough post-
Saudinization policy. The agencies that do not have a 10% proportion of local employees in
middle and more senior managerial roles will have a 20% increase in the burdens of tax to the
Saudi authorities to be imposed within 3 years of the introduction of the policy. This policy
shifts the agencies from normal to a post-normal mode of being.

Exploring Solutions

An agency has a normative personality and a type profile that arises from three normative
personality traits and a social and a cultural orientation trait. At the agency level all three traits
are connected with self-regulation of information, but in the normative personality level where
we are able to distinguish between types of information the traits undertake finer forms of
control, a situation we shall explain now. The personality metasystem is connected with
attitudes/emotive impulses and conceptual information, and the integrative trait (GƮ) is
connected with self-reference. The personality figurative system is connected with decision
imperatives and schemas and the appreciativeness trait (AƮ) is connected with self-regulation.
The personality operative system is connected with the potential for action and behavioural
conditioning, and the viability trait (VƮ) is connected with self-organisation.

The social orientation (SƮ) of the personality may take values that orientate it towards
immediate action (SƮI) or towards deliberated action after observation (SƮJ), and both affect the
way that the agency presents itself to its environment. Given that an environmental change
develops, the agency must either respond immediately, or centre on observation before action.

37
Given an environmental situation that creates new imperatives for an agency, any
psychological examination of its normative personality that tries to examine its internal
processes and predict its potential decision making behaviour requires a full analysis of all trait
levels of personality traits. We recall that while the social orientation is affected by the viability
trait, the viability trait is also contingent on the other two. Together, the social orientation (SƮ)
and cultural orientation (CƮ) traits operate in a personality environment that is sensitive to
changing external contexts for the agency. The requisite efficacy of the information processes
that connect the traits in the normative personality is determined through a complex internal
agency processes, and at each personality trait level it operates through two sets of type (yin-
yang) forces, i.e., GƮ(GƮJ, GƮI), AƮ(AƮJ, AƮI), and VƮ(VƮJ, VƮI).

A full analysis as might be suggested here would be too deep for this illustrative example,
especially since it is being constructed to simply provide some indication of the analytical
process. As such we shall restrict ourselves to a relatively superficial analysis that considers
principally the viability trait VƮ and its immanent dynamics between its type (yin-yang) forces
(VƮJ, VƮI).

So, the traits are dynamically interactive and are responsible for immanent agency change.
During this process trait types may find ascendancy one over the other, or they may join in a
balancing alliance. This applies to the relationship between VƮI and VƮJ as it does to all the other
traits. This notion of trait dynamics will be used, not to reach definite conclusions about how an
agency will change, but to show how real events can fit within the formal framework that we
are providing.

An agency viability trait is operative in that decisions are made that affect its behaviour in its
environment. The decisions that occur are affected by the trait values (of type) that it takes. It
may do so through autonomy (VƮI) when the agency might react under its own cognition to the
lessons drawn from (or opportunities offered by) its local environmental impulses. It might also
do so through “embeddedness” (VƮJ) which arises from the notion of complementarity (Parker
Grant, 2006). At its extreme embeddedness is seen as the blurring of agency boundaries (Smith,
2003) to the extent by which there may be a loss of perceived accountability or even the public
perception of identity. That we are referring to a public perception of autonomy does not mean
that the agency loses its status of autonomy which is required in this modelling process.

Let us now suppose that the agency responds to the Saudi authority post-Saudinization position
through social action (SƮ). It does not matter at this stage whether it prefers to adopt a trait
orientation that is longer term observation (SƮJ) or a shorter term action (SƮI) directed. In either
case it has two optional strategies. One is to acquiesce and become more embedded (VƮJ)) giving
opportunity access to members of the the local culture, and the other is to maintain its autonomy
(VƮI) and seek alternative measures that may reduce the potential taxation burden. One such
alternative measure is the use of like bribery and corruption. The possibility is that in the longer
term this option would aggravate the situation, encouraging the Saudi authorities to find tougher
means still that do not interfere might even allow the maintenance the bribery and corruption
route taken by the agency. A result of this might be that in the longer term the more ideational
Saudi faction will begin to see the agencies more as a colonial foe that requires reigning-in, while
the more sensate faction will see it as a cash cow.

As a result of the environmental change, immanent agency conflicts arise, agency profile
stability is endangered, and each of the sub-agency types move to make their arguments felt. One
would likely support an attempt towards post-Sudinization because of its orientation towards

38
embeddedness (VƮJ), while the other wishes to maintain agency autonomy (VƮI) through whatever
means possible. This positioning is dependent to some extent on the appreciativeness that exists
with the agency. This trait takes either the enatiomer values of harmony (AƮJ) or achievement
(AƮJ) (or some balance between them). Thus perhaps there might be a connection between
harmony and embeddedness, but indeed achievement can also be related to emdeddedness
within the context provided. Harmony and achievement appear to be types that relate directly to
ideology and ethics because of their figurative nature within our modelling process, so how
might these connect with the potential of creating proposals for bribery or corruption? Might
these be seen in terms of the development of agency pathologies as the proposals are
manifested through non-requisite efficacy from the appreciative trait to the viability trait, or
might it be that the use of payoffs are not considered to be amoral pathologies in a Saudi
political environment, but simply normal practices of reciprocal generosity? In addition
viability trait positioning will also be dependent upon integrativity with its types of
subordination to hierarchy (GƮJ) or liberation away from regulatory power and bureaucracy
(GƮI). So, might liberation support autonomy, or might it be that subordination to the hierarchy
being imposed by the new Saudi regime dominate? Ultimately such questions relate to agency
attitudes and emotive impulses that occur at a deep level of psychological analysis, and hence a
deeper examination would be needed than is possible here to examine these connections. Each
type plays its own role in creating arguments that can affect the action orientation, and they
each depend upon the positioning of the traits and the nature of the cognitive processes of the
sub-agencies that support them. Appropriate arguments can be constructed by the sub-agencies
at each trait level to support their positions, but these will be forged within the context of the
cultural and social environments of the agency. To create from this a proper study, there would
be a need to create independent but cybernetically connected arguments for each of the traits
(GƮ(GƮI, GƮJ), AƮ(GƮI, AƮJ),, VƮ(VƮI, VƮJ), SƮ(SƮI, SƮJ), CƮ(CƮI, CƮJ)), likely with support from
efficacy values. For an agency insider inquirer to formulate such an analysis is difficult enough,
but for an outsider the agency must clearly be a patent one.

For now we shall explain the hypothetical situation simply with respect to the viability trait
recognising that it is contingent on the other two personality traits. The ability of the agency to
establish a stable strategic option in the environment indicated could only be attained if the
composition of its population is drawing towards embeddedness. This is dependent on its
internal cognitive dynamics. Stability is not possible when the information difference K = VƮI -
VƮJ is not yet at its absolute minimum value (i.e., K  K = min(abs K)). As time progresses
both information levels VƮI and VƮJ decrease, meaning, the complexities of both the autonomy
and embeddedness for strategic behaviours tend to decrease. This may occur gradually through
the process of structural changes, since structure constrains and facilitates certain types of
behaviour, or morphogenically through emergence that occurs (for instance) either when one
culture suddenly dominates, or when autonomy and embeddedness cultures establish
themselves into a new balance through a “joint alliance” that enables the formation of a new
frame of reference that simplifies the way they are both seen. This joint alliance outcome might
involve maintaining autonomy while meeting the Saudi proportion rule to avoid tax penalties.
The growth eqs. (14) were shown to hold for populations of people (and strategic resources).
Hence, they may well describe what happened to the populations in the environment. Can we
also use the solutions (17), (18) to (14)? These require constant growth coefficients w1 and w2.
The introduction of post-Sudinization was so rapid that the growth coefficients might well have
been approximately constant over that time interval. Also, the growth coefficient w1
undoubtedly exceeded w2, and possibly much exceeded it, so that even if initially the two
populations (relaying to GƮJ and GƮI) were equal, it would not take long before the
embeddedness supporters much outnumbered the autonomy supporters. For example, if w1 – w2

39
were 0.1 (10% growth advantage per year for embeddedness), by eq. (16) it would only take t =
10 yrs for the embeddedness supporters to achieve a population advantage of 2.72 (as a
convenient number) times that of the autonomy supporters.
We discussed before using the information alliance difference K(t) as an indicator of impending
danger for a system. In this problem there is a unique solution eq. (17) so that |K(t)| = K(t), the
minimized alliance difference. Also, if by eq. (12)  =1/2, we have VƮI = (1/2) VƮJ, so that K =
GƮI – GƮJ = GƮI – 2 GƮI = - GƮI, and consequently the absolute value |K’| = |GƮI | = GƮI since GƮI
is positive, and this is even if   1/ 2 information |K| will be proportional to VƮI. We show the
evolution of information GƮI (t) or |K(t)| over time in Figure 7; this is the dashed curve. The
curve shows that after peaking at about 36 yrs (when both populations are equal) the
information disparity monotonically falls toward zero. The curve indicates that 36 yrs is a
critical time for the system. Before this time population 2 observes in dismay being overtaken
by population 1. Turmoil might result as population 2 tries to reverse the trend. Beyond this
time the system population 1 more and more dominates over 2. The contest is now over, and
the system approaches absolute equilibrium, albeit without alliance or conciliation in this
example.
There is a further interpretation, and it comes from the idea that population equates to
regulative power. Let us assume that population growth represents as well a process of
regulative power accumulation. Therefore, the EPI population results above imply that where
there are constant growth rates present, one sub-agency rapidly achieves complete regulative
dominance over the other, and this is independent of the initial regulative power levels. Let us
suppose that we are dealing with regulative power as volume of human energy that is used
viably through political processes such that it can travel a social distance. In other words, effort
is put into a successful political process with the result that regulative power is achieved. From
this proposition, the population dynamics now represent a process of regulative power
accumulation. Interpreting this in terms of the EPI population results above, we can now say
that where there are constant growth rates present in the regulative power held by the two sub0-
agencies, after a suitable amount of time (the order of tr of eq. (16)) one sub-agency rapidly
achieves a state of complete dominance over the other, and this is independent of their initial
regulatory power levels. If resistance to this growth in power occurs, then conflict can result.
This is more apt to occur before one sub-agency catches up to the other. Beyond that time
peace ensues since the contest is over and there is a decisive winner.
Thus, for general constant growth rates and initial population levels, the time t1 as given at eq.
(18) defines a general state of parity of power. Beyond this time one sub-agency becomes ever
more powerful, indicating to all that the contest is over; consequently apparent peace ensues.
We say apparent peace because it may come about through some temporary accommodation or
indeed some sort of cognitive structural violence where sub-agencies are kept in their place
through possible penalties.
A corollary of these numerical results is that if an alliance balance is to be struck between
autonomy and embeddedness, then the growth rates must change with time. In particular, these
changes must be ever in the direction of balancing the two populations. For example, if
population 1 is currently tending to dominate its growth rate must be diminished relative to that
of population 2. These rate changes can of course occur naturally or be imposed from the
environment. If imposed, the art of achieving an alliance lies in continually adjusting them in
the direction of a balance.
14. Conclusion and Commentary

40
Collective agency theory has been developed that explores the emergent normative
personality. The theory arises from Bandura’s cybernetic considerations of the agency, linked
to trait theory. The agencies are socio-cognitive but operate internal controls through traits
and the development of an agency type profile. The socio-cognitive processes involve
efficacies that influence the type profile that emerges. Three traits have been identified for the
personality: viability and appreciativeness and integrativity, and traits have also been
identified for social and cultural orientations within the personality environments.

Traits are independent variables, assumed to separately and independently characterize

personality with some predictive value for patterns of behaviour of individuals, and which
can be measured along scales. Types can be characterized through traits which are assumed
to have a specific level score or value, Thus if a personality can be characterised by two traits
with high scores and two traits with low scores that person belongs to type
‘high/high/low/low’. In personality theory certain trait patterns have been found to be stable,
but not all possible combinations of traits forming types may make sense empirically. One
may chose a limited set of types as the most characteristic for a specific set of agencies.

A viable personality system consists of at least three types of elements, which constitute
different sets of information: domains that can be expressed in terms of unconscious,
subconscious and conscious knowledge; processes which are constituted as information flows
between domains that contribute towards self-reference, self-regulation, self-organization;
and traits, which regulate information flows of processes, and which through trait values that
are controlled by requisite efficacies, determine personality types. The socio-cognitive
processes explain how the traits and other attributes work together.

Networks of processes consist of information flows between domains. Traits are regulators of
the processes, i.e., determine their importance in case of conflict between different classes of
information, and operate as a response to personality trait values for specific types of
information orientation.

The yin-yang concept operates as an epistemic process that is constrained to operate within
any domain and affecting the states that a trait assumes. The concept purports that the value
that a trait settles to is determined by a conflict between two opposing stable forces, and the
dominant force determines the value that emerges. The origin of this comes from trait
orientations that can be reflected through forward and backward loops, so that the type values
that arise are either figuratively or operatively oriented. Thus for instance in the viability trait
there is either “embeddedness” or ‘autonomy’ dominate. However, under certain conditions
an “ideal” balance can occur between the two forces. When pathologies develop in the
personality, efficacy (which determine the relationship between the types) could be blocked
for a given trait either individually (for a feed-forward or feedback) or simultaneously (for
feed-forward and feedback).

The agency model consists of five traits: three personality traits and two traits regulating
different networks of information flows with the cultural and social environments. While
Jung originally proposed a ying-yang theory of personality, this appears to be the first time
that traits are seen to be subject to shifts that arise from agency cultural orientations.
However, there is some evidence that this does occur with migrants across cultures, though
we have not found any detailed study. The notions arise originally from Sorokin’s proposition
that cultural yin-yang processes of culture may have very long time swings between ideate
and sensate types. However, these occur because such cultures have large scale populations,

41
and small scale populations as might be associated with corporate agencies have smaller scale
movements.

We have been interested in agencies that in normal homeostatic equilibrium mode are able to
maintain a stable agency profile, thus providing access to the possibility of behavioural
anticipation. However, such agencies also possess an immanent dynamics through which
personality change may occur under sufficient stimulus. Environmental exigencies may
become an imperative for a reformulation of the immanence resulting in a post-normal mode
of agency temperament. This leads to a new balance between type interaction shifts in each
trait and the possibility of change in agency orientation. Such situations do not usually
provide access to the possibility of behavioural prediction. The need then, has been to find a
way to explore the immanent agency dynamics towards an identification of a new stable
personality orientation, and hence the likelihood of behavioural anticipation. This has been
approached using information theory.

Within the personality the viability trait is contingent on the other two personality traits, and
any immanent dynamic that evolves in respect of the personality able to generate strategic
decisions centres on the viability trait. The recognition that normative personality traits are
influenced by an agency’s cultural orientation provides access to the development of theory
that argues that for trait immanence. In other words, collective agency traits change over time
through their internal dynamics in a way that is not normally perceived for the individual
agency. To observe that this may occur in individual agencies, one would need to examine
changes in the cultural traits that constitute their environment. Another attribute of trait
theory for the normative personality is that agencies may find that the traits take balanced
values that typify them. This is not a usually represented feature of individual personality
theory, and the distinction likely arises because of the extreme durability potential that a
collective agency has beyond that of the individual.

We have applied Frieden’s information theory to the socio-cognitive situation and this has
resulted in a clear illustration of the immanent processes at work in relation to the
development of agency type profiles. We initially argued that personality trait values are
influenced by attitudes which are tied to culture, and referred to earlier work that shows that
cultures shift between type (ideational and sensate) values itself. It is this immanent dynamic
that the agency maintains over its durable existence that shifts, in one way or another, the trait
values that the normative personality settles to. In particular we have shown that it is
possible, given personality measures for the traits, to form anticipations about personality
outcomes - that is in respect of decisions that a personality is likely to make. Even though
anticipations are possible, the issue of measuring efficacy is still not completely resolved. We
have distinguished between requisite efficacy that defines the nature of κ, and efficacy status
that occurs through processes of operative and figurative intelligence. The distinction
between the requisite and efficacy status implies pathology. The requisite efficacy cannot be
assumed to be a classical physics value of ½, since it is relative to the agency and its type
profile. It is also likely that we are not dealing with quantum affects within the normative
personality, so that in general 0    1 . Evaluating traits empirically would enable efficacy
status to be identified in the patent agency, and means would also be required to determine
the requisite efficacy. The result would enable the discovery of the potential for preconscious
agency pathology, even prior to its appearance.

This paper has shown that there is a significant potential in the psychological analysis of
normative personality formally through both graphical and mathematical approaches. While

42
the graphical theory illustrated in the figures is able to define logical regulatory modelling
structures, the mathematical information theory is able to identify detailed relationships and
data input requirements. This symbiosis is important to any formal modelling process. This
form of analysis is far from the more traditional approaches, not only in organisational
theory, but also in agency psychology. It has also been shown that any agency analysis will
likely require extensive exploration of its 5 dimensions: the cultural and social orientation
traits that define the personality environment and the three normative personality traits that
represent the cognitive process of the agency, together with efficacy related evaluations. This
is easier to do in patent agencies where information and their processes are accessible.

So far we have only considered the immanent dynamics of agencies, and have not reflected
too much on agency pathologies. Pathologies and efficacy values in the agency are intimately
tied together. For instance in the post-Saudinization example we presented, if the rise of
bribery and corruption is classed as a dysfunction involving a collection of pathologies, then
what values of efficacy are involved and how might they differ from requisite efficacy values
that confirm agency types?

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1. Notes

1
This revision is the resut of a shift away from Jungian temperament theory. Tempermanet theory
centres on emotional atributes that are able to be used to establish personality differences. However,
adopting a cognitive theory that centres on empistemic values that are in turn conditioned by
emotions offers a much broader based theory of the personality.
2
The term enantiomer (also enantiomorph that in particular relates to form or structure) means a
mirror image of something, an opposite reflection. The term derives from the Greek enantios or
"opposite," and is used in a number of contexts, including architecture, molecular physics, political
theory, and computer system design. We use it in the sense of complementary polar opposites. The
related word enantiodromia is also a key Jungian concept used in his notions about consciousness
(e.g., http://www.endless-knot.us/feature.html), and (from the OED Online) it is the process by
which something becomes its opposite, and the subsequent interaction of the two: applied especially
to the adoption by an individual or by a community, etc., of a set of beliefs, etc., opposite to those
held at an earlier stage. For Jung the word enantiodromia represents the superabundance of any force
that inevitably produces its opposite. Consequently the word enantiodromia often implies a dynamic
process which is not necessarily implied by the word enantiomer. By using the simpler word
enantiomer we shall not exclude the possibility of any dynamic action that may have been implied
by the term enantiodromia.

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3
FFM uses factor analysis to is identify the five factors neuroticism, extraversion, openness,
agreeableness and conscientiousness (Goldberg, 1990), which appears to be a development of
Eysenck’s (1957) original approach to explore political mindedness.
4
By the word formal we mean a set of explicit propositions that define a logic which establishes a
framework of thought and set of conceptualisations that enables organised operation to occur, and
problem situations to be addressed both theoretically and empirically. Formalisms also constrain the
way in which situations can be described by the rules that they pursue. According to Kyburg (1968,
p20) formal logic provides a standard of validity and a means of assessing validity.
5
However “appropriate” or “good” an agency model might be deemed to be, there is a pragmatic need
to make inquiries to theoretically and practically determine its capacity to operate efficaciously. Even
where we might have techniques for this, it is not always possible because of a lack of agency
transparency. Here, the collective processes of an a collective agency may be more or less patent or
empirical in relation to its cognitive information processes, where: (1) the patent agency is “open and
available to inspection” enabling information processes to be identified and examined; and (2) the
empirical agency (which refers to a term originally used by Jung in recognition that the processes of
mind and personality can only be inferred from behaviour) maintains information processes that are
impatent and hence not open and available to inspection.
6
Wollheim (1999) defined cognitive state in terms of impulses, perceptions and instincts, imaginings,
and cognitive dispositional drives in terms of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and
obsessions. Mental disposition consists of beliefs, knowledge, memories, abilities, phobias and
obsessions, and has duration and history. Both mental states and dispositions are causally related,
mental state being able to instantiate, terminate, reinforce and attenuate mental disposition. Mental
dispositions can also facilitate mental states.
7
The case of the mobile individual may be different. Is it the case, therefore, that cross cultural
transients experience personality changes where the cultures to which they shift take on distinct
orientations? Social revolutions also create culture shifts, and does this affect the personality
orientations of individuals?
8
The dictionary definition of the word consummate is unqualified, perfect or complete. We therefore
use the word inconsummate as its constructivist opposite, to mean that the perception by the
creative observer of noumena is qualified so that phenomena are perceived partially or
incompletely, and in some circumstances even “imperfectly”.
9
By structural violence we mean the constraints imposed by ones social structure, a concept
originally proposed by Galtung (1972). This operates by limiting the development of the potential
of an individual by not enabling access to the necessary resources through prejudicial or biased
social structures.
10
While we can talk of the number N indicating the complexity of a situation, we should note that
according to Yolles (1999) at least five types of complexity can be identified. These are: (1)
computational complexity is defined in terms of the (large) number of interactive parts, (2) technical
complexity (also referred to as cybernetic complexity) occurs when a situation has a “tangle” of
control processes that are difficult to discern because they are numerous and highly interactive. It
also involves the notion of future and thus predictability, and technically complex situations have
limited predictability, (3) organisational complexity is defined by the rules that guide the
interactions between a set of identifiable parts, or specifying the attributes, (4) personal complexity
is defined by the subjective view of a situation, and (5) emotional complexity occurs with a “tangle”
of emotional vectors are projected into a situation by its participants (and can be seen as emotional
involvement).
11
At least one argument for the mind having a quantum dimension centres on the nature of
consciousness, seen as a universal field with local manifestations (Nunn, 1994). This idea derives
from the notion that the brain consists of vibrating molecules (dipoles) in nerve cell membranes that
centre on microtubules, an important part of the structure of every cell including nerve cells. Nunn
notes Hamerhoff’s (1994) perception that single-cell organisms like paramecium can have
behaviours normally thought to need a brain, suggesting that their “brain” is in their microtubules.

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 Shape changes in the constituent proteins could subserve computational functions and would
involve quantum phenomena.
26
We emphasize that the monotonic behaviour is only in the stated case of a Fokker-Planck
(diffusion) process. A counter-example is a quantum process, which can instead be periodic in
time. Note also that the monotonic behaviour in the F-P case requires the correct evaluation of I at
each time t. In particular a point at which the slope of the PDF is infinite must be included within
the domain of integration (or summation) if and only if the point is physically attainable. For
example, each position in a system undergoing diffusion is so attainable, and so is included within
the integral; a counterexample is provided by the kinetic energy E values of a system. These cannot
go negative, so that the points E=0 or less are avoided in the integration.

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