Case Digest Polirev

COURSE OUTLINE IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Cor Jesu College Law School

Atty. Maruli Ali Garcia Sanchez
(A.Y. 2022-2023)
The Legislative Department
1. David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016; J. Leonen (See:
http://legacy.senate.gov.ph/press_release/2022/0909_poe1.asp)
(MATTHEWS)
2. Poe-Llamanzares v. Elamparo, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
(MATTHEWS)
3. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (MATTHEWS)
4. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,
2010(MATTHEWS)
5. G.R. No. 189868 - KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, ET AL. v. COMELEC; (MATTHEWS)
6. Bantay v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007 (MATTHEWS)
7. Angkla v. COMELEC; G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020 (MATTHEWS)
8. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009 (MATTHEWS)
9. Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
(MATTHEWS)
10.Pp. v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875 (MATTHEWS)
11.Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimental, G.R. No. 179817 (MATTHEWS)
12.Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (MATTHEWS)
13.Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil 863 xiv. Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643
(2008)(BALABAT)
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14.Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001) (BALABAT)
15.Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC (2007) (BALABAT)
16.Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287 (2014) (BALABAT)
17.Belgica v. Ochoa (2013) (BALABAT)
18.Demetri v. Alba, 148 SCRA 209 (BALABAT)
19.Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340 (2006) (BALABAT)
20.Philcomsat Holdings v. Senate (2012) (BALABAT)
21.Bengzon v. Senate, 203 SCRA 767 (BALABAT)
22.Miguel v. Gordon xxiv. Lopez v. Senate (2004)(BALABAT)
23.Pimentel v. Joint Committee (2004) (BALABAT)
24.PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E.
ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA,GUILLERMO B.
GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M.
ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and
ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners, vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE
VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents. G.R.
No. L-23326, December 18, 1965 (BALABAT)
i. The Executive Department

1- 13 -MENIESSA DEPALUBOS; 14- 36- ANTIPOLO, ROSINE
1. De Lima v. Duterte (2019) (DEPALUBOS)
2. MARK ANTHONY V. ZABAL, THITING ESTOSO
JACOSALEM, AND ODON S. BANDIOLA, Petitioners vs.
RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the
Philippines; SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, Executive
Secretary; and EDUARDO M. ANO, [Secretary] of the
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Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 238467 (2019) (DEPALUBOS)
3. Poe-Llamanzares v.COMELEC (DEPALUBOS)
4. Pormento v. Estrada (2010)
5. Senate v. Ermita
6. Neri v. Senate
7. Makalintal v. COMELEC (2003)
8. Lopez v. Senate (2004)
9. Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee (2004)
10.Brillantes v. COMELC (2004)
11.MAclaintal v. PET (2010) ‘
12.Soliven v. Makasiar
13.Estrada v. Desierto (2001) xiv. De Lima v. Duterte (2019); See: J.
Leonen’s concurring opinion xv. Gloria v. CA (2000)
14.National Amnesty v. COA (2004) on “ex-officio”
15.Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, PET 005 (2021)
16.Estrada v. GMA, G.R. No. 146738 (2001)
17.See: Designated Survivor Bill of Former Senator Lacson;
18.Sereno v. Republic
19.Matibag v. Benipayo (2002)
20.Bautista v. Salonga
21.Calderon v. Carale xxiv. Manalo v. Sistoza
22.De Rama v. CA (2001)
23.De Castro v. JBC (2010)
24.Domingo v. Rayala (2008)
25.Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
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26.Ampatuan v. Uno (2011) xxx. Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes
(2004)
27.Gudani v. Senga (2006)
28.David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
29.IBP v. Zamora (2000) xxxiv. Lacson v. Perez xxxv. Guanzon v,
De Villa
30.Sanlakas v. Reyes
31.Kulayan v. Gov. Tan (2012)
32.Fortun v. GMA (2012)
33.Lagman v. Medialdea xl. Sabello v. DECS xli. Garcia v.
Chairman
34.Pp. v. Patriarca
35.Vera v. Pp.
36.Bayan v. Executive Secretary
j. The Judicial Department

i. Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General on Judicial Review, Legal
Ethics, and Public Interest Cases
ii. A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC (2014) re: Request for Copies of SALN
iii. De Castro v. JBC
iv. Chavez v. JBC
v. Jardeleza v. Sereno
vi. Estopina v. Lobrigo
vii. In Re: Resolution date
05 August 2008 in A.M.
No. 07-4-11-
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SC re: SC Disbars Lawyer Previously Disbarred in the US
viii. [A.C. No. 11149. August 15, 2017]. LAURENCE D. PUNLA
AND MARILYN SANTOS, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY.
ELEONOR MARAVILLA-ONA, RESPONDENT.
[Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3709]. On double-disbarment;
Fine.
Viii A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011 re: Plagiariasm
ix. Canlas v. NAPICO
x. Caram v. Segui (2014)
xi. Lucena v. Elago (2020); Elements of enforced disappearances
xii. (G.R. No. 262026, In Re Writ of Amparo, Manglalan et al. v.
Lt. Bacarro, 23 August 2022)
xiii. xiv. Sanchez v. Darroca (2019)
xv. Saez v. GMA (2012)
xvi. A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
xvii.A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC (THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS xviii.

Lee v. Ilagan xix. Gamboa v. Chan
xx. Vivares v. STC
xxi. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC WRIT OF KALIKASAN
xxii. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila (2008)
xxiii. Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice xxiv. Fuentes v. Ombudsman-Mindanao
xxv. Dizon v. Judge Lopez
xxvi. Sereno v. Republic (Main Case Decision ); G.R. No. 237428, May 11,
2018; and all its opinions
xxvii. See too: Calida v. Sereno,G.R. No. 237428 (2018) Decision on MR; June
19, 2018; and all its opinions
k. Constitutional Commissions
i. See cases in Nachura’s Outline
l. Local Government
i. See cases in Nachura’s Outline
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m. Accountability of Public Officers
i. Impeachment; Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)
ii. Sereno Quo Warranto Cases above
iii. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives CoJ (2011) iv. De Lima
v. Guerrero
n. National Economy and Patrimony

i. Cruz v. DENR
ii. Philippines v. China Arbitration Case;
https://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-
%2020160712%20-%20Award.pdf
iii. Ruben Carpio vs. Modair Manila Co. Ltd., Inc. (G.R. No. 239622, June 21,
2021),
iv. [ G.R. No. 217590, March 10, 2020 ] PHILIPPINE

CONTRACTORS ACCREDITATION BOARD,
PETITIONER, V. MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
v. EN BANC [ G.R. No. 230112, May 11, 2021 ] GLOBAL
MEDICAL CENTER OF LAGUNA, INC., PETITIONER,
VS. ROSS SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
RESPONDENT; [G.R. No. 230119, May 11, 2021] ROSS
SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER, VS.
GLOBAL MEDICAL CENTER OF LAGUNA, INC.,
RESPONDENT. See this article:
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https://www.zicolaw.com/resources/alerts/supreme-
courtstrikes-down-the-nationality-requirement-on-
contractorslicense/
vi. G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018 MARIO DIESTA

BAJARO, Petitioner, v. METRO STONERICH CORP.,
AND/OR IBRAHIM M. NUÑO, Respondents.
vii. G.R. No. 182722 DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL
CREDIT COOPERATIVE [DCCCO], Represented by
Felicidad L. Ruiz, its General Manager, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Respondent.
viii. CDA v. Dolefil (2002)
ix. Estoconing v. Pp. (2020)
o. Social Justice and Human Rights

i. Catherine Dela Cruz-Cagampan Vs. One Network Bank,
Inc., [One Network Bank]/Or Alex V. Buenaventura,
President/Myrna S. Viado, HR Head
G.R. No. 217414. June 22, 2022 [Date Uploaded: 08/25/2022]
ii. G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994 BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR.,
CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO,
AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
p. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
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i. Tablatin v. Gutierrez on NMAT
ii. PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954.
SEPTEMBER
10, 2019 on LEB and PhilSAT
iii. Miriam College v. CA (2000)
iv. [G.R. NO. 127980 : December 19, 2007] DE LA SALLE
UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD
HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO,
CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and
JAMES YAP, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE
COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND
SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO
VALDES, JR.,Respondents.
v. See: https://up.edu.ph/what-is-academic-freedom-and-why-
thefuss/
vi. [ G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018 ] RAYMOND A. SON,
RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, AND WILFREDO E. POLLARCO,
PETITIONERS, V. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, FR.
ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR.
CYNTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN, AND THE
COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN FACULTY
COUNCIL, RESPONDENTS.
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vii. See:
https://www.divinalaw.com/dose-of-law/academicfreedoms-
metes-bounds-2/
viii. Read:
https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinionjust-
saying-do-not-touch-academic-freedom/
q. The Family
i. Obergefell v. Hodges;
ii. Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General
iii. Roe v. Wade iv. Dobbs v. Jackson
v. Imbong v. Ochoa
r. General Provisions
s. Transitory Provisions
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
a. General Principles
b. Powers of Administrative Bodies
c. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
d. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
i. Some cases: Maglalang v. PAGCOR (2013)
ii. G.R. No. 144464 November 27, 2001 GILDA G.
CRUZ and ZENAIDA C. PAITIM, petitioner, vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
iii. Cases in Nachura’s Outline
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iv. 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017
RACCS)
v. D.O. 49, s. 2006 of Department of Education
vi. Supreme Court absolves government employee from
administrative liability for participating as a resource speaker
and disseminating government information materials in a
training seminar without leave from her superiors [Domingo v.
Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 236050 (17 July 2020)] vii.
Luzviminda dela Cruz v CA, et. al. 305 SCRA 303 (March 25,
1999) viii. Morales v. CA and
Binay, Jr. (2015)
III. LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

b. Eligibility and Qualifications
c. De Facto Officers
d. Commencement of official relations
e. Powers and duties of public officers
f. Liability of public officers
g. Rights of public officers
h. Termination of Official Relationship
i. Read too: https://www.albertocagra.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Public-Officers-Reviewer-
11.30.15.pdf ii. [ G.R. No. 244128, September 08, 2020 ]
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MARIO M. MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE,
CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O. PELO,
PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND
COA REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. VIII, RESPONDENTS, and all its opinions.
iii. See: Public Officers Nachura’s Outline
IV. SUFFRAGE AND ELECTION LAWS

b. The Commission on Elections
c. Voters: Qualifications and Registration
d. Candidates; Certificates of Candidacy
e. Campaign; Election Propaganda; Contributions and Expenses
f. Board of Election Inspectors; Watchers
g. Casting and Counting of Votes
h. Canvass and Counting of Votes
i. Canvass and Proclamation
j. Pre-election controversy
k. Election contests
l. Election offenses
i. See: Nachura’s Outline
V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
b. General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units
c. Municipal Liability
d. Local officials
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e. Inter-governmental relations
f. Local initiative and referendum
g. Local Government Units
i. See: Nachura’s Outline
VI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
a. Read: Nachura nd Gatdula’s Public International Law (preferably the
latest edition)
VII. OTHER PERSONAL NOTES OF LATEST JURISPRUDENCE
FROM VARIOUS SOURCES (AS OF October 7, 2022)
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The Supreme Court (SC) struck down a provision of a law taxing offshore gaming
operators to raise funds for COVID-19 response, citing the prohibition on
duplication of laws with the same purpose.
Republic Act 11494 or the Bayanihan to Recover As One Act (Bayanihan 2)
imposed a 5% franchise tax on gross bets from operations of Philippine Offshore
Gaming Operators (POGOs) the proceeds of which to be earmarked for COVID-
19 response efforts. The tax shall be collected even after two years or upon
determination that the virus has been contained.
The high court, however, ruled that a provision in Bayanihan 2 violates the
Constitution’s “one subject, one title” rule. It states that “every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”
“The imposition of new taxes, camouflaged as part of a long list of existing taxes,
cannot be contemplated as an integral part of a temporary COVID-19 relief
measure. Invariably, Section 11(f) and (g) of the Bayanihan 2 Law are
unconstitutional, in so far as it imposes new taxes on POGO licensees,” the
42page decision read.
“The respondents admit that the Bayanihan 2 law is not a tax measure. Simply
stated, the Bayanihan 2 Law was not enacted to impose new taxes in order to
address the COVID-19 pandemic,” the court ruled.
House of Representatives Ways and Means chairman Joey Salceda, the
principal author of RA 11590, welcomed the SC decision.
“That is why we need to close down illegal POGOs and enforce the law. Legal
POGOs already comply with the strictest tax provisions ever included in the Tax
Code. If you close down the legal POGOs, you only incentivize the underground
POGOs,” said Salceda in a statement.
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SC: Failure to Disclose Previous Employment

Not a Ground for Dismissal
September 21, 2022
The Supreme Court has ruled that omission of past employment is not a just
cause to terminate an employment.
In a Decision penned by Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the Court’s Third
Division granted the petition of Nancy Claire Pit Celis to reverse and set aside
the Decision dated June 7, 2019 and the Resolution dated December 6, 2019 of
the Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the
Decision dated July 13, 2018 and the Resolution dated October 26, 2018 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and held that Celis’ employer,
Bank of Makati (A Savings Bank), Inc. (Bank of Makati), validly dismissed Celis.
Petitioner Celis was hired on July 15, 2013 as an Account Officer of Bank of
Makati’s Pasay City Branch. On May 23, 2016, the bank assigned her to its Legal
and External Agency Department as an Administrative Officer.
By the end of 2017, the Bank of Makati’s Human Resource Department received
a report that Celis was previously employed in the Rural Bank of Placer (Bank of
Placer), Surigao del Norte and was involved in a case concerning embezzlement
of funds. Celis did not disclose this past employment when she applied for a job
with the Bank of Makati.
After an investigation and hearing, Celis was dismissed for violating the Bank of
Makati’s Code of Conduct and Discipline (Bank’s Code of Conduct), for
“knowingly giving false or misleading information in applications for employment
as a result of which employment is secured.” Celis’s employment was also
terminated on the ground of “serious misconduct, fraud, or willful breach of trust
and loss of confidence” under the Labor Code.
This prompted Celis to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims, and
damages against the Bank of Makati. She maintained that the omission of her
past employment with the Bank of Placer was done in good faith and that the
Bank of Makati failed to prove her involvement in the embezzlement case. The
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Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Celis and held that she was illegally
dismissed, holding that her failure to state her past employment was not a
serious offense that would justify suspension and termination. The LA also noted
that Celis was never administratively found guilty of the supposed charge of
embezzlement against the Rural Bank of Placer, which allowed her to resign
without any derogatory record.
The LA’s ruling was upheld by the NLRC, but was subsequently overturned by
the CA.
In reversing the CA, the Supreme Court stressed the Constitutional policy that
whenever there are doubts in the interpretation of labor legislation and contracts,
the former should be resolved in favor of labor.
In Celis’ case, considering that she did not actually state any false information in
her job application but merely omitted to reflect her past employment with the
Bank of Placer, she could not have committed the alleged infraction of allegedly
violating the Bank’s Code of Conduct for concealing her previous employment.
“The labor tribunals aptly held that this is merely a case of an omission to
disclose former employment in a job application, a fault which does not justify
petitioner’s suspension and eventual termination from employment… [T]he
penalty must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the
infraction. To dismiss petition on account of her omission to disclose former
employment is just too harsh a penalty,” the Court said.
The Court noted that Celis had been working for the Bank of Makati for almost
five years when it raised, out of the blue, the issue regarding her undisclosed
past employment. “To the Court, such matter is already water under the bridge.
Likewise, the fact that [Bank of Makati] suddenly created an issue about [Celis’]
undisclosed past employment lends credence to her allegation that the charge
against her was only precipitated by her discovery of the corrupt practices
involving her division head and her department head,” it said.
The Court further held that the CA’s reliance on the Principle of Totality of
Infractions was misplaced. Under the Principle of Totality of Infractions, previous
offenses may be used to aggravate a subsequent infraction to justify an
employee’s dismissal only if they are related to the subsequent offense upon
which termination is decreed.
According to the Supreme Court, even assuming that Celis’ act of omission did
constitute an offense, her two previous infractions, (1) improper conduct and acts
of gross discourtesy or disrespect to follow employees, and (2) personal
borrowing from the bank’s clients, are not related to the offense that became the
basis for her termination. Hence, the Principle of Totality of Infractions does not
apply.
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While the High Tribunal sustained the NLRC rulings, the Court deemed it best to
award Celis separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the resultant strained
relations between her and the Bank of Makati.
The Court also modified the monetary award with an imposition of a legal interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the Decision until full
satisfaction. The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper
computation of the monetary awards.
Full text of G.R. No. 250776 dated June 15, 2022 at
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29851/
——
“The Court, thus, considered that (residents) have a “reasonable expectation of

privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners’ property (by his neighbour) or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.” (Spouses Hing
v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
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The Supreme Court on Tuesday, August 30, declared that “no-spouse” rules for
employees are “discriminatory” unless there is a reasonable business necessity.
The decision marks the end of the more than 10-year legal battle of petitioner
Catherine dela Cruz-Cagampan, who was fired from her job at One Network
Bank, Incorporated (ONBI) following her marriage to fellow employee Audie
Angelo.
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That academic freedom in HEIs in the Philippines is guaranteed by the
Constitution attests to the recognized value of academic freedom in HEIs. In the
United States academic freedom is not provided by the Constitution but defined
by the US Supreme Court (cf. landmark Sweezy vs New Hampshire case.) Here
the essential academic freedoms are defined by Justice J. Frankfurter as: the
right to determine (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. This definition has been adopted
in Philippine jurisprudence on academic freedom, e.g. Ateneo de Manila vs.
Capulong.
——
G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017, DENMARK S. VALMORES, PETITIONER, VS.
DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, IN HER CAPACITY AS DEAN OF THE COLLEGE
OF MEDICINE, AND DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, FACULTY OF THE MINDANAO
STATE UNIVERSITY, RESPONDENTS.
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SC: Naturalization Does not Apply to Dual

Citizens by Birth
August 12, 2022
The Supreme Court has held that Filipinos born to one Filipino parent and one
foreign parent are considered dual citizens by birth and not by naturalization,
regardless of subsequent acts performed to confirm the foreign citizenship. In
a Decision penned by Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the Supreme Court En
Banc granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Mariz Lindsey
Tan Villegas Gana-Carait, and annulled and set aside the Commission on
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Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution dated September 23, 2021 which
denied Gana-Carait’s Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First
Division’s Resolution dated February 27, 2019. The said COMELEC resolutions
denied the petition to disqualify Gana-Carait as a candidate for Member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna for the May 2019
elections, but granted the petition to deny due course to or cancel her certificate
of candidacy (CoC).
On October 17, 2018, Gana-Carait filed her CoC for the May 2019 National and
Local Elections. Two petitions were then filed before the COMELEC against her:
one for her disqualification, on the ground that she failed to renounce her United
States (US) citizenship; the other for the cancellation of her COC, for false
representations on her eligibility to run for office given her American citizenship.
The COMELEC’s First Division resolved the consolidated cases in its February
27, 2019 Resolution, dismissing the petition for disqualification but granting the
petition for the cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, finding that she was a dual
citizen by naturalization because of positive acts subsequently performed by her
mother to secure a Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United
States of America and a US passport for Gana-Carait.
Thus, the COMELEC held that Gana-Carait must comply with RA No. 9225, or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, which requires candidates who
are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenship. GanaCarait moved to
reconsider the ruling, but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, prompting
Gana-Carait to go to the Supreme Court.
In ruling to set aside COMELEC’s cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, the Court
held that Gana-Carait, who was born to a Filipino father and an American
mother, is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization.
The Court also found that the subsequent positive acts made by Gana-Carait’s
mother to request confirmation from the United States Consular Service of Gana-
Carait’s US citizenship is not considered a naturalization process but a mere
presentation of documentary evidence to establish the fact that GanaCarait is an
American citizen by birth.
The Court held that since Gana-Carait is a dual citizen by birth, and not by
naturalization, she is not covered by the provisions of the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act requiring candidates who are dual citizens by
naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to renounce their foreign citizenships in order to become eligible for elective
office. As a dual citizen by birth, Gana-Carait is thus considered a Filipino
qualified to run for public office. Hence, she could not be said to have made a
false representation in her COC, ruled the Court.
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The Court also harmonized conflicting provisions under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure (COMELEC Rules) and the Rules of Court on the reckoning point for
the 30-day period within which one can challenge a COMELEC ruling before the
Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is based on Section 7,
Article IX of the Constitution, a petition for certiorari shall be filed within 30 days
from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution to be reviewed. Section 1,
Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules, however, provides that such petition must be
filed within 30 days from the promulgation date. Further, Section 3 of the same
Rule declares that decisions in petitions to cancel COCs become final and
executory after five days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Court. The
Court held that the COMELEC Rules are merely procedural and thus cannot
override substantive law, especially the Constitution. The COMELEC Rules
cannot be applied in a way that would shorten the constitutionally mandated
period within which aggrieved parties can question an adverse COMELEC
ruling.
The Court ruled that to harmonize the COMELEC Rules with the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, the proper interpretation of Section 8, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules is that COMELEC rulings, in the absence of a restraining order
from the Supreme Court, issued within five days from receipt of the aggrieved
party, shall be rendered only executory, but not final.
In the case of Gana-Carait, despite the COMELEC’s issuance of the Certificate of
Finality, Entry of Judgment, and Writ of Execution, the challenged COMELEC
ruling did not actually attain finality since Gana-Carait was able to file the Petition
for Certiorari before the Supreme Court within 30 days from notice of the
COMELEC ruling.
The SC Public Information Office will upload the full text of the Decision on the
SC website once available.###
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Good evening. Please be reminded of our WEBINAR on the 2022 case of

DOBBS versus JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORG., which overturned ROE
versus WADE, (the 1973 case decided by the US Supreme Court which laid
down the doctrine that abortion is a constitutionally protected right under the right
of privacy).
Our speaker, Dr. Jeremy Gatdula, is the only Filipino to be a part of an amicus
curiae brief in the US Supreme Court in the Dobbs case.
Dr. Gatdula will discuss how the DOBBS case can lay the foundation for
overturning our REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH LAW and shut down the same sex
marriage bill.
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IS THE RIGHT TO HAVE AN ABORTION STILL A CONSTITUTIONALLY

PROTECTED RIGHT IN THE U.S.?
If you want to know the answer, then join the Webinar of the IBP DAVAO DEL
SUR CHAPTER!!!
In 1973, the US Supreme Court, in the case of Roe versus Wade ruled that the
right to have an abortion is a constitutionally protected right under the right of
privacy.
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But in June 2022, the ROE versus WADE decision was overturned by the
decision in the case of Dobbs versus Jackson Women’s Health Organization.
Thus, abortion is no longer a constitutionally protected right in the U.S.
Let us listen to Dr. Jeremy Gatdula as he enlightens us on the Dobbs case.
Dr, Jeremy Gatdula is the only Filipino legal academic to be a part of an amicus
curiae brief in the US Supreme Court abortion case of Dobbs vs. Jackson
Women’s Health Organization.
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SC Provides Clarificatory Guidelines on

PleaBargaining in Drugs Cases
July 28, 2022
The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberations on Tuesday, July 26, 2022,
reaffirmed the primacy and exclusivity of its rule-making power under the
Constitution, and guaranteed its precedence in governing over the plea
bargaining process in drugs cases.
In the consolidated cases of People v. Montierro, (G.R No. 254564), Baldadera v.
People (G.R. No. 254564); and Re: Letter of the Philippine Judges Association
Expressing its Concern over the Ramifications of the Decisions in G.R. No.
247575 and G.R. No. 250295 (A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC), the Supreme Court En
Banc underscored the stability and independence of the Court and its rulemaking
power in resolving the conflict between Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No.
27, which prohibits plea bargaining for illegal sale of dangerous drugs to the
lesser offense of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under Republic Act No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and the SC’s
Resolution in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC adopting the Plea Bargaining Framework in
Drugs Cases.
Holding that plea bargaining in the prosecution of drugs cases goes into the very
matters of fundamental constitutional rights, the Court resolved to clarify the
guidelines it earlier issued in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, dated April 10, 2018. Hence,
39
while the Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the DOJ’s efforts to amend DOJ
Circular No. 27 to conform with the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases,
the Court nevertheless issues the following guidelinesfor the guidance of both the
Bench and the Bar:
1. Offers for plea bargaining must be initiated in writing by way of a formal
written motion filed by the accused in court.
2. The lesser offense which the accused proposes to plead guilty to must
necessarily be included in the offense charged.
3. Upon receipt of the proposal for plea bargaining that is compliant with the
provisions of the Court’s Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, the judge
shall order that a drug dependency assessment be administered. If the accused
admits drug use, or denies it but is found positive after a drug dependency test,
then he/she shall undergo treatment and rehabilitation for a period of not less
than six (6) months. Said period shall be credited to his/her penalty and the
period of his/her after-care and follow-up program if the penalty is still unserved.
If the accused is found negative for drug use/dependency, then he/she will be
released on time served, otherwise, he/she will serve his/her sentence in jail
minus the counselling period at the rehabilitation center.
4. As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties
and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual
agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court.
• Though the prosecution and the defense may agree to enter into a plea
bargain, it does not follow that the courts will automatically approve the proposal.
Judges must still exercise sound discretion in granting or denying plea
bargaining, taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the
character of the accused.
5. The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea
bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:
• the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in the community as a
drug addict and a troublemaker, has undergone rehabilitation but had a relapse,
or has been charged many times; or • when the evidence of guilt is strong.
6. Plea bargaining in drugs cases shall not be allowed when the proposed
plea bargain does not conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework
in Drugs Cases.
7. Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely
on the ground that the accused’s plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with
the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ,
40
though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if
any.
8. If the prosecution objects to the accused’s plea bargaining proposal due
tothe circumstances enumerated in item no. 5, the trial court is mandated tohear
the prosecution’s objection and rule on the merits thereof. If the trialcourt finds
the objection meritorious, it shall order the continuation of the criminal
proceedings.
9. If an accused applies for probation in offenses punishable under RA No.
9165, other than for illegal drug trafficking or pushing under Section 5 in relation
to Section 24 thereof, then the law on probation shall apply.
The Supreme Court Public Information Office will upload a copy of the Court’s
Decision to the SC website once it receives an official copy from the Office of the
Clerk Court En Banc. ###
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In re: THE GRANDFATHER'S CLAUSE
The assailed provision granted a period for practitioners to register as

psychologists without examination and crafted sufficient standards on who may
avail the exemption measured in terms of educational attainment and work
experience.
Specifically, the law provides that applicants who have Bachelor’s Degree in
Psychology may be registered without examination if they accumulated a
“minimum of ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a
psychology” and “updated their professional education in various
psychologyrelated functions.”
——
41
YOU MAY NOW COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF THE PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE IN BIGAMY CASE. IT MEANS THAT YOU CAN NOW RAISE AS A
DEFENSE THE NULLITY OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE.
(I have discussed that sa BLD PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS long before
this en banc decision under Art. 40. Check your copy. Nakaka-dalawa n ako by
the way. First, it's about Art. 992 ab intestado. Now, Art 40 on bigamy)
In the leading case of Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021,
Hernando, J., the SC en banc exonerated the accused from criminal liability for
bigamy when during the pendency of the bigamy case, a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage was entered. Previous decisions had held that a
person who contracts a second marriage without a prior court declaration of
nullity of his first marriage was liable for bigamy even if the first marriage was
subsequently declared void by a court. The SC held in Pulido that the
requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity under Article 40 of the Family
Code, which is for purposes only of remarriage, should not have been extended
to criminal cases.
——
SC: A notary violates the notarial rules when they notarize a deed of absolute
sale where their uncle (a relative within the fourth civil degree) is identified as a
vendee, even if (owing to the unilateral nature of the deed) only the vendors had
signed the contract. A.C. No. 11219, 16 March 2022
42
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KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia – Malaysia said on Wednesday, July 13, it had

obtained a stay order against the enforcement of a French arbitration court ruling
ordering the government to pay $14.9billion to the descendants of a late sultan
over a colonial-era land deal.
A British law firm representing the heirs did not immediately respond to a request
for comment.
The Paris Court of Appeal on Tuesday allowed an application by the Malaysian
government for the stay after finding that enforcement of the award could infringe
the country’s sovereignty, Malaysia’s law minister Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar
said in a statement.
Malaysia is also preparing to have the ruling set aside, he said.
The stay order comes a day after lawyers representing the heirs of the late sultan
moved to seize two Luxembourg-based units of Malaysian state oil firm Petronas.
Petronas has described the seizure as “baseless” and said it would vigorously
defend its legal position.
The heirs claim to be successors-in-interest to the last Sultan of Sulu, who
entered a deal in 1848 with a British trading company over the use of his territory,
now known as the Malaysian state of Sabah.
Malaysia took over the arrangement after independence from Britain, paying a
token sum to the heirs annually. But the payments were stopped in 2013, with
Malaysia arguing that no one else had a right over Sabah, which was part of its
territory.
A French court issued the $14.9 billion award in favor of the heirs in February,
with Malaysia refusing to participate in the arbitration.
Wan Junaidi said Malaysia did not recognize the heirs’ claim and would take all
steps to uphold the country’s sovereignty. – Rappler.com
—-
📣#SupremeCourtDecisions “A person cannot serve two hostile masters without

detriment to one of them. Where a director is so employed in the service of a rival
company, he cannot serve both, but must betray one or the other.”
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SC Sets Guidelines in the Application of the Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity |
July 13, 2022
The Supreme Court has laid down the parameters in determining the liability of
corporate officers and directors who unfairly usurp business opportunities that
belong to the corporation they serve.
In a 32-page Decision penned by Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the Court
granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Total Office Products and
Services, Inc. (TOPROS), praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ ruling
which set aside the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that TOPROS
director and top officer John Charles Chang, Jr. violated his fiduciary duties
under the Corporation Code.
The Court remanded the case to the Pasig RTC, Branch 158 to resolve the case
with dispatch following the new guidelines set by the Court in its Decision to
determine the exact liability of Chang.
In 1982, Chang was designated by TOPROS’ owners, spouses Ramon and

Yaona Ang Ty, to manage TOPROS as the sole distributor of Minolta plain paper
copiers in the Philippines. While TOPROS grew to a multi-million enterprise,
Spouses Ty eventually discovered that Chang, while still a TOPROS director and
officer, incorporated TOPGOLD Philippines, Inc. (TOPGOLD), Golden Exim
Trading and Commercial Corporation (Golden Exim), and Identic International
Corp. (Identic) to siphon assets, funds, goodwill, equipment, and resources of
TOPROS. Chang also obtained opportunities properly belonging to TOPROS
and awarded these to his own corporations, to TOPROS’ prejudice. Chang was
subsequently ousted as TOPROS director and officer and a case for damages
was filed by TOPROS against Chang, TOPGOLD, Golden Exim, and Identic.
Under Section 34 of the Corporation Code (now Section 33 of the Revised

Corporation Code), a director who acquires for himself a business opportunity
which should belong to the corporation and who obtains profits to the prejudice of
the corporation has the duty to refund to the corporation the profits he derived
from the opportunity, unless ratified by the corporation.
The Court held that the rationale for this duty is that “a person cannot serve two
hostile masters without detriment to one of them. Where a director is so
employed in the service of a rival company, he cannot serve both, but must
betray one or the other.”
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Hence, the fiduciary duty of corporate officers and directors prohibits them from
engaging in a “business in direct competition with that of the corporation where
he is a director by utilizing information he has received as such officer, under the
established law that a director or officer of a corporation may not enter into a
competing enterprise which cripples or injures the business of the corporation of
which he is an officer or director,” ruled the Court.
The Court held that under the doctrine of corporate opportunity, directors,
officers, and controlling shareholders have the legal responsibility, “under the
duty of loyalty, not to take such opportunities for themselves, without first
disclosing the opportunity to the board of directors of the corporation and giving
the board the option to decline the opportunity on behalf of the corporation. If the
procedure is violated and a corporate fiduciary takes the corporate opportunity
anyway, the fiduciary violates its duty of loyalty and the corporation will be
entitled to a constructive trust of all profits obtained from the wrongful
transaction.”
In the case of Chang, in order to establish whether he violated the doctrine of

corporate opportunity and is thus obligated to refund the profits he derived from
various business opportunities because of his position in TOPROS, the Court laid
down the following elements to determine when a prohibited corporate
opportunity exists, giving rise to a claim of damages:
- The corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;

- The opportunity is within the corporation’s line of business;
- The corporation has an interest or expectancy in the opportunity; and - By
taking the opportunity for his own, the corporate director, trustee, or officer will
consequently be placed in a position inimicable to his duties to the corporation.
The Court added that in determining if the opportunity is within the corporation’s
line of business, the involved corporations must be shown to be in competition
with one another, such that they are both engaged in related areas of
businesses, producing the same products with overlapping markets.
The Court ruled that the doctrine of corporate opportunity applied to Chang, and
that his actions constituted acts of disloyalty in violation of the Corporation Code
after it found that (1) Chang owned majority of the shares in TOPGOLD, Golden
Exim, and Dentic; (2) TOPGOLD, Golden Exim, and Identic were in the same line
of business as TOPROS; (3) TOPROS has existing service contracts with Linde,
45
a client of Golden Exim; (4) Rental payments due TOPROS were instead paid to
TOPGOLD; and (5) Chang bought the land where TOPROS’ building is located
in the name of Golden Exim instead of TOPROS, justifying awarding Golden
Exim the investment opportunity because “he had to make his own living.”
However, since further reception and evaluation of evidence is needed to

determine the exact liability of Chang, the Court remanded the case to the RTC,
concluding that “the claim for damages under Section 34 of the Corporation Code
necessitates factual determinations which must be ultimately made by the RTC
itself in the exercise of its judicial functions, embodied in a final judgment.”
FULL TEXT of G.R. NOS. 200070-71 at: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28545/
Source: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28626/
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#JurisprudenceUpdate: AQUINO v. AQUINO (G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018 • 07

December 2021 [Date Uploaded: 07 July 2022] • En Banc • Leonen, J.)
SC Revisits ‘Iron Curtain Rule’ in Succession Law, Upholds Best Interest of the
Child
Children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their
grandparents and other direct ascendants by right of representation.
In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court En

Banc reinterpreted Article 992 of the Civil Code, which prohibits nonmarital
children from inheriting from their siblings who are marital children, as well as
“relatives of [their] father or mother[.]” The Decision used the terms “marital” and
“nonmarital” to replace the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” when referring to
the children, as the latter terms are pejorative terms when used to describe
children based on their parents’ marital status.
This case involves a woman who claims to be the nonmarital child of a man who
died before she was born. After her alleged paternal grandfather died, she
asserted her right to represent her deceased father—a marital child—in inheriting
from her grandfather’s estate.
However, in previous cases, the Court had interpreted Article 992 as barring
nonmarital children from inheriting from their grandparents and other direct
ascendants, as they are covered by the term “relatives.” The Supreme Court had
called this prohibition the “iron curtain rule,” inferred from a perceived hostility
between the marital and nonmarital sides of a family.
Now, the Court reexamined the iron curtain rule, finding that Article 992 “should
be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics.
Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving some of its
48
members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of
antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.”
The Court also recognized that nonmarital children primarily suffer the
consequences imposed by laws, despite the status being beyond their power to
change. Some children may be nonmarital because their parents choose not to
marry; in 2016, the Philippine Statistics Authority reported that, from 2007 to
2016, there was 14.4% decline in registered marriages in the country. Other
children may be nonmarital because one or both of their parents are below
marriageable age. In 2017 alone, 196,478 children were born to mothers 19
years old and under, and 52,342 children were sired by fathers 19 years old and
under. There are also children who are nonmarital when their mother was a
survivor of sexual assault who did not marry the perpetrator; or when one parent
dies before they can marry the other parent.
Departing from regressive conjectures about family life in favor of the best
interests of the child, the Court abandoned the presumption that “nonmarital
children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in
a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family.”
The Court ruled that grandparents and other direct ascendants are outside the
scope of “relatives” under Article 992. “Both marital and nonmarital children,
whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their
parents and other ascendants.” Thus, a nonmarital child’s right of representation
should be governed by Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not differentiate
based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct descendants.
The two amici curiae appointed by the Court, Dean Cynthia Del Castillo and
Professor Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan, also contributed insights on the Civil
Code, Family Code, and jurisprudential treatment of nonmarital children.
However, because of factual issues with the nonmarital child’s claim of filiation,
the Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court and ordered it to receive
further evidence, including DNA evidence. It emphasized that DNA testing is a
valid method of determining filiation in all cases where this is an issue.
| Media Release by the Supreme Court Public Information Office dated 31 March
2022
Read full text here: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28508/
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#SupremeCourtPH #TechnologyDrivenJudiciary #SupremeCourtSays
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SC: Under the Local Govt Code and the CSC Rules on Sexual Harrassment, a
city mayor has the power to discipline and penalize a city government employee
for sexual harrassment. (Gatchalian v. Urrutia, G.R. No. 223595, 16 March
2022) [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28437/](https://t.co/xmtQVMW4uJ)
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56
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Under article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomats

enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. But any commercial activity outside
their professional work can be the subject of civil claims.
The UK Supreme Court's justices have now ruled - by a majority of three to two -
that if the facts of the case are proved, Mr Basfar does not have diplomatic
immunity because his alleged exploitation of her amounted to commercial
activity.
——
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60
——
Is it legal for the President to directly assume the functions of a Cabinet

Secretary"
Yes, it is perfectly legal.
The general rule is that the President is not allowed to hold additional office or
employment during his tenure. (Sec. 13, Art. VII, Const.). This prohibition is
allembracing and covers both public and private offices or employment. (Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 [1991]).
However, as an exception, the President may concurrently assume and perform

the functions of a Cabinet position or any official and employee of an executive
department, bureau, and office directly while being the President, owing to the
fact that he/she is clothed by the Constitution with executive power and power of
control over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." (See Bermudez v.
Torres, 311 SCRA 733 [1999], citing Pelaez v. Auditor-General, 15 SCRA 569
[1965]).
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61
62
63
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Cadajas v. People (G.R. No. 247348, 16 November 2021; uploaded 16 June

2022)
1) Evidence from a Facebook Messenger account is admissible against an

accused who owns the account if it was obtained by a private individual with
whom he shared the password access to the account (such as his girlfriend, the
complainant in this case). In such a case, the accused cannot invoke a
reasonable expectation of privacy to render the evidence inadmissible.
Effectively, the Marti rule has been extended to the digital space. (J. Gaerlan
dissents on this point)
2) The possession of child pornography is enough to constitutes the crime of

child pornography (as penalized under the Anti-Child Pornography Act) even if
there is no intention to profit from the material. (J. Caguioa dissents from the
holding that mere possession is enough)
3) The crime of child pornography, even if defined by special laws such as

the Anti-Child Pornography Act and the Cybercrime Prevention Act, is mala in se,
not malum prohibitum. (J. Leonen disagrees on this point) The prosecution will
thus have to establish criminal intent in prosecuting chld pornography cases.
4) The SC further affirmed that if the crime was committed using a computer
system, then by operation of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the penalty is one
degree higher – reclusion perpetua in this case. (JJ. Lazaro-Javier and
Zalameda write separately to urge Congress to review this implication, feeling
that the penalty is disproportionate to the crime)
64
Ponencia by J. J. Lopez, separate opinions by JJ. Leonen, Lazaro-Javier and
Zalameda. Dissents by J. Caguioa (joined by J. Inting) and J. Gaerlan.
——-
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Is the excessive sexual desire of your partner a ground for nullity of marriage?
65
Ruling:
No. The couple's irreconcilable sexual preferences would in no way amount to

psychological incapacity. The husband's inability to sexually satisfy his wife
because she prefers the conventional way of sexual intercourse could not be
taken to mean that he is psychologically incapacitated.
Sexual incompatibility is not a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE APRIL 2022 CASE OF PADUA VERSUS

PADUA, STATES:
“Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article. It must be stressed that an
unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.”
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A word on failure of elections and annulment of election results. In the course

of this Protest, the parties appeared to have confused the remedies of failure of
elections and annulment of election results.—Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, PET 005,
2021.
See too dff. Cancel doc v. dQ; effects.
——
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68
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“No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one (1) year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Governmentowned
or controlled corporations (GOCCs) or in any of their subsidiaries.”
(𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 6, 𝘈 𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤 𝘭𝘦 𝘐𝘟-𝘉 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶 𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯)
The subsequent withdrawal of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) filed, even with
Comelec’s approval, does not render that COC void ab initio. Once filed, the
permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
subsequently withdrawn. (𝘔 𝘰𝘯𝘳𝘰𝘺 𝘷. 𝘊𝘈, 20 𝘚𝘊𝘙𝘈 620 (1967))
This constitutional prohibition aims to avert a “spoils system” of appointing

“𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗹𝗮𝗺𝗲 𝗱𝘂𝗰𝗸𝘀” or those allies who have lost in the election.
“𝗦𝗽𝗼𝗶𝗹𝘀 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺” is the practice of awarding government jobs to supporters and

friends of the victorious political party or candidate. (𝘉𝘭𝘢𝘤𝘬’𝘴 𝘓𝘢𝘸 𝘋 𝘪𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰 𝘯𝘢𝘳𝘺,
4387 (8𝘵𝘩 𝘌𝘥., 2004))
———
SC: An action for medical malpractice based on contract (which prescribes in 10

years) must allege an express promise to provide medical treatment or achieve a
specific result. Otherwise, the suit is one for tort/quasi-delict, which prescribes in
4 years.
De Jesus v. Dr. Uyloan & Asian Hospital, G.R. No. 234851, 15 Feb 2022
[https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27060/](https://t.co/tlInJM49Ir)
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The SC affirms that under Art. 167 of the Family Code, a woman cannot institute
an action to impugn the legitimacy of her own child, as only her husband is
allowed to do so under the law. The majority and concurring opinions emphasize
that it is up to Congress to remedy the perceived gender inequality wrought by
Art. 167.
69
The dissents of JJ. Leonen and Lazaro-Javier argue that Art. 167 does not
unequivocally deny the mother standing to bring the suit, and can be judicially
interpreted to allow the mother to file the action (and perhaps establish the
illegitimacy of her child through evidence other than her own declaration)
The case is is Ordoña v. Civil Registrar of Pasig City (G.R. No. 215370, 9
November 2021), per J. Inting
[https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27196/](https://t.co/VfyLy9BuWf), with concurring
opinions by CJ Gesmundo
[https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27199/](https://t.co/U6JQwDUStY), JJ. Perlas-
Bernabe [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27202/](https://t.co/9X8OzEwr6w) & Caguioa
[https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27208/](https://t.co/qcD5HD3JT3) Dissents by JJ.
Leonen [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27205/](https://t.co/y7PmXG23FB) & Lazaro-
Javier [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27211/](https://t.co/WIKEJjrJkA)
—-
SC: The "denial of financial support" by a man to their partner/child can lead to
conviction under Section 5 of VAWC only if it is also proven that such act was
intended to either cause victim mental/emotional anguish or humiliation [per
Section 5(e)], or to control/restrict the woman/child's actions or decisions [per
Section 5(i)].
The Court also clarified (abandoning past jurisprudence) that the "denial of
financial support" under Sec. 5(e) of VAWC is distinct from that under Sec. 5(i).
The variance doctrine, which previously justified the conviction under Section 5(i)
of one accused under Sec. 5(e), and vice-versa, can not thus apply.
The case is Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946, 9 November 2021 (uploaded
today). [https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/27269/](https://t.co/f4xMwRgmu6) The Court
was unanimous, but 5 Justices (JJ. Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Lazaro-Javier,
Zalameda, and M. Lopez) have separate concurring opinions.
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70
In a Decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the
Court discouraged legal actions brought about by a broken heart and a broken
promise as it reiterated that a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong as long as it does not palpably and unjustifiably contradict good
customs.
The Court found that Jhonna Guevarra was NOT liable for damages to her
former fiancee, Jan Banach, a German national, after breaking up with him when
she discovered that he was not a divorcee, but was still married to a third wife.
The Court ruled that there was no legal basis to order Guevarra to return the
PHP 500,000.00 sent by her ex-fiance for a supposed conjugal home since she
was justified in breaking off their engagement and Banach’s actions were tainted
with fraud and deceit since he lied about his marital status and even hid his true
name from Guevarra.
Furthermore, the Court explained that since the money was given as a gift to help
Guevarra and her family with their possible eviction from their home, the legal
principle of unjust enrichment cannot be applied to compel her to return the cash
to Banach.
Read the full text of the decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/26981/.
#TechnologyDrivenJudiciary #SupremeCourtPH
—-
Before the Supreme Court ordered Congress, Comelec and Marcos to answer,
the presumptive president through Atty Estelito Mendoza already submitted
manifestation saying SC has no jurisdiction to stop the canvass and
proclamation.
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Citing Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, Mendoza - the dictator's solicitor
general - says the language and intent of the provision makes canvass and
proclamation by Congress mandatory "and Supreme Court is without jurisdiction
to prevent implementation." | via Lian Buan/Rappler.
—-
No to Litigation to Sorrows Caused by Broken Hearts and Promises―SC
May 18, 2022
“A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is

not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs…
Litigation to the sorrows caused by a broken heart and a broken promise must
be discouraged.”
The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine as it granted the Petition for Review
on Certiorari assailing the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed
the decision of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding petitioner liable for damages
to respondent, her German former fiancé. Petitioner broke up with the
respondent after finding out that the latter lied about his identity and marital
status.
In a Decision penned by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court granted the
petition of Jhonna Guevarra, et al. and deleted the award of actual damages in
the amount if P500,000 to respondent Jan Banach.
Guevarra and Banach met through a pastor, and the latter subsequently courted
the former until they became a couple. Both agreed to get married, with Banach
giving Guevarra P500,000 to buy a lot for their conjugal home.
However, Guevarra broke up with Banach after she found out that he was not a
divorcee, as he led her to believe, but was actually still married to his third wife.
This prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and her parents before the RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of Banach and awarded moral damages and attorney’s
fee. On appeal, the CA issued a Decision on January 29, 2007 similarly ordering
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Guevarra and her parents to return the money under the principle of unjust
enrichment. However, it deleted the awards of moral damages and attorney’s
fees, as it ruled that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and
that he did not have the purest intentions in expressing his desire to marry
Guevarra.
Both parties sought reconsideration of the CA’s 2007 Decision. On July 14,
2014, the CA issued a Resolution denying the Motions for Reconsideration. The
case was then elevated to the Supreme Court , the main issue being whether or
not the Order to return the P500,000 is proper.
The Court agreed with the CA that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and
deceit, and that he did not have the purest intentions in marrying Guevarra. It
noted that Banach lied about his marital status, and even hid his true name from
Guevarra.
“These acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation. Finding out that one’s
betrothed is still married to another person, and that they are not who they say
they are, are reasons enough to conclude bad faith…Since
respondent himself did not act in good faith, he cannot claim damages under the
New Civil Code. The unjust enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies if
the property is acquired without legal grounds,” said the Court.
The Court explained that Banach gave the money as a gift to help Guevarra and
her parents with their possible eviction from their home. It added that the money
being a gift, petitioner Guevarra is correct to say that she cannot be compelled
to return the same. (G.R. No. 214016, Guevarra, et al. v. Banach, November 24,
2021) FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/26981/
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For apparently the first time, the SC defines a framework for distinguishing
between an administrative franchise and a secondary license. While both are
issued by administrative agencies and not by Congress, an administrative
franchise falls within the contemplation of "franchise" under the Constitution.
In New Vision Satellite Network, Inc. v. Provincial Govt of Cagayan (G.R. No.
248840, 5 July 2021), the Court concluded that the "Certificate of Authority" that
is issued by the NTC to enable cable TV services by operators is in the nature of
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an administrative franchise. As a result, cable TV operators may be subject to
franchise taxes by local government units.
For the first time, the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the concept of an
"environmental tort action" - an action for damages based on environmental harm
in a well-defined area or to specific persons or classes of persons. Such action is
accommodated under current Civil Code damages framework.
(Sanggacala v. NPC, G.R. No. 209538, 7 July 2021)
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This may be the SC's first post-Molina decision, where the liberalized rules on
psychological incapacity as a ground for voiding a marriage have been applied.
(Datu v. Datu, G.R. No. 209278, 15 Sept 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/24275/
Lazaro v. People, G.R. No. 230018, 23 June 2021, may be the very first
Supreme Court decision involving the crime of "Giving Assistance to Suicide" as
penalized under Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code. The instructive value of
the decision though is in the field of Criminal Procedure, involving as it does an
Order whose dispositive portion had both granted a Motion to Quash on the
ground that the facts do not constitute an offense, as well as a directive to the
prosecutor to file an amended information to correct that defect.
——
PHILIPPINE CONTRACTORS ACCREDITATION BOARD, PETITIONER, V.

MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC., RESPONDENT. EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 217590, March 10, 2020 ]
The argument of petitioner is misplaced. Section 14, Article XII of the

Constitution refers to the privilege of a natural person to exercise his profession
in the Philippines.45 On the other hand, under Article IV of R.A. No. 4566, even
partnerships, corporations and organizations can qualify for a contractor's license
through its responsible officer.46 The "profession" under the aforesaid provision
refers to the practice of natural persons of a certain field in which they are
trained, certified, and licensed. Being a licensed contractor does not
automatically qualify within the ambit of the Constitution as a "profession" per se.
A contractor under R.A. No. 4566 does not refer to a specific practice of
profession, i.e. architecture, engineering, medicine, accountancy and the like.
Suffice it to say that a corporation or juridical person, in this case a construction

firm, cannot be considered a "professional" that is being exclusively restricted by
the Constitution and our laws to Filipino citizens. The licensing of contractors is
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not to engage in the practice of a specific profession, but rather to engage in the
business of contracting/construction.
Professionalizing the construction business is different from the exercise of

profession which the Constitution exclusively restricts to Filipino citizens. To
reiterate, the license required under R.A. No. 4566 is for purposes of engaging in
the business of contracting under the terms of the said act for a fiscal year or a
certain period/project, and not for the purpose of practicing a particular
profession. The responsible officer who secures a license for contracting, for his
own business or for the company, may already be a professional in his own field
(i.e., engineer, architect). Then again, the license acquired under R.A. No. 4566
does not make the licensed contractor a "professional" within the meaning
contemplated under Section 14, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the construction industry is not one which the
Constitution has reserved exclusively for Filipinos. Neither do the laws enacted
by Congress show any indication that foreigners are proscribed from entering
into the same projects as Filipinos in the field of construction. Thus, we find that
setting the equity limit for a certain type of contractor's license has no basis.
In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino
monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure
that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Thus, while the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, it also recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair.
In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited
entry into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a
balance between protecting local businesses and allowing the entry of foreign
investments and services.
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More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress
the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the
recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest requires. Thus,
Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on
the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into
certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to
foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
NEDA has not opposed such policy.
——
The decision to marry and to whom are two of the most important choices that a
woman can make in her life. In the words of the US Supreme Court in Obergefell
"[n]o union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of
love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two
people become something greater than once they were. "27 The State has no
business interfering with this choice. Neither can it sanction any undue burden of
the right to make these choices.—G.R. No. 187417
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, vs.BRENT HOSPITAL AND
COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
CONCURRING OPINION JARDELEZA,
J.:
February 24, 2016

G.R. No. 187417
CHRISTINE JOY CAPIN-CADIZ, Petitioner, vs.BRENT HOSPITAL AND
COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
______end Bar 2022
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Art. 151 of Family Code, which requires as a condition precedent that suits
between family members must first be subject to earnest efforts to compromise,
does not apply in petitions challenging the validity of a reconstituted duplicate
certificate of title even when filed against a family member. (Ty v. Chua, G.R. No.
212598, 29 Sept 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/23706/
The Supreme Court itself concedes that this case (Ruego v. People, G.R. No.
226745, 3 May 2021) should not have reached the courts in the first place. (See
Decision, p. 15) But there is some academic interest, if only because if revisits a
precedent originally established in 1934, one which the Court now declares as
obsolete.
The Supreme Court now holds, contrary to Ppl. v. Balubar (60 Phil. 698), that the
loss of a tooth during an altercation does not automatically result in a conviction
for serious physical injuries, if no evidence is presented that such loss had led to
a "visible deformity."
Filipino dies in 2000 Air Kenya plane crash, survived by a widow and his siblings.
After the widow is awarded indemnity (US $430,000) by Air Kenya, collateral
relatives (who are heirs under PH law) sued for their share. But the Supreme
Court rules that under the "state of the most significant relationship rule", it is
Kenyan law that applied, and Kenya law only entitles the widow, and not
collateral relatives, to accident indemnity. (Vda. de Alcaneses v. Alcaneses, G.R.
No. 187847, 30 June 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/23338/
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PULIDO v PEOPLE, GR No. 220149, July 27, 2021, Unanimous En Banc
Decision per J. Hernando
In laying to rest the conflicting decisions on the matter, the Supreme Court has
held that the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of a void ab initio of a prior or subsequent marriage in order to raise it as a
defense in a Bigamy case.
Art. 40 of the Family did not in any way amend Art. 349 of the RPC on Bigamy.
Thus, the accused in the Bigamy case can collaterally attack the validity of a prior
void marriage in the same criminal proceedings for Bigamy.
The foregoing will not apply if the 1st or 2nd marriage is merely voidable, since a
voidable marriage is valid until annulled.
SC Affirms Conviction of Psychologically Abusive Husband
READ: sc.judiciary.gov.ph/21529/
https://twitter.com/scph_pio/status/1447404873125826560?s=21
“The Supreme Court has affirmed the conviction for violation of RA 9262, or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, of a man who had
evicted his wife and their children from their house and cohabitated with his
mistress.
The Court upheld the Decision of the Court of Appeals, (CA) which in turn
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch
71, finding petitioner guilty of Section 5(i) of RA 9262.
The Court, however, imposed a higher penalty on the petitioner. It sentenced him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prison
correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prison mayor as
maximum. He was also ordered to pay a P100,000 fine.
Furthermore, it directed the petitioner to undergo mandatory psychological

counseling or psychiatric treatment and to report his compliance therewith to the
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court of origin within 15 days after the completion of such counseling or
treatment.
The Court ruled that the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the
conviction of petitioner. It held that psychological violence under RA 9262 was
duly established.
The petitioner’s wife claimed that in their 23 years of marriage, the petitioner had
a habit of getting drunk and womanizing. In October 2010, she and the petitioner
had a fight and evicted her and their children. The eldest of the children
convinced his three sisters to return to the house to compel the petitioner to
support them, leaving the fifth sibling with their mother. The three, through text
messages, reported to their mother that petitioner was always drunk and brought
home one night a woman, whom the petitioner introduced to them as their aunt.
Petitioner’s wife later learned that the woman was already living with petitioner
and their children.
The Court ruled that “a judicious study of the case reveals that all the elements of
the crime charged were duly established.”
The elements of violation of Section 5(i) of RA 9262 are: 1) the offended party is
a woman and/or her child or children; 2) the woman is either the wife or former
wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate,
or living within or without the family abode; 3) the offender causes on the woman
and/or
child mental or emotional anguish; and 4) the anguish is caused through acts of
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar
such acts or omissions.
The Court held that the first and second elements of the offense were
uncontested. The offended party is a woman and her child or children. The victim
is the wife of petitioner with whom he has five children. One of their children
testified in court about the infidelity of her father and how his mistress lived with
them in her parents’ conjugal home.
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As to the third and fourth elements, it was duly established that petitioner
committed psychological violence through marital infidelity and public ridicule or
humiliation, which caused mental anguish and emotional suffering upon his wife.
The Court dismissed the defense of denial and alibi of the petitioner who had
also contended that the RTC and CA Decisions were based on hearsay
evidence. He said that his wife could not have suffered psychological violence
since she did not have personal knowledge of his alleged marital infidelity and
that she only came to know of such through their daughter.
The Court, however said that while hearsay is considered inadmissible evidence
under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, “the rule does not apply to
independently relevant statements.” It stressed that while the legitimate wife
indeed did not have personal knowledge of petitioner’s infidelity, her statement
“may be considered an independently relevant statement.” It added that her
statements were duly corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay.
“It is fundamental that the defense of denial is inherently weak and cannot prevail
over the positive and categorical testimony of the prosecution witnesses. In this
case, other than bare denials, herein petitioner did not proffer any convincing
defense to disprove the testimony of his wife and his daughter about his marital
infidelity. As such, there is no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the RTC,
as concurred in by the CA, that indeed, petitioner committed marital infidelity
against his wife,” the Court said.
The RTC imposed an indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one
day of prison correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prison
mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the CA affirmed RTC ruling. The CA concurred with RTC that all the
elements of the offense charged were duly established by the prosecution and
that there is no doubt that petitioner inflicted psychological violence upon his wife
when he evicted her and their children from their conjugal home and when he
maintained an extramarital affair with a woman in their conjugal home where they
lived as a couple.
(G.R. No. 241390, XXX,* v. People, January 13, 2021)
FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/21465/“
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#JurisprudenceUpdate: In the matter of petition for Writ of Amparo of Vivian A.
Sanchez Vs. Psupt. Marc Anthony D. Darroca, Chief of Police, San Jose
Municipal Police Station; Pssupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Provicial Director, PNP-
Antique; Pcsupt. John C. Bulalacao, Regional Director, PNP-Region VI, and
Members of the PNP under their authority
G.R. No. 242257 • 15 June 2021 [Date Uploaded: 08 October 2021] En
Banc • Leonen, J.
Access the full text of the case here: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/21507/
•••
SC Reiterates Permanent Protection Order Against PNP
The Supreme Court has denied the motion for reconsideration of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and reiterated the permanent protection order prohibiting
the latter from monitoring or surveilling a family over their suspected association
with the New People’s Army (NPA).
The Court granted on October 15, 2019 the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by
Vivian A. Sanchez after the latter proved with substantial evidence that she and
her two children became persons of interest and were put under surveillance
because of her dead husband’s suspected affiliation with the NPA.
The Court held that petitioner substantiated her entitlement to the writ of amparo
with the required substantial evidence. It said: “The totality of petitioner’s
evidence convincingly shows that she and her family became subject of
unwarranted police surveillance due to their relationship with a suspected
member of the New People’s Army resulting in an actual threat to their life,
liberty, and security due to the government’s unparalleled zeal in eradicating
communism.”
The Court further held that respondents PNP are gravely mistaken in their
assertion that “the right to privacy, gender and power analysis, are not applicable
in the present case.”
The Court noted that petitioner was targeted because she initially refused to
divulge her relationship with her dead husband when she went to the funeral
parlor. Respondents claim that she was only placed under general investigation
because they wanted to know the identity of the unclaimed cadaver, but even
after she had admitted to being the suspected member’s estranged wife, police
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surveillance continued and even intensified, causing her fear and anxiety for her
and her children’s safety.
“Thus, in determining the existence of substantial evidence to support a petition

for a wit of amparo, judges should also be cognizant of the different power
dynamics at play when assessing if there is an actual or future threat to a
petitioner’s life, security, or liberty,” said the Court. “Refusing to acknowledge this
might lead to an outright denial of protection to those who need it the most.”
The Court held the right to privacy is a fundamental right, with the Constitution
providing explicit limitations on unwarranted State intrusion into personal affairs.
One’s right to privacy is not set aside because of their relationship with a person
of interest or because they have become a person of interest.
“The continued drive against communists––with President Rodrigo Duterte even

proclaiming that the New People’s Army posed a bigger threat than extremist
groups––puts petitioner and her children in a precarious position, because while
respondents deny surveilling petitioner and her children, they nonetheless admit
that as the family members of a communist, they were proper subjects of
investigation,” said the Court in the decision penned by Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen.
“While respondents have the mandate to investigate, their duty must be balanced
with petitioner’s fundamental rights. Respondents must also take into account
that petitioner and her children are not ordinary witnesses, as seen by the
privileges of testimony and communication that they enjoy. Hence, petitioner’s
relationship with her husband insulates her from any inquiries on his supposed
communist activities. Whatever information respondents may have wished to
obtain from petitioner or her children, as witting or unwitting witnesses, is
protected by spousal and filial privilege,” it added.
Furthermore, the Court held that “if respondents wanted to investigate petitioner
and her children, they should have conducted a formal investigation instead of a
surreptitious surveillance, which not only infringed on petitioner’s right to privacy
and her spousal privilege but was also an abuse of respondents’ authority as
State agents.”
Justice Ramon Paul Hernando maintained his dissent and voted to grant the
Motion for Reconsideration. He was joined by Chief Justice Alexander G.
Gesmundo.
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The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and contended that “the right
to privacy, as well as gender and power analysis, [is] not applicable in the
present case. They also point out that the rules on marital privilege and
disqualification only apply to judicial proceedings, not to investigations.
Furthermore, they assert that a writ of amparo is confined to serious human
rights violations––particularly, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances––and that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that she was entitled to the writ.
On August 16, 2018, Vivian learned that her estranged husband, Eldie
Labinghisa, was among seven alleged NPA members who were gunned down by
the PNP in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique. When she went to the funeral
home to verify the news of her husband’s death, police officers stationed there
took her photos without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she
left without being able to see or identify her husband’s body. The following day,
Vivian went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three police
officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if
she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Vivian hurried
home without confirming the identity of her husband’s body. Later that day, two
police officers went to Vivian’s house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She
confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa. In the following days, Vivian noticed the
frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle tailed her
and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband’s wake. She also
noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her
to fear for her and her children’s safety.
Text: Supreme Court PIO
Supreme Court: The racist treatment by a Filipino ship captain of his Myanmar
crew can constitute just cause for dismissal, on the ground of serious
misconduct, under Art. 297 of the Labor Code. (Ocampo v. ISCMP, G.R. No.
232062, 26 April 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/21481/
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In the recently uploaded decision of Estoconing v. People, the SC acquitted on
reasonable doubt the manager of a canteen cooperative for violating the
Expanded Senior Citizen's Act by refusing to extend the senior's discount to a
senior citizen who bought drinks from the canteen.
In concluding there was reasonable doubt, the SC took into account that (a) the
Cooperative Code allows duly qualified cooperatives to have tax exempt status;
(b) senior citizen's discounts offered by enterprises are offset by tax deductions,
of which a tax-exempt entity such as a cooperative cannot avail.
The SC does not categorically say that tax-exempt cooperatives (or other tax
exempt entities for that matter) do not have to extend senior citizens' discounts
under the ESCA, but arguably, the Court broadly hints at that implication.
Notably, the SC took the rare step of referring the decision to Congress for
possible remedial legislation.
The case is Estoconing v. People, G.R. No. 231298. While decided last October
2020, a copy was uploaded on the Court's website just last week.
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Dito po sa Nuremberg Trials from 1945 to 1949 na-develop ang legal concepts
on crimes against humanity. Tingnan po natin ang descriptions ng proceedings
na ito.
On p. I. Legal not medical condition.
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———-
(sent to macbook on sept. 2021)
SC: Warrantless inspections of jail cells extends only to searches incidental to

reasonable measures preserving internal order and security. If search is intended
to gather evidence against a detained inmate, the rules on search warrants under
Rule 126 apply. The Court was apparently prompted to express that view partly
in light of opinions expressed in a Senate Committee Report that there was no
need to secure a search warrant as long as the subject of the search is locked
up. (Confused Citizens of Region 8 v. Hon. Arguelles, (A.M. Nos. RTJ-17-2494 &
RTJ-19-2557, 26 January 2021; uploaded 25 August 2021)
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104
105
106
107
It must be noted that the restriction provided in the Bill of Rights is directed
against the government, so that it does not govern private relations. As far as the
Constitution is concerned, Article III can be invoked only against the government.
Nonetheless, with the inclusion of almost all the constitutional rights in Article 32
of the Civil Code, the same may now be invoked in civil cases involving relations
between private persons. Thus, the definition above indicates that the bill of
rights is a safeguard not just against the abuses of the government but also of
individuals or group of individuals.
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Remo v. Sec. Of foreign affairs. Married woman msy use maiden name.
Marriage does not change of name but only the civil status. So. Old notion. Wala
na.
Gaazette Online? No, based on the Supreme Court declining to give equivalence
to online posting with publication requirements as prescribed by law or
Constitution (see Garcillano v. House) Neither is there a law that establishes the
Official Gazette online as the equivalent of the offline Gazette (though there is a
pending bill to that effect)
Forwarded; Standard Caveats
PULIDO v PEOPLE, GR No. 220149, July 27, 2021, Unanimous En Banc

Decision per J. Hernando
In laying to rest the conflicting decisions on the matter, the Supreme Court has
held that the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of a void ab initio of a prior or subsequent marriage in order to raise it as a
defense in a Bigamy case.
Art. 40 of the Family did not in any way amend Art. 349 of the RPC on Bigamy.
Thus, the accused in the Bigamy case can collaterally attack the validity of a prior
void marriage in the same criminal proceedings for Bigamy.
The foregoing will not apply if the 1st or 2nd marriage is merely voidable, since a
voidable marriage is valid until annulled.
Footnote # 4 of Gocolay v Gocolay (G.R. No. 220606, 11 January 2021) offers

"nonmarital" as a substitute term for "illegitimate" child unless directly referring to
statute or jurisprudence. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/20369/ (J. Leonen)
LAND OWNERSHIP BY FORMER FILIPINO CITIZENS

(The Foreign Investments Act (RA 7042), as amended by R.A. 8179)
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Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII,
Section 8 of the Constitution - Any natural born citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter in a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3)
hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other
purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total are
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other
purposes, he shall be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land
for business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him
shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which
should be situated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines;
Provided, That the total land area thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000)
square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural
land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee who has already
acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land and vice versa.
A will executed in the Philippines by a non-Filipino that involves property in the

Philippines may be admitted to probate for the first time in a Philippine court.
(Gaspi v. Hon. Pacis-Trinidad, G.R. No. 229010, 23 Nov 2020; uploaded 26 Jul
2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/20364/
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From Anjo David: The PH Supreme Court's decision re: withdrawal from the
Rome Statute is out. Key takeaway: President Duterte did not need Senate
concurrence to withdraw from the Rome Statute.
Why not? Well, based on the dispositif, because the petitions were moot.
But, like many of the Court's other decisions, and despite its emphasis in this
decision on the need for judicial restraint, the Court still went beyond the issue of
mootness and made pronouncements not needed to arrive at its conclusion.
Other takeaways:
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1. The Court, for the first time, laid down the rule that the President can
unilaterally withdraw from a treaty absent circumstances that prevent her/him
from doing so: (1) when the Senate imposes such a condition, (2) when the
President entered into the treaty through prior congressional imprimatur, and (3)
when withdrawal from the treaty violates any other statute.
2. In my understanding, the Court's main reason for holding that the

President can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty (sans the said circumstances) is
that a treaty, to be valid, does not need concurrence from the two chambers of
Congress, i.e., the "conventional republican mill" in the Court's words, but only
from the Senate. To put it bluntly, so what? Does it follow from that premise that
the President has the power to unilaterally withdraw from any treaty?
I'm not expressing any position here. I'm only pointing out what seems to me is a
leap in logic.
3. The Court categorically said that "liability for the alleged summary killings
and other atrocities committed in the course of the war on drugs is not nullified or
negated here. The Philippines remained covered and bound by the Rome
Statute until March 17, 2019."
-----
Question: If the case was moot to begin with, can we assign any jurisprudential
value to the Court's pronouncements in this decision that go beyond the
dismissal of the petitions?
115
116
117
118
119
120
Supreme Court promulgates new clemency guidelines for disbarred lawyers who
seek reinstatement to the Bar. The guidelines institute a fact-finding procedure to
determine whether the claims offered by the disbarred lawyer in support of
clemency are accurate. (Nunez v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 5054, 2
March 2021; uploaded 8 July 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/19790/
121
122
123
SC declares that in cases of sale governed by the Civil Code, of conjugal
property by a husband without the consent of the wife is voidable, not void. Prior
jurisprudence to the contrary is now abandoned.
The SC reiterated though that under Family Code (which took effect in 1987)
such sales by one spouse without the consent of the other is clearly null and
void. The sale in question took place in 1967, or prior to enactment of Family
Code.
(Sps. Cueno v. Sps. Bautista, G.R. No. 246445, 2 March 2021 )
Sana v. People, G.R. No. 224469, 5 Jan 2021 (uploaded 11 June 2021) - With
the expanded recognition of Indigenous Peoples' rights under the Constitution,
the IPRA, and jurisprudence, now all seeking to reconcile the regalian doctrine,
the civilist concept of land ownership, and IP's sui generis ownership of ancestral
domains, there is now reasonable doubt whether a Mangyan who cuts down
timber within their Ancestral Domain can be convicted for illegal logging under
Sec. 77 of the Forestry Code. The key question was whether an IP can be
deemed as "without authority from the State" to cut timber, as required under
Sec. 77.
124
Vote was 10-3 to acquit. Majority opinion by J. Lazaro-Javier. Dissents by CJ
Peralta (joined by Hernando) and J. Lopez; concurring opinions by JJ. Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, and Zalameda (joined by Gaerlan)
Simply, a police blotter.
125
—President to run as VP. Or Pres. to run again. Duterte. Erap cases.
126
127
128
Tan-Andal v. Andal—PI in Art. 36 is medical but legal concept. Not mandatory
doctor. Totality of evidence.
129
130
Marcos v. Robredo.
I told myself I won't waste time with trolls, but I've been asked for comments
about this particular post twice on different groups, so let me just put them here.
Let me put the comments in the context of the original post, preceded by the
">>>": SORRY, MAHABA NA NAMAN ITO:
MGA KATANUNGAN TUNGKOL SA PHILIPPINES VS. CHINA ARBITRATION

CASE
1. ANO ANG SOVEREIGNTY?
Ang ibig sabihin ng sovereignty ay full and absolute control and authority within a
territory.
Ang territory ng isang bansa ay nagtatapos sa kanyang territorial waters, 12
nautical miles mula sa kanyang baseline. Pati ang airspace, bed at subsoil ng
territorial waters ay kasama rin sa territory ng isang bansa. Sa lahat ng iyan may
sovereignty ang isang bansa. (Kung may overseas territory ka, obviously may
sovereignty ka rin doon).
And in international relations, you can only have sovereignty kung i-recognize
yan ng ibang bansa. Hindi ibig sabihin na sinabi mong may sovereignty ka, may
sovereignty ka an.
..
>>>MISLEADING. Tita, sovereignty per se does not disappear simply because a
country does not recognize it, otherwise it is that easy for another country to take
it away. You are confusing the concept and fact of State sovereignty with political
recognition of State sovereignty, which then involves the distinction between de
facto and de jure sovereignty.
>>>E.G.: Tingnan mo Taiwan, do you think it is not exercising sovereignty
because it is not politically recognized by the majority of States due to the One
China Policy? Non-recognition by other States does not nullify the fact that
Taiwan is exercising sovereignty and self-determination for itself and its people.
Sovereignty exists because it is exercised, it ceases when it is not, such as when
the State gives it up.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------
2. MAY SOVEREIGNTY BA TAYO SA ATING EEZ?
Ang EEZ ay ang buong 200 NM from the baseline. Ayon sa international law, ang
parte lang ng EEZ na may sovereignty tayo ay ang 12NM na territorial waters.
131
Pagkatapos ng 12 NM na yan, ang mayroon lang tayo ay sovereign rights at
limited jurisdiction.
..
>>>OK yan mostly, pero hindi "limited jurisdiction" and tawag dun sa literature;
"functional jurisdiction" ang mas appropriate, kasi it reflects the functional
approach taken by the international community in dealing with issues of
jurisdiction over the ocean.
.
----------------------------------------------------------------
3. ANO ANG SOVEREIGN RIGHTS?
Ang sovereign rights ay partial at economic in nature. Ito po ay karapatan ng
isang bansa na i-explore, i-exploit, i-conserve, at i-manage ang living and
nonliving natural resources sa loob ng kanyang EEZ.
Mayroon din tayong sovereign rights para sa economic exploitation at exploration
ng EEZ para sa mga activities na katulad ng energy production from the water,
currents, at wind.
..
>>>MISLEADING. Ini-ismol mo masyado. Sovereign rights under UNCLOS is not
merely a "partial and economic" right, it is a right recognized under UNCLOS and
agreed upon by all States Parties, and therefore it is also a legal right. This legal
right binds other States to recognize, respect and give due regard to it, and to
comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State that carry it out and
protect it. This is essentially a property right that inures to the State instead of
individuals. There are no property rights if no one respects them, or just anyone
else can take them. When one State takes away the resources subject of the
sovereign rights of another State, there is a violation of the right, from which
arises a dispute, and for which there is a remedy.
.
-------------------------------------------------------------
4. ANO ANG LIMITED JURISDICTION?
Ang jurisdiction ay ang kapangyarihan ng isang bansa na ipatupad ang kaniyang
batas within an area of its responsibility.
Ang jurisdiction po ng isang bansa sa kanyang EEZ ay LIMITADO lamang sa
mga aspetong ito:
- pag-tayo at paggamit ng mga artificial islands, installations, and structures -
marine scientific research
- protection and conservation and preservation of the marine environment
.
.
>>>MISLEADING AND FALSE. Mars, una sa lahat, yung 1st paragraph mo,
definition yan ng "geographic jurisdiction". Pangalawa, read UNCLOS Art 56(1).
132
Ang linaw-linaw niyan, the coastal State HAS ALL THREE of what is described in
the 3 paragraphs "a", "b", and "c". Ano itong sinasabi mo na limitado siya sa
56(1)(b) lang? Pirated ba ang kopya mo?
>>>Pangatlo, between sovereign rights under Art 56(1) and jurisdictions under
Art 56(2), sovereign rights is the superior and broader power especially when it
comes to the living resources of the EEZ. Kaya nga letter "a" siya eh. The
concept of "sovereign rights" in Art 56(2)(a) is broader than the specific
jurisdictions identified in Art 56(2)(b), because sovereign rights grant all the
ancillary or related jurisdiction necessary to exercise and enforce those rights,
the authority for which is stated in Art 73. Basahin mo yun, Art 73 says the State
may take measures necessary "to ensure compliance with the laws and
regulations" including boarding, inspection, arrest, and judicial proceedings.
>>>Sobrang mali sabihin na States are limited to only jurisdiction over the three
items under Art 56(2)(b). Ang linaw-linaw ng sinabi ng Art 56(1): "In the EEZ, the
coastal State has:" tapos tatlo yung enumeration. Kung letter "b" lang , e di dapat
ang title ng Part V ay "Limited Jurisdiction Zone". Bokya ka sa Finals kapag
ganyan sagot mo.
..
-------------------------------------------------------------
5. ANO ANG SAKOP NG ATING EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS SA ATING EEZ AND
CAN WE SHARE?
Ang mga non-living resources lang po katulad ng langis.
Nasa atin naman iyon kung i-share natin. Hindi po labag sa sovereign rights ang
pag-share ng resources. Hindi rin labag sa konsepto ng sovereign rights kung
ayaw natin. Kung maganda naman kasi ang deal why not. Pero hindi natin
malalaman kung maganda ang deal kung hindi tayo makikipag-usap.
..
>>>FALSE. Una, basahin mo uli, UNCLOS Art 56(1). Both living and non-living
resources in the EEZ are subject of sovereign rights, that is very clearly written.
Pangalawa, non-living resources of the EEZ also refer to those in the water itself,
not only seabed and subsoil. In case you don't know, the non-living resources in
seawater include dissolved minerals like salt, metals, and the component
elements; they also include energy and any other uses of the water. Pangatlo,
rights over oil and gas rights per se are continental shelf rights, and they are
governed by the continental shelf regime, not the EEZ regime; nakalagay yan sa
Art 56(3). Dahil sa overlap ng continental shelf regime (UNCLOS Part VI) at EEZ
regime (UNCLOS Part V), effectively, ang nire-regulate ng EEZ ay mainly living
resources and non-living resources in the waters.
.
--------------------------------------------------------------
6. EH SA MGA LIVING RESOURCES PO KATULAD NG ISDA?
133
Ito po ay kumplikadong usapin.
a) Ang sabi po sa UNCLOS, dapat i-determine ng isang coastal State,
katulad ng Pilipinas, ang kanyang “capacity to harvest the living resources” na
nasa kanyang EEZ. Kung walang capacity ang isang State na i-harvest ang
“entire allowable catch” dapat ay bigyan niya ng access ang ibang bansa sa
“surplus" na ito.
b) Ang highly migratory po na mga isda dapat ay makipag-coordinate sa
ibang bansa para sa conservation at optimum utilisation nito, both sa loob at
labas ng EEZ.
c) May karapatan din ang mga landlocked States within our region na i-
exploit ang surplus ng living resources sa ating EEZ
..
>>>MISLEADING. Although mayroon ngang ganyang obligations, walang
nakalagay sa UNCLOS na bago ka mag-exercise ng EEZ rights ay kailangan mo
muna gawin lahat yan. Ang EEZ rights hindi conditional, at halos lahat ng
obligations diyan sa UNCLOS Part V, concurrent. Maghanap ka ng bansa na
nagsasabi na hindi pa sila nag-e-exercise ng EEZ jurisdiction nila dahil wala pa
silang TAC, surplus at access arrangement: wala kang makikita. Lahat sila nage-
exercise ng EEZ rights & jurisdiction nila kahit wala yan.
.
.
d) Traditional fishing grounds.
Although there’s nothing in UNCLOS that compels us to respect the traditional
fishing activities of other States in our waters, the international practice is to
respect traditional fishing activities (sharing po ang trend).
..
>>>FALSE. Mali ka diyan, baligtad ang trend. Traditional fishing rights are NOT
automatically recognized in favor of other States in the EEZ; these were precisely
abrogated through the EEZ regime. Yun ang punto ng pagiging "exclusive," sa
coastal State lang siya unless pumayag siya na pumasok ang iba. Even if
surrounding nations have been habitually fishing in the SCS historically, the EEZ
gave the fishing rights to the coastal State, and any continuation of foreign fishing
activity requires agreement between the fishing State and coastal State.
Traditional fishing rights of the nationals of other States require recognition and
approval by the coastal State. They exist independently as a matter of law only in
the territorial sea (jurisprudence) and archipelagic waters (Art 51(1), and even
then again can only be exercised on the basis of a specific agreement/treaty
between the States involved, or after adjudication/arbitration where the rights
were an issue.
134
>>> Note ha, the Philippines has NEVER expressly recognized or accepted
traditional fishing rights in favor of anyone other than Filipino citizens. See Act
4003, PD 704, RA 8550, RA 10654, and the 1987 Constitution Art XII s.2.
.
Halimbawa:
..
>>>OY TITA, MALI LAHAT ng example mo. Hindi mo yata binasa ang footnotes
nung pinagkuhanan mo.
..
- Ang India at Sri Lanka ni-recognize nila ang traditional fishing rights ng
kanilang mga mangingisda sa Palk Bay (1974)
..
>>>Palk Bay was subject of a boundary agreement in 1974, and a fisheries
agreement in 1976. These were signed before UNCLOS entered into force in
1994. Tapos, kapag binasa mo yung fisheries agreement, both sides agreed their
fishermen will not fish on the other’s waters without express permission. Ang
tawag dito, reciprocal fisheries licensing agreement, hindi automatic recognition
ng traditional fishing rights in the EEZ. In fact, the fisheries disputes are still
ongoing because the 1974 agreement actually impedes traditional fishing from
continuing. Isa pa, this is a large BAY na naka-ipit between India and Sri Lanka,
na halos magkasinglapit ng Mindoro at Palawan. Hindi ito gaya ng West
Philippine Sea at South China Sea.
..
- Ang Japan, kahit nag-establish siya ng 200NM fishery zone, ni-recognize
pa rin niya ang traditional fishing rights ng mga mangingisda na galing sa China
at South Korea kahit sa fishery zone na iyan (1978)
..
>>>MALI NA NAMAN, MARS! Yung recognition na yan, 1978 pa yan bago
magka-bisa ang UNCLOS. Nung nagkabisa ang UNCLOS noong 1994, pinasa
ng Japan ang Law 74 on the EEZ and Continental Shelf, kung saan na-terminate
ang rights in their favor. Kasi yung China ginagamit siya para maka-isa sa
Senkaku Islands. So baligtad na naman ang katotohanan: in-abrogate nila ang
traditional fishing rights nung kapit-bahay nila.
..
- Sa 1998 Eritrea vs. Yemen Arbitration Case sinabi ng Tribunal na even
“sovereignty is not inimical to, but rather entails, the perpetuation of the
traditional fishing regime in the region.” At dahil dyaan, kahit na ang sovereignty
ng mga isla ay ibinigay sa Yemen, sinabi ng Tribunal na dapat i-ensure niya ang
“traditional fishing regime of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both
Eritrea and Yemen" and they "shall be preserved for the benefit of the lives and
the livelihoods of this poor and industrious order of men.”
135
..
>>>HELLOoo, yung traditional fishing rights as arbitral award dito, were existing
over the waters of the disputed islands and the islands themselves. Sa madaling
salita, nasa territorial sea hindi sa EEZ. Tingnan mo muna yung kaso bago mo
icite, bagsak ka sa recit pag hanggang digest ka lang.
..
- sa decision ng Tribunal, the Scarborough Shoal is declared as traditional
fishing grounds of both Filipino and Chinese fishermen. At kahit one day
mapatunayan na ang Pilipinas ay may sovereignty sa Scarborough Shoal, hindi
pwede paalisin ang mga Chinese fishermen dahil traditional fishing grounds din
nila yan. Remember yung sinabi sa Eritrea vs Yemen? At syempre hindi rin
pwedeng gambalain ng mga Chinese ang pangingisda ng mga Pilipino
..
>>>HELLOOO AGAINnn, ang Scarborough Shoal mayroong territorial sea, dahil
mayroon siya 6 na bato above water at high tide. Yung traditional fishing rights
diyan sa territorial sea ng Scarborough, hindi sa buong EEZ ng Pinas.
..
Ang buong South China Sea actually ay traditional fishing grounds ng LAHAT ng
mangingisda ng lahat ng bansa na nakapalibot dito.
So, it’s either maging swapang tayo or makipag-kasunduan tayo sa lahat ng
bansa na i-respeto ang ating common tradition with them.
Isa pa, the ecological crisis in the South China Sea (dwindling fish stocks o ang
pagbaba ng stocks ng mga isda) URGENTLY requires na makipag-cooperate
tayo whether we like it or not. Ang exploitation kasi ng mga isda sa dagat ay
economically managed, the new thinking is ecosystem-based fisheries
management, and that requires multilateral efforts kasi wala namang kinikilalang
EEZ or territory ang kalikasan.
..
>>>OK totoo naman, agree ako diyan na urgent ang ecological crisis as SCS.
Pero kaya nga lumalala, kasi ang China, pinaglipana na ang fishing fleet niya
kahit sa tubig ng ibang bansa pagkatapos wasakin at ubusin yung coastal
resources nila. Alam mo ba, China harvests at least 40% ng total fish catch a
SCS based on official statistics? Kita mo naman ang fishing fleet nila, grabe
makahigop ng pangisdaan yan sa laki at kagara ng mga fishing fleet nila. Tapos,
sister was sila pake kung destructive ang fishing nila. Wasak na wasak na mga
coral reef dahil sa clam diggers nila, umaabot na nga dito sa Pangasinan at
Visayas. Malaki kasi kita nila, isang giant clam at least P25,000 ang bentahan,
para gawin lababo. Ang kapalit, kabuhayan ng mangingisda kasi durog ang
bahura at wall nang tirahan ang mga isda. Tayo, pinipigilan natin ang muro-ami
at dynamite fishing kasi nasisira ang bahura; sila, dinudurog talaga nila. Tapos
ayaw mo silang pigilan?
136
.
---------------------------------------------------------------
7. MAPAPAALIS BA NATIN ANG CHINA SA ATING EEZ?

Hindi. Walang sinabi ang Arbitral Tribunal na dapat paalisin ang China. Ang
sinabi lang ng Tribunal ay hindi nila pwedeng gambalain ang ating mga
mangingisda at ang oil exploration sa Reed Bank na ginagawa ng kumpanya ni
Manny Pangilinan.
And remember, the Philippines has no sovereignty over its EEZ. That means,
walang power to exclude in its most extreme form ang Pilipinas sa zone na iyan.
Sabi nga ng yumaong US Supreme Court Justice na si Antonin Scalia:
sovereignty is inherently the power to exclude people who have no right to be
there. Sa sovereignty lang yan buong-buo at presence based, meaning kung
walang karapatan ang isang tao na tumapak sa territory mo, pwede mo syang
tanggalin kesehoda pa kung anong ginagawa niya. Sa sovereign rights, partial
lang ang exclusion at related sa activity at hindi sa mere presence. Generally,
the only activities that UNCLOS doesn't allow in your EEZ are economic in
nature (exploration and exploitation ng living and non-living resources); kasi
ikaw ang may exclusive rights dyaan, specially sa non-living resources. Non-
economic activities are not forbidden; tapos may traditional fishing rights pa.
They can be present there basta hindi nila lalabagin ang karapatan mo. So yung
military vessel issue nga ng China sa 2nd Thomas Shoal hindi pinaki-alaman ng
Arbitral Court even though na the court decided na yang shoal na iyan ay nasa
EEZ ng Pilipinas. They can be there, hwag lang nilang pakikialaman ang
ginagawa ng mga mangingisda natin at ng exploration sa oil.
..
>>>FALSE AND MISLEADING. Sobra. Una, sinabi nga ng Tribunal na yung
fishing ng China as look ng EEZ natin ay in contravention of PH rights and
jurisdictions. Ibig sabihin non, mali sila, wala silang karapatan manatili duon kung
ayaw natin. Entonces, dapat umalis sila. Kino-confuse mo naman ang issue.
Dahil wala silang karapatan doon, sa negotiation between us dapat ang objective
natin ay umalis sila. Yun ang value noong arbitration award, kasi alam din ng
lahat ng ibang bansa dapat umalis sila. Kaya nga sila galit ang galit at
nagmamatigas, alam nila yon at ayaw nila. Kung totoo na walang ganung
implikasyon, bakit sila ganoon kagalit, aber? Dahil hindi nila type si PNoy?
>>>Pangalawa, See UNCLOS Art 58 and 73. Other States are obligated to
comply with coastal State laws and regulations for the EEZ under Art 58, and
coastal States are allowed to enforce them against other States under Art 73.
Hindi mo kailangan ang sovereignty, dahil mayroon kang sovereign rights. Yun
ang ibig sabihin noon. That you have the sovereign rights means that all other
States are bound to respect your EEZ rights to comply with the law and
137
regulations to explore, exploit, conserve their natural resources. PH therefore has
a legal right to demand that CN withdraw from the PH EEZ, and not fish in it
except under a fisheries agreement with conditions such as those in Art 62(4), all
in compliance with PH law, when we choose to do it. Sa ngayon, hindi pwede.
Hintayin mo na lang ang Cha-cha kung gusto mo, subukin ilagay sa Constitution
muna. Until then, alis ka muna.
>>>Pa-Scalia-Scalia ka pa, yung dating pinaka-conservative na ayaw sa
LGBTQX, how ironic, na sinundan mo pa ng 'the only activities that UNCLOS
doesn't allow in your EEZ are economic in nature.' Eh ano ba akala mo sa
Chinese fishing, hindi economic??? Bakit sila nandun, naglalamyerda? Ah oo
nga, maritime militia nga pala, so okay lang sa iyo.
>>>As for 2nd Thomas Shoal, kaya walang ma-say ang Tribunal, kasi nga
military activity which is beyond their jurisdiction, yun lang. Hindi dahil walang
karapatan ang Pinas, kasi nga sinabi din naman nila na 2nd Thomas Shoal is
part of the PH EEZ and continental shelf. So big sabihin, hindi pwede mangisda
o maghanap ng oil ang China na walang pahintulot sa Pinas. Hindi yung huwag
lang nila paki-alaman ang Pilipino. Magka-iba yon.
.
------------------------------------------------------------
8. ANONG MANGYAYARI SA MGA ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS NG CHINA NA NASA

ATING EEZ?
Although sinabi ng Tribunal na violation ito sa UNCLOS, walang sinabi ang
Tribunal kung anong dapat gawin.
Hindi rin sinabi ng Tribunal na dapat lisanin iyon ng China at ibigay sa Pilipinas.
Wala rin naman kasing nakalagay sa UNCLOS kung anong dapat gawin sa mga
naitayo na.
Furthermore, UNCLOS only said na ang mga bansa ay may jurisdiction about
establishments of artificial islands within their EEZ. Hindi po ibig sabihin nito eh
yung mga naitayong artificial islands, structures, etc ay ikaw ang may ownership.
Ikaw lang ang binigyan ng UNCLOS ng karapatang mag-regulate. Ngayon kung
naviolate yang karapatan mo, it doesn't mean you will have ownership over those
structures. Walang nakalagay sa UNCLOS about that. Hwag mag-assume.
..
>>>AYUSIN MO YAN, medyo pilit kasi. Tama ka, walang sinabi ang Tribunal
kung ano gagawin sa artificial islands. Pero hindi nga naman hiningi ng Pilipinas
na sabihin nila. Remember, inumpisahan ng China yung mga yon 2014, or during
the proceedings, at minadali nga nila matapos ang main works by 2016. Sinadya
talaga nila yun para nga fait accompli na. Kaya nga sabi ng Tribunal contrary to
international law ang paggawa ng mga isla na yun, unfair kasi. Ganyan ang ugali
138
ng gusto mong kausap, walang paki at nang-i-isa. Ok lang sa iyo naman, kasi
nga, power.
>>>Pero, tandaan mo, sabi ng Tribunal the construction on Mischief Reef is
contrary to the PH EEZ/CS rights & jurisdiction, and it was not subject to valid
appropriation by CN. No rights arise in favor of CN from its act of constructing an
artificial island on Mischief Reef. Even if the Tribunal did not say who owns the
islands, that does not diminish the fact that they were made contrary to PH rights
and jurisdictions and does not legitimize any further violation thereof. Sovereignty
not necessary. You don't have to own the house to be subject to theft or damage
to your property.
>>>Sa ownership noong islands, tama ka, walang sinabing ganyan sa UNCLOS
at hindi naman ito iginigiit sa ngayon. Pero ang hindi mo gets, kaya may ganung
argument, it is based on the principle of accession. Sa lupa, if the land is yours,
and someone builds a house on it in bad faith and without your permission
(squatter kumbaga), when you recover the land the house also belongs to you.
The accessory follows the principal. So yung argument na dapat sa atin din yung
artificial islands na ginawa ng China, may basehan yon na legal principle. And
this principle is one of those that can fall under "general principles of law
recognized by all civilized nations" IF this dispute were to be settled legally and
fairly. Kaya ganyan ang sinabi ni Teddyboy Locsin. Hindi lang siya nag-
aassume.
.
-------------------------------------------------------------
9. PAPAANO PO NATIN SILA MAPAPAALIS SA MGA ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS
NA IYON?
Negotiate with them or launch a war with them. Pero one thing is for sure, kung
ikaw ang nasa posisyon ng China lilisanin mo ba ang mga islang iyon at ibibigay
sa Pilipinas? No.
If you are really concerned about those islands, the most constructive way to deal
with them is to talk to China regarding how both of you can benefit from them.
Negotiate. Negotiate. Negotiate.
..
>>>Tama ka diyan, negotiation is the proper recourse short of war. But that does
not mean that PH should give up any of its bargaining strengths. Pero ang hirap
sa diskurso mo sister, lahat ng boladas mo, walang panghahawakan ang
Pilipinas. "waley siyang sovereignty, waley rights, sunod ka lang, wala ka
magagawa." Ano pang pag-uusapan, limos? What do you think will be the
outcome if you go into a negotiation thinking that there is nothing you can do, that
you have no rights, that there is no law to protect you?
>>>Kitang-kita mo naman, those illegally-constructed islands are military bases,
and they are used to further violate PH rights and jurisdictions elsewhere in its
139
EEZ/CS. Sige nga, kung wala kang karapatan at all, at wala kang kahit anong
poder, at wala kang kahit ano basehan na protektahan ang EEZ/CS mo, paano
ka mag-negotiate? Ano'ng bargaining power meron ka? Kung ganyan ka
magnegotiate, tenk yu na lang ha, hanap na lang ako ng iba kasi wala ako
mapapala.
.
-------------------------------------------------------------
10. SO GANOON NA LANG IYON?
May legitimate interest po ang China kung bakit nila itinayo ang mga islang iyon:
security.
Although the establishment of those artificial islands within the EEZ of the
Philippines is illegal dahil walang permission ng Pilipinas, China has a legitimate
reason why they need to have a strong foothold in the South China Sea. Legality
and legitimacy are not the same in international relations.
Ang halos lahat ng trade na dumadaan sa South China Sea ay galing o papunta
sa China. If you are going to study Chinese history, you'll understand the painful
lessons China had to learn by not securing the flow of trade to and from its
shores. China has experienced its most humiliating defeats from the Europeans
through that sea. So hindi mo talaga mapapaalis ang China dyaan dahil their
security would be at stake. If that trade gets obstructed, China’s economy will be
in peril. And you don’t want a big country like China to fail because it will have
negative repercussions in the entire world, and it will be much worse than the
Global Financial Crisis.
Ngayon, dahil hardliner ka, eto: If the Philippines can ensure China that it can
guarantee security sa flow of trade to and from China, then by all means paalisin
ninyo sila. If the Philippines has the capacity to secure that trade for China,
paalisin ninyo ang China.
Even the United States secures the flow of maritime trade going to and coming
from the US by deploying its navy and having naval outposts. China is simply
doing what any country that has an economy with a global reach is doing. Kaya
nga napaka-unreasonable and illogical ng mga concerns about China violating
freedom of navigation dahil most of the navigation going on in that sea ay may
kinalaman sa trade with China: sa Vietnamese side ng South China Sea
dumadaan lahat, while sa Philippine side dumadaan yung ibang papunta at
galing ng Australia. Why would they stop freedom of navigation, eh maritime
trade is the artery of their economy?? Ano yan suicide?
Kahit ang Pilipinas ang nasa lugar ng China, the Philippines will do the same. So
recognise the legitimate interests of China and see how the Philippines and
China can work together in order for the Chinese interests to be not inimical to
the legitimate interests of our country. And you will not know their legitimate
140
interests and how we can reconcile our interests with them if you are not going to
talk to them.
..
>>>MISLEADING. Having a legitimate interest is not an excuse for acting
contrary to law, nor for taking away the legitimate rights and interests of other
nations. The whole point of having international law is to keep more powerful
countries from stepping on smaller ones. That is exactly what is being advocated
here: mas malakas and China, kailangan nina ang security, kaya tanggapin an
lang natin an gagawin niya and gusto niya, kahit tayo ang agrabyado and
nawawalan ng rights or resources under the law that we previously agreed to
abide by. Kung ganyan lang pala, wala ka talagang kwentang bansa. Kahit sino
malakas sa iyo, tiklop ka, ibigay mo lahat ng gusto nila.
>>>Tama ka, we have to talk with them. At yun nga ang ginawa ng
administration, talk with them. In the meantime, ano'ng nagyari? Patuloy pa rin
ang pag-armado sa artificial islands, patuloy pa rin ang pagkuha at pagwasak sa
natural resources, patuloy pa rin ang pagpigil sa ating energy exploration,
patuloy pa rin ang pagdeploy ng CCG, PLAN at maritime militia.
.
-------------------------------------------------------------
11. NAKU MASAMA TALAGA ANG INTENTION NG CHINA!
You can never know their intention if you are not going to talk to them. If you
don't talk to them and assume na masama ang intention nila, all your actions will
be based on an illlusion.
Obviously, you can never fully know the intentions of another country even by
talking to them. The solution to this problem is talking to them regularly. Eh yung
syota mo nga hanggang ngayon hindi mo ma-intindihan, eh isang bansang may
complex history, different culture, at language pa kaya? So kapit lang. Not talking
to them and not having a good relationship with them don't put you in a better
position.
..
>>>Oy tita, this is not a matter of whether "masama" ang intention. Gaya ng sabi
mo, tingnan mo lang ang interests and needs ng China: ultimately, 1.4 Billion
people to keep happy with all the First World amenities, and external security,
even if that security comes at the expense of the security of the surrounding
smaller countries. This is not about being "good" or "bad", this is about simple
logic: CN needs more resources, CN needs to absolutely control the seas and
dominate the countries around her vulnerable southern coast in order to feel
secure. Think about that and what that entails when you talk with them, and
isipin what role they would give the PH to play in that.
.
--------------------------------------------------------------
141
12. SO SA ATIN ANG SPRATLYS?
The Arbitral Tribunal didn’t say anything about that. Hwag kang ambisyosa.
.
.
>>>OK, yan tama yan.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------
13. SO ANONG MANGYAYARI SA SCARBOROUGH SHOAL?
Both Filipino and Chinese fishermen are allowed to operate there. The Arbitral
Court didn’t award the Scarborough Shoal to the Philippines or to China because
the Tribunal has no authority to determine issues of territorial sovereignty.
Pero kahit na one day mapatunayan na ang Pilipinas o ang China ay may
sovereignty sa Scarborough Shoal, hindi nila pwedeng paalisin ang mga
mangingisda ng isa't isa kasi nga traditional fishing grounds ng kapwa nila
mangingisda ang shoal.
That's why the decision said, mali ang China sa paggambala sa mga
mangingisda natin, pero hindi nangangahulugan na mga Pilipinong mangingisda
lamang ang pwedeng mangisda doon. Both Chinese and Filipino fishermen have
the right to be there. In short, walang swapangan.
..
>>>Scarborough Shoal is continuously being dug up and destroyed by Chinese
fishermen. That's a fact. Kahit DENR, last 2019 nagbigay ng report as NSA na
patuloy pa rin ang destruction dahil sa clam diggers nila, at nag-complain na
walang nangyayari sa Bilateral Consultation Mechanisms kung saan nila ni-raise
yung issue twice before then. Ganyan ang pakikipag-negotiate sa China. Right
now, wa sila pake sa churva mong sharing-sharing, they are simply taking.
Tingnan mo sa Google Earth, 500+ hectares ng Scarborough ang kinalawkaw
nila, kita sa satellite dahil ganun ka-massive ang damage. Every year more of the
reef is turned to rubble, and even our fishermen who can only fish outside the
reef are finding it hard to make a profit out of the dwindling fisheries there.
They are the ones in control there since 2013. So, sino ang tunay na suwapang?
.
---------------------------------------------------------------
14. SO ANG SOUTH CHINA SEA AY WEST PHILIPPINE SEA?
Yan ang sabi ng propaganda ng Aquino Administration. The Arbitral Tribunal
doesn’t refer to the sea as West Philippine Sea but as South China Sea.
..
>>>Chika. See Admin Order No. 29, s. 2012. WPS refers only waters under our
jurisdiction, not the entire SCS.
.
---------------------------------------------------------------
142
15. SO ATIN ANG SOUTH CHINA SEA?
Walang sinabing ganyan ang Arbitration Court. Hwag ka nga.
..
>>>Wala naman nagsabi na buong SCS atin. Hwag ka mag-assume.
.
----------------------------------------------------------------
16. MAKA-CHINA KA BA?
I’m not for China. I'm for international stability and realistic thinking. And I serve
my country by educating my people on how international relations really work.
.
>>>OK. Nagkakataon lang na sa analysis mo na medyo pamali-mali, between
China and Philippines, down lagi ang Pinas. Charot.
.
----------------------------------------------------------------
17. WHAT'S YOUR BACKGROUND AT MASYADO KANG
NAGMAMARUNONG?
Graduate po ako ng Combined Major in World Politics and Global Justice, minor
in International Development, magna cum laude, sa Leiden University
CollegeThe Hague. Some of my key courses are International Law, Jurisdiction,
Advocacy & Litigation, Transnational History, Sovereignty and Statehood, Peace
and Conflict Psychology, Conflict Resolution and Settlement, and Foreign Policy
and Diplomacy at Multilateral Institutions (both I studied under a former NATO
Secretary General).
I studied din po sa UCLA ng US Foreign Policy at Chinese International
Relations. At "Global Poverty, Local Solutions" sa International Institute of Social
Studies
I also have a Master's in International Relations at Leiden University. Nagtuturo
rin po ako ng International Relations sa isang European university.
I have at least 10 years of international experience and worked with people at the
international level, such as international NGOs, private international defence and
consultancy firm (on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear threats), and high-
level diplomats.
So I just don't have the academic training on international relations, may practical
experience din po ako.
..
>>>OK. Impressive credentials. I am sure you are good at what you do, but you
don't do Law. You are not a lawyer, but you're interpreting law. Alam mo 'day,
tawag diyan malpractice. Parang yung mga nag papa-brain surgery sa dentista.
.
>>>Caveat emptor. Char.
-------------------------------------------------------------
143
144
145
On the admissibility as evidence of a police blotter entry. It had been the
employee of the plaintiff who had identified before the trial court the police
certification about the blotter entry. (Guerrero v. PPSII, G.R. No. 223178, 9
December 2020; uploaded on 22 Feb 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/17426/
Supreme Court, apparently for the first time, and in a pro hac vice ruling,
determines whether domestic fights (with allegations of physical violence)
involving a lawyer and their spouse may be the subject of a disbarment
proceeding. (Cristobal v. Atty. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12702, 10 November 2020;
uploaded on 22 February 2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/17478/
Supreme Court: A legitimate child may legally change their surname to that of
their mother's, instead of their father's, notwithstanding Article 364 of the Civil
Code ("Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.") There is a 1980 SC decision already to that effect, but what is
interesting about this new decision is how, in interpreting the provisions, the
Court invokes the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, as
enshrined by the Constitution, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, and RA 7192 (Women in Development and
Nation Building Act).
The case is Alanis v. CA, G.R. No. 216425, 11 Nov. 2020 (uploaded 22 Feb
2021) https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/17424/
The Supreme Court has abandoned a jurisprudential rule first established in 1951
(Villa v. Ybanez) that the absence of a signature and approval of the
provincial/city/state prosecutor on the face of an Information is a jurisdictional
defect that dismisses the case. This also means that the ground to quash under
Section 3(d), Rule 117 may now be waived by the accused, because it no longer
is a jurisdictional defect.
The case is Gomez v. People (G.R. No. 216824, 10 November 2020; uploaded
15 February 2021). Ponencia by J. Gesmundo, vote was unanimous. Concurring
opinions by JJ. Perlas-Bernabe and Delos Santos.
146
Listen to ATL Orals.
147
148
149
150
Marcos v. Robredo here:
https://www.manilatimes.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/RESO-PET-NO005.pdf
151
152
What constitute “Con-Ass”? Comm. House. House. Senate. Congress. ? Good
question.
New decision concerning plea of guilt for capital offenses. By an 8-6 vote, the SC
held that after an accused pleads guilty for a capital offense, the accused shall
be acquitted if the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite the
opportunity to do so. Guidelines were also issued on the proper course of action
in case of such pleas of guilt.
The 6 dissenters (JJ. Perlas-Bernabe, Lazaro-Javier, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos

Santos, and Gaerlan) would have sustained instead the Court of Appeals, which
instead ordered a remand of the case for reception of prosecution's evidence.
The case is People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, 29 Sept. 2020; uploaded on 7
January 2021. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/16267/
Lawyer who notarized two versions of the same deed of sale (the second
containing a lower sale price to minimize capital gains taxes) is suspended by the
Supreme Court for 2 years. (Lopez v. Atty. Ramos, A.C. 12081, 24 Nov 2020)
153
154
155
Dr. Treyes v. Larlar, G.R. No. 232579, 8 September 2020 (uploaded 20
November 2020). J. Caguioa ponente, in dissent are CJ Peralta, JJ. Leonen,
Gesmundo and Hernando. https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/15192/
156
157
#
158
159
Infidelity or having extramarital affair is considered “psychological violence,” the
Supreme Court said in a decision that affirmed the prison sentence of up to eight
years against a husband found guilty of having an affair and fathering three
children with his mistress.
Araza y Jarupay Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 247429. September 8, 2020
Mallari v. Pp. (2020)—

SC: Resisting arrest with light force is disobedience to authorities, not direct
assault. The Supreme Court (SC) has clarified that when a person being
apprehended by a police officer resists or uses force that is not dangerous, grave
or severe, the offense is resistance and disobedience to an agent of a person in
authority and not the more serious crime of direct assault. Mallari was accused of
drunkenly kicking the legs and slapping the face of Police Officer 2 (PO2)
Richard Navarro while the latter pacified her during a squabble at a billiard hall
on the morning of January 12, 2007.
In her defense, Mallari said the officer held her feet, pulled her to the ground, and
caused her to hit her head, neck and buttocks. She complained of unlawful
aggression against her honor and dignity.
The SC stressed that to be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or
the use of physical force against the authorities “must be serious.”
It noted that previous convictions for direct assault involved force more serve
than slapping and punching (such as seizing the officer by the throat, throwing
him to the ground, or hitting him with a club).
The SC pointed out that resistance would not really be possible without the use
of some force. If legislators intended to treat every use of force as a direct
assault, they would not have wasted words by coming up with a separate offense
of disobedience or resistance. “Although the charge is direct assault, the
prosecution was able to prove resistance or disobedience. These offenses have
similar elements, varying only as to the degree of seriousness of the offender’s
resistance. Direct assault necessarily includes resistance or disobedience,” read
the decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic Leonen.
Supreme Court affirms that under Sec. 5(i) of Violence Against Women/Children
Act, a man who leaves his family to cohabit with another woman could be found
guilty of psychological violence against his wife. Husband now faces jail time of
between 6 months to 8 years. Case is Araza v. People, G.R. No. 247429, 8
September 2020 (uploaded 21 October 2020) http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/14574/
160
Wish you were here. Take care of yourself always. Looking forward to that day
we meet. Tantamount to illicit, romantic affair.—Zerna v. Zerna (2020).
Disbarred. See Leonen’s dissent: No. While immoral but not gross. So, suspend
only for 3 years. Patay tao. Disbar pa. Kasi SC did not know the fact of his death
prior to decision.
The president may call a special session at any time. Sec. 15, Art VI, second
sentence 1987 Consti. Digong calls special session to resume 2021 budget.
Bert Pascua y Valdez Vs. People of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 250578. September 7, 2020. Supreme Court: An accused who pleads
guilty to a lesser offense pursuant to plea bargaining now allowed in drug cases
(per Estipona) may be eligible to probation even if originally charged for an
higher offense not covered by probation. (Pascua v People, G.R. No. 250578, 7
Sept 2020) http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/13968/.
People of the Philippines Vs. Maria Cristina P.

Sergio and Julius L. Lacanilao
G.R. No. 240053. October 9, 2019. Mary Jane Velosos’ deposition and written
interrogatories are akin to dying declaration. So no violation of consti
“confrontational clause” or face to face. This is a novel issue too. Leonen
concurred.
David v. SET (2016). Sen. Poe is natural-born citizen even if naturalized and
foundling. See too case on Poe as Presidential candidate.
Pp. v. Adbulah. Gr. No. 243941.(2020). Inventory in another barangay as muslim

area ang buy bust scene not valid and violates chain of custody requirements for
illegal sale: SALE AND CORPUS DELICTI. So, since violate chain of custody,
not prove second element of corpus delicti. None compliance of Sec. 21 (chain of
custody) may be done if a. Justified and b. Preserved integrity. Here, the reason
to violate Sec. 21 is simply Islamaphobia—hatred against the Islamic community
161
—can never be valid ground to justify failure to comply Sec. 21. See too Pp. v.
Sebilleno.
Magtoto v. Maguera. (1975) Miranda applies prospectively, not retroactively. See

dissents.
G.R. No. 207711, July 02, 2018

MARIA C. OSORIO Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
D E C I S I O N LEONEN, J.:
Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the
same to another without the investor's consent may be held criminally liable for
other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit
not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.
“Ayoko na” are words of resignation.—Estrada v. Desierto (2001).
In a recent decision denying plea of local swine producers to exclude a Thai

competitor from operating in the Philippines, the Supreme Court nonetheless
concedes that certain statements about the hortatory nature of the Filipino First
policies in Const made in Tanada v Angara (1997) may warrant revisiting in a
future case. —NFHFI v. BOI, G.R. No. 205835, 23 June 2020 (uploaded 28
September 2020)
[http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/13779/](https://t.co/WgTYZOkte5?amp=1)
Estopina v. Lobrigo and Sayre v. Xenos.
PBCOM V. REGISTER OF DEEDS. GR NO. 222958, March 11, 2020. Ponente

J.
Caguiao: “x x x if only to resolve the NOVEL issue presented before the Court.” A
registered owner who fails to prove the loss of his or her owner’s duplicate
certificate of title may not be barred from filing a new petition to replace the same.
In reconstitution, no conclusive adjudication of rights between adversarial
parties. So dismissal of first is without prejudice. Hence, res judicata does not
162
apply. Sec. 4, Rule 1, ROC provides for suppletory or analogous application of
the Rules in land registration, whenever practicable and convenient.
In March 2020, the Insurance Commission issued a legal opinion stating that
members of the LGBTI community may designate their partners as beneficiaries
in their insurance plan.
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=50D981FE-A36B4A37-
85D5-8432F6C7AB56
Angkla v. Comelec. Gr no. 246816. Allocation of party list seat. Banat is still
good. Need to declare unconstitutional: majority. So. 8. 7 voted dismiss petition
including Leonen. 7 dissent. 1 no part. So. Not enough vote.
In this case, GMA repeated engaged petitioners as camera operators for its
television programs. As such, petitioners performed activities which are within the
regular and usual business of GMA and not identifiably distinct or separate from
the other undertakings of the media network. The Court added that it would be
absurd to consider the nature of the petitioners’ work of operating cameras as
distinct or separate from the business of GMA, a broadcasting company that
produces, records and airs television programs. Leonen. GMA CAMERAMEN.
REGULAR.
RBG. US CONSTI NO NO. SETS SC. SO. CONGRESS MAY. PHIL. NO. 15.
Also. US. No duty to ecology. Here. Meron.
JUST IN: Supreme Court denies with finality lawyer Dino de Leon’s petition to
disclose Pres Duterte’s health records.
In 3 paragraphs, SC says no new arguments raised, De Leon failed to establish

Duterte’s ministerial duty to disclose health records and his right to demand it.
Mike Navallo, ABS-CBN News.
Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes Vs. The Senate of the

Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 208162. January 7, 2020: Leonen. Sec. 14 par. 4. of Anti Hazing Law
constitutional, not bill of attainder, not degrading punishment. The amendments
to RA 8049, RA 11053 being beneficial to accused applied retroactively.
163
BQ: Designated survivor and continuity government plan under 1987
Constitution.
SC: Spur-of-moment cursing by a professor at a minor student is not by itself

cause for the dismissal of the prof by the university. But subsequent aggravating
acts by the professor such as denying having cursed and filing counter-charges
vs the student could validate his dismissal. Adamson University Faculty Union v.
Adamson University (G.R. No. 227070, 9 Mar 2020). Leonen. In short, foul mouth
forgivable but not dishonesty and being an ass. Fair enough.
An employee is considered constructively dismissed if he or she is sexually

harassed by her superior and her employer failed to act on her complaint with
prompt and sensitivity.—Leonen in LBC v. Paco (2020).
Satire is constitutionally-protected speech. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC.

anent Beltran journalist “epicenter of solar system”.
Valdez principle on bail. Pp. V. Valdez
Under the Constitution, the President has the absolute authority to pardon or not
the pardon an offender subject only to three limitations, to wit: (1) pardon must be
made after conviction of the accused by final judgement; (2) impeachable offense
cannot be pardoned; and (3) election offense without favorable recommendation
of the Comelec cannot be pardoned. These constitutional limitations are
exclusive. In Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, the
Supreme Court, En Banc, said that the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only
when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution. The granting of
pardon within the limits of the Constitution is a political question, which is beyond
the review power of the judiciary. In Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211
September 15, 1989.
164
Ricalde v. Pp. (2015)
Marcos burial. Ocampo v. Enriquez (2016)
Pp. V. Zzz (2020)! No maria clara. Gender free.
Leonen on first rape boy victim.
A major new Supreme Court ruling that affects the construction industry and
PPP projects. Voting 14-1, the Court has affirmed the nullification of Rule III,
Sec. 3.1 of the Revised Rules Governing Licensing and Accreditation of
Constructors in the Philippines, insofar as it limits the issuance of regular
contractor's licenses to Filipino citizens. In effect, foreign firms may now
undertake construction activities in the Philippines under the same regular
license as Filipinos. The decision is PCAB v. MWC, decided on 10 March 2020
but uploaded only last Wednesday. The ponencia is by J. Gesmundo; with J.
Leonen filing a dissent while J. Perlas-Bernabe filing a concurrence.
Among the reasons offered by the Court: that there was no intent under R.A.
4566 (the Contractors' License Law) to restrict foreigners from regularly
undertaking construction activities in the Philippines, and that construction is not
a profession and therefore not covered by the constitutional provision restricting
the practice of professions to Filipinos.
[http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/12933/](http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/12933/) Leonen lone
dissent. Perlas-Bernabe: Concurred. 14-1.
Fuertes v. Senate, GR No. 298162 (Jan. 7, 2020), Leonen: Motion to Quash on

constitutional grounds, based on the theory that no crime when there is no law
punishing it. (Nullum crimen sine lege).
People of the Philippines Vs. Jerry Sapla y

Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
G.R. No. 244045. June 16, 2020 [Date Uploaded: 08/17/2020]
—If sole basis ang unverified report, not basis for probable cause to intrusive
search moving vehicle.
165
Death penalty. 1987 pwede. 2006 protocol. No. Resolve.
We welcome this pronouncement from the DOJ Secretary which says, "if the
contents merely express a position on public issues, such as one's stand against
the ATA (Anti-Terrorism Act), written on placards or streamers, the same
constitute a lawful exercise of one's freedom of speech or expression protected
by the Constitution."
As a religious doctrine, the church is prohibited from intervening with the affairs of
the state. This doctrine is based on the teaching of Jesus Christ “To render unto
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s.” For
example, in Canon Law clerics are generally not allowed to participate in partisan
politics or to hold offices which involve the exercise of civil power. (Cruz,
Philippines Political Law, 1987, p. 62) Ed Panlilio, a Roman Catholic priest, was
suspended from his pastoral duties for running for governor of Pampanga in
2007 because of a conflict between a role in political parties and in the church.
As a constitutional doctrine, the Church may meddle with the affairs of the state
in the absence of an implementing law. Query:Because of the alleged corrupt
practices of former President Estrada, the Archbishop of Manila and Catholic
priests participated in “People’s Power II”. Was the participation of the
Archbishop and several priests in “Edsa Revolution II” that ousted President
Estrada a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of Church and
State? Answer: No. The principle of separation of State and church is non-
selfexecuting. Said principle neither confers rights to question the intervention of
the Church in government affairs nor imposes obligation to the Church not to do
such intervention. It is merely a guideline for the government not to intervene in
affairs of the Church. However, it is not a guideline for the Church not to
intervene in governmental affairs. The Church cannot violate the constitutional
provision on separation. Only the State can offend it. According to Father
Joaquin G. Bernas the constitutional command on the separation of Church and
State is addressed to the State and not to the Church. (A Living Constitution,
Constitutional Issues arising during the Troubled Gloria Arroyo Presidency, Part
II, by Father Bernas, p. 110)
Panganiban cites four cases that he believed the High Court magistrates failed
to live up to their role as “conscience of society” and gave in to the mob: 1)
“Raising of hands in barangay assemblies to ratify a Constitution” (Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, March 31, 1973). Josue Javellana filed a class suit
questioning then President Ferdinand Marcos’ abuse of authority when he
created the Citizen Assemblies (barangays) to ratify the 1973 Constitution. The
166
SC voted 4-2 with four abstentions declaring that while there was no valid
ratification of Marcos’ “New Society”, there was “no further obstacle to the New
Constitution being considered in force and effect.”
2) “Opening the party-list to every Juan, including the rich and the powerful”
(Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, April 2, 2013). Panganiban described this as a
“reversal” of Ang Bagong Bayani vs Comelec (June 26, 2001) that “the law
crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of the Payatas hovel dwellers
cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.” He said then
Senior Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the ponente, convinced the majority of his
colleagues that ““the party-list system is intended to democratize political power
by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance
to win seats in the House of Representatives.”
3) Identification of the main plunderer to sustain a prosecution for plunder (Arroyo
v. People, July 19, 2016) Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who was
charged with plunder for signing “OK” on the alleged diversion of state lottery
funds, was able to walk free after close to four years of hospital detention after
the SC. Then Senior Justice Lucas P. Bersamin wrote “Such identification of
the main plunderer was not only necessary because the law required [it], but
also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all the accused to
be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for.” It
was Arroyo who appointed Panganiban as the 21st CJ in 2005. Panganiban
played a key role in swearing in then vice president Arroyo as new president in
2001 following the ouster of then president Joseph Estrada.
4) Ousting of a chief justice via quo warranto (Republic v Sereno, May 11, 2018).
Quo warranto cases are originally meant for election cheating cases but Solicitor
General Jose Calida, who reckoned correctly that he had a better chance of
getting his way with SC, used it to preempt Congress from exercising its sole
power to initiate impeachment proceedings against then Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno.
Do not Use ‘Unnecessary entanglement’ instead lack of cold neautrality of judge.

Miriam to corona impeachment. As former used church state separation.
"The touching of the knee was clearly unsolicited and uncalled for," the ruling
said, pointing out that it violated ethical standards for public service under the
Constitution and Republic Act 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. "Even if the act was done without malice, it is
beyond all bounds of decency and decorum for a person to touch any body part
of another without consent for that matter," it said. While the SC acknowledged
the positive effects of teasing in improving interpersonal relationships in the
167
workplace, it distinguished "playful teasing" from "hurtful teasing." “However,
unsolicited contact, even if done in jest, has no place in the workplace, especially
in the government service.”—Presidential Broadcast StaffRadio Television
Malacañang (PBS-RTVM) Vs. Vergel P. Tabasa G.R. No. 234624. February 26,
2020.
Joke pabuya 50M pres. Quashed. Not hot putsuit. Not media coz not voluntary.
https://irp-
cdn.multiscreensite.com/7dcde495/files/uploaded/Constitutional%20Law_zqYJ
vLIRRridqZ4X9Prs.pdf
Anti Terror Bill. Only judge can issue warrants of arrest.
Anak airplane pal to us. Citizenship?
Lopez. Son of fil mother father. Born in US. Natural-born. Ano ba. Passport.
Noong bata ka pa. Alien? Poor. Foreigner? Dual cits are natural born. Not 50/50.
Natural born for public office. Not to franchise. Merely citizenship. Novel. Not yet
juris on it. To be interpreted.
No hard fast definition of terrorism. Many countries tried to define it. No

consensus.
Enter vfa. Concurrence of senate. Withdrawal? No need. Pending Petition.
Fact checking is also an exercise of free speech. It is essential to achieve many

of the constitutional purposes of the guarantee of free speech. Any state attempt
to dilute, threaten or regulate fact checking is constitutionally suspect.
#FreedomOfSpeech. Twit Justice Leonen.
House of Representatives approved HB 78, amending the Public Service Act and
allowing 100% foreign ownership in power, transport and communications sector.
Consti?
168
Art xii sec. 11. Public utilities. Not media. Media is art. Xvi sec. 11: limit
ownership. No 50 year period. Even if public utilities, no limit for renewals.
Monsod op on abs.
Serious illness of president. Disclose case. Based on the discussions during the
1986 Constitutional Commission (ConCom), Gatmaytan said the executive
department, particularly the Office of the President (OP), was given the
“discretion on how to implement the provision.” (See Palace denies VERA Files’
FOI request on Duterte’s health; official statement, medical records ‘not on file’)
The Constitution also does not provide a clear definition of what counts as a
“serious illness.” (See VERA FILES FACT SHEET: The deal with the president’s
health)
In his comprehensive reviewer of the 1987 Charter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 ConCom, said the provision:
“...envisions not just illness which incapacitates but also a serious illness which
can be a matter of national concern.”
The late Sen. Blas Ople, who proposed the provision, said it covers medical
conditions that “[does] not really [incapacitate] but seriously inconvenience” the
president in the conduct of his urgent duties, such as an advanced state of
kidney disease that requires treatment by dialysis, among “infinite” examples. But
ultimately, “what constitutes a serious illness is being left to the hands of the
courts because they are the ones who are going to interpret the Constitution if
there is any disagreement among all [its] stakeholders,” Gatmaytan said. De leon
petition dismissed 13-2 vote.
Only the national government can impose travel restrictions, President Rodrigo
Duterte reminded local governments as he ordered them to accept OFWs
returning to their homes. Basis?
SC: ANCIENT DOCUMENT CAN BE PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 239990, August 22, 2018 ] LUCENA HERNANDEZ
V. PIO HERNANDEZ AND ROSENDO HERNANDEZ.
•
• Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:
• Sec. 21. When evidence by authenticity of private document not
necessary, — Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
169
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no
other evidence of its authenticity need be given.
From the foregoing, to be considered an ancient document, the following
requisites must concur: (1) it should be more than thirty (30) years old; (2) it
should be found in the proper custody; and (3) it should be unblemished by
any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.[1]
• In this case, all the requisites are present. The Malayang Bilihan ng Lupa
was executed on May 10, 1952 or more than 30 years ago. It was also
found in the custody of the heirs of Juan Hernandez, unblemished, and
without any alteration.
• Pp. v. Solar: Right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. Guidelines.
• Pimentel v. LEB, G. R. 230642: LEB power as constitutional for
accreditation, PhilSAT as unconstitutional, among others. FOR THE
CLARIFICATION OF ALL: Sharing with you some points from the 130+
paged ponencia.
• Pimentel v. LEB, G.R. 230642 (September 10, 2019)
• 1. Does LEB continue to have supervisory and regulatory authority over
legal education, including graduate legal education? • Yes, it does. The
Supreme Court clearly affirms this.
• 2. Can the Supreme Court exercise supervision and regulation over legal
education?
• No, it cannot. This would constitute the usurpation of non-judicial
functions. The function of regulating education -- of which legal education
is a component -- belongs to the Legislature and to the Executive.
• 3. Can LEB impose a legal internship requirement as prerequisite for
taking the Bar?
• No, it cannot, as this would interfere with the Supreme Court's exclusive
authority to determine who may or may not be admitted to the Bar.
• 4. Is LEB still allowed to administer the PhilSAT?
• YES, IT IS. The LEB has the authority to administer the PhilSAT provided
that failing to meet the PhilSAT cut-off does not automatically bar the
student from admission to law school, when the law school sets admission
standards in the legitimate exercise of academic freedom.
• 5. Did the Supreme Court affirm the right of the LEB to lay down required
subjects in the pre-law curriculum?
• No, the Court found that such requirements interfered with the academic
freedom of the institution. The decision was very strong on upholding
institutional academic freedom.
170
• 6. Does one who pursues an LLM or a JSD have to be a lawyer or even a
law graduate?
• No, it all depends on the institution or the graduate school of law
concerned. The Court also struck down the requirement that candidates
for the LLM should be JD or LLB graduates. BUT the Graduate School of
Law may itself make this a requirement. The essential point is that the
prerogative of the institution to lay down admission criteria is preserved.
• 7. Is the LLM requirement for faculty members and a JSD or DCL for the
dean of a graduate school of law sustained by the Supreme Court?
• YES...AND THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT. The Court held these
requirements to be well within the powers of the LEB. However, the LEB
cannot impose sanctions for non-compliance (unless the law school's
academic policies do so), nor can the LEB undertake the classification of
professors (fulltime v. part-time) except in accordance with the law school's
own principles of classification.
• Based on the law, if you have at least three (3) or more articles of
hentai manga or hentai videos, you are presumed by law to be a child
pornographer and you may be jailed. As long as the characters are
depicted or made to appear as children, they are considered children
by law and, if they engage in sexual conduct in the video or in the
manga, such material may be considered child porn. Anti Child Porno
Act 2009.
• Amendment of civil crim procedure and rules of court.
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1iP3LARFmsdZTdr5Mzltu8qbkYCJRXimc ?
usp=drive_open
Medical records of President. Case. Dissents. Leonen. Caguia.
De lima v. Duterte. On immunity. With opinion of Leonen.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ntcEnHAccuIPt9pyr5uH181ccYYnU0-o/view
(Singh New Rules on Evidence).
See. New Civ Pro.
Immunity from suit. No. During tenure. Not term. See. Concurring of Leonen:
Immunity covers only civil crim admin. Not writ of amparo, habeas data. Basta:
Exec. Sec. as Office of pres. not president himself. —de lima v. Duterte.
171
Falcis case. Dismissed. Premature. Got it. Technicalities. Congress and more
public discourse.
Teacher. Inciting to sedition. Clear present danger. Rpc uses dangerous

tendency rule. If unlawful arrest. Extrajucial confession will not cure defect. Even
if ej confession. It must be with counsel if sa state. If media. Voluntary and
spontaneous. Remedy: Quash before plea. Plus. No intent. Actua non facit reum.
Inciting means to public. Not opinion. All elements must be proven. Police is to
protect not arrest. Arbitrary detention. Public officials must not be onion skinned.
Gumabon v. Director of Prisons: Once deprive of consti rights, court rendered
judgment deemed ousted of jurisdiction. Bill of rights against State. Exc. media.
Exc. media in control of state or uncounselled involuntary under duress
confessions.
THIS MIGHT SAVE YOU
The filing of information against the teacher who allegedly offered 50 million to
anyone who’d kill the President is a bitter pill to swallow.
To begin with, if the warrantless arrest is not valid, the DOJ should have
dismissed the case so the NBI could instead pursue conduct of preliminary
investigation. The extra-judicial confession, even if admissible, could not in any
way cure the defect because if the arrest is unlawful, the court could not acquire
jurisdiction over his person. This is a well-settled rule, incidentally.
As regards the extra-judicial confession, there are 2 kinds under the law. One
given during custodial investigation which should be in writing, express, voluntary
and with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel (People v.
Tuniaco, G.R. Nos. 185710, January 19, 2010). The other when made before
members of media, which should be voluntary and spontaneous (People v
Quitola, GR Nos. 200537, June 13, 2016).
As regards the subject case, the teacher gave two. One when he was travelling
with the NBI which obviously is not admissible since the four constitutional
requirements were not present. The other was when he was presented before
the media, which under the circumstances, would not qualify as both voluntary
and spontaneous.
At any rate, the teacher still has remedy. His counsel can file a motion to quash
before he makes his plea in order to assail the unlawful arrest.
172
This is just my take on this. I don’t claim to be an expert. Pogi lang😁
#FreeSpeech!
173

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COURSE OUTLINE IN POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Cor Jesu College Law School

The Legislative Department

i. The Executive Department

j. The Judicial Department

xvii.A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC (THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS xviii.

n. National Economy and Patrimony

iv. [ G.R. No. 217590, March 10, 2020 ] PHILIPPINE

vi. G.R. No. 227982, April 23, 2018 MARIO DIESTA

o. Social Justice and Human Rights

p. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports

iii. Cases in Nachura’s Outline

III. LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

IV. SUFFRAGE AND ELECTION LAWS

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- The corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity;

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Yes, it is perfectly legal.

However, as an exception, the President may concurrently assume and perform

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Sexual incompatibility is not a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage.

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“Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and

A word on failure of elections and annulment of election results. In the course

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This constitutional prohibition aims to avert a “spoils system” of appointing

“𝗦𝗽𝗼𝗶𝗹𝘀 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺” is the practice of awarding government jobs to supporters and

SC: An action for medical malpractice based on contract (which prescribes in 10

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No to Litigation to Sorrows Caused by Broken Hearts and Promises―SC

May 18, 2022

“A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is

PHILIPPINE CONTRACTORS ACCREDITATION BOARD, PETITIONER, V.

The argument of petitioner is misplaced. Section 14, Article XII of the

Suffice it to say that a corporation or juridical person, in this case a construction

Professionalizing the construction business is different from the exercise of

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SC Affirms Conviction of Psychologically Abusive Husband

Furthermore, it directed the petitioner to undergo mandatory psychological