Torts as a common law

- covers all wrongful acts whether intentional or unintentional

Quasi-delict
- founded on fault or negligence

Art. 2176 - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another there

being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Can QD cover criminal acts?

- There are 2 ways of commiting a crime, one is dolo or deceit and culpa
or fault. Deceit is when an act was performed with deliberate intent, and
there is fault when the act is performed not with intent, but with
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

What to file? Either:

● Criminal Case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries - culpa criminal
● Civil action for damages based on quasi-delict - culpa aquiliana.
●
- you have culpa criminal and culpa aquiliana covering one
and the same negligent act.

Would culpa C and culpa A be the same? (Barredo vs Garcia, 1942)

- No. While culpa criminal covers or affects the public interest, culpa A is
only a matter of private concern. There is also a burden of proof that is
needed to prove each of the cases.
CC - proof beyond reasonable doubt
CA - preponderance of evidence

- The court held that there is a separate individuality of CC and CA under

the Civil Code. This is significant where we think of whether we can file 2
separate cases affecting one and the same negligent act.

Art. 2177 - the separateness and distinct character of CC and CA

- responsibility for negligence under Art. 2176 is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the penal
code.
- Since they are different, that 1 negligent act can give rise to 2 possible
cases.

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 Case: Manliclic vs Calaunan (2007)
A criminal case was first filed for the negligent act of Manliclic.
Later on, a civil case for CA - complaint for damages was filed against
the same Manliclic in separate RTC. In the course of the trial, Manliclic
was acquitted in the CC.

Q: What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal in the criminal case with the
civil case that was filed not for culpa C but for culpa A?

The SC held that in spite of the acquittal of Manliclic, he can still be

held liable under quasi-delict because his acquittal may have
distinguished his civil liability arising from the crime, but his civil liability
arising from quasi-delict has not been extinguished. This has to be so
because QD is a separate legal institution with substantivity all of its own
and individuality of its own, entirely apart and independent from a delict
or a crime.

★ In other words, if the accused is acquitted based on reasonable

doubt, his civil liability arising from crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. But if the accused was acquitted
on the basis that he was not the author of the crime, or that there
is a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist, such acquittal closes the door to civil liability
that is based on crime or ex-delicto. BUT, if the civil liability is now
based on Tort, that can still be instituted on grounds because it is
based other than the delict complained of.

★ If the accused is acquitted in the criminal case, that acquittal will

not affect at all the civil case or CA. The responsibility arising from
fault or negligence in QD is entirely separate and distinct from civil
liability arising from negligence under the penal code. In fact, his
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in
the civil case that is based on CA.

Since we can constitute Culpa C and a Culpa A case based on 1 negligent act, is
there even a need to make a reservation to file independent civil action of QD
in the criminal case for reckless imprudence?
- Those Civil Actions under 32, 33, 34, and 2176, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party and it shall proceed
independently of the criminal action. (R111, RoC)

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 ★ As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule 111, unlike its predecessor, no
longer includes the independent civil actions under 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the CC requiring prior reservation to be made in a previously instituted
criminal action. (Supreme Transportation Liner vs San Andres, 2018)

How would we look at the culpa or negligence or fault that is in culpa

contractual from the negligence or the fault that is in culpa A?
- There is a distinction between culpa that you find in culpa contractual
and the culpa in culpa A. In culpa contractual, the culpa or negligence is in
the performance of contractual obligation. In Culpa A, the obligation is
considered independent source of obligation. In fact in culpa A, the culpa
there is substantive and independent. But in culpa contractual, the culpa
there is an incident in the performance of the obligation (Manila Railroad
Case, 1918)

Case: Orient Freight International Inc vs Keihin -Everett Forwarding Co (2017)

The SC held that culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual are different.
Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-delict in
terms of conditions, defenses, and proof - so they generally cannot co-exist.

Case: Calalas vs CA (2000)

- There was just one case that was filed for damages, but that case was a
case for culpa contractual as well as culpa aquiliana. It was a case where
a college freshman in Siliman took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by Calalas - there was a contractual aspect. That jeepney was
filled to capacity of about 24 passengers. Sunga was given by the
conductor an extension seat. On the way to Sibulan, the jeepney stopped
to let a passenger off, because Sunga was seated on the extension seat,
she had to go down. Just as she was doing so, a truck driven by Verena
and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She filed a complaint for damages against two
separate personalities - Calalas for breach of contract of carriage and
Salva and Verena for quasi-delict.
★ This is still very much consistent with the ruling of the court that
they cannot co-exist because the case for culpa contractual was
not against one and the same person with the one who was sued
also for culpa A. It is just one and the same case, but against
different defendants.

Can there still be a tort even if there is an existing contract? (Regino vs

Pangasinan Colleges, 2004)

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 - Art. 2176 would seem to tell us that there can be no QD if there is a
contractual relation between parties which reads:
“the fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
obligation between the parties shall be called QD”
- If there is an existing contract between parties, that would be the
governing law between them. It would not be Art. 2176. This is the context
of the framers wherein they said that there can only be QD if there is no
pre-existing contractual obligation between parties.
★ However, the Court also held that there can be occasions where
tort can still exist even if there is a contract if the act that breaks
the contract can in itself be a tort

Case: Dalen vs Mitsui OSK Lines (2019)

- QD exists even if the parties were covered with an employment contract.
There the court found that there was negligence on the part of the
employer when it allowed the vessel to load and transport wet cargo
resulting in the sinking of the vessel. Notwithstanding the contractual
relation between parties, the act of the employer was QD and not simply
a breach of contract.

Is tort broader than QD? (Shokat Baksh vs CA, 1993 - Breach of Promise to
Marry)
- QD is a civil law concept, while Torts is an anglo-american or common law
concept. In that sense, Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as
well like assault, battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
★ When we compare Tort with QD, we can really say that Tort could
be broader than QD. But, when we look at the whole spectrum of
the whole legal system, the SC seems to be directing us to the fact
that looking up the Civil Code as well as the other aspects of RPC,
specially Art. 21 of the Civil Code - this seems to fill the vacuum
because now, even those that are not legally wrong can now be
considered as a source of damages if there has been breach in
morals, customs, and other civil wrongs that may be established.
★ Because we have Art. 19, 20, and 21 - Art. 21 specially has greatly
broadened the scope of our law in civil wrongs. So when torst
would be compared with our system of civil wrongs, the Court
boldly declares that we have much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-Americal law on torts.

QUASI-DELICT

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 - founded on fault and negligence

Concept of Negligence
- omission of diligence required by the circumstances on ones person, time
and place
- negligence consists in the omission of that diligence required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time, and of the place (Art. 1173)
- so it is essentially objective. It is a case to case basis.

Test of Negligence (Picart vs Smith (1918)

- If we want to know if a person is negligent, ask the question of
“could a prudent man in a case under consideration foresee the
harm? If so, did he take the necessary precautions? In testing
negligence, it is always a question of foreseeability of harm and
the failure to take the necessary precautions.
- look at the aspects pertaining to a person’s nature of obligation,
assumption of risk or even stipulations (Art 1174)

Foreseability
- varies depending on the circumstances of person, time, and place
as well as the needed precautions that need to be taken.
ex. banks, minors, gun owners

Diligence required for those suffering physical handicapped or infirmity

(Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carrier) - Standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind)
Francisco here is blind. He is asking the court to look and consider his
physical infirmity in determining whether he should be held liable for damages.
To determine diligence which must be required for all persons, the basis is
always been the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly
person. But if one is physically disables, he is required to use that standard of
care appertaining to one who is physic handicapped and infirmity. So the Court
held that physical handicapped and infirmities such as blindness and deafness
are treated as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person
must act. So a standard of conduct for blind person becomes that of a
reasonable person who is blind.
- Here, the court however did not excuse Francisco because despite being
blind had been managing and operating the station for 15 years and so
his being blind was not a hindrance for him to transact business at this
time.

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Case: Manila Electric vs Nordec Phil (2018)
Varying Degree of Standard of Care and diligence required on the basis of
ones circumstance
The SC held that a company operating a business imbued with public interest is
held up to a different kind of standard - a higher degree of care. The court said the
Ridjo Doctrine states public utility has the imperative duty to make reasonable and
proper inspection of a of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they will not
malfunction. The court highlighted the fact that distribution utilities are public utilities
vested with public interest and so held to a higher degree of diligence.

How to prove negligence?

- one who alleges negligence has the burden of proof of proving the same. ( BJDC
Construction, 2014)
- But there are presumptions of negligence that the law has put in.

Presumption of Negligence
- there is a disputable presumption of negligence if the driver has been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding 2 months. (Art. 2184)
- there is also a presumption of negligence if the person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic
violation. (Art 2185)

Case: Anonuevo vs CA (2004)

What was involved is a bicycle rider and the owner of the car. The owner
of the car argued that the bicycle rider was violating traffic regulations when
his bicycle was not equipped with a reflectorized device which is required in a
City Ordinance in their locality.
- The court held that it is erroneous to rely on 2185 to impute presumption
of negligence because 2185 cannot apply to non-motorized vehicles even
by analogy. Because there is a substantial distinction between motor
vehicle and non-motorized vehicle that the framers of the Civil Code
were very much aware of. There must be a reason why 2185 is limited to
motorized vehicle cases. So the presumption of negligence cannot be
used in non-motorized vehicles because there is factual and legal basis
that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185.

Res Ipsa Loquitur as a rule of evidence, not a presumption of negligence

Case: Africa vs Caltex (1966)
A conflagration happened. Nobody was able to trace the source or proximate
causation of that conflagration. The court said that if we ask the question “if the
accident is a kind which does not necessarily or ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent, and the cause of that injury is under the exclusive control of the person in

6
charge, then the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured, there can be an application of re ipsa
loquitur.

Elements:
a. accident is a kind that does not necessarily or ordinarily occur
b. the cause of that injury is under the exclusive control of the person in
charge
c. injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action of
contribution on the part of the person injured
Case: Perla Compania de Seguros vs Sps Sarangaya
The court said that we use res ipsa loquitur if by the nature of the incident,
direct evidence is not available. So if the nature of the incident is such that direct
evidence is not available, the plaintiff can rely on the fact that the accident happened
and it is within the exclusive control of the defendant. In that case, the rule of evidence
will set in that the person who has the exclusive control of the instrumentality that
caused the thing from happening is in fact negligent.

❖ However, the court held in the case of Layugan vs IAC, 1988 that you cannot just
use res ipsa loquitur each time you cannot find proof of negligence because the
doctrine can only apply if the nature of the case is such that no direct evidence
is available.

Tandaan ang concept at application ng res ipsa!!!!!

Proximate Cause (Art. 2179)

★ It means that in the natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause and without which the result would not have occured.
- It can also be acting first and producing the injury whether immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor.

- when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury, he cannot recover damages.
- It means that, the negligence in itself must be the proximate cause of the
incident. Otherwise, even if negligence is proven, if that negligence is not the
proximate cause, then there is still can be no recovery.

Immediate Cause
- need not necessarily be the proximate cause.
Ex. A bumping the car of B because A’s car was bumped by C. The
damage on the car of B was because C bumped into the car of A which
then caused A to bumped into the car of B.

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Case: Sanitary Steam Laundry vs CA
There was presumption of negligence that was invoked because there was a
traffic violation that was committed. Because the presumption was invoked and it falls
squarely within the circumstance, negligence was in fact established.
- However, the court said that even if there is a negligence on the part of the
owner of the Cimaron, this incident would still have happened just the same
because the driver of the panel could not stop despite the fact that he applied
the brakes.

★ It is not enough therefore to establish negligence. It is equally important that

that negligence was in fact the proximate cause of the happening of the event.
So that negligence is without legal consequence unless it is established to be
the proximate cause of the injury. To enable the plaintiff to recover, he must
establish negligence whether by direct evidence or by the used of presumption
of negligence or the invocation of the rule of evidence of res ipsa loquitur. BUT
he must as well establish that negligence is the proximate cause of the incident.

Possible Defenses
a. proximate causation
- the negligent act is not the proximate cause
b. assumption of risk (volenti non fit injuria)

Afialda vs Hisole, 1949

Case of a caretaker of a carabao who was gored to death by the
carabao he was taking care of. When the heirs filed a case against the owner
of the carabao, the SC held that the animal is in fact in the custody and under
the control of the caretaker who was paid for his work as such. So it was the
caretaker’s business to try and prevent animal from causing injury. Being
injured by the animal under that circumstance is one of the risk of the
occupation.
- Foreign jurisprudence also tells us the risk that is being taken by the
boxers or by the athletes to be an aspect of assumption of risk.

In the case of Ilocos Norte vs CA, 1989, the court held that you CANNOT invoke
assumption of risk if the person is responding to an emergency or if the life or
property of another is in peril. So it has been held that a person is excused from the
force of the rule of assumption of risk when he voluntarily ascends to a known danger
because there was an emergency that was found to exist or if he is responding to the
life or property of another that is in peril.

Bar 2012, Nikko Hotel Garden vs Reyes (2005)

Here Amay Bisaya went or gatecrashed into an exclusive party and he
was asked to leave. One of the arguments presented to ward off liability when
Amay Bisaya filed the case for damages was that, a gate crasher assumes the
risk of being asked to leave.

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 ★ The Court defined assumption of risk as that it is a self inflicted injury or
a consent to injury which then precludes recovery of damages by one
who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger even if he
is not negligent in doing so.

c. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance which goes with other names such as: ******
- doctrine of supervening negligence
- doctrine of discovered peril
- humanitarian doctrine

There are 2 acts of negligence occuring, but the negligence of plaintiff

was prior or antecedent to the negligence of the defendant. It is the defendant who
has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so.
- So notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff, there can still be
recovery against the defendant who has the last clear chance to avoid the
impending harm from happening.

Picart vs Smith (Doctrine of Last Clear Chance)

In this case, there were 2 acts of negligence occurring, but the act of
negligence of plaintiff was antecedent to the negligence of defendant. The court
disregarded the negligence of the plaintiff so as to allow complete or full recovery.
- The Court further opined that the plaintiff was not free from fault. He was
negligent, but his negligence was antecedent to the negligence of the
defendant who was also negligent. So the negligent act of 2 parties is not
contemporaneous, the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval of time. Hence, there can be no full
recovery without reference to the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

Contributory Negligence (2179)

- if the negligence was contributory, and the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant’s lack of care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
- A partial defense of plaintiff for his own negligence

Last Clear Chance vs Contributory Negligence

Last clear Chance Contributory Negligence

The negligence of the plaintiff and the
negligence of the defendant are not
concurring. The negligence of the
plaintiff is antecedent to the
negligence of the defendant.
The negligence of the 2 parties are
concurring. Because they are
concurring, the plaintiff's recovery will
have to be mitigated.

Complete Defende of P Incomplete Defense of P

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Case: National Transmission Corp vs De Jesus (2015)
De Jesus was found negligent in not using protective equipment. Because his
negligence was concurring, the court said that act was an act of negligence
contributory to the unfortunate incident that led to his death. Accordingly the amount
of damages that can be recovered by his heirs was reduced to 20%.

Case: Jarco Marketing vs CA (1999)

The child who eventually died can be accused of contributory negligence when
she hurled herself on top of the counter which gave in and eventually led to her death.
★ The court said that in our jurisdiction, a person under 9 is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment. The same presumption unlike
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of person over 9 and under 15
unless it has shown that it has acted with discernment. Taking that as a context,
the court said, if a child under 9 years old can be conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment. It can also be said that a child under 9 years of age
can be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter
of law.

d. Emergency Rule *****

- when an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, he cannot be held guilty
of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution.

Caveat: The emergency must not be brought by his own negligence.

e. Prescription (4 years)
- an action for QD must be instituted within 4 years from occurence of the
cause.

Subrogation

Case: Vector Shipping vs American Homes Assurance Comp

Caltex exported petroleum cargoes through MV Vector. Caltex
insured the cargo with American Home Assurance Company. MV Vector
and MV Paz collided on Dec 20, 1987 and the entire petroleum cargo of
caltex perished. Dec. 20, 1987 was the date of the collision, July 12, 1988 -
less than a year after. American Home Assurance indemnified Caltex and
on March 5, 1992, American Assurance sued Vector among others. The
argument that was raised by Vector was that the case was already
prescribed. The collision occurred in 1987, paid Caltex in 1988, and filed a
case against them in 1992. Looking at the provision of the Civil Code on

10
 prescription, we only have 4 years from occurence of cause. So if the
collision occurred in 1987, the case should be filed in 1991. And because the
case was only filed on March 5, 1992 - prescription was set up as a
defense.
★ The Court said, the COA of American Home Assurance Company
did not yet prescribed. The legal provision governing this case is
not 1146 of the Civil Code, but 1144 which provides that actions must
be brought within 10 years from the time of occurence of the
cause will be among the others obligations created by law. The
Court said in Vector Shipping Corp that subrogation is one
obligation created or arising from law. The applicable provision
would be 1144 and announce then that the period of limitation is 10
years.

Case: Vicente Henson vs UCPB (2019, En Banc)

The court looked at the aspect of legal subrogation, and held that looking into
1303 of the Civil Code, subrogation is but a mode of creditor substitution. And so legal
substitution is but a mode of creditor substitution, the insurer can take nothing with
subrogation but the rights of the insured. And so, based on that premised the court
said:
★ The Court abandoned the rule in Vector that an insurer may file an action
against the tortfeasor 10 years from the time the insurer indemnifies the
insured. Following the principles of subrogation, the insurer only steps on the
shoes of the insured, and therefore for purposes of prescription, inherits only
the remaining period in which the insured may file an action against the
wrongdoer. The prescriptive period of the action that the insured may file
against the wrongdoer begins at the time that the tort was committed and the
loss/injury occurred against the insured.

*****Vis-a-vis prescriptive period in cases where the insurer is subrogated to the rights
of the insured against the wrongdoer based on a quasi-delict:

1. For cases that were filed by the insurer during the applicability of Vector Ruling
- from Aug. 15, 2013 until the finality of the Henson decision of SC in 2019, the
prescriptive period is 10 years from the time of payment by the insurer to the
insured because the Vector doctrine is the prevailing rule at this time, and so
issues of prescription must be resolved under the Vector’s parameters.

2. For cases filed by the insurer prior to the applicability of the Vector ruling -
before Aug. 13, 2013, the prescriptive period was 4 years from the time the Tort
was committed. That was because the Vector Doctrine which espoused a
unique rule on legal subrogation was not yet a binding precedent at that time.

3. For cases however, that had not yet been filed at the time of the finality of the
decision of the court in 2019, the court held that when the tort was committed

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 and the subsequent loss or injury against the insured occurred prior to the
finality of the decision of the Court in 2019, the insurer is given a period NOT
exceeding 4 years from the time of the finality of the Henson case to file the
action against the wrongdoer provided that it does not exceed the total period
of 10 years.

4. For cases where the Tort was committed after the Vector ruling was
overturned by the SC or after the finality of the Henson Ruling, the Vector ruling
would no longer hold application. The rule will be that - the prescriptive period
of 4 years from the time the Tort is committed against the insured by the
wrongdoer.

Prevailing RULE:
The prescriptive period of an action that the insured can file against the
wrongdoer BEGINS at the time the tort was committed and it is no longer 100 years,
but 4 years from occurence of the cause.

Civ Pro Aspect

- actions for damages caused by the tortious act of the defendant survive the
death of the latter.
Who can be held liable for Torts?

Art. 2176 - whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault ort negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done.

Art. 2194 - if there are two or more tortfeasors, their liability for QD is solidary.

Doctrine of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Liability (Art 2180)

- the obligations imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions but also for those of persons of whom one is responsible.

Are we creating a liability for a separate set of persons who are responsible not for
their own acts or omissions but for the persons who are under their care?
- if you have a person committing an act or omission and this person is under the
supervision of another, can you file a case against the person supervising him
without having to implead the very person who committed the act or omission?
★ The SC held that the legislature which adopted our Civil Code has always
founded the reason or the cause of damages on the fact the you shall be held
responsible for the culpability directly imputed to the person who caused the
act or omission.

What is the basis of liability of 2180?

- Looking at the provision, the person for whom one is responsible has committed
an act or omission which led to the question why has he committed that act or
omission? - It must be because the person for whom one is responsible may be

12
 remiss in having to supervise him. That is where the context of 2180 was
founded.

★ The basis therefore of the liability of the persons enumerated under Art. 2180 is
his own negligent act of failing to supervise the person who is under his care or
supervision.

Case: Cerezo vs Tuazon, (2004)

There is a driver and the owner of the vehicle. A case was filed against the
owner of the vehicle without impleading the driver who cannot be found at that time.
The defendant lawyer asked for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
plaintiff then was not able to implead the driver despite order from the court on the
contention that the driver is an indispensable party to the civil action for damages.

★ The SC held, there is a person who committed the act or omission and then
there is a person who is supervising him. The Court ruled that vicarious liability
is a liability that is primary and direct. What is being punished is the person’s act
of omission in failing to supervise that person who is under his care. Because it
is his primary and direct liability, you need not even bring in the person for
whose act or omission he has made answerable. As held by the court, vicarious
liability is not subsidiary to the liability of the person for whom one is made
vicariously liable of. Although the negligence is simply imputed in the sense that
it arises from the act or omission of the person under one’s care or control, the
act being punished is the negligent act of the one made vicariously liable. So you
can proceed against the person supervising another together with the driver.
Or you can you can proceed against the employer without having to implead
the driver.

Parents
- the wording in 2180 of the Civil Code had been that “the father can be held
vicariously liable for acts or omissions of their minor children who live in their
company. Only in case of death or incapacity will the mother be held
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children in their company.
- BUT under the Family Code, Art 221 made the parents liable for the acts of their
children who live in their company. NOW, parents, and not just the father would
be held liable for the acts or omissions of the minor children living in their
company.

***the act or omission must be done by their minor children living in their
company
● minors
- for purposes of ascribing vicarious liability of parents, the age of
majority would not be 18. Even if we have lowered the age of
majority to 18, the law made specific provision that this shall not

13
 derogate the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for
children living with them BELOW 21 years old. (RA 6809)

● parents
- the minor child (to be understood within the context of below 21
under RA 6809) must be living in the company of their parents so
that parents will be held vicariously liable. This flows from the legal
and natural duty of the parents to closely supervise the child who
is in their custody and control.

2010 Bar
On May 5, 1989, 16 year old Rozanno who was issued a student permit drove to
school a car which is a gift from his parents. His class was scheduled to go on a field
trip , his teacher requested him to accomodate in his car 4 of his classmates. On the
way to the museum where the students were scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a
wrong maneuver causing a collision with a jeepney. One of his classmates dies. He and
his 3 classmates were badly injured.

Q1:Who was liable for the death of Rozanno’s classmate and the injuries suffered by
Rozanno and his 3 other classmates?

Ans: The school, its administrators, and teachers shall be liable for the resulting death
and injuries sustained by Rozannii nad his classmates. Under the FC, the foregoing
persons shall be liable for the acts of the minor under special parental authority and
responsibility that they exercise over him. This authority applied whether inside or
outside school premises. In this case, Rozanna was still a minor when he drove the car
at the time of the incident. The field trip on such occasion was authorized activity, and
thus the provision applies.

Q2: How about the damage to the jeepney?

Ans: It is submitted that the teachers, the schools and its administrators shall still be
liable for the damage to the jeeney because even if Rozanno was the one driving the
vehicle, he was considered under the supervision, instruction, and custody of the
school at the time of the unfortunate event. Hence, they shall be liable for the damage
caused by the negligence of the minor including that of the jeepney. There being
negligence on the part of Rozanno which was the immediate and proximate cause of
the damage of the jeepney, and being under parental authority of the school, the
latter shall be principally and solidarily liable for the resulting damage.

Q3: Under the same set of facts, except the date of the occurrence of the incident, this
time in mid-1994, what would be your answer?

Ans: Under such circumstances, Rozanno would have been 21 years old at the time of
the accident. Such being the case, the occurrence shall be governed by the provision

14
of the Civil Code on quasi-delict. Hence, not being under the parental authority of
either of the school or his parents, Rozanno shall be personally liable for all the
consequences which resulted from the accident.

Minor up for adoption

- if the basis of the liability is that the parents actually would have the
legal and moral duty to closely supervise their children who are under
their custody, theSAME reasoning may be used for minor children that
are up for adoption.

Actual Custody Rule

In the case of Tamargo vs CA (1992), the question that was asked is
between the adopting parent and the biological parent, who should be held
liable for an act or omission committed by the minor child sought to be
adopted?
★ The Court settled the matter not by choosing one over the other
because one is the biological parent or the other is already the adopting
parent. The court looked at who had actual custody during the incident.
The Court held, the trial custody period had not yet began. So the actual
custody was still with the natural parents, not the adopting parents, so
the ones who will be held liable will be the natural parents and not the
adopting parents because the actual custody at the time of the incident
was still with them .

Guardians
- they ara also vicariously liable for acts or omissions of the minors under their
care

EMPLOYERS - Vicarious Liability of Employers

Liability of Employers in case of QD (2180)

Employers engaged in business

- they are responsible for acts of their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions

Employers not engaged in business

- responsible for acts of their employees acting in the scope of their
assigned task

When can it be said that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task or on the occasion of the performance of the ‘ees function?

15
Case:Castilex vs Vasquez, (1999)
An employee was issued a company vehicle and something happened. Can it be
said that the operation of the ‘er issued vehicle by the ‘ee is sufficient to trigger the
vicarious liability of the ‘er?
★ If the ‘ee uses the employer issued vehicle in going to and from his workplace,
he is not acting within the scope of his assigned task in the absence of special
business benefit to the ‘er and absence of showing thereof.
- This is because taking your meals going to and from your workplace are
personal problems or concerns of the ‘ee. Unless, you are able to show
special benefit to the ‘er, the use of the company issued vehicle by the
‘ee cannot be said to be an occasion whereby he is acting within the
scope of his assigned task. Therefore, we cannot trigger the vicarious
liability of the ‘er.

Case: Imperial vs Sps Bayaban, (2018)

The SC held that an act is deemed an assigned task if it is done by the ‘ee in
furtherance of the interest of the ‘er or for the account of the ‘er at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage.

Liability of employers in Criminal Case

Art. 102 of the RPC states that ‘ers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies
committed by their ‘ees in the discharge of the latter’s duties.

3 Conditions: (Basa Marketing Corp vs Bolinao)

1. The ‘er must be engaged in any kind of industry
2. That the ‘ee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties
3. That the ‘ee is insolvent

In this case, there is a criminal case against the ‘ee. That criminal case
culminated in the ‘ee having been civilly adjudged liable. The ‘ee was insolvent and it
has been shown that the ‘er is engaged in some kind of industry and that the ‘ee
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.
- what may be done in this case is to have the ‘er subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability of the ‘ee that may have been found insolvent.

★ The liability of the ‘er under the RPC will come in only after the ‘ee has
been convicted and held civilly liable ex delicto. It has been shown that he
committed the act in the discharge of his duties and that the ‘ee was
insolvent.
- the subsidiary liability of the ‘er will only come in if all of the
conditions are shown to have existed.

Case: Dr. Solidum vs Pp (2014)

16
 There is a flaw in logic and in law when the RTC of Manila held the ‘er hospital
liable together with Dr. Solidum. In the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC
convicting Dr. Solidum, there was a mention that Hospital ng Maynila had jointly and
severally - meaning to say solidarily liable with Dr. Solidum for damages.

★ The SC held that this ruling is erroneous because Hospital ng Maynila had not
even been impleaded as one of the accused in the criminal case. The court
therefore said that there is no way that Hospital ng Maynila could be held civilly
liable under Art. 103 because the civil liability will come in under Art. 103 if and
only if the conditions for subsidiary liability are present.

★ To hold therefore an ‘er liable for the damage done by the ‘ee under the RPC, it
must be shown that the ‘er must be engaged in some kind of business. The
offense has been committed by the ‘ee in the discharge of his function and the
‘ee was insolvent. If all of the conditions are present, the court held that the
liability ipso facto exist. So there can be no other defense raised by the ‘er. The
subsidiary liability immediately attaches upon showing of these conditions upon
conviction and upon proof of the ‘ee’s insolvency. (pauli ulit para matandaan
hahahaha)

Defense of the employer if held liable under Art. 103 of the RPC
- show that none of the conditions exists. Meaning to say he is not
engaged in some kind of business, the act was not committed in the
discharge of the ‘ees functions, and the ‘ee is not insolvent.
- However, if the conditions are indeed present. He does not have any
defense that he can set up.

Employer’s liability under Art. 2180

- The liability here is not subsidiary. The reason why ‘ers are vicariously liable
under 2180 is that it is their own negligence that is being punished in failing to
supervise their ‘ees. And so the liability in Art. 2180 of the ‘er is direct and
immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse of negligent ‘ee or even
upon prior showing of insolvency.

Employer’s DEFENSE
- observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.
Diligence of GFF
- diligence in the selection and supervision of the ‘ees.

a. Selection of the ‘ee

- he must scrutinize the ‘ees qualifications, experience, and service record.
➔ The SC held that due diligence in the selection of ‘ee, the facts
must be shown in concrete proof including documentary evidence.

b. Supervision

17
 - it is not sufficient for the ‘er to show that he was very careful in the
selection of the ‘ee. He must show that after taking in the ‘ee, he
exercised due diligence in the supervision of the ‘ee.
➔ In the matter of supervision, ‘er should formulate standard
monitoring procedure, monitor the implementation, and impose
disciplinary sanctions. This must also be shown in a concrete proof
including documentary evidence. (Tip: always have manual of
instructions formulating standard operating procedures, memos
showing that the SOPs have been implemented and even
disciplinary measures have been imposed for breaches thereof.

DGFF distinguished from defense of ‘er in culpa contractual

- Breach of contract of carriage (Art. 1759)
- Common carriers are liable for the death and injuries to passengers
although the ‘ees acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carrier .
➔ an ‘er facing a civil case for breach of contract of carriage, it is no
defense that the ‘ee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task. It is no defense that you have exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family because 1759 provides that liability will still
be affixed on common carriers even if the ‘ee may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carrier.

Hats that an employer can wear (tandaan para maganda ang sagot sa exam)
➢ Art. 103 RPC
● subsidiary: after ‘ee’s conviction and insolvency
● ipso facto
● defenses - the 3 conditions are not present, if present - NO
defense

➢ Art. 1759
- liability of the common carrier attaches even beyond the scope of
his assigned task. You cannot even escape liability by showing that
you have exercised all the DGFF in the selection and supervision
of the ‘ees because that kind of defense is available only to the ‘er
who is being sued under 2180 of the Civil Code for culpa-aquiliana.
➢ Art 2180

***Source of several Bar Exam Questions

- what kind of defenses can be raised kasdyay
❖ Examinees should not be able to raise the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee if
the case that the ‘er was facing is NOT a case for CULPA
AQUILIANA.

18
Registered Owner Rule
- the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the
tortfeasor driver (Montecalvo vs tan, 2018)

Case: Sps Mangaron vs Hanna Via Design & Construction (2019)

The SC held, as between the registered owner and the driver, the former is
considered the ‘er of the latter - registered owner is the ‘er of the driver and is
primarily held liable for the tort committed by the driver. But the real owner cannot
escape liability under the principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner who
shouldered the liability has the right to be indemnified by the means of cross claim by
the actual ‘er of the negligent driver.

➔ The registered owner of the vehicle other than the actual owner is to be the
one that will be held solidarily liable with the driver. The responsibility of the
registered owner will be attached. But if the basis of liability is not culpa
contractual and but culpa aquiliana, the liability will have to apply to the actual
owner of the vehicle.

Connect it with the case of:

Case: R Transport Corp vs Yu, 2015
You have a case of culpa contractual - breach of contract of carriage. You
have 2 kinds of personalities there - the registered owner who actually transferred
ownership of the vehicle to another person, but who remains to be the registered
owner. (So you have the registered owner and the actual owner)

Whose liability is it for whenever the driver has committed a negligent act?
- for purposes of fixing liability, the registered owner, rather than the actual
owner shall be solidarily liable with the driver.

Tamayo Case
Tamayo is the registered owner, but there is already a transferee. The one who
is directly responsible is still the registered owner for the accident. He will be
responsible as a registered owner for the damages that have been claimed by the
passengers, but the transferee shall be responsible to the registered owner for what
the latter has been adjudged to pay.
➔ This is important because if the registered owner for instance has paid 1M, he
can then go after the actual owner. Taking the ruling of the Court, he can ask
the actual owner to pay him 1M - the amount that he has been adjudged to pay.

In the context of a case for quasi-delict:

BUT, if the case however is one NOT for breach of contract of carriage but for
quasi-delict, the liability of both the registered owner and the actual owner shall be
SOLIDARILY liable. This means that it is for the better protection of the public if both
the owner of record and the actual owner shall be held solidarily liable.

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 ➔ So then in a case not for culpa-contractual but for culpa-aquiliana, you have the
registered owner and the actual operator, and they are being held liable. The
court has ruled that the liability is solidary. Unlike the case of culpa contractual
where the registered owner can ask for full reimbursement from the actual
operator, in a case for culpa aquiliana - the case is such that he can only ask
for the portion corresponding to the solidary liability of the actual operator.

Reading together the case of R Transport and Sps Mangaron would be that:
In R Transport the registered owner was made to pay for the acts or omissions of the
driver - then the RO can then ask for reimbursement from the driver NOT for the
FULL amount but for the portion corresponding to the share of the actual operator by
means of cross claim as against that actual ‘er.

In Sps Mangaron, the court said as between the registered owner and the driver, the
former is considered the ‘er and using the principle of unjust enrichment, that RO shall
have then the right to be indemnified by means of cross claim against the other actual
‘er of the negligent driver.

Culpa Contractual Culpa Aquiliana

pay in full and then ran after the actual hati sila ng liability
owner for a reimbursement in full

1M - 1M 1M - 500k

Recourse of employer held vicariously liable (2181)

- for employers that have been made to pay using vicarious liability principle
under a case for QD, he can ask full reimbursement from the ‘ee for what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim (pero hindi gano sa totoong
buhay)

Recourse of owner of vehicle at the time of mishap (2184)

- if you were an ‘er and you were in the vehicle at the time of the mishap - you
are solidarily liable with the driver if it can be shown that by the use of due
diligence, you could have prevented the misfortune. Because you are solidarily
liable with the driver, you cannot claim full reimbursement for the full amount
you have paid. What can be asked for reimbursement for would be that portion
of liability of the driver.

- BUT if you were not in the vehicle at the time of the incident, then Art. 2180 will
apply - you will get paid by way of reimbursement for whatever you have
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

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 ‘Er is Inside the vehicle ‘Er is NOT inside the Vehicle

50% reimbursement 100% reimbursement

*****2009 Bar Q (4pts)

STATE
- liable if it acts through a special agent
***Read Bar Qs on this matter

LGUs
- liable for damage occurring on those streets or roads or buildings under their
control or supervision

TEACHERS
- liable for acts or omissions of their students or pupils regardless of age so long
as they remain in their custody.

Meaning of in custody
- BEFORE, it means when the students is at attendance at the school even
during recess time
- NOW, the SC held that the student is “under our care and supervision -
custody” if the student is in the school is inside the school premises and
pursuant to a legitimate student objective in the exercise of legitimate
student right even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. So
even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus, in the company of his classmates is still within the custody
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under Art. 2180.
- Even expanded under Art, 218 of the FC which states that “they are within
the custody for ALL authorized acts transpired whether inside or outside
the premises of the school.

- School and administrators will be liable for acts or omissions of a minor child
under care or supervision

On fieldtrips anf Educational Tours (Bar 2010 - 6%)

- yung si Rozanno

Defense of Teacher being held liable vicariously

- he exercised due diligence

***What constitutes due diligence is when he is strict in enforcing school

regulations and in maintaining school discipline. (Amadora vs CA)

Strict Liability Torts, Special Torts, and Kindred Torts, Privacy Torts

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Strict Liability Torts
- This is liability without, a branch of Tort that seeks to regulate activities that
are useful and necessary, but may create abnormally dangerous risk to the
society. There is no need to prove negligence.

Classes of Strict Liability Torts

1. possessor of animals
- they are being held liable for the damage caused by their animal
even if that animal may have escaped or be lost.
- this is based on natural equity and principle of social interest that
he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure, or service must
answer for the damage which such animals may cause.

➔ this responsibility shall cease in case the damage came

from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.

2010 Bar Q
Primo owned a pet iguana which he keeps in a man-made pond enclosed
by a fence situated in his residential lot. A typhoon knocked down the fence of
the pond and the iguana crawled out the gate of Primo’s residence. N, a
neighbor who was passing by, started throwing stones at the iguana, drawing
the iguana to move toward him. N, panicked and ran but tripped on something
and suffered a broken leg. Is anyone liable for N’s injuries?

Ans: No one should be held liable for N’s injuries. As a rule, the possessor
of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
damage which is may cause, although it may escape or be lost. Such is not the
case when the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who has suffered the damage. In the instant case, the pet iguana
escaped not because of Primo’s negligence but because of the typhoon which
knocked down the fence. Also, N’s is also at fault since the fact states that he
started throwing stones at the iguana which caused it to move towards him.
Therefore, no one is liable.

2. manufacturer and processors of food stuffs, etc.

Case: Mercury Drug (2007)

A mercury drug ‘ee dispensed “dormicum” - a sleeping tablet when
what should have been given is “diamicron”.
- The SC held that the rule on caveat emptor cannot apply to the
purchase and sale of drugsAn imperative duty is on the druggist
to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone
who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The

22
 drugstore business is imbued with public interest which require
the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.

Case: Pascual vs Ford Motor (2016)

- if you want to hold a manufacturer of a motor vehicle liable, you must be
able to show that the defect is present upon delivery or manufacture of
the product and there has been no substantial change in the condition by
which it was sold.
➔ The Court did not apply strict liability tort because what was
brought was a vehicle that was a second hand Ford and there has
already been a substantial change in the condition at the time it
was sold.

Special Torts
- those kinds of Torts relating to 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 of the Civil
Code.

Abuse of Right Principle

- this is the principle that broaden the spectrum of our civil redress of
damages.

Case: Metro Heights Subdi vs CMS (2018)

- the disconnection and transfer of water service connection
without the consumer’s knowledge and consent is considered an
abuse of right.

➔ Every abuse of right claim must be founded on malice and badfaith.

Case: UE vs Jader (2000)

Educational institutins are bound to inform the student of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
The conscious or indifference of a person to the rights or wlfare of the
persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim
for damages.

Case: Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs Reyes

A case of a gate crasher who was asked to leave. The SC decided
the case on the basis of one important factual consideration - it was not
shown that the one who asked Amay Bisaya to leave was motivated by ill
will. So the act complained of was not shown to be intentional and yet, for
Art. 19, 20, 21 - abuse of right principle case to prosper, it must be shown
that there is an act which is legal but that is CONTRARY to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy and it is done with INTENT to injure.

23
 Common denominator bet. 19, 20, 21 or the abuse of right principle would
be INTENT to injure. That the act complained of must be intentional.
Medical Negligence or Medical Malpractice
- failure of the physician to exhibit that degree of care which is ordinarily
employed by the profession under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances. (Reyes vs Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 2000)

Degree of Care required to a Physician

- that which is prevailing in the locality (locality rule)

What needed to be established in a medical malpractice case?

2 Pronged Evidence
a. locality rule - recognized standard in the medical community
b. Physician involved has departed negligently from that standards
***it is always shown by expert testimony

Unique Case of Ramos vs CA (1999)

The SC held used the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The SC held that
ordinarily, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as
a consequence of administering such anesthesia in the absence of negligence.
Upon these facts and under theses circumstances, a layman would be able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequence
of professional treatment were not as such s would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised. You need not have to present expert witness in
this case.

Other defenses in a Medical Malpractice case would be:

a. reasonable diligence - lack of fault of respondent
b. plaintiff’s own negligence
c. Doctrine of Informed Consent
- GR: duty of the physician to inform the risk and consequence of
the procedures or to give choices to with respect to proposed
therapy with the inherent dangers thereo.
- However, the physician is not obliged to discuss relatively minor
risks inherent in the procedure of very low incidence. BUT, the
right to be informed should be denied where it is evident tha he
cannot evaluate data and the patient is a child or incompetent.

Liability of Hospitals
- under the concpet of agency by implication or estoppel, when a hospital publicly
displays in its lobby the names and specializations of the physicians associated
with it - it is now estopped from passing all the blame to that physician in saying
that he was not really an ‘ee of the Hospital.

24
 Case: City States Savings Bank vs Tobias (2018)
The SC held that the doctrine of apparent authority or holding out
theory, or ostensible agency imposes a liability not as the result of the reality of
a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an
‘er in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists. Liability of the principal for the acts and contracts of his agents
extends to those which are within the apparent scope of the authority
conferred on him, although no actual authority to do such acts or to make such
contracts has been conferred. However, the ‘er’s liability is solidary with that of
his ‘ee.

Captain of the Ship Doctrine (Professional Service vs Agana)

- the operating surgeon was made responsible because he is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all the person connected with the
operation. Their duty os to obey his orders.

TORTS and DATA Privacy

- also know as Privacy Tort
➔ In 1960, torts scholar William Prosser published in California Law Review
his article entitled “Privacy” based on his thorough review of the various
decisions of the US Courts of the Privacy laws. The law of privacy
comprises of 4 distinct kinds of invasion of 4 differents interests of the
plaintiff. (Pollo vs David, 2011 En Banc)

The classifications are the ff:

1. intrusion upon plaintiff’s solitude or his private affairs
2. the public disclosure or embarassing private facts about the
plaintiff
3. the publicity that places the plaintiff in a flase eye in the public eye
4. the appropriation for the defendant’s advanatge, of the plaintiff’s
name and likeness.
- these are all very different interst of plaintiff. They are only
tied together by a common name because they are all
founded on the right of a person to be let alone.

★ Tort of Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude

- happens when a person intentioanlly intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns in a amtter that was highly offensive to a reasonable person.

★ Tort of Public Disclosure of Private Fact

★ Tort of False Light

25
 - happens when a publicized matter was highly offenisve to a reasonable
person and was not a legitimate concern of the public such that it place
that person in the public for a false light. So it is a private fact which is
not of a legitimate concern he public.
★ Tort of Appropriation
- when a person adopted to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another

(Nasa lecture ni sir bonix to, page 111)

Two Categories of Privacy Claims

a. Informational Privacy
- refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters

b. Decisional Privacy
- refers to the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions concerning speech, religion, personal relations,
education and sexual preferences.

Case: Pollo vs David (2011)

- this case involves search of office computer assigned to a government ‘ee. This
government issued computer assigned to a government ‘ee was charged
administratively and eventually dismissed from service. The ‘ee’s personal files
were stored on that computer and were used by the government as evidence
of his misconduct. He said that the seizure of his personal file was
unconstituional especially that it was done wit hout a warrant. But CSC argued
that here, CSS was acting not as a government agent or a law enforcer but as
an ‘er. CSC argued that where the government as ‘er invades the private files
of an ‘ee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use in the
course of an initial investigation of a possible misconduct - the government
agency acts in its capacity as an ‘er rather than a law enforcer.

★ In deciding whether the personal files that was confiscated and seized
from the conputer issued by the government, the seizure of which is
without any warrant, the SC asked 2 important questions to wit;
a. Did the ‘ee have a reasanable expectation of privacy?
b. Is the ‘er government’s intrusion reasonble punder the
circumstances?
➔ A. SC took note of CSC’s Office Memorandum No. 10 S 2002 -
The Computer Use Policy (CUP). There, the SC said, looking
at the CUP - the ‘ee concerned here does not really have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. the policy states that
computers that have been issued remains to be properties
of the government and can only be used for legitimate
business purposes. There is no expectation of privacy,
users understand that anything that they create, stores,

26
 send or receive in the computer system will not be covered
by the reasonable expectation oof privacy except the
members of the Comission. There is waiver of privacy
rights, the user of the computer expressly waive any right
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive in
the computer.
➔ Here, there was a password that was placed, but the policy
said even if you do have a password, it does not imply
privacy. The use of passwords to gain access to the
computer system does not imply that users have
expectations of privacy.

★ The SC then ruled, that with that policy in place - then there is really no
reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the ‘ee concern in the
use of the computer.

Was the seizure of the personal files in thet government issued computer reasonable,
especially that it was done sans warrant?
- There the court ruled, it was the computer that was subjected to the search
and it was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an ‘ee to
encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would likely be the starting
point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral
nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a
button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.

Case: Vivares vs St, Theresa’s College (2014)

- Images, though personal in nature when posted in facebook that was not placed
in “only me” setting - there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to the photo in question.

DAMAGES
Bar 2009, 2013

Case: Pp vs Jugueta (2016, En Banc) *****

I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and
other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

27
 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:

a. Frustrated:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

b. Attempted:

i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:

28
 a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will
depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA
9346:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00

1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00

Interest

Case: Eastern Shipping Lines

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from

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 judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,

an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
- where the demand is not established with certainty, the interest shall begin
to run only from the date the judgment of the court has made. For instance, I
ask for actual damages. That is not constitutive of a loan or forbearance of
money. Based on the computation, the damages sustained is 1M. It can be
argued that that demand can be estalished with reasonable certainty at the
time you made the demand. But if your claim is such that you are asking for
1M for the moral damages you sustained, that is a kind of demand that
cannot be established yet with reasonable certainty because the amount of
moral damages we will be awarded with depends solely on the discretion of
the court. Because it is such an obligation not constituting a load or
forbearance of money - and the demand cannot be yet established with
reasonable certainty at the time it is made, the interest of 6% shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of teh court was made.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
- either way whether it is a loan or not a loan, the judgment that has been
made by the court shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum form
finality of judgment until its satisfaction. The rationale of the court is that
from the time the judgment has become final, it is transformed into that of
an obligation constitutive of a loan because in that sense, the judgment
debtor owed that amount to the judgment creditor.

➔ BSP Circular mandates that in the absence of express contract as to rate of

inetrest, legal interest shall be 6% per annum which made the Court modify the
case of Eastern Shipping in the case of Lacar.

Sample Dispositive Portion

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 The amount of 950.00 shall earn a rate of 12% per annum form Aug 26,
2005 until June 30, 2013, and after June 30, 2013, interest rate of 6% shall then be
computed upto the date of finality of the decision. The damages - moral and
exemplary shall earn an interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the finality
of this Decision.

Case: Nacar vs Gallery (2013 En Banc)

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal
interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged
on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

***May formula

Case: Lara’s Gifts and Decors vs MIS (2019 En Banc)

In this case, the court looked in a scenario where there is in fact stipulated
interest in writing. What then to do? - If there is a stipulated interest, that will prevail
provided it is not excessive and unconscionable until full payment without
compounding, unless compounding is expressly stipulated by parties.
1. If it consists of a loan or forbearance of money, and there is a stipulated
interest, that is what will prevail until full payment. In other words, you do not
ship it to 12% as what was first announced in Eastern Shipping - from the finality
of judgment until full payment. The stipulated rate of interest will be the one
that will control until full payment because precisely that is what has been
stipulated by the parties - that is on the PRINCIPAL obligation. The interest on
the principal shall be separately earned interest at the legal rate prescribed by
BSP - from the time of judicial demand until full payment.

2. In the absence of stipulated interest, in a loan or forbearance of money, goods,

credits or judgments, the rate of interest on the principal amount shall be the

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 prevailing legal interest prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which shall be
computed from default, i.e., from extrajudicial or judicial demand in accordance with
Article 1169 of the Civil Code, UNTIL FULL PAYMENT, without compounding any
interest unless compounded interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation.
Interest due on the principal amount accruing as of judicial demand shall
SEPARATELY earn legal interest at the prevailing rate prescribed by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, from the time of judicial demand UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.
3. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, goods,
credits or judgments, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed in the discretion of the court at the prevailing legal interest
prescribed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, pursuant to Articles 2210 and 2011 of
the Civil Code. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty.Accordingly, where the amount of the claim or damages is established
with reasonable certainty, the prevailing legal interest shall begin to run from the
time the claim is made extrajudicially or judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) UNTIL FULL
PAYMENT, but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date of the
judgment of the trial court (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained) UNTIL FULL PAYMENT. The actual
base for the computation of the interest shall, in any case, be on the principal
amount finally adjudged, without compounding any interest unless compounded
interest is expressly stipulated by law or regulation.

(read the dispositive portion)

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