SEVERAL JUDGMENTS

PROBLEM: On October 13, 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents Willibaldo 
Uy (Uy), Chua Ping Hian (Chua) and the latter’s agent, Laureana P. Borres  (Borres). She
alleged that on three separate occasions, she obtained loans from Chua in the total amount of
P5.5 million. On November 9, 1995, however, she learned that her title over the property was
cancelled and that a new one was issued on November 8, 1995 in the name of Chua. Thereafter,
Chua offered to sell back the property to petitioner for P10 million, which the latter accepted.
However, on December 7, 1995, petitioner came to know that Chua sold the subject lot for P7
Million to Uy, to whom a new transfer certificate of title was issued by the Makati Register of
Deeds. 

Petitioner filed a complaint. Chua filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner’s action
which is founded on fraud is barred by prescription. In their Answer, Uy and Borres contended,
among others, that petitioner’s cause of action, if any, has been waived or abandoned. 

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that her complaint
seeks to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the fraudulent conveyance of her property. She
claimed that the trial court cannot render several judgment and separate the liability of Borres
with that of her co-respondents. As such, appeal from the decision of the trial court can be
perfected by the filing of a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the questioned order
without need of submitting a record on appeal. The CA dismissed the petition. Whether or not
petitioner was able to perfect an appeal within the required period. (NO)

ANSWER: Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides – 

SEC. 4. Several judgments.—In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a
several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to
proceed against the others. 

A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct
from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have been the subject
of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the complaint
was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is
proper. 
It is clear that the third cause of action for payment of the amounts of P200,000.00 and
P120,000.00 is directed only against Borres to the exclusion of Uy and Chua.

The rationale for requiring the filing of a record on appeal in cases where several judgment is
rendered is to enable the appellate court to decide the appeal without the original record which
should remain with the court a quo pending disposal of the case with respect to the other
defendants. (Fernando v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 160730, December 10, 2004)

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO AND CARIDAD
ENTAPA, 802 SCRA 392, G.R. NO. 215072 SEPTEMBER 7, 2016

FACTS:

With the situation that the Entapa Heirs could no longer work and hope to reacquire their
property, the plaintiffs-heirs formally demanded for the return of the 20% initial deposit paid to
the PNB and also the real property taxes paid when the property had already been divided and
awarded to the beneficiaries covered by CLOA[s].

The Philippine National Bank did not return the amount paid by the Entapa Heirs which led to
the filing of the instant case. Likewise, the Entapa Heirs suffered for the vain hope that they
could get back the properties with so much attachment or sentimental value. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court’s Decision violated the Rules of Civil Procedure when it failed to
state the facts and law on which its ruling was based.

RULING:

YES. A court must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions; otherwise, its decisions are
void. 

RULE 36
Judgments, Final Orders and Entry Thereof

SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining

the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of the court. 

The trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner’s liability. The Decision
merely contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion. 

Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

G.R. No. 128628. August 23, 2001.

ILDEFONSO SAMALA v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
TOPIC: Petition for Relief

PROBLEM: Because of a vehicular accident Romulo Ocampo filed a 2 complaint for damages
against bus driver Benjamin Babista and the owner of the Super Saint Bus, Ildefonso Samala.On
May 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Ocampo. Petitioners received a copy
of the trial court’s decision on 29 September 1995. They filed a notice of appeal on 16 October
1995. In its order of 17 October 1995, the trial court denied due course to the appeal for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period. On November 24, 1995, petitioners filed with the
trial court a petition for relief from order denying their appeal. Petitioners argued that the reason
for the failure to file the notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days was the fact that the notice was
entrusted to Jose Samala, Jr. but he suffered from diarrhea on October 11 to 12, 1995. He could
not leave the house and nobody could attend to the filing of the notice. Thus, he filed it only on
Monday, October 16, 1995, thinking that the period had not lapsed. Whether or not petitioner
may file a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court after their notice
of appeal was denied by the trial court for being filed out of time?

ANSWER: Yes, a petition for relief from judgement was validly availed by the petitioner.
Samoso v. CA, elucidates that relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court
is a remedy provided to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. A petition for relief from judgment is an
equitable remedy that is allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy.

In the case at bar, the petitioner’s failure to file the notice of appeal on time (one day late) due to
above stated reason falls under excusable negligence.

G.R. NO. 150722, August 17, 2007

SPOUSES EUGENIO & VICENTA REYES, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS
TOPIC: Double Period Rule 

PROBLEM: The Voluntads Petition for Redemption and caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 25073. The notice of lis pendens was carried over to property sold to
petitioner Spouses Reyes while under litigation. The case was decided in favor of the Voluntads
by the public respondent on 8 December 1995. This was learned by the spouses on 30 May 1997
however they contended that such facts were not known to them until their receipt on 31 May
2000 of a copy of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 132294, at which time they allegedly learned
with certainty that they were bound by the 8 December 1995 RTC decision. Hence, they file a
petition for relief on 21 June 2000 in belief that their 60-day period reckoned from 31 May
2000.Whether or not the 60-day period reckoned from 31 May 1997 or on 30 May 2000.

ANSWER: The sixty-day period commenced, at the latest, on 30 May 1997, the date when
petitioners received an Order from this Court directing them to comment on the Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus filed by the Voluntads docketed as CA-GR SP No. 44141 entitled
'Delfin Voluntad, et al v. Hon. Oscar Barrientos, et al, to which a copy of the Decision in Civil
Case No. 142-M-93 had been attached. That period expired on July 30, 1997.

On the other hand, the six-month period is reckoned from the date of entry of the Order issued by
the public respondent in Civil Case No. 142-M-93 on 8 December 1995. The same expired on 8
June 1996.

TOPIC: APPLICABILITY
PROBLEM: Petitioner’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 6, 1993. However,
in the notice of hearing, petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate the date and time of the motion’s
hearing as explicitly required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. He
subsequently submitted a Notification and Manifestation on April 14, 1993 upon realizing the
error, citing the spate of prolonged power outages as the reason for the delay. The trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and the Notification and Manifestation on the ground of
absence of notice as required under the Rules of Court, and that the motion adverted did not
suspend the running period to appeal. Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for relief from
judgment but the same was denied. The judgment was appealed to the CA but was also
dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Whether or not the petitioner has succeeded in
showing his entitlement to relief.
ANSWER: A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does
not toll the period to appeal, and upon expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or
decision becomes final and executory. Nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the
attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the
demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules
of Court provides that “these rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.” In the instant case, it is but just that the petitioner be given the opportunity to
defend himself and pursue his appeal considering the particular circumstances that justifies the
relaxation of the procedural rules. (Basco vs CA, G.R. No. 125290, August 9, 2000)

TOPIC: ISSUE ON SIXTY-DAY PERIOD

PROBLEM: Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, or Other Proceedings or
Annulment of Mortgage against PNB. That on the February 23, 2010 hearing of the case for
initial reception of evidence where she was present, her former counsel failed to appear. The
RTC issued an Order dismissing outright the petition for relief. The trial court explained that
under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a petition for relief from a final judgment or
order must be filed within: (a) 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) six months from entry of such judgment, order, or other
proceeding. It emphasized that these two periods must concur and must be strictly observed since
compliance with the reglementary periods is jurisdictional. CA could no longer act on the urgent
motion in view of the Court’s Resolution and an Entry of Judgment denying the Petition for
Review on Certiorari had become final and executory and had been recorded on the Book of
Entries of Judgments. Whether or not the outright dismissal due to the petition for relief from
judgement was filed out of time.
ANSWER: Yes. Petitioner failed to comply with the 60-day period provided under Section 3,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court when she filed her petition for relief three years from the time she
acquired knowledge of the order sought to be set aside. Likewise, she failed to comply with the
six-month period provided in the same Rule when she filed her petition for relief more than eight
months from the date of entry of the order sought to be set aside. As an equitable remedy, strict
compliance with the applicable reglementary periods for its filing must be satisfactorily shown
because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State,
which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment,
order, or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to
litigation. As such, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the petition was filed within
its reglementary periods, otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright. (Lasam vs PNB,
G.R. No. 207433, December 5, 2018)

ROLANDO TING
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO
G.R. No. 168913, March 14, 2007, SECOND DIVISION, CARPIO MORALES, J

PROBLEM NO 7: In a land registration case, Judge Marigomen of the CFI granted the spouses
Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's request for title registration, which was then final and executory.
To register his title to the same lot, Ting submitted a request to the RTC of Cebu. The
respondents submitted their responses and referred to the LRC. They claimed that the filing of
the petitioner's application was prohibited due to res judicata. The RTC dismissed the case.
According to the petitioner, the LRA has not yet issued the registration decision and a specific
Engr. Rafaela Belleza asserted that the Cebu Cadastral Extension survey is inaccurate and that
any subsequent surveys conducted therein must first have approval from the Land Management
Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, before being used in court. 

Whether or not the final order execution is applicable in this case?

ANSWER:
NO. Regarding the petitioner's assertion that Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
that:
A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action
before it is barred by the statute of limitations. The December 10, 1976 decision became
"extinct" in light of respondents' failure and their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period. The same does not lie. This provision of the Rules refers to civil
actions and does not apply to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. It is
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment secured against the
adverse party. His failure to act to implement the same within a reasonable time as provided in
the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.  In special proceedings,
the purpose is to establish a status, condition, or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had owned the land and
the winning party desires to oust him from that place. Furthermore, there is no provision in the
Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except for the proceedings to place the winner in possession under a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, Unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, it
becomes final without any further action upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal.

LILIA T. ONG
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA SARMIENTO
G.R. No. 92241 October 17, 1991, FIRST DIVISION, MEDIALDEA, J

PROBLEM NO. 8 Sarmiento sued Dee, and the complaint was amended to add Lilia Ong as a
defendant for the collection of P121,759. The checks that Dee and Ong wrote allegedly bounced.
Sarmiento sought the issuance of a preliminary attachment writ. Ong served with the writ of
attachment, and some hogs were levied. Upon rendering its decision, RTC found Dee and Ong
solidarily liable. Dee and Ong filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA). Sarmiento submitted a Motion
for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous. The
RTC stated that the motion no longer had any jurisdiction to act on motion considering the
appeal was perfected considering the appeal was perfect, and a writ of attachment was already
secure in the court's judgment. RTC granted Sarmiento's motion for execution pending appeal,
conditioned upon a bond of P121,759.00. Ong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
an injunction with CA. However, CA upheld the writ of execution pending appeal, saying that
RTC had duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid down by Section 2, Rule 39 RROC,
allowing execution as an exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment, which is 
a. motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; 
b. good reasons for issuing execution; and 
c. The good reasons be stated in a Special Order.  
It has accepted as "good reasons" Sarmiento's statements that the appeal of Ong is frivolous and
dilatory considering that they have not adduced substantial valid and meritorious defenses. 

CA also ruled that the bond filing constitutes special ground authorizing the court to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal. It held that since the RTC did not GAD nor was there any change
in the conditions to require CA's intervention, it will not interfere with the exercise of discretion
of the RTC regarding the sufficiency of the "special reasons" warranting execution pending
appeal. CA also disagreed with Ong's claim upon the filing of her NOA RTC had lost
jurisdiction to act on Sarmiento's motion for execution pending appeal, declaring the mere filing
of the appellant's NOA does not divest RTC of jurisdiction over the case since an appeal is not
perfected on the date of notice of appeal was filed but on the expiration of the last day to
appeal.CA held that the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party was Dec. 15, 1988,
while Sarmiento filed her motion on Dec. 12, 1988. Hence, the appeal was not yet perfected, and
RTC still had jurisdiction.  

Whether or not the filing of a bond, without anything more, can be considered a good
reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2 of Rule 39

ANSWER

NO.  In Section 23 of the Interim Rules (implementing BP 129) states that:

SECTION 23. Perfection of Appeal. — In cases where appeal is taken the perfection of the
appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. To consider the mere
posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment
pending appeal routinary the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be executed
immediately, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to
answer for damages that might result therefrom. It is a situation, to repeat, neither contemplated
nor intended by law. We have no alternative but to strike down the writ of execution pending
appeal for lack of "good reasons" to justify its issuance.

Financial distress 

PROBLEM: Sometime in 1982, San Juan Macias Memorial Park, Inc. (SJMMPI), through its
President Lourdes Pascual, looked for a buyer for the Memorial Park for P1,500,000.00.
Thereafter, Pascual, et al. came to an agreement, with Pulumbarit issuing eighteen checks.
Pulumbarit and/or his lawyer reduced the agreement into writing and secured the signatures of all
parties. In 1983, Pascual et al. sent a letter to Pulumbarit requesting for a copy of their written
agreement and to reissue new checks to replace the ones he previously issued. Failed, Pascual et
al. filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract, Damages and Accounting with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Receivership against Pulumbarit. They alleged that Pulumbarit
falsified their agreement and that the agreement was a sale of all the paid-up stocks of SJMMPI
and not a management agreement with option to buy. Whether (1) Pascual et al.' s filing of an
Urgent Motion for Execution Pending Appeal constituted forum shopping; (2) the consolidation
of CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 with CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 resulted to an infringement of
Pulumbarit's right to due process; (3) the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 rendered CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 moot and academic; (4) the grant of
the motion for execution pending appeal by the CA was proper; (5) the finding of fact in the
application for receivership constituted res judicata as to the issue of the true agreement between
the parties; and (6) the agreement between the parties was one for sale or management of the
memorial park.
ANSWER: (1) No. Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Here, any action by the
CA on Pascual et al.’s motion is provisional in nature. (2) No. Aside from being heard in oral
argument, Pulumbarit also filed with the CA several other pleadings. (3) No. The subjects in CA-
G.R. CV No. 69931 and CA-G.R. SP No. 61873 concern two different, albeit closely related,
issues. (4) No. Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides that discretionary execution
may only issue "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing." (5)
No. There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. (6) Agreement between the parties was one for sale. If the
agreement was really for the management of the memorial park, it should have been the
corporation which should be paying appellant. (Pulumbarit vs CA, G.R. Nos. 153745-46,
October 14, 2015)

Break open, lawyer’s liability 

PROBLEM: Complainant Rosa Arcadio lease an owned by Ernesto Ylagan, brother of

respondent. Respondent, as counsel for his brother, instituted an ejectment suit against Arcadio.
Complainant petitioned but dismissed and the restraining order was lifted. Thus, pursuant to the
writ of execution, respondent, together with the sheriffs and barangay officials shook and banged
until the small padlock was "smashed"; used tools to open the door, they forced open the doors
of the rooms and ransacked the place; and locked the doors and gate with new padlocks.
Respondent alleged that when they arrived, it was padlocked from the outside, which are
indications that their arrival was anticipated and that complainants intended to frustrate the writ.
People even summoned policemen, but after checking the identification of the sheriffs and
verifying the writ, found everything in order and left. Whether Atty. Ylagan must be disbarred.

ANSWER: No. The complaint must be dismissed for lack of legal basis. The writ of execution
issued partakes of the nature of a habere facias possessionem—the process commonly resorted
to by the successful party in an action of ejectment, for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff
in the actual possession of the land recovered. (Arcadio vs. Ylagan, A.M. No. 2734, July 30,
1986)

SPOUSES EDUARDO and ELSA VERSOLA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SHERIFF REYNALDO B. MADOLARIA, JUDGE LYDIA
QUERUBIN LAYOSA BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 217, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY AND DR. VICTORIA
T. ONG, OH, respondents.

G.R. No. 164740             July 31, 2006

FACTS:
In 1993, Dr. Victoria Ong granted a P1,000,000 loan to Dolores Ledesma and as a security, the
latter issued a check and executed a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot.
Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to Versola spouses for P2,500,000. The Spouses
paid P1,000,000 as a downpayment, however, they were only able to pay P50,000 for the
remaining amount. To raise the full amount, the Spouses applied for loan with AsiaTrust Bank,
Inc. They convened at a scheme wherein the spouses will pay for the obligation of Ledesma to
Dr. Ong. However when AsiaTrust Bank tried to register the Real Estate Mortgage, there was an
existing obligation to a certain Miladay’s Jewels Inc., in the amount of P214,284.00 that caused
the refusal to release the loan. 
Dr. Ong filed for a Complaint for a Sum of Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust
which rendered a favorable verdict and no having been filed the foregoing Decision attained the
finality. In 2000, the sheriff set the sale of the property at a public auction and later sold. In 2002,
Veloso spouses filed an opposition on the ground that the property is a family home and must be
exempt from execution.
ISSUE:
Whether the property is exempt from execution. (NO)
RULING:
The Spouses remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until after
almost one year from the date of the auction sale when he filed their motion to declare the
property exempt from execution. But even in the said motion, the Spouses did not present any
evidence that the property is a family home.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code
is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not
sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home.
This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop
the party from later claiming the exception.

Demurrer of Evidence
PROBLEM: The Wife filed a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute
Community of Property where she presented her documentary and testimonial evidence. She had
to make a lot of adjustments which entailed a lot of sacrifice on her part which she gave up her
luxurious lifestyle, limited social life, took care of the family matters by herself, sexual activities
between spouses decreased and was unable to conceive a child. She was eventually diagnosed
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was found to exist before the parties' marriage; and
the fact that petitioner is comfortable with her behavior and sees nothing wrong with it or the
need to change renders treatment improbable. Husband filed a demurrer of evidence as the
claims where not supported by clear evidence. RTC denied the Husband’s contention, by holding
that petitioner has adduced substantial evidence to show that she is suffering from a personality
disorder and that there is, therefore, a need for husband to adduce controverting evidence.
Whether the ruling of the RTC is correct?
ANSWER: No. In a demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict. The trial court,
as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
of the proceedings. Apart from the opinion raised by the Doctor, there appears to be no other
competent and credible proof that the alleged disorder is in fact grave enough to bring about the
disability and that said disorder is permanent or clinically incurable. It was capricious for the
RTC to deny the demurrer to evidence and require the husband to controvert evidence totally
wanting and unduly impose unwarranted burden on his part, resources, and most especially to the
docket of the courts. (GO-YU v YU G.R. No. 230443)

G.R. No. 120010 , Oct. 3, 2002

Solidbank Corporation vs CA 

PROBLEM: Solidbank filed claims with the Liquidator of PBC. The court discovered that there
was an existing Purchase Agreement and MOA between PBC and FEBTC. Solid bank filed with
the trial court a Motion to Implead the FEBTC and PBC and it ordered them to pay jointly and
severally.
Petitioner insists that summary judgment is proper in this case; that the grounds upon which the
summary judgment was filed were not successfully rebutted by FEBTC nor by the Liquidator of
Pacific Bank; that the pleadings and admissions on the record, together with the affidavits show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Was the summary judgment proper? 
ANSWER: No. The summary judgment was not proper. Requisite under Rule 34, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must
be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
 In the case at bar, there is a genuine issue, the resolution which requires the presentation
of evidence. Therefore, the trial court cannot render summary judgment in where the requisites
are not present.

Several Judgment

PROBLEM: Petitioner filed a case against private respondent on the basis of three causes of
action. In July 2001, the trial court dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents on
the grounds of prescription, ratification, and abandonment of cause of action. In October 2001,
the trial court modified its July order by reinstating the complaint insofar as the action for the
recovery of the sum of money and separate the liability of private respondent Borres. 

Petitioner filed the present case claiming that the trial court cannot render several judgments and
separate the liability of Borres from her co-respondents. The Court of Appeals held that the trial
court validly rendered several judgment because the liability of Borres in petitioner’s third cause
of action is distinct from the liability of the other respondents. Are the several judgments
rendered by respondent judge valid? (YES) 

ANSWER: Yes. A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could
have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing provision because the complaint
was filed against several defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is
proper. (Fernando vs. Santamaria, 487 SCRA 351) 

Requisites of summary judgment

PROBLEM: Respondent filed an action for sum of money and damages against petitioner
corporation and its President, Llanos. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial where they
confirmed in open court that they indeed entered into a contract growing agreement with
respondent and that the latter was entitled to a net compensation of P482,766.88 under the said
contract. RTC rendered partial summary judgment insofar as the amount of P482,766.88 which
was executed and granted. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but denied. Hence, they
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was also dismissed. Whether or not the
summary judgment is proper. (YES)
ANSWER: Yes, the Court held Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2)
requisites for summary judgment to be proper:
1. there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and
2. the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.

The petitioners’ admission of their liability resulted the respondent waiving all his other claims
in the complaint, including his claim for consequential damages. There was no other genuine
issue left for which the complaint for sum of money and damages may be prosecuted. By reason
of such admission, petitioners likewise waived whatever defenses they may have to deter
recovery by respondent under the said contract. Thus, respondent became entitled, as a matter of
law, to the execution of the partial summary judgment. (Monterey Foods vs. Eserjose, G.R. No.
153126, Sept. 11, 2003)

18. KALILID VS IAC; failure to deny an actionable document

FACTS:
Philippine Banking Corporation filed a complaint for collection against Kalilid and Messrs. de
Jesus and Salonga with Branch 23 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The trial Judge based his decision primarily on two factors: (1) the failure of petitioner Kalilid to
verify its answer, which failure the trial Judge considered as amounting to an admission by
petitioner Kalilid of the genuineness and due execution of promissory notes.
ISSUE: Whether or not IAC erred in its decision.
RULING: No. The SC ruled that Kalilid, due to its failure to verify its answer, is deemed to
have admitted by implication the authenticity and due execution of promissory notes, which were
both annexed to and made the basis for respondent Bank's complaint. Consequently, defenses
relating to the genuineness and due execution of the notes, such as that the instruments are
spurious counterfeit, or of different import on their faces from the ones executed by the parties;
or that the signatures appearing therein are forgeries; or that said signatures were unauthorized as
in the case of an agent signing for his principal or one signing in behalf of a partnership or
corporation; or that the corporation was not authorized under its charter to sign the instruments;
or that the party charged signed the instruments in some capacity other than that set out in the
instruments; or that the instruments were never delivered, are effectively cut off, placing
petitioner Kalilid in estoppel from disclaiming liability under those promissory notes.

19. SJ with pending third-party complaint

PROBLEM: Lanuza Lumber obtained a loan from PNB as evidenced by a promissory note
secured, among others, by the proceeds of a Letter of Credit. PNB in addition required Lanuza
Lumber to submit a surety bond. Utassco executed a Surety Bond in favor of PNB for Lanuza
Lumber’s loan. The promissory note became due and payable but Lanuza Lumber and Utassco
refused payment prompting PNB to file in the CFI an action to recover the amount of the
promissory note with interest plus attorney's fees (Principal Action).
Utassco brought a third party action against the owner of Lanuza Lumber on the indemnity
agreement executed between them (Third Party Complaint). CFI ruled in favor of PNB and
ordered Utassco to pay the loan plus interest and atty’s fees even if the Third Party Complaint
was still pending. Whether or not CFI may render its judgement on the principal action even if
the third party complaint filed by Utassco was still pending.
ANSWER: Yes. SC said that the third party complaint could have been prosecuted quite
separately from the principal action between PNB and Utassco. Trial court should not defer from
rendering judgment on the pleadings in the principal action because PNB was not interested at all
in the outcome of the third party complaint. 
Under Section 12, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, the purpose of a third party complaint is
to enable a defending party to obtain contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from a
person not a party to the action. Thus, notwithstanding the judgment on the pleadings, Utassco
could still proceed with the prosecution of its third party complaint. (PNB vs. UTILITY
ASSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC./Utassco)

20. Legal Basis of Judgment

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.

HEIRS OF THE LATE IRENEO & CARIDAD ENTAPA
GR. NO. 215072, 2016-09-07
PROBLEM: On December 5, 1973, Caridad Entapa and her children executed a Special Power
of Attorney authorizing Joseph Gonzaga  to enter into legal transactions on their behalf. Gonzaga
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property owned by the Entapas in favor of the
Philippine National Bank to guarantee his loan of P30,600.00. Gonzaga failed to pay the loan.
The property was foreclosed and was sold at a public auction wherein the Philippine National
Bank emerged as the winning bidder. 
 The heirs wanted to recover the property and one option was to repurchase the property
under the Sugar Restitution Law. The Philippine National Bank formally communicated to the
Entapa Heirs of the approval of the repurchase and the valuation, however, the Entapa heirs were
shocked when they came to know that the subject lot had been earlier offered to the Department
of Agrarian Reform under the Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme. The PNB tried to reassure the
heirs that the Certificate of Title is still in the name of the PNB and it would push through the
repurchase. 
The trial court failed to cite any legal basis for declaration of petitioner's liability. The
Decision merely contained a recitation of facts and a dispositive portion. Whether or not a court
must state the factual and legal basis for its decisions.
ANSWER:
Yes. The trial Court merely narrated the factual circumstances of the case and directly
declared the liability of the bank to pay the amount she paid as down payment for the re-
purchase of the subject land. The CA stated that it "contained no reference to any legal basis in
reaching its conclusions nor did it cite any legal authority or principle to support its conclusion
that the bank is liable."
The Court relays that the constitutional requirement that the basis of the decision of our
courts should be clearly articulated and made legible to the parties does not merely assure
fairness. The judiciary arrives at its conclusions on the basis of reasonable inference from
credible and admissible evidence and the text of law and our jurisprudence. Decisions of all
courts should not be based on any other considerations. 
The petition is denied. The Constitution requires that a court must state the factual and
legal grounds on which its decisions are based. Any decision that fails to adhere to this mandate
is void.

G.R. No. 163280 : February 2, 2010

DORIS U. SUNBANUN, Petitioner, v. AURORA B. GO, Respondent.
 
Effect
Problem: 
Sunbanun filed a suit for damages against spouses Go for the breach of the warranty in
the fire insurance policies they had made involving Sunbanun’s property. The RTC rendered the
judgement finding only Aurora liable and ordered her to pay for damages and attorney’s fees. 
Aurora filed for a Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal which was
denied by the court. 
The CA dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed, stating the following:
 Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one
petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing
her to represent the two (2) other petitioners; the 
 Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the
petition but lacks explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not
done personally. 
 Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers. 
 Certified true copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to
the petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true copy; 
 Copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the petition which
would support the allegations therein are not attached.
Bringing the issue of whether formal deficiencies in the petition be relaxed in the interest
of justice.
 
Answer: 
The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. Non-submission of
certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the Complaint and Answer is
not fatal, nor is the failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers. However,
whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred
modes of service. Should one deviate from the general rule, it is mandatory for him/her to submit
a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served. 
Nevertheless, in spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be applied to her benefit.
Doctrine of Immutability of Judgment
PROBLEM:
Aguilar sold to SPS Sanchez a portion of his lot located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu, South
Cotabato. Aguilar fenced the boundary line of the spouses lot and the alleged alluvium. The
petitioner filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the MCTC of
South Cotabato. They claimed that they are the owners of the alluvium. 
 
MCTC dismissed the complaint. After 4 years, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment before the RTC seeking to annul the Decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. The RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the MCTC
Decision. However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. Whether the MCTC lack
of jurisdiction

ANSWER:
NO. The court ruled that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over the person and over the subject
matter of the claim. The SC has ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting,
and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a
court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
In this case, the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability
of final judgments. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. 
(SPS SANCHEZ, vs. VDA. DE AGUILAR, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018)

23. RUIZ VS. CA, 201 SCRA 119; Examples of extrinsic fraud
PROBLEM:  Ruiz obtained loans from Torres on different occasions,consolidated loan of
P750,000.00 prior to maturity, the loans were consolidated under (1) promissory note and was
secured by a real estate mortgage and the lot was registered in the name of RUIZ.
Thereafter, RUIZ obtained (3) more loans from TORRES, and it was secured by 3 promissory
notes in the amount of 100,000 each. These combined loans of P300,000.00 were secured by
P571,000.00 worth of jewelry pledged by RUIZ to TORRES. RUIZ paid the stipulated 3%
monthly interest on the P750,000.00 loan, amounting to P270,000.00. 
RUIZ’s failure to pay the principal loan of P750,000.00, as well as the interest payment,
TORRES demanded payment not only of the P750,000.00 loan, but also of the P300,000.00 loan.
When RUIZ failed to pay, TORRES sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the aforementioned
real estate mortgage. 
A day before the scheduled auction sale, RUIZ filed a complaint with the RTC, with a prayer for
the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale and to fix
her indebtedness to TORRES based on the aggregate loan of P750,000.00, plus the other loans of
P300,000.00, covered by separate promissory notes, plus interest, minus P571,000.00
representing the amount of jewelry pledged in favor of TORRES.
Court further held that the promissory note in question is a unilateral contract of adhesion drafted
by TORRES. It struck down the contract as repugnant to public policy because it was imposed
by a dominant bargaining party (TORRES) on a weaker party (RUIZ).

ANSWER: NO, Court held that promissory note is not a contract of adhesion. 
Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of the other party
is the signing of his signature or his ‘adhesion’ thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of lading,
contracts of sale of lots on the installment plan fall into this category.
Promissory note in question did not contain any fine print provision which could not have been
examined by RUIZ. Petitioner had all the time to go over and study the stipulations embodied in
the promissory note. Aside from the March 22, 1995 promissory note for P750,000.00, three
other promissory notes of different dates and amounts were executed by petitioner in favor of
private respondent. These promissory notes contain similar terms and conditions, with a little
variance in the terms of interests and surcharges. 
The fact that petitioner and private respondent had entered into not only one but several loan
transactions shows that petitioner was not in any way compelled to accept the terms allegedly
imposed by TORRES. 
Note: RUIZ, in her complaint dated October 7, 1996 filed with the trial court, never claimed that
she was forced to sign the subject note.
To be required is certainly different from being compelled. RUIZ could have rejected the
conditions made by the TORRES. As an experienced business- woman, she ought to understand
all the conditions set forth in the subject promissory note

Requisites:Berry Rule
PROBLEM: On December 16, 1991, the trial court convicted Dinglasan for violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, by issuing a Commercial Bank Check No. HO270451 in the amount of
P515,000.00 to Antrom, Inc., which was dishonored when presented to the bank by reason of
insufficiency of funds.
 On October 30, 2000, the petitioner filed a Petition for New Trial and, in the alternative, for the
Reopening of the Case based on newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly discovered
evidence claimed by Dinglasan are the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan and Ma. Encarnacion
Vda. De Dinglasan. These affidavits, together with the transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985
attached to Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena
Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within five banking
days from notice of dishonor. He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and
refused to make good the said check within five banking days from the notice of dishonor, is
absent. WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THE CASE BASED ON
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED.
 ANSWER: NO. The pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
 Rule 121 – New Trial or Reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
 (a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.
 These standards, also known as the "Berry Rule," trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry v.
State of Georgia27 where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
 Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that
it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it
was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so material
that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not
cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th.
That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And
6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character
or credit of a witness.
 Verily, the claim of Dinglasan that the alleged evidence sought to be presented in this case was
recently discovered is a falsity. The records are very clear. The transmittal letter dated 8 October
1985 was already offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the
Petition for Review filed before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Irrefragably, the letter dated
8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was
already weighed by the appellate court. (A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents., G.R. No. 145420, September 19, 2006)

Prohibition on the filing of a second motion for reconsideration

Problem: Petitioners leased the property from Respondent Mena Ravanes with the
agreement that they will vacate it, regardless of their rental payments, when the latter and her
family would need to use it. In March 2000, respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their
daughter, Rowena, is getting married and would need the property to build her house. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the property. Thus, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for
Ejectment against petitioners in the MeTC of Pasig City. The MeTC declared as void and against
public policy the interpretation of petitioners of their contract that they were assured of a lifetime
lease for as long as they are paying monthly rent. Respondent-spouses appealed to the CA. On
September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the Execution of
Judgment dated August 29, 2007. The CA denied the motion. On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Whether or not the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.
Answer: Under Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.
In the case at bar, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision,
although in the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment." In fact,
the relief prayed for by petitioners in this manifestation and motion is the same relief obtained
once a motion for reconsideration is filed on time. Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides that generally, a motion for reconsideration filed on time stays the execution of the
judgment sought to be reconsidered. It thus confused the court why petitioners captioned their
motion as a "Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Execution of Judgment" when the effect
sought is one and the same -to stay the execution of judgment. (Heirs of Gamaliel Albano vs.
Spouses Ravanes, G.R. No. 183645, July 20, 2016)

When second MR allowed

PROBLEM: PAL retrenches 5,000 of its employees including the 1,400 cabin crew
personnel. The FASAP filed complaint for illegal retrenchment against PAL and Patricia Chiong,
AVP for Cabin Crew Services of PAL. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the FASAP which
later reversed by NLRC. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision, hence, the filing of this case to
the Supreme Court. The 3rd Division took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of the PAL
but PAL filed its Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, the case was re-raffled off to the 2nd
Division due to the retirement of its members, which the latter dismissed the second MR of PAL.
The PAL Counsel’s submitted several letters to the Clerk of Court and the resolution dismissing
the second MR was recalled. FASAP filed a MR invoking its rights to due process as the recall
arose from the Court’s ex parte consideration of mere letters from the Counsel of PAL. Whether
or not the Supreme Court may entertain the second MR of PAL.

ANSWER: Yes. The second MR of PAL could no longer be challenged as a prohibited

pleading in light of the SC resolution granting the PAL’s motion for leave to file a second MR.
The rule prohibiting the filing of a second MR is by no means absolute. Although Sec. 2, Rule 52
of the Rules of Court disallows the filing of a second MR, the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court allows an exception which can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court
en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its members. (Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP) vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), Patria Chiong
and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008)

G.R. No. 128628            August 23, 2001

ILDEFONSO SAMALA AND BENJAMIN BABISTA, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 15,
Naic, Cavite, and ROMULO OCAMPO
 PARDO, J.

Topic: Petition for relief

FACTS

Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from judgment which was denied for failure to file within the
15-day reglementary period. Petitioners then filed for relief from the order granting a writ of
execution arguing that the reason for such failure was the fact that the notice was entrusted to
Jose, who suffered from diarrhea. The last day for filing the notice fell on a Friday. Jose filed the
notice immediately on the next business day, Monday, believing in good faith that he could still
file it. Delay was actually for one day, Saturday and Sunday excluded.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for relief should be granted on the ground of excusable negligence.

RULING

YES. Where no element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to
petitioners, a one-day delay does not justify their appeal's denial. The rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially
on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
avoided. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from the courts.

SPS. REYES VS. CA G.R. No. 150722

August 17, 2007

FACTS: 
Voluntad obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Pandi secured by a mortgage over one-half of a
parcel of land. Voluntads failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. It was sold
at a public auction with the bank as highest bidder. Later, without the knowledge of the
Voluntads, the bank assigned its right over the property to Spouses Dizon.
The Civil Case was decided in favor of the Voluntads and subsequently filed a petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus relative to the denial of a writ of execution sought against the
transferees of the land to Spouses Reyes. Voluntad received a copy of the decision on May 30,
2000.
Voluntad’s MR was denied. Contending that they were not given their day in court as they were
never impleaded as party-defendants in the Civil Case, and that their inability to intervene in the
proceedings was due to excusable negligence. Spouses Reyes filed the subject Petition for Relief
from Judgment on June 21, 2000, which was denied as it was fled out of time.  

ISSUE: 
When shall the 60-day and the six months period for filing petition for relief be reckoned for a
party not included in the original judgment but later bound by the judgment by a higher Court on
certiorari?

RULING:
The Rules cannot be clearer when it states that the petition for relief mist be files within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding to be set aside and
six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order, or other proceeding. These two periods must
concur. Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these
periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is
allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it
were, a petition for relief is actually the "last chance" given by law to litigants to question a final
judgment or order. And failure to avail of such "last chance" within the grace period fixed by the
Rules is fatal. The 6-month period from entry of judgment must concur, otherwise the petition
will be deemed filed out of time.
The court held that the CA committed no reversible error in not finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the respondent judge dismissed the subject petition for relief from judgment.

Nature and effect of reglementary period 

Problem: The spouses Bartolome loaned Php 500,000 from the respondents, and agreed to pay
within two months with interest of five percent per month. To secure the loan the spouses loaned
their Bago Bantay property to the respondents. The period to pay lapsed without the spouses
having paid part of the loan. In the meantime, the spouses died and the respondents filed a
complaint for judicial foreclosure against the petitioner and the heirs of spouses Bartolome, as
the former allegedly represented Lita Bartolome. In a decision dated December 22, 2009, the
RTC ordered the petitioners to pay the respondents. 

In February 8, 2010 they filed a motion for reconsideration and filed a request before the PNP
handwriting expert to examine the authenticity of the respondents’ alleged signatures of real
estate mortgage, which was denied on May 25, 2010. 

On August 11, 2010 they filed a notice of appeal which was denied for being filed out of time. 

On September 24, 2010 they filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their lawyer who
failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period which was denied on April 27,
2011. 

On July 13, 2011, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was also
denied as it found out that the petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a motion for certiorari. 

On November 11, 2011, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied,
hence this petition before the Supreme Court. 

Whether or not the petitioners’ former counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence

Answer: No. The double period required under Rule 38, Section 3 is jurisdictional and should be
strictly complied with. 

(G.R. No. 199283 June 9, 2014; Juliet Vitug Madarang and Romeo Bartolome v. Spouses Jose
Morales and Carolina Morales)

Trust International vs. Pelaez, G.R. No. 146871, August 22, 2006

Remedy of Denial of Petition for Relief

PROBLEM: On 29 December 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner anchored its petition on the "excusable negligence" of its
counsel Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako's (Siguion Reyna) law firm and the gross
negligence of Atty. Elena C. Cardinez (Atty. Cardinez), a newly hired junior associate of the
Siguion Reyna law firm, who allegedly handled the case for petitioner. Petitioner revealed that
the instant case was assigned to Atty. Cardinez in June 2003 and that all notices, orders and legal
processes in connection with the instant case were immediately forwarded to her for appropriate
action. Unconvinced by the Court of appeals denying the Petition of the Petitioner. WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THE GROSS AND PALPABLE NEGLIGENCE, BORDERING ON FRAUD,
COMMITTED BY PETITIONER'S FORMER HANDLING COUNSEL, ATTY. CARDINEZ,
WHOSE NEGLIGENCE AND ACTIVE MISREPRESENTATION PREVENTED
PETITIONER FROM EXHAUSTING ALL THE LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT,
PARTICULARLY, THE REMEDY OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.

ANSWER: No. At the onset, it must be pointed out that the present petition seeking the setting
aside of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated 13 February 2004 and 29 July 2004, denying
petitioner's petition for relief from judgment, is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. 
Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, however, provides: 
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.
In the present case, it has been Attys. Santamaria-Seña, Peña and Javier who participated in
the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. They did not notify the Court of Appeals that they
had withdrawn from the case. There was completely no reason for them not to file an appeal,
being the handling counsel of record during the pendency of the case before the Court of
Appeals.
In sum, this is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable,
pervasive and reckless which deprives the party of his or her day in court. For this reason, the
Court need no longer concern itself with the propriety of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court is bound by the Court of Appeal's ruling
which had become final and executory due to the simple and inexcusable negligence of
petitioner's counsel in allowing the reglementary period to lapse without perfecting an appeal.

NOTE: Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court- SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment

G.R. No. 168913             March 14, 2007

ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA
L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and
JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents.
FACTS:
On December 10, 1976, the Court of First Instance of Cebu grants the registration of title
in favor of Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza, and such become final and executory on
January 29, 1977. However, the said decree was actually issued only on July 26, 2003.
On February 12, 1997, petitioner Rolando Ting file with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot of spouses Lirio. Respondent, heirs of
Lirio argued that the application shall barred on the ground of res adjudicata. 
The petitioner elevates the case file a petition for certiorari. Following, section 6, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, state that:
“A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations”
Petitioner, argues that although the decision had become final and executory on January
29, 1977, but no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA); it was only on July 26, 2003 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by
respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant
judgment passé[d] into extinction. Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be
the basis of res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for land registration should be barred for being res
judicata.
RULING:
In the light of foregoing. The application of Rolando Ting is bar by res judicata. Section
30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
“Judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the
judgment.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is applicable to civil actions and is not applicable
to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. 
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the
ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

GOOD REASONS

PROBLEM: Sarmiento filed a complaint against Dee and Ong on the allegation that they had
issued the bounced checks. The trial judge found Dee and Ong jointly and severally liable. Dee
and Ong filed a notice of appeal. Sarmiento filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution Pending
Appeal," alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous. The trial judge granted Sarmiento’s
motion for execution pending appeal, conditioned upon a bond. Ong filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction with the CA which was dismissed. It observed that the presence
of the circumstances allowing execution as an exception, or pending appeal, even before final
judgment: xxx good reasons for issuing execution xxx. Whether or not the writ of execution
pending appeal was premised on, or justified by good reasons.

ANSWER: NO. When the period of appeal has not expired, execution of the judgment should
not be allowed, save only if there be good reasons therefor. Where the reason given is that an
appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for
the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the
disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal. To
consider the mere posting of a bond a ‘good reason’ would precisely make immediate execution
of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the exception. Judgments would be
executed immediately, as a matter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed
to do was to post a bond to answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to
repeat, neither contemplated nor intended by law. (Ong v. CA, G.R. No. 92241, October 17,
1991)

Financial Distress may not be enough good reason for discretionary execution pending
appeal.

PROBLEM: In a motion filed on July 5, 1984, and pending resolution of Pulumbarit’s Motion
to Dismiss, Pascual et al. sought to have Pulumbarit declared in default. The trial court granted
this motion and allowed Pascual et al. to present their evidence ex parte. On September 5, 1984,
the trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of Pascual et al. This judgment of default was
reversed by the CA on January 15, 1989 and the case was remanded to the trial court for
reception of Pulumbarit’s evidence. Prior to the reversal of the trial court’s default judgment,
however, Pascual et al. applied for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of the
Memorial Park and all its records and business transactions during the pendency of the case. This
application was denied by the trial court in an Order dated October 10, 1991. Pulumbarit filed a
Notice of Appeal dated August 19, 2000. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69931.
Meanwhile, and before the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 7250-M to the CA,
Pascual et al. filed with the trial court motions praying for (1) the issuance of a writ of injunction
against Pulumbarit and (2) the execution of the decision pending appeal. The trial court granted
these motions on September 13, 2000 pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Pulumbarit’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of this Order (directing discretionary
execution) was denied on October 3, 2000. May the filing of the motion for execution pending
appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 69931 render Pulumbarit’s petition for certiorari moot and academic?

ANSWER: No. Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court provides, in part, that discretionary
execution (or execution pending appeal) may only issue “upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.” Good reason must consist of superior or exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may
suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later. The financial distress of a juridical entity
is not comparable to a case involving a natural person — such as a very old and sickly one
without any means of livelihood, an heir seeking an order for support and monthly allowance for
subsistence, or one who dies. Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not
outweigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments.
Certainly, a juridical entity like petitioner corporation, has other than extraordinary execution,
alternative remedies like loans, advances, internal cash generation and the like to address its
precarious financial condition. In this case, the grant by the CA of Pascual, et al.’s motion for
discretionary/extraordinary execution was founded on the following reasons: (1) to stop
Pulumbarit from continuing to receive money from the sale of the lots and (2) to save the
property from distraint and public auction. The Court finds the foregoing reasons insufficient to
justify the execution of the trial court’s Decision pending final resolution of Pulumbarit’s appeal.
(Pulumbarit, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals (17th Division), 772 SCRA 244, G.R. Nos. 153745-46
October 14, 2015)

PORTION OF JUDGMENT THAT MAY BE EXECUTED

PROBLEM: 

Private respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera)
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against the Spouses
Romualdo Lastimosa (Romualdo) and Felisa Lastimosa (Fe1isa). The former sought to recover
from the latter four parcels of land located in Baruan, Agno, Pangasinan (subject property).

During the trial of the case, Romualdo died. A Motion for Substitution was filed by the
decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children Flordeliza Sagun, Reynaldo Lastimosa, Recto
Lastimosa (Recto), Rizalina Ramirez (Rizalina), Lily Lastimosa, and Avelino Lastimosa (Heirs
of Lastimosa).

RTC Branch 55 rendered a Decision, declaring the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of the
parcels of land in question, and thereby ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and
to surrender possession thereof. 

Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto and Rizalina
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA. Felicitas sought the
nullification of the RTC Branch 55's Decision dated March 16, 2004, and the corresponding
Writs of Execution and Demolition issued pursuant thereto. Former Tenth Division of the CA
rendered a Decision, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. Court affirmed the CA
decision in the Petition for Annulment of Judgment

At about the same time, the Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and Demolition dated
May 28, 2010. The Motion for Execution was anchored on the fact that the Decision dated
March 16, 2004, in the case for recovery of ownership, possession and damages had long
attained finality.
RTC Branch 55 issued an Order granting the Motion for Execution and Demolition, and denying
the Motion to Desist. Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the Writ of
Execution and Demolition issued by the lower court. Fifteenth Division of the CA rendered the
assailed Decision dismissing the appeal on the following grounds, to wit: (i) the Heirs of
Lastimosa availed of the wrong remedy by filing an appeal, instead of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65; (ii) the matter pertaining to the non-inclusion of Felicitas is already barred by res
judicata, as it has been settled with finality

Felicitas filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the same Decision, which was denied by the
CA. Undeterred, Felicitas filed the instant petition for review on certiorari20 under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Whether the CA erred in ordering the execution of the Decision
dated March 16, 2004. (NO)

ANSWER: Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when the
judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. In the same vein,
the decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case, regardless of any claim that it
is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.

Neither may the parties object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law. The only
exceptions thereto are when: "(i) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (ii) there has been a
change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (iii) execution is
sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (iv) it appears that the
controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (v) the terms of the judgment are
not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (vi) it appears that the writ
of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against
the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was
issued without authority."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that in as early as March 16, 2004, the RTC Branch 55 of
Alaminos, Pangasinan rendered a Decision in the case for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages, ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the subject properties and surrender
them to the Heirs of Nivera. There is no dispute that this ruling of the RTC had become final and
executory.
(Salazar vs. Felias, G.R. No. 213972, Feb. 5, 2018)

A.M. No. 2734 July 30, 1986

ROSA SANTIAGO ARCADIO, et. al., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CESAR ZOOK YLAGAN, respondent.
BREAK OPEN, LAWYER’S LIABILITY
PROBLEM: 
Complainant filed a sworn letter-complaint on 15 February 1985, praying that the
respondent be disbarred on the grounds that used violence to break open their domicile without
authority from the court.
Arcadio was a lessee of an apartment owned by Ylagan’s brother, who asked the
respondent to institute an ejectment suit against Arcadio before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, based on three grounds: sublease by the lessee of the premises to another without
the consent of the lessor; need of the lessor/owner to repossess the unit for his own use or for the
use of any immediate member of his family; and, ownership by the lessee of another residential
unit in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Respondent alleged that when they arrived at the apartment, it was abandoned and
padlocked from the outside, which are indications that their arrival was anticipated and that
complainants intended to frustrate the writ; that the service of the writ was carried out in a most
civil and orderly fashion notwithstanding the belligerent attitude of persons purporting to be
Arcadio's relatives, friends and counsel, who were present during their entire stay in the
premises; and that these people even summoned a police patrol, but the policemen, after
checking the Identification of the sheriffs and verifying the writ, found everything in order and
left. 
The question is whether the complaint be dismissed for the lack of legal basis.
ANSWER:
While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers
who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will, on the other hand, protect them from the
unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. Private persons and particularly disgruntled
opponents, may not, therefore be permitted to use the courts as vehicle through which to vent
their rancor on members of the Bar.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason or necessity to refer this complaint to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. This administrative case,
therefore, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Properties exempt from execution.

SPS. EDUARDO AND ELSA VERSOLA vs. CA
G.R. No. 164740, 2006-07-31
PROBLEM: Dr. Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma entered into a loan
transaction. Ledesma issued to private respondent a check for 1,000,000.00 pesos and promised
to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon
City. The execution of the deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, Ledesma sold the
said house and lot to petitioners Versola wherein they paid Ledesma P1,000,000.00 as down
payment, with the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of
P75,000.00. 
 . To raise the full amount that Ledesma demanded, petitioners applied for a loan with
Asiatrust Bank, Inc. in the amount of P2,000,000.00. Asiatrust then granted a loan of
P2,000,000.00 to petitioners with a written guarantee that the P1,500,000.00 would be given
directly by Asiatrust to private respondent. Asiatrust approved the loan application however,  it
discovered a notice of levy on execution was annotated, thu Asiatrust did not register said Real
Estate Mortgage and refused to release the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners.
Private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against petitioners to which they
lost. The sheriff set the sold the property at a public auction. and was awarded to private
respondent. For failure of petitioners to redeem the property during the redemption period, a
Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of private respondent. Whether or not petitioners
timely raised and proved that their property is exempt from execution. 
ANSWER: No. The petitioners' assertion for exemption is a mere afterthought, a sheer artifice
to deprive private respondent of the fruits of the verdict of her case.
On the day immediately prior to the scheduled sale of the subject property, petitioners
filed with the sheriff an Objection/Exception to Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Versola's Family
Home alleging there that the property subject of the intended auction sale was their family home.
It was only after almost two years did petitioners rigorously claim that the property in question is
exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing that petitioners adduced evidence to
prove that it is indeed a family home.
The right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the
person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estopped the party
from later claiming the exception.
G.R. No. 209672 -  Jan. 14, 2015
Edmund Sia vs. Arcena
Writ of Possession

PROBLEM: Due to real property tax delinquencies of PRI, the City Treasurer auctioned the
lands, with the petitioner as the highest bidder was issued with Certificate of Sale. Petitioner was
not able to take possession thereof in view of the refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final
Bill of Sale despite the lapse of the one-year redemption period. The mayor issued an executive
order nullifying the sale.
The petitioner was constrained to file a Petition for the annulment of the EO , mandamus,
and damages against the City Treasurer and the Mayor. Petitioner moved for the delivery of the
possession of the subject lots as they were already being occupied by third parties, including
herein respondents. A Writ of Possession, and eventually, a Writ of Demolition were issued in
petitioner’s favor. But was held null and void by the CA. Did CA correctly declared the writs to
be null and void?
ANSWER: Yes. The CA correctly ruled that the writs of possession are null and void. Writs of
possession are not applicable to special civil action for mandamus. The judgment only declared
valid the auction sale where petitioner bought the subject lots, and accordingly ordered the City
Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale to petitioner. 
Since the said judgment did not order that the possession of the subject lots be vested unto
petitioner, the RTC Br. 15 substantially varied the terms of the aforesaid judgment — and thus,
exceeded its authority in enforcing the same — when it issued the corresponding writs of
possession and demolition to vest unto petitioner the possession of the subject lots.

Property of another

PROBLEM: Petitioners further alleged that their occupancy of the lands was not
pursuant to any agreement entered into with anyone of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R or
any of the defendants’ predecessors-in-interest. 
Further, they alleged that it was not even established that their residential structures
were within the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-R, in which the Deputy Sheriff was ordered
to cause the demolition of all improvements which he may find within the premises immediately
after the expiration of the 15-day notice.
In its 28 April 2000 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the
Special Order of Demolition. The Court of Appeals ruled that respondent’s right to the subject
parcels of land had already been settled with finality. Whether the Special Order of Demolition
may be enforced against petitioners who were not party-defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R.

ANSWER: No. The generally accepted principle is that no man shall be affected by
any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment
rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to
the action, and not against one who, not being a party in the case, did not have his day in
court. Due process requires that a court decision can only bind a party to the litigation and not
against one who did not have his day in court. 

In this case, petitioners were not parties in Civil Case No. 925-R. Petitioners’ allegation
that their possession did not arise from an agreement with the defendants or the predecessors-in-
interest of the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R remains unrebutted by respondent. The
Special Order of Demolition only binds the defendants in Civil Case No. 925-R as well as their
agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest. In the absence of proof that petitioners
are agents, assigns, representatives, or successors-in-interest of the defendants in Civil Case No.
925-R, the Special Order of Demolition may not be enforced against them. Section 43, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which would allow the judgment obligee to recover
indebtedness due to the judgment obligor, does not apply in this case. (Fermin vs. Esteves, G.R.
No. 147977  March 26, 2008)

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