Assignment 6

Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Fountain

Facts:
 In March 1996, Harun Fountain was shot in the back of the head at point-blank range by

a playmate.

 As a result of his injuries, including the loss of his right eye, Fountain had extensive

lifesaving medical services from many providers, including Yale Diagnostic Radiology

(Yale/plaintiff).

 The expenses at Yale totaled $17,694. Yale billed Vernetta Turner-Tucker (Tucker),

Fountain's mother, but the bill went unpaid and, in 1999, Yale obtained a judgment

against her.

 In January 2001, all of Tucker's debts were discharged in bankruptcy, including the Yale

judgment. None of the cases, from bankruptcy to the present litigation, discussed

Fountain's father.

 Tucker filed suit against the boy who had shot her son.

 However, Fountain passed away before the case was settled.

 The settlement from this tort case was placed into probate court as part of Fountain's

estate. Tucker was the administrator of her son's estate.

  When the settlement was deposited, Yale asked the probate court for payment of its

$17,694 judgment from the estate.

 The Probate Court denied the motion, reasoning that parents are liable for medical

services rendered to their minor children, and that a parent's refusal or inability to pay for

those services does not render the minor child liable.

 Yale was denied payment from the estate and appealed to the trial court, which held for

Yale.

 Tucker and the estate (defendants) appealed.

Judicial Opinion:

BORDEN, Justice

The rule that a minor's contracts are voidable is not absolute. An exception to this rule,
eponymously known as the doctrine of necessaries, is that a minor may not avoid a contract for
goods or services necessary for his health and sustenance. Such contracts are binding even if
entered into during minority, and a minor, upon reaching majority, may not, as a matter of law,
disaffirm them.

… [W]e conclude that Connecticut recognizes the doctrine of necessaries. We further conclude
that, pursuant to the doctrine, the defendants are liable for payment to the plaintiff for the
services rendered to Fountain.

Our common law has long recognized the parents' obligation to provide for their minor child
(“there is a law of our universal humanity … which impels parents, whether fathers or mothers,
to protect and support their helpless children”)
The present case illustrates the inequity that would arise if no implied in law contract arose
between Fountain and the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff undoubtedly presumed that Fountain's
parent would pay for his care and was obligated to make reasonable efforts to collect from
Tucker before seeking payment from Fountain, the direct benefit of the services, nonetheless,
was conferred upon Fountain. Having received the benefit of necessary services, Fountain should
be liable for payment for those necessaries if his parents do not pay.

Fountain received, through a settlement with the boy who caused his injuries, funds that were
calculated, at least in part, on the costs of the medical services provided to him by the plaintiff in
the wake of those injuries. This fact further supports a determination of an implied-in-law
contract under the circumstances of the case. The judgment is affirmed.

Facts:

 Dorris Reed bought a house from Robert King for $76,000.

 King and his real estate agent knew that a woman and her four children had been
murdered in the house ten years earlier and allegedly knew that the event had materially
affected the market value of the house.

 They said nothing about the murders to Reed, and King asked a neighbor not to inform
her of them.

 After the sale, neighbors told Reed about the murders and informed her that the house
was consequently worth only $65,000.

 Reed brought an action against King and the real estate agent, alleging fraud and seeking
rescission and damages.

 The complaint was dismissed, and Reed appealed.

Judicial Opinion:

BLEASE, Associate Judge

The requisite elements of fraud are

 (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact (or, in some cases, an

opinion) susceptible of knowledge,

 (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or without sufficient knowledge on the subject to
warrant a representation,

 (3) with the intent to induce the person to whom it is made to act upon it; and such person
must

 (4) act in reliance upon the representation

 (5) to his damage.’’ The trial court determined that Reed failed to allege concealment of a
material fact. Concealment, however, may include mere silence when a party has a duty
to disclose.

 This duty falls upon the seller of real property where he

 1- knows of facts that have a material effect upon the value or desirability of the property
and

 2- knows that these facts are unknown to the buyer and inaccessible to the buyer through
the exercise of ordinary diligence.

 The second of these conditions clearly applies. King knew that Reed was unaware of the
murders, and Reed cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate and discover such an
unlikely possibility.
 The issue therefore turns upon the question of materiality. Material nondisclosures in real
property cases generally pertain to physical defects of the property or to legal
impediments to its use.

 Murder, however, is a particularly disturbing event that may cause a buyer to be unable to
live in a house where it has occurred and may thus deprive the buyer of the intended use
of the property.

 Moreover, the content of the information not disclosed by the seller need not be the
crucial factor. If Reed can prove that the murders significantly and measurably affected
the market value of the premises, she should receive a favorable judgment on the issue of
materiality and duty to disclose.