Can Labour Provisions Work Beyond The Border Evaluating The Effects of EU

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International Labour Review, Vol. 155 (2016), No. 3
Can labour provisions work beyond

the border? Evaluating the effects
of EU free trade agreements
Liam CAMPLING,* James HARRISON,** Ben RICHARDSON***
and Adrian SMITH****
Abstract. The European Union (EU) has concluded close to 50 bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs), with around 10 more under negotiation. EU FTAs now include
“trade and sustainable development” chapters, which contain labour provisions
based on a “promotional” rather than “conditional” approach. In the context of the
debate on the purpose and efficacy of the trade–labour linkage, the authors exam-
ine the possibilities and limitations of these provisions, drawing attention to the
lack of research on their effect “on the ground”. To bridge this gap, they propose
a new research agenda for evaluating the effects of labour provisions in EU FTAs.
Inclusiveness is just as important outside the EU’s

borders. We are committed to promoting sustainable
development, international labour standards and decent
work also outside the EU (European Commission,
2010, p. 8).
S ince the 1990s and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European
Union’s Single Market, the rules that govern international trade have been
* School of Business and Management, Queen Mary University of London, email: l.cam
pling@qmul.ac.uk. ** School of Law, University of Warwick, email: j.harrison.3@warwick.ac.uk.
*** Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, email: b.j.richardson@
warwick.ac.uk. **** School of Geography, Queen Mary University of London, email: a.m.smith@
qmul.ac.uk. Authorship of this article is fully collaborative. The article arises from a research pro-
ject, funded by the Queen Mary–Warwick strategic partnership, entitled “The externalization of
European Union economic governance: The mismatch of economic and social development?”. We
are very grateful to both institutions for this funding, which enabled research involving interviews
with key informants and trade policy/trade data analysis. We are also grateful for the research as-
sistance of Tim Edkins, Peg Murray-Evans and Aidan Wong, and for comments received from the
International Labour Review’s anonymous referee and the editors of the Special Issue. A previous
version of this article was presented at the workshop “Fostering labor rights in the global economy:
Multidisciplinary perspectives on the effectiveness of transnational public and private policy initia-
tives”, University of Leuven, 20–21 February 2014 (see also Campling et al., 2014).
Responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles rests solely with their authors, and
publication does not constitute an endorsement by the ILO.
Copyright © The authors 2016

Journal compilation © International Labour Organization 2016
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358 International Labour Review
subject to intense academic and public debate. Two aspects of this debate are
particularly noteworthy. First, the idea that liberalizing trade relationships will
lead to increased prosperity for all has become increasingly contested, and the
causal relationships between trade openness, economic growth and broad so-
cial goals such as poverty reduction and better working conditions are now ac-
knowledged to be more complex than initially supposed (McCulloch, Winters
and Cirera, 2001; Harrison, 2007). Second, many recent trade agreements – in
contrast to the multilateral rules agreed in the 1947 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that were centred on “openness” and the unifying
principle of liberalization – have involved the creation of regulatory frame-
works that place members under positive obligations on a variety of issues,
from the protection of intellectual property to conducting scientific risk assess-
ments of food safety regulations (Heiskanen, 2004). As a result, there is now
widespread recognition of the need to carefully scrutinize international trade
agreements in order to understand the complex effects that their rules have
on the international trading system, on individual countries operating within
that system, and on particularly vulnerable groups that may be negatively af-
fected (Harrison, 2007 and 2014).
This article concentrates on another set of positive obligations: inter-
national labour standards, provisions on which are increasingly prevalent in bi-
lateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). The article explores a novel
approach to the inclusion of these labour provisions by the European Union
(EU), concentrating on the “new generation” of EU bilateral FTAs, starting
with the 2011 agreement with the Republic of Korea (the “EU–South Korea
FTA”). These agreements are part of the EU’s project to establish a “deeper”
and “more comprehensive” range of trade and associated obligations.1 This
focus allows us to investigate the effects of a number of similar labour pro-
visions, used in agreements that vary greatly in terms of their geographical,
developmental and broader legal contexts. Ultimately, we wish to know the
extent to which – if at all – the EU meets its own lofty rhetoric outlined in the
epigraph to this article, especially given the assumption held by many critics
of FTAs that “agreements will only be as useful as the politicians desire them
to be” (Vogt, 2014).
The remainder of the article is organized into four sections. The first re-
caps the failed attempts to incorporate labour standards in the WTO system,
and the subsequent diversion of these efforts into the bilateral sphere. It is
important to reflect on these differentiated bilateral “experiments”, since they
cover an increasingly large proportion of international trade between coun-
tries. The second section then explores one important and widespread model
of labour provisions – the “promotional” model, which the EU has incorp-
orated within the “trade and sustainable development” chapter of all its re-
1 The language “deep” and “comprehensive” in the EU’s current trade agreement agenda
was first captured in the negotiations with neighbouring States involved in the Eastern Partnership
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership over a range of bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) (see Wijkman, 2011; Smith, 2015).
Labour provisions in EU free trade agreements 359
cent FTAs. In this section, the basic components of the “promotional” model,
and the limited variations that exist in different agreements, are described.
The existing academic literature that has analysed these new arrangements is
explored, highlighting the lack of critical scholarship on the degree to which
these arrangements have transformed (or have the potential to transform)
labour and employment practices in a variety of national and industrial/sec-
toral contexts. The third section makes proposals for a research agenda that can
bridge this gap, involving investigation of the concrete consequences of these
agreements in countries that are now subject to this new breed of bilateralism.
We call for an exploration of the phenomenon of “EU externalization” – in
our case, referring to the contested incorporation of extra–EU spaces into the
governance structures defining the EU’s single internal market, not only from
the perspective of policy-makers and lobbying interests in Brussels and EU
Member States (the focus of much of the existing literature), but also from
the perspective of industry and workers in partner countries. The fourth sec-
tion presents the authors’ conclusions.
Labour provisions in international trade:

From multilateral impasse to bilateral experimentation
There is a long history of linkage between trade agreements and labour stand-
ards (ILO/IILS, 2013) and since the inception of the multilateral trading sys-
tem in the mid-twentieth century there have been periodic attempts to have
labour conditionality – often as part of a wider “social clause” – included
within the GATT and subsequently the WTO. This was often as a result of
proposals put forward by the United States and supported by various other
powerful actors, including the EU; both actors had begun to link their unilat-
eral trade preferences to minimum labour standards from the 1980s onwards
(Charnovitz, 2002; Haworth, Hughes and Wilkinson, 2005). This linkage be-
came particularly prominent in the run-up to the first WTO Ministerial Con-
ference – held in 1996 in Singapore – where it proved to be a major stumbling
block for the trade negotiations as a whole. Indeed, an invitation to the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) to speak was withdrawn because of de-
veloping countries’ objection to any discussion of labour issues at the meeting
(Leary, 1997).2 The meeting’s outcome document, the “Singapore Ministerial
Declaration”, reflected the reluctance of many countries to use the WTO to
directly govern labour standards. In the Declaration, Member States simply
acknowledged the ILO as the competent body to “set and deal with” labour
standards; they rejected the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes;
2 In this article we use the terms “developed” and “developing” country as self-assessed by
Member States in the WTO, who assign themselves to one or other category. Currently around one
quarter of the 164 WTO Members consider themselves as developed countries, counting EU Mem-
ber States as separate entities. Curiously, this does not include all OECD members. For instance,
the Republic of Korea classifies itself as a developing country in the WTO context.
and affirmed that the WTO and ILO Secretariats would continue their exist-
ing collaboration (WTO, 1996).
The Declaration appeared to have signalled clearly that the ILO, and
not the WTO, would lead on labour standards (O’Brien et al., 2000). How-
ever, the United States’ interpretation was that this did not discount the
possibility that widely agreed ILO standards could at some point be dis-
seminated within the trade system. Using the WTO to enforce labour stand-
ards thus once more became an issue in the run-up to the third Ministerial
Conference, held in 1999 in Seattle, and again contributed to the ultimate
breakdown in negotiations (Charnovitz, 2002). This led to Member States
reaffirming – at the fourth Ministerial Conference, held in 2001 in Doha – the
declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding inter-
nationally recognized core labour standards. Since then there has been no
serious attempt to address the issue of labour standards within the multi-
lateral WTO framework (Orbie, Gistelinck and Kerremans, 2009). However,
this has not spelt the end of attempts to create linkage on this issue. Indeed
– as has happened in relation to many other areas linked to trade – as progress
has been blocked in the WTO, there has been an upsurge in the negotiation
of labour standards within bilateral trade agreements (Ebert and Posthuma,
2011).3 Consequently, we are currently witnessing a period of experimenta-
tion whereby different models of labour provisions are operating in bilateral
trade agreements between different trading partners. These models differ
greatly in terms of scope of trade, scope of labour provisions, methods of
promotion and methods of enforcement.4
In this article, we concentrate on analysing the model of labour provi-
sions included in recent EU bilateral FTAs and argue that there is an absence
of research examining the potential and real effects of these provisions on
workers’ employment conditions. The emerging EU FTA model differs from
that favoured by other countries, particularly the United States and Canada.
The International Labour Organization and the former International Institute
for Labour Studies usefully differentiate between the “conditional” and the
“promotional” approach to labour provisions (ILO/IILS, 2013). FTAs that use
3 While there were only four regional and bilateral trade agreements containing labour
standards in 1995, by June 2013 there were 58 (ILO/IILS, 2013). Moreover, although it is clear
that actors such as the United States, Canada and the EU have taken the lead in including such
provisions, there is evidence that this is an increasingly international phenomenon (Kerremans
and Martins Gistelinck, 2009). From the roughly 190 countries with trade agreements in 2013, 120
were partners to at least one agreement containing some form of labour provision, and there were
16 agreements between developing countries – i.e. South–South agreements – containing labour
standards (ILO/IILS, 2013).
4 Unilateral “Generalized System of Preferences” (GSP) schemes cover trade in certain
goods only, whereas bilateral trade agreements often cover a much wider range of goods, services
and investment. Labour provisions can be based on ILO core labour standards, the ILO Decent
Work Agenda, national legislation or particular conventions, and can be promoted through dia-
logue, complaint mechanisms, capacity building and other means. Labour provisions can be enforced
through a variety of mechanisms, including a standard dispute settlement mechanism, a bespoke
labour dispute settlement and the opinions of groups of experts.
a conditional approach include labour provisions that make the conclusion of a

trade agreement conditional on respect for particular labour standards (“pre-
ratification conditionality”) and/or provisions in the concluded trade agree-
ment that allow for sanctions to be taken if particular labour standards are
violated (“post-ratification conditionality”). Around 40 per cent of trade agree-
ments that include labour provisions adopt a conditional approach, meaning
that compliance entails an economic sanction or benefit (ibid.). This approach
is typical of many of the trade agreements concluded by the United States
and Canada.5 The remaining 60 per cent adopt an exclusively promotional ap-
proach, whereby “provisions do not link compliance to economic consequences
but provide a framework for dialogue, cooperation, and/or monitoring and are
found mainly in EU, New Zealand and South–South trade agreements that
consider labour issues” (ibid., p. 1).
As described in the next section, the origins and rationale for both the
conditional and promotional approaches have been extensively discussed in
the literature. To date, however, research into the impact and effectiveness of
these provisions has focused almost entirely on the conditional approach.6 The
findings regarding these “hard law” provisions suggest that they have gener-
ally been used to demonstrate political commitment to core labour standards,
to ratchet up domestic labour legislation in signatory countries, and to pro-
vide crude but clear incentives by which to influence the behaviour of national
governments (Zhou and Cuyvers, 2011; Grynberg and Qalo, 2006; Hafner-
Burton, 2005).
However, the EU’s bilateral approach appears as a distinct alternative,
favouring “soft law” policy tools. Observers of EU trade policy report that
the European Commission has increasingly come to see sanctions as “the
nuclear option”, i.e. something to be deployed only rarely and reluctantly.7
Indeed, in the new generation of EU bilateral FTAs, this option no longer
even exists (although it is preserved in its unilateral GSP+ scheme).8 In this
sense, the EU’s approach has much more in common with labour standards
such as those advanced in private forms of trade governance, including sup-
ply-chain certification, corporate codes of conduct and public–private com-
pacts. Through mechanisms such as self-regulation, norm-setting, peer review
and international monitoring, this proliferating set of initiatives has produced
a wide variety of outcomes, some of which are more effective than others –
although it remains the case that they are often only established and/or im-
plemented in response to pressure brought by civil society watchdogs (see
5 The United States makes use of both pre-ratification and post-ratification conditionality.
Canada, at least in a formal sense, makes use of post-ratification conditionality only.

6 It is worth noting here that the EU does maintain conditionality in its GSP, although ar-
guably the value of some of these trade preferences is diminishing as the Union signs an increasing
number of bilateral agreements with third countries.
7 Interview with senior personnel, development policy NGO, Brussels, 2013.
8 To date, preferences have only been suspended for Belarus, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, al-
though they have also been considered for China, India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation.
Fransen, 2012; Hughes, Buttle and Wrigley, 2007). While these private-sector
initiatives share some characteristics with the EU’s “promotional” labour
provisions in its bilateral FTAs, there are also marked differences. For ex-
ample, private-sector initiatives are not linked to international trade legis-
lation; they are therefore not good indicators of the impact of mechanisms
formally endorsed by political leaders and linked to legal obligations to en-
force ILO Conventions. The following section therefore explores the pro-
motional labour provisions model, as contained in recent EU bilateral FTAs,
and what this model means in practice.
The EU promotional labour provisions model:

A negotiating blueprint
Since the mid-1990s, the EU has “deliberately put ‘sustainable development’
and ‘social solidarity’ at the heart of EU trade policy discourse” (Orbie, 2011,
p. 165). This commitment has since become institutionalized in key EU legal
instruments, namely the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which most commentators identify
as critically underpinning current trade policy (e.g. Orbie, 2011). The Lisbon
Treaty amends the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to state
that trade policy “shall be conducted in the context of the principles and object-
ives of the Union’s external action” (TFEU, Article 207(1)) – objectives that
include equality and solidarity – and amends the Treaty on European Union to
create the objective of “fair trade” alongside “free trade” (TEU, Article 3(5)).
At the same time, the treaty also increased the scope of the European Com-
mission to conclude trade and investment agreements independently of EU
Member States, while introducing a greater role for the European Parliament
in ratifying and reviewing trade policy (De Gucht, 2010).
This policy discourse and institutionalized legal commitment began to
permeate into the EU’s trade agreements, in terms of protection of labour
standards, around the turn of the millennium. The first agreement in which
core labour standards appear is the 1999 Trade, Development and Cooper-
ation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, which was closely followed by
clear commitments to labour standards in the 2000 “Cotonou Agreement”
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of States and the 2003 FTA
with Chile (Van Den Putte et al., 2013). Subsequent to these agreements, the
European Commission felt bullish enough about the prospects for trade–
labour linkage to publicly pledge to “put more of its commercial weight behind
efforts to promote social standards and decent work in bilateral and multilat-
eral trade negotiations” (European Commission, 2006, p. 8). Indeed, this can
be seen as part of a wider attempt on behalf of the EU to establish an invig-
orated human rights and democracy framework beyond the realm of inter-
national trade (Council of the European union, 2012).
This commitment crystallized in the 2011 EU–South Korea FTA, in
which we see a distinct model of labour provisions appearing, in what the
EU itself refers to as a “new-generation” agreement (DG Trade, 2012), which
includes a specific legal chapter on “trade and sustainable development”.

Over the same timeframe as negotiation of the EU–South Korea FTA – and
as part of the wider Global Europe strategy and deeper engagement with
its neighbouring States – the EU also embarked on Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) negotiations with countries in Eastern
Europe and North Africa, Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotia-
tions with sub-regions of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and a host
of other free trade agreements. All new-generation FTAs concluded by the
EU contain a similar “trade and sustainable development” chapter. Equiva-
lent chapters are also found in the Association Agreements with the Republic
of Moldova and Georgia, which were signed in 2014 and entered into force
in 2016, and all trade agreements negotiated by the EU reportedly contain
similar provisions (Bartels, 2013).9 While there is some limited variation be-
tween the provisions in the different agreements, commentators have been
able to observe sufficient commonality to be able to identify the emergence
of a “blueprint” (Van den Putte et al., 2013).
All EU new-generation FTAs have common elements in terms of the
substantive labour standards relied on, the institutional structures created and
the way that complaints are handled. They also share the same context: recog-
nition of the importance of consideration of labour standards if trade agree-
ments are to promote sustainable development and international trade is to
be appropriately “managed”.10 In terms of substantive standards, all new-gen-
eration FTAs involve the parties committing to the ILO’s core labour stand-
ards, namely freedom of association and the effective recognition of collective
bargaining, the elimination of forced and compulsory labour, the abolition of
child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation. The parties undertake to not use labour standards for the
purposes of disguised protectionism, to uphold their own existing domestic
labour laws and to not weaken or waive laws in order to encourage trade or
investment (Bartels, 2013). In terms of institutional structures, the “trade and
sustainable development” chapters provide for the establishment of a joint
committee – the Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development – com-
prised of representatives of the two parties, who are responsible for oversee-
ing implementation of the relevant chapter in conjunction with various civil
society mechanisms. None of the FTAs utilize the standard dispute settlement
procedure for dealing with complaints. Therefore, no party can bring an ac-
tion that would result in the suspension of trade preferences against the other
9 However, negotiations with countries such as the United States and Canada are likely to
pose particular problems for the rolling out of the EU model, as these countries have their own
standard sets of labour provisions.
10 For example, in the EU–Moldova Association Agreement, which contains a DCFTA agree-
ment, Article 365 of the “trade and sustainable development” chapter states that the EU and Mol-
dova “reaffirm their commitment to promote the development of international trade in a way that
is conducive to full and productive employment and decent work for all”. Identical provisions exist
in the EU–Georgia Association Agreement.
party; rather, complaints are handled by a panel of experts who report their
findings in various ways depending on the institutional structures established
under each agreement (ibid.).11
Existing research on the EU promotional labour

provisions model
Existing research on the EU’s promotional labour provisions model adopted
in its FTAs has largely revolved around the reasons for this type of trade–
labour linkage. Drawing upon many of the themes that recur across the history
of the trade and labour debate, yet influenced by the disciplinary and theor-
etical position of the author(s) concerned, the literature identifies a number
of different motivational aspects. Bringing together the various strands of this
research, Orbie, Gistelinck and Kerremans suggest four factors that explain
the EU’s approach in this area:
[…] the ideological disposition of EU member state governments; member state
concerns about possible creeping EU competences in the area of labour regula-
tions; the fact that trade-related labour standards may be less important for the
member states than other trade-related objectives and concerns; and the increased
attractiveness of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as an alternative
to a WTO-based approach to international labour standards (Orbie, Gistelinck
and Kerremans, 2009, p. 148).
Analysis of this motivationally focused literature demonstrates the lim-

ited extent to which the research explains how these arrangements have the
potential to transform labour and employment practices “on the ground” in
third countries.
In terms of the ideological disposition that drives the EU’s inclusion of
labour standards in trade agreements, the EU’s approach is often character-
ized as being based on an attempt to ensure that working conditions world-
wide are gradually enhanced and improved; what one might term a universalist
human rights rationale (Harrison, 2007). Certainly, this principle is embed-
ded in much of the European Commission’s discourse on the new-generation
FTAs (Orbie, 2011). In contrast, the Commission downplays arguments that the
new-generation FTA model is designed to protect EU industry from “unfair”
competition arising from the exploitation of labour following liberalization of
markets – what one might term a “social dumping” rationale – although this
argument may find more favour in individual EU Member States (Bossuyt,
2009). Nevertheless, campaigning groups and citizens across Europe do ap-
pear to be concerned about the effects of opening up markets without social
protection, as “workers in countries with lower standards ‘subsidise’ the pro-
duction of cheap products through poverty wages, unsafe working conditions
11 The EU–CARIFORUM Agreement contains provisions relating to a panel of experts,
but also does not rule out using the standard dispute settlement procedure. This is perhaps the most
significant variation in the new-generation FTA model compared to the standard EU template.
There are a range of other subtle variations, which are explored in Bartels (2013).
and subsequent hardship” (Alternative Trade Mandate, 2014; see also Jansen,
Peters and Salazar-Xirinachs, 2011, and Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2008). The
explicitly expressed ideological motivation for the EU new-generation FTA
model is not, in itself, evidence that it is its single aim and objective, and does
not inform us as to what the effects of the model might be in third countries.
In this regard, see Burgoon (2009).
In terms of the political dynamics of the adoption of the new-generation
FTA model, there are suggestions that the model represents a weak comprom-
ise. EU Member States and institutions face pressure from particular interest
groups to include some form of “social” provisions in their trade agreements,
and they act upon this. But the complex and often closed dynamics of EU
policy-making make it difficult for such groups to be effective (Kerremans
and Martins Gistelinck, 2009) and EU Member States tend not to see labour
standards as a priority beyond their immediate material impact on import-
sensitive industries (Orbie, Gistelinck and Kerremans, 2009). Therefore, the
new-generation model is characterized as being geared more towards placat-
ing vociferous interest groups within Europe – whether industrial sectors or
social campaigners, acting as the contemporary equivalent of Bootleggers and
Baptists12 – than actually attempting to have any meaningful impact on EU–
third country trade relationships. This perspective suggests that the progres-
sive possibilities envisaged by key EU policy-makers in relation to the new
model are limited.
A more positive analysis of intended effects stems from the argument
that there is a strong ideational aspect to the EU new-generation FTAs. Ac-
cording to this argument, the new model was developed against a background
of genuine concern from developing countries about the EU’s motives in pur-
suing its own social trade agenda (Elgström, 2007), with the aim of tackling
this international legitimacy deficit. By utilizing ILO core labour standards as
the values it promotes, the EU seeks to counter criticism that it is promoting
its own social agenda, and instead appears to embrace a set of values with uni-
versalist appeal (Manners, 2009). The use of cooperative mechanisms based on
dialogue and persuasion is also vital to the EU being seen as a reasonable actor
in trade policy debates (Elgström, 2007). This perspective allows commenta-
tors to argue that the EU is primarily exercising “normative power” through
its new-generation model, or – from a legal perspective – that it is using a
more consensual soft-law approach (ibid.). However, it is also acknowledged
that there is yet to be any determination of any actual impact of the EU’s ap-
proach beyond its own political acceptability (Manners, 2009).
Finally, the EU’s approach has been characterized as motivated by an
attempt to create policy coherence between different areas, such as the so-
cial and human rights dimension of the EU’s policies on the one hand, and
its trade policies on the other (see Bossuyt, 2009). Traditionally these policies
12 The coalitions that take their name from the interest groups that lobbied for alcohol pro-
hibition in the United States – i.e. unlikely partners brought together by a common cause.
have been implemented separately, but by integrating labour standards into

trade agreements the aim is to achieve policy coherence, i.e. realizing both sets
of objectives through the same policy mechanism. However, integrating these
differing policy objectives within the same legal instrument will not necessar-
ily achieve coherence. One criticism is that overlap between the new labour
provisions and the “human rights clause” that has been included in all EU
FTAs since the 1990s creates a lack of internal coherence, thereby potentially
undermining the provisions in question (Bartels, 2013). A more far-reaching
critique of the “coherence” approach is that the focus on achieving coherence
can blunt the transformative potential and progressive possibilities of social
agendas. This is because there is an assumption that the creation of legal co-
herence is equivalent to respect for underlying values, and that the incorpor-
ation of labour standards into trade agreements will lead to the protection of
human rights and labour standards on the ground. However, this assumption
should not be made (Harrison, 2014).
The ideological, political, ideational and policy-coherence motivations
for the new-generation FTAs provide important insights into why EU pol-
icy has developed the way it has. Clearly, on questions of causality, there is
no “right” answer waiting to be uncovered, and – equally clearly – it is prob-
able that overlapping rationales for the promotion of labour standards will
be found within particular policy-making milieux. However, while this exam-
ination of the overlapping rationales for the EU’s approach is important in
terms of exploration of key motivational issues, it remains largely wedded to a
Brussels-based perspective. In other words, examination has been much more
focused on tracing the domestic origins of trade policy within the EU than
on studying the contested, dynamic and differing translations of this trade
policy into the economies and polities of developing countries. Questions are
left hanging throughout this debate about what might actually be achieved
by the new-generation model. Ideologically, will the model seek to promote
overall improvements in labour standards in third countries, or focus only on
key export industries? Politically, is the model mere window-dressing or is it
well-crafted policy-making that can have a real impact? Ideationally, will a
normative-power or soft-law agenda only be of interest conceptually, or will
it actually have an effect in the real world? Also, is the attempt to create pol-
icy coherence between different areas of policy-making a progressive step that
will lead to more focused and less contradictory policy-making, or will it blunt
the transformative potential of the social agenda?
We suggest that debate over the “progressive possibilities” of promo-
tional trade policy, i.e. policy that systematically privileges the disadvantaged
– in this case, heavily exploited workers – can only be advanced through the
empirically informed study of its effects in the fields and factories of the global
economy. There is currently a paucity of research to this end. As noted by the
ILO/IILS, while trade agreements with promotional as opposed to conditional
labour provisions are multiplying rapidly, “the effects of the promotional ac-
tivities on workers’ rights on the ground have proven difficult to assess. […]
More field research on specific activities conducted under the different trade
agreements is required in order to reach a better understanding of their ef-
fects” (2013, p. 67). Specifically on the EU’s bilateral trade agreements, Van
Den Putte et al. corroborate this gap, confirming that “no comparative and
systematic research has been conducted on the scope, enforceability and the
promotion of these social norms” (2013, p. 35).
The need for a research agenda evaluating the real, material effects of
EU bilateral FTAs upon firms and workers “beyond the border” of the EU
is also demonstrated by the wide range of positions adopted by trade union
groups and civil society organizations commenting on the new-generation
model. For example, among those civil society groups following EU trade
policy, contrasting accounts have been offered. The European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC) has endorsed the EU–South Korea FTA and appears
hopeful that workers’ rights can be upheld via the new institutional architec-
ture (ETUC, 2010). Meanwhile, the Seattle to Brussels Network of social cam-
paign groups has been much more cautious about the use of labour provisions
in EU FTAs, suggesting that without credible enforcement mechanisms and
the threat of sanctions, any measures to protect labour will be largely ineffec-
tual and are thus no more than rhetorical concessions (S2B Network, 2012).
According to the Transnational Institute, the EU’s FTA with Peru and Colom-
bia even represented a backwards step from the more rudimentary but condi-
tional requirements contained in its GSP+ (Fritz, 2010). Finally, a researcher
at the CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics and Environment has
warned that many developing countries legitimately see labour standards as
barriers to trade and that “social issues such as child labour are domestic prob-
lems and trade agreements should not be used as a tool to deal with them”
(Jatkar, 2012, p. 10).13
Can labour provisions work beyond the border?

Evaluating the effects of EU bilateral FTAs
The fundamental questions that need to be asked in respect of labour pro-
visions in EU FTAs are to what extent – and how – they affect the lives of
workers beyond the EU’s formal borders, i.e. in the third country in question.
This analysis, which is under-explored, should include examination of three
key dimensions of labour standards: workers’ legal protection (referring to
core labour standards in particular), employment conditions (such as collect-
ively negotiated wage increases) and political representation (i.e. the spaces
opened up through the trade negotiation process and the subsequent institu-
tional architecture). If we do not address these questions, we risk misunder-
standing the possibilities for progressive trade policy by assuming that once a
set of standards has been enshrined in a text, these standards are effortlessly
and uniformly “externalized” and incorporated into the governance practices
13 This author was writing in a personal capacity.

Table 1. Research framework for evaluating the effects of EU bilateral FTAs
Area of enquiry Type of key informant Indicative types of evidence sought Notes
368
Negotiation and implemen- National government of- First-hand experience of negotiation process (e.g. role of pol- Emphasis on individuals in-
tation of labour provisions ficials itical leadership, local lobbying, pressure/demands from EU) volved in policy change, when
in EU FTAs (third-country National sector/industry First-hand experience of implementation process and pre- assessing the causal links
level) associations/CEOs ratification effects in areas of employment conditions, worker and effects of the develop-
protection and representation (e.g. legislative reform, including ment and institutionalization
National trade unions/ of labour standards in case-
union federations to labour codes/acts; ILO core labour standards; minimum
working age; working time directives; minimum wage levels study third countries
Local civil society/NGOs and their review; creation of formal dispute and/or complaint
Academics and specialist mechanisms
researchers First-hand experience of engagement with the FTA committees
on trade and sustainable development and domestic advisory
groups
Collection of legal and policy documents, “grey literature”
(e.g. consultancies) and descriptive statistics
Negotiation and EU officials (various First-hand experience of negotiation process (e.g. internal Emphasis on individuals in-
implementation of labour Directorates General) EU institutional dynamics; lobbying by industry, labour or- volved in policy change when
provisions in FTAs (EU EU industry associations ganizations and civil society; pressure/demands from partner assessing causal links and
level) government) effects of the development
European Trade Union and institutionalization of la-
Confederation Formal monitoring experience of labour provision implementa-
tion process (e.g. legislative reform as above) bour standards at EU level
NGOs and civil society
organizations at EU level First-hand experience of engagement with the FTA commit-
tees on trade and sustainable development and domestic
advisory groups
Collection of legal and policy documents, “grey literature”
(e.g. consultancies) and descriptive statistics
Effect of labour provisions National government/EU Monitoring of employment conditions, protection and repre- Emphasis on actual effects
on workers’ lives officials sentation in particular firms/sectors on the lived experience of
Interplay of labour provi- National/EU sector/indus- Knowledge of interplay with other aspects of EU FTAs (e.g. workers from the perspective
sions with other aspects of try associations technical standards) of third-country and EU-level
EU FTAs (national/EU level) officials and organizations,
National trade unions/ Knowledge of implementation of labour standards outside to interlink with research de-
union federations EU FTAs (e.g. private standards of buyers, labour provisions scribed below
International Labour Review
in other FTAs such as with the United States)
Table 1. Research framework for evaluating the effects of EU bilateral FTAs (concl.)
Area of enquiry Type of key informant Indicative types of evidence sought Notes
Effect of labour provisions Firm managers Employment conditions: description of contracts, pay/ Emphasis on actual effects
on workers’ lives Shop-floor stewards bonuses, application of minimum age, wage and working on the lived experience of
Interplay of labour provi- time legislation, management/workplace pressure (intensi- workers
Sample of workers (includ- fication of labour)
sions with other aspects ing informal and/or non-
of EU FTAs and private organized) Workers’ legal protection: safety, occupational health, training,
governance (firm level) Local civil society incidence of workplace accidents
Political representation: ability to organize, existence of labour
organizations (and differences between them), management
responsiveness to negotiation/requests, quality of labour rep-
resentation (use of independent or company unions; affiliation
to political parties, etc.)
First-hand knowledge of interplay with other aspects of EU
FTAs (e.g. technical standards)
Labour provisions in EU free trade agreements
First-hand knowledge of implementation of labour standards

outside EU FTAs (e.g. private standards of buyers)
Collection of employment contracts, information on wage and
employment levels, company reports, descriptive statistics
Impact of differing national, National government/EU First-hand experience of negotiation process Emphasis on individuals in-
geo-economic and geo- officials First-hand experience of implementation process volved in policy change when
political contexts National/EU sector/indus- assessing causal links, and
try associations on the comparative differ-
ences/similarities arising from
National/EU trade union/ national cases
union federations
Civil society/academics
Comparison of material Comparison of workers’ legal protection, employment condi-
from different national and tions and political representation, based on different national
firm-level interviews case studies
369
of signatory countries. In table 1 we set out an indicative research framework

for evaluating the effects of EU bilateral FTAs on workers’ lives. To try and
unpack the question of “how”, and as part of the development of a wider re-
search agenda, we will now outline our three main areas of enquiry, as shown
in table 1, before elaborating on the key methodological challenges that our
approach entails. The three areas of enquiry incorporate, to varying degrees,
the three dimensions outlined above, albeit with some situated more neatly
within a particular area of enquiry than others.
Negotiation and implementation of labour provisions

in EU FTAs
The first aspect of negotiation and implementation of labour provisions in-
volves looking at the extent to which negotiation processes are being shaped
by the activism of state and civil society actors in the FTA third countries
themselves (Hurt, Lee and Lorenz-Carl, 2013). This may increasingly take the
form of transnational campaigning, whereby opposition may be voiced in Eur-
ope – on behalf of, or in solidarity with, groups in the proposed trade partner
country – bearing in mind the Lisbon Treaty provisions, which accord a much
stronger role for the European Parliament in shaping trade policy. The gen-
esis of labour standards is important, since not only does this have implica-
tions for how the legislation is ultimately implemented, it also constitutes an
opportunity for organized labour and its advocates to advance their interests
prior to the agreement being struck. During trade negotiations and the now
obligatory “sustainability impact assessments” that inform them, state elites
in third countries have frequently sought to convince EU policy-makers that
their Government does protect human and labour rights, thereby opening up
political space for domestic coalitions to push for reform where they disagree
with this assertion.14 In this regard, see the discussion on pre-ratification con-
ditionality in ILO/IILS (2013).
The second aspect of negotiation and implementation of labour provi-
sions involves consideration of the EU institutional mechanisms established
under an FTA, in order to understand the processes by which the FTA is
brought into being, and how the mechanisms created have subsequently been
utilized. For example, the EU–South Korea FTA provides for the establish-
ment of a joint Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development to moni-
tor implementation of the “trade and sustainable development” chapter, and
a Domestic Advisory Group, for each party to the FTA, in which national
and EU civil society actors are required to participate and whose work feeds
into the Committee. There is some initial evidence suggesting that the com-
bination of weak domestic advisory groups, a “trade and sustainable devel-
opment” chapter that lacks any mechanism to arbitrate disputes or impose
penalties, and the absence of political will on the part of the EU means that
14 Interview with a European Commission representative, Brussels, 2013.

the EU–South Korea FTA does not thus far provide a particularly effective
mechanism for resolving labour disputes. One commentator close to the advis-
ory group process, citing the EU’s refusal to invoke formal consultations (the
first step in the existing dispute settlement process) upon receiving evidence
of serious labour violations committed by the Government of the Republic
of Korea involving teachers, civil servants and train drivers, said he believed
that “there are no effective mechanisms for the resolution of disputes”.15 This
is in comparison to the US FTA dispute settlement mechanisms, which con-
tain provisions for lodging complaints over labour violations, international ar-
bitration and sanctions. The same commentator said that, generally speaking,
EU enforcement of labour standards was “extremely frustrating, with the EU
taking a very mechanical reading of the arrangements and even then still not
taking action when its own requirements are satisfied”. In another instance,
a civil society participant nominally involved in the Consultative Committee
established under the EU–Cariforum Economic Partnership Agreement
explained that, five years after the signing of the Agreement, no meetings had
yet been held, because of inactivity on the Caribbean side and the reluctance
of the European Commission to speed things along in view of the marginal
trading status of the region.16 These examples suggest the need for research
strategies focused on understanding negotiation processes and implementation
dynamics derived from key informants involved in bilateral FTA negotiation
and implementation, as shown in table 1.
Effect on workers’ lives of labour provisions and the interplay

of labour provisions with other aspects of EU FTAs
In order to more effectively evaluate the effect on workers’ lives of labour pro-
visions, and the related institutional structures, it is necessary to examine na-
tional and regional policies that have emerged from the FTA process, and how
these have influenced the three dimensions of labour standards: workers’ legal
protection, employment conditions and political representation. One import-
ant question that arises from the discussion of ideological motivations for the
new-generation EU FTA model is whether the focus of emerging policies has
been on export industries (a “social dumping” approach) or on labour stand-
ards issues throughout the economy (a universalist human rights approach).
This question is most effectively addressed, in the first instance, by focusing
on industries where major labour concerns are likely to exist. We have identi-
fied, for example, the sugar industry in Guyana, the automotive industry in the
Republic of Korea and the clothing industry in Moldova as suitable industries
for exploring this question; each country signed a bilateral FTA with the EU
15 Comments made by Jeff Vogt, International Trade Union Confederation, Brussels, at the
workshop “Labour Standards and Sustainable Development: Unpicking the EU’s approach”, Lon-
don, October 2014.
16 Interview with a representative of a development NGO, Brussels, 2013.
in recent years, and all of these industries are significant employers and EU-
oriented exporters within their respective countries.17
Each of these industries has given rise to labour-related concerns, includ-
ing strikes over wages by sugar workers in Guyana, the intimidation of auto-
parts factory workers in the Republic of Korea, and the exploitation of female
seasonal factory workers in Moldova (see, respectively, Stabroek News, 2013;
Amnesty International, 2013; and Clean Clothes Campaign, 2005 and 2014).
In order to understand the extent to which the institutional mechanisms of the
respective FTAs have engaged with these issues, it is important to go beyond
consideration of the FTA institutional structure, and examine remuneration
and working conditions at the level of the third-country firms themselves, at-
tempting to identify the causal pathways through which the “trade and sustain-
able development” chapters of EU FTAs generate material improvements (or
not) for workers. In doing this, one must avoid focusing solely on “labourism”,
with its emphasis on the permanent, male, centralized and unionized work-
force, and pay equal attention to the precarious workforce constituted by tem-
porary, outsourced and disorganized patterns of employment.18
Since the “trade and sustainable development” chapters do not work in
isolation, one must also pay attention to the ways in which they intersect with
other aspects of the FTA, and with mechanisms of private governance in sup-
ply chains, such as corporate codes of conduct. For example, Locke (2013), in
his analysis of the use of private standards in promoting better working con-
ditions in the global economy, has suggested that private standards are most
effective when layered alongside, and interacting with, state regulation. Three
main aspects are involved in this. The first concerns the secondary effect of
other aspects of trade agreements. This aspect requires an analysis of how
technical standards influence the upgrading of workplace practices and safety,
or – where DCFTAs are embedded in wider Association Agreements, as is
the case for Moldova and Georgia – how these requirements influence other
aspects of labour rights recognition, such as working hours directives. Other
secondary effects to be considered are those – as in Papua New Guinea’s In-
17 Automobiles (specifically, transport equipment) constituted 16 per cent of EU imports
from the Republic of Korea in 2012 (the second largest import product category in terms of money
value); sugar accounted for 43 per cent of EU imports from Guyana in the same year (the largest
import product category); and clothing accounted for 18 per cent of EU imports from Moldova
(again, the largest import product category). All data are extracted from the Eurostat Comext data-
base. The significance of these products in EU trade relations with the country in question is
important, since it provides the best possible chance of identifying any effects that the FTA provi-
sions and processes are having. It is our assumption that these provisions will have most leverage
over businesses that are commercially sensitive to European markets and public opinion. There-
fore, each of these examples could be used to explore the “social dumping” rationale. In addition,
both the Republic of Korea’s automotive industry and Guyana’s sugar industry have been noted
for their labour conflicts and strikes in recent years, and the integration of the Moldovan clothing
industry into EU production and contracting networks has raised questions concerning working
and employment conditions (Kingston, 2008).
18 See, for example, Barrientos, Gereffi and Rossi (2011) on the differentiated effects of Global
Production Networks (GPNs) on different categories of workers in the clothing industry, following
Morocco’s integration into the “fast fashion” segment of the EU garment industry.
terim EPA – whereby a review clause for a new rule of origin contributed
to the improvement of labour law and the unionization of several thousand
workers (Hamilton, Lewis and Campling, 2011; Campling and Havice, 2013).19
The second aspect is the way labour provisions in FTAs interplay with other
aspects of European external relations, such as how Aid for Trade finance is
targeted towards training for certain civil society groups in order to help them
monitor implementation. The third aspect is the need to understand the in-
terplay between FTAs and private governance standards (such as corporate
codes of conduct, where applied), and the extent to which these agreements
and standards drive change in workers’ experiences in mutually beneficial or
contradictory ways.
Impact of differing national, geo-economic

and geo-political contexts
Typically, research on the trade–labour linkage has compared across, rather
than within, sets of agreements, e.g. the US model compared to the EU model
or to the Canadian model (see Doumbia-Henry and Gravel, 2006; Lazo Grandi,
2009). This approach tends to assume uniformity within agreements and over-
looks the fact that broadly similar texts can have very different effects depend-
ing on the context. For example, a free-standing EU FTA (e.g. the EU–South
Korea FTA), an FTA as part of a wider European Neighbourhood Policy and
Association Agreement (e.g. Moldova) and an FTA as part of a Regional
Economic Partnership Agreement (e.g. Cariforum) are likely to look very
different in practice, even before one takes into account the influence of the
political economy, state and civil society in the country concerned. As well as
recognizing the role that the particular geo-political context of an FTA will
play, it is also important to consider specific industry contexts. Different indus-
tries will be unevenly and differentially affected by the agreements in place,
depending upon the prevailing forms of employment and labour regimes in the
industry in question. Again, effective implementation of labour provisions will
likely differ based on whether they are implemented in capital-intensive manu-
facturing (e.g. automobile industry), labour-intensive manufacturing (e.g. gar-
ment industry) or agricultural production and processing (e.g. sugar industry).
Implementation is, in part, dependent upon firms having the financial resources
– as well as the will – to restructure workplace practices, and will differ consid-
erably between activities with low capitalization (e.g. garment workshops and
19 One of the major gains for Papua New Guinea in the Interim EPA was a liberalized rule
of origin for fish products (a major export to the EU). This was tied to a review clause, after three
years of implementation of the new rule, to assess its developmental and environmental impact.
The official review identified weaknesses in relation to core ILO Conventions, which the Papua
New Guinea Government agreed to redress in the second EU–Pacific interim EPA Trade Com-
mittee meeting in February 2012. In this new context, the International Transport Workers’ Fed-
eration worked with representatives of over 5,000 fish-processing workers to shift membership
from “company” unions to the independent national Maritime and Transport Workers Union.
sugar plantation and processing plants) and those with much higher levels of
capitalization, such as in automotive assembly plants.
Sensitivity to geographical and sectoral difference will therefore play
a key role in the ability of the EU’s new-generation FTA model to enhance
working conditions in key export industries, particularly given the differing
views on the replication dynamic of EU FTAs. For example, trade union lob-
byists are hopeful that the precedent set by the “blueprint” of the EU–South
Korea FTA could be incorporated – and even strengthened – in the EU’s pro-
posed FTA with India, and its probable FTA with China.20 However, others
have argued that in order to protect human and labour rights, FTAs must “be
designed in full partnership between the negotiating parties and not based on
a template model that one party develops and the other signs on” (Mohama-
dieh, 2012, p. 5). Likewise, Grynberg and Qalo suggest that the EU model
could become “a precedent-setting means of introducing new issues into the
WTO negotiating process” (2006, p. 651), while others – pointing to the high
bar set by the model in terms of civil society involvement – highlight the
“difficulty of having the same model set up with all trade partners as well as
at the multilateral level” (EESC, 2012).
Methodological challenges
In undertaking research on the effects of new-generation EU FTAs in the
fields and factories of third countries there are clear methodological challenges.
Causal chains are likely to be long and complex, and there is no consensus on
how best to identify the effects of a single trade arrangement or the impact of
the degree of export orientation on economic and social development, how-
ever the latter might be defined (see, for example, the discussion on economic
and social upgrading, in Milberg and Winkler, 2011). A common reading of “ef-
fectiveness”, as far as labour provisions are concerned, has been to consider the
extent to which a cohesive external policy on human and labour rights is con-
structed and then taken up by signatory countries. Here, the tracking of official
documentation and expert commentary on legislative decision-making can be
used to assess changes in law that can be linked to the negotiating process of a
particular trade agreement (Cammett and Posusney, 2010). Making this causal
claim is somewhat harder in the case of post-ratification conditionality. In these
situations, some scholars have opted to assess the response of governments to
trade disputes alleging breaches of obligations and/or any suspension of pref-
erences resulting from the violation of minimum labour standards, to establish
the effectiveness of these mechanisms (ILO/IILS, 2013). This is a valid path-
way but one that will have to be adapted in the case of “promotional” FTAs,
given the absence of clear-cut hard-law rulings (e.g. by interviewing members
20 Interview with representative of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Brus-
sels, 2013.
of committees on trade and sustainable development, and domestic advisory

groups, to assess how institutional dialogue shaped government policy).21
Going beyond consideration of national-level changes to labour law or
ratification of international conventions (neither of which necessarily lead to
effective implementation), other scholars have examined “effectiveness” in
terms of the correlation between the measurement of actual labour rights
and some independent variable. Mosely and Uno (2007), for example, look at
the extent to which different aspects of economic globalization, such as trade
openness, correlate with collective labour rights in a wide range of developing
countries. They establish an index of labour rights by “scoring” violations of 37
types of union-related rights in each country across a 17-year period, based on
reports compiled by the United States, the ILO and the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions. To make the claim that trade, rather than some
other factor, is having a certain effect, in their regression analysis they control
for factors such as the level of democracy, the strength of civil society, and the
degree of economic development.22
Rather than pursuing this kind of quantitative approach – which would
tell us little about the specific causal pathways of “promotional” labour provi-
sions, or about the social significance and biases of the labour rights abuses that
they did or did not address23 – we suggest there is greater value in following
methodological techniques used primarily in the literature on non-state gov-
ernance mechanisms. For example, to assess the effectiveness of Hewlett-Pack-
ard’s audits to assess suppliers’ compliance with the relevant code of conduct,
Locke, Rissing and Pal (2013) supplement their study of the audits with inter-
views conducted with a range of factory managers and supervisors. Moreover,
by conducting this fieldwork at two similar suppliers – in the Czech Repub-
lic and Mexico – they were able to see how a similar global auditing system
took root in different national contexts – sometimes substituting for public
enforcement of national law (as in Mexico) and sometimes complementing it
(as in the Czech Republic). In the same way, we suggest that there is a need to
supplement collation of labour rights reports with interviews with elite-level
policy-makers and factory-level stakeholders (managers and unions), and to
do so in different national contexts. The aim is not to “score” the lived ex-
perience of workers under new EU trade arrangements, but – in the spirit of
Max Weber’s Verstehen – to elaborate what importance actors in developing
countries assign to EU trade policy with regard to the way labour is governed
and how this trade policy has structured their attempts to change the protec-
tion, conditions and representation afforded to workers (see also Delp et al.,
21 Moreover, as indicated in table 1, our methods for gathering data incorporate a multi-
scalar approach that tries to capture dynamics of change at local/national/regional and firm/indus-
try/sector levels.
22 As an aside, the authors found that trade openness was positively correlated with labour
rights violations.
23 For instance, are people of a particular sex, ethnicity or race discriminated against more
than others?
2004), and to evaluate the real material consequences of the implementation

of labour provisions in FTAs.
Our approach offers an original contribution to the academic literature
on the trade–labour linkage, and an evidence-based opportunity for policy-
makers to better understand the effectiveness of labour provisions in FTAs,
beyond looking at what is visible on the surface (e.g. formal legal triggers such
as disputes or complaints). Semi-structured interviews in export-orientated fac-
tories and fields may reveal, for example, that labour standards are not prop-
erly applied or fully respected or, conversely, that managers of firms based in
export processing zones (EPZs) do not fully utilize the legal opportunity af-
forded by their EPZ status to exploit labour or degrade working conditions
because of concerns that EU FTA conditions will be applied.
Existing research on US FTAs and labour is instructive in understanding
some of the methodological advances and challenges. There has been a consid-
erable body of research since 1994 on the effects of trade liberalization under
NAFTA on labour markets in general (e.g. Hanson, 2003; Klein, Schuh and
Triest, 2002; Delgado-Wise and Márquez Covarrubias, 2007) and in particular
industries and sectors such as retail and agriculture in Mexico (e.g. Tilly, 2006,
and Otero, 2011, respectively), and on divestment in US manufacturing and
the rise of garment maquilas in Mexico (e.g. Bair and Gereffi, 2003; Bair and
Werner, 2011). However, there is considerably less focused empirical research
on the effects of labour provisions in US FTAs on employment relations in
the factories and fields of partner countries, beyond statistical time series ana-
lyses on the incidence of formal labour disputes. Some work has been done on
the effectiveness of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC) – a NAFTA “side agreement” – which was the first international
labour agreement to be linked to a trade agreement. NAALC has some con-
siderable parallels with the EU FTA Committee on Trade and Sustainable
Development, but since its entry into force in 1994, dozens of labour dis-
putes have been heard under the Agreement and several policy reports on
labour issues occurring under the umbrella of NAFTA have been produced
(see NAALC, 2014).
Research on the effectiveness in practice of this side agreement indicates
mixed results, with a common finding being that “unions were not able to score
any major victories within NAALC” (Tilly, 2013, p. 210; see also Dombois, 2002),
despite it having the “capacity to advance the struggle for labor rights” (Singh
and Adams, 2001; see also Compa, 2001).24 For example, Nolan Garcia (2011)
combines a statistical analysis of recorded NAALC disputes with interview data
from key participants and found that, of all union techniques, transnational ac-
tivism-based petitions and worker testimony constitute the most effective ap-
proach to having a dispute heard. This suggests that less well organized and/or
resourced workforces are less likely to be accepted into the NAALC process;
24 In the very different context of the Middle East, Cammett and Posusney (2010) found
that US FTAs brought about an improvement in labour standards.

however, they are also excluded from Nolan Garcia’s research design, because
the impact on the ground of NAFTA-associated labour standards may be diffuse
or tacit, rather than involving the submission of a formal dispute. For example,
Singh and Adams argue that “many employers and governmental authorities
may be changing questionable labor practices under threat of exposure through
NAALC” (2001, p. 12). Conversely, from the perspective of labour, given the lack
of major “victories”, workers may not have faith in the NAALC mechanism and
thus consciously opt to not engage it, while some businesses have, in response
to public pressure, established labour standards that are “much more extensive
than the system included in FTAs” (Gresser, 2010, pp. 491–492). Therefore, while
Nola Garcia’s research methods are able to tell us something about different
approaches to labour activism and the institutional activities of NAALC, they
are less informative on the relative uptake of labour standards in the factories
and fields. It is precisely this type of methodological weakness that the research
agenda outlined in this article seeks to overcome.
Conclusion
The “trade and sustainable development” chapter contained in all recent EU
FTAs creates a blueprint for the EU’s efforts to integrate social concerns
around labour standards in all future EU trade agreements. The rhetoric in
relation to this “new-generation” model is lofty, and suggests a serious and
integrated approach to tackling labour issues in the context of the EU’s glo-
balizing and liberalizing agenda.
Thus far, the academic literature on this issue has focused on the reasons
for the emergence of this blueprint. This article suggests that, as a result, aca-
demic analysis is unable to seriously engage with what this new model might
achieve in terms of its outcomes for workers in third countries. We argue
that empirical research is required on the effect of labour provisions “on the
ground” in different countries, in order to be able to seriously engage with
these important questions and to develop an understanding of how labour
provisions can “work beyond the border”, in the context of the uneven exter-
nalization of EU governance mechanisms, i.e. the way that some places and
practices are more tightly bound to the rules of the EU’s market than others.
In particular, we need to be attentive to the ways in which this new architecture
of labour governance structured through FTAs is differentiated by contingent
national and local dynamics. In other words, we need to recognize the signifi-
cance of geographical differentiation in the structuring of worker protection,
employment conditions and political representation mechanisms beyond the
EU’s borders, as emerging systems of EU governance intersect with sectoral,
national and local specificities. This requires an approach based on openness to
an understanding of how complex, intertwined dynamics lead to differentiated
outcomes, rather than on blueprint theorizing and rule-making. As part of that
approach, it is necessary to evaluate how both locally-specific and common out-
comes are experienced in a range of countries and industries integrated in the
EU market. This research agenda should be taken seriously, and acted upon
promptly, since the current period of bilateral experimentation is giving rise to
a wide range of labour provision models, operating in various FTAs. The EU
model has the potential to seriously influence the future of trade–labour link-
age, but has not, as yet, been subject to any sustained evaluation.
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Can labour provisions work beyond

Inclusiveness is just as important outside the EU’s

Copyright © The authors 2016

Labour provisions in international trade:

a conditional approach include labour provisions that make the conclusion of a

Canada, at least in a formal sense, makes use of post-ratification conditionality only.

The EU promotional labour provisions model:

includes a specific legal chapter on “trade and sustainable development”.

Existing research on the EU promotional labour

Analysis of this motivationally focused literature demonstrates the lim-

11 The EU–CARIFORUM Agreement contains provisions relating to a panel of experts,

have been implemented separately, but by integrating labour standards into

Can labour provisions work beyond the border?

13 This author was writing in a personal capacity.

in other FTAs such as with the United States)

First-hand knowledge of implementation of labour standards

of signatory countries. In table 1 we set out an indicative research framework

Negotiation and implementation of labour provisions

14 Interview with a European Commission representative, Brussels, 2013.

Effect on workers’ lives of labour provisions and the interplay

Impact of differing national, geo-economic

of committees on trade and sustainable development, and domestic advisory

2004), and to evaluate the real material consequences of the implementation

that US FTAs brought about an improvement in labour standards.

WTO. 1996. Singapore Ministerial Declaration. WT/MIN(96)/DEC. Declaration adopt-

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