G.R. No.

189698               February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is
intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope
with time limitations.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person

holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered

ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second
provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as
constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil
service officers and employees in partisan political campaign is
unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification if the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and
appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation by an appointing authority.
The instant case presents a rare opportunity for the Court, in view of the constitutional challenge
advanced by petitioners, once and for all, to settle the issue of whether the second proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which, as
shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the American occupation, is violative of the
equal protection clause.

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of
Article III of the Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369. It is now the
opportune time for the Court to strike down the said proviso for being violative of the equal protection
clause and for being overbroad.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.