THE 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,  plaintiff-

appellee, vs. POTENCIANO  TANEO,  defendant-appellant. (Sleep
Walking)

  FACTS: Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parent's house in

the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16,
1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were
entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis
Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and
while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and,
upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the
abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao
and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days
later as a result of her wound, and also the fætus which was
asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo,

and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua  with the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the
defendant appealed.

ISSUE: WON TANEO’s Acts constitute as exempting circumstance

HELD: Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream

and his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of
entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the

fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does
not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not
known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one's conscience
where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our
observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive but
just for the sake of committing it. But under the special circumstances of
the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented,
we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit
the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same
opinion. The doctor stated that, considering the circumstances of the
case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of a
hallucination and not in his right mind.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, accused whose
death sentence is under review.

FACTS: There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of

September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver. The victim, a 72 year
old widow was sitting on her bed when she was insulted by the accused,
slapped and struck on the head several times with a hammer until she was
dead. Her companions witnessed the assault and one of them despite
threats from the accused called the police. The accused was surrendered by
his father and was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal. Although the accused's pretenses to be insane appeared to be
supported by the testimonies of his wife and other defense witnesses, the
psychiatrists presented by the defense testified that the accused acted with
discernment. Based on the report of the National Mental Hospital on the
mental condition of the accused which showed that his ailment of
schizophrenia did not necessarily impair his discernment of right from
wrong, the trial court concluded that the accused was sane and convicted
him of Murder for which he was sentenced to death.   |||

ISSUE: WON PUNO SHOULD BE ACQUITTED

HELD: NO. Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col
was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats
which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's
companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal
maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and
Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really
disposed of her because he thought that she was a witch.
we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed
the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the
psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not completely
deprived of reason and freedom of will.

DISSENTING - It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when

appellant suffered from his last attack or relapse and September 8, 1970
when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had
elapsed. Medically speaking, the interval was not sufficient time for
appellant's full recovery nor did such time give any guaranty for his
mental disease to be "cured".
Appellant was still mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim.
He previously suffered from a "displacement of aggressive and hostile
behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and boxed
their dog. He had the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting
harm on him. This delusion found its mark on the victim whom he
believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she would harm him,
appellant had to kill her in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a
mere consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam"
as personified by the victim; he did not kill Aling Kikay herself. And the
said fatal act was made by appellant in defending himself from the
"mangkukulam".
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner,vs.RICHARD O.
SARCIA,  respondent. (RAPE CASE ISSUE AGE OF THE OFFENDER
MINOR BUT UPON TRIAL OF THE CASE THE ACCUSED WAS
ALREADY ADULT)

FACTS: On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA],together

with her [cousin and two other playmates],was playing in the yard
of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with
him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo's house. She agreed.
Unknown to appellant, [AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts
and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter,
he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of
her and inserted his penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant
made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi").[AAA] felt
severe pain inside her private part and said "aray".She also felt an
intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin],who positioned herself around five (5) meters
away from them, witnessed appellant's dastardly act. Horrified,
[AAA's cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's] mother,
her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA's]
mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were
still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and
ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the
backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying.
Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA]
and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not
 answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just
accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had
done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her.
Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating
sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her
cousin].[AAA's cousin] came to their house and told [AAA's] mother
again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement
on top of [AAA].[AAA's mother],however did not say anything. At
that time, [AAA's] father was working in Manila. 
ICESTA

Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of

Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health
officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on
[AAA];(2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal
certificate containing the result of [AAA]'s examination; (3) Dr.
Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of
Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the
findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA];(5) [AAA]'s
medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar
laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal
mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in
layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which
means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or
pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a
medical instrument or penis".

ISSUE: WON DEATH PENALTY SHOULD BE IMPOSED.

HELD: NO. However, this Court finds ground for modifying the
penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA's conclusion that
the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68 (2) 33 of the Revised Penal
Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he
admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was
18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could
have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996". Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority,
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more
beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has
appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age. 34 
CAcEaS

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a

minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes
of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. 35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
appellant is  reclusion perpetua.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA,  defendant-appellant. Naglalaro ng
volleyball tapos binato ni valentin yung bola hinabol siya ng
sampal sa batok gusto gumanti kinuha knife sa pinsan tapos
sinaksak si ragojos)

FACTS: "Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November

19,1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were
playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who
was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at Juan
Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan
Ragojos chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him,
slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the
deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which reason said
deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately
to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing
with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on
the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he,
looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now
deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of
his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife.
Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his
cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he
might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in
taking possession of the knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's
pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached
Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with
his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to do so
because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger than the accused. Juan Ragojos,
ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while
he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two
hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he
carried.
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT

HELD: YES. because it is error to determine discernment by the means

resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his
brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted with
discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but
also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time he
might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the
consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have
had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense
mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of
the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of
intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among
other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity
may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case,
the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and even during the trial (U. S. vs. Maralit, 36
Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived
at by it is correct.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ZZZ, accused-appellant.

FACTS: ZZZ went at large, but he was later arrested on February 6,

2003. Upon arraignment, ZZZ pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 6
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses: (1) the victim's uncle
BBB; (2) Senior Police Officer 3 Jaime Lavarias (SPO3 Lavarias); (3) Dr. Paz
Q. Mejia (Dr. Mejia); (4) Dr. Ronald Bandonill (Dr. Bandonill); and (5) the
victim's father CCC. 7
BBB testified that he was the uncle of both AAA and ZZZ. The
victim's father, CCC, was his brother, and ZZZ's mother is his second
cousin. ZZZ's mother and AAA's father are relatives, making them
related. 8
BBB testified that at around 7:00 p.m. on May 16, 1996, he was on
his way to the store to buy cigarettes when he saw ZZZ dragging AAA by
the wrist toward the school. Though it was dark and he was about 10
meters away, he was able to see them using a flashlight he was carrying.
Still, he said he presumed nothing was off, thinking they were relatives. He
had merely reprimanded them before he went on to buy his cigarette and
returned home, where he had a drinking spree with his nephews. 9
The following day, news spread that AAA was missing. With his
cousin Josefino Camilet, BBB went on a search for his niece and informed
barangay officials who then helped to look for her. 10 
aScITE

A couple of days later, the barangay officials found a lifeless AAA in

a bamboo grove near the school. BBB said that her niece's naked body
had already blackened due to decomposition. On the same day, he said
he found ZZZ in his house — the last time he had ever seen him. 11
SPO3 Lavarias testified that he was on duty the day AAA was found.
When he and his companions went to _____________, they saw AAA's corpse
under the bamboo grove. They came to know the body's identity through
BBB, who also claimed that ZZZ was the person behind the crime.
Accompanied by BBB, the police went to ZZZ's house, but he was nowhere
to be found. They proceeded to prepare an investigation report and
requested an autopsy on AAA. 12
In the police officers' Joint Affidavit, SPO3 Lavarias recalled that they
went back to the barangay on May 20, 1996 and found YYY, ZZZ's brother.
YYY told them that on the night of the incident, he was walking home with
ZZZ and AAA when his brother told him to go home alone. 13
Dr. Mejia, a municipal health officer in _________________, testified
that she was the physician who conducted the initial autopsy as requested
by the police officers. According to her report, there was a crack on AAA's
temporal skull and a half-inch long laceration below her left labia, while
brain matter leaked above her left ear. The doctor also noted that the
body had already been decomposing when it was found. 14
Dr. Mejia, however, said that she could not give a precise medical
opinion on the laceration on AAA's labia as she was not an obstetrician-
gynecologist. She also could not precisely tell how many days lapsed since
AAA had died, though she testified that the cracked temporal skull may
have caused AAA's death. 15
Dr. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that he conducted an autopsy on AAA on May 29,
1996. Upon examination, he found that the cadaver was at an advanced
state of decomposition, the face was contorted, the tongue was
protruding from the mouth, and all the extremities were flexed. He noted
that the contorted face could have been either due to decomposition or
due to a grimace caused by pain before she died. 16
Dr. Bandonill also observed contusions on AAA's face, right arm's
anterior surface, and the front and side parts of her thigh. He noted
contusions on the genital area, which could have been caused by a hard
or blunt instrument. Clumps of dried blood from the vaginal opening
could have also been caused by a tear inside the genital area. 17
From these findings, Dr. Bandonill remarked that AAA might have
been sexually assaulted. He added that AAA's death could have been
caused by the traumatic cerebral contusion. 18
CCC, the victim's father, testified that AAA was 11 years old when
she was raped and killed. He showed that he spent P20,000.00 for the
 internment of AAA and P30,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses such as
transportation costs. In anguish from AAA's death, he also asked for
damages. 19 HEITAD

For the defense, ZZZ testified that he was 15 years old when the
incident happened, as evidenced by his birth certificate. He confirmed
that he knew AAA as his cousin, and that both resided in the same
barangay. On the night of May 16, 1996, he said that he went to his
grandmother's house, where he watched television with his brother and
around 20 other people — including AAA. After watching, he and his
brother, YYY, returned to their sister's house to sleep. He said that he did
not notice if AAA left their grandmother's house. 20
Cansino added that when AAA was found dead, none of the
barangay officials and police officers went to his sister's house to
investigate him. On May 22, 1996, his stepfather brought him to Tarlac to
work as a helper in a grocery store, where he used the alias Peter Viray to
be employed. He later found out that he was charged with rape with
homicide of AAA. 21
Also testifying for the defense was YYY, ZZZ's brother, who retracted
what he had said earlier when the police interviewed him. Affirming ZZZ's
testimony, he testified that on the night of the incident, they watched
television at their grandmother's house before they went home and slept
at their sister's house.

ISSUE: WON ZZZ ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT

HELD: YES. Here, accused-appellant argues that even if he were

guilty of raping AAA, he must still be exempt from criminal liability since
he was only 15 years old 73 when he committed the offense and the
prosecution failed to prove that he acted with discernment.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that accused-
appellant acted with discernment in carrying out the crime. 74 First, he
perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second, after knowing
that he had been tagged as the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing
to Tarlac and concealing his identity. Third, as confirmed by the social
worker assigned to him, he knew and understood the consequences of his
acts. Lastly, Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA was raped by means of
force, as evidenced by the contusions all over her body and by the tear
from her vaginal area.
As can be gleaned from these facts, accused-appellant committed
the crime with an understanding of its depravity and consequences. He
must suffer the full brunt of the penalty of the crime.
 SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK), * JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES,
and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as
represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., petitioners, vs. QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as
represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, respondents.

STATUS OFFENSES MAIN ISSUE

FACTS: The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in
Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of
"Oplan Rody." 3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 99-02, 4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda
ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong
Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13, 5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046 6 entitled "An
Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the
Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other
Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon
City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301, 7 Series of 2014, entitled "An
Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors
from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for
Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon
City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8
 Petitioners, 9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) — an association of young adults and minors that aims
to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights
and welfare of the youth and minors 10 — filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process. 11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.

ISSUE: WON ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

HELD: Party granted

 VICKY C. TY,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  respondent. ( nag issue ng cheke dahil sa takot sa
ospital)

FACTS: This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for

violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila.
The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to
No. 93-130465.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty's mother Chua Lao So Un
was confined at the Manila Doctors' Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990
until 4 June 1992. Being the patient's daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October
1990.  6  As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account  7  shows the total liability of
the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Ty's sister, Judy Chua, was also
confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital
bills in the amount of P418,410.55.  8  The total hospital bills of the two patients
amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note
wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.  9  To assure
payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank
payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of
P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored
by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of
funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant
hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were
not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7)  Informations  subject of the instant
case.  10
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue
the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and
harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She
alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition
unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the
cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother's food and refusal to
change the latter's gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital's
suspending medical treatment of her mother. The "debasing treatment," she
pointed out, so affected her mother's mental, psychological and physical health
that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the
hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the demands of
the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with
Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother's immediate discharge.

ISSUE: WON UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR GROUND FOR EXEMPTION IN

CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN Bp22

HELD: No. The only question of law raised — whether the defense of
uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability —
has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.  24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of
such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to
it.  25  It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's life or
limb.  26  A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be
speculative, fanciful, or remote.  27  A person invoking uncontrollable fear must
show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.  28  It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.  29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks — a condition the
hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged — for
fear that her mother's health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane
treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.  ESTaHC

To begin with, there was no showing that the mother's illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death.
Secondly, it is not the law's intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less petitioner's flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide.
In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospital's threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but
to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted
that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.  30  And if indeed she
was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all
the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of  B.P. 22. She even testified that her
counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
"because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem."  31  Besides,
apart from petitioner's bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to
corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospital's demands.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. FLORENTINO LABUGUEN y FRANCISCO alias
"Tinong," and ROMEO ZUÑIGA 1 y PILARTA, accused-
appellants.

FACTS: On 3 January 2002 at about 7:30 in the evening,

while spouses Manuel Padre and Nenita Padre and their two
daughters, Rhoda and Rachel, were having dinner at their home at
Villaruz, Delfin Albano, Isabela, five (5) men suddenly barged in, one
holding a firearm and one with a bonnet with [a] hole showing the
eyes only. Labuguen, [sic] entered first and pulled Rachel into the
comfort room (CR), together with her mother Nenita and sister
Rhoda, who in turn were pulled by Macalinao and by an
unidentified man respectively. Manuel, on the other hand, was
brought to the store by an unidentified man. Nenita was then
brought to [the] Padre's store while Rhoda and Rachel were left in
the comfort room. A few minutes later, Labuguen brought Rachel
out of the comfort room and she saw Zuniga, standing by the door
of the store and Macalinao, standing guard at the CR door and
holding a gun. Upon reaching the dining area, Labuguen stabbed
Rachel with a small knife on the left breast and then Macalinao hit
her on the forehead with the butt of a gun, causing her to fall
down. Then Labuguen strangled her and as she could not remove
his hands off her neck, she played dead. As soon as Labuguen
stood up and left, together with the other perpetrators, she
immediately ran for help to their neighbor Patricio Respicio
(Respicio), who[,] together with Alex Rodriguez, brought her to the
hospital. At the hospital, she learned from her relatives that her
parents and sister died on the night of 3 January 2002. Dr.
Gambalan treated her serious injury on the left chest and less
serious wounds on the head and abrasions on the neck.
Meanwhile, after Manuel closed the store and returned to
the house, Zuniga, upon the instruction of Joel Albano (Albano), hit
[Manuel hard] on the forehead, causing the latter to fall. Eric
Madday, one of the five men and who also used to work for Manuel
Padre, boxed Nenita on the abdomen and when Zuniga saw the
chopping knife, he stabbed her at the back. On the other hand,
 Rudy Macalinao shot Rhoda when she tried to run away. On the
belief that all members of the Padre family were dead, the group
proceeded to Albano's house, where Zuniga learned that they got
the money from the Padre family. He saw Albano [give] a bundle of
money to Rudy Macalinao. He left Delfin Albano, [sic] in Isabela and
went into hiding in Gerona, Tarlac on 7 January 2002.
Upon learning of the incident from Kagawad Alex Rodriguez,
the police investigators went to the hospital on 4 January 2002 and
interviewed Rachel, who identified two of the perpetrators —
Labuguen, who happen[ed] to be Padre family's longtime neighbor
and who used to work for them, and Macalinao, also one of the
victims' helpers. At that time, she purposely withheld the name of
Romeo Zuniga, one of Padre's longtime customers, as she wanted
him to reveal his companions. From the hospital, the police
proceeded to the crime scene, where they found Manuel's body
near the store, Nenita's body was recovered inside the store while
that of Rhoda was located inside the house. Rachel was released
from the hospital on 12 January 2002.
Labuguen was apprehended by the police on 4 January 2002.
The blood-stained jacket he was wearing during the custodial
investigation was submitted for serological examination at the PNP
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. The blood taken from
Labuguen's jacket tested positive for human blood group A. As to
Zuniga, Rachel decided to reveal his identity as one of the five men
who robbed and killed her parents and sister Rhoda to Fiscal Dalpig
and later to Fiscal Torio. He was arrested in Gerona, Tarlac by the
police operatives in 2006 and narrated to them the incident.
Zuniga posits that he was forced by his co-accused to rob
Padre Family and if he did not join them the co-accused would hurt his
family.

ISSUE: WON ZUNIGA IS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY DUE TO

UNCONTROLABLE FEAR

HELD: No. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence

must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the
fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is
greater than or at least equal to that committed. A threat of future
injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to
leave no opportunity for the accused to escape. 19
As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, Zuñiga is not entitled to
avail of this exempting circumstance. As noted by the CA, the malefactors
had a well-hatched plan to commit the crime of robbery with homicide
and that Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but
likewise actively participated in its commission. As the CA found: "Verily,
there was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat to his life and his
family as he was an active participant in the commission of the crime
charged. He acted on his own free will and was not under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear as he claims." 20 Moreover, as correctly argued by
the Office of the Solicitor General, Zuñiga had every opportunity to escape
while they were passing through the cornfields on their way to the Padre's
house. However, he did not avail of the said chance. 21 He did not perform
any overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. 22 While he
refused to kill Rachel, he nonetheless delivered the fatal blow to Manuel's
head and stabbed Nenita at her back using a chopping knife without any
prodding or compulsion from his companions.
MITIGATING

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-

appellee, vs. MAMERTO NARVAEZ,  defendant-appellant. (right of way
sinarhan binarily ng shotgun yung nag block ng way)

FACTS: "At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan,
Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased Davis
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer,
father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the
highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in the
municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the
house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n.,
Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that
the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented
from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed
the group, saying -'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if
possible we will talk it over - what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia,
who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered:
'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium
and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down,
Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep,
appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting' 

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS A VALID SELF-DEFENSE

HELD: NO. WE find, however, that the third element of defense of

property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was
no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only
awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His
plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him
was no provocation at all.
 Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not
justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He
should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he
could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
(6) That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.

The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful

aggression on persons, not property.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1
ERNESTO ULEP,  accused-appellant. (pulis binaril yung baliw na
tumatakbo ng naka hubad nakahiga na binaril pa sa ulo)

Initial charge murder naging homicide dahil sa mitigating

circumstance of incomplete self-defense

FACTS: two o'clock in the morning of 22 December 1995

Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking
insensibly to himself in his room. His brother-in-law, Dario Leydan,
convinced him to come out of his room and talk to him, but Wapili told
Leydan that he could not really understand himself. After a while, Wapili
went back to his room and turned off the lights. Moments later, the lights
went on again and Leydan heard a disturbance inside the room, as if Wapili
was smashing the furniture. 3 Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan called Pastor
Bonid of the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili,
but they could not enter the latter's room as he became wild and violent.
Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan.
Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two (2) of his neighbors attempted to tie
Wapili with a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built
and stronger than anyone of them. 4 Wapili, who appeared to have
completely gone crazy, kept on running without any particular direction.
Thus, Leydan went to the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a
neighbor, and asked for assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando,
he banged Plando's vehicle parked outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando
then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto Espadera and SPO2
Crispin Pillo, all members of the PNP assigned to secure the premises of the
nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan. 5
At around four o'clock in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Ulep
together with SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene on board
an Anfra police service jeep. The three (3) police officers, all armed with M-16
rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili approaching
them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police
claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's
relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool. 
DcTaEH

SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down
his weapons or they would shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!")
and continued advancing towards the police officers. When Wapili was only
about two (2) to three (3) meters away from them, SPO1 Ulep shot the victim
with his M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim
slumped to the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet
into his head and literally blew his brains out.

ISSUE: WON THERE IS A COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE.

HELD: NO. The elements in order for self-defense to be appreciated

are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed
by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and, (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. 12
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has
committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending
himself. 13 In the present case, the records show that the victim was
lying in a prone position on the ground — bleeding from the bullet
wounds he sustained, and possibly unconscious — when accused-
appellant shot him in the head. The aggression that was initially begun
by the victim already ceased when accused-appellant attacked him.
From that moment, there was no longer any danger to his life.
 NOEL GUILLERMO y BASILIANO,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,  respondent. (away sa inuman basiliano
hinampas ng bote sa ulo nagalit sinaksak si Winnie 3 beses)

FACTS: Vicente Alon averred that at 5:40 in the afternoon of

July 21, 1996, Winnie Alon, Wilfredo Cabison, Eddie Roque, and
him [sic] were at the public market of Cuartero, at [sic] the
restaurant of Melecio Heyres to eat. 8 Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias,
and Joemar Palma were at the restaurant drinking beer. Noel
Guillermo and Arnel Socias are known to him since childhood since
they come from the same barangay. 9 Joemar Palma is known to
him only recently in that incident. 10
While sitting at the table inside the restaurant, an altercation
between Arnel Socias and Winnie Alon regarding the cutting of
wood by a chain saw [sic] transpired. Noel Guillermo suddenly took
hold of Winnie Alon and stabbed the latter at the neck three (3)
times. 11 Joemar Palma went to the kitchen and got a knife. Arnel
Socias hit him with a bottle of beer by [sic] the head. He fell down
and lost consciousness. 12 [Footnotes referring to the pertinent
parts of the record supplied]

Significantly, Vicente admitted on cross-examination that he and Winnie

were already drunk even before they went to the restaurant where the
stabbing took place. 13

Eddie corroborated the testimony of Vicente on material points,

particularly on the state of their intoxication even before going to the
scene of the stabbing. His testimony on what transpired at the restaurant
was summarized in the RTC decision 14 as follows:
Eddie Roque alleged that at around 5:40 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 21, 1996, he, together with Winnie Alon, Vicente
Alon and Wilfredo Cabison, were [sic] inside the restaurant of Mrs.
Heyres at Cuartero Public Market to leave their tools of the chain
saw [sic] and to eat and drink. 15 Noel Guillermo, Arnel Socias, and
Joemer Palma were ahead of them to [sic] the restaurant and were
drinking beer. They invited them and they joined them. 16 Before
 each of them could fully consume a bottle served upon each of
them, Winnie Alon and Arnel Socias argued about the cutting of
wood by means of a chain saw [sic]. The argument was so heated
that each of the protagonists stood up and Arnel Socias took 2
bottles which were thrown to Vicente Alon who was hit on the
forehead. 17
Noel Guillermo hugged or embraced Winnie Alon and
stabbed him three times (3) on [sic] the neck with a Batangueño
knife. Arnel Socias went around, then behind, and stabbed Winnie
Alon once, on the left side of his body, just below his left armpit,
with a pointed object, but he could not determine what weapon
was used. Joemar Palma also helped in stabbing Winnie Alon once,
hitting him at the right side of his body.

ISSUE: WON THERE IS COMPLETE SELF DEFENSE

HELD: NO. 2nd element of Self-defense was not present in this case because
there was no reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel. In this
case accused upon being hitted by a bottle of beer he noticed that he has a
butterfly knife in his pocket and stabbled Winnie 3 times. The act of
stabbing 3 times was not congruent to the 2 nd element of self-defense,
where in fact the act of stabbing was done to end the life of the victim with
rage. Hence incomplete self-defense. The penalty imposed was mitigated
due to an mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The
penalty which the RTC imposed and which the CA affirmed lowered
the penalty of reclusion temporal  by one degree, which yields the
penalty of prision mayor. From this penalty, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is determined by taking into account the
attendant modifying circumstances, applying Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code. 51 Since no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
intervened, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be  prision mayor  in its medium period whose range is from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years.  aATHES

To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty,  prision

mayor  has to be reduced by one degree without taking into account the
attendant modifying circumstances. The penalty lower by one degree
is  prision correccional  whose range is from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
The trial court is given the widest discretion to fix the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty provided that such penalty is within the range
of prision correccional.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILLIAM

SABALBERINO y ABULENCIA, accused-appellant. (parricide
husband killed wife because of an heated argument)

FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution established that herein

accused-appellant, William Sabalberino (William)  and the victim, Delia
Fernandez-Sabalberino (Delia) were husband and wife who used to live
together at Barangay 59, Picas, Sagkahan, Tacloban City. William was
employed as a painter, while Delia worked as a laundrywoman. They have
five (5) children, namely, Wendel, Wedylyn, William, Angela and Jessica.
Around one o'clock in the morning of August 17, 2005, Angela and Jessica
were roused from their sleep when they heard their parents shouting at
each other. They were prompted to get out of bed and, thereafter, stood
by the door of their room while witnessing their parents argue with each
other. While in the middle of their quarrel, William punched Delia hitting
her face. Angela and Jessica then rushed to their mother and embraced
her. Thereafter, William went to the kitchen to get a knife and proceeded
to stab Delia hitting her chest below the armpit while the latter was
holding Angela and Jessica. Delia, on the other hand, managed to stand
and walk towards the door of their house. However, before reaching the
door, she decided to walk back towards the bed but before she could
make it to the bed she collapsed. William then went to her aid, embraced
her and cried. He asked his children to call for help, but Delia died soon
thereafter.
William, on his part, did not deny having stabbed Delia.
However, he claimed that the stabbing was accidental. William
alleged that in the afternoon of August 16, 2005, he arrived home
tired and took a nap while waiting for his daughters to prepare their
meal. He woke up around 6:30 in the evening and took dinner with
his children. When he inquired about his wife, their children told him
 that she was still washing clothes. After eating, he went to sleep
inside the master's bedroom. Around midnight, he woke up to
urinate. Upon turning on the lights and stepping out of their
bedroom, he saw his wife half naked with a completely naked man
on top of her. Angry at what he saw, he went to the kitchen to get a
knife and approached the two. His wife and the man then stood up,
and the latter tried to gain possession of the knife. They grappled.
When William was able to take control of the knife, he tried to stab
the man but, unfortunately, he accidentally hit his wife who at that
time stood between him and the man. The man then picked up his
clothes and hurriedly jumped out of their window. William tried to
run after him, but he came to the aid of his wife when he saw her fall
down. He then asked his children to call for help, but his wife died
before help arrived.

ISSUE: WON PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

CAN BE AVAILED BY THE ACCUSED FOR MITITGATING THE PENALTY

HELD: NO. It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when
the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus
so powerful as to overcome reason. 34 The obfuscation must originate
from lawful feelings. 35 The turmoil and unreason which naturally result
from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or
excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree
as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. 36 The excitement which is
inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not
constitute obfuscation. 37 In the present case, the prosecution was able
to establish that the crime was precipitated by a quarrel between
accused-appellant and the victim. However, such kind of argument,
no matter how heated or serious it was, is not the kind that would
cause the passion or obfuscation contemplated under the law.
As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
same can be appreciated if the accused satisfactorily complies with
three requisites, to wit: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he
surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent;
and (3) the surrender is voluntary. 38 There must be a showing of
spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare
them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. 39 In the instant
case, there was no showing of spontaneity on the part of accused-
appellant as it was not he who asked for the police to go to their
house. 40 Neither was there proof that he acknowledged his guilt when
apprehended by the police authorities. While it appears that he did not
resist when the police officers brought him to the police station for
questioning, such lack of resistance does not necessarily equate to
his voluntary surrender. The voluntariness of one's surrender should
denote a positive act and not a mere compliant or submissive
behavior in the presence of authorities.
 ISIDRO MIRANDA y PARELASIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (pilo and company after
attending a party passed by the house of accussed and
threw stones – frustrated homicide)

FACTS: The antecedent facts show that in the evening of August 14,
2011, victim Winardo Pilo (Pilo) attended the party of his niece at
Barangay Binonoan, Infanta, Quezon. After the party, he and his
friend Danilo Damaso (Damaso) left. While on their way home, they
passed by the house of Miranda and threw stones at the latter's
home. 6
While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside
and started hacking Pilo. He hit Pilo's right forehead. Again, Miranda tried
to hit Pilo, but the latter parried the attack with his left arm. 7
In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him.
Thereafter, Damaso grabbed possession of the bolo. 8
In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo
twice, but claimed that his acts were done in self-defense. 9 He narrated
that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00 p.m., while he was at home with
his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door, followed by
several other thuds and stones hurled at their house. Miranda peeped
through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that
before he peeped through the door, he heard Pilo challenge him to come
out so that they could kill each other. 10 Miranda asked Pilo if something
was wrong, but the latter ignored him and continued hurling
stones. 11 According to Miranda, Pilo approached him and hit his upper
left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms downwards to
pick up something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo's arm
with his bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's oncoming attack. 12
At this instance, Damaso, arrived and grappled with Miranda to get
a hold of the latter's bolo. Because of this, Damaso likewise sustained
injuries.
ISSUES: WON THERE IS COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE

HELD: No. This is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-

defense. 33 Significantly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (i) there must have been a
physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be
unlawful. 34 To be sure, the accused must show that the aggression
caused by the victim in fact put his life or personal safety in real and grave
peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined threat.
Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the
attack against the accused is impending or at the point of happening. This
scenario must be distinguished from a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong. 35
Applying the foregoing doctrines to the case at bar, it becomes all
too apparent that the evidence on record does not support Miranda's
contention that Pilo employed unlawful aggression against him. It must be
remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the house of
Miranda. Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did not throw
stones at him, much less, utter any invectives, or threatening words
against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw merely hit Miranda's roof and
door. 36
Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was
throwing stones, the latter did not respond but simply remained mum,
and threw a stone at Miranda's iron door.

Mitigating applicable
Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful
aggression, admittedly, however, such deed was vexatious, improper and
enough to incite Miranda into anger. The fact that Miranda was stirred to
rage was understandable considering that his wife and daughter were at
his home, and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the stones.
In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although
there may have been no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have given sufficient
provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated. Such acts
which were deemed vexatious range from the victim's act of
challenging the accused's family while armed with a bolo; 52 or
thrusting a bolo at the accused while threatening to kill him with the
lives of the accused's wife and children placed in peril; 53 and the
victim attempting to hack the accused. 54 Certainly, Pilo's act of
hurling stones while Miranda's family was peacefully enjoying their
supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in
favor of Miranda the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.
 RODEL URBANO,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  respondent. ( nag inuman kapikunan nag
suntukan, urbano naka suntok ng isang malakas kay brigido
nagka brain damage namatay)

FACTS: On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim

Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the compound of the Lingayen
Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a
picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some
other co-workers, they drunk beer in a restaurant. While inside the
compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner
asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of insulting
petitioner. 
acSECT

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads

succeeded in breaking up the fight, but only for a brief moment as the
protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows at
each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch", as described by
eyewitness Orje Salazar, on Tomelden's face, which made Tomelden
topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the
ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The
blow, however, caused Tomelden's nose to bleed and rendered him
unconscious.
Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office
of the LIWAD general manager where he spent the night. He remained in
the compound the following day, September 29, 1993. Upon arriving
home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife,
Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been rendered
unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which
impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community
Hospital where Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated
left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at the right cerebrum.
On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital
complaining of dizziness, headache, and other pains. The attending
 doctors observed the patient to be in a state of drowsiness and frequent
vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison
Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending
physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from "brain
injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage". 3  DHTCaI

Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of

October 10, 1993, and, due to financial constraints, was thereafter
discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement. Upon
reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme
head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to the Lingayen
Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him. This time,
things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to
be semi-conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any
stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to
"cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant
cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident".

ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable

HELD: YES, but gave 2 mitigating circumstance in favor of accused.

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating

circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating

circumstance or as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is
to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; 12 it is not enough that the
provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; 13 the provocation must be
sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act 14 and should
immediately precede the act. 15 This third requisite of self-defense is
present: (1) when no provocation at all was given to the aggressor; (2)
when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if
the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person
defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act of
aggression. 16 
EHSIcT

In the instant case, Tomelden's insulting remarks directed at

petitioner and uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted
sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements
made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner
was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight.
Petitioner's unrebutted testimony on the events immediately
preceding the fisticuff and earlier dovetails with the testimony of Salazar.

It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation

came from Tomelden. In fact, petitioner, being very much smaller in
height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as
events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when
petitioner's lucky punch found its mark.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be
appreciated in his favor. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight,
being very much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows
of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the scuffle, to connect a
lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked,
petitioner helped carry his unconscious co-worker to the office of the
LIWAD's general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot reasonably be
expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to
commit so grave a wrong as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as
a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was
just unfortunate that Tomelden died from that lucky punch, an
eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the
financial means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear
that the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave
a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner
landed a lucky punch at Tomelden's face while their co-workers were
trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never
intended so grave a wrong as to kill the victim.

The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of

the RPC is reclusion temporal  or from 12 years and one day to 20
years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and of
sufficient provocation from the victim, and the application of par. 5
of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next lower
penalty prescribed for homicide and this should be  prision mayor  or
from six years and one day to 12 years. Consequently, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner ought to
be incarcerated from  prision correccional  as minimum and  prision
mayor  as maximum. In view of the circumstances of the case,
considering that the petitioner never meant or intended to kill the
victim, a prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor  as maximum period is proper while the period of two (2) years
and four (4) months of prision correccional  as minimum period is
reasonable.
We find no reason to modify the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ALBERTO BENITO Y RESTUBOG, defendant-
appellant.

(Employee of csc killed his boss Pedro in Manila and

voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and made a plea
of guilty however RTC of manila did not appreciate such
mitigating and rendered a judgement for the accused with
the penalty of death which resulted to automatic review of
the SC)

FACTS: It is not controverted that at about 5:30 p.m. of December 12,

1969, the victim Pedro Moncayo, Jr., Assistant Chief of Personnel
Transaction and Acting Chief of the Administrative Division of the
Civil Service Commission, while driving his car on P. Paredes street in
front of the Office of the Civil Service Commission was followed by the
accused, and when the car was about to turn at the intersection of P.
Paredes and Lepanto Streets, Manila, the accused shot him eight times
with a .22 caliber revolver, causing the victim's death. The accused was
charged with murder and when the case was called for trial, through
counsel de parte, he manifested his desire to withdraw his previous plea
of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty without prejudice to
proving mitigating circumstances. The prosecution manifested that it
would controvert whatever mitigating circumstances the accused would
prove and also prove other aggravating circumstances. The trial court
repeatedly explained to the accused the nature and consequences of his
plea of guilty to the offense charged and warned him that the maximum
penalty imposable is death. Notwithstanding the explanation and warning
of the trial court, the accused, assisted by his counsel de parte upon being
re-arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. The accused presented evidence to
prove mitigating circumstances and the prosecution subsequently
introduced evidence to prove aggravating circumstances not mentioned
in the information. The Court sentenced the accused to death after finding
him guilty as principal in the crime of murder qualified by treachery, with
 the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, offset by the
mitigating circumstance of accused's plea of guilty.

ISSUE: WON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE SHOULD BE APPLIED.

HELD: YES. The generic aggravating circumstance of disregard

of rank considered by the lower Court against the accused is being
assailed on the ground that at the time of the commission of the
murder, the accused was no longer connected with the Civil Service
Commission as the decision in the administrative case against him
ordering his dismissal from the service became effective February 16,
1966.
There is no question, however, that accused was a clerk in the Civil
Service Commission and the victim was Assistant Chief of the Personnel
Transaction of that Office. When the accused saw and talked with the
deceased regarding the former's administrative case that proved to be the
motive for the murder by his own admission, accused made it very
obvious that he recognized the deceased as his superior officer. The mere
fact that the dismissal of the accused from office was made immediately
executory was of no moment since he appealed that decision and the
case was still pending and, by his own allegation, he was later completely
exonerated by the Civil Service Board of Appeals in its decision of
February 17, 1971.
It may be true that this aggravating circumstance was
considered against the accused even if it was not alleged in the
information, but this is a generic aggravating circumstance, and not
a qualifying circumstance that would change the nature or affect the
gravity of the crime committed, but one which is capable of being
proven and taken into consideration even if it was not alleged in the
information. The lower Court in considering this generic aggravating
circumstance against the accused did not violate his constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him for
murder. This aggravating circumstance was correctly considered against
the accused.
V
We cannot see Our way clear to the argument of the accused that
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, although included
in the information, should not be considered against the accused because
although he pleaded guilty to the charge unconditionally, the prosecution
sought and was allowed to adduce evidence to show the criminal
participation of appellant in the commission of the offense and the
background of the crime imputed to him, and the evidence submitted by
the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. It is further argued that the
prosecution is deemed to have thereby waived the effect of the
unconditional plea of guilty by the accused in so far as the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is concerned.
What upsets the entire argument of the accused is the fact that the
prosecution successfully proved the existence of evident premeditation
because Exhibit "A", his own declaration, narrates fully the several
attempts of the accused to talk with the deceased; how he was rebuffed in
those attempts and even insulted, and that he was jobless after having
been dismissed from the office on allegedly fabricated charges made by
the deceased. All of these admissions provided a strong motive for the
accused to plan on how to retaliate against the victim by taking the law
into his hands.
We cannot disregard the fact that the accused unconditionally
pleaded guilty to the offense charged after the lower Court specifically
called his attention to the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation before he was re-arraigned (p. 5, t.s.n. December 26, 1969),
and after the Fiscal had rejected his counsel's proposal to delete this
aggravating circumstance from the information (p. 3, t.s.n. December 26,
1969). The accused was fully aware of the consequences of his
unconditional plea of guilty to the offense of murder after it was
explained to him, and the serious implication and meaning of the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation expressly mentioned
in the information.
 The admission of the accused that he had with him a .22 caliber
revolver on the afternoon of December 12, 1969; that when he saw the
victim driving his car on P. Paredes Street he followed him up to the
corner of P. Paredes and Lepanto Streets where he shot the victim eight
times suddenly and without any warning, speaks eloquently of his plan,
generated by an all-consuming hatred, to kill the person whom he
considered responsible for all his misfortunes.
The lower Court did not, therefore, err in considering the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against the appellant.
For all the foregoing, the guilt of the appellant has been
established beyond reasonable doubt, with two mitigating
circumstances in his favor, that of plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender. However these are offset by the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and disregard of respect due
to the deceased. The crime of murder being punishable with
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code), the penalty, pursuant to Article 248 in relation to Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, should be, as it is hereby, imposed in
its medium period, or reclusion perpetua.
The penalty of death imposed by the trial court is hereby
modified and reduced, as above indicated, to reclusion perpetua
with accessories of the law.
 RICARDO BACABAC,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  respondent. (petitioner police officer shot
Jonathan and edzel whom in fact

FACTS: Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the
victim and his companions also left and on their way home, they
encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and
there figured in a misunderstanding.
On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the
dance hall, noticed a commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was
"hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands". Still later, he
saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." 2 He thus told the victim and his
companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose),
whereupon Eduardo 3 told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot
him. Jesus thus left and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his
father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan
managed to flee.
The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the
course of which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner),
together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's
father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del
Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-
16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood
and a revolver, respectively.
Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the
ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized,
explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel
for other persons. Jesus blurted out, however, "You are just bragging
that you are brave. You are only bullying small children." 4 Petitioner,
at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his
armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at the victim and
Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on
the move to strike [the victim] with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell.
 And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and as he was
raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.
Meanwhile, Melchor escaped. 5
The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital.
The victim was pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died two hours later.
ISSUE: WON THERE IS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.

HELD: NO. As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of

"immediate vindication of a grave offense", it fails. For such mitigating
circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, "committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito),
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same degree." 59 The offense
committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick 60 (according to Jesus),
a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). 61 By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was
hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." 62 That act would certainly not be
classified as "grave offense". And Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence,
not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in
Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. INOCENCIO
GONZALEZ, JR.,  accused-appellant. (road rage resulting to
accidental firing hitting Noel’s wife resulting to her death and
injuries to 2 other companions)

FACTS: In the afternoon of October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m. both
the families of the private complainant Noel Andres and that of the accused-
appellant Inocencio Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola
Memorial Park. The appellant was driving a white Isuzu Esteem with his
grandson and three housemaids, while the private complainant was driving a
maroon Toyota FX with his pregnant wife Feliber Andres, his two year old
son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law, Francar Valdez. At the
intersection near the Garden of Remembrance, while the accused-appellant
Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and the complainant Noel Andres
was headed straight along the road to the exit their two vehicles almost
collided. Noel Andres was able to timely step on the brakes. The appellant
continued driving along his way while Noel Andres drove behind the
appellant's vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the
opportunity to do so. 1 Noel Andres then got out of his vehicle and knocked
on the appellant's car window. 2 This is as far as their versions of the incident
coincide.
The prosecution's version of the incident is that Noel Andres calmly
told the appellant to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that
he, Andres, is with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied,
"Accidents are accidents, what's your problem." Andres stated that he saw
the appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle
when he was blocked by the appellant's son who said, "Anong problema mo
sa erpat ko." Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately
boarded his vehicle, sat at the driver's seat, closed the door, and partially
opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellant's son,
Dino. Suddenly, one of his passengers said "Binaril kami". He turned to his
wife Feliber Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. He turned
around and saw his son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were also wounded.
Andres admitted in court that he and Dino were shouting at each other so
that he did not hear the shot. Andres then got out of his vehicle to warn the
appellant not to flee. He then took the wounded members of his family to
the exit where there was an ambulance standing by. The three were then
taken to the Sta. Monica Hospital and were later transferred to the Quezon
City Medical Center.
The defense's version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellant's
path by positioning his FX obliquely along the appellant's lane from the
latter's left side. Andres then got out of his vehicle, stood beside the
appellant's car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, "Putang ina mo,
ang tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo
mo." 3 The appellant stayed inside his car and allegedly replied, "Pasensiya ka
na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente lang." The appellant Gonzalez and
another witness for the defense, Quidic, testified that Noel Andres went back
to his vehicle to move it in such a way that it is straight in front of the
appellant's car. Andres allegedly got out of his vehicle again and continued
shouting and cursing at the appellant. 4 Dino, the appellant's son, who rode
in another vehicle decided to go back when he did not see his father's car
behind him. When Dino arrived at the scene he confronted Andres and the
two had an altercation. Both Dino and the appellant stated that Andres
remained outside his vehicle during the altercation with Dino. When Andres
suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, Dino froze on the spot
where he stood. This prompted the appellant to get his gun from the glove
compartment and feeling that his son was threatened he got out of his car
ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put
down his hand holding the gun. This is when the appellant's daughter Trisha
who was riding in Dino's car arrived at the scene, walked past Dino and
Andres, and pushed the appellant away. She hugged her father and in the
process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand
and with Trisha's substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant
lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. The accused stated that he did
not know he shot somebody until the private complainant's sister-in-law,
Francar Valdez, got out of the vehicle carrying a bloodied small boy. The
defense claims that the appellant did not try to flee and even told the
complainant's sister-in-law to take the wounded to the hospital.
ISSUE: WON that judgment be rendered exempting him from criminal
and civil liabilities. Appellant declared that he had no intention to shoot
Noel Andres much less his wife nor the children. He lost his balance
when his daughter Trisha approached and pushed him backwards to
stop him from joining Dino and Noel Andres but the appellant tried to
free his right hand holding the gun and it accidentally fired and won
there is treachery

HELD: No. Treachery under par. 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is

defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the
execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two
elements must concur: 1) the employment of means of execution that
would insure the safety of the accused from retaliatory acts of the
intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to defend
himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously
adopted by the offender. 8 The suddenness of the attack, the infliction of
the wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at
the time the attack was made or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not
by themselves render the attack as treacherous. 9 This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused
whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the latter
accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless. 10 The means employed for
the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have
been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the
consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the
risk of retaliation from the intended victim. 11 Accordingly, it has been
consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or
crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by
heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of
opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of
attack. 12 Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation
by reason of the victim's provocation was held to be without treachery.
Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the
victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive
behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was
sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. 13 For the rules on treachery to apply the
sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by
the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. 14
This Court has also had occasion to state that whether or not the attack
succeeds against its intended victim or injures another or whether the crime
committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown
that the attack is attended by treachery, the said qualifying circumstance may
still be considered by the court. 15 Thus, the determining factor on whether
or not the commission of a crime is attended by treachery is not the resulting
crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its execution. 16
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack
must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the
crime itself. 17
We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the
shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime
committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
The encounter between Noel Andres and the appellant was a
chance encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles
almost collided at an intersection inside the memorial park.
Unfortunately, heated exchange of remarks that followed the near
collision was fanned by a short temper, which in the case of the
appellant, was augmented by the improvident use of a firearm.

The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and

obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and
none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of
prosecution witness contradicts the appellant's pretense of voluntary
surrender. Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards
the gate of the memorial park while he was questioning him after the
shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked his path the
appellant could have fled the scene of the crime. 51
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not
obtaining. For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be
shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and
obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime
was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the
accused's mind; and that (3) "the passion and obfuscation arouse from
lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or
revenge." 52 Noel Andres' act of shouting at the appellant's son, who
was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion
and obfuscation as it is claimed by the accused. Besides, the appellant's
son, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein the
appellant's son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his
reason and shot at the FX of Noel Andres. The same holds true for the
appellant's claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres. Provocation
must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and
that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The
sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the
case. 53 The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and
his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation
to shoot at the complainant's vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of
Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not
amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally,
the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity
between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and
the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time
of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used,
the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the
victim. 54 The appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought
nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the
appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a
gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.
For the death of Feliber Andres, and in the absence of any mitigating
circumstance, the appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum. For each count of the slight physical injuries committed
against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant is hereby sentenced
to 20 days of arresto menor in its medium period.
 GEORGE BONGALON,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  respondent. (petitioner slapped jayson and
Roldan because the two minor inflicted injuries to her daughter
by burning her daughters daughter and throwing stone. Here
accused was charge Child abuse)

FACTS: Jayson dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both
minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner's
house, the latter's daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at
Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the
face; 4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers' house and challenged
Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of
the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the
Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also
underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital; 5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1)
contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1 x 1 cm. contusion left
zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left. 6  EHScCA

On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or

maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan
after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about
Jayson and Roldan's throwing stones at them and about Jayson's burning
Cherrylyn's hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to
a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming
his daughters. 7
To corroborate the petitioner's testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that
her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson
had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn's hair.
Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy."
She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective
father. 8

ISSUES: WON ACCUSED GUILTY OF CHILD ABUSE

HELD: No, but merely slight physical injuries.
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to
the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and
slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts
constituted child abuse  within the purview of the above-quoted provisions.
The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of
hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to
humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on
Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger,
indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at
the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked
that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro
reo  every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus,
the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. 18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson's physical injury required five to seven days of
medical attention, 19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries
under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,  to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The
crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor  when the offender has inflicted physical
injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
 one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the
same period.
xxx xxx xxx

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor,  which ranges
from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. 20 In imposing the correct penalty,
however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code,  21  because
the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power. 22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise
from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. 23 It is
relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender
suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted
under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two
minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn's hair, the
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion. Arresto menor  is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e.,  one day to
10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the  Indeterminate
Sentence Law  being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding
one year, 24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages
are granted in criminal cases resulting in physical injuries. 25 The amount of
P5,000.00 fixed by the lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the
current jurisprudence. 26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals;
and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding petitioner George
Bongalon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal
Code;  (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto
menor;  and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson dela Cruz the amount of P5,000.00
as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO
PAGAL y MARCELINO and JOSE TORCELINO y
TORAZO,  defendants-appellants.

(Robbery accused pleaded guilty and the RTC rendered

them death penalty by reason of aggravating circumstance
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident
premeditation and disregard of respect due the offended
party offset only by the mitigating circumstance of their
plea of guilty)

FACTS: "That on or about December 26, 1969, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to gain, and by means of violence, take away from
the person of one Gau Guan, cash amounting to P1,281.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Gau Guan in the said
sum of P1,281.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said amount of
P1,281.00, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of their superior strength, treacherously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the said Gau Guan, by then and there stabbing him
with an icepick and clubbing him with an iron pipe on different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death thereafter.

"Contrary to law, and with the generic aggravating

circumstances of (1) nighttime purposely sought to better accomplish
their criminal design; (2) evident premeditation; (3) in disregard of
the respect due the offended party; and (4) with abuse of confidence,
the accused being then employees of the offended party." 1

When the case was called for arraignment, counsel de oficio for the
accused informed said court of their intention to enter a plea of guilty
 provided that they be allowed afterwards to prove the mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceding the act, and that of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and
obfuscation. 2 Thereafter, the trial judge propounded to them the
questions and the accused gave the answers quoted hereunder.

ISSUE: WON ACCUSED MAY BE SENTENCED TO DEATH PENALTY

HELD: No.
The appellants further assail the trial court in not appreciating in
their favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation, and
passion or obfuscation.
Again, the appellants' contention is devoid of merit. Firstly,
since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the
appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged
maltreatment and/or ill treatment of the appellants by the
deceased, these two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered
as two distinct and separate circumstances but should be treated as
one. 11 Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot
be mitigating in a crime which — as in the case at bar — is planned
and calmly meditated before its execution.
Finally, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in considering
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, evident premeditation, and
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank
and age.
Although the trial court correctly considered the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity because the same was purposely and
deliberately sought by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the
crime, nevertheless, We disagree with its conclusion that evident
premeditation and disregard of the respect due the offended party were
present in the commission of the crime.  cdphil

Evident premeditation is inherent in the crime of

robbery. 13 However, in the crime of robbery with homicide, if there
is evident premeditation to kill besides stealing, it is considered as
an aggravating circumstance. 14 In other words, evident
premeditation will only be aggravating in a complex crime of robbery
with homicide if it is proved that the plan is not only to rob, but also
to kill. 15 In the case at bar, a perusal of the written statements 16 of
the appellants before the police investigators show that then
original plan was only to rob, and that, they killed the deceased only
when the latter refused to open the "kaha de yero", and fought with
them. The trial court, therefore, erred in taking into consideration
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with
insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of
his rank, age or sex may be taken into account only in crimes against
persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime there is some
insult or disrespect shown to rank, age, or sex. 17 It is not proper to
consider this aggravating circumstance in crimes against
property. 18 Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property
and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. 19 The trial court
erred in taking into account this aggravating circumstance.
It results that in the commission of the crime, there is only
generic aggravating circumstance, i.e., nighttime or nocturnity.
Robbery with homicide is punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. 20 Since the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is offset by
the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the lesser penalty,
which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed upon the appellants.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee,vs.JUNE IGNAS
y SANGGINO,  accused-appellant.

(Wilma’s extramarital relation with nemecio resulted for

the accused to kill nemecio. Accused pleased mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation and voluntary
surrender)

FACTS: On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda,

and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio were sending off
Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was leaving
for Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio
checked at Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a
room. 12 All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when
Wilma Grace left for Taiwan. 13
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by
Wilma Grace on various dates. Although all the letters were addressed to
Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma Grace to be read by her
paramour, Nemesio. 14 In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed
Romenda to reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.
It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following
her bosom friend's written instructions, informed appellant about the
extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Romenda
informed him that the two had spent a day and a night together in a room
at Dangwa Inn in Manila. 15 Appellant became furious. He declared
"Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio"
(There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that
Nemesio). 16 Appellant then got all the letters of Wilma Grace from
Romenda. 17
That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellant's neighbor who was
presented at the trial as a prosecution witness, had a talk with appellant.
Mayamnes was an elder of the Kankanaey tribe to which appellant
belonged. He wanted to confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was
likewise from the same tribe, 18 was having an affair with appellant's
spouse. Talk apparently had reached the tribal elders and they wanted the
problem resolved as soon as possible. 19 A visibly angry appellant
confirmed the gossip. 20 Mayamnes also testified that he advised Nemesio
to stay at the Mountain Trail Kankanaey community until things had
cooled down. 21
Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and
offered his equipment for sale. Among the potential buyers he
approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the offer. 22
Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant
load his bakery equipment on board a hired truck and depart for Nueva
Vizcaya. 23
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another
prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a trader in vegetables, she was at the
Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. 24 The Trading Post is a popular depot
where vegetable growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce late in the
evenings for sale to wholesalers and retailers. Witness Bayanes said she
was at the unloading area (bagsakan),conversing with another dealer at
the latter's booth, when suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet
evening. 25
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots
came from. She testified that she saw a person falling to the
ground. 26 Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches
away, 27 was another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband
and casually walked away. 28
Initially, she only saw the gunman's profile, but when he turned, she
caught a glimpse of his face. 29 She immediately recognized him as the
appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he was her
townmate and had known him for several years. Witness Bayanes was five
or six meters away from the scene, and the taillight of a parked jeepney,
which was being loaded with vegetables, plus the lights from the roof of
the bagsakan,aided her recognition of appellant. 30
Also at the bagsakanarea that night was prosecution witness Marlon
Manis. He testified that on hearing gunshots from the Trading Post
 entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the gunfire came
from. He saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was
lying on the ground. 31 Witness Manis saw that the fallen victim was
Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had known since Grade 2 in
elementary school. 32 Manis then saw another person, some 25 meters
away, hastily walking away from the scene. He could not see the person's
face very well, but from his gait and build, he identified the latter as his
close friend and neighbor, June Ignas. 33 Manis said that the scene was
very dimly lit and the only illumination was from the lights of passing
vehicles, but he was familiar with appellant's build, hairstyle, and manner
of walking. 34
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that
she knew appellant. She said they were co-workers formerly at the
Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. 35 Barredo
declared that at around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to
her residence at Pico, La Trinidad. After being served refreshments,
appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed the empty
shells from the chamber. 36 Appellant then told her to throw the empty
cartridges out of the window. Because of nervousness she
complied. 37 Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her that he had
just shot his wife's paramour. 38 Appellant then stayed at her house for 8
or 9 hours; he left only in the morning of March 11, 1996, 39 according to
her. Police investigators later recovered the spent gun shells from witness
Barredo's sweet potato garden.

An information was file for the crime of aggravated especially by the use of
an unlicensed firearm. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,but, on motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty
was upgraded to death. Hence, this automatic review of the case.

ISSUE: (1) WON ACCUSED COMMITED MURDER

(2) WON THERE IS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
 HELD: (1) No, because the information failed to state additional
crime of unlicensed fire arm. Assuming arguendo that the evidence on
record suffices to sustain the appellant's conviction for the unlawful killing
of Nemesio Lopate, the question arises: Was the killing murder as found
by the trial court or mere homicide? Note that the amended information
under which the appellant stands charged does not, unlike the original
information, charge appellant with murder but with mere "unlawful
killing" albeit through the use of an unlicensed firearm. Note further that
the amended information does not definitely and categorically state that
the "unlawful killing" was attended by the aggravating or qualifying
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in
the information. 66 Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took
effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of
Nemesio Lopate, as a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should
be given retrospective application. Hence, absent specific allegations of
the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
nocturnity in the amended information, it was error for the trial court to
consider the same in adjudging appellant guilty of murder. As worded, we
find that the amended information under which appellant was charged
and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any
conviction should, thus, fall under the scope and coverage of Article
249 67 of the Revised Penal Code.

(2) We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and

obfuscation inexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of
vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be
claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or
motive. 113 In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same
breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for
passion and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his moral equanimity. 114 To repeat, the period of two
(2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wife's extramarital
dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant
to reflect and cool off.
Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to
consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. On this
point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender
has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. 115 Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were
circulated for information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A
team of police investigators from La Trinidad, Benguet then went to
Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for questioning. Only then
did he return to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the
victim. Clearly, appellant's claimed surrender was neither
spontaneous nor voluntary.
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense
of homicide the penalty imposable under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be
imposed on appellant is an indeterminate prison term consisting of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor,as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal  as maximum.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX
NIDERA y SINGZON, accused-appellant. (won voluntary
surrender when the law enforcer proceeded to the
residence of the accused and accused did not fight back
when apprehended)

FACTS: That on or about the 5th day of June 2009 in the

Municipality of Capoocan, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill, armed with a stone and bladed weapon, with
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab to death
Jerson Delos Santos inflicting upon said Jerson Delos Santos fatal
wounds which cause (sic) his direct death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Trial on the merits ensued after accused-appellant entered a plea of
"not guilty." 3
The factual milieu of the case, according to the version of the
prosecution, was quoted by the CA in the following manner:
The first witness was SPO3 Gary Zaldy Ligutan [who] testified
in this wise: On June 6, 2009 he was assigned at the Capoocan
Municipal Police Office. On that day, and while on duty, Benjamin
Delos Santo[s] and Ronald Brazil arrived and reported a stabbing
incident which transpired at 8:30 o'clock that morning. He, SPO2
Arturo Micmic, PO2 Rodolfo Mercolita and PO2 Charlie Nartea,
accompanied by their confidential agent proceeded to the house of
Alex Nidera in order to arrest him. When they arrived at the house
of the latter and after calling his name, Alex Nidera peacefully
surrendered himself to them. Alex Nidera also turned over to SPO2
Arturo Micmic a kitchen knife. They then returned to their station
and upon arrival thereat, he turned over the accused and the
bladed weapon to the investigator. In connection with this case, he
and his fellow responding officers executed a joint affidavit of
arrest.
 The second witness was SPO1 Arturo Micmic whose
testimony could be summarized thus: He is a policeman who was
assigned at the Capoocan Municipal Police Station starting in the
year 1999. He was about to start his duty at the said station on June
6, 2009 when they received a report about a stabbing incident in
which the suspect was Alex Nidera. He and three other police
officers on duty, accompanied by one Benjamin Delos Santos
proceeded to the house of Alex Nidera in order to arrest him. When
they arrived at the house of the latter and after calling his name,
Alex Nidera surrendered himself to them. When he asked Alex
Nidera where was the knife used in the incident, the latter returned
to his house and when he came back, he carried a kitchen knife and
turned over to them. They returned to their station and upon
arrival thereat, he turned over the accused and the bladed weapon
to their investigator. In connection with his case, he and his fellow
responding officers executed an affidavit. However, he has no
knowledge about the stabbing incident. Benjamin Delos Santos,
while mentioned in their affidavit, has not executed any affidavit in
connection with the case. He has not placed any distinguishing
mark on the knife surrendered by the accused to them.
The third witness was SPO2 Enrique Delgado whose
testimony was dispensed with after the defense stipulated with the
prosecution about the gist of his testimony which is to identify the
entries in the police blotter logbook.
The fourth witness to be presented was Dr. Bibiana O.
Cardente. However, her testimony was dispensed [with] after the
parties stipulated with the prosecution regarding the purposes for
which her testimony was being offered.
The fifth witness was Mr. Ervin Flores, who was presented to
give an eyewitness account. He recalls that at 8:45 o'clock in the
evening of June 5, 2009, he was in the company of his kuya Jerson
and kuya Edmar walking the length of the National Highway after
whiling away the time at the Carnival Fair in Poblacion, Capoocan,
Leyte. Jerson placed both his arms on their shoulders while they
were walking. Suddenly, a stone coming from behind them hit
Jerson, causing him to fall face down to the ground. They also
stumbled to the ground. While his kuya Jerson was still slumped in
the ground, Alex Nidera stabbed Jerson using a small bolo, hitting
 the left side of the body. When Jerson turned around, he was
stabbed again and was hit at the abdominal part of his body. Jerson
fell to the ground on his back. Alex Nidera delivered more blows
and then mounted himself on top of Jerson and tried to slash the
neck of Jerson. When Jerson was no longer moving, Alex Nidera
stood up and casually walked away. He has known Alex Nidera
prior to the incident.
On cross-examination, he admitted that his kuya Jerson was
already tipsy when the latter urged him and his kuya Edmar to go
home. It was while they were walking along the National Highway
in Brgy. Buti, Capoocan, Leyte when somebody from behind hit his
kuya Jerson with a stone, hitting his kuya Jerson on the left side of
his head. He then ran away. From where he was, [he] saw that
many persons surrounded Jerson while the latter was being
stabbed by Alex Nidera. The latter however did not harm him even
if he was just some three meters away. His kuya Jerson died trying
to defend himself from the blows of Alex Nidera.
The last witness to testify was Mrs. Delia Delos Santos.
However, her testimony was dispensed with after the defense
stipulated with the prosecution regarding the amount of actual
damages incurred for the [embalment], wake and interment. 4
Accused-appellant did not take the stand and the testimonies of
SPO4 Gary Zaldy Ligutan and SPO2 Enrique Delgado were dispensed with
after the parties stipulated on the gist of their supposed statements,
which centered on the fact of accused-appellant's surrender as reflected
in the police blotter. 5

ISSUE: WON THE ACT OF NOT RESTRAINING FROM THE POLICE OFFICERS WHEN
APPREHENDED CONSTITUTES AS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

HELD: NO. As to the claim of accused-appellant that he is entitled to

the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same does not
deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the
following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of
the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities
either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture. 16
In this case, there was no spontaneity on the part of accused-
appellant. Rather than personally surrendering himself to the
authorities, it was the police who sought him due to a stabbing
incident report where he was tagged as the suspect. Accused-
appellant's failure to resist apprehension and surrender of the
weapon do not necessarily equate to voluntary surrender. The
voluntariness of one's surrender should denote a positive act and
not a mere compliant or submissive behavior in the presence of
authorities. 17
The Court, however, notes there is no need to qualify the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the phrase, "without eligibility for parole,"
pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. 18 In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Likewise, the Court sustains the award of damages in line with our
pronouncement in People v. Jugueta.
REYNALDO S. MARIANO,  petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,  respondent. (born again accidentality hit
Ferdinand and raised mitigating of voluntary surrender)

FACTS: At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999,

Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay
Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their
two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de
Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and
was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo
Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca,
and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just
attended a worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon
and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and
blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the
jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo.
Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation.
However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and
kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to
pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis
intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na
lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and
Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate
ways. aDATHC

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand

decided to drop by his mother's house in San Roque, Angat to pick
up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his
mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a
moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness.
Urbanita shouted, "Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie." She
identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the
same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to
show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the
house of the latter's mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away
 from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an
oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo
made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However,
Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was
sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-
up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might
harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to
their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo proceeded to
Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the
incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos,
Bulacan, where he stayed for two and a half days and incurred
medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00. On September 15, 1999,
Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center in Quezon
City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical
expenses amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise spent P909.50 for
medicines, P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctor's fee and
P12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and masseur from
September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial
injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and
subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as
evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of
St. Luke's Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount of
P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance, as
evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.

RTC – Frustrated Homicide

SC – Reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injury

ISSUE: WON THE CA IS CORRECT in the decision of Reckless imprudence

resulting to serious physical injury
HELD: YES. "Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of n failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place." 9 To constitute
the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and
wanton disregard of the consequences is required. 10 The Prosecution
must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence
and the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People, 11 the
petitioner was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that he had
driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney.
In Pangonorom v. People, 12 a public utility driver driving his vehicle very
fast was held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to
avoid hitting a swerving car. In the absence of any cogent reasons,
therefore, the Court bows to the CA's observations that the petitioner had
driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of
Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand,
causing the latter's injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner's insistence, the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of
Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of
the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. "The
rationale of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.: 13
. . . can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized
under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which
characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to
another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order
that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the
courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being
bound by what We may call the mathematical formula provided for
in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular
provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of
Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating
circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset
them. IaSCTE

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The error
should be avoided because no person should be condemned to suffer a
penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged
or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guilty of any crime must be
duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and
prescribing the punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender
should the penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the
correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based
on the gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus,
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that had the act been
intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall
suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it
would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code,
a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article
25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law
punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in
accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is
an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of
either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is
provided. aIcETS

In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the

principal afflictive penalties to be reclusion perpetua, reclusion
temporal, and prision mayor; the principal correctional penalties to
be prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro; and the
light penalties to be arresto menor and fine not exceeding P200.00. Under
this provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical
injuries based on the gravity of the physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall
wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of
serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
 1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall become insane,
imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to
hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a
leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have
become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor
habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted,
the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost
any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall
have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he as n habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety
days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical injuries
inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the
injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the
persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of any of the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by
subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by
subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered by
subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to
a parent who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive
chastisement.

In its decision, 14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained

multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital
wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma; that he
had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It
was also on record that he had testified at the trial that he was unable to
attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to
temporary amnesia; and that he had required the attendance of
caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind,
his physical injuries did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently,
the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner's act as a grave felony had it
been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period.
Instead, the petitioner's act that caused the serious physical injuries, had
it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand's physical injuries were those
under Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the
performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more
than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which
ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless imprudence,
and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment would
not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law inapplicable, 15 the Court holds that the straight penalty of two
months of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the petitioner.