Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MT1 PMLS Lec L9
MT1 PMLS Lec L9
Velasquez, RMT, MLS (ASCPi)/TRANSCRIBED BY: ESPINOSA, TAN, & BRANZUELA MT-1F
● Biorisk
→ Application of both biosafety and biosecurity Fig. Biorisk management Diagram
● Integration of biosafety and biosecurity
→ to manage risks when working with biological toxins B. IMPORTANCE OF BIORISK MANAGEMENT
and infectious agents
● System or process to control safety and security risks ● Is a way for science to show we care for the future
associated ● To conform to prudent biosafety/biosecurity practices
→ with the handling or storage; ● Expand the research community's awareness of the
→ and disposal of biological agents and toxins in the importance of biological safety
laboratories and facilities → In the conduct of good science through effective
● Defined according to the World Health Organization
communication
(WHO) as
→ “The analysis of ways and development of → Every new discovery must be credited well,
strategies to minimize the likelihood of the meaning there is communication between
occurrence of biorisks” researchers
● To prevent employees and their families from acquiring
A. BIORISK MANAGEMENT AS SYSTEM/PROCESS laboratory-associated (Nosocomial) infectious diseases
→ Nosocomial diseases - hospital acquired
● It deals with decisions
diseases
● To prevent contamination of the environment and promote ▪ And return a positive result for SARS
environmental quality → Additional epidemiologic investigation revealed that
● To comply with all the applicable National, International, ▪ Laboratory where he worked was also involved
in research on SARS-coronavirus
and Local guidelines and regulations
▪ One of the cell cultures of West Nile virus was
→ for the use of biohazards contaminated with the same infecting strain of
● Prevent loss, theft, or misuse of microorganisms, sars coronavirus
biological materials, and research-related information → Although this represent an exceptional event
→ Only belongs to researchers ▪ Serves to highlight the inherent risk posed to
● Protect proprietary materials and information laboratory workers by virtue of their occupation
● Protect the reputation and mission of the institute
● DECEMBER 2003
● Enhance emergency preparedness and response
→ Male laboratory scientist
→ Working in Level 4 BSL
● Added info ▪ Identified to have contracted the virus
→ Pathogens and toxins have been used even in the → Happened when manually disinfecting a spillage
recent past to ▪ He may not have practice precautionary
▪ Threaten and harm people measures
▪ Disrupt society, economies, and political status ▪ May not have worn a mask and gloves while
doing so
quo
▪ Resulting to him testing positive for SARS
→ Because of those
▪ They show no regard for ethical values ● MARCH 25, 2004
▪ Do not respect the right of people to safe and → Female research student was admitted
peaceful life → A’s mother (died)
▪ Do not recognize global treaties and → Nursing attending A
conventions → C’s mother
→ C’ aunt
→ Several regulatory approaches are made
→ C’ father
▪ To limit unauthorized access to biological → Retired doctor sharing hospital room with C
agents and toxins available in biological → G’s daughter in-law
laboratories
▪ They are now carefully considered and APRIL 17, 2004
implemented worldwide → Male laboratory Researcher
→ Female Labworker in BSL3
→ Female Labworker developed pneumonia
Real Life Scenario (SARS)
→ Male lab worker (A’s supervisor)
● AKA Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) ● Economic consequences and scientific concerns resulting
● A talk in the whole world on 2003 from the laboratory acquired SARS-CoV infection in
● Case (SEPTEMBER 2003) Singapore, Taipei, and Beijing
→ 27 year old → Not only raised biosafety awareness
→ Microbiology graduate student → Also, promoted review by the concerned scientific
→ Singapore community and national regulatory bodies
→ Working with a non-attenuated strain of West Nile ● These incidents triggered the improvement of national
virus biosafety policies
▪ In Level 3 BSL 3
▪ Evaluated for flu like symptoms Real Life Scenario (COVID-19)
Non-attenuated ● Not weakened or strained
● Work related infections of health workers from news
Level 3 BSL ● Since virus is really contagious
● Contributing factor
→ Relaxed biorisk management
→ Patient denied any exposure to SARS
● As part of medical field
→ Had no travel history
→ Follow correct procedures as to not harm others
▪ Quite understandable since symptoms for
and ourselves
these viruses are indistinguishable early on
→ Inappropriate lab procedures and cross
contamination of III. WORKING WITH BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
▪ West nile virus and SARS-CoV
→ Big difference from 2 A. RISKS INCLUDE:
▪ Coughing and difficulty in breathing does not
come with west nile 1. Accidental infection
→ Was discharge in emergency department ● E.g accidental contraction of biothreat UN through an
▪ But returned 5 days later because of persistent exposure
fever ● 2001 anthrax attacks proved infectious agents and toxins
→ Because Singapore remained in a heightened state can be misused to intentionally harm individuals and
of alert for SARS at 2003 populations
▪ PCR was performed with the sputum
specimen
● Anthrax attack
→ Several people in US received mail in envelope
→ No content but inside those were spores of anthrax
→ A lot of them contracted anthracis (disease)
→ A lot died
→ Bioterrorism is a real threat
2. Accidental release of toxic chemicals
3. Intentional theft and/or misuse
4. Physical injuries
● E.g accidental needle stick injuries from sharps, animal
bites, slips or falls, burns, and ergonomic injuries
(repetitive strain, prolonged exposure to abnormal
temperatures or vibrations, prolonged awkward positions)
3. Engineering Controls
E. PERFORMANCE
1. Control
● Done through
→ Validation/verification, QC, proficiency testing,
Specimen management
● Procedures undertaken by the laboratory staff
→ For the continuous and immediate monitoring of
laboratory work
→ In order to decide whether the results are reliable
enough to be released.
2. Assurance
3. Improvement