Buried Beneath The Headlines Regarding The Ongoing Trade Dispute Between The US and China

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Buried beneath the headlines regarding the ongoing trade dispute between the US

and China, incidents of tension in the South China Sea, and therefore port protests,
a conflict between Canada and China is simmering beneath the surface.

Although tensions first arose over the Canadian government's detention of Huawei.
According to Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver, it currently affects almost all aspects of
the two countries' relations, from China's demand to detain two Canadian voters,
Archangel Spaur and Archangel Kovrig, on charges of stealing state secrets.
Because of this, Canadian agricultural products are still banned. The conflict
represents one of Canada's most serious policy challenges since 9/11. If there is any
consolation, it is that Canadian policymakers, and therefore the public, find
themselves in a very good position to appreciate the country's global standing and to
fully appreciate the international challenges on the horizon.

China's actions fall back on a well-worn playbook, however one that Canada is
unfamiliar with. In 2010, Japan detained the captain of a Chinese fishing smack after
it rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands. In response, China halted exports of group metals to Japan and later
ordered four Japanese contractors suspected of espionage. When Japan fired the
captain, Beijing completely relented. Different countries such as India, Vietnam, the
Republic of Korea, and therefore the Philippines are closely associated with
variations of this militant Chinese behaviour.

Canada, however, is unfamiliar with these approaches, and is anxious to develop a


good policy response. His position is refined by the shocking irresponsibility of his
top ally, u.s . President Donald Trump's style of undermining pre-existing
assumptions about the US alliance's guarantees of national security has periodically
caused serious anxiety in Canada. The cases have led some observers, notably
former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and former ambassador to China John
McCallum, to advocate that Canada should visit Meng to defuse the conflict.

His position follows scepticism about Canada-US relations. It also presents an


opportunity (in their minds) for the North American nation to become a neutral broker
between the two countries. The outcome of this position would be disastrous for the
North American nation and would represent an initial misunderstanding of the
country's position within the world. Failure to understand Canada's strategic position,
as an unusually close ally with the United States as an intrinsic part of the US-led
Western alliance, is the most dangerous vehicle the Chinese government has ever
exploited. Reversing the surrender order would be an incomprehensible policy coup
of the associate degree, the significance of which is far from the arrival of Meng. His
decision calls into question Canada's commitment to its closest ally when it is best
served.

Significantly, Canada's willingness to continue the surrender process and bear the
economic consequences has only increased support in Washington, particularly in
Congress and the political community. He calls Ottawa a steadfast ally and valuable
political capital, a square measure clearly more important to Canada's national
interest than its relationship with China. This overwhelming support bodes well for
the long-term security and economic ties between the two countries, which could
extend well into the Trump administration's tenure.
Unfortunately, the long-term study of Canada-US relations could have a downward
impact on the state of affairs with China, particularly with this occupant of the White
House. Ottawa's response to national capital must be measured, consistent and
robust. The government's approach to the latter objective has so far failed. Given
McCallum's and Chrétien's statements, the Liberal government should immediately
take advantage by distancing itself from the remarks and rather than hardening
Canada's position. Otherwise, the national capital is left to mistrust that Ottawa —
and, more specifically, the ruling party — might even be close to buying into their
campaign of intimidation. On the contrary, giving in to Beijing's demands would set a
very dangerous precedent for future relations with China. They would conclude that
with strong enough pressure, Canada would yield to any demand. Finally,
transparently rejecting Huawei's involvement in Canadian 5G networks, a
transparent threat to national security, would eliminate another potential lever that
the Chinese government could pull.

Canada’s diplomatic efforts should conjointly avoid superficial efforts and move
toward a lot of substantive measures. The Liberal Government has tried to corral
allies to pressure China over the detention of Canadian voters. However, considering
Beijing’s utter dismissal of criticism associated with human rights abuses in Sinkiang,
or its perspective toward the port demonstrations, it's unlikely the campaign can
force associate degree amendment of policy. what is more, Canada’s allies have
very little incentive to try and do over issue infirm worded de-marches to China,
because it isn't a very sturdy or reliable ally for countries within the Indo-Pacific.
though Ottawa has slightly augmented Canada’s military presence within the region
and improved ties with Japan and Singapore, this square measure immensely low to
the challenge at hand.

Therefore, Canada should still expand its diplomatic engagement and defence ties
with key allies and partners. Not solely can this sustain diplomatic support, it'll send a
solid signal to national capital that its actions have real consequences. as an
example, Canada’s recent cross-servicing agreement with Japan represents a
potential model that might be adopted elsewhere. It might conjointly participate a lot
of actively in a number of the joint infrastructure developments comes being LED by
Japan, the U.S, and India. Such efforts might facilitate facilitate larger Canadian
engagement with the Quad – a casual security grouping that consists of the U.S.,
India, Japan, and Australia. it might even be a transparent, however tag, response to
China, act that any powerful efforts can solely push Canada into nearer relation with
similar allies.

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