Central Banks Group 1

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Course project 2 - The Role of Central Banks

Carl-Oscar Backlund
Anton Jansson
Mirjam Lundin

Group 1
Umeå School of Business, Economics and Statistics
Spring semester 2020
Financial Markets, Institutions, and Financial Planning C
Financial indicators

Table 1. Financial indicators


GDP (USD billion) Inflation Unemployment Interest rate Foreign exchange rate

Federal Reserve 20544.34 2.30 % 3.60 % 1.75 % EUR/USD: 1.0944

European Central Bank 13669.95 1.40 % 6.20 % 0.00 % USD/EUR: 0.9136

State Bank of Vietnam 245.21 6.43 % 2.15 % 6.00 % USD/VND: 23,230.00

Central Bank of Brazil 1868.63 4.19 % 11.00 % 4.25 % USD/BRL: 4.3203

Qatar Central Bank 192.01 -0.33 % 0.10 % 4.25 % USD/QAR: 3.6400

Bank of Ghana 65.56 7.90 % 6.7 % 16 % USD/GHS: 5.3649


Source: Trading Economics

Yield Curves
All yield curves except for Europe comes from World Government Bonds. We did not find a
yield curve for Ghana.

Figure 1 & 2: Yield Curve for The U.S. and Europe

Figure 3 & 4: Yield Curve for Vietnam and Brazil


Figure 5: Yield Curve for Qatar

Main features

Federal Reserve System


The main features for the bank’s monetary policy is to promote maximum employment, price
stability and moderate long-term interest rates in the US economy. They also work to ensure
that the inflation rates are low and stable, to help the economy operate more efficiently. The
bank has a goal to keep the inflation rate around 2 percent. It’s hard to set a permanent goal
for the maximum employment rate so these goals are always an assessment of the labour
market at a specific point in time. The inflation rate and the maximum employment rate have
a complementary effect on the stable prices and the bank’s ability to keep a moderate long-
term interest rate (Federal reserve, 2020a). The role of the bank’s committee (FOMC) is to
oversee open market operations and execute monetary policies to mitigate deviations from
targeted goals (Federal reserve, 2020b). The federal reserve is a part of the congress but is an
independent office free of party politics (Federal reserve, 2020c).

European Central Bank


The European central bank’s (ECB) main purpose is so maintain price stability. ECB aims to
keep the inflation rate under 2 %, but not much lower (ECBa, 2019). The governing council
is mainly the decision makers regarding monetary policy in ECB and consist of six members
of the Executive Board plus governors from each of the 19 national central banks that are
members in the European monetary union. The main responsibilities are to provide guidelines
and make sure that decisions are being enforced. They also decide on monetary policies for
the eurozone which is among other things key interest rates and the monetary reserves.
Moreover, they are making decisions regarding the framework for supervision (ECB, 2019b).
ECB issues forecasts quarterly regarding GDP, unemployment rates, inflation and other
macroeconomic indicators (ECB, 2019c).

State Bank of Vietnam


The purpose of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) monetary policy is to stabilize the value of
their currency, provide a safe banking and credit system, make sure that the national payment
system is safe and works efficiently and work for better socio-economic development. The
SBV is a ministerial body of the Vietnamese Government (SBV, 2020a).

The decision making within SBV is divided into three branches. The SBV governor and the
prime minister has mandate to decide which tools to use in order to implement the national
monetary policy. This covers tools such as interest rates, exchange rates, reserve
requirements, open market operations and refinancing (SBV, 2020b,c). The National
Assembly receives proposals regarding inflation from the government and sets the annual
inflation targets. The National Assembly is also responsible for supervision over the
implementation of the monetary policy. The president makes the negotiating and signing
regarding international matters connected to monetary policy and banking (SBV, 2020c).

Central Bank of Brazil


The role of the central bank is to enhance the purchasing power of their domestic currency
Real. Additionally, to make sure the financial system is working in an efficient and stable
way. Therefore, the central bank is responsible to monitor the financial market infrastructures
in order to guarantee stability in the financial markets (BCB, 2020b,c).

The central bank has a monetary policy committee (COPOM). The main objectives are to
keep order within the monetary policy, but also regarding the short-term interest rate. To have
transparency regarding monetary policy and its decision-making process (BCB, 2020b). In
addition to this, the committee is also responsible in trying to reach Brazil’s inflation target
which currently is 4 %. COPOM is also responsible for the interest rate target, which affects
the interest rate for overnight interbank loans, subsidized by government securities. This
interest rate is called the SELIC rate, in other words the federal funds rate (BCB, 2020b). The
benchmark for this interest rate is 4,50 % (WSJ, 2019).

Regarding the legal status of the central bank, it is given authority in the Brazilian
constitution but not legal autonomy by the government. One can argue that the central bank
has been given some legal autonomy, for example regarding inflation targeting (Meade, p.
60).

Qatar Central Bank


The features of the monetary policy rely on four pillars. The first is about financial stability,
in order to facilitate the operations for all parties involved in the financial market. The second
is about credit controls, and this is a quite complex system. But the purpose of it, is to
monitor financial sector developments in order to minimize risk within the sector, for
example to stabilize inflationary pressure. The third pillar is about the central bank given the
authority by law to ensure that there is a stable liquidity and solvency within the banking
system in Qatar. The fourth is about monitoring the other non-banking financial institutions,
which is for example insurance companies, or exchange houses (QCB, 2020a,c,d).

The four pillars mentioned above is the framework of the main features in the monetary
policy that QCB perform in order to ensure financial stability. They have some certain tools
in order to do so as well. For example, they have three different rates, one for daily
transactions within the Qatar Money Market, one for overnight transactions when depositing
or lending from the central bank, and then they have their own repo rate. The monetary policy
is the responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee. Their job is to formalize and
implement the decisions made by the central bank (QCB, 2020a,c,d).

Bank of Ghana
The main features of the monetary policies for the bank is to ensure price stability and low
inflation. They also support the government in their objectives such as economic growth and
employment. They also have a responsibility to use monetary measures to promote stability
in the value of their currency. Their medium-term inflation rate target set by the government
is currently set at 8±2%. If the inflation rate reaches above target, they use the interest rate as
an instrument to bring the inflation rates down again so that they can avoid instability in the
economy. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) works to provide statistical data and
necessary advice for the formulation of monetary policies as well as initiate proposals for the
formulation of the monetary policies. The MPC also decides interest rates. The central bank
is directly accountable to parliament and the wider public (BoG, 2020a).

Domestic financial markets

Federal Reserve System


The federal reserve’s actions through monetary policies directly affects the domestic market
in many ways. They can influence companies’ ability to hire employees by providing more or
less money to banks for them to lend out to companies. The changes they do to the interest
rate can also have a lot of different effects on the financial market, such as mortgage rates,
return on bonds and other types of loans which all can increase or decrease spending in the
market. The federal reserve's main role when it comes to monitoring the financial market is to
make sure the market is moving towards their goals of maximum employment, stable prices
and moderate long-term interest rates (Investopedia, 2019).

European Central Bank


ECB is responsible for the currency in the Euro area. Therefore, they have a goal to provide
an infrastructure that facilitates a good and safe flow of payments and other financial
instruments (ECB, 2020d). However, ECB decides on the same interest rate for all countries
within the area. This might be beneficial for some countries, and disadvantageous for others
and leaves the member states with only fiscal policy as policy tool. Thus, the euro members
give up the opportunity to use domestic monetary policy tools to respond to country-specific
shocks.

The Single Supervisory Mechanism is monitoring the 117 most significant banks in the
eurozone. The purpose of the supervision is to maintain a secure banking system, guarantee
an equal monitoring and boost financial integration and stability. ECB is, among other things,
empowered to increase banks capital requirements, recall a banks licences and make
supervisory reviews (ECB, 2020e).

State Bank of Vietnam


SBV is working for a stable value of the currency and to provide a safe banking and credit
system. Hence, the banks operations play a big role in the financial markets. SBV are using
open market operations where they are buying and selling securities. SBV should decide
which type of securities that should trade through open market operations and decide on
interest rates and exchange rates. The SBV has a mission to hinder lending with high interest.
Moreover, the central bank uses refinancing, which they define as providing short-term loans
and payment facilities to credit institutions (SBV, 2020b). By these mechanism, the central
bank can definitely impact domestic financial markets.

The Banking Supervision Agency is an entity subordinated to SBV that is responsible for
banking supervision. The purpose is to support and provide the governor with advice
regarding credit institutions and banks. The reason is among others to avoid cases of
corruption, terrorist financing and money laundering (SBV, 2020d).

Central Bank of Brazil


The central bank has a key role in the financial system. The objective is to authorize and
monitor the financial market infrastructure, in order to protect the settlement and transaction
of securities and derivatives, including foreign trade. An important thing is to reduce the
systematic risk within the financial market. For example, when a threat to the system occurs
and action is needed, the central bank has the authority to suspend participants. This to ensure
a functioning and smooth financial system (BCB, 2020c). Given these facts, it is noticeable
that the central bank has a big role in the domestic financial market in order for it to be stable
and efficient.

Qatar Central Bank


The central bank’s impact on the domestic financial market might differ a lot depending on
how much they are willing to do, but in general it has a big influence on the market. With
different rates they adjust, they can tighten or expand its monetary policy, enhancing the
investments or the other way around. The central bank also has the mission to stabilize their
domestic currency against the US dollar at 3,64 Qatari Riyal per USD (QCB, 2020c), which
affects the whole country and its economy. The central bank also has intense supervision over
the financial market in order to achieve welfare, and to minimize injustice within the system
(QCB, 2020).

Bank of Ghana
Much of the monetary policies conducted at the Bank of Ghana is in relation to managing
their inflation rate. Therefore, the impact that the monetary policies can have on the domestic
financial market is depending on how the inflation rates are moving. If the inflation rates start
fluctuating from targeted rates the bank is going to use the interest rate to combat this. The
changes made to the interest rate then in its turn affects the borrowing and spending on the
market. The bank also has a responsibility to regulate, license, promote and supervise non-
banking financial institutions (Bank of Ghana, 2020b).

Independence

Federal Reserve System


Independence in this case is whether or not the central bank can make decisions without
influence from congress or other party affiliations. This is true for the federal reserve which is
under supervision by the congress but is run by an independent board of governors. There is
seven governors which are nominated by the president and voted for by the senate. These
governors all are appointed for a 14-year term and cannot be reappointed after those 14 years.
This 14-year term means they overlap different presidencies over their term, meaning they
might have been nominated by a president no longer in office (Federal reserve, 2020d).
Because of this we consider the fed to be very independent.

European Central Bank


The European Central Bank is considered the most independent central bank in the world
(Mishkin et al,. 2013, s. 290). For example, ECB decides over its own budget and the national
governments of the member states, other EU bodies or any other institutions are prohibited to
give guidance. ECB is also forbidden to approve loans to the public sector within the member
countries, to prevent the bank from being affected by national authorities. ECB are fully
empowered to decide over the monetary policy (ECB, 2020f). ECB is independent in theory,
but maybe not in practice. This is due to previous involvement in fiscal policy to save
European banks. ECB is responsible for the banking supervision in the euro area which
includes a larger risk for ECB’s reputation. This might be conflicting with monetary policy
and also generate a risk for political pressure (Issing, 2017, s. 94).

State Bank of Vietnam


It is clear that the SBV is not independent from politics. SBV is a ministerial body of the
Vietnamese Government (SVB, 2019a). The decision making is heavily influenced by
politics. This is obvious since the National Assembly sets the inflation targets, the president is
doing the negotiating regarding monetary policy on the international arena and the prime
minister together with the SBV governor decides on the monetary policy tools (SBV, 2019c).

Central Bank of Brazil


In February 2019, the senate appointed a new central bank president. He is the grandson to a
former Brazilian politician. This makes the matter regarding “independence” quite doubtful.
But, in April 2019, president Bolsonaro also proposed that the central bank autonomy should
indeed be more independent in order to make the monetary policy in the country more
contemporary (Reuters, 2019b). This is positive news in order to become more independent
from political intrusion. The statements and proposals can be questioned though. Brazil have
severe problems with corruption, and it is not unusual to find corrupt politicians. Fraud and
bribery are severe issues that the government has to deal with (Gain Integrity, 2017). We
would therefore like to argue that politicians have an impact on the central bank. With that
said, we imply that the central bank is lacking independency.

Qatar Central Bank


We would like to argue that the bank is dependent in many ways. For example, there is “The
Law of the Qatar Central Bank”, which regulates the framework that the central bank is
ordered to obey. This includes state monetary policy. It is also written in the law that the
central bank is to cooperate with government ministries and authorities within certain
boundaries, in order to achieve what is best for the country (QCB, 2020a).

The chairman of the board of directors is a board member in several different financial
authorities or institutions, some of them governmental (QCB, 2020e). His involvement hints
that the central bank has political connections, and that this could have an effect on the bank
and its monetary policy. One could also argue that their monetary policy regarding their
domestic currency that is fixed towards the US dollar also indicates that the government has
an interest in their operations.

Bank of Ghana
In the monetary framework they disclose that it is the government that sets the inflation
targets, not the central bank. In this case, the Bank of Ghana act as an instrument for the
government, supporting the government's economic objectives and following their target
inflation rates. In our opinion, this does not really feel that independent and as discussed
earlier, they have only been independent in setting interest rates since 2002, which tells us
that they were even less independent before. (BoG, 2020a).

Transparency

Federal Reserve System


Through their website you can find a lot of information about the central bank, everything
from economic data, the structure of the organisation to meeting details from board meetings.
They are also disclosing much information about their responsibilities as a bank and who the
board members are, and whose job is to fulfil these responsibilities. There is probably some
sensitive information that they do not disclose but most of the information that a public
person might be interested in is easily accessible through their website. The website itself is
also very modern and easy to navigate.

European Central Bank


According to ECB, the bank shows transparency by being open with all necessary
information about the strategies, decisions and assessments to the public. The information
should also be provided in a straightforward way and within a reasonable timeframe. ECB
achieves this by regular communication about its operation and strategies, by being open
about what the monetary policy are able to do and by announcing predictions about economic
development (ECB, 2020g).

State Bank of Vietnam


The SBV never mention their work on transparency on their website. Since they are not
openly providing this information, nor do they present much information on their website in
general, we can conclude that the SBV is lacking transparency. They do make some press
releases regularly and present some statistics on the home page. Even though one can read
about what tools are being used to reach their targets, one cannot find information about the
actual target regarding inflation for instance. In an article published in the Vietnamese
newspaper VnExpress, the writer reported on an economist at the World Bank who expressed
the need for more transparency from SVB regarding a case on Vietnam’s flexible exchange
rate (VnExpress, 2016). This reinforces the argument for poor transparency.

Central Bank of Brazil


The bank ensures that their financial statements are in accordance with the International
Financial Reporting Standards, and that they are submitted to an autonomous external audit.
They also imply that they release relevant information to the public in advance, in order to
diminish the risks of asymmetric information. In addition to this, they also have a database in
which they release information on a regular basis to the public (BCB, 2020d). With this in
mind, you might suggest that they are transparent to a certain level, but it is questionable to
say that they are fully transparent.

Qatar Central Bank


One of the stated objectives is to be transparent in their work, and to ensure transparency in
all of the financial institutions they monitor and oversee. But also, to ensure transparency in
the national economy in general (QCB, 2020a). Beyond this, it is quite hard to find
information regarding the transparency of the central bank. We would imply that the
transparency is inadequate though.

Bank of Ghana
We cannot find any mentioning of transparency as a goal or a function of the bank. They do
disclose a fair amount of economic data and other functions in which they are in charge of,
but much of this information is limited. For example, their monetary policy framework is
about their inflation targets and what their main objectives is, but all of this is information is
addressed in under one page. This gives us a feeling that there is a lot of information that is
not displayed on their website and therefore we do not really get a feeling of transparency.
Moral Hazard

Federal Reserve System


Following the financial crisis there was an injection of moral hazard into the financial system.
The financial crisis showed investors that the stock market was far too important for the
consumer psyche to let it fall. The investors also learned that there were companies that were
too big to fail and got bailed out during the crisis. This has led to the investors knowing that
“big brother” is going to bail them out in the case of something going horribly wrong. This
has changed investors views on risk and what creates value (CNBC, 2012).

European Central Bank


We think that ECB has injected moral hazard in the economy. As mentioned above, the main
purpose for ECB is to maintain price stability and the bank should be independent from fiscal
policy. However, ECB is also responsible for banking supervision. These two responsibilities
might be in conflict. This can make intermediaries more risk tolerant because of the security
of knowing that the central bank will protect the bank from failing to save its own reputation.
For instance, in May 2010, ECB bought government bonds from countries that were under
severe pressure during the eurozone crisis (Issing, 2017, s.95-96). ECB was also forced to
bailout Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain during the crisis (Gourinchas et al., 2017,
s.7). Another proof of that is that ECB temporary designated administrators to take over the
Italian Banca Carige (ECB, 2020h).

State Bank of Vietnam


SVB made its first bailout of the commercial bank VNBC in 2015 to retain political stability.
According to the Economist journal, this opened up for a greater risk that other banks feel at
ease knowing that the central bank will save them if things go bad. VNBC was also one of
the smallest Vietnamese commercial banks. This sent signals to larger banks that they could
be sure that SVB would save them too, in the event of a collapse (The Economist, 2015). As
mentioned above, SVB is not independent. Hence, the monetary and fiscal policy are
interrelated. We believe that this injects problems with moral hazard in the economy.

Central Bank of Brazil


Brazil’s central bank has injected moral hazard many times in the past. Banks of all types
relied on the central bank to bail them out in case of insolvency in the 80s and 90s, which the
central bank often did, and this injected more moral hazard into the economy (Sola et al., p.
5). The fact that some banks in Brazil might grown to be “too big to fail” is also a problem
since the central bank has a past of bailing out financial institutions. This might lead to banks
operating in a riskier way, in good faith of the central bank to bail them out in case of
bankruptcy. The central bank therefore needs to discourage such behaviour and indicate that
the financial institutions in the economy have full responsibility of their actions (Reuters,
2013).

Qatar Central Bank


There is nothing significant you can find about moral hazard in the country or injected by the
central bank. If something appears it is probably hushed down immediately. The country is
extremely wealthy, and almost everything can be bought with money, including people's
opinion.
Bank of Ghana
There is little to none information about any potential moral hazards caused by the Bank of
Ghana. Because of their lack of transparency, there might also be so that moral hazards that
occur gets silenced by the government to keep the public in the dark. From the information
that is available we do not find any signs that the central bank has injected any moral hazard
into the economy.

Communication

Federal Reserve System


Most of the Federal reserve's communication to the financial community goes through their
website. On their website you can find details from all of their board meetings and they
upload regular monetary reports as well. These monetary reports are a good way for the
federal reserve to communicate the current status of the market to the financial community.
In the monetary report they also talk about their current monetary policy. On the website you
can also find press releases containing news and other types of announcements from the bank
(Federal reserve, 2020e).

European Central Bank


ECB strives for a two-way communication with the public and private sector, experts from
the academia and the civil society. The reason why it is important is because ECB should be
an independent central bank. Hence, it is necessary for accountability. The two-way
communication helps getting an overall picture of the context in which ECB operates, gives
an understanding for the financial markets and banking system and contributes with
important opinions (ECB, 2020i).

ECB presents press conferences on their website every six week right after the Governing
Council decides on the monetary policy (ECB, 2020j). ECB President and members from the
Executive boards are also regularly arranging hearings with the European Parliament and
these meetings are live streamed (ECB, 2020k). The bank also provides ECB podcast where
they discuss the economy of the euro area with different experts (ECB, 2020l).

State Bank of Vietnam


The central bank of Vietnam is communicating with the financial community by publishing
their annual reports along with other statistics such as balances and liquidity (SVB, 2020e).
They also do weekly press releases, providing information about the banking operations
(SVB, 2020f). However, this is mostly a one-way communication. As far as we are
concerned, the bank does not seek interaction with, for example, the civil society or the
academia. This might be undermining the effectiveness of the communication.

Central Bank of Brazil


The former president of the Brazilian central bank Ilan Goldfajn has in an interview with
F&D in December 2019 talked about how the transparency at The Central Bank of Brazil has
improved significantly, for example by improving the way they communicate in a more
straightforward and simple way. In particular communication with the financial community
has improved since the central bank has improved the way they announce their monetary
policy decisions (IMF, 2019).
As mentioned in the transparency section, the central bank publishes financial reports and
statistics periodically in order to facilitate the work of others, the financial community in
particular (BCB, 2020d). Therefore, we can imply that they are trying on improving their
communication with the financial community.

Qatar Central Bank


The central bank is trying to be more transparent in their work, and they announce decisions
taken by the Monetary Policy Commission to all commercial banks in the country. To the
public, they publish it via their own homepage and through local media (QCB, 2020c).
Therefore, we would like to assert that their communication with the financial community is
efficient to an extent. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, they also supervise and monitor the
financial market widely which originates a need for close communication between the central
bank and the financial institutions in the country.

Bank of Ghana
The Bank of Ghana communicate to the financial community through their website and
uploads a wide variety of different reports. These reports are available within two weeks of a
meeting where the MPC announce their interest rate decision. They do not publish a
transcript of the actual meeting of the MPC but they do upload a transcript of the press
briefing to their website one week after the meeting (BoG, 2020a). This ties back to their
problem with transparency, not giving the public or the financial community full disclosure
of what is actually discussed during a meeting of the committee.

Summary - Similarities and differences

Financial Indicators
We can see a connection that the wealthier and more developed countries show much lower
rates of interest and inflation than the poor and developing countries. Qatar have deflation
while Ghana and Vietnam have high inflation. The unemployment in Brazil is very high. This
is also the country that is expected to cause the next financial crisis. Qatar are the only ones
that have their currency fixed (to the US dollar). Looking at the yield curves, all of them have
a positive trend, but the European is negative at the moment.

Main features and Domestic financial markets


One similarity we can find is that every central bank has an overall goal of working towards
stability in the financial market. Besides this similarity, the goals for the different central
banks do vary quite a bit with some working more towards the value of their currency while
others put more effort into maintaining inflation and interest targets. Through our analysis we
can also determine that all of the different central banks have somewhat of an impact on their
domestic financial markets. The level of impact do vary however, mostly depending on the
banks main targets and their instruments for managing these targets. All of the central banks
have a monetary policy committee, but the size, function and appointment process vary
dramatically between the countries.

Independence
We would imply that ECB and Federal reserve are the most independent central banks, with
ECB in the forefront. They have well-regulated frameworks which separates them from
influence of outstanding parties. But the chairman of Federal reserve is nominated and
confirmed by the president respectively the senate, which indicates some dependency.
The other central banks seem to be influenced by politicians and the government to a larger
extent, and many of the countries such as Brazil, Vietnam and Ghana are also affected by
high levels of corruption and bribery. Therefore, they seem to operate much more according
to the government's agenda. Vietnam and Qatar are heavily influenced by government
ministries in their operations.

Transparency
ECB and the Federal reserve are considered more transparent than the other central banks.
ECB, federal reserve and Brazil are mentioning on their websites how they work with
transparency. Qatar states that transparency is important, but never mention what they do to
achieve it. Vietnam and Ghana never mention anything about transparency. They do publish
some statistics and press releases, but the information is poor compared to the other central
banks. One is not able to read about targets on Vietnam’s website for instance.

Moral hazard
We can find a similarity for the origin of the moral hazard that the different central banks
have injected into the financial markets. All of the moral hazard has been created as an effect
of different bailouts, which has created new views on risk and values on financial markets.
For Bank of Ghana and QCB we could not uncover any moral hazard. The similarity we can
find here is that this is the two smallest countries out of those we have analysed.

Communication
ECB works for a two-way communication with the market and we therefore consider them
best at communication. Federal reserve and SVB do press releases regularly. All banks
publish annual reports, statistics and monetary reports to some extent. The quality differs
between the banks though. What all banks have in common is that they mainly use their
website as the channel for communication. ECB incorporates other channels as well, such as
podcast.
References

Federal Reserve System

K.Farr, M. (2019). Farr: The Fed is Creating Moral Hazard. CNBC, [Online] January 6.
Available via:
https://www.cnbc.com/id/45899402 [Retrieved 2020-02-08]

Zucchi, K. (2019). The Federal Reserve System Affects You More Than You Think.
Investopedia, [Online] June 25. Available via:
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/090514/federal-reserve-system-affects-you-
more-you-might-think.asp [Retrieved 2020-02-08]

Federal Reserve System (2020a). Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy
Strategy. Federal Reserve System.
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[Retrieved 2020-02-08]

Federal Reserve System (2020b). Federal Open Market Committee. Federal Reserve system.
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Federal Reserve System (2020c). About the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve
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https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases.htm [Retrieved 2020-02-08]

The European Central Bank

ECB (2020a). Introduction. European Central Bank.


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/html/index.en.html. [Retrieved 2020-02-06]

ECB (2020b). Governing Council. European Central Bank.


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06]

ECB (2020c). Macroeconomic projections.. European Central Bank.


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/index.en.html. [Retrieved 2020-02-06]

ECB (2020d). About. European Central Bank.


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/intro/html/index.en.html. [Retrieved 2020-02-06]

ECB (2020e). Single Supervisory Mechanism. European Central Bank.


https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/thessm/html/index.en.html.
[Retrieved 2020-02-07]

ECB (2020f). Independence. European Central Bank.


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html. [Retrieved 2020-02-
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ECB (2020g). Transparency. European Central Bank.


https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/transparency/html/index.en.html [Retrieved 2020-02-07]

ECB (2020h). ECB appoints temporary administrators for Banca Carige. European Central
Bank.
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2019/html/ssm.pr190102.en.html.
[Retrieved 2020-02-07]

ECB (2020i). Guiding principles for external communication for high-level officials of the
European Central Bank. European Central Bank.
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