Republic vs.

Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

Facts:
On November 24, 1986 Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson were married at the Pasay City Hall. In lieu of a
marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5 years. On
August 1990, Jose Dayot contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (co-employee). They were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On
the other hand, on July 1993, Jose filed a complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage in RTC Binan Laguna where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his
consent was secured through fraud.

Issue: W/N the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license

Held:

Yes. The CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five(5)months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986.
Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. According to the SC cannot
accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa
was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the
explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore,
“the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio.
The supreme court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time. Hence, the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is affirmed, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any.

Iwasawa vs. Gangan,

G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

Facts:

Yasuo Iwasawa met Felisa Custodio Gangan sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines.
introduced herself as “single” and “has never married before.” Yasuo and Felisa got married on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in Japan. In July 2009, Felisa
confessed to Yasuo that she received news that her previous husband passed away. Yasuo sought to
confirm the truth of his wife’s confession and found out, that she was married to one Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994. This prompted Yasuo to file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage to Felisa as null and void on the ground that their marriage is
a bigamous one, based on Article 35 (4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, Yasuo presented the following pieces of documentary evidence
issued by the NSO: Cert of Marriage between Yasuo and Felisa on November 28, 2002; Cert of Marriage
between Felisa and Arambulo on June 20, 1994; Cert of Death of Arambulo on July 14, 2009; and Cert
from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded. The prosecutor admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial. The RTC ruled that
there was insufficient evidence to prove Felisa’s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that
while Iwasawa offered the certificate of marriage of Felisa to Arambulo, it was only Yasuo who testified
about said marriage. The RTC ruled that Yasuo’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal
knowledge of Felisa’s prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to
the marriage certificate between Felisa and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled
that Iwasawa’s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the
preparation of said document. Iwasawa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence this
petition.
Issue:

W/N second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo is bigamous

Held:

Yes. The Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void
from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what
transpired in the instant case. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of Yasuo to Felisa on the ground that their
marriage is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that Felisa married Arambulo
on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that Felisa contracted a second marriage this time with Yasuo
on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
of Felisa with Arambulo at the time she married Yasuo Iwasawa; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009
and that it was only on said date that Felisa’s marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been
dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of Felisa to Yasuo Iwasawa is bigamous, under art 34, hence,
declared null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage
was contracted. Petition is granted.

Tani-Dela Fuente vs. Dela Fuente Jr.

G.R. NO. 188400 March 08, 2017

Facts:

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City. They
had two children. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an
introvert and was prone to jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His
jealousy, a gun-poking, and a sexual pervert became so severe. Sometime in 1986, Rodolfo suspected
that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria
Teresa's head. This time, She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and supported their children
by herself. On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical
psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo Lopez was presented as an expert witness. Rodolfo did not file any responsive
pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the OSG to
submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence, however, failed to comply with the trial
court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from
the OSG. The trial court granted the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. On August 20, 2002,
the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration. However the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate
court reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence the petition.

Issue:

W/N the CA erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on ground of
psychological incapacity of Rodolfo.

Held:

Yes. the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Contrary to
the ruling of the CA, the Supreme Court found that there was sufficient compliance with Molina
guidelines to warrant the nullity of Maria's marriage with Rodolfo. She was able to discharge the burden
of proof that her husband suffered from psychological incapacity. The CA is mistaken when it chided the
lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally
conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and psychological condition. In Camacho-
Reyes vs. Reyes, states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its
very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
In this case, parties may have lived together, but the facts narrated by Maria show that Rodolfo failed
to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that
petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage. The incurability and severity of
respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person
with paranoid personality disorder would Rodolfo's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of
physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and
partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain
married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent
simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent
truly could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this
Court to believe that respondent's mental illness is incurable. The petition is granted.

Remo vs. Secretary of Foreign Affairs,

G.R. No. 169202, March 05, 2010

Facts: 

Maria Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R. Rallonza. In her passport, the following entries appear:
“Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. Prior
to the expiry of the validity of her passport, Maria Virginia, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the
renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. However,
Maria’s request was denied. On appeal, she argued, that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996)
conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to
continue using her maiden name upon marriage. Hence, this petition.

Issue: 

W/N Maria Virginia can changed her surname “Rallonza” to her middle name “Remo” in
her replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage?

Held:

No. A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman
marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this
principle. RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman
from using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the DFA allows a
married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant
is not required to adopt her husband’s surname. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman
may either adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt
her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden
name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name. 
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage
to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage. Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of RA
8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance  must prevail over the provisions
of title xiii of the civil code which is the general law on the use of surnames.  A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. Petition is denied.