Property Case

Coverage po natin ay hanggang co-ownership see u on the 26th at 5:30pm
Padi kindly inform our property class that the ff: cases will be included in our exams on october 26:
1) Associated insurance co. vs. Isabel Iya, 103 Phil. Reports 972 - A building certainly cannot be
divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to
another.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1958maydecisions.php?id=211
2) Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil Reports 709 - Machinery becomes immobilized only when
placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant or any
person having only a temporary right.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1935/aug1935/gr_l-40411_1935.html
3) Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil Reports, 335 - One cannot obtain a title over the accretion on
the south by the sea because it is a property of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of
men.
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1960maydecisions.php?id=321
4) Grande vs. Court of Appeals, 115 Phil Reports 521 - the accretion does not automatically become
registered land just because the land which received it is covered by a Torrens title.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/jun1962/gr_l-17652_1962.html
5) Pardell vs Bartolome, 23 Phil Reports 450 - a co-owner should use the co-owned property only: a) in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended; b) in such a way as not to injure the interest of
the co-ownership, and c) in such a way as not to prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1912novemberdecisions.php?id=206
6)Taningco vs. Register of Deeds, 5 SCRA 381 - the surviving spouse as co-owner of the community
property, may alienate or sell her inchoate share, subject to the limitation that the alienation or sale,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to what will eventually be allotted to her during the
partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/jun1962/gr_l-15242_1962.html
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15242 June 29, 1962
ROSAURO M. TANINGCO and SIMPLICIA RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA, respondent.
Juan A. Baes for petitioners.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
On August 10, 1958 the spouses Rosauro M. Taningco and Simplicia Ramos took a mortgage, for a
loan of P9,000 extended by them to Nieves Mediarito, on all the "rights, interests, and participation"
of the latter in six parcels of land registered in the land records of Laguna as conjugal properties of
herself and her husband Salvador Roxas, then already deceased. The properties were under judicial
administration in the corresponding intestate proceeding and had not yet been liquidated and
partitioned between the widow and the heirs. The deed of mortgage was duly signed by the
mortgagor and otherwise appears to have been executed with the requisite formalities. When
presented to the Register of Deeds for Laguna, however, it was denied registration on two grounds,
of which only the first is now in issue, namely, that "mortgagor Nieves Mediarito, the surviving
spouse of Salvador Roxas, alienated her one-half (½) conjugal share without previous liquidation of
the conjugal properties." The matter was elevated en consulta by the mortgagees to the Land
Registration Commissioner, who sustained the action taken by the Register of Deeds by resolution
dated November 22, 1958. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, and petitioners
have come to this Court on appeal from both the resolution and the order of denial.
The Land Registration Commissioner does not question the legality or validity of the mortgage, but
excepts to its registrability because the mortgagor "does not appear yet to be the registered owner of
the property being mortgaged." The suggestion is that there must first be a settlement and
distribution of the conjugal estate because before then the interest of the wife therein is merely
inchoate. The premise of the reasoning is inaccurate. The interest of the wife is registered, the titles
to the lands being in the names of the spouses. After the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, as
by death of the husband, this interest ceases to be inchoate and becomes actual and vested with
respect to an undivided one-half share of the said properties. It is one thing to say that the widow's
share, being undivided, does not consist of determinate and segregated properties and an entirely
different thing to consider her interest as still inchoate. The partnership having been dissolved, if the
deceased husband leave heirs other than the wife, as in this case, the properties come under the
regime of co-ownership among them until final liquidation and partition. In the language of Chief
Justice Arellano in Marisga vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107, 110: "The community property of the
marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the
legal partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or
the widow if he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse." Article 484, Civil Code. And as provided
in article 493 of the same Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, although
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. The
application of this article, which was taken from article 399 of the old Civil Code, has been elucidated
in the case of Maria Lopez vs. Magdalena Gonsaga Vda. de Cuaycong, et al., 74 Phil. 601. Citing
Manresa, Volume 3, pp. 486-487, 3rd ed., this Court said:
"Each co-owner owns the whole, and over it he exercises rights of dominion, but at the same
time he is the owner of a share which is really abstract, because until the division is effected,
such share is not concretely determined. The rights of the co-owners are, therefore, as
absolute as dominion requires, because they may enjoy and dispose of the common
property, without any limitation other than that they should not, in the exercise of their right,
prejudice the general interest of the community, and possess, in addition, the full ownership
of their share, which they may alienate, convey or mortgage; which share, we repeat, will not
be certain until the community ceases. The right of ownership, therefore, as defined in Art.
348 of the present Civil Code, with its absolute features and its individualized character, is
exercised in co-ownership, with no other differences between sole and common ownership
than that which is rightly established by the Portuguese Code (Arts. 2175 and 2176), when it
says "that the sole owner exercises his rights exclusively, and the co-owner exercises them
jointly with the other co-owners"; but we shall add, to each co-owner pertains individually,
over his undivided share, all the rights of the owner, aside from the use and enjoyment of the
thing, which is common to all the co-owners." (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar the mortgage sought to be registered by appellants does not refer to any specific
portions of the six parcels of land described in the mortgage instrument but to the mortgagor-wife's
rights, interest and participation therein — whatever they may actually turn out to be upon liquidation
and partition. If such mortgage is legal and valid, as the law says it is, there can be no justifiable
reason why it should not be registered, registration being an essential requirement in order that the
mortgage may be validly constituted. Article 2125, Civil Code. The registration will in no way affect
the rights of the deceased husband's creditors, if any, or of his heirs, for their interest is limited to the
husband's half of the estate not covered by the mortgage. As far as the debt if any, of the conjugal
partnership are concerned, their payment is provided for by law before the one-half share of the
wife-mortgagor is finally determined, and therefore would not be affected by the mortgage. Articles
182 and 185.
A roughly analogous case is Gotauco & Co. vs. Register of Deeds of Tayabas, 59 Phil. 756, where a
levy of execution was sought to be inscribed in the registry against the share of a judgment debtor in
several tracts of land registered in the name of a deceased of whom he was one of the heirs. The
inscription was denied by the register of deeds; the question was elevated en consulta to the Fourth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and then appealed therefrom to the Supreme Court.
In ordering the acceptance of the levy of execution for inscription in the Registry, this court said that
"although the value of the participation of the (judgment debtor) in the state of the (decedent) was
indeterminable before the final liquidation of the estate, nevertheless, the right of participation in the
estate and the lands thereof may be attached and sold, the real test being, as laid down in Reyes vs.
Grey, 21 Phil. 73, 76, whether or not the judgment debtor holds such a beneficial interest in the
property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of for value.
WHEREFORE, the resolution and the order appealed from are set aside and respondent-appellee
Register of Deeds of Laguna is ordered to register the document in question upon compliance with
the legal requisites concerning the payment of taxes and registration fees. No pronouncement as to
costs.1äwphï1.ñët
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and
Regala, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant and appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and

LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors and appellees.
David S. Ignacio for Appellant.
Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V.

Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.
Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.
SYLLABUS
1. PROPERTY; LAND FORMED BY ACTION OF THE SEA. — Land formed by the action of
the sea is property of the state; Francisco v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505,
involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides of the Manila Bay.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED FOR PUBLIC USE; DECLARATION NECESSARY.
— Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive
department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer needed for coast
guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the
public domain; not available for private appropriation or ownership.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land
(mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square
meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the
parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the application, the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew
his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the
public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor- in-interest
possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn,
Valeriano alleged that he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the
Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant
which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It
has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which borders it on the
southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting
it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and
public for a period of twenty years until said possession was disturbed by oppositor
Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore
land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public
domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed
part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the following errors: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the
land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public
domain.
"II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court
nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be the property of the applicant-
appellant, the said land not being necessary for any public use or purpose and in not
ordering at the same time its registration in the name of applicant-appellant in the
present registration proceedings.
"III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the
applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription, the said land having ceased to
be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.
"IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in
estoppel from claiming the land in question as a land of the public domain." cralaw virtua1aw library
Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been
formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the
New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." cralaw virtua1aw library
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the
banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay.
Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable
because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be
considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea,
being a mere indentation of the same: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the
entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or
curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake." 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco,
Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)
Moreover, this Tribunal has in some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands
bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. v. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a
parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land
formed by the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco v. Government of
P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb
and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the
public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared
the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became
disposable and available for private ownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866
reads thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by
the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof." cralaw virtua1aw library
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad v. Director
of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no
longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the
government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent
thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration
that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service. If no such
declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the
public domain." (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente
Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited in Velayo’s Digest, Vol. I,
p. 52).
". . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a
position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified
in Article 4 of the Law of Waters."cralaw virtua1aw library
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no
longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they
continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive
prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say
that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of
Insular Government v. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505, this Court said: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion,
without previous permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may
have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land,
is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of
commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the
benefit of those who live nearby." cralaw virtua1aw library
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, and

Gutiérrez David, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-10837-38. May 30, 1958.]
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. ISABEL IYA,

ADRIANO VALINO and LUCIA VALINO, Defendants.
ISABEL IYA, Plaintiff, v. ADRIANO VALINO, LUCIA VALINO and ASSOCIATED

INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY. INC., Defendants.
Jovita L. de Dios for defendant Isabel Iya.
M. Perez Cardenas and Apolonio Abola for defendant Associated Insurance & Surety Co.,
Inc.
SYLLABUS
1. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; BUILDINGS; IMMOVABLE STATUS OF BUILDING

UNAFFECTED BY CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP OF LAND. — A building is an immovable
property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner (Lopez v. Orosa, supra, p. 98). It cannot be divested of its character of
a realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. If the status of the
building were to depend on the ownership of the land, a situation would be created where a
permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands.
2. CHATTEL MORTGAGE; SUBJECT OF; EFFECT WHERE THE INTEREST CONVEYED

IS IMMOVABLE. — As personal properties could only be the subject of a chattel mortgage, the
execution of a chattel mortgage on a building is invalid and a nullity, the registration of the
chattel notwithstanding. The registration of the chattel in the Chattel Mortgage Registry
produced no effect whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in
the nature of a real property, the registration of the document in the registry of chattels is merely
a futile act. Thus the registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials
produce no effect as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37
Phil. 644).
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT ACQUIRED BY PURCHASER AT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL

FORECLOSURE SALE. — A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra-
judicial foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which
mortgage has been declared null and void with respect to said real properties, acquires no right
thereto by virtue of said sale (De la Riva v. Ah Kee, 60 Phil. 899).
DECISION
FELIX, J.:
Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino, husband and wife, were the owners and possessors
of a house of strong materials constructed on Lot No. 3, Block No. 80 of the Grace Park
Subdivision in Caloocan, Rizal, which they purchased on installment basis from the
Philippine Realty Corporation. On November 6, 1951, to enable her to purchase on
credit rice from the NARIC, Lucia A. Valino filed a bond in the sum of P11,000.00
(AISCO Bond No. 971) subscribed by the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., and
as counter-guaranty therefor, the spouses Valino executed an alleged chattel mortgage
on the aforementioned house in favor of the surety company, which encumbrance was
duly registered with the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal on December 6, 1951. It is
admitted that at the time said undertaking took place, the parcel of land on which the
house is erected was still registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation.
Having completed payment on the purchase price of the lot, the Valinos were able to
secure on October 18, 1958, a certificate of title in their name (T.C.T. No. 27884).
Subsequently, however, or on October 24, 1952, the Valinos, to secure payment of an
indebtedness in the amount of P12,000.00, executed a real estate mortgage over the
lot and the house in favor of Isabel Iya, which was duly registered and annotated at the
back of the certificate of title.
On the other hand, as Lucia A. Valino, failed to satisfy her obligation to the NARIC, the
surety company was compelled to pay the same pursuant to the undertaking of the
bond. In turn, the surety company demanded reimbursement from the spouses Valino,
and as the latter likewise failed to do so, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage
over the house. As a result thereof, a public sale was conducted by the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal on December 26, 1952, wherein the property was awarded to the surety
company for P8,000.00, the highest bid received therefor. The surety company then
caused the said house to be declared in its name for tax purposes (Tax Declaration No.
25128).
Sometime in July, 1953, the surety company learned of the existence of the real estate
mortgage over the lot covered by T.C.T. No. 26884 together with the improvements
thereon; thus, said surety company instituted Civil Case No. 2162 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila naming Adriano and Lucia Valino and Isabel Iya, the mortgagee, as
defendants. The complaint prayed for the exclusion of the residential house from the
real estate mortgage in favor of defendant Iya and the declaration and recognition of
plaintiff’s right to ownership over the same in virtue of the award given by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal during the public auction held on December 26, 1952. Plaintiff
likewise asked the Court to sentence the spouses Valino to pay said surety moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Defendant Isabel Iya filed her answer to
the complaint alleging among other things, that in virtue of the real estate mortgage
executed by her co-defendants, she acquired a real right over the lot and the house
constructed thereon; that the auction sale allegedly conducted by the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on the house was null and
void for non-compliance with the form required by law. She, therefore, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and annulment of the sale made by the Provincial Sheriff.
She also demanded the amount of P5,000.00 from plaintiff as counterclaim, the sum of
P5,000.00 from her co-defendants as crossclaim, for attorney’s fees and costs.
Defendants spouses in their answer admitted some of the averments of the complaint
and denied the others. They, however, prayed for the dismissal of the action for lack of
cause of action, it being alleged that plaintiff was already the owner of the house in
question, and as said defendants admitted this fact, the claim of the former was already
satisfied.
On October 29,1953, Isabel Iya filed another civil action against the Valinos and the
surety company (Civil Case No. 2504 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) stating
that pursuant to the contract of mortgage executed by the spouses Valino on October
24, 1952, the latter undertook to pay a loan of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per
annum or P120.00 a month, which indebtedness was payable in 4 years, extendible for
only one year; that to secure payment thereof, said defendants mortgaged the house
and lot covered by T.C.T. No. 27884 located at No. 67 Baltazar St., Grace Park
Subdivision, Caloocan, Rizal; that the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., was
included as a party defendant because it claimed to have an interest on the residential
house also covered by said mortgage; that it was stipulated in the aforesaid real estate
mortgage that default in the payment of the interest agreed upon would entitle the
mortgagee to foreclose the same even before the lapse of the 4-year period; and as
defendant spouses had allegedly failed to pay the interest for more than 6 months,
plaintiff prayed the Court to order said defendants to pay the sum of P12,000.00 with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from March 25, 1953, until fully paid; for an
additional sum equivalent to 20% of the total obligation as damages, and for costs. As
an alternative in case such demand may not be met and satisfied plaintiff prayed for a
decree of foreclosure of the land, building and other improvements thereon to be sold
at public auction and the proceeds thereof, applied to satisfy the demands of plaintiff;
that the Valinos, the surety company and any other person claiming interest on the
mortgaged properties be barred and foreclosed of all rights, claims or equity of
redemption in said properties; and for deficiency judgment in case the proceeds of the
sale of the mortgaged property would be insufficient to satisfy the claim of plaintiff.
Defendant surety company, in answer to this complaint insisted on its right over the
building, arguing that as the lot on which the house was constructed did not belong to
the spouses at the time the chattel mortgage was executed, the house might be
considered only as a personal property and that the encumbrance thereof and the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings made pursuant to the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law were proper and legal. Defendant therefore prayed that said building be
excluded from the real estate mortgage and its right over the same be declared
superior to that of plaintiff, for damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Taking side with the surety company, defendant spouses admitted the due execution of
the mortgage upon the land but assailed the allegation that the building was included
thereon, it being contended that it was already encumbered in favor of the surety
company before the real estate mortgage was executed, a fact made known to plaintiff
during the preparation of said contract and to which the latter offered no objection. As
a special defense, it was asserted that the action was premature because the contract
was for a period of 4 years, which had not yet elapsed.
The two cases were jointly heard upon agreement of the parties, who submitted the
same on a stipulation of facts, after which the Court rendered judgment dated March 8,
1956, holding that the chattel mortgage in favor of the Associated Insurance & Surety
Co., Inc., was preferred and superior over the real estate mortgage subsequently
executed in favor of Isabel Iya. It was ruled that as the Valinos were not yet the
registered owner of the land on which the building in question was constructed at the
time the first encumbrance was made, the building then was still a personalty and a
chattel mortgage over the same was proper. However, as the mortgagors were already
the owners of the lot at the time the contract with Isabel Iya was entered into, the
building was transformed into a real property and the real estate mortgage created
thereon was likewise adjudged as proper. It is to be noted in this connection that there
is no evidence on record to sustain the allegation of the spouses Valino that at the time
they mortgaged their house and lot to Isabel Iya, the latter was told or knew that part
of the mortgaged property, i.e., the house, had previously been mortgaged to the
surety company.
The residential building was, therefore, ordered excluded from the foreclosure prayed
for by Isabel Iya, although the latter could exercise the right of a junior encumbrancer.
So the spouses Valino were ordered to pay the amount demanded by said mortgagee or
in their default to have the parcel of land subject of the mortgage sold at public auction
for the satisfaction of Iya’s claim.
There is no question as to appellant’s right over the land covered by the real estate
mortgage; however, as the building constructed thereon has been the subject of 2
mortgages; controversy arise as to which of these encumbrances should receive
preference over the other. The decisive factor in resolving the issue presented by this
appeal is the determination of the nature of the structure litigated upon, for where it be
considered a personalty, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage and the subsequent
sale thereof at public auction, made in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law would
be valid and the right acquired by the surety company therefrom would certainly
deserve prior recognition; otherwise, appellant’s claim for preference must be granted.
The lower Court, deciding in favor of the surety company, based its ruling on the
premise that as the mortgagors were not the owners of the land on which the building
is erected at the time the first encumbrance was made, said structure partook of the
nature of a personal property and could properly be the subject of a chattel mortgage.
We find reason to hold otherwise, for as this Court, defining the nature or character of a
building, has said:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and
distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Art.
415, new Civil Code) could only mean one thing — that a building is by itself an
immovable property . . . Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision
to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner." (Lopez v.
Orosa, G. R. Nos. supra, p. 98).
A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the
land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To hold it the other way, the
possibility is not remote that it would result in confusion, for to cloak the building with
an uncertain status made dependent on the ownership of the land, would create a
situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of
the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties could only be the
subject of a chattel mortgage (Section 1, Act 3952) and as obviously the structure in
question is not one, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is
clearly invalid and a nullity. While it is true that said document was correspondingly
registered in the Chattel Mortgage Register of Rizal, this act produced no effect
whatsoever for where the interest conveyed is in the nature of a real property, the
registration of the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act. Thus, the
registration of the chattel mortgage of a building of strong materials produce no effect
as far as the building is concerned (Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644).
Nor can we give any consideration to the contention of the surety that it has acquired
ownership over the property in question by reason of the sale conducted by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, for as this Court has aptly pronounced:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale
thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has
been declared null and void with respect to said real properties, acquires no right
thereto by virtue of said sale" (De la Riva v. Ah Keo, 60 Phil., 899).
Wherefore, the portion of the decision of the lower Court in these two cases appealed
from holding the rights of the surety company over the building superior to that of
Isabel Iya and excluding the building from the foreclosure prayed for by the latter is
reversed and appellant Isabel Iya’s right to foreclose not only the land but also the
building erected thereon is hereby recognized, and the proceeds of the sale thereof at
public auction (if the land has not yet been sold), shall be applied to the unsatisfied
judgment in favor of Isabel Iya. This decision however is without prejudice to any right
that the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., may have against the spouses
Adriano and Lucia Valino on account of the mortgage of said building they executed in
favor of said surety company. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,

Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
Arsenio Suazo and Jose L. Palma Gil and Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for appellant.
J.W. Ferrier for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue in this case, as announced in the opening sentence of the decision in the trial court and as
set forth by counsel for the parties on appeal, involves the determination of the nature of the
properties described in the complaint. The trial judge found that those properties were personal in
nature, and as a consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiff.
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the
Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of
Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to
another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery
used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning
machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease
between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the following provision:
That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings
introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership
of the party of the first part without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said
improvements and buildings; also, in the event the party of the second part should leave or
abandon the land leased before the time herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings
shall likewise pass to the ownership of the party of the first part as though the time agreed
upon had expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not
included in the improvements which will pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or
abandonment of the land leased.
In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw,
Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action
against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in
question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such
properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein.
Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the defendant herein having
consummated the sale, proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties
described in the corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao.
As connecting up with the facts, it should further be explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has
on a number of occasions treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel
mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the
original mortgages.
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the Code, real property
consists of —
1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any

building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and
which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.
Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last mentioned paragraph. We entertain
no doubt that the trial judge and appellees are right in their appreciation of the legal doctrines flowing
from the facts.
In the first place, it must again be pointed out that the appellant should have registered its protest
before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while not
conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention
and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. In this connection the
decision of this court in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo ( [1923], 44 Phil.,
630), whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such a situation.
It is, however not necessary to spend overly must time in the resolution of this appeal on side issues.
It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner of any building or
land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the
land by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the lease.
A similar question arose in Puerto Rico, and on appeal being taken to the United States Supreme
Court, it was held that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when
placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner. In the opinion written by Chief Justice White, whose knowledge of the Civil Law is well
known, it was in part said:
To determine this question involves fixing the nature and character of the property from the
point of view of the rights of Valdes and its nature and character from the point of view of
Nevers & Callaghan as a judgment creditor of the Altagracia Company and the rights derived
by them from the execution levied on the machinery placed by the corporation in the plant.
Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real) property, not
only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to property of a
movable nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is applied.
"Things," says section 334 of the Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own
nature or by their destination or the object to which they are applicable." Numerous
illustrations are given in the fifth subdivision of section 335, which is as follows: "Machinery,
vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the industrial
or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works." (See also Code Nap., articles 516, 518 et seq.
to and inclusive of article 534, recapitulating the things which, though in themselves
movable, may be immobilized.) So far as the subject-matter with which we are dealing —
machinery placed in the plant — it is plain, both under the provisions of the Porto Rican Law
and of the Code Napoleon, that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such result would
not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a
usufructuary or any person having only a temporary right. (Demolombe, Tit. 9, No. 203;
Aubry et Rau, Tit. 2, p. 12, Section 164; Laurent, Tit. 5, No. 447; and decisions quoted in
Fuzier-Herman ed. Code Napoleon under articles 522 et seq.) The distinction rests, as
pointed out by Demolombe, upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the
possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable
property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization
to become the property of another. It follows that abstractly speaking the machinery put by
the Altagracia Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did not lose its character of
movable property and become immovable by destination. But in the concrete immobilization
took place because of the express provisions of the lease under which the Altagracia held,
since the lease in substance required the putting in of improved machinery, deprived the
tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost such machinery, and it was
expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of the plant belonging
to the owner without compensation to the lessee. Under such conditions the tenant in putting
in the machinery was acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the obligations
resting upon him, and the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal
effect from the act of the owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the
machinery.
xxx xxx xxx
The machinery levied upon by Nevers & Callaghan, that is, that which was placed in the
plant by the Altagracia Company, being, as regards Nevers & Callaghan, movable property,
it follows that they had the right to levy on it under the execution upon the judgment in their
favor, and the exercise of that right did not in a legal sense conflict with the claim of Valdes,
since as to him the property was a part of the realty which, as the result of his obligations
under the lease, he could not, for the purpose of collecting his debt, proceed separately
against. (Valdes vs. Central Altagracia [192], 225 U.S., 58.)
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, the costs of
this instance to be paid by the appellant.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo
and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property
is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof
had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964
square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion,
alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-
interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when
respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages
corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their
answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year
1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and
costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual
deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We
are inclined to believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in
1931, because the surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed
by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact
that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman,
defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered land of the
plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion
since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but
could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more
or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered
upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257
(Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under
this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for
taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by
mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of
land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question
being an accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to
the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that
the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment,
because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the owner of the
riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the
law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have
been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by
prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that
the action was commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the
land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel
of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered property, within the
meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14,
1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which
started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties.
By law, therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the
riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of
the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership
through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is
registered, the accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of
the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period
required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong
to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to
the protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act.
Such protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To
hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the
technical description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the
identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a
negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream
(Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him
to all the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion
is concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the
Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition
area by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case
of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the
length of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that
he occupied the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the
plaintiffs. The area under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he
declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in
1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was
changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was
Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his
own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful
possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he
said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence
than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first
stated that the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the
latter's attention to the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that
they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only
then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan;
and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his
co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title.
This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession
to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square meters. 1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933
to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is
they and not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the
additional circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The
excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the
certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor
Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the
land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been
illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence,
that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion
started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of
the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of the
defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property
in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the
land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land
just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered
land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso
facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner,
making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be
placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been
provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial
property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered
property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by
registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription?
This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration
of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-
appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old
Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4656. November 18, 1912. ]
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE

PARDELL, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, Defendants-Appellants.
Gaspar de Bartolome in his own behalf.
B. Gimenez Zoboli for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. ESTATES; REALTY; RIGHTS OF COOWNERS OR TENANTS IN COMMON. — Each

coowner or tenant in common of undivided realty has the same rights therein as the
others; he may use and enjoy the same without other limitation except that he must
not prejudice the rights of his coowners, but until a division is effected, the respective
parts belonging to each can not be determined; each coowner exercises joint dominion
and is entitled to joint use.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; RENT BY ONE COOWNER. — For the use and enjoyment of a particular
portion of the lower part of a house, not used as living quarters, a coowner must, in
strict justice, pay rent, in like manner as other people pay for similar space in the
house; he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space which, if rented to
a third party, would produce income.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPAIRS AND IMPROVEMENT; INTEREST. — Until a cause instituted to
determine the liability of the rest of the coowners for repairs and improvements made
by one of their number is finally decided and the amount due is fixed, the persons
alleged to be liable can not be considered in default as to interest, because interest is
only due from the date of the decision fixing the principal liability. (Supreme court of
Spain, April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, November 22, 1901, in connection with
arts. 1108-1110 of the Civil Code.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATOR; COMPENSATION. — To an

administrator or voluntary manager of property belonging to his wife and another, both
coowners, the property being undivided, the law does not conceded any remuneration,
without prejudice to his right to be reimbursed for any necessary and useful
expenditures in connection with the property and for any damages he may have
suffered thereby.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DEMAND VALUATION BEFORE DIVISION OR SALE. — Any
one of the coowners of undivided property about to be divided or to be sold in
consequence of a mutual petition, has the right to ask that the property be valued by
experts, a valuation which would not be prejudicial but rather beneficial to all.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby
the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and
the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo Pardell y Cruz and Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the
first of whom absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in
his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, and the defendant,
Matilde Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and
Calixta Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively; that
Calixta Felin, prior to her death, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in
Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and
Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of
the persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after
her death, leaving no heirs of the said testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the
defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from some personal property and jewelry already
divided among the heirs, the testatrix possessed, at the time of the execution of her
will, and left at her death the real properties which, with their respective cash values,
are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built,
situated on Escalante Street, Vigan, and valued at P6,000.00
2. A house of mixed material, with the
lot on which it
stands, at No. 88 Washington Street, Vigan valued at 1,500.00
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan;
valued at 100.00
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in
the barrio of San Julian,
Vigan;
valued at 60.00
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo
of Santa Lucia; 86.00
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo
of Candon; valued at 150.00
Total 7,896.00
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs’ interest; that,
notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde
Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicenta and to deliver to
the latter the one-half of the same which rightly belonged to her, or the value thereof,
together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said defendant
and her husband, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of
the properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said
properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on
account of the extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their
value in cash, as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of
P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome,
to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to
appraisal, of the undivided property specified, which one-half amounted approximately
to P3,498, or, if deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested
with the full and absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the
properties in question, as universal testamentary heir thereof together with the
defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and
damages, and to pay the costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4,
6, 7 and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sisters’ brother
Manuel, their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the
defendants had never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz her share of the said
properties; and stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be
understood, however, that the surname of the defendant’s mother was Felin, and not
Felix, and that Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted
paragraph 3 of the complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin,
and likewise paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and
the jewelry, since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the
possession of the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a
chain in the form of a bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a
postage stamp on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials M.O., a pair of cuff
buttons made of gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the
initials M.O., and a gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the
plaintiffs, in conformity with petition, one-half of the total value in cash, according to
appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half
amounted to P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendant had never refused to divide
the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the
same; that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on
Calle Escolta the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from
other sources, which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891,
and from the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which
proceeds, added together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission;
that, between the years abovementioned, 765.38 pesos were spent on the house
situated on Calle Escolta, and on that on Calle Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which
made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of
reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which had been destroyed by
an earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on
the part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made
up to August 1,1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15,
and the expenses to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.18,
which, divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the
latter’s share P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year
1891 the defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlement of
accounts, and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the
sum of P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from
various sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the
undivided property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former the legal
remuneration of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the
defendants were willing to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said
properties, deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs,
and asked that the judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from
the latter that amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants, in their counterclaim, reported each and all of the allegations contained
in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged
to pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law;
that, as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than
P3,654.15, and the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the
plaintiffs owed the defendants P1,299.08, that is, one-half of the difference between
the amount collected from and that expended on the properties, and asked that
judgment be therefore rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from
the plaintiffs, Ricardo Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from
December 7, 1904, the date when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums
to which the defendant Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided
properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission
to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective
appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrased "in cash in accordance with the
assessed value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by
substituting the following words in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By
reason of all the foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render judgment by
sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome,
to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total value of the
undivided properties described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the
expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the
plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these
two appointees such value shall be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by
the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof,
it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a
full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is
prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages,
and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said defendants
were allowed a period of three days within which to present a new answer. An
exception was taken to this ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the
partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due
consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed
between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at
the valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question,
there being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order
of December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation
determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on
which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the
inclosed land, and the seed lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and
that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot
on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon.
After this partition had been made, counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8,
1908, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in
question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desisted
from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to
the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310,
and those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party
had to deliver to the other, as they were pro indiviso properties; that, therefore, the
defendants had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount
which the plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of
the properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the
counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property
should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the
former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver
to the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the
sum of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties allotted to the
defendants; such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of
the said counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of the pro indiviso
status of the property.
The case having been heard, the court, on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding
that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the
defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise
any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from
the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to
costs. An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the defendants who
moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the
judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied,
exception whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions,
and the same was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript
of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her
will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings
were had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of
the said hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and
approved in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from the said division made during the trial, and
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity
claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in
addition to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta,
Vigan; (2) the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08,
demanded by way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December
7, 1904; (3) the payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a
percentage claimed to be due him as the administrator of the property of common
ownership; (4) the division of certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta
Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the amendment be held to have been improperly
admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905,
against the opposition of the defendants, through which admission the latter were
obliged to pay the former P910.50.
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made
by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to
the plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of
the fact that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house,
which was pro indiviso property of joint ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced
in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided
which was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages,
wherein are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story
of the said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and
her husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet as such
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court,
between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is
imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house
on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to
her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her
husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had
it been rented to a stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the
community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their rights." cralaw virtua1aw library
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling,
in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the
said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor
that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to
her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an
accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners
exercises together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange
that delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents
and proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the property of
joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
derived from the upper story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less,
because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of
some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The
defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said
house, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she
prevent the latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining
to her as a coowner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the
fact that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde’s husband,
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the
same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position
which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice requires that he pay his
sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could
have produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly
rental is fixed at P16 in appearance with the evidence shown in the record. This
conclusion as to Bartolome’s liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of
the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously
the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to
the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which
those quarters could and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger,
in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were
used as stores. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta
P384, that is, one-half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been
obtained during four years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the
peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the
payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the
present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said
house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its
reconstruction or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This
expenditure, notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs,
was duly proved by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully
rebutted, was also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and
urban properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of
P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house,
leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for
the rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work
undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to replace it in a
habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who
was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question,
when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount
expended in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth
P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the
defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand,
though from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the
rents which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the
justice of the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the
defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount
which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of
the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained,
inasmuch as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the
plaintiffs would or would not be obliged to pay any sum whatever in reimbursement of
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle
Escolta, whether or not the defendants in turn, were entitled to collect any such
amount, and finally what the net sum would be which the plaintiffs might have to pay
as reimbursement for one-half of the expenditures made by the defendants. Until final
disposal of the case, no such net sum can be determined, nor until then can the debtor
be deemed to be in arrears. In order that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in
connection with a matter at issue between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial
decision from what date the interest will be due on the principal concerned in the suit.
This rule has been established by the decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in
reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of the Civil Code, rendered on April 24,
1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the

defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership,
inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and
his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any
remuneration whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he
administered the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife who
held it in joint tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any
compensation as such voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a
reimbursement for such actual and necessary expenditures as he may have made on
the undivided properties and an indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while
acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his duty to care for and preserve the
said property half of which belonged to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble and
labor occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law’s half of the said
property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house aforementioned,
without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have produced had they
been leased to another person.
With respect to the division of the certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during
her lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would
have been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it
would have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the
plaintiff Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother
of the said sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts,
without success; therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason
for holding that the said gift was not made.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the
assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as
determined by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of
the trial judge admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the
law and principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso
property, subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation is not
prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to their interests, considering
that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a parcel of realty is less than
the actual real value of the property, and this being understood by the defendants, they
appointed an expert appraiser to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the
plaintiffs, the value of the properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in
the later proceedings of the suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the
litigating parties agreed to an amicable division of the pro indiviso hereditary property,
in accordance with the price fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third
party, in view of the disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen
by the litigants. Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the
said sum, the difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial
expert appraiser for the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter
appraisal, redounded to the benefit of both parties.
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment
appealed from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by
the defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the
sum of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of the
one-half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or repair
of the Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the
latter the amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant
Matilde, should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters
on the lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of
Vigan; and we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of
the rents which could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2)
that the plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay legal interest from December 7, 1904, on
the sum expended in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the
interest fixed by law, at the rate of per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment
to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant
Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of the pro
indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect
from the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation
and the price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment
to the complaint; and, (5) that no partition shall be made of certain jewelry
aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment,
as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those
of this decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made
regarding the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

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Coverage po natin ay hanggang co-ownership see u on the 26th at 5:30pm

G.R. No. L-15242 June 29, 1962

ROSAURO M. TANINGCO and SIMPLICIA RAMOS, petitioners,

Juan A. Baes for petitioners.

[G.R. No. L-12958. May 30, 1960.]

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant and appellant, v. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and

David S. Ignacio for Appellant.

Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V.

Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, and

[G.R. Nos. L-10837-38. May 30, 1958.]

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. ISABEL IYA,

ISABEL IYA, Plaintiff, v. ADRIANO VALINO, LUCIA VALINO and ASSOCIATED

Jovita L. de Dios for defendant Isabel Iya.

1. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; BUILDINGS; IMMOVABLE STATUS OF BUILDING

2. CHATTEL MORTGAGE; SUBJECT OF; EFFECT WHERE THE INTEREST CONVEYED

3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT ACQUIRED BY PURCHASER AT AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-40411 August 7, 1935

DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any

Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

[G.R. No. 4656. November 18, 1912. ]

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE

Gaspar de Bartolome in his own behalf.

B. Gimenez Zoboli for Appellees.

1. ESTATES; REALTY; RIGHTS OF COOWNERS OR TENANTS IN COMMON. — Each

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY ADMINISTRATOR; COMPENSATION. — To an

1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built,

situated on Escalante Street, Vigan, and valued at P6,000.00

2. A house of mixed material, with the

stands, at No. 88 Washington Street, Vigan valued at 1,500.00

3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan;

the barrio of San Julian,

5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo

of Santa Lucia; 86.00

6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo

of Candon; valued at 150.00

Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

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