Introduction

EPRI/NRC-RES
EPRI/NRC RES FIRE PRA

METHODOLOGY
Module I-1: Fire Risk Requantification
P j t
Project
J.S. Hyslop – NRC/RES

R.P. Kassawara – EPRI
Fire PRA Workshop 2011

g CA and Jacksonville FL
San Diego
A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
General
• Based on MOU between NRC-RES and EPRI on fire risk
• Needed to provide more realistic methods for risk-informed,

performance-based fire protection activities
• Scope is full power, CDF and LERF
• Course does not provide official NRC positions, but does

represent
p the expertise
p of authors of NUREG/CR-6850
(EPRI 1011989)
Fire PRA Workshop 2011, San Diego & Jacksonville A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Module I-1: Fire Risk Requantification Project Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Quality Product
• Participation by industry and the public
• Formal process to resolve technical disputes within

NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 1011989) team
• Improvements made in areas important to fire risk
• Fire PRA methodology still evolving
– Solutions provided to fifteen fire PRA questions in NFPA 805

frequently asked questions (FAQ) process in NUREG/CR-6850
Supplement 1, EPRI 1019259
– “Unreviewed Analysis Methods” in process

Slide 3
Uses Of Methodology
• Support for 10CFR50.48(c) implementation

– Plants using technology for fire PRA development/upgrade
• ANS fire risk standard development
– Typically defines state-of-art, although supports lesser capability
categories as well
• Reactor Oversight Process analyses
– Refined phase 3 analyses
– Development of phase 2 Fire Protection SDP (IMC 0609
0609, Appendix F)
• Other expected uses
– Analyses under the current fire protection regulations (i.e.
exemptions/deviations or plant changes due to risk-informed
risk informed technical
specifications)
Slide 4
Fire Model Validation and Verification (V&V)
• Fire modeling is an integral part of fire PRA
• Fire model verification and validation (V&V) is required for

NFPA 805 applications
• Most fire models are computational
• Some are based only on empirical correlations

– Address cases where computational fire models inadequate
– Fill important gaps in fire PRA
• PRA Methodology document not a reference for fire models
• EPRI/RES V&V of fire models EPRI 1011999/NUREG

1011999/NUREG-1824
1824
Slide 5
Related Activities
• EPRI 1011989/NUREG/CR-6850
– Publication 2005
– General workshops 2005, 2006
– Detailed training 2007-2010
• EPRI 1011999/NUREG-1824 2007
• Fire PRA NFPA 805 FAQ Support 2010
• Fire HRA Methodology Development Late 2011
• Fire Modeling Application Guide Early 2012
• Fire
Fi Events
E t Database
D t b 2012
• Fire Modeling Training Integrated
• Low Power/Shutdown Fire PRA Methods NRC
Slide 6
EPRI/NRC-RES
METHODOLOGY
Introduction and Overview: the Fire PRA
M h d l
Methodology and
d Course
C Structure
S
Steve Nowlen - Sandia National Laboratories

Bijan Najafi - Science Applications International Corp.
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Training Workshop
San Diego, CA, August 1-5, 2011 and
Jacksonville, FL, November 14-18,
14 18, 2011
Overview of this morning’s presentations
I. A brief overview of the course structure, content and

objectives
II. User experience – industry and NRC
III. An overview of the ASME/ANS PRA Standard
IV. Ongoing projects and activities related to fire PRA
– Fire Event Database update activity
– Supplemental methods development efforts and the NRC/industry
peer review panel
– Ongoing
g g efforts on fire-induced circuit failure mode and likelihood
analysis (recent testing, PIRT panel, PRA expert panel)
Fire PRA Training, 2011, San Diego CA and Jacksonville FL A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Introduction and Overview Slide 2
Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
PART I
A brief Overview of the

EPRI/NRC--RES Fire PRA Methodolog
EPRI/NRC Methodology
&
The Fire PRA Course
Course Structure
• Five parallel modules:

1. PRA/Systems Analysis
2. Electrical Analysis
3. Fire Analysis
4. Fire PRA Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
5. Advanced Fire Modeling
• General structure for each module:
– PowerPoint presentations covering key concepts and the general “how
to”” off each
h taskk
– Example problems to illustrate key elements
• Our intent is that you participate actively in the discussions
– A
Askk questions!
ti !
– Instructors will both encourage and moderate discussions
– They may also closure if discussion gets off-track (e.g., we cannot solve
your regulatory questions)
OVERVIEW OF FIRE PRA PROCESS AND
MODULE STRUCTURE
TASK 1: Plant Boundary & TASK 2: Fire PRA Component
Partitioning Selection
TASK 3: Fire PRA Cable

Selection
SUPPORT TASK A: Plant

W lk D
Walk Downs TASK 4:
4 Qualitative
Q lit ti Screening
S i TASK 5: Fire
Fire-Induced
Induced Risk
Model
TASK 6: Fire Ignition

Frequencies
SUPPORT TASK B: Fire PRA

Database TASK 7A: Quantitative TASK 12A: Post-Fire HRA:
Screening - I Screening
TASK 8: Scoping Fire Modeling Fire Analysis Module
PRA/System Module
TASK 7B: Quantitative
Screening - II Circuits Module
HRA Module
B Fire Analysis and Fire
Modeling Modules
OVERVIEW OF FIRE PRA PROCESS AND
MODULE STRUCTURE (2)
( )
B
Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis
TASK 9: Detailed Circuit Failure

Analysis TASK 11: Detailed Fire Modeling
A. Single Compartment
B. Multi-Compartment
C. Main Control Room
TASK 10: Circuit Failure Mode &
Lik lih d A
Likelihood Analysis
l i
TASK 12B: Post fire HRA:

TASK 13: Seismic-Fire TASK 14: Fire Risk Quantification Detailed & recovery
Interactions
Fire Analysis Module
TASK 15: Uncertainty & PRA/System Module

Sensitivity Analyses
Circuits Module
TASK 16: Fire PRA HRA Module

Documentation
Fire Analysis and Fire
Modeling Modules
Module 1: PRA/Systems Analysis
• This module cover analysis elements related to plant systems accident

response modeling, integration of human actions into the plant model,
and risk quantification tasks
• Specific
S ifi ttasks
k covered
d are:
– Task 2: Equipment Selection
– Task 4: Qualitative Screening
– Task 5: Fire-Induced Risk Model
– Task 7: Quantitative Screening
– Task 15: Risk Quantification
– Task 16: Uncertainty Analysis
Module 2: Electrical Analysis
• This module covers analysis elements related to the identification and

tracing of cables, and the analysis of electrical circuit failure modes and
likelihood
• Tasks covered are:

– Task 3: Cable Selection (and Routing)
– Task 9: Detailed Circuit Analysis
y
– Task 10: Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis
– Support Task B: FPRA Database
Module 3: Fire Analysis
• This module covers analysis elements related to the identification,

characterization and analysis of fires scenarios
– fire sources, fire frequency, fire damage, and fire protection systems and
features,
• Tasks covered are:

– Taskk 1:
T 1 Pl
Plantt Partitioning
P titi i
– Task 6: Fire Ignition Frequency
– Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
– Task 11: Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis
– Task 13: Seismic/Fire Interactions (briefly)
– Support Task A: Plant Walkdowns
Module 4: Fire PRA Human Reliability Analysis
• Second year for fire HRA module

– Updated
p based on last yyear’s roll-out experience
p and refinements to the reference
document (NUREG-1921, TR1019196, draft for comment)
• Covers fire PRA analysis elements related to the identification of human
failure events (HFEs) and quantification of human error probabilities
(HEPs)
• Tasks covered:
– Task 12a: screeningg level HRA
– Task 12b: detailed HRA quantification
• Note: EPRI/RES guidance includes an intermediate “scoping” approach
– Approach more realistic than screening
screening, yet lacks detail and realism of
detailed HRA quantification
– Instructors will explain how this fits into overall analysis framework
Module 5: Advanced Fire Modeling (New!)
• Covers the use of computational fire models in support of fire scenario

screening and analysis
• Reference: RES/EPRI NPP Fire Modeling Application Guide (NUREG-1934,
TR1023259, draft for comment)
• From handbook correlations to computational fluid dynamics
dynamics…
• Fire modeling tools support:
– Task 8: Scoping Fire Modeling
– Task 11: Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis
• Intended as a complement to the fire analysis module 3:
– Module 3 focuses on the overall structure and content of the fire analysis elements
– Module
M d l 5 focuses
f on the
th actual
t l use off computational
t ti l fifire models
d l
Another element that you will see in training is
y Standard
citations to the PRA Quality
• ASME/ANS RA-Sa–2009:
– Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008:
RA S 2008: Standard for Level 1/Large Early
Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant
Applications
• The training
g slides p
provide links from elements of the methodology
gy to
requirements of the standard
– Not intended to “teach” the standard
– Intended to p
provide a road map p between the methods and the standard’s
Supporting Requirements
• A separate presentation this morning will provide a high-level
introduction to the standard, it’s structure, and it’s place
p
Any questions before we move on?
EPRI/NRC-RES FIRE PRA
METHODOLOGY AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO NRC’s
REGULATORY STRUCTURE
Mary Drouin
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

San Diego CA and Jacksonville FL
How Does NUREG/CR-6850 Fit into the NRC
g y Structure?
Regulatory
• The objective
j here is to p
provide an understanding, g,
from a regulatory perspective, the need for a fire
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology
d
document, t and d th
therefore,
f its
it role
l iin th
the regulatory
l t
structure.
• A major aspect of this objective is understanding

what is meant by regulatory structure.
Fire PRA Methodology and its Relationship to NRC’S Regulatory Slide 2
Structure
NRC Regulatory Structure
• Congressional Mandate
– Atomic Energy Act indicates that the mission of the NRC is to
ensure that commercial nuclear power plants are operated in a
manner that provides adequate protection of public health and
safety and is consistent with the common defense and security.
security
• NRC provides for public health and safety via a licensing,
oversight and enforcement process.
• Licensing, oversight and enforcement all involve
establishing regulations and developing the necessary
supporting structure (e.g.,
(e g regulatory guides).
guides)
Structure
What is the Relationship Between a Regulation
and a Methodologygy Document?
Defines technical requirements for

REGULATIONS
the design and operation of the
(e.g., 10 CFR Part 50)
nuclear power plant
Provides one technical approach

REGULATORY
that is acceptable for meeting the
GUIDES
regulation
Technical documents provide

SUPPORTING detailed guidance on issues
TECHNICAL associated
i t d with
ith meeting
ti th
the
GUIDANCE approach established in the
regulatory guide (or regulation)
Structure
What is the Relationship in the Context of a
Fire PRA?
• Example relevant regulations:

– 10 CFR §50.48(c),
§50 48(c) Fire Protection
Protection, National Fire Protection Association
Standard NFPA 805
– 10 CFR §50.69, Risk-informed categorization and treatment of structures,
systems and components for nuclear power reactors
– 10 CFR §50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction
permit, or early site permit
– 10 CFR §50.36, Technical Specifications
• What is the common element among these regulations?
– The use of risk information, and therefore, the need to have confidence
in the risk analyses (or PRAs) being used to generate the information
– Risk contributors to be addressed include internal fires.
Structure
How is This Confidence Achieved?
REGULATIONS
10 CFR §50.48(c)
§50 48(c) 10 CFR §50.69
§50 69 10 CFR §50.90
§50 90 10 CFR §50.36
§50 36 etc
etc.
RG 1.205 RG 1.201 RG 1.174 RG 1.177

y Guidance/staff position includes use of risk/PRA information
y Reference to RG 1.200 for guidance on determining PRA technical
acceptability for both internal and external hazards (e.g., internal fire)
RG 1.200
“Describes one acceptable approach for determining whether the technical adequacy of the
PRA, in total or the parts that are used to support an application, is sufficient to provide
confidence in the results, such that the PRA can be used in regulatory decision-making for light-
water reactors.”
Structure
How is This Confidence Achieved (cont’d)?
• The approach provided in RG 1.200 defines the

attributes and characteristics of a technically
acceptable PRA.
– The defined attributes and characteristics are very high level.
• For example, characteristics and attributes provided in
RG 1.200 for Fire Ignition Frequencies:
– Frequencies are established for ignition sources and
consequently for physical analysis units.
– Transient fires should be postulated for all physical analysis units
regardless
g of administrative controls.
– Appropriate justification must be provided to use nonnuclear
experience to determine fire ignition frequency.
Structure
• RG 1.200 allows the use of a consensus standard (as

endorsed by the NRC) with a peer review to demonstrate
conformance with the defined attributes and characteristics.
– RG 1.200 endorses and p
provides a p
position on the ASME/ANS PRA
Standard (ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009).
– Part 4 of the ASME/ANS standard provides the requirements for
fires at-power PRA.
• The PRA Standard, however, only defines what is required
for a technically acceptable PRA and an acceptable peer
review.
review
Structure
• Guidance is needed for how to accomplish the

requirements in the standard and guidance is
needed for the peer review in determining whether
the intent of requirement is met.
• This guidance is particularly needed for those
aspects in the PRA where the model is not well
known.
known
• One major objective of NUREG/CR-6850 is to
provide the detailed g
p guidance for how to
accomplish meeting the requirements for Fire PRA.
– As such, NUREG/CR-6850 supports both the PRA
standard and the PRA peer review guidance
Structure
Overall Relationship
REGULATIONS §50.48(c) §50.69 §50.90 §50.36 etc.

(
(e.g., 10 CFR Part
P t 50)
RG 1.205 RG 1.201 RG 1.174 RG 1.177 etc.

REGULATORY
GUIDES
RG 1.200
“WHAT TO” SUPPORTING PRA Standard and Peer Review

TECHNICAL GUIDANCE (ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 and NEI-07-12)
PRA
Technical
Acceptability
y NUREG/CR-6850
DETAILED “HOW TO” y NUREG-1855
SUPPORTING TECHNICAL y NUREG-1842
GUIDANCE y NUREG/CR-6823
y etc.
Structure
Structure of PRA Standard
Hazard Type • Two different hazard types are defined in the Standard

which include both internal and external hazards.
Hazard groups
• For each hazard type, the various groups of hazards are
defined, for example for internal hazards: internal
events, internal flood and internal fires.
Technical Elements • For each hazard group, the technical elements are
defined for developing the hazard-specific PRA model.
Objectives • The objective of each technical element is defined
defined.
High Level
• High level requirements are defined which specify what
Requirements is needed to accomplish the defined objective of the
(HLRs) technical element
element.
• Supporting requirements are defined which, in turn,
Supporting
Requirements specify what is needed to accomplish the defined high
(SRs) l
level
l requirement.
i t
Structure
Structure of PRA Standard (cont’d)
• At the supporting requirement level, it was recognized that the

extent or to which the level of detail, the level of plant specificity
and the level of realism of the PRA model can vary
• Consequently, the minimum defined by the requirement can also
vary
• Consequently, three “categories of capability” were defined for the
supporting requirements
requirements.
• Capability Category I: the very basic needed.
• Capability Category II: the minimum to support majority of applications
• Capability Category III: the minimum to support application with high reliance
on the fidelity of the PRA results.
Structure
Standard Capability Categories
Capability Category I
p y g y • Level of
minimum addressed by the detail of
technical requirement plant model
Supporting Requirement
• Pl
Plant design
td i
Capability Category II
Specifies the minimum with and
minimum to achieve
regard to level of detail, “current good practice” for
operational
plant design and specificity
q
the technical requirement
operational specificity,
and realism of plant • Realism of
response Capability Category III plant
minimum to achieve the response
p
state‐of‐the‐art for the
technical requirement
Structure
Standard Capability Categories (cont’d)
PRA
Capability Category I Capability Category II Capability Category III
Attribute
Sufficient to identify relative
Scope and Sufficient to identify relative Sufficient to identify relative
importance of all
Level of importance at the system importance of significant
component level
Detail or train level component level contributors
contributors
Generic data/models
G /
Plant- Plant-specific data/models for Plant-specific data/models
except for unique design
Specificity the significant contributors for all contributors
and operational features
Departures from realism Departures from realism will Departures for realism will
Realism
will
ill h
have moderate
d t iimpact*t* h
have smallll iimpact*
t* h
have negligible
li ibl iimpact*
t*
*Differentiation from moderate, to small, to negligible is determined by

the degree
g that the conclusions and risk insights
g could affect a
decision under consideration.
• Moderate: likely that a decision could be affected
• Small: unlikely a decision could be affected
• Negligible: a decision would not be affected.
Structure
Illustration of Fire PRA Standard Structure and
NUREG/CR-6850
Hazard Type Internal Hazards External Hazards
Internal Events Seismic Events
Hazard groups
Hazard groups Internal Floods Hi h Wi d
High Winds
Internal Fires External Floods
Other External Hazards
Plant Partitioning Fire Ignition Frequency
Technical
Equipment Selection Quantitative Screening Fire PRA
Cable Selection Circuit Failure
Elements Qualitative Screening Human Reliability Analysis Standard
Plant Response Model Risk Quantification
Fire Scenario Selection Seismic/Fire Interactions
Objectives The objectives of the equipment selection elements is to select the plant
equipment that will be included/credited in Fire PRA plant response model.
HLR‐ES‐A The Fire PRA shall identify equipment whose failure . . . .
HLR‐ES‐B The Fire PRA shall identify equipment whose failure including spurious operation
High Level would adversely affect the operability/functionality of that portion of the plant
Requirements design to be credited in the Fire PRA.
HLR‐ES‐C the Fire PRA shall identify instrumentation . . . .
(HLRs) HLR‐ES‐D The Fire PRA shall document the Fire PRA equipment selection
The Fire PRA shall document the Fire PRA equipment selection . . . .
ES‐B1 Capability Category I Capability Category II Capability Category III
Supporting IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ NUREG/

Appendix R equipment to be Appendix R equipment to be Appendix R equipment to be
q
Requirements
(SRs)
credited in the Fire PRA
credited in the Fire PRA. credited in the Fire PRA and
credited in the Fire PRA and
INCLUDE risk‐significant
INCLUDE all equipment from
CR 6850
CR-6850
equipment from the IE PRA the IE PRA
Structure
Fire PRA Standard and NUREG/CR-6850:
Illustration of the Mapping of HLRs & SRs to 6850
Technical HLR SR 6850/1011989 Comments
element sections that
cover SR
ES A The Fire PRA shall identifyy equipment
q p whose failure caused byy an initiating
g fire including
g spurious
p
operation will contribute to or otherwise cause an initiating event.
1 2.5.3
2 3.5.3 Covered in “Cable Selection” chapter
3 2.5.3
4 2.5.1, 2.5.4
5 254
2.5.4
6 2.5.6
B The Fire PRA shall identify equipment whose failure including spurious operation would
adversely affect the operability/functionality of that portion of the plant design to be credited in the
Fire PRA.
1 2.5.2
2 2.5.4
3 5.5.1 Covered in “Fire-Induced Risk Model” chapter
4 3.5.3 Covered in “Cable Selection” chapter
5 n/a Exclusion based on probability is not covered in 6850/1011989
C The Fire PRA shall identify instrumentation whose failure including spurious operation would
impact
p the reliabilityy of operator
p actions associated with that p
portion of the p
plant design
g to be
credited in the Fire PRA.
1 2.5.5
2 2.5.5
D The Fire PRA shall document the Fire PRA equipment selection, including that information about
the equipment necessary to support the other Fire PRA tasks (e.g., equipment identification;
equipment type; normal
normal, desired
desired, failed states of equipment; etc
etc.)) in a manner that facilitates Fire
PRA applications, upgrades, and peer review.
1 n/a Documentation not covered in 6850/1011989
Structure
Overall Process
When implementing RG 1.200,

PRA technical acceptability
involves:
Technical requirements
in the PRA Standard
Developing a PRA describe what needs to
in accordance to be in the PRA, but do
the technical
ASME/ANS not describe how to
requirements of RA-Sa-2009 build the PRA model
the Standard (as
endorsed by NRC) Provides guidance for
one acceptable
RG NUREG/CR 6850
NUREG/CR-6850 methodology that can PRA
1.200 be used for how to Model
develop PRA and meet
the PRA Standard
Performing a peer
review (as endorsed A peer review
i iis required
i d tto
by NRC) to assess NEI 07-12 evaluate how the PRA
whether the technical model was built to determine
requirements were whether it meets the intent of
actually met the technical requirements in
the PRA Standard
Structure
Summary/Conclusion
• NUREG/CR-6850
G/C is a methodology
document and, while not required to be
met, plays a major role in defining
f a
technically acceptable Fire PRA to support
NRC activities
i i i where
h a Fi
Fire PRA model
d l iis
needed and the results of the Fire PRA
model
d l are usedd to meet a regulation.
l i
Structure
FIRE PRA METHODS AND
RESEARCH UPDATE - 2011
Rick Wachowiak
Sr Project Manager
EPRI
San Diego CA and Jacksonville FL
Slide 1
Fire PRA New Methods Update Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Contents
• Fire Events Database
• Heat Release Rates for Electrical Cabinets
• Fire
Fi M Methods
th d EExpertt Review
R i P
Panell
• Fire Modeling
g Application
pp Guide
Slide 2
FEDB Purpose and Objectives
The Electric Power Research Institute’s Fire Events Data Base is the
principal
i i l source off fi
fire iincident
id t operational
ti lddata
t ffor use iin fi
fire PRA
PRAs
Thiss project
p oject will improve
p o e tthe
e FEDB by
by:
• Including expanded and improved data fields
• Improving consistency and quality of information
• Improved
I d fire
fi eventt severity
it classification
l ifi ti
These improvements support fire PRA:
• Updated, improved fire frequencies
• Treatment of detection & suppression effectiveness
• Estimates of damaging fire frequencies and their characteristics
Slide 3
Scope and Cooperation with NRC under MOU
• Update data through 2009, and beyond as available

• Principal
Pi i ld data
t sources:
– Plant records, e.g. condition or corrective action reports supplemented
with available
– LERs, ENs
– NEIL, EPIX reports
– Plant specific data collected for FPRAs
• Cooperative effort lead by EPRI with NRC under MOU
– Database software upgrades
– Data field content and definitions
– Fire severity criteria
– Beta testing
– QA audit
Slide 4
Key Fire Event Data Base Features
• Event summary description

• Location and source characteristics
• Fire duration, growth, and damage descriptive details
• Detection
– Time(s)
– Systems & equipment
– Fire brigade and other personnel role
• Suppression
– Time(s)
– Systems & equipment
– Fire brigade and other personnel role
• Fire severity classification graded
graded, dependent on magnitude and
impact details
Slide 5
Fire Event Severity Classifications
• The severity levels used in the updated FEDB are “challenging”,

“potentially
potentially challenging
challenging”, and “not
not challenging
challenging”
• The new “challenging” and “potentially challenging” classifications

combined are essentially y equivalent
q to the NUREG/CR-6850
“potentially challenging” classification
• A distinction made between “challenging” fires that did (or could)

d
damage a critical
iti l componentt bbeyondd th
the iignition
iti source andd th
those
“potentially challenging” fires that might evolve into challenging fires in
fire PRA model
• Initial classification using fire severity algorithm
Slide 6
Fire Event Severity Determination
• Applied to new and existing fire event data (1990 forward)
• Fire event severity classification algorithm:

– Logic model using FEDB data field entries to indicate initial fire
y classification
severity
– Challenging → Potentially Challenging → Not Challenging
– Identifies key missing information needed to make classification
on “undetermined” events
• Fire event severity classification review & justification for exceptions

required
• Resolution of “undetermined” severity classifications incorporated in

event data collection and coding process to extent practical
Slide 7
Event Derived/Inferred: Fire Severity
Event Classification Event Sub-Classification Criteria
CHALLENGING Damageg to or ignition

g of an adjacent
j object
j occurred. This includes ignition
g
of secondary combustibles.
One of the following:
Damage to or ignition of an adjacent object could have occurred if the fire
were in a different location.
Damage to or ignition of an adjacent object or component could have
occurred if significant suppression actions had not been taken.
POTENTIALLY Damage to or ignition of an adjacent object could have occurred if minor

CHALLENGING suppression actions were not taken in a timely manner.
Not “challenging” and Damage to or ignition of an adjacent object could have occurred if the fire
one of the following: were in a different location and if minor suppression actions were not
taken in a timely manner.
NOT CHALLENGING Overheat condition only; no smoldering or flaming combustion.
Not “potentially Smoldering fire self-extinguishes without any active intervention.
challenging” and one of
the following: Fire involves an ignition source in a location that has no relevance to plant
operations or safety.
UNDETERMINED Any fi
A fire eventt that
th t d
does nott h
have sufficient
ffi i t iinformation
f ti tto classify
l if as
challenging, potentially challenging, or not challenging.
Slide 8
Fire Events Database Progress
1 Request CR “List” for Key Words

n = input from utilities required
(2 000 - 4,000
(2,000 4 000 / plant)
= Audit (NRC)
Owner’s Groups Perform m
Screening Review
1
Request CRs for Probable
2 Fires Pl t responding
Plants di tto requests
t
(75 - 125 / plant)
Expect completion in 2011
EPRI Screen for
Potential Significance
IImportant
t t 2
Existing FEDB Site Follow-up for
3
Fire Events “Real Fires”
(0 – 5 / plant) (10 – 15 / plant)
EPRI
Categorize Events in New
Important 3 FEDB
Fires 3rd audit in Nov 2011
Potentially Challenging and (0-3/plant)
Challenging Fires
Slide 9
Fire Ignition Frequency (Re)Analysis:
p
Purpose, , Objective,
j , Scope
p
• Re-examine and update fire event trends and fire ignition frequencies
developed in EPRI interim Report 1016735
1016735, FAQ 08-0048
• Use data from the FEDB updated through 2009
• Improved methods to address statistical issues/concerns for low

density fire ignition bins
• Results
R lt tto be
b suitable
it bl ffor use iin plant
l t specific
ifi fifire PRA applications
li ti
• Includes coordination with the NRC, industry technical review
• Preparation of EPRI technical reports
Slide 10
Technical Issues and Approach
• Based on data from 1990-2000, between plant variability detected
– Strong indication for aggregated data, high density fire ignition bins
– Low density fire ignition bins indeterminate
– Approach assumes between plant variability
• Plan to apply hierarchical Bayes treatment for all fire ignition bins; draft
methodology report prepared and in review
• Uncertainty bounds & plant specific sensitivity will generally increase

while maintaining generic “results” for mean fire ignition frequencies
• Industry wide trends and any implications unknown until new data is
available for analysis
• Use of pre-1990
pre 1990 data under discussion between RES and EPRI
Slide 11
Status and Schedule
• Methodology report for technical review with NRC under MOU:

Comments received 2nd Qtr 2011
• Draft EPRI Interim Technical Report on methodology for industry

technical review: 4th Qtr 2011
• Draft EPRI Technical Report on updated FEDB fire ignition frequency

(re)analysis: 1st Qtr 2012
• Final EPRI Technical Report (methodology and data analysis): Mid

2012
Slide 12
Vertical Electrical Cabinet Heat Release Rate
Proposed Methodology
• Purpose of study: Re-evaluate the heat release rates (HRRs) of

cabinet fires recommended for use in NUREG/CR-6850
NUREG/CR 6850 (Table G G-1)
1)
• Scope limited to:

– Vertical electrical cabinets
– No quantification of external influences
– No quantification of fire duration
• Model developed to characterize

potential HRR for cabinet fires
– Cabinet size and combustible load
– Ventilation characteristics
– Types of combustibles
Slide 13
Vertical Electrical Cabinet Heat Release Rate Model
• Model maintains distinction between qualified cable and non-qualified cable

fires
• Establish probability that fire in a cabinet with only qualified cables may
remain localized
• Model adds refinements and thus more inputs needed than in NUREG/CR-
6850:
– If not ventilation-limited: HRR dependent on combustible loading.
Combustible loading estimated based on:
• Cabinet volume
• Estimate of cabinet fullness (low/high loading).
– If ventilation-limited: HRR controlled by amount of air available for
combustion.
• Determination on whether cabinet is cooled by forced or natural
ventilation
• Assessment of robustness regarding gap potential
• Need to know vent area and position of vents (top, bottom, or vents at
i t
intermediate
di t llevel)
l)
Slide 14
Vertical Electrical Cabinet Heat Release Rate
Current Status
• Independent
I d d t expertt review
i panell
– Fire modeling and fire PRA practitioners
– Mix of contractors and utility
y
– Verify that the method is correct, has proper bases, and is
useable
• Comments received and are being resolved
• Expected to be published in 2011
• NRC requested formal review by NRC-RES
NRC RES
Slide 15
FPRA Unreviewed Analysis Methods Review Panel
• NEI 07-12 allows Fire PRA peer reviews to identify

“unreviewed
unreviewed analysis methods”
methods
• Panel process established to provide a review for any
new methods
– 6 to 10 members – Utilities, EPRI, Owners’ Groups, NRC
– Independent from developer and user(s) of method(s)
– Review proposed method and provide comments
– Determine the applicability / limitations of the method
– Identify interface with the Fire PRA Standard
• EPRI to “publish” approved methods via letter to NEI
– Eventually provided as a collection in an EPRI report
Slide 16
Panel Status
• ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc. submitted four methods –

Alignment
g factors for:
– Electrical cabinet fires
– Pump oil fires
– Transient fires
– Hot work fires
• Each method attempts to add realism to a fire PRA
– Proposition is that fires included in the generic frequencies do not
generally behave as aggressively as the Fire PRA treats them
• Review of methods as submitted is complete and there are significant
comments
• ERIN is resolving comments
• Each of the methods will need to be re-reviewed following update of
the
h ddocumentation
i
Slide 17
Insights From the Panel Process
• Methods that treat all scenarios the same are

more difficult to justify
m in Method
– Tie method to scenario specific
information
– Specify information needed to justify
onservatism
applicability
• Methods relying on expert judgment
may put the panel into a different role
Co
– Expert panel vs. independent review Generic Applicability
– Different process may be needed when in this role
• Scenario
S i specific
ifi examplesl neededd d
• Involve the author earlier in the process
• Review one method at a time
Slide 18
Fire Modeling Application Guide
• Joint EPRI / NRC RES publication under MOU

• Describes
D ib th
the process off conducting
d ti a fifire modeling
d li
analysis for commercial nuclear power plant applications
• Provides guidance on incorporating the uncertainty
associated with a fire modeling analysis in a Fire PRA
• Five fire models discussed
– Two empirical, two zone, one CFD
• Eight “real world” examples provided
– Applicability of models and data ranges
• Draft is out for public comment
– This forms the bases for Module 5 – Advanced Fire Modeling
g
Slide 19
Enhanced
E h d Fire
Fi Events
E t Database
D t b to
t
Support Fire PRA
((A jjoint NRC-RES/EPRI p
project)
j )
Given by J.S. Hyslop, NRC/RES
Joint RES/EPRI Fire PRA Workshop

August and November 2011
S Di
San Diego, CA
Motivation
• Need for improved database identified by NFPA 805 FAQ

program
– FAQ 48 required an update of current fire events database to
include 2001-2009 data address fire ignition frequency
• Updated, improved database will also serve more general
fire PRA needs of both NRC and industry
Fire PRA Workshop, 2010, San Diego & Jacksonville A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Enhanced Fire Events Database Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Participants and Roles
• Joint project by RES and EPRI

– RES and EPRI collaborated on data fields and criteria for severity
classification
– EPRI taking the lead in collecting data and populating database,
with RES in an audit role
• SNL and INL under contract to RES; ERIN lead contractor
to EPRI
• Plan for a joint RES/EPRI report to be issued on project in
2012
Slide 3
Improvements
• Expanded and improved data fields

– Improved Fire Ignition Source Details
– Improved Fire Detection and Suppression Response Details
– Improved Fire Event Severity Classification
• More complete data
– Update expected to collect more data than currently exists for total
1968-2000 period of existing database
• Expanded fields will capture important information
relevant to analyses unavailable in existing version.
• Each individual event description will also be more
complete
• Reduced
R d d percentage
t off ““undetermined”
d t i d” ddata
t
Slide 4
Improvements (cont.)
• Severity classification for applying database to frequency

expanded to be more transparent and reproducible,
reproducible
although some judgment remains
– Generic rules to eliminate “false positives” for events under the
severity
it classification
l ifi ti generated t d
• Improving Consistency and Quality Assurance
• Allowing for Reference Data Source Traceability
Slide 5
Event Derived/Inferred :
y
Fire Severity
• Four severity classifications

– Challenging
– Potentially Challenging
– Not Challenging
– Undetermined
• For challenging, the fire is further developed than for
potentially challenging
– Potentially challenging fires evolve into challenging fires in fire
PRA model
• Thus, no PRA applications distinguish between potentially
challenging and challenging fires
Slide 6
Applications
• Initial application will be fire ignition frequency

• An
A essential ti l companion
i application
li ti willill b
be suppression
i
reliability
– Some very
y minor fires kept
p in earlier database will be removed in
update
• Expect true component frequencies will be developed
once component population data collected by Owners’
Owners
Groups (later than 2012 schedule cited earlier)
g
• Further qualitative insights on fires to be g
gained
Slide 7
EPRI/NRC-RES
METHODOLOGY
dc Circuits Project and Related Activities
Gabriel Taylor – U.S. NRC

U. S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
JJoint
i t RES/EPRI Fire
Fi PRA Training
T i i Workshop
W k h
San Diego, CA, August 2011 and
Jacksonville, FL, November 2011
History of Fire & Circuit Problems
Failure, Protection, Testing
• RG 1.75, “Physical Independence of Electrical Systems”

• Browns
B F
Ferry Fire
Fi 1975
• IEEE 383, “Qualifying Class 1E Electrical Cables”
• IN 99
99-17,
17 “Post
Post-Fire
Fire Safe-Shutdown
Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis Problems”
Problems
• NEI Cable Testing 2001 & Expert Elicitation 2002
• RIS 2004-03
2004 03, “Risk-Informed
Risk Informed Approach for Post-Fire
Post Fire Safe-
Safe
Shutdown Circuit Inspections”
• NRC CAROLFIRE – RIS 2004-03 Bin 2 & Fire Modeling
• DUKE Armored Cable Testing
• NRC DESIREE-FIRE – direct current circuits
• KATE-FIRE – Kerite Thermal Fragility Evaluation
Fire PRA Workshop, 2011 A Collaboration of U.S. NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Slide 2
Fire PRA Circuit Analysis Activities Research (RES) & Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
NEI / EPRI Testing 2001
• Square Steel Room

• Diffusion Burner
• Cable Tray &
Conduit Bend
• Sprinkler Head
• Hot Gas & Plume
Exposures
• 18 Tests using MOV
Circuit
Slide 3
CAROLFIRE
Cable Response to Live Fire
• 78 Small- and 18 Intermediate-scale tests

• ac MOV and Insulation Resistance Measurement
Systems used for failure mode diagnostic
• RIS 2004
2004-03
03 & Fire Model Improvement
Penlight Shroud
A
Cable Tray & Test Cables
A A-A
0.81 m (2'-8") 0.51 m (1'-8 1/4")
Cable Tray Supports
Slide 4
DESIREE-FIRE
Direct Current Electrical Shorting In Response to Exposure Fire
• Similar thermal exposure methods as CAROLFIRE

• 59 small- and 17 intermediate scale tests
– 225 individual circuit trials
• Insulation
Ins lation resistance meas
measurement
rement was as not used
sed
• Several different dc control circuits simulated NPP circuits
and monitored cable failure modes.
– dc MOV
– Medium Voltage Switchgear (15kV / 4.16kV)
– Pilot
Pil SOV
– 1” SOV assembly
– Large
g coil
Slide 5
Diagnostic Units
FUSE BLOCK DCCCS CABLE UNDER TEST

FROM DISTRIBUTION
CIRCUIT BREAKER
A P
V
C
NC
A G
V
1750
B
10A
NO
A R
V
1750
+ A
C NC
A YC1
VDC
V
125 V
A
O A YO1
- NC
V
10A A N
V
SP
V
Slide 6
DESIREE-FIRE
S
Slide 7
CAROLFIRE ac Results – RIS 2004-03
• Inter-cable shorting less likely than Intra-

• Inter-cable between thermoset and thermoplastic
is very small compared to either common type
• No basis on number of failures to consider
• No basis for taking credit of CPT
• Very low probability of ac hot shorts >20 minutes
in duration
• THIEF fire model
Slide 8
Cable Damage Prediction Model – THIEF
• Thermally-Induced Electrical Failure (THIEF)

• Provides a numerical solution of the one
one-dimensional
dimensional heat
conduction equations within a homogenous cylinder with
fixed temperature-independent properties
• Incorporated in CFAST and FDS fire models
• User specifies cable failure temperature
Slide 9
Electrical PIRT
• Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table

• Structured approach to an expert elicitation
• Facilitated by Brookhaven National Laboratories
• Group of 8 electrical experts
– 4 NRC, National Laboratories
– 4 EPRI, Utilities, Contractors
Slide 10
PIRT Objectives
• Review test data, identify important phenomena that

affects
ff t cable/circuit
bl / i it failure
f il mode,
d and d th
then rank
k th
the
phenomena and important influencing parameters.
• Consensus on longstanding post-fire
post fire safe-shutdown
safe shutdown
circuit issues.
– MHIF, 3 phase proper polarity, CTs, etc.
Slide 11
PIRT Work
• PIRT panel identified lack of readily usable information

from multiple testing reports
• NRC has initiative to provide a compilation NUREG
document of previous test results
• Focus on evaluating the data based on the key
phenomena and parameters identified by PIRT panel.
Slide 12
Data Report Example – Failure Mode
Global Approach - Insultion Type

80
100%
60
62%
Fuse Clear
ount
100% 52%
40 Spurious Actuation
Co
Hot Short
38% HS/SA Possible
56%
51%
20 44%
0
TP TS
Slide 13
Data Report Example – Raceway Routing
Duration
Duration - Raceway Routing

400
MAX = 1345 MAX = 456
300
Seconds
q1
200
min
median
max
100 q3
0
AIR CONDUIT TRAY AIR CONDUIT TRAY
Hot Short Spurious Actuation
Slide 14
PRA Expert Panel
• Electrical PIRT Panel results will be used by a follow-on

group of fire PRA experts
• PRA panel will revise EPRI best-estimate conditional
probabilities for circuit hot short/spurious
p p actuations used
in fire PRA methods, along with developing new
probabilities.
Slide 15
dc Circuits Project and Related Activities
Questions
Questions ?
Slide 16
EPRI/NRC-RES
Fire PRA Course
Revision Date: June 21, 2011
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Division of Risk Analysis

3412 Hillview Avenue Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
Palo Alto, CA 94303 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
2
PREPARERS
TECHNICAL TEAM LEADS:

Bijan Najafi Steven P. Nowlen
Science Applications International Corp. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
1671 Dell Ave, Suite 100 PO Box 5800
Campbell, CA 95008 Albuquerque, NM 87185-0748
PROJECT MANAGERS:
Richard Wachowiak J. S. Hyslop

Electric Power Research Institute U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Fire Research Branch
iii
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 How to Use this Package ............................................................................................. 1-4
1.3 References .................................................................................................................. 1-4
2 EXAMPLE CASE PLANT - GENERAL INFORMATION ......................................................... 2-1

2.1 Overall Plant Description ............................................................................................. 2-1
2.2 Systems Description .................................................................................................... 2-1
2.2.1 Primary Coolant System .......................................................................................... 2-1
2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High Pressure Injection Systems ............................ 2-2
2.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System .............................................................................. 2-3
2.2.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System .................................................................................... 2-3
2.2.6 Electrical System ..................................................................................................... 2-5
2.2.7 Other Systems ......................................................................................................... 2-5
2.3 Plant Layout ................................................................................................................. 2-6
2.4 SNPP Drawings.............................................................................................................. 2-6
3 MODULE 1: PRA/SYSTEMS .................................................................................................. 3-1
4 MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 4-1
5 MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 5-1
6 MODULE 4: FIRE PRA HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS .................................................... 6-1
7 MODULE 5: ADVANCED FIRE MODELING .......................................................................... 7-2
v
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater

ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability
CF Cable (Configuration) Factors
CCW Component Cooling Water
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CLERP Conditional Large Early Release Probability
CM Corrective Maintenance
CRS Cable and Raceway (Database) System
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
EF Error Factor
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure
EPR Ethylene-Propylene Rubber
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FEDB Fire Events Database
FEP Fire Emergency Procedure
FHA Fire Hazards Analysis
FIVE Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI TR 100370)
FMRC Factory Mutual Research Corporation
FPRAIG Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR 105928)
FRSS Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
HEAF High Energy Arcing Fault
HEP Human Error Probability
HFE Human Failure Event
HPI High Pressure Injection
HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HRR Heat Release Rate
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICDP Incremental Core Damage Probability
ILERP Incremental Large Early Release Probability
vii
IPE Individual Plant Examination
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IS Ignition Source
ISLOCA Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident
KS Key Switch
LERF Large Early Release Frequency
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LOC Loss of Control
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
MCC Motor Control Center
MCR Main Control Room
MG Motor-Generator
MOV Motor Operated Valve
MQH McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad’s Method
MS Main Steam
NC No Consequence
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NEIL Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
NQ cable Non-Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PE Polyethylene
PM Preventive Maintenance
PMMA Polymethyl Methacrylate
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PSF Performance Shaping Factor
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
Q cable Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS Reactor Coolant System
RDAT Computer program for Bayesian analysis
RES The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (at NRC)
RHR Residual Heat Removal
RPS Reactor Protection System
RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank
SDP Significance Determination Process
SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture
SI Safety Injection
SO Spurious Operation
SOV Solenoid Operated Valve
SRV Safety Relief Valve
viii
SSD Safe Shutdown
SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List
SUT Start-up Transformer
T/G Turbine/Generator
TGB Turbine-Generator Building
TSP Transfer Switch Panel
UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer
VCT Volume Control Tank
VTT Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Technical Research Centre of Finland)
XLPE Cross-Linked Polyethylene
ZOI Zone of Influence
ix
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute under a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperative Nuclear Safety Research have been
developing state of the art methods for conduct of fire PRA. In September 2005, this work
produced the “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” EPRI
1011989, and NUREG/CR-6850 [1].
A Fire PRA Course has been put together to train interested parties in the application of this
methodology. The Course/Seminar is provided in five parallel modules. The first three modules
are based directly on Reference [1]. However, that document did not cover fire human reliability
analysis (HRA) methods in detail. For 2010, the training materials were enhanced to include a
fourth module based on a more recent EPRI/RES collaboration and a draft guidance document,
EPRI 1019196, NUREG-1921 [2] published in late 2009. The training materials are based on
this draft document including the consideration of public comments received on the draft report
and the team’s responses to those comments. For 2011 a fifth training module on Advanced Fire
Modeling techniques and concepts has been added to the course. This module is based on the
another joint RES/EPRI collaboration and a draft guidance published in January 2010, EPRI
1019195, NUREG-1934 [3].
The four training modules are:

 Module 1: PRA/Systems Analysis - This module covers the technical tasks for development
of the system response to a fire including human failure events. Specifically, this module
covers Tasks/Sections 2, 4, 5, 7, 14, and 15 of Reference [1].
 Module 2: Electrical Analysis – This module covers the technical tasks for analysis of
electrical failures as the result of a fire. Specifically, this module covers Tasks/Sections 3, 9,
and 10 of Reference [1].
 Module 3: Fire Analysis – This module covers technical tasks involved in development of
fire scenarios from initiation to target (e.g., cable) impact. Specifically, this module covers
Tasks/Sections 1, 6, 8, 11, and 13 of Reference [1].
 Module 4: Fire Human Reliability Analysis: This module covers the technical tasks
associated with identifying and analyzing operator actions and performance during a
postulated fire scenario. Specifically, this module covers Task 12 as outlined in Reference
[1] based on the application of the approaches documented in Reference [2].
1-1
 Module 5: Advanced Fire Modeling: This module is new for the 2011 training course and
covers the fundamentals of fire science and provided practical implementation guidance for
the application of fire modeling in support of a fire PRA. Module 5 covers fire modeling
applications for Tasks 8 and 11 as outlined in Reference [1] based on the material presented
in Reference [3].
Integral to Modules 1, 2 and 3 is a set of hands-on problems based on a fictitious, simplified

nuclear power plant. The same power plant is used in all three modules. This document
provides the background information for the problem sets of each module. Clearly, the power
plant defined in this package is an extremely simplified one that in many cases does not meet any
regulatory requirements or good engineering practices. Design features presented are focused on
bringing forward the various aspects of the Fire PRA methodology. This package includes a
general description of the power plant and the internal events PRA needed as input to the Fire
PRA.
For Module 4 and 5, independent sets of examples are used to illustrate key points of the analysis
procedures. The examples for these two modules are not tied to the simplified plant. Module 4
uses examples that were derived based largely on pilot applications of the proposed fire HRA
methods and on independent work of the EPRI and RES HRA teams. The examples for
Module 5 were taken directly from Reference [3] and represent a range of typical NPP fire
scenarios across a range of complexity and that highlight some of the computation challenges
associated with the NPP fire PRA fire modeling applications.
The instruction package for specific technical tasks is provided in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 which
are organized by Modules (see above). A short description of the Fire PRA technical tasks is
provided below. For further details, refer to the individual task descriptions in EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2. The figure presented at the end of this chapter provides a
simplified flow chart for the analysis process and indicates which training module covers each of
the analysis tasks.
 Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning (Task 1). The first step in a Fire PRA is to
define the physical boundary of the analysis, and to divide the area within that boundary
into analysis compartments.
 Fire PRA Component Selection (Task 2). The selection of components that are to be
credited for plant shutdown following a fire is a critical step in any Fire PRA. Components
selected would generally include many, but not necessarily all components credited in the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R post-fire SSD analysis. Additional components will likely be selected,
potentially including most but not all components credited in the plant’s internal events PRA.
Also, the proposed methodology would likely introduce components beyond either the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of
interest due to considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited
functions and components; as well as due to concerns about fire effects on instrumentation
used by the plant crew to respond to the event.
 Fire PRA Cable Selection (Task 3). This task provides instructions and technical
considerations associated with identifying cables supporting those components selected in
Task 2. In previous Fire PRA methods (such as EPRI FIVE and Fire PRA Implementation
1-2
Guide) this task was relegated to the SSD analysis and its associated databases.
This document offers a more structured set of rules for selection of cables.
 Qualitative Screening (Task 4). This task identifies fire analysis compartments that can be
shown to have little or no risk significance without quantitative analysis. Fire compartments
may be screened out if they contain no components or cables identified in Tasks 2 and 3, and
if they cannot lead to a plant trip due to either plant procedures, an automatic trip signal, or
technical specification requirements.
 Plant Fire-Induced Risk Model (Task 5). This task discusses steps for the development
of a logic model that reflects plant response following a fire. Specific instructions have been
provided for treatment of fire-specific procedures or preplans. These procedures may impact
availability of functions and components, or include fire-specific operator actions
(e.g., self-induced-station-blackout).
 Fire Ignition Frequency (Task 6). This task describes the approach to develop frequency
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Significant changes from the EPRI FIVE
method have been made in this task. The changes generally relate to use of challenging
events, considerations associated with data quality, and increased use of a fully component-
based ignition frequency model (as opposed to the location/component-based model used,
for example, in FIVE).
 Quantitative Screening (Task 7). A Fire PRA allows the screening of fire compartments and
scenarios based on their contribution to fire risk. This approach considers the cumulative risk
associated with the screened compartments (i.e., the ones not retained for detailed analysis)
to ensure that a true estimate of fire risk profile (as opposed to vulnerability) is obtained.
 Scoping Fire Modeling (Task 8). This step provides simple rules to define and screen fire
ignition sources (and therefore fire scenarios) in an unscreened fire compartment.
 Detailed Circuit Failure Analysis (Task 9). This task provides an approach and technical
considerations for identifying how the failure of specific cables will impact the components
included in the Fire PRA SSD plant response model.
 Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis (Task 10). This task considers the relative
likelihood of various circuit failure modes. This added level of resolution may be a desired
option for those fire scenarios that are significant contributors to the risk. The methodology
provided in this document benefits from the knowledge gained from the tests performed in
response to the circuit failure issue.
 Detailed Fire Modeling (Task 11). This task describes the method to examine the
consequences of a fire. This includes consideration of scenarios involving single
compartments, multiple fire compartments, and the main control room. Factors considered
include initial fire characteristics, fire growth in a fire compartment or across fire
compartments, detection and suppression, electrical raceway fire barrier systems, and
damage from heat and smoke. Special consideration is given to turbine generator (T/G) fires,
hydrogen fires, high-energy arcing faults, cable fires, and main control board (MCB) fires.
There are considerable improvements in the method for this task over the EPRI FIVE and
Fire PRA Implementation Guide in nearly all technical areas.
1-3
 Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis (Task 12). This task considers operator actions
for manipulation of plant components. The analysis task procedure provides structured
instructions for identification and inclusion of these actions in the Fire PRA. The procedure
also provides instructions for incorporating human error probabilities (HEPs) into the fire
PRA analysis. (Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not develop a detailed fire
HRA methodology. Fire-specific HRA guidance can be found in NUREG-1921, EPRI
1019196, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines – Draft Report for
Comment, November 2009. Publication of the final Fire HRA report remains pending.)
 Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach to help identify
the risk from any potential interactions between an earthquake and fire.
 Fire Risk Quantification (Task 14). The task summarizes what is to be done
for quantification of the fire risk results.
 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analyses (Task 15). This task describes the approach to follow
for identifying and treating uncertainties throughout the Fire PRA process. The treatment
may vary from quantitative estimation and propagation of uncertainties where possible
(e.g., in fire frequency and non-suppression probability) to identification of sources without
quantitative estimation. The treatment may also include one-at-a-time variation of individual
parameter values or modeling approaches to determine the effect on the overall fire risk
(sensitivity analysis).
1.2 How to Use this Package
This package is intended to provide the background information necessary to perform some of
the problem sets of the Course/Seminar. Please note:
1. All Course/Seminar attendees are expected to review Section 2 of this document and become
familiar with the power plant defined in that section.
2. The instructors of each module will provide questions or case study problem sets and will
guide the attendees to sections relevant to each specific problem set. Attendees will be
expected to review those relevant sections and use the information or examples provided in
those sections to complete the assigned problem set.
3. Do not make any additional assumptions in terms of equipment, systems, or plant layout
other than those presented in the problem package without consulting the instructor.
1.3 References
1. EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear
Power Facilities, September 2005.
2. EPRI 1019196, NUREG-1921, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines

– Draft Report for Comment, Technical Update, November 2009.
3. EPRI 1019195, NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide –
Draft Report for Comment, January 2010.
1-4
1-5
1-6
2
EXAMPLE CASE PLANT - GENERAL INFORMATION
2.1 Overall Plant Description
This chapter provides background information about the fictitious plant used in the hands-on
problem sets of Modules 1, 2 and 3. Note that the examples used in Module 4 (HRA) are not
based on the example case plant.
The following notes generally describe the example case plant, including its layout:
1. The plant is a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) consisting of one Primary Coolant Loop,
which consists of one Steam Generator, one Reactor Coolant Pump and the Pressurizer. A
Chemical Volume Control System and multiple train High Pressure Injection system, as well
as a single train Residual Heat Removal system interface with the primary system
2. The secondary side of the plant contains a Main Steam and Feedwater loop associated with
the single Steam Generator, and a multiple train Auxiliary Feedwater System to provide
decay heat removal.
3. The operating conditions and parameters of this plant are similar to that of a typical PWR.
For example, the primary side runs at about 2,200 psi pressure. The steam generator can
reject the decay heat after a reactor trip. There is a possibility for feed and bleed.
4. It is assumed that the reactor is initially at 100% power.
5. The plant is laid out in accordance with Figures 1 through 9. The plant consists of a
Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Diesel Generator Building and
the Yard. All other buildings and plant areas are shown but no details are provided.
2.2 Systems Description
This section provides a more detailed description of the various systems within the plant and
addressed in the case studies. Each system is described separately.
2.2.1 Primary Coolant System
The following notes and Figure 10 define the Primary Coolant System:
1. The Primary Coolant Loop consists of the Reactor Vessel, one Reactor Coolant Pump, and
one Steam Generator and the Pressurizer, along with associated piping.
2-1
2. The Pressurizer is equipped with a normally closed Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV),
which is an air operated valve (AOV-1) with its pilot solenoid operated valve (SOV-1).
There is also a normally open motor operated block valve (MOV-13) upstream of the PORV.
3. The Pressure Transmitter (PT-1) on the pressurizer provides the pressure reading for the
Primary Coolant Loop and is used to signal a switch from Chemical Volume Control System
(CVCS) to High Pressure Injection (HPI) configuration. That is, PT-1 provides the automatic
signal for high pressure injection on low RCS pressure. It also provides the automatic signal
to open the PORV on high RCS pressure.
4. A nitrogen bottle provides the necessary pressurized gas to operate the PORV in case of loss
of plant air but does not have sufficient capacity to support long-term operation.
2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High Pressure Injection Systems
The following notes and Figure 10 define the shared CVCS and HPI System:
1. The CVCS normally operates during power generation.
2. Valve type and position information include:
Status on Loss of Power Position During Motor

Valve Type
(or Air as applicable) Normal Operation Power (hp)
AOV-2 Air Operated Valve Fail Closed Open N/A
AOV-3 Air Operated Valve Fail Open Open N/A

MOV-1 Motor Operated Fail As Is Closed >5
Valve
MOV-2 Motor Operated Fail As Is Open <5
Valve
MOV-3 Motor Operated Fail As Is Closed <5
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
3. One of the two HPI pumps runs when the CVCS is operating.
4. One of the two HPI pumps is sufficient to provide all injection needs after a reactor trip and
all postulated accident conditions.
5. HPI and CVCS use the same set of pumps.
2-2
6. On a need for safety injection, the following lineup takes place automatically:
 AOV-3 closes
 MOV-5 and MOV-6 open
 MOV-2 closes.
 Both HPI pumps receive start signal, the stand-by pump starts and the operating pump
continues operating.
 MOV-1 and MOV-9 open.
7. HPI is used for re-circulating sump water after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). For
recirculation, upon proper indication of low RWST level and sufficient sump level, the
operator manually opens MOV-3 and MOV-4, closes MOV-5 and MOV-6, starts the RHR
pump, and aligns CCW to the RHR heat exchanger.
8. RWST provides the necessary cooling water for the HPI pumps during injection. During the
recirculation mode, HPI pump cooling is provided by the recirculation water.
9. There are level indications of the RWST and containment sump levels that are used by the
operator to know when to switch from high pressure injection to recirculation cooling mode.
10. The Air Compressor provides the motive power for operating the Air Operated Valves but
the detailed connections to the various valves are not shown.
2.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System
The following notes and Figure 10 define the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System:
1. The design pressure of the RHR system downstream of MOV-8 is low.
Status on Loss of Position During Motor

Valve Type
Power Normal Operation Power (hp)
MOV-7 Motor Operated Fail As Is Closed (breaker >5
Valve racked out)
Valve
MOV-20 Motor Operated Fails As Is Closed >5
Valve
3. Operators have to align the system for shutdown cooling, after reactor vessel de-
pressurization from the control room by opening MOV-7 and MOV-8, turn the RHR pump
on and establish cooling in the RHR Heat Exchanger.
2.2.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System
The following notes and Figure 11 define the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System:
2-3
1. One of three pumps of the AFW system can provide the necessary secondary side cooling for
reactor heat removal after a reactor trip.
2. Pump AFW-A is motor-driven, AFW-B is steam turbine-driven, and AFW-C is diesel-
driven.
Position During
Status on Loss Motor
Valve Type Normal Power (hp)
of Power
Operation
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
4. Upon a plant trip, Main Feedwater isolates and AFW automatically initiates by starting
AFW-A and AFW-C pumps, opening the steam valves MOV-14 and MOV-15 to operate the
AFW-B steam-driven pump, and opening valves MOV-10, MOV-11, and MOV-18.
5. The CST has sufficient capacity to provide core cooling until cold shutdown is achieved.
6. The test return paths through MOVs-16, 17, and 19 are low flow lines and do not represent
significant diversions of AFW flow even if the valves are open
7. There is a high motor temperature alarm on AFW pump A. Upon indication in the control
room, the operator is to stop the pump immediately and have the condition subsequently
checked by dispatching a local operator.
8. The atmospheric relief valve opens, as needed, automatically to remove decay heat if/should
the main condenser path be unavailable.
9. The connections to the Main Turbine and Main Feedwater are shown in terms of one Main
Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and a check valve. Portions of the plant beyond these
interfacing components will not be addressed in the course.
2-4
10. Atmospheric dump valve AOV-4 is used to depressurize the steam generator in case of a tube
rupture.
2.2.6 Electrical System
Figure 12 is a one-line diagram of the Electrical Distribution System (EDS). Safety related buses
are identified by the use of alphabetic letters (e.g., SWGR-A, MCC-B1, etc.) while the non-
safety buses use numbers as part of their designations (e.g., SWGR-1 and MCC-2).
The safety-related portions of the EDS include 4160 volt switchgear buses SWGR-A and
SWGR-B, which are normally powered from the startup transformer SUT-1. In the event that
off-site power is lost, these switchgear receive power from emergency diesel generators EDG-A
and EDG-B. The 480 volt safety-related load centers (LC-A and LC-B) receive power from the
switchgear buses via station service transformers SST-A and SST-B. The motor control centers
(MCC-A1 and MCC-B1) are powered directly from the load centers. The MCCs provide motive
power to several safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs) and to DC buses DC BUS-A and
DC BUS-B via Battery Chargers BC-A and BC-B. The two 125 VDC batteries, BAT-A and
BAT-B, supply power to the DC buses in the event that all AC power is lost. DC control power
for the 4160 safety-related switchgear is provided through distribution panels PNL-A and PNL-
B. The 120 VAC vital loads are powered from buses VITAL-A and VITAL-B, which in turn
receive their power from the DC buses through inverters INV-A and INV-B.
The non-safety portions of the EDS reflect a similar hierarchy of power flow. There are
important differences however. For example, 4160 volt SWGR-1 and SWGR-2 are normally
energized from the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT-1) with backup power available from SUT-
1. A cross-tie breaker allows one non-safety switchgear bus to provide power to the other. Non-
safety load centers LC-1 and LC-2 are powered at 480 volts from the 4160 volt switchgear via
SST-1 and SST-2. These load centers provide power directly to the non-safety MCCs. The non-
vital DC bus (DC BUS-1) can be powered from either MCC via an automatic transfer switch
(ATS-1) and battery charger BC-1 or directly from the 125 volt DC battery, BAT-1.
2.2.7 Other Systems
The following systems and equipment are mentioned in the plant description but not explicitly
included in the fire PRA:
 Component Cooling Water (CCW) – provides cooling to Letdown Heat Exchanger and the
RHR Heat Exchanger– assumed to be available at all times.
 It is assumed that the control rods can successfully insert and shutdown the reactor under all
conditions.
 It is assumed that the ECCS and other AFW related instrumentation and control circuits
(other than those specifically noted in the diagrams) exist and are perfect such that in all
cases, they would sense the presence of a LOCA or otherwise a need to trip the plant and
provide safety injection and auxiliary feedwater by sending the proper signals to the affected
components (i.e., close valves and start pumps, insert control rods, etc.).
2-5
 Instrument air is required for operation of AOV-1, AOV-2, AOV-3, and AOV-4.
2.3 Plant Layout
The following notes augment the information provided in Figures 1 through 9 (Drawings A-01
through A09):
 The main structures of the plant are as follows:
- Containment
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Diesel Generator Building
- Intake Structure
- Security Building
 In Figure 1 (Drawing A-01), the dashed lines represent the fence that separates two major
parts: the Yard and Switchyard.
 Switchyard is located outside the Yard with a separate security access.
 CST, RWST, UAT, Main Transformer and SUT are located in the open in the Yard.
 All walls shown in Figures 1 through 8 (Drawings A-01 through A-08) should be assumed as
fire rated.
 All doors shown in Figures 1 through 8 (Drawings A-01 through A-08) should be assumed as
fire rated and normally closed.
 Battery rooms A and B are located inside the respective switchgear rooms with 1-hour rated
walls, ceilings and doors.
 All cable trays are open type. Vertical cable trays are designated as VCBT and horizontal
cable trays as HCBT. For horizontal cable trays, the number following the letters indicate
the elevation of the cable tray. For example, HCBT+35A denotes a horizontal cable tray at
elevation +35 ft.
 The stairwell in the Aux. Building provides access to all the floors of the building. The doors
and walls are fire rated and doors are normally closed.
2.4 SNPP Drawings
The following 12 pages (pages 2-7 through 2-18) provide schematic drawings of the SNPP.
Drawings A-01 through A-09 are general physical layout drawings providing plan and elevation
views of the plant. These drawings also identify the location of important plant equipment.
Drawing A-10 provides a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) for the primary coolant
system, and drawing A-11 provides a P&ID for the secondary systems. Drawing A-12 is a
simplified one-line diagram of the plant power distribution system.
2-6
INTAKE
14
STRUCTURE
AA
SECURITY
CST BLDG.
7
8B
DG DG-B CONTAINMENT
SWITCH
BLDG.
YARD 8A 12
DG-A
TURBINE BLDG.
UAT RWST
MAIN AUX BLDG.

TRANSFORMER
SUT
BATTERY
15 ROOM 1
AA
13 YARD
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-01
Date:
PLANT LAYOUT
6/22/09
GENERAL Revision No.:
1
1
PLANT AIR
SOV-1 7
N2
AOV-1
MOV-13
PRESSURIZER
+70 FT
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
+55 FT
CABLE SPREADING ROOM
+40 FT
SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 5 6 9 10 11
RCP-1 +20 FT
MOV-7
CHARGING PUMP ROOM 2
+0 FT GRADE
RHR PUMP ROOM 4A 4B
-20 FT
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-02
PLANT LAYOUT Date:
7/21/11
SECTION AA Revision No.:
2
MOV-4 MOV-3
MOV-8
MOV-10
MOV-11
RHR
PUMP
MOV-14 MOV-20
MOV-15
AFW-B
AFW-A
NOTES:
RHR
HX
1. VERTICAL PIPE PENETRATION
TO UPPER ELEVATION.
2. PENETRATION TO UPPER
4A NOTE 1 FLOOR IS SEALED.
HCBT 0
(NOTE 2) 4B UP
HCBT: HORIZONTAL CABLE TRAY
VCBT: VERTICAL CABLE TRAY
VCBT 10
(NOTE 2)
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-03
Date:
AUX BLDG
7/21/11
EL. - 20FT Revision No.:
2
MOV-9 MOV-1 AOV-3
MOV-5
CV-3
RWST
HPI-B MOV-6
HPI-A
AOV-2
NOTE:
CV-4 CV-2
1. VERTICAL PIPE PENETRATING
LETDOWN
VCT
NOTE 1 MOV-2 THE FLOOR.
HX
UP
VCBT 0A
VCBT 0B
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-04
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
EL. 0FT Revision No.:
1
7
10 11
BATTERY BATTERY
120V DC-B
5 6
BC-A INV-A PNL-A 120V DC-A

SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR
ROOM A ROOM B
ROOM A ROOM B
SST-A SST-B
4KV BUS-B
BC-B INV-B PNL-B
4KV BUS-A
LC-B
LC-A
MCC-A MCC-B
SWG ACCESS HCBT: HORIZONTAL CABLE TRAY
ROOM VCBT: VERTICAL CABLE TRAY
UP
120VAC-B
HCBT +37B 120VAC-A
9
HCBT +35A
VCBT +20B HCBT +37B

VCBT +20A
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-05
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
EL. +20FT Revision No.:
1
HCBT +50A VCBT +40B
VCBT +40A HCBT +50B

UP
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-06
AUX BLDG Date:
6/22/09
EL. +40FT
Revision No.:
1
7
MCB
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
1
SHIFT
KITCHEN SUPERVISOR
OFFICE
CONTROL
ROOM
ACCESS UP
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-07
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
MAIN CONTROL ROOM Revision No.:
1
CST
4KV BUS 1 SST-1 LC-1 V-12
AOV-4
4KV BUS 2 SST-2 LC-2

1
MOV-18
AFW-C
(Diesel Driven)
MOV-19
MOV-17
MCC-1
MCC-2
MOV-16
12
ATS
BC-1
250V/DC BUS-1
HCBT +10A
HCBT +10B
BATTERY ROOM
BAT-1 15 AIR COMPRESSOR 1
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-08
Date:
TURBINE BLDG
6/22/09
1
MOV-14, MOV-15
MOV-17, MOV-16, MOV-19
MOV-13 AUX. FEEDWATER PUMP A, PUMP C
AOV-4 AOV-1 MOV-11, MOV-10, MOV-18
TURBINE
PT-1 SEE DETAIL

BELOW
MAIN FEED
PRESSURELZER
DG-A DG-B
FEEDWATER
CONTROL
AUX.
ELECTRICAL TURBINE AND
MAIN FEED RX CONTROL HPI + RHR SW +
CB-1 CCW
CB-7
3' 3' 2' 2' 4'
CB-6 CB-4 CB-2 CB-3 CB-5
TI-1 RHR PUMP

LI-2 MOV-5
LI-1 MOV-6
LI-4 MOV-3
LI-3 MOV-4
PUMP HPI-A MOV-1
PUMP HPI-B MOV-9
AOV-2
MOV-2 AOV-3
Drawing No.:
MOV-20 SNPP A-09

MOV-7 MOV-8
Date:
DETAIL FROM MAIN CONTROL ROOM
6/22/09
ABOVE
MAIN CONTROL BOARD Revision No.:
1
SKID MOUNTED
AIR COMPRESSOR
OPERATED VIA
SOV-1 WITH N2 AIR
BACKED BY AIR SUPPLY
FC
AOV-1 MOV-13
(PORV) CCW LI-1 LI-2
SG TI-1
FC RWST
PT-1
PZR LETDOWN HEAT VCT
EXCHANGER
AOV-2
OPERATED
VIA SOV-2
(AIR)
MOV-2
MOV-6
MOV-5
FO
RV
MOV-7 AOV-3
RCP-1 OPERATED
CV-2
VIA SOV
(AIR) HPI-A
MOV-1
CV-3
MOV-9
MOV-20
HPI-B
CV-4
LI-3 LI-4
MOV-3
MOV-4
RHR HEAT
EXCHANGER
MOV-8
RHR PUMP
SNPP
CCW Drawing No.:
A-10
Date:
PRIMARY SYSTEM 7/21/11

P&ID
Revision No.:
2
ATOMOSPHERE
RELIEF VALVE
AOV-4
TO TURBINE
MSIV CONDENSER
SG GOVERNOR
STEAM
TURBINE
MOV-14 MOV-15
CST
MOV-11
AFW-B
(STEAM) A-1 V-11
L.O.
MOV-10
AFW-A
MOV-18
AFW-C
(DIESEL DRIVEN)
FROM
FEEDWATER
MOV-19
MOV-16
MOV-17
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-11
Date:
SECONDARY SYSTEM 6/22/09

P&ID
Revision No.:
1
SWYD OFF-SITE POWER
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1
SWGR-1 SWGR-2 SWGR-A SWGR-B
RCP-1 Spare HPI-A AFW-A RHR-B HPI-B

SST-1 SST-2 SST-A SST-B
LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-A1 MCC-B1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(Racked Out)
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-18
MOV-17
MOV-20
MOV-18
MOV-19
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-7
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
ATS-1
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
BAT-1 DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
DC BUS-1
Vol
Reg
INV-A PNL-A PNL-B INV-B
MOV-11
MOV-14
NON-VITAL
DC LOADS
AOV-4 MOV-15
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SOV-2
SOV-3
SWGR-B
SWGR-A
EDG-A
LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PT-1 LI-2 LI-4
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-12
Date:
ELECTRICAL 7/21/11
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
Revision No.:
2
3
MODULE 1: PRA/SYSTEMS
The following is a short description of the Fire PRA technical tasks covered in Module 1. For
further details, refer to the individual task descriptions in Volume 2 of EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850.
selected would generally include many components credited in the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R
post-fire SSD analysis. Additional components will likely be selected, potentially including
any and all components credited in the plant’s internal events PRA. Also, the proposed
methodology would likely introduce components beyond either the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R
list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of interest due to
considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited functions and
components.
for manipulation of plant components. Task 12 is covered in limited detail in the
PRA/Systems module. In particular, those aspects of Task 12 that deal with identifying and
incorporating human failure events (HFEs) into the plant response model are discussed.
Methods for quantifying human error probabilities (HEPs) are deferred to Module 4.
3-1
3-2
4
MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS
NUREG/CR-6850.
4-1
5
MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS
NUREG/CR-6850.
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Ignition frequencies are provided for 37 item
types that are categorized by ignition source type and location within the plant. For example,
ignition frequencies are provided for transient fires in the Turbine Buildings and in the
Auxiliary Buildings. A method is provided on how to specialize these frequencies to the
specific cases and conditions.
 Scoping fire Modeling (Task 8). Scoping fire modeling is the first task in the Fire PRA
framework where fire modeling tools are used to identify ignition sources that may impact
the fire risk of the plant. Screening some of the ignition sources, along with the applications
of severity factors to the unscreened ones, may reduce the compartment fire frequency
previously calculated in Task 6.
compartments, detection and suppression, electrical raceway fire barrier systems), and
 Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach for identifying
potential interactions between an earthquake and fire.
5-1
6
MODULE 4: FIRE PRA HUMAN RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
further details relative to this technical task, refer to the individual task descriptions in Volume 2
of EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850.
PRA analysis.
Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not develop a detailed fire HRA methodology.
Training module 4 is instead based on a joint EPRI/RES project as documented in NUREG-
1921, EPRI 1019196, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines – Draft
Report for Comment. Publication of the final report remains pending. The training materials
presented here are based on the draft guidance including consideration of public review
comments received and the team’s response to those comments.
6-1
7
MODULE 5: ADVANCED FIRE MODELING
Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not provide detailed guidance on the application
of fire modeling tools. Rather, the base methodology document assumes that the analyst will
apply a range of computation fire modeling tools to support the analysis, provides recommended
practice relative to the general development/definition of fire scenarios and provides
recommendations for characterizing of various fire sources (e.g., heat release rate transient
profiles and peak heat release rate distribution curves). The question of selecting and applying
appropriate fire modeling tools was left to the analyst’s discretion.

1924, EPRI 1019195, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide – Draft Report for
Comment. Publication of the final report remains pending. The training materials presented here
are based on the draft guidance including consideration of public review comments received and
the team’s response to those comments.
7-2
EPRI/NRC-RES
Fire PRA Course
Revision Date: June 21, 2011
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Division of Risk Analysis

3412 Hillview Avenue Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
Palo Alto, CA 94303 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
2
PREPARERS
TECHNICAL TEAM LEADS:

Bijan Najafi Steven P. Nowlen
Science Applications International Corp. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
1671 Dell Ave, Suite 100 PO Box 5800
Campbell, CA 95008 Albuquerque, NM 87185-0748
PROJECT MANAGERS:
Richard Wachowiak J. S. Hyslop

Electric Power Research Institute U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
Fire Research Branch
iii
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 How to Use this Package ............................................................................................. 1-4
1.3 References .................................................................................................................. 1-4
2 EXAMPLE CASE PLANT - GENERAL INFORMATION ......................................................... 2-1

2.1 Overall Plant Description ............................................................................................. 2-1
2.2 Systems Description .................................................................................................... 2-1
2.2.1 Primary Coolant System .......................................................................................... 2-1
2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High Pressure Injection Systems ............................ 2-2
2.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System .............................................................................. 2-3
2.2.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System .................................................................................... 2-3
2.2.6 Electrical System ..................................................................................................... 2-5
2.2.7 Other Systems ......................................................................................................... 2-5
2.3 Plant Layout ................................................................................................................. 2-6
2.4 SNPP Drawings.............................................................................................................. 2-6
3 MODULE 1: PRA/SYSTEMS .................................................................................................. 3-1
4 MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 4-1
5 MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 5-1
6 MODULE 4: FIRE PRA HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS .................................................... 6-1
7 MODULE 5: ADVANCED FIRE MODELING .......................................................................... 7-2
v
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater

ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram
BWR Boiling Water Reactor
CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability
CF Cable (Configuration) Factors
CCW Component Cooling Water
CDF Core Damage Frequency
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CLERP Conditional Large Early Release Probability
CM Corrective Maintenance
CRS Cable and Raceway (Database) System
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
EF Error Factor
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure
EPR Ethylene-Propylene Rubber
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FEDB Fire Events Database
FEP Fire Emergency Procedure
FHA Fire Hazards Analysis
FIVE Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI TR 100370)
FMRC Factory Mutual Research Corporation
FPRAIG Fire PRA Implementation Guide (EPRI TR 105928)
FRSS Fire Risk Scoping Study (NUREG/CR-5088)
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
HEAF High Energy Arcing Fault
HEP Human Error Probability
HFE Human Failure Event
HPI High Pressure Injection
HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection
HRA Human Reliability Analysis
HRR Heat Release Rate
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
ICDP Incremental Core Damage Probability
ILERP Incremental Large Early Release Probability
vii
IPE Individual Plant Examination
IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events
IS Ignition Source
ISLOCA Interfacing Systems Loss of Coolant Accident
KS Key Switch
LERF Large Early Release Frequency
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LOC Loss of Control
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident
MCC Motor Control Center
MCR Main Control Room
MG Motor-Generator
MOV Motor Operated Valve
MQH McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad’s Method
MS Main Steam
NC No Consequence
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NEIL Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NPSH Net Positive Suction Head
NQ cable Non-Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PE Polyethylene
PM Preventive Maintenance
PMMA Polymethyl Methacrylate
PORV Power Operated Relief Valve
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PSF Performance Shaping Factor
PVC Polyvinyl Chloride
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
Q cable Qualified (IEEE-383) cable
RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
RCS Reactor Coolant System
RDAT Computer program for Bayesian analysis
RES The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (at NRC)
RHR Residual Heat Removal
RPS Reactor Protection System
RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank
SDP Significance Determination Process
SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture
SI Safety Injection
SO Spurious Operation
SOV Solenoid Operated Valve
SRV Safety Relief Valve
viii
SSD Safe Shutdown
SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List
SUT Start-up Transformer
T/G Turbine/Generator
TGB Turbine-Generator Building
TSP Transfer Switch Panel
UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer
VCT Volume Control Tank
VTT Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus (Technical Research Centre of Finland)
XLPE Cross-Linked Polyethylene
ZOI Zone of Influence
ix
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Electric Power Research Institute under a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperative Nuclear Safety Research have been
developing state of the art methods for conduct of fire PRA. In September 2005, this work
produced the “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” EPRI
1011989, and NUREG/CR-6850 [1].
A Fire PRA Course has been put together to train interested parties in the application of this
methodology. The Course/Seminar is provided in five parallel modules. The first three modules
are based directly on Reference [1]. However, that document did not cover fire human reliability
analysis (HRA) methods in detail. For 2010, the training materials were enhanced to include a
fourth module based on a more recent EPRI/RES collaboration and a draft guidance document,
EPRI 1019196, NUREG-1921 [2] published in late 2009. The training materials are based on
this draft document including the consideration of public comments received on the draft report
and the team’s responses to those comments. For 2011 a fifth training module on Advanced Fire
Modeling techniques and concepts has been added to the course. This module is based on the
another joint RES/EPRI collaboration and a draft guidance published in January 2010, EPRI
1019195, NUREG-1934 [3].
The four training modules are:

 Module 1: PRA/Systems Analysis - This module covers the technical tasks for development
of the system response to a fire including human failure events. Specifically, this module
covers Tasks/Sections 2, 4, 5, 7, 14, and 15 of Reference [1].
 Module 2: Electrical Analysis – This module covers the technical tasks for analysis of
electrical failures as the result of a fire. Specifically, this module covers Tasks/Sections 3, 9,
and 10 of Reference [1].
 Module 3: Fire Analysis – This module covers technical tasks involved in development of
fire scenarios from initiation to target (e.g., cable) impact. Specifically, this module covers
Tasks/Sections 1, 6, 8, 11, and 13 of Reference [1].
 Module 4: Fire Human Reliability Analysis: This module covers the technical tasks
associated with identifying and analyzing operator actions and performance during a
postulated fire scenario. Specifically, this module covers Task 12 as outlined in Reference
[1] based on the application of the approaches documented in Reference [2].
1-1
 Module 5: Advanced Fire Modeling: This module is new for the 2011 training course and
covers the fundamentals of fire science and provided practical implementation guidance for
the application of fire modeling in support of a fire PRA. Module 5 covers fire modeling
applications for Tasks 8 and 11 as outlined in Reference [1] based on the material presented
in Reference [3].
Integral to Modules 1, 2 and 3 is a set of hands-on problems based on a fictitious, simplified

nuclear power plant. The same power plant is used in all three modules. This document
provides the background information for the problem sets of each module. Clearly, the power
plant defined in this package is an extremely simplified one that in many cases does not meet any
regulatory requirements or good engineering practices. Design features presented are focused on
bringing forward the various aspects of the Fire PRA methodology. This package includes a
general description of the power plant and the internal events PRA needed as input to the Fire
PRA.
For Module 4 and 5, independent sets of examples are used to illustrate key points of the analysis
procedures. The examples for these two modules are not tied to the simplified plant. Module 4
uses examples that were derived based largely on pilot applications of the proposed fire HRA
methods and on independent work of the EPRI and RES HRA teams. The examples for
Module 5 were taken directly from Reference [3] and represent a range of typical NPP fire
scenarios across a range of complexity and that highlight some of the computation challenges
associated with the NPP fire PRA fire modeling applications.
The instruction package for specific technical tasks is provided in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 which
are organized by Modules (see above). A short description of the Fire PRA technical tasks is
provided below. For further details, refer to the individual task descriptions in EPRI 1011989,
NUREG/CR-6850, Volume 2. The figure presented at the end of this chapter provides a
simplified flow chart for the analysis process and indicates which training module covers each of
the analysis tasks.
selected would generally include many, but not necessarily all components credited in the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R post-fire SSD analysis. Additional components will likely be selected,
potentially including most but not all components credited in the plant’s internal events PRA.
Also, the proposed methodology would likely introduce components beyond either the 10
CFR 50 Appendix R list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of
interest due to considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited
functions and components; as well as due to concerns about fire effects on instrumentation
used by the plant crew to respond to the event.
1-2
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Significant changes from the EPRI FIVE
method have been made in this task. The changes generally relate to use of challenging
events, considerations associated with data quality, and increased use of a fully component-
based ignition frequency model (as opposed to the location/component-based model used,
for example, in FIVE).
 Scoping Fire Modeling (Task 8). This step provides simple rules to define and screen fire
ignition sources (and therefore fire scenarios) in an unscreened fire compartment.
compartments, detection and suppression, electrical raceway fire barrier systems, and
There are considerable improvements in the method for this task over the EPRI FIVE and
Fire PRA Implementation Guide in nearly all technical areas.
1-3
PRA analysis. (Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not develop a detailed fire
HRA methodology. Fire-specific HRA guidance can be found in NUREG-1921, EPRI
1019196, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines – Draft Report for
Comment, November 2009. Publication of the final Fire HRA report remains pending.)
 Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach to help identify
the risk from any potential interactions between an earthquake and fire.
1.2 How to Use this Package
This package is intended to provide the background information necessary to perform some of
the problem sets of the Course/Seminar. Please note:
1. All Course/Seminar attendees are expected to review Section 2 of this document and become
familiar with the power plant defined in that section.
2. The instructors of each module will provide questions or case study problem sets and will
guide the attendees to sections relevant to each specific problem set. Attendees will be
expected to review those relevant sections and use the information or examples provided in
those sections to complete the assigned problem set.
3. Do not make any additional assumptions in terms of equipment, systems, or plant layout
other than those presented in the problem package without consulting the instructor.
1.3 References
1. EPRI 1011989, NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear
Power Facilities, September 2005.
2. EPRI 1019196, NUREG-1921, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines

– Draft Report for Comment, Technical Update, November 2009.
3. EPRI 1019195, NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide –
Draft Report for Comment, January 2010.
1-4
1-5
1-6
2
EXAMPLE CASE PLANT - GENERAL INFORMATION
2.1 Overall Plant Description
This chapter provides background information about the fictitious plant used in the hands-on
problem sets of Modules 1, 2 and 3. Note that the examples used in Module 4 (HRA) are not
based on the example case plant.
The following notes generally describe the example case plant, including its layout:
1. The plant is a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) consisting of one Primary Coolant Loop,
which consists of one Steam Generator, one Reactor Coolant Pump and the Pressurizer. A
Chemical Volume Control System and multiple train High Pressure Injection system, as well
as a single train Residual Heat Removal system interface with the primary system
2. The secondary side of the plant contains a Main Steam and Feedwater loop associated with
the single Steam Generator, and a multiple train Auxiliary Feedwater System to provide
decay heat removal.
3. The operating conditions and parameters of this plant are similar to that of a typical PWR.
For example, the primary side runs at about 2,200 psi pressure. The steam generator can
reject the decay heat after a reactor trip. There is a possibility for feed and bleed.
4. It is assumed that the reactor is initially at 100% power.
5. The plant is laid out in accordance with Figures 1 through 9. The plant consists of a
Containment Building, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Diesel Generator Building and
the Yard. All other buildings and plant areas are shown but no details are provided.
2.2 Systems Description
This section provides a more detailed description of the various systems within the plant and
addressed in the case studies. Each system is described separately.
2.2.1 Primary Coolant System
The following notes and Figure 10 define the Primary Coolant System:
1. The Primary Coolant Loop consists of the Reactor Vessel, one Reactor Coolant Pump, and
one Steam Generator and the Pressurizer, along with associated piping.
2-1
2. The Pressurizer is equipped with a normally closed Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV),
which is an air operated valve (AOV-1) with its pilot solenoid operated valve (SOV-1).
There is also a normally open motor operated block valve (MOV-13) upstream of the PORV.
3. The Pressure Transmitter (PT-1) on the pressurizer provides the pressure reading for the
Primary Coolant Loop and is used to signal a switch from Chemical Volume Control System
(CVCS) to High Pressure Injection (HPI) configuration. That is, PT-1 provides the automatic
signal for high pressure injection on low RCS pressure. It also provides the automatic signal
to open the PORV on high RCS pressure.
4. A nitrogen bottle provides the necessary pressurized gas to operate the PORV in case of loss
of plant air but does not have sufficient capacity to support long-term operation.
2.2.2 Chemical Volume Control and High Pressure Injection Systems
The following notes and Figure 10 define the shared CVCS and HPI System:
1. The CVCS normally operates during power generation.
Status on Loss of Power Position During Motor

Valve Type
(or Air as applicable) Normal Operation Power (hp)
AOV-2 Air Operated Valve Fail Closed Open N/A
AOV-3 Air Operated Valve Fail Open Open N/A

Valve
MOV-2 Motor Operated Fail As Is Open <5
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
3. One of the two HPI pumps runs when the CVCS is operating.
4. One of the two HPI pumps is sufficient to provide all injection needs after a reactor trip and
all postulated accident conditions.
5. HPI and CVCS use the same set of pumps.
2-2
6. On a need for safety injection, the following lineup takes place automatically:
 AOV-3 closes
 MOV-5 and MOV-6 open
 MOV-2 closes.
 Both HPI pumps receive start signal, the stand-by pump starts and the operating pump
continues operating.
 MOV-1 and MOV-9 open.
7. HPI is used for re-circulating sump water after a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). For
recirculation, upon proper indication of low RWST level and sufficient sump level, the
operator manually opens MOV-3 and MOV-4, closes MOV-5 and MOV-6, starts the RHR
pump, and aligns CCW to the RHR heat exchanger.
8. RWST provides the necessary cooling water for the HPI pumps during injection. During the
recirculation mode, HPI pump cooling is provided by the recirculation water.
9. There are level indications of the RWST and containment sump levels that are used by the
operator to know when to switch from high pressure injection to recirculation cooling mode.
10. The Air Compressor provides the motive power for operating the Air Operated Valves but
the detailed connections to the various valves are not shown.
2.2.4 Residual Heat Removal System
The following notes and Figure 10 define the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System:
1. The design pressure of the RHR system downstream of MOV-8 is low.
Status on Loss of Position During Motor

Valve Type
Power Normal Operation Power (hp)
MOV-7 Motor Operated Fail As Is Closed (breaker >5
Valve racked out)
Valve
MOV-20 Motor Operated Fails As Is Closed >5
Valve
3. Operators have to align the system for shutdown cooling, after reactor vessel de-
pressurization from the control room by opening MOV-7 and MOV-8, turn the RHR pump
on and establish cooling in the RHR Heat Exchanger.
2.2.5 Auxiliary Feedwater System
The following notes and Figure 11 define the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System:
2-3
1. One of three pumps of the AFW system can provide the necessary secondary side cooling for
reactor heat removal after a reactor trip.
2. Pump AFW-A is motor-driven, AFW-B is steam turbine-driven, and AFW-C is diesel-
driven.
Position During
Status on Loss Motor
Valve Type Normal Power (hp)
of Power
Operation
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
Valve
4. Upon a plant trip, Main Feedwater isolates and AFW automatically initiates by starting
AFW-A and AFW-C pumps, opening the steam valves MOV-14 and MOV-15 to operate the
AFW-B steam-driven pump, and opening valves MOV-10, MOV-11, and MOV-18.
5. The CST has sufficient capacity to provide core cooling until cold shutdown is achieved.
6. The test return paths through MOVs-16, 17, and 19 are low flow lines and do not represent
significant diversions of AFW flow even if the valves are open
7. There is a high motor temperature alarm on AFW pump A. Upon indication in the control
room, the operator is to stop the pump immediately and have the condition subsequently
checked by dispatching a local operator.
8. The atmospheric relief valve opens, as needed, automatically to remove decay heat if/should
the main condenser path be unavailable.
9. The connections to the Main Turbine and Main Feedwater are shown in terms of one Main
Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) and a check valve. Portions of the plant beyond these
interfacing components will not be addressed in the course.
2-4
10. Atmospheric dump valve AOV-4 is used to depressurize the steam generator in case of a tube
rupture.
2.2.6 Electrical System
Figure 12 is a one-line diagram of the Electrical Distribution System (EDS). Safety related buses
are identified by the use of alphabetic letters (e.g., SWGR-A, MCC-B1, etc.) while the non-
safety buses use numbers as part of their designations (e.g., SWGR-1 and MCC-2).
The safety-related portions of the EDS include 4160 volt switchgear buses SWGR-A and
SWGR-B, which are normally powered from the startup transformer SUT-1. In the event that
off-site power is lost, these switchgear receive power from emergency diesel generators EDG-A
and EDG-B. The 480 volt safety-related load centers (LC-A and LC-B) receive power from the
switchgear buses via station service transformers SST-A and SST-B. The motor control centers
(MCC-A1 and MCC-B1) are powered directly from the load centers. The MCCs provide motive
power to several safety-related motor operated valves (MOVs) and to DC buses DC BUS-A and
DC BUS-B via Battery Chargers BC-A and BC-B. The two 125 VDC batteries, BAT-A and
BAT-B, supply power to the DC buses in the event that all AC power is lost. DC control power
for the 4160 safety-related switchgear is provided through distribution panels PNL-A and PNL-
B. The 120 VAC vital loads are powered from buses VITAL-A and VITAL-B, which in turn
receive their power from the DC buses through inverters INV-A and INV-B.
The non-safety portions of the EDS reflect a similar hierarchy of power flow. There are
important differences however. For example, 4160 volt SWGR-1 and SWGR-2 are normally
energized from the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT-1) with backup power available from SUT-
1. A cross-tie breaker allows one non-safety switchgear bus to provide power to the other. Non-
safety load centers LC-1 and LC-2 are powered at 480 volts from the 4160 volt switchgear via
SST-1 and SST-2. These load centers provide power directly to the non-safety MCCs. The non-
vital DC bus (DC BUS-1) can be powered from either MCC via an automatic transfer switch
(ATS-1) and battery charger BC-1 or directly from the 125 volt DC battery, BAT-1.
2.2.7 Other Systems
The following systems and equipment are mentioned in the plant description but not explicitly
included in the fire PRA:
 Component Cooling Water (CCW) – provides cooling to Letdown Heat Exchanger and the
RHR Heat Exchanger– assumed to be available at all times.
 It is assumed that the control rods can successfully insert and shutdown the reactor under all
conditions.
 It is assumed that the ECCS and other AFW related instrumentation and control circuits
(other than those specifically noted in the diagrams) exist and are perfect such that in all
cases, they would sense the presence of a LOCA or otherwise a need to trip the plant and
provide safety injection and auxiliary feedwater by sending the proper signals to the affected
components (i.e., close valves and start pumps, insert control rods, etc.).
2-5
 Instrument air is required for operation of AOV-1, AOV-2, AOV-3, and AOV-4.
2.3 Plant Layout
The following notes augment the information provided in Figures 1 through 9 (Drawings A-01
through A09):
 The main structures of the plant are as follows:
- Containment
- Auxiliary Building
- Turbine Building
- Diesel Generator Building
- Intake Structure
- Security Building
 In Figure 1 (Drawing A-01), the dashed lines represent the fence that separates two major
parts: the Yard and Switchyard.
 Switchyard is located outside the Yard with a separate security access.
 CST, RWST, UAT, Main Transformer and SUT are located in the open in the Yard.
 All walls shown in Figures 1 through 8 (Drawings A-01 through A-08) should be assumed as
fire rated.
 All doors shown in Figures 1 through 8 (Drawings A-01 through A-08) should be assumed as
fire rated and normally closed.
 Battery rooms A and B are located inside the respective switchgear rooms with 1-hour rated
walls, ceilings and doors.
 All cable trays are open type. Vertical cable trays are designated as VCBT and horizontal
cable trays as HCBT. For horizontal cable trays, the number following the letters indicate
the elevation of the cable tray. For example, HCBT+35A denotes a horizontal cable tray at
elevation +35 ft.
 The stairwell in the Aux. Building provides access to all the floors of the building. The doors
and walls are fire rated and doors are normally closed.
2.4 SNPP Drawings
The following 12 pages (pages 2-7 through 2-18) provide schematic drawings of the SNPP.
Drawings A-01 through A-09 are general physical layout drawings providing plan and elevation
views of the plant. These drawings also identify the location of important plant equipment.
Drawing A-10 provides a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) for the primary coolant
system, and drawing A-11 provides a P&ID for the secondary systems. Drawing A-12 is a
simplified one-line diagram of the plant power distribution system.
2-6
INTAKE
14
STRUCTURE
AA
SECURITY
CST BLDG.
7
8B
DG DG-B CONTAINMENT
SWITCH
BLDG.
YARD 8A 12
DG-A
TURBINE BLDG.
UAT RWST
MAIN AUX BLDG.

TRANSFORMER
SUT
BATTERY
15 ROOM 1
AA
13 YARD
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-01
Date:
PLANT LAYOUT
6/22/09
GENERAL Revision No.:
1
1
PLANT AIR
SOV-1 7
N2
AOV-1
MOV-13
PRESSURIZER
+70 FT
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
+55 FT
+40 FT
SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 5 6 9 10 11
RCP-1 +20 FT
MOV-7
CHARGING PUMP ROOM 2
+0 FT GRADE
RHR PUMP ROOM 4A 4B
-20 FT
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-02
PLANT LAYOUT Date:
7/21/11
SECTION AA Revision No.:
2
MOV-4 MOV-3
MOV-8
MOV-10
MOV-11
RHR
PUMP
MOV-14 MOV-20
MOV-15
AFW-B
AFW-A
NOTES:
RHR
HX
1. VERTICAL PIPE PENETRATION
TO UPPER ELEVATION.
2. PENETRATION TO UPPER
4A NOTE 1 FLOOR IS SEALED.
HCBT 0
(NOTE 2) 4B UP
VCBT 10
(NOTE 2)
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-03
Date:
AUX BLDG
7/21/11
EL. - 20FT Revision No.:
2
MOV-9 MOV-1 AOV-3
MOV-5
CV-3
RWST
HPI-B MOV-6
HPI-A
AOV-2
NOTE:
CV-4 CV-2
1. VERTICAL PIPE PENETRATING
LETDOWN
VCT
NOTE 1 MOV-2 THE FLOOR.
HX
UP
VCBT 0A
VCBT 0B
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-04
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
1
7
10 11
BATTERY BATTERY
120V DC-B
5 6
BC-A INV-A PNL-A 120V DC-A

SWITCHGEAR SWITCHGEAR
ROOM A ROOM B
ROOM A ROOM B
SST-A SST-B
4KV BUS-B
BC-B INV-B PNL-B
4KV BUS-A
LC-B
LC-A
MCC-A MCC-B
SWG ACCESS HCBT: HORIZONTAL CABLE TRAY
ROOM VCBT: VERTICAL CABLE TRAY
UP
120VAC-B
HCBT +37B 120VAC-A
9
HCBT +35A
VCBT +20B HCBT +37B

VCBT +20A
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-05
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
EL. +20FT Revision No.:
1
HCBT +50A VCBT +40B
VCBT +40A HCBT +50B

UP
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-06
AUX BLDG Date:
6/22/09
EL. +40FT
Revision No.:
1
7
MCB
MAIN CONTROL ROOM
1
SHIFT
KITCHEN SUPERVISOR
OFFICE
CONTROL
ROOM
ACCESS UP
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-07
Date:
AUX BLDG
6/22/09
MAIN CONTROL ROOM Revision No.:
1
CST
4KV BUS 1 SST-1 LC-1 V-12
AOV-4
4KV BUS 2 SST-2 LC-2

1
MOV-18
AFW-C
(Diesel Driven)
MOV-19
MOV-17
MCC-1
MCC-2
MOV-16
12
ATS
BC-1
250V/DC BUS-1
HCBT +10A
HCBT +10B
BATTERY ROOM
BAT-1 15 AIR COMPRESSOR 1
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-08
Date:
TURBINE BLDG
6/22/09
1
MOV-14, MOV-15
MOV-17, MOV-16, MOV-19
MOV-13 AUX. FEEDWATER PUMP A, PUMP C
AOV-4 AOV-1 MOV-11, MOV-10, MOV-18
TURBINE
PT-1 SEE DETAIL

BELOW
MAIN FEED
PRESSURELZER
DG-A DG-B
FEEDWATER
CONTROL
AUX.
ELECTRICAL TURBINE AND
MAIN FEED RX CONTROL HPI + RHR SW +
CB-1 CCW
CB-7
3' 3' 2' 2' 4'
CB-6 CB-4 CB-2 CB-3 CB-5
TI-1 RHR PUMP

LI-2 MOV-5
LI-1 MOV-6
LI-4 MOV-3
LI-3 MOV-4
PUMP HPI-A MOV-1
PUMP HPI-B MOV-9
AOV-2
MOV-2 AOV-3
Drawing No.:
MOV-20 SNPP A-09

MOV-7 MOV-8
Date:
DETAIL FROM MAIN CONTROL ROOM
6/22/09
ABOVE
MAIN CONTROL BOARD Revision No.:
1
SKID MOUNTED
AIR COMPRESSOR
OPERATED VIA
SOV-1 WITH N2 AIR
BACKED BY AIR SUPPLY
FC
AOV-1 MOV-13
(PORV) CCW LI-1 LI-2
SG TI-1
FC RWST
PT-1
PZR LETDOWN HEAT VCT
EXCHANGER
AOV-2
OPERATED
VIA SOV-2
(AIR)
MOV-2
MOV-6
MOV-5
FO
RV
MOV-7 AOV-3
RCP-1 OPERATED
CV-2
VIA SOV
(AIR) HPI-A
MOV-1
CV-3
MOV-9
MOV-20
HPI-B
CV-4
LI-3 LI-4
MOV-3
MOV-4
RHR HEAT
EXCHANGER
MOV-8
RHR PUMP
SNPP
CCW Drawing No.:
A-10
Date:
PRIMARY SYSTEM 7/21/11

P&ID
Revision No.:
2
ATOMOSPHERE
RELIEF VALVE
AOV-4
TO TURBINE
MSIV CONDENSER
SG GOVERNOR
STEAM
TURBINE
MOV-14 MOV-15
CST
MOV-11
AFW-B
(STEAM) A-1 V-11
L.O.
MOV-10
AFW-A
MOV-18
AFW-C
(DIESEL DRIVEN)
FROM
FEEDWATER
MOV-19
MOV-16
MOV-17
Drawing No.:
SNPP A-11
Date:
SECONDARY SYSTEM 6/22/09

P&ID
Revision No.:
1
SWYD OFF-SITE POWER
G EDG-A EDG-B
UAT-1 SUT-1
SWGR-1 SWGR-2 SWGR-A SWGR-B
RCP-1 Spare HPI-A AFW-A RHR-B HPI-B

SST-1 SST-2 SST-A SST-B
LC-1 LC-2 LC-A LC-B
COMP-1 MCC-A1 MCC-B1
MCC-1 MCC-2
(Racked Out)
MOV-10
MOV-13
MOV-18
MOV-17
MOV-20
MOV-18
MOV-19
MOV-1
MOV-3
MOV-5
MOV-7
MOV-2
MOV-4
MOV-6
MOV-8
MOV-9
ATS-1
BC-A BC-B
BAT-A BAT-B
BC-1
BAT-1 DC BUS-A DC BUS-B
DC BUS-1
Vol
Reg
INV-A PNL-A PNL-B INV-B
MOV-11
MOV-14
NON-VITAL
DC LOADS
RCP-1 MOV-15
VITAL-A VITAL-B
SOV-2
SOV-3
SWGR-B
SWGR-A
EDG-A
LI-1 LI-3 SOV-1 TI-1 ANN-1 PT-1 LI-2 LI-4
SNPP
Drawing No.:
A-12
Date:
ELECTRICAL 10/19/11
ONE-LINE DIAGRAM
Revision No.:
3
3
MODULE 1: PRA/SYSTEMS
NUREG/CR-6850.
selected would generally include many components credited in the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R
post-fire SSD analysis. Additional components will likely be selected, potentially including
any and all components credited in the plant’s internal events PRA. Also, the proposed
methodology would likely introduce components beyond either the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R
list or the internal events PRA model. Such components are often of interest due to
considerations of multiple spurious actuations that may threaten the credited functions and
components.
for manipulation of plant components. Task 12 is covered in limited detail in the
PRA/Systems module. In particular, those aspects of Task 12 that deal with identifying and
incorporating human failure events (HFEs) into the plant response model are discussed.
Methods for quantifying human error probabilities (HEPs) are deferred to Module 4.
3-1
3-2
4
MODULE 2: ELECTRICAL ANALYSIS
NUREG/CR-6850.
4-1
5
MODULE 3: FIRE ANALYSIS
NUREG/CR-6850.
estimates for fire compartments and scenarios. Ignition frequencies are provided for 37 item
types that are categorized by ignition source type and location within the plant. For example,
ignition frequencies are provided for transient fires in the Turbine Buildings and in the
Auxiliary Buildings. A method is provided on how to specialize these frequencies to the
specific cases and conditions.
 Seismic Fire Interactions (Task 13). This task is a qualitative approach for identifying
potential interactions between an earthquake and fire.
5-1
6
MODULE 4: FIRE PRA HUMAN RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
PRA analysis.
Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not develop a detailed fire HRA methodology.
1921, EPRI 1019196, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire Human Reliability Analysis Guidelines – Draft
Report for Comment. Publication of the final report remains pending. The training materials
presented here are based on the draft guidance including consideration of public review
comments received and the team’s response to those comments.
6-1
7
MODULE 5: ADVANCED FIRE MODELING
Note that NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI 1011989 did not provide detailed guidance on the application
of fire modeling tools. Rather, the base methodology document assumes that the analyst will
apply a range of computation fire modeling tools to support the analysis, provides recommended
practice relative to the general development/definition of fire scenarios and provides
recommendations for characterizing of various fire sources (e.g., heat release rate transient
profiles and peak heat release rate distribution curves). The question of selecting and applying
appropriate fire modeling tools was left to the analyst’s discretion.

1924, EPRI 1019195, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide – Draft Report for
Comment. Publication of the final report remains pending. The training materials presented here
are based on the draft guidance including consideration of public review comments received and
the team’s response to those comments.
7-2

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Introduction

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EPRI/NRC-RES

EPRI/NRC RES FIRE PRA

J.S. Hyslop – NRC/RES

Fire PRA Workshop 2011

• Based on MOU between NRC-RES and EPRI on fire risk

• Needed to provide more realistic methods for risk-informed,

• Scope is full power, CDF and LERF

• Course does not provide official NRC positions, but does

• Participation by industry and the public

• Formal process to resolve technical disputes within

• Improvements made in areas important to fire risk

• Fire PRA methodology still evolving

– Solutions provided to fifteen fire PRA questions in NFPA 805

– “Unreviewed Analysis Methods” in process

• Support for 10CFR50.48(c) implementation

• Fire modeling is an integral part of fire PRA

• Fire model verification and validation (V&V) is required for

• Most fire models are computational

• Some are based only on empirical correlations

• PRA Methodology document not a reference for fire models

• EPRI/RES V&V of fire models EPRI 1011999/NUREG

Steve Nowlen - Sandia National Laboratories

I. A brief overview of the course structure, content and

A brief Overview of the

The Fire PRA Course

• Five parallel modules:

TASK 3: Fire PRA Cable

SUPPORT TASK A: Plant

TASK 6: Fire Ignition

SUPPORT TASK B: Fire PRA

TASK 8: Scoping Fire Modeling Fire Analysis Module

Detailed Fire Scenario Analysis

TASK 9: Detailed Circuit Failure

TASK 12B: Post fire HRA:

Fire Analysis Module

TASK 15: Uncertainty & PRA/System Module

TASK 16: Fire PRA HRA Module

• This module cover analysis elements related to plant systems accident

• This module covers analysis elements related to the identification and

• Tasks covered are:

• This module covers analysis elements related to the identification,

• Tasks covered are:

• Second year for fire HRA module

• Covers the use of computational fire models in support of fire scenario

Fire PRA Workshop 2011

• A major aspect of this objective is understanding

Defines technical requirements for

Provides one technical approach

Technical documents provide

• Example relevant regulations:

RG 1.205 RG 1.201 RG 1.174 RG 1.177

• The approach provided in RG 1.200 defines the

• RG 1.200 allows the use of a consensus standard (as

• Guidance is needed for how to accomplish the

REGULATIONS §50.48(c) §50.69 §50.90 §50.36 etc.

RG 1.205 RG 1.201 RG 1.174 RG 1.177 etc.

“WHAT TO” SUPPORTING PRA Standard and Peer Review

Hazard Type • Two different hazard types are defined in the Standard

• At the supporting requirement level, it was recognized that the

*Differentiation from moderate, to small, to negligible is determined by

Plant Partitioning Fire Ignition Frequency

Supporting IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ IDENTIFY Fire Safe Shutdown/ NUREG/

When implementing RG 1.200,