1

Self-Determination & Constitution Making in

Nepal
(Constituent Assembly, Inclusion, & Ethnic Federalism):

Surendra Bhandari
Inclusion

One of the major criticisms against the nation-building process in

Nepal is mirrored in the state of pervasive exclusion aggravated by a
deficient mechanism of inclusion in place. The state of exclusion has
continuously been exposed to a greater extent, in turn realizing a
widespread need for inclusion. Nevertheless, time and again, many of
the propositions proposed in regard to ending the exclusion and
cementing inclusion have also been mired in myopic elitist
explanations. In most of the cases, some experts and stakeholders have
also ignored to visualize the distinctions between the pre-1990,
particularly the panchayati style nation-building, the post-1990
process of inclusion and nation-building, and the post-2006 process of
inclusion and nation-building. In the following paragraphs, we will
show the state of inclusion and its progression in these three different
phases.

5.2.1 Inclusion During the Panchayati Era: 1960-1990

The panchayati style of nation-building constructed on the

exclusionary policy was widely contested by all democratic forces and
each individual aspiring for democracy. The panchayati system
explicitly adopted a policy of “Our King, Our Country; Common
Language, Common Attire.” It tried to institutionalize the incorrect
philosophy that the king and country were inseparable; thus, without
the king, the existence of the country would be in jeopardy. To
reinforce the inseparability thesis, it transpired to adopt another
damaging policy that a Nepali would be a true Nepali only when they
were speaking the accepted language and wearing the accepted dress.
With its unitary political philosophy, it generated a uniform political
class called the panchas. Nevertheless, it also endeavored to
accommodate ethnic communities into the system and the political
class, even though the panchayati political class constantly and
ruthlessly repressed any idea aspiring for democracy.1

1
During the panchayati period, any act of aspiring democracy was considered a
crime, and it was common to arrest and prosecute people. While opposing the
political philosophy of panchayat, the author of this book was also arrested,
5.2 Inclusion 2

The 1962 Panchayati Constitution gave legitimacy to the concept

of a Hindu Kingdom,2 particularly to signify the Crown as the
common bond of allegiance.3 Moreover, it constitutionally declared
the king as to be the adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion.4
In practice, this constitutional design, along with the policy of “Our
King, Our Country,” reinforced the dominance of Aryan culture and
Hindu religion throughout the country. The extremely repressive
philosophy of the panchayati regime was legitimized under Article
20(2) of the Panchayati Constitution, which placed the king above
the constitution with all State powers and sovereignty.5
The hegemonic nature of panchayati nation-building featured an
extremely centralizing tendency and exclusionary policy, which
proved to be a dangerously harmful arrangement of nation-building.
The only remedy to the aggressive pan- chayati style of nation-
building could be the democratic process of nation-building that
began in 1990. However, some scholars regrettably consider the
panchayati style of nation-building as more inclusive than the post-
1990 nation-building. For example, Mahendra Lawoti claims, “ . . .
the monarchy has proven to be more inclusive than the major
mainstream political parties.”6 He further claims, “The political
exclusion of traditionally excluded groups in Nepal continues even
after the restoration of democracy in 1990.”7 He further adds, “ . . . a
constitutional monarchy and the Maoists who shun violence would be
compatible with the inclusive institutions... ”46

charged with treason, and imprisoned for 3 years.

2
See Article 3(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990. It reads,
“Nepal is an independent, indivisible and sovereign monarchical Hindu State.”
3
/d., Article 2(1), which reads, “Having common aspirations and united by the
common bond of allegiance to the Crown, the Nepalese people irrespective of
religion, race, caste or tribe collectively constitute the nation.”
4
Id., Article 20(1), which reads, “In this Constitution the words ‘His Majesty’ mean
his Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being a descendant of King Prithvi
Narayan Shah and adherent of Aryan culture and Hindu religion.”
5
Id., Article 20(2), which reads, “The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in His Majesty
and all powers-executive, legislative and judicial emanate from Him. These powers
are exercised by His Majesty through the organs established by or under this
Constitution and other laws for the time being in force keeping in view the interest
and wishes of His Majesty’s subjects according to the highest traditions of the Shah
dynasty.”
6Supra note. Lawoti, Towards a Democratic Nepal, p. 317.
7
Id., p. 19.
5.2.2 Inclusion in the Post-1990 Era

As a compromise document
2.5 Concluding between the king and the democratic political parties3 of Nepal, the
Observations
1990 Constitution, as discussed in Chaps. 1 and 2 of this book, could not be expected to be the
perfect democratic constitution, despite being hailed as the best constitution of the world by its
drafter, especially by the chairperson of the Drafting Committee, Justice Bishow Nath
Upadhyaya.8 From its inception, different stakeholders on different grounds and reasons contested
the 1990 Constitution. The king contested it because his powers were sharply constrained, while
some ethnic communities contested the 1990 Constitution because it did not incorporate all their
demands, and political parties contested it because they found a number of weaknesses in the 1990
Constitution. The Maoists especially had strong reason to contest the constitution as the United
People’s Front position in the parliament had dropped off from 9 seats in the 1991 elections to 0
seats in the 1994 elections. With this bitter election experience, the Maoists believed that they
could not find a chance to rise to power by the peaceful electoral process; thus, they adopted the
route of insurgency by condemning the parliamentary democracy, dragging the country into a
vicious conflict.
There were some common criticisms of the 1990 Constitution shared by political parties9 and
ethnic communities. Both political parties and the ethnic communities had objections to the Hindu
features of the Nepalese state. Specially, Article 4(1) of the 1990 Constitution was criticized for
legitimizing a Hindu state.10 Among the 27-Point Criticism of the 1990 Constitution tendered by
Madan Bhandari, Point 2 had clearly mentioned that the term “Hindu” used to define the nature
of the kingdom was redundant and ambiguous. However, Professor Surya Subedi contends that
“Although the mention of ‘Hindu’ rather than a ‘multi-religious’ society in this article may raise
some disquiet among certain non-Hindu Nepalese people, many people regard this as a statement
of the actual situation... The term ‘Hindu’ may be taken to mean a Hindu and constitutional
monarchical Kingdom implying that the monarchy is Hindu rather than the State itself ”11
Likewise, the 27-Point Criticism had also denounced the ambiguity persisted in Article 612 of
the 1990 Constitution, especially for entitling the Nepali language as the “language of the nation
of Nepal,” and had suggested to designate all languages spoken in Nepal as national languages
while recognizing the Nepali language as the official language. Except for the Nepal Sadbhawana
Party (Goodwill and Harmony Council of Nepal), which was demanding the recognition of Hindi
as the second national language, for most of the ethnic communities, some kind of constitutional
status to their mother tongues had to be given. In fact, Article 6(2) of the 1990 Constitution had
provided constitutional recognition of all languages spoken as mother tongues in the various parts
of Nepal as the national languages of Nepal. In this context, the 1990 Constitution cannot be
simply placed on par to the 1962 Constitution in regard to its approach on nation-building and
inclusion.

8
See Maligodi, Miri (2013). Constitutional Nationalism and Legal Exclusion: Equality, Identity Politics, and Democracy in Nepal. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, p. 10.
9See The 27 Points Criticism of the Drift of the 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal by Midin
Bhindiri, the secretary-general of the CPN (UML), reproduced in Bhindiri (1990). The Future of the Nepalese Constitution.
Kithmindu: Law Associates Nepal.
10See Article 4(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal (1990), which reads, “Nepal is i multiethnic,

multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical

Kingdom.”
11See Subedi, Suryi P. (1999). Constitutional Accommodation of Ethnicity and National Identity in Nepal.

International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 6, 121-147, p. 143.

12
See Article 6(1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, which reads, “The Nepali language
in the Devanagari script is the language of the nation of Nepal. The Nepali language shall be the official
language.”
5.2.2.1 Inclusive Nation
Having legitimized a flawed concept of “nation” in the “bond of allegiance to the
2.5 Concluding Observations 4
Crown,” the
1962 Constitution propagated a totalitarian style of nation-building, whereas the 1990 Constitution
cultivated the concept of nation in qualitatively refined terms but also persisted deep ambiguities
as discussed above. Except the objectionable term “Hindu” used in Article 4(1) of the 1990
Constitution, the idea of a nation under Article 2 was conceptually not objectionable. It had
defined a nation as the “bond of allegiance to national independence and integrity of Nepal” to be
collectively constituted by the Nepalese people “irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe.”13
Despite the fairly objective and neutral concept of a nation incorporated in Article 2, the 1990
Constitution under Article 27(2) continued the same panchayati legacy that His Majesty was the
symbol of the Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people. Further, Article 27(3) of
the 1990 Constitution elevated the king as the protector of the constitution. Against this
background, the spirit of Article 2 was chipped away with the sweeping provisions under Articles
27 (2) and 27(3). However, Professor Surya Subedi erroneously contends that “Indeed, the
institution of monarchy has served as the symbol of Nepalese nationality and the unity of the
Nepalese people since the unification of the country... the Shaha dynasty has effectively acted as
the focal point of national unity.”14
For any political society, national ties or bonds are understandably important for the existence
of a nation. To voluntarily nurture the bond of unity, the existence of a political society alone is
not sufficient; it should be fashioned in a democratic structure, especially into a liberal democratic
society. The post-1990 era was obviously not a liberal democratic era; nevertheless, it had some
features of democratic nation-building. Mainly, it adopted a fairly neutral and objective concept
of a nation. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, has further reinforced the same neutral and
objective standards in defining the nation.15
It is no secret that in the name of a nation, states have united. Also, in the name of a nation,
states have disintegrated. What creates unity and what causes disintegration? It is not a simple
answer; nevertheless, global experience shows that unless the bond of unity is defined and realized
on objective standards, it is always challenging for any nations to achieve the peaceful coexistence
of multiple communities especially in a pluralist society. The non-secular “Hindu” feature of the
Nepalese state certainly made inroads toward achieving the neutral and objective standards of a
nation; thus, it needed to be eliminated. The 2007 Constitution has accomplished the task, which
should be permanently institutionalized by the future constitution.
All the same, sovereignty pledges the independence and territorial integrity as a core concept
of the bond of unity. By this very reason, only the sovereign people can conscientiously cultivate
and cherish the bond of unity.
The 1962 Constitution posited the sovereignty in the hand of king. It was a serious challenge to
the 1990 Constitution to end the king’s monopoly over state power and transfer sovereignty from
the claws of kings to the Nepalese people. Despite many weaknesses, the credit of admitting the
Nepalese people as the sovereign power of Nepal should undoubtedly go to the 1990 Constitution.
Article 3 of the 1990 Constitution provides that “The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the
Nepalese people and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”
Some people also criticized this concept of sovereignty on the ground that it did not admit the
complete sovereignty of the people. Criticisms of this type are often oblivious to the fact that since
the development of the concept of constitutionalism, sovereignty has itself been constitutionalized

13See Article 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, which reads, “Having common
aspirations and united by a bond of allegiance to national independence and integrity of Nepal, the
Nepalese people irrespective of religion. race, caste or tribe, collectively constitute the nation.”
14Supra note. Subedi, Constitutional Accommodation, p. 127

15
See Article 3 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, which reads, “Having multiethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious and multicultural characteristics with common aspirations and being
united by a bond of allegiance to national independence, integrity, national interest and prosperity
of Nepal, all the Nepalese people collectively constitute the nation.”
in demand of placing no one above the constitution.
By reading Articles 2 and 1(2) of the Interim Constitution, 2007, one may get the same
impression of2.5the 1990Observations
Concluding Constitution. Article 2 of the 2007 Constitution provides
5 that “The
sovereignty and state authority of Nepal shall be vested in the people of Nepal.” Article 1(2)
provides that “It is the duty of every person to uphold this Constitution.” At the core, the thesis
echoes what Rousseau said in the eighteenth century—we are free and sovereign because we are
governed by law and not by other men.
With these developments, the search for a more inclusive concept of a nation received
significant space in the dissolved CA. Consequently, the CA Committee on Minority Rights
proposed more inclusive and objective standards of the nation. It mentions that “Nepal is a federal,
secular, fully proportional and inclusive democratic republic nation free of untouchability, caste
and religious discrimination founded on the multiethnic, multilingual, multi-religious,
multicultural equality, freedom, and justice” [my translation].
5.2.2.2 Inclusive State
Receptively, two modus operands have been widely acknowledged for inclusion: first, the end of
exclusion as the primary condition of inclusion and, second, creating a level playing field as the
proactive intervention for equity distribution and inclusion. Despite the encouraging social and
political receptivity of these ideas, some deep controversies have also erected barriers in the
execution of these modus operands.
One of the captivating but equally subtle arguments is that in the executive body, legislative
body, judiciary, public service, army, police, political leadership, and other public agencies (all of
them can be termed as the “state”), ethnic representation is not proportionate to the demographic
size of the population. The ethnic representation is rather imbalanced and marginal. Bahuns,
Chettris, and Newars alone have occupied most of these institutions. Madhesis have constantly
been deprived of joining armies and security agencies. Dalits are absolutely marginalized in each
sector of the society. Thus, the state is extremely exclusionary. These arguments are undoubtedly
valid. Despite being valid, there are also some subtleties that pose some central problems. First,
could it be practically possible to have demographically proportional representation of each of the
125 ethnic groups, 123 linguistic groups, and 10 religious groups in the state? Second, should
demographic “proportional ethnic representation” or “ethnicity” be the defining theory or guiding
principle of state representation?
To answer these questions and help solve the riddles, two competing philosophies have been
suggested. First, to end exclusion, ethnicity-based proportional representation should be the basic
primary condition of inclusion. Second, nonethnic merit-based system with positive
discrimination should be employed as the guiding principle and organizing theory of state
representation. The first argument is growing as a populist political vocabulary with potent
paradoxes. As a paradox, it revives the recently abolished caste and untouchability system in a
redundant way. The essence of the caste-based system is that it allows privileges to certain groups
in society by birth. The ethnicity-defined state representation in a much more exposed way might
change the state’s functional characteristics into ethnic normativity by incapacitating the positivity
of governance in the same line of birth identity. The mainstreamed group sensitivities might
retentively invent ethnic identity in more rigid and intolerable hierarchical orders, or “violent
hierarchies” in Derrida’s terms.16 In fact, Nepalese society is historically demanding to end all
types of dominations by one or a few privileged groups over other groups, which should not be
diluted in securing privileged status in the name of ethnicity.
In the post-2006 period of Nepal, two immense revolutions have already occurred: first, the
abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic state and, second, a formal end of
the disgraceful caste and untouchability system. All instances of history and historical injustices

16SeeDerrida, Jacques (1982). Positions (trans: Allan Bass). The

University of Chicago Press, p. 41.
cannot be undone. What can be done is the setting of universal principles and institutionalizing
these principles so that they may shape the future. The 2007 Interim Constitution in real terms has
paved the path2.5for accomplishing
Concluding Observations both of these revolutions. Under these changed 6circumstances,
the major causes of the exclusion have been formally eradicated. Theoretically, the Nepalese state
has been given an opportunity to truly befit to the aspirations of an inclusive society, which is
more convincing on the system of merit in place. Perhaps, hardly any society could ever achieve
any goals by entirely excluding the merit system from the sectors and spectrums of the state.

5.1 Liberal Democracy and Federalism

Since all major political parties have adopted federalism as a political policy in their manifestos
for the second CA election held in November 2013, the country seems to be moving from a unitary
structure to a federal structure. However, the fundamental and technical differences among the
political parties on the modality and numbers of federal structure have not yet been converged.
For example, the Nepali Congress (NC) has adopted a nonethnic federal model, the CPN (UML)
has adopted a mixed model, and the UCPN (Maoist) has adopted an ethnic federal model. This
row has been present since the first CA. Despite this conflict of interests, encouraging
developments have taken place recently on the technical side. All of these major political parties
now seem flexible on the numbers of provinces, which was one of the major points of contention
in the first CA. Also, the Madhesh-based parties, who were demanding a single province, have
now shown more flexibility toward accepting two or more provinces in the Terai region.
Why are the model and numbers in the federal structure of Nepal so important? Why are these
three major parties, as well as all other political parties in Nepal (there are 130 political parties in
Nepal, enigmatically many of them are ethnicity- based political parties), espousing different
models? Why has federalism become such a hard nut that no political parties are able to crack in
it adopting a common model? When these questions were asked to political leaders, ethnic groups,
and other stakeholders, most of them have given an easy and commonplace answer— accusing
other political parties and groups of being run by a foreign element and vested interests.
As a researcher, I had taken an opportunity to ask these questions to many people from young
college students to former prime ministers in Nepal. Curiously, I got more convincing and detailed
answers from the young people than from the senior political leaders. Most of the political leaders
of different political parties have the same polemic and accusatory answer that “other parties are
run by vested political interests being influenced by foreign elements.” Having no solutions to
these interests and elements, most political parties and leaders seem to be drifting with no specific
direction. But the young people show promising convictions. They clearly pointed to the lack of
commitment on the part of political parties and leaders to liberal democracy as the major cause of
the most political discontents. They also argued, if a liberal democracy is the main agenda of the
post-2006 era, which it should be, the controversies of federal models and numbers appear less
meaningful to them.
The young people were especially worried about two possible scenarios. First, they see
perennial political polemics in the future even after the designation of a formal federal setup. With
the existing political dynamics, most likely they see most stakeholders not being ready to endorse
the formally set up federal model wholeheartedly, since it will be a model compromised only
between a few powerful political parties. Moreover, dissatisfied groups and political actors keep
demanding more provinces as a continuous political agenda, as seen in India. On July 30,2013,
Telangana, a new state, has been formed out of Andhra Pradesh. The Times of India modestly
remarks that “India may have 50 States if all demands for new states are met.”17 While, India has
managed the political process with admirable level of efficiency, it will be hard in the beginning

The Times of India (2013, August 4).

17See

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-08-
04/india/41057301_1_creation-new-states-least-50-states.
Accessed 5 August 2013.
for the Nepalese polity to handle all these demands with the same level of efficiency, which most
likely will engender an atmosphere of political instability along with a race to the bottom. Second,
in federalism the youth of
2.5 Concluding Nepal see the possible challenges of an illiberal democracy
Observations 7 as faced by
the Nepalese polity for a long time, namely, political criminalization, disrespect to
constitutionalism, a weak condition of the rule of law, more politics and more ethnic conflict,
tapering growth and development, misrule, political favoritism, and pandemic corruption, in short,
the doggedness of all the justice problems.
In both of these scenarios of political instability and illiberal democracy, the young people find
themselves to be the direct victims by default, because the prospects of jobs will be diminished,
resulting in the lack of opportunities for a better life and personal development. Thus, they suggest
upholding the idea of a liberal democracy as the priority agenda for nation-building in Nepal. I
would like to categorize the “liberal democracy” perception of the young Nepalese, the future
leaders, in the following four propositions:
• Constitutionalism
• The rule of law
• Political parties reform
• A robust counter-hegemonic mechanism in place

5.3.1 Constitutionalism

I am deeply amazed and fascinated with the understanding of constitutionalism by the young
people in Nepal. They appreciate constitutionalism as the bond of unity among the Nepalese
people and the guiding principle of nation-building. They perceive constitutionalism at two levels:
as the guiding principle of a constitution and, on the promulgation of a constitution, as the supreme
authority to govern all stakeholders, political parties, ideologies, and individuals.
Four eccentricities of the political actors in Nepal have specifically caught the attention of the
younger generations: political passions for limitless power, intense abuses of state apparatuses,
engagement in the proliferation of misconceptions, and obsession to political ideology when their
passions are limited and the acts of abuses are challenged. Ideology does not matter for them if
their passions are fulfilled, and abuses to state apparatuses are perpetuated. Ideology comes to the
forefront as a weapon to gain political power only when the passions are limited and the abuses
are challenged. This inconvenient and overly realistic manifestation of polity, i.e., gaining power
as the only motivation of the polity, has become a serious inroad to institutionalizing
constitutionalism in Nepal. It is because constitutionalism limits the political passions, prohibits
the abuses of state apparatuses, and demands ideology to be strictly bound within the framework
of a constitution. However, if constitutionalism is entrenched formally and implemented
practically to the satisfaction of its spirit, the young people would like to move beyond the issue
the state structure.

5.3.2 The Rule of Law

The younger generation clearly understands that the concept of the rule of law has failed to
embody the practical manifestation of constitutionalism in the context of Nepal. Whether it is a
pre-1990 period or a post-1990 period, the weak rule of law conditions always hovered as a
repugnant threat to the poor, deprived, and powerless sections of society. The Nepali young share
that they have certainly experienced a liberal political environment and better conditions for
liberty, freedom, and human rights in the post-1990 era, but could not feel much difference to the
rule of law conditions, since the abuses of power for personal benefit and political interests were
endlessly pervasive, reinforcing the Nepali proverb that “law is what is used against the poor, but
freedom for the rich and powerful.”
The younger generation expects the rule of law to be a mechanism to transform all powers either
within the framework of authority and responsibility or rights and duty or both. The powerful
political and bureaucratic class has continuously exercised authority without any accountability
and rights without any duty, whereas the poor, left-behind, and powerless sections of society have
been severely2.5 encumbered only with responsibilities and duties. To their 8 surprise, this
Concluding Observations
aggressively intolerable state of derogation in the rule of law condition in Nepal has been
continued even in the post-2006 period as well. Indeed, the culture of gun, gang violence, rape,
mugging, insecurity, and threats has increased manifold in the post-2006 situation, which the
young notice with extreme dismay and intense apprehension. For them the post-2006 Nepalese
polity should steadfastly focus on the robust institutionalization of the rule of law condition for
reforming the polity, rather than diverting real issues to some less meaningful external structural
issues.

5.3.3 Political Parties Reform

The Nepalese younger generation unambiguously acknowledges the role of political parties as the
representatives of the people into two specific domains: as lawgivers and the government. As the
lawgivers, political parties should be able to provide such candidates in elections that could
represent the people in manufacturing laws and making the government responsible to the
legislature, which demands knowledge and quality in representation. The younger generation calls
this role as remedying the “diseconomy of rules.” In other words, they consider the traditional
style of law positing role of the legislators not enough to address the dynamics of changing society.
The posited law should be optimal and in no condition should be less than efficient. At the same
time, the legislative oversight should be effective to make the government responsible to
implement the law efficiently. But the young are extremely disappointed by the irresponsible
attitudes and activities of the political parties in choosing representatives.
Political parties choose a candidate not from the best people in society contributing in their
respective disciplines as leaders, but bring in only those who are in the party organizational setup
and loyal to the top ranks. The candidacy selection is limited too harshly by myopic political
vision. Regrettably, political parties cannot see leadership quality and national leaders in people
who are beyond the party rank and outside the core political circle. They hardly bring truly social
and disciplinary leaders in the legislature. As a result, either the posited rules are inefficient or
their implementation is ineffective. This is the core of governance problem to be solved in the
eyes of the young people, which they consider to be the priority of the post- 2006 era of nation-
building. To achieve the efficiency of rules or to remedy the “diseconomy of rules,” political party
reform is a must, but with the existing level of myopic political vision prevalent among the
political leaders, it seems a mirage in the eyes of the young.
Along with legislators, political parties are also those agencies, which form a government. In
each spectrum of social life, good governance and fairness in social dealings are necessary
preconditions for a liberal democracy, growth, development, and justice. The act of political
intervention in terms of political partition of top civil positions, even the judicial positions
including the appointment of judges, was considered by the young not only as a symptomatic fact
of politicization but also as an irrefutable evidence of derogation in fairness. No matter what form
of government would be adopted, the problems of good governance and fairness should be
effectively addressed on the basis of the rule of law, the young firmly believe.

5.3.4 A Robust Counter-Hegemonic Mechanism in Place

Despite the signs of systemic derogations all over the Nepalese polity, the younger generation is
however optimistic on the role played by the civil society organizations, judiciary, human rights
commission, media, and other agencies. Counterhegemony, since the times of Gramsci, is one of
the key instruments employed to make the legislative and executive organs of the state responsible
to the rule of law, which has often been used satisfactorily in the post-1990 period of Nepal.
 In this regard, the role of academia, civil society organizations, judiciary, human rights
organizations, and media turn out to be undeniably important. Despite some populist postures and
much space given to counterproductive
2.5 Concluding Observations news, the young find the media a true counter-hegemonic
9
institution developed in the post-1990 era. They express utmost disappointment on the role of
academia, especially on the excessive politicization of public educational institutions and the
deterioration of educational quality. They perceive the public educational institutions as those
platforms that keep producing political cadres in the country. Similarly, they also lament the
excessive party loyalties of academia and NGOs, who often surrender their autonomy for petty
interests, though perhaps also being compelled for survival. The judiciary and the Human Rights
Commission have often played an important counter-hegemonic roles, the worry though has been
exacerbated by some frequent attempts to judicial politicization. Unbelievably, the younger
generation seems ambivalent on the role of civil society organizations. They perceive that without
any support by the donor agencies, hardly any civil society organization and movement in Nepal
could stand on its own. The neo-colonization of civil society by the donor agencies has produced
a new generation of civil society, primarily motivated by financial benefits lacking any sui generis
foundation.
Without a robust counter-hegemonic mechanism in place, the premises of constitutionalism, the
rule of law, and the political party reform for remedying the diseconomy of rules could hardly be
achieved. The younger generation seems suspicious of the possibility of more politics and
politicization of the counter- hegemonic institutions in name of ideology, regionalism, ethnicity,
identity, and other fragmented ideals. Nevertheless, they are optimistic that a liberal democracy
would finally overcome all difficulties because there is no other alternative for the sustainable
development of the Nepalese polity.
5.2 Concluding Observations

The Nepalese polity is uniquely grappling with all three phases of nation-building. There still exist
some elements of nation-building peculiar to the formative phase. Concurrently, the elements of
the democratic phase of nation-building that emerged from the 1990s are also growing relentlessly
by embracing the elements of postnation-building. At this point, the nation is undergoing the
restructuring process to make the nation more inclusive and just. The modus operandi for
achieving the more inclusive and a just order, the political actors have so far espoused, is the
federal structure of governance. Its introduction to a unitary country having no earlier experience
of federalism with heterogeneous ethnic, cultural, and religious distribution of the population is
undoubtedly a daunting task. What is more, the idea of ethnic identity embedded within the idea
of federalism has prodded both theoretical and practical complexities in the process. Obviously,
any new order will retain its superiority over the old order, if it is designed on humane and liberal
foundations in safeguarding the ideal of equal citizens in a liberal democratic model.
Emancipation of individuals from all types of oppressions, dominations, and discriminations as
a project of the democratic nation-building in the changed political context indubitably invigorates
the goal of the Nepalese polity toward a direction that is a must and desirable. Without any doubt,
an exclusionary society is a disgrace that perpetuates injustice, which the new project should end
in all its forms and essence. Doing so, the new project should preserve the historical achievements
and wisely abolish all counterproductive concepts bred historically, endured currently, and argued
recklessly.
By its very nature, extremism in all its forms undermines conceptual validity and hyperbolizes
the tenacity of erroneous concepts. This is a serious challenge ahead to the Nepalese nation-
building. The projection of the post-1990 developments and the 1990 Constitution as the complete
source of exclusion while crediting the Maoist and some ethnic organizations as the only savior
of change18 undermines the truth. As discussed elsewhere in this book, the 1990 Constitution

18
There ire many scholars and activists who propagate this line of thinking. Among them, Miri
Miligodi, Yish Ghii, Mihendri Liwoti, and Krishin B. Bhittichin ire few of them cited elsewhere
in this book.
suffers from some serious weaknesses, including projecting the nation as a “Hindu nation” and its
inability to abolish the caste system; nevertheless, in all its endeavors, it created a civic state of
equal citizens 2.5
with equalObservations
Concluding political rights, equal liberty and freedom, and equal access
10 to justice;
secured human rights without any discrimination; recognized all mother tongues as the languages
of nations; and, on top of all of that, also realized the idea of positive discrimination to protect and
create a level playing field for all individuals and sections of society left behind. The creation of
the Dalit Commission and the affirmative actions to promote the civil, political, and public
participation of women, dalits, and ethnic people in the State were some creditable achievements
of the 1990 Constitution, though they were not adequate.
Currently, the mission of state restructuring for the purpose of inclusive nation- building is
obsessively centered on the proposition of federalism and ethnic federalism. To what form it may
grow, neither federalism nor ethnic federalism should be the goal of the country. The goals are
clear: a liberal democracy, economic growth, human resources development, the end of poverty,
the end of oppression and discrimination, the end of lawlessness state, and securing justice, among
others. Bihari Krishna Shrestha forcefully cautions that the idea of federalization should not
perpetuate the unmitigated feudalism, which exists all over the country.19 Oommen, in pursuance
of the distinction between nation and ethnicity, observes that “ . . . it is necessary to recognize the
distinction between national and ethnic minorities; while the former are territorially anchored, the
latter are spatially dispersed. This distinction has profound implications for building and
federalization of national states.”20
Ethnicity exists from a tribal society to a post-national stage of nation-building. A tribal society
is exclusive. It does not share its land with others. It does not allow its members to be exposed to
other cultures and does not accommodate cultures and languages of other communities. Thus,
ethnicity as a culture, language, and race exists in its exclusivity in a tribal society. A nation is a
higher form of human organization, but not yet a fully grown political organization.21 It permits
the sharing of land with other people. It allows for the accommodation and sharing of culture and
languages. It adopts a diversity of languages, cultures, and religions. Though, at the same time, it
overemphasizes linguistic, religious, and cultural particularism and fragmentation, called partisan
ethnic identity.
Comparatively, a nation is thus qualitatively distinct from an exclusive tribal society. But a
nation state is the highest form of political organization, which human civilization has ever
achieved. Its distinction is particularly marked by the idea of politically equal citizen in a civic
state. A civic state is a guarantee of political participation, self-governance in terms of government
by elected representatives, the rule of law, and constitutionalism. Though, a civic state is not
uniform. In its different stages it upholds distinct ideals of nation-building, which is true for Nepal
as well. In this course, across the globe certain cultures, and languages, have played unifying roles.
By ignoring this fact, any projection of the social process of accommodation and the uniting role
played by the Nepali language as hegemony is certainly myopic in its vision and treatment.
A survey conducted by Hachhethu and his team observes that “People of both sexes and across
different age groups, areas of habitation (rural and urban) and development regions preferred to
identify themselves as Nepali rather than as ethnic or mixed (both national and ethnic).” The
survey further analyzes with some figures. It reveals that “The largest percentage of the
respondents of the citizen surveyed (43 %) identified themselves as Nepali; those who preferred
a mixed identity (both Nepali and ethnic) were at 31 %; and the ethnic/regional identity was
preferred by 26 % of the respondents. Among the parliamentarians, 87 % of the respondents
identified with their Nepali identities, and only a negligible proportion of them, 3 %, preferred

See Shrestha, Bihari Krishna (2012). Federalising Back to the Baise Chaubise Days: An
19

Anthropological Perspective on Ethnicity as the Basis for State Restructuring in Nepal. In

Chitanya Mishra and Om Gurung (Ed.), Ethnicity and Federalism in Nepal. Kathmandu: T. U. Central
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, p. 48.
20
Id., Oommen, T. K. Ethno-nationalism and Building National States in South Asia: Towards Federalization, p. 9
21
Id., pp. 7-8.
ethnic identity.”22
In name of populism, if the political actors keep shunning the real political issues in the country
and amuse with the engagement
2.5 Concluding Observations of the nation confined to some aesthetic structural
11 matters, the
real opportunity of democratic nation-building might be unpleasantly squandered for some time.
As suggested by Habermas, an ideal political process emerges from four validity claims:
meaningfulness, truth, rights, and faithfulness of the actors.23 What the democratic nation-building
in Nepal needs today is practice of these four validity claims sincerely by all actors.
In short, the post-2006 nation-building in Nepal cannot risk eschewing the civic nature of a
state. As a political process, nation-building is expected to be strengthened on the basis of
constitutionalism, which is distinct from tribal and partisan ethnic identity. Nurturing cultural
diversity, and promoting cultural pluralism for dignified coexistence are a must for a democratic
nation-building in Nepal. The Nepalese polity has every hope and possibility to grow, flourish,
prosper, and live in peace and happiness. The educated youth are the nation’s source of immense
power, a source of this hope, and the possibility of democratic nation- building. I am fully
confident in their power and wisdom.

22 Id., p. 9.
23
Hachhethu, Krishan, Kumar, Sanjay, & Subedi, Jiwan (2008). Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State of
See
Democracy. Kathmandu: International IDEA.