Professional Documents
Culture Documents
John Rawls - Wikipedia
John Rawls - Wikipedia
John Bordley Rawls (/rɔːlz/;[3] February 21, 1921 – November 24, 2002) was an
American moral and political philosopher in the liberal tradition.[4][5] Rawls received both
the Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy and the National Humanities Medal in 1999,
the latter presented by President Bill Clinton, in recognition of how Rawls's work "revived
the disciplines of political and ethical philosophy with his argument that a society in
which the most fortunate help the least fortunate is not only a moral society but a logical
one".[6]
Years".[12]
Spouse(s) Margaret Warfield
Fox
Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness"
recommends equal basic liberties,
Philosophy career
equality of opportunity, and facilitating
the maximum benefit to the least Education Princeton University
advantaged members of society in any (BA, PhD)
case where inequalities may occur.
Awards Rolf Schock Prizes in
Rawls's argument for these principles
Logic and
of social justice uses a thought Philosophy (1999)
experiment called the "original
position", in which people deliberately
Era 20th-century
select what kind of society they would philosophy •
choose to live in if they did not know
21st-century
which social position they would
philosophy
personally occupy. In his later work
Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls Region Western philosophy
Princeton
Politics •
Social contract
theory •
Democracy •
Political
Legitimacy •
Instrumental and
value rationality
Original position •
Reflective
equilibrium •
Overlapping
consensus •
Property-owning
democracy •
Public reason •
Liberal
neutrality[1] •
Veil of ignorance •
Deliberative
democracy •
Liberal socialism •
Primary goods •
:
Telishment •
Dismissal of the
Concept of
Desert[2]
Influences
Hobbes • Aristotle • Locke •
Influenced
Anderson • Appiah • Habermas •
September Group
Signature
Rawls graduated from the Calvert School in Baltimore before enrolling in the Kent
School, an Episcopalian preparatory school in Connecticut. Upon graduation in 1939,
Rawls attended Princeton University, where he was accepted into The Ivy Club and the
American Whig-Cliosophic Society.[17] At Princeton, Rawls was influenced by Norman
Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein's student.[18] During his last two years at Princeton, he
"became deeply concerned with theology and its doctrines." He considered attending a
seminary to study for the Episcopal priesthood[19] and wrote an "intensely religious
senior thesis (BI)."[18] In his 181-page long thesis titled "Meaning of Sin and Faith," Rawls
attacked Pelagianism because it "would render the Cross of Christ to no effect."[20] His
argument was partly drawn from Karl Marx's book On the Jewish Question, which
criticized the idea that natural inequality in ability could be a just determiner of the
:
distribution of wealth in society. Even after Rawls became an atheist, many of the anti-
Pelagian arguments he used were repeated in A Theory of Justice.[21] Rawls graduated
from Princeton in 1943 with a Bachelor of Arts summa cum laude.[14]
Rawls enlisted in the U.S. Army in February 1943.[22] During World War II, Rawls served
as an infantryman in the Pacific, where he served a tour of duty in New Guinea and was
awarded a Bronze Star;[23] and the Philippines, where he endured intensive trench
warfare and witnessed traumatizing scenes of violence and bloodshed.[24][25] It was
there that he lost his Christian faith and became an atheist.[18][26][27]
Following the surrender of Japan, Rawls became part of General MacArthur's occupying
army[14] and was promoted to sergeant.[28] But he became disillusioned with the military
when he saw the aftermath of the atomic blast in Hiroshima.[29] Rawls then disobeyed an
order to discipline a fellow soldier, "believing no punishment was justified," and was
"demoted back to a private."[28] Disenchanted, he left the military in January 1946.[30]
Academic career …
Rawls received his Ph.D. from Princeton in 1950 after completing a doctoral dissertation
titled A Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge: Considered with Reference to
Judgments on the Moral Worth of Character. Rawls taught there until 1952 when he
received a Fulbright Fellowship to Oxford University (Christ Church), where he was
influenced by the liberal political theorist and historian Isaiah Berlin and the legal theorist
H. L. A. Hart. After returning to the United States he served first as an assistant and then
associate professor at Cornell University. In 1962, he became a full professor of
philosophy at Cornell, and soon achieved a tenured position at MIT. That same year, he
moved to Harvard University, where he taught for almost forty years and where he
:
trained some of the leading contemporary figures in moral and political philosophy,
including Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, Thomas Nagel, Allan Gibbard, Onora O'Neill, Adrian
Piper, Arnold Davidson, Elizabeth S. Anderson, Christine Korsgaard, Susan Neiman,
Claudia Card, Rainer Forst, Thomas Pogge, T. M. Scanlon, Barbara Herman, Joshua
Cohen, Thomas E. Hill Jr., Gurcharan Das, Andreas Teuber, Samuel Freeman and Paul
Weithman. He held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard.
Later life …
Rawls rarely gave interviews and, having both a stutter (partially caused by the deaths of
two of his brothers, who died through infections contracted from Rawls)[32] and a "bat-
like horror of the limelight,"[33] did not become a public intellectual despite his fame. He
instead remained committed mainly to his academic and family life.[33]
In 1995, he suffered the first of several strokes, severely impeding his ability to continue
to work. He was nevertheless able to complete The Law of Peoples, the most complete
statement of his views on international justice, and published in 2001 shortly before his
death Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, a response to criticisms of A Theory of
Justice. Rawls died on November 24, 2002, at age 81, and was buried at the Mount
Auburn Cemetery in Massachusetts. He was survived by his wife, Mard Rawls,[34] and
their four children, and four grandchildren.[35]
Philosophical thought
Rawls published three main books. The first, A Theory of Justice, focused on distributive
justice and attempted to reconcile the competing claims of the values of freedom and
equality. The second, Political Liberalism, addressed the question of how citizens divided
by intractable religious and philosophical disagreements could come to endorse a
constitutional democratic regime. The third, The Law of Peoples, focused on the issue of
global justice.
:
A Theory of Justice …
A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, aimed to resolve the seemingly competing claims
of freedom and equality. The shape Rawls's resolution took, however, was not that of a
balancing act that compromised or weakened the moral claim of one value compared
with the other. Rather, his intent was to show that notions of freedom and equality could
be integrated into a seamless unity he called justice as fairness. By attempting to
enhance the perspective which his readers should take when thinking about justice,
Rawls hoped to show the supposed conflict between freedom and equality to be illusory.
Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) includes a thought experiment he called the "original
position." The intuition motivating its employment is this: the enterprise of political
philosophy will be greatly benefited by a specification of the correct standpoint a person
should take in his or her thinking about justice. When we think about what it would mean
for a just state of affairs to obtain between persons, we eliminate certain features (such
as hair or eye color, height, race, etc.) and fixate upon others. Rawls's original position is
meant to encode all of our intuitions about which features are relevant, and which
irrelevant, for the purposes of deliberating well about justice.
The original position is Rawls's hypothetical scenario in which a group of persons is set
the task of reaching an agreement about the kind of political and economic structure
they want for a society, which they will then occupy. Each individual, however,
deliberates behind a "veil of ignorance": each lacks knowledge, for example, of his or her
gender, race, age, intelligence, wealth, skills, education and religion. The only thing that
a given member knows about themselves is that they are in possession of the basic
capacities necessary to fully and wilfully participate in an enduring system of mutual
cooperation; each knows they can be a member of the society.
:
A Theory of Justice, Visual illustration of the "original position"
1st ed. and "veil of ignorance"
Rawls posits two basic capacities that the individuals would know themselves to
possess. First, individuals know that they have the capacity to form, pursue and revise a
conception of the good, or life plan. Exactly what sort of conception of the good this is,
however, the individual does not yet know. It may be, for example, religious or secular,
but at the start, the individual in the original position does not know which. Second, each
individual understands him or herself to have the capacity to develop a sense of justice
and a generally effective desire to abide by it. Knowing only these two features of
themselves, the group will deliberate in order to design a social structure, during which
each person will seek his or her maximal advantage. The idea is that proposals that we
would ordinarily think of as unjust—such as that black people or women should not be
allowed to hold public office—will not be proposed, in this, Rawls's original position,
because it would be irrational to propose them. The reason is simple: one does not know
whether he himself would be a woman or a black person. This position is expressed in
the difference principle, according to which, in a system of ignorance about one's status,
one would strive to improve the position of the worst off, because he might find himself
in that position.
Rawls develops his original position by modelling it, in certain respects at least, after the
:
"initial situations" of various social contract thinkers who came before him, including
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Each social contractarian
constructs his/her initial situation somewhat differently, having in mind a unique political
morality s/he intends the thought experiment to generate.[36] Iain King has suggested
the original position draws on Rawls's experiences in post-war Japan, where the US
Army was challenged with designing new social and political authorities for the country,
while "imagining away all that had gone before."[37]
In social justice processes, each person early on makes decisions about which features
of persons to consider and which to ignore. Rawls's aspiration is to have created a
thought experiment whereby a version of that process is carried to its completion,
illuminating the correct standpoint a person should take in his or her thinking about
justice. If he has succeeded, then the original position thought experiment may function
as a full specification of the moral standpoint we should attempt to achieve when
deliberating about social justice.
In setting out his theory, Rawls described his method as one of "reflective equilibrium," a
concept which has since been used in other areas of philosophy. Reflective equilibrium is
achieved by mutually adjusting one's general principles and one's considered
judgements on particular cases, to bring the two into line with one another.
Principles of justice
…
Rawls derives two principles of justice from the original position. The first of these is the
Liberty Principle, which establishes equal basic liberties for all citizens. 'Basic' liberty
entails the (familiar in the liberal tradition) freedoms of conscience, association and
expression as well as democratic rights; Rawls also includes a personal property right,
but this is defended in terms of moral capacities and self-respect,[38] rather than an
appeal to a natural right of self-ownership (this distinguishes Rawls's account from the
classical liberalism of John Locke and the libertarianism of Robert Nozick).
Rawls argues that a second principle of equality would be agreed upon to guarantee
liberties that represent meaningful options for all in society and ensure distributive
justice. For example, formal guarantees of political voice and freedom of assembly are of
:
little real worth to the desperately poor and marginalized in society. Demanding that
everyone have exactly the same effective opportunities in life would almost certainly
offend the very liberties that are supposedly being equalized. Nonetheless, we would
want to ensure at least the "fair worth" of our liberties: wherever one ends up in society,
one wants life to be worth living, with enough effective freedom to pursue personal
goals. Thus participants would be moved to affirm a two-part second principle
comprising Fair Equality of Opportunity and the famous (and controversial[39]) difference
principle. This second principle ensures that those with comparable talents and
motivation face roughly similar life chances and that inequalities in society work to the
benefit of the least advantaged.
Rawls held that these principles of justice apply to the "basic structure" of fundamental
social institutions (such as the judiciary, the economic structure and the political
constitution), a qualification that has been the source of some controversy and
constructive debate (see the work of Gerald Cohen). Rawls's theory of justice stakes out
the task of equalizing the distribution of primary social goods to those least advantaged
in society and thus may be seen as a largely political answer to the question of justice,
with matters of morality somewhat conflated into a political account of justice and just
institutions. Relational approaches to the question of justice, by contrast, seek to
examine the connections between individuals and focuses on their relations in societies,
with respect to how these relationships are established and configured.[40]
Rawls further argued that these principles were to be 'lexically ordered' to award priority
to basic liberties over the more equality-oriented demands of the second principle. This
has also been a topic of much debate among moral and political philosophers.
Finally, Rawls took his approach as applying in the first instance to what he called a
"well-ordered society ... designed to advance the good of its members and effectively
regulated by a public conception of justice."[41] In this respect, he understood justice as
fairness as a contribution to "ideal theory," the determination of "principles that
characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances."[42] Much recent
work in political philosophy has asked what justice as fairness might dictate (or indeed,
whether it is very useful at all) for problems of "partial compliance" under "nonideal
:
theory."
Political Liberalism …
In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls turned towards the question of political legitimacy in
the context of intractable philosophical, religious, and moral disagreement amongst
citizens regarding the human good. Such disagreement, he insisted, was reasonable—
the result of the free exercise of human rationality under the conditions of open enquiry
and free conscience that the liberal state is designed to safeguard. The question of
legitimacy in the face of reasonable disagreement was urgent for Rawls because his own
justification of Justice as Fairness relied upon a Kantian conception of the human good
that can be reasonably rejected. If the political conception offered in A Theory of Justice
can only be shown to be good by invoking a controversial conception of human
flourishing, it is unclear how a liberal state ordered according to it could possibly be
legitimate.
The intuition animating this seemingly new concern is actually no different from the
guiding idea of A Theory of Justice, namely that the fundamental charter of a society
must rely only on principles, arguments and reasons that cannot be reasonably rejected
by the citizens whose lives will be limited by its social, legal, and political
:
circumscriptions. In other words, the legitimacy of a law is contingent upon its
justification being impossible to reasonably reject. This old insight took on a new shape,
however, when Rawls realized that its application must extend to the deep justification of
Justice as Fairness itself, which he had presented in terms of a reasonably rejectable
(Kantian) conception of human flourishing as the free development of autonomous moral
agency.
The core of Political Liberalism, accordingly, is its insistence that, in order to retain its
legitimacy, the liberal state must commit itself to the "ideal of public reason." This
roughly means that citizens in their public capacity must engage one another only in
terms of reasons whose status as reasons is shared between them. Political reasoning,
then, is to proceed purely in terms of "public reasons." For example: a Supreme Court
justice deliberating on whether or not the denial to homosexuals of the ability to marry
constitutes a violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause may not advert
to his religious convictions on the matter, but he may take into account the argument
that a same-sex household provides sub-optimal conditions for a child's development.
This is because reasons based upon the interpretation of sacred text are non-public
(their force as reasons relies upon faith commitments that can be reasonably rejected),
whereas reasons that rely upon the value of providing children with environments in
which they may develop optimally are public reasons—their status as reasons draws
upon no deep, controversial conception of human flourishing.
Rawls held that the duty of civility—the duty of citizens to offer one another reasons that
are mutually understood as reasons—applies within what he called the "public political
forum." This forum extends from the upper reaches of government—for example the
supreme legislative and judicial bodies of the society—all the way down to the
deliberations of a citizen deciding for whom to vote in state legislatures or how to vote in
public referenda. Campaigning politicians should also, he believed, refrain from
pandering to the non-public religious or moral convictions of their constituencies.
The ideal of public reason secures the dominance of the public political values—
freedom, equality, and fairness—that serve as the foundation of the liberal state. But
what about the justification of these values? Since any such justification would
:
necessarily draw upon deep (religious or moral) metaphysical commitments which would
be reasonably rejectable, Rawls held that the public political values may only be justified
privately by individual citizens. The public liberal political conception and its attendant
values may and will be affirmed publicly (in judicial opinions and presidential addresses,
for example) but its deep justifications will not. The task of justification falls to what
Rawls called the "reasonable comprehensive doctrines" and the citizens who subscribe
to them. A reasonable Catholic will justify the liberal values one way, a reasonable
Muslim another, and a reasonable secular citizen yet another way. One may illustrate
Rawls's idea using a Venn diagram: the public political values will be the shared space
upon which overlap numerous reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls's account of
stability presented in A Theory of Justice is a detailed portrait of the compatibility of one
—Kantian—comprehensive doctrine with justice as fairness. His hope is that similar
accounts may be presented for many other comprehensive doctrines. This is Rawls's
famous notion of an "overlapping consensus."
Such a consensus would necessarily exclude some doctrines, namely, those that are
"unreasonable," and so one may wonder what Rawls has to say about such doctrines. An
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable in the sense that it is
incompatible with the duty of civility. This is simply another way of saying that an
unreasonable doctrine is incompatible with the fundamental political values a liberal
theory of justice is designed to safeguard—freedom, equality and fairness. So one
answer to the question of what Rawls has to say about such doctrines is—nothing. For
one thing, the liberal state cannot justify itself to individuals (such as religious
fundamentalists) who hold to such doctrines, because any such justification would—as
has been noted—proceed in terms of controversial moral or religious commitments that
are excluded from the public political forum. But, more importantly, the goal of the
Rawlsian project is primarily to determine whether or not the liberal conception of
political legitimacy is internally coherent, and this project is carried out by the
specification of what sorts of reasons persons committed to liberal values are permitted
to use in their dialogue, deliberations and arguments with one another about political
matters. The Rawlsian project has this goal to the exclusion of concern with justifying
liberal values to those not already committed—or at least open—to them. Rawls's
:
concern is with whether or not the idea of political legitimacy fleshed out in terms of the
duty of civility and mutual justification can serve as a viable form of public discourse in
the face of the religious and moral pluralism of modern democratic society, not with
justifying this conception of political legitimacy in the first place.
Rawls also modified the principles of justice as follows (with the first principle having
priority over the second, and the first half of the second having priority over the latter
half):
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed
their fair value.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged members of society.
These principles are subtly modified from the principles in Theory. The first principle
now reads "equal claim" instead of "equal right," and he also replaces the phrase
"system of basic liberties" with "a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties." The two parts of the second principle are also switched, so that the difference
principle becomes the latter of the three.
Rawls's views on global distributive justice as they were expressed in this work surprised
many of his fellow egalitarian liberals. For example, Charles Beitz had previously written
a study that argued for the application of Rawls's Difference Principles globally. Rawls
denied that his principles should be so applied, partly on the grounds that a world state
does not exist and would not be stable. This notion has been challenged, as a
comprehensive system of global governance has arisen, amongst others in the form of
the Bretton Woods system, that serves to distribute primary social goods between
human beings. It has thus been argued that a cosmopolitan application of the theory of
justice as fairness is the more reasonable alternative to the application of The Law of
Peoples, as it would be more legitimate towards all persons over whom political coercive
power is exercised.[43]
According to Rawls however, nation states, unlike citizens, were self-sufficient in the
cooperative enterprises that constitute domestic societies. Although Rawls recognized
that aid should be given to governments which are unable to protect human rights for
economic reasons, he claimed that the purpose for this aid is not to achieve an eventual
state of global equality, but rather only to ensure that these societies could maintain
liberal or decent political institutions. He argued, among other things, that continuing to
give aid indefinitely would see nations with industrious populations subsidize those with
idle populations and would create a moral hazard problem where governments could
spend irresponsibly in the knowledge that they will be bailed out by those nations who
had spent responsibly.
:
Rawls's discussion of "non-ideal" theory, on the other hand, included a condemnation of
bombing civilians and of the American bombing of German and Japanese cities in World
War II, as well as discussions of immigration and nuclear proliferation. He also detailed
here the ideal of the statesman, a political leader who looks to the next generation and
promotes international harmony, even in the face of significant domestic pressure to act
otherwise. Rawls also controversially claimed that violations of human rights can
legitimize military intervention in the violating states, though he also expressed the hope
that such societies could be induced to reform peacefully by the good example of liberal
and decent peoples.
Despite the exacting, academic tone of Rawls's writing and his reclusive personality, his
philosophical work has exerted an enormous impact on not only contemporary moral and
political philosophy but also public political discourse. During the student protests at
Tiananmen Square in 1989, copies of "A Theory of Justice" were brandished by
protesters in the face of government officials.[44][45][46] Despite being approximately
600 pages long, over 300,000 copies of that book have been sold,[47] stimulating critical
responses from utilitarian, feminist, conservative, libertarian, Catholic, communitarian,
Marxist and Green scholars, which Rawls welcomed.
Charles Taylor, Alasdair Macintyre, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer all have posed
formidable oppositions to Rawls's theory of justice throughout their careers, stimulating
a large reactionary body of normative and critical scholarship.[53]
The late philosopher G. A. Cohen, along with political scientist Jon Elster, and John
Roemer, used Rawls's writings extensively to inaugurate the Analytical Marxism
movement in the 1980s.
Philosopher Eva Kittay has extended the work of John Rawls to address the concerns of
women and the cognitively disabled.[58]
:
Awards and honors
Bronze Star for radio work behind enemy lines in World War II.[59]
Musical
Publications
Bibliography …
A Study in the Grounds of Ethical Knowledge: Considered with Reference to
Judgments on the Moral Worth of Character. Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University,
1950.
Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, 4. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993. The hardback edition published in 1993 is not identical. The
paperback adds a valuable new introduction and an essay titled "Reply to Habermas."
:
Some Rawls scholars use the abbreviation PL to refer to this work.
The Law of Peoples: with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited." Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999. This slim book includes two works; a
further development of his essay entitled "The Law of Peoples" and another entitled
"Public Reason Revisited," both published earlier in his career.
A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard
University Press, 2010. With introduction and commentary by Thomas Nagel, Joshua
Cohen and Robert Merrihew Adams. Senior thesis, Princeton, 1942. This volume
includes a brief late essay by Rawls entitled On My Religion.
Articles …
"Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." Philosophical Review (April 1951), 60 (2):
177–197.
:
"Two Concepts of Rules." Philosophical Review (January 1955), 64 (1):3–32.
"Distributive Justice: Some Addenda." Natural Law Forum (1968), 13: 51–71.
"Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion." American Economic Review (May 1974), 64
(2): 141–146.
"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical." Philosophy & Public Affairs (Summer
1985), 14 (3): 223–251.
"The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus." Oxford Journal for Legal Studies (Spring
1987), 7 (1): 1–25.
"The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good." Philosophy & Public Affairs (Fall 1988),
:
17 (4): 251–276.
"The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus." New York University Law
Review (May 1989), 64 (2): 233–255.
"Roderick Firth: His Life and Work." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
(March 1991), 51 (1): 109–118.
"The Idea of Public Reason Revisited." Chicago Law Review (1997), 64 (3): 765–807.
[PRR]
Book chapters …
"Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice." In Carl J. Friedrich and John W.
Chapman, eds., Nomos, VI: Justice, pp. 98–125. Yearbook of the American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy. New York: Atherton Press, 1963.
"Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play." In Sidney Hook, ed., Law and Philosophy:
A Symposium, pp. 3–18. New York: New York University Press, 1964. Proceedings of
the 6th Annual New York University Institute of Philosophy.
"Justice as Reciprocity." In Samuel Gorovitz, ed., Utilitarianism: John Stuart Mill: With
Critical Essays, pp. 242–268. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971.
"The Basic Liberties and Their Priority." In Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, III (1982), pp. 1–87. Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
"Social unity and primary goods" in Sen, Amartya; Williams, Bernard, eds. (1982).
Utilitarianism and beyond. Cambridge / Paris: Cambridge University Press / Editions de
la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme. pp. 159–185. ISBN 978-0511611964.
Reviews …
Review of Axel Hägerström's Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (C.D. Broad,
tr.). Mind (July 1955), 64 (255):421–422.
Review of Richard B. Brandt, ed., Social Justice (1962). Philosophical Review (July
1965), 74(3): 406–409.
See also
Philosophy of economics
Notes
1. Young, Shaun (2002). Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism (http
s://archive.org/details/beyondrawlsanaly0000youn) . Lanham, MD: University Press of
America. p. 59 (https://archive.org/details/beyondrawlsanaly0000youn/page/59) .
ISBN 978-0761822400.
4. Martin, Douglas (November 26, 2002). "John Rawls, Theorist on Justice, Is Dead at 82" (htt
ps://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/26/obituaries/26RAWL.html) . NY Times.
5. Wenar, Leif (2017). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/) (Spring 2017 ed.). Metaphysics
Research Lab, Stanford University.
6. Weinstein, Michael M. (December 1, 2002). "The Nation; Bringing Logic To Bear on Liberal
Dogma" (https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/01/weekinreview/the-nation-bringing-logic-to-b
ear-on-liberal-dogma.html) . The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (https://www.worldcat.
org/issn/0362-4331) . Retrieved September 7, 2021.
8. Swift, Adam (2006). Political philosophy : a beginners' guide for students and politicians (htt
ps://archive.org/details/politicalphiloso00swif/page/10) (Second edition, revised and
expanded ed.). Cambridge: Polity. pp. 10 (https://archive.org/details/politicalphiloso00swif/p
age/10) . ISBN 978-0745635323. OCLC 63136336 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/631363
36) .
9. " "Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Authors and Argument" by Catherine H.
:
Zuckert (Ed.)" (https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/political-philosophy-in-the-twentieth-century-auth
ors-and-argument/) . Cambridge University Press. 2012. Retrieved January 21, 2020.
11. "They Work For You search: "John Rawls" " (https://www.theyworkforyou.com/search/?s=%2
2john+rawls%22) . Theyworkforyou.com. Retrieved February 26, 2010.
12. Moore, Matthew J. (2009). "Political Theory Today: Results of a National Survey". Rochester,
NY. SSRN 1463648 (https://ssrn.com/abstract=1463648) .
16. Anatory, Izidory. "The Influence of John Rawls and Robert Nozick Under Contemporary
Political Philosophy" (https://www.academia.edu/5618697) . Academia. Retrieved
January 21, 2020.
18. Wenar, Leif (January 1, 2013). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). John Rawls (http://plato.stanford.edu/a
rchives/win2013/entries/rawls/) (Winter 2013 ed.).
19. Joshua Cohen and Thomas Nagel, "John Rawls: On My Religion" (http://entertainment.times
online.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/the_tls/article5931573.ece) , Times Literary
Supplement, 18 March 2009
20. Rawls, John Bordley (1943). "Meaning of Sin and Faith" (http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/8843
5/dsp01tt44pn90s) .
21. Nelson, Eric (December 2, 2019). "John Rawls' 'A Theory of Justice' and Jewish Heresy" (htt
ps://www.tabletmag.com/sections/arts-letters/articles/john-rawls-justice-jewish-heresy) .
Tablet Magazine. Retrieved April 19, 2020.
:
Tablet Magazine. Retrieved April 19, 2020.
23. "His first experience of combat was in New Guinea—a country which saw fighting for almost
the whole duration of the Pacific campaign—where he won a Bronze Star." From article by
Iain King, titled Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.org/articles/thinkers-at-wa
r-john-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Monthly, 13 June 2014, accessed 20
November 2014.
25. "One soldier in a dugout close to Rawls stood up and deliberately removed his helmet to
take a bullet to the head, choosing to die rather than endure the constant barrage. ... Later
Rawls confided the whole experience was 'particularly terrible' ..." From an article by Iain
King, titled Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.org/articles/thinkers-at-war-jo
hn-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Monthly, 13 June 2014, accessed 20
November 2014.
27. Ronald J. Sider; Paul Charles Kemeny; Derek H. Davis; Clarke E. Cochran; Corwin Smidt
(2009). Church, State and Public Justice: Five Views. InterVarsity Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-
0830874743. "Religious beliefs, argues John Rawls—a Harvard philosopher and self-
identifying atheist—can be so divisive in a pluralistic culture that they subvert the stability of
a society."
28. From article by Iain King, titled Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.org/articles
/thinkers-at-war-john-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Monthly, 13 June 2014,
accessed 20 November 2014.
29. "The total obliteration of physical infrastructure, and the even more horrific human toll,
affected him deeply ... and the fact that the destruction had been deliberately inflicted by
his own side, was profoundly unsettling. He wrote that the scenes still haunted him 50 years
later." From an article by Iain King, titled Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.or
g/articles/thinkers-at-war-john-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Monthly, 13 June
2014, accessed 20 November 2014.
:
30. From an article by Iain King, titled Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.org/artic
les/thinkers-at-war-john-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Monthly, 13 June 2014,
accessed 20 November 2014.
32. Rogers, Ben (November 27, 2002). "Obituary: John Rawls" (https://www.theguardian.com/ne
ws/2002/nov/27/guardianobituaries.obituaries) . The Guardian. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
34. Hinsch, Wilfried (October 4, 2003). "Review of The Cambridge Companion to Rawls" (https:
//ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-cambridge-companion-to-rawls/) . Retrieved October 18, 2020.
37. "Deciding what this new (Japanese) society should look like was the task of the Supreme
Command for the Allied Powers, and Rawls took this question—what should the rules of a
society be—back to the US. But only in 1971 did he come up with a comprehensive answer.
His theory starts by imagining away all that had gone before, just as the past had been
erased in Hiroshima." Taken from Thinker at War: Rawls (http://www.military-history.org/artic
les/thinkers-at-war-john-rawls.htm) , published in Military History Magazine, 13 June 2014,
accessed 20 November 2014.
40. Young Kim, Justice as Right Actions: An Original Theory of Justice in Conversation with
Major Contemporary Accounts (https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781498516518/Justice-as-Right
-Actions-An-Original-Theory-of-Justice-in-Conversation-with-Major-Contemporary-Accou
nts) . Lexington Books, 2015. ISBN 978-1498516518; Iris Marion Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference. Oxford University Press, 1990.
44. "With NEH grant, Notre Dame philosopher Paul Weithman planning conference on enduring
impact of John Rawls // College of Arts and Letters // University of Notre Dame" (https://al.n
d.edu/news/latest-news/with-neh-grant-notre-dame-philosopher-paul-weithman-planning-
conference-on-enduring-impact-of-john-rawls/) .
48. https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/who-was-john-rawls-political-philosopher-
justice
49. https://www.philosophy.rutgers.edu/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/4ElizabethAnderson.pdf
50. Van Parijs, Philippe (1991). "Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an
Unconditional Basic Income". Philosophy & Public Affairs. 20 (2): 101–131. JSTOR 2265291 (
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2265291) .
51. Amartya Sen (May 22,1979). "Equality of What?" The Tanner Lecture on Human Values,
Stanford University (http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Sen-1979_Equality-of-Wha
t.pdf)
52. Cohen, G. A. (1990). "Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities". Recherches
Économiques de Louvain / Louvain Economic Review. 56 (3/4): 357–382. JSTOR 40723932
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/40723932) .
54. https://www.marcuse.org/herbert/scholaractivists/00JoelAnderson3rdGeneration.html
55. Frankfurt-Live, "Wichtigster politischer Philosoph" seiner Generation: DFG würdigt Leibniz-
Preisträger Rainer Forst (http://cms.frankfurt-live.com/front_content.php?idcat=10&idart=57
018) Accessed on February 28, 2012
:
018) Accessed on February 28, 2012
57. Forst, Rainer; Forst, Professor Rainer (2002). Contexts of Justice (https://www.ucpress.edu/
book/9780520232259/contexts-of-justice) . ISBN 978-0520232259.
58. McAfee, Noëlle; Howard, Katie B. (2022), "Feminist Political Philosophy" (https://plato.stanfo
rd.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/feminism-political/) , in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2022 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, retrieved March 1, 2022
59. Page 12 of 'John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice' by Thomas Pogge, 2007.
61. "Oxford / News / Colleges / PPE finalists create revision musical" (http://www.cherwell.org/n
ews/college/2012/10/02/ppe-finalists-create-revision-musical) . Cherwell.org. October 3,
2012. Retrieved January 31, 2013.
References
Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice (Original ed.). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674017726.
:
Rawls, John (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674005112.
Wenar, Leif (2008) "John Rawls" (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John
Rawls (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/) )
External links
Audio recordings of Rawls's 1983 lecture course "Modern Political Philosophy" (http://
www.openculture.com/2015/06/free-listen-to-john-rawls-course-on-modern-political-
philosophy-recorded-at-harvard-1984.html/)