60. CASTRO VS.
GREGORIO his illegitimate children; denied committing any falsification’ and implored
Adoption| October 15, 2014 | Leonen
DOCTRINE:
The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child
born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children. Under Article III, Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his
wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.
As a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption
of Michelle P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009): The use of the word “shall” in
the above quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. The law provides for several exceptions
to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his
or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint
adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must
first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
FACTS:
● Rosario and Atty. Jose G. Castro Jose married each other in 1962. After a
couple of months, Rosario left Jose due to incompatibilities between them.
They briefly reconciled in 1969, and managed to give birth to a child, Joanne,
in 1970.
● The reconciliation only lasted one year and they again separated allegedly
because of Jose’s homosexual tendencies. Even so, they remained friends.
● In 2000, at the age of 70, Jose filed a petition for adoption of his alleged
illegitimate children, Jed and Regina, who he alleged were his child with
Lilibeth Fernandez, who died in 1995.
● After a favourable Home Study Report, the trial court granted the petition
for adoption, noting that no opposition was filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
● In 2006, Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose. In the
complaint, she alleged that Jose failed to support their child, Joanne, whom
she single-handedly raised, while showering gifts to his alleged lover, his
driver Larry. She alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the court when he
stated in his petition for adoption that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children, when they were actually children of Larry and his wife, Lilibeth,
● He filed the adoption petition to cover up for his homosexual relationship
with Larry. In his answer, he denied withholding support to Joanne; he
offered to support her but Rosario always refused it; Jed and Regina were
the IBP to rule on the case with justice and equity.
● On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City.
● Rosario and Joanne then filed an action for annulment of judgment before
the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment of adoption rendered by the
RTC. She alleged that the purported “Affidavit of Consent” which she
allegedly signed, was falsified as she did not sign it; the birth certificates of
Jed and Regina attached to the petition for adoption also showed glaring
inconsistencies; one set of birth certificates show Jose as the father, while
another set showed Larry, Jose’s lover, as the father. Rosario maintain that
Jed and Regina were Larry’s children, not Jose’s.
● The appellate court however denied the petition..
● Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Subsequently,
they filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court and
argued that because of the falsified affidavit of consent presented by Jose,
they were deprived of the right to participate in the proceedings. They also
contended that the adoption of illegitimate children require the consent not
only of the spouse, but of the legitimate children 10 years older and above.
● On the other hand, Jed and Regina argue that Rosario and Joanne were not
deprived of due process since their interests were amply protected by the
Office of the Solicitor General. Since there was publication of the petition,
there was constructive notice to the world of the adoption proceedings;
● The alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, not outside of the trial,
hence it is not extrinsic fraud but rather intrinsic fraud which is not covered
by a petition for annulment of judgment.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
Whether or not intrinsic rather than extrinsic fraud was committed by defendant---
THERE WAS EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
● Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping him away
from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the
defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat[12]. (Emphasis supplied)
● An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within
four years from discovery[13]. Petitioners alleged that they were made
aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18,
2007 is within the period allowed by the rules.
● The badges of fraud are present in this case.
○ First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no
relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City,
llocos Norte. Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6,
Laoag City. Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
Rosario and Joanne were residents of Parañaque City, Manila. The
 petition for adoption, however, was filed in the Regional Trial be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The trial court gave due course to the the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
petition on Jose’s bare allegation in his petition that he was a
resident of Batac, even though it is admitted in the Home Study
Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City.
○ Second, using the process of delayed registration, Jose was able to
secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the RULING: Unfortunately, Jose’s death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
father and Larry as merely the informant. Worse still is that two criminal liabilities[15]. Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any provision on the
different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently.
that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila, Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552[16] since
and another wherein the portion for the mother’s name was not rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with
filled in at all. The birth certificates of Jed and Regina from the no other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment. WHEREFORE, the
National Statistics Office, however, show that their father was petition is GRANTED.
Larry R. Rentegrado. These certificates are in clear contradiction to
the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in support
of his petition for adoption.
○ Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless, to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged
to be fraudulent.
● All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.

● The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as

intrinsic.
○ Intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a
fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the
acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have
been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the
case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner
of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud
through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a
skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and
proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of
documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation
of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive
of extrinsic fraud[14].
● When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of
any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
● Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can
 61. IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM ● Unless there is a judicial decree, the marriage still subsists.
Adoption| May 21 2009 | Carpio
RULING: As the requirement for adoption requires both spouses to jointly adopt, the Trial
DOCTRINE: Court must be affirmed. Petition is denied.
When the law on adoption is clear on its procedure. There can be no exception in the
rule of adoption where both spouses must file the petition for adoption.

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation
to suit petitioner.
Monina Lim - Petitioner
FACTS:
● Monina Lim is an optometrist and was married to Primo Limo, they were
childless
● (Michelle and Michael) Minor children were entrusted to them by one Lucia
Ayuban
● Monina wanted children and registered them as their own children.
● The two were barely 11 days old when brought to her clinic. The spouses
took them as their own and sent them to school - The two used the surname
Lim in all their documents.
● Primo died in 2000 and Monina remarried an American Angel Olario
● Monina Lim decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
provided in RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
● Michelle 25 years old, Michael 18 years old at this time.
● Michelle, her husband, Michael and Olario all signed an affidavit of consent.
● RTC - Denied the adoption.
● Direct Appeal to SC
Notes:
In all cases the H&W must adopt jointly.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
Petitioner argued that joint parental authority is no longer required since both
children are 18 and above.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified
and responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just
one of the effects of legal adoption.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Petitioner can singly adopt, even if she remarried – NO
● Adoption as provided in R.A 8552 provides that the Husband and Wife
shall jointly adopt.
● There can be no other interpretation as the law explicitly states that both
spouses must adopt jointly, the absence of Olario in the petition is fatal
to the adoption.
● It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario
2. WON Joint adoption is no longer possible since Olario has filed for
dissolution of marriage in Los Angeles - NO
● The time that petitioner filed for adoption was during their
marriage. And filing for dissolution of marriage is the same as a
decree of dissolution of marriage.
 62. IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
● There is no law regulating the use of a middle name
FACTS:
● Petitioner filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia.
● He alleged that Stephanie’s mother was Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname. Now that
petitioner is a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent, he prayed
that Stephanie’s middle name “Astroga” be changed to “Garcia”, her
mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig”,
his surname.
● Law is notably likewise silent as to what the middle name an adoptee may
use. The law only provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters”.
● Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother.
● In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
● In order to avoid an injustice, in case of doubt in the interpretation of the
law, it is necessary to tip the scales in favor of right and justice.
● Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
the court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

RTC:
● It granted the adoption and that the minor shall be known an STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
● Petitioner filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA), as her middle name.
● RTC denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his
middle name.

ISSUE:
● WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name

RULING: YES
● The OSG agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use,
as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother arguing that:
○ it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with
her natural mother as she remains to be an intestate heir
○ there is no law expressly prohibiting her to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name;
○ it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother.

The name of an individual has two parts:

● the given or proper name and
● the surname or family name.

The surname identifies the family to which the child belongs and is fixed by law.
And as correctly submitted by both parties, there is not law regulating the use of a
middle name.
 63. LAHOM VS. SIBULO
Title VII. Adoption| 14 July 2003 | J. Vitug
DOCTRINE:
Under RA 8552, the adopter has no right to rescind a decree of adoption even if the
adoption decree was given prior to the law’s enactment
FACTS:
● Isabelita Lahom, petitioner, was married with Dr. Diosdado Lahom;
● They were not able to produce a child;
● In 1971, they decided to adopt respondent, Dr. Jose Sibulo, when he was just
2 y.o
● In 1972, an order granting the petition was issued, and it directed the Civil
Registrar to change the last name of the child to Lahom;
● In 1999, petit commenced an action to rescind the adoption decree alleging
that resp has been ungrateful and would not use “Lahom” as his last name;
● Resp filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action because when the
complaint was initiated, RA 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act (enacted in
1998) was already in force and effect;
● Resp argued that such law deleted the right of the adopters to rescind the
decree of adoption;
● Trial court granted the motion;
● Petitioner appealed alleging that her right to annul the adoption decree
should not be affected by the enactment of RA 8552 since such right was
vested to her under the Civil Code and Family Code when the adoption
decree was issued.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON petitioner has the right to rescind the adoption decree issued in
1972 under RA 8552 – NO
● The SC ruled that the jurisdiction of the court as well as the controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the
petition was filed. It further stated that the exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements
of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged
that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.While adoption
has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute. It is a privilege that is governed by the state's
determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and
welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the
withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to regulation by the State.
● In this case, the petition to annul the adoption decree was filed after the
enactment of RA 8552 which removed the right of the adopters to
rescind an adoption decree; thus, it is but logical to dismiss the case
based on the prevailing law.
● Likewise, the SC ruled that even if the petitioner is allowed to rescind
the adoption decree, the action has already prescribed. In the old law
(Rule 100), such rescission can only be done w/in 5years from the
happening of the fact of the ground for rescission.
● Lastly, the SC said that an adopter still has the right to remove certain
accrued interests (i.e. legitime and etc) of an undeserving child
RULING: The assailed judgment is affirmed. Petition is denied.
NOTE:
The SC discussed the history of adoption
“A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the
subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the
family. The continuity of the adopter's family was the primary purpose of adoption
and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. Countries, like Greece, France,
Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family, neither
allowed nor recognized adoption. It was only much later when adoption was given
an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its
way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on
adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an
overriding consideration. In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of
children invited universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of
1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, followed by the United
Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, were written instruments that would
also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the
Philippines of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code
and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, gave immediate statutory
acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated
the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the
Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted
child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter
to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever
the legal ties created by adoption.”
 64. DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEM
Support | December 10, 2014 | J. Peralta
DOCTRINE: Even if the laws of the foreign country neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
FACTS:
● Petitioner and Respondent contracted marriage in Holland in 1990.
● They had a son who at the time of the filing of the petition was 16 years old.
● Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her
son came home to the Philippines.
● Since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son.
● Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
● Petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
● RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal
case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who
is an alien
● Hence, this petition
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law
Yes. However, petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners, such that they are governed by their national law with respect
to family rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded
the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands
in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, even if the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto. We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent
is no longer liable to support his former wife.
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Yes. Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made
liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to
give support to petitioner’s son.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner
is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
RULING: Petition Granted. Respondent is liable to provide support to his child,
notwithstanding that the laws of the Netherlands do not require it. Case is remanded to
conduct further proceedings on the merits of the case.
 65. SPS. LIM VS. LIM
Support | October 30, 2009 | Carpio, J
DOCTRINE:
Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they
have parents who are capable of supporting them.
FACTS:
· Respondent married Edward the son of the Petitioners. They all lived in
petitioner’s home in Forbes Park Makati together with the respondent’s
children with Edward, and Edward’s grandparents.
· Following a violent confrontation, respondent took their children and
abandoned the Forbes Park residence because she caught Edward with his
grandmother’s in-house midwife.
· Respondent for herself and her children then sued the petitioners,
Edward, and the grandparents for support. The RTC ordered Edward to
provide a monthly support of Php6000 pendente lite.
· The RTC then held Petitioners and Edward liable for Php40,000 monthly
support. (Php34,000 coming from the petitioners and Php6,000 from Edward,
his actual monthly income).
· Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA questioning their liability to
support the petitioner and her children. The CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON petitioners are liable for the support of their daughter-in-law and
grandchildren? Only to the grandchildren.
Petitioners argue that their obligation to support their grandchildren has
not yet been activated because under the Civil Code, ascendants are only
liable upon default of parental authority of the minor’s parents. Given
that both Respondent and Edward exercise parental authority over the
children, it is they who should be liable for support.
However their reliance on Title IX on parental authority must fall short.
The governing provisions of this case are those found in Title VIII, as
amended by the Family Code, on Support. These titles differ in concerns
including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among
relatives of differing degrees. Thus although support arising from
parental authority ends upon the age of emancipation, the same obligation
arising from spousal and general familial ties lasts during the obligee’s
lifetime.
The SC is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly
from their grandparents if they have parents who are capable of
supporting them.
However, in the case at bar, given that Edward’s monthly income of Php.
6000 cannot support his family, and that the respondent is unemployed
and has no means of financial income, the obligation to support their
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree.
It is to be noted that petitioner’s obligation must only extend to the
grandchildren. It is Edward’s sole obligation to provide for the
Respondent.
RULING: Petition Denied. Case Remanded to the Trial Court for further
proceedings.
NOTE:Article 204
Petitioners cannot avail Article 204 to be allowed to fulfil their obligation by
maintaining respondent and their children at their residence because Art 204
provides that this alternative cannot be availed in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle.

Given that the reason for abandonment is respondent’s belief that Edward
committed concubinage with his grandmother’s in-house midwife.
66. LACSON VS. LACSON
Support | August 28, 2006 | J. Garcia
DOCTRINE:
Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the
situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Edward Lacson is the father of the respondent sisters Maowee and
Maonaa Lacson. Respondent Lea Daban Lacson is the wife of petitioner and
mother of respondent sisters.
● Maowee was born on December 4, 1974 while Maonaa, a little less than a
year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal
home in Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek shelter
somewhere else.
o They shuttled from one dwelling place to another for 18 years -
stayed with Lea’s mother-in-law then to Lea’s mother then with
Lea’s brother, Noel Daban.
● From the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying on his commitment memorialized in a note
dated Dec. 10, 2975 to give support to his daughters.
● Lea admits that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts
for school expenses and Edward’s mother gave small amounts to help in the
children’s schooling. (Both nursing in St. Paul’s College, Iloilo CIty)
● Early 1995, Lea, in behalf of her 2 daughters filed a complaint against
Edwards for support before the RTC.
o Claims that Edward has not provided them support since 1976 and
that owing to Edward’s neglect, their mother borrowed money
from her brother Noel from time to time, P400K to P600K.
● RTC granted the sisters support pendente lite at P12K per month
representing 216 months or 18 years of support in arrears. CA affirmed.
● Edward’s allegation:
o There was no previous extrajudicial demand, let alone judicial
demand mad by the respondents invoking Art. 203 of Family Code:
Art. 203 - The obligation to give support shall be demandable
from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the
date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
o His obligation to pay starts from the filing of the Civil case in 1995
since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand
for support was made upon him.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON petitioner should only be made liable to pay support from the time
of the filing of the complaint - NO
● Edward veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of
the two could celebrate her second birthday. Petitioner could not expect any
of the sisters during their tender years to demand support from him. Even
their mother found it difficult to get in touch with him.
● Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand
but what would pass as a demand was definitely made. Asking one to
comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the
situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or plea.
● RTC found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had
been made: respondents’ mother went to their paternal grandmother’s
house and asked for support - Edward embodied in a note.
● CA made a parallel finding: Edward’s note stated “he will sustain their
daughters as requested by their mother” thus practically confirming the
demand having been made by Lea.
● Hence, an extrajudicial demand for support having been made on petitioner
as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note.
2. WON Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from petitioner - YES
● Art. 207 of Family Code: When the person obliged to support another
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of
reimbursement from the person obliged to give support.
● Resulting juridical relation between petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-
contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himself at the expense of another.
RULING: As Edward has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents support all
throughout their growing years and it being established that a demand from the mother has
been made, Edward should be made liable for the entire 18 years of arrears in support.
 67. SALIENTES VS. ABANILLA ● RULE: Article 211 grants joint parental authority and joint custody over
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente their common child.
● Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
DOCTRINE: While mother is given the preference for custody of a child below 7 yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of
years old, it is not a ground to disqualify the father from seeing or visiting his custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their
child. child.
● IN THIS CASE: Father’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see
FACTS: his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
● Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of minor Lorenzo available to him.
Abanilla. ● While Article 213 (on preference given to mother regarding custody of child
● Due to in-laws problems, Loran (father) suggested to his wife that they below 7 years old) can be raised as a counter-argument for Loran’s petition
transfer to another house but Marie (mother) refused. for custody, it CANNOT be used as a basis for preventing the father to see
● As a result, he left the house of his in-laws and was prevented from seeing his own child.
his son. ● Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
● Later on, Loren in his personal capacity, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus child under seven years of age.
and Custody before RTC Muntinlupa ● RULING: The petition for habeas corpus is proper. Loran shall not be
● RULING OF RTC: Ordered that Lorenzo’s body be produced and be deprived from seeing or visiting his minor child.
brought to the Court.
● RULING OF CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Marie.
○ It upheld the ruling of the RTC
○ CA likewise pointed out that RTC did not award the custody of
Lorenzo to anyone but since the trial court was still about to
conduct a full inquiry as to cause of minor’s detention and the
matter of his custody.
○ It ordered Marie (mother) to show cause and explain why the
custody of her own child be given to her.
● ARGUMENTS OF MARIE (Mother)
○ Since her child is below 7 years old, custody must be given to her
since there is no compelling reason not to give it to her.
○ With this, there was no need for the mother to show cause and
explain the custody of her very own child.
● ARGUMENTS OF LORAN (Father)
○ Article 213 (on custody of minor child) does not extend to the right
of the father to see his son. With this, he invoked that he is entitled
to writ of habeas corpus.
○ Under the law, both parents have shared custody and parental
authority over their son.
ISSUE:
● WON couple who is separated de facto must exercise parental authority
over their common child. [YES]

HELD:
YES. Parental authority shall be exercised jointly by both parents.
 68. BECKETT VS. JUDGE SARMIENTO
Parental Authority | Jan 30, 2013 | Velasco, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: Custody agreement can never be regarded as "permanent and
unbending," the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of the
child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to
the latter’s best interest.
No child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. If already over 7 years of age, the
child’s choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be
respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.
FACTS:
● Geoffrey Beckett married to Eltesa Densing Beckett were married and had a
child Geoffrey Becket Jr.
● Both spouses sued each other before (1) Eltesa sued Geoffrey in violation of
RA 7610 VAWC and following a suit for declaration of nullity of their
marriage; (2) Geoffrey sued his wife for adultery.
● Both cases were raffled before Respondent Judge Sarmiento Jr. There was a
compromise agreement which they agreed hence the pending civil and
criminal cases were to be dismissed and the permanent and full custody of
their child would be for Geoffrey subject to visitorial rights of the wife. (The
child was then 5 years old).
● Geoffrey left for Australia with his son Geoffrey Jr plus 3 other children
(previous relationships). He filed for divorce and was granted in 2007.
● In 2010 Eltesa and Geoffrey had an agreement that Geoffrey, Jr will stay with
her even after the holidays but she will return the child on Jan 9 2011. Eltesa
didn’t return the child. Geoffrey filed a case against Eltesa for violation of
RA 7610 and the case was raffled to Judge Sarmiento. The child remained
with Eltesa hence Geoffrey applied for the issuance of Habeas Corpus.
● Judge Sarmiento issued an order (1) Eltesa return the child to Geoffrey; (2)
Geoffrey bring the child in the pre-trial conference. à Eltesa still didn’t give
the child back.
● Judge Sarmiento issued another order (1) gave Eltesa provisional custody
over the child and (2) directed DSWD to conduct a social case study on the
child. à Geoffrey moved for reconsideration because the judge cannot grant
provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the compromise agreement before.
● Judge Sarmiento was also conversing with Eltesa in Cebuano dialect during
the proceeding which Geoffrey and his counsel didn’t understand despite
their requests to speak in Filipino or English.
● Geoffrey’s MR was unresolved and several hearings were postponed due to
the late submission of DSWD on the case study report. à Geoffrey filed this
instant complaint.
● Geoffrey Argues: (1) Judge Sarmiento is liable for gross ignorance of the
law- granted provisional custody; (2) partiality by committing acts of serious
misconduct and irregularities in the performance of official duties, such as
but not limited to allowing one Helen Sy to enter his chambers before the
March 15, 2011 hearing, his habit of conversing with Eltesa in the local
dialect and for adjourning a hearing while he was conferring with his
counsel in private.
● Judge Sarmiento Claims: (1) He deferred action in the MR due to the
pending case study report; (2) then he denied the MR due to the report of
DSWD recommending that the child should be in the custody of his mother,
Eltesa.
● Report of Psychologist Duhaylungsod from the child: (1) Geoffrey leaves
his child to the care of his older half brother or his girlfriends; (2) he was
sent outside of the house once by the girlfriend and forced to stay in the
garage; (3) he never wants to stay with Geoffrey whom he feared and once
locked him in his room without food.
● Office of the Court Administrator: Recommended that Judge Sarmiento be
liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined with stern warning.
Recommended dismissal of the complaint insofar the charge of partiality
and serious misconduct and irregularities based on the circumstances
alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
● WON Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law? - NO
○ Complainant has charged respondent judge with gross ignorance
of the law. He alleges that the judge’s compromise agreement
before operates as res judicata or a bar to the judge to issue a
provisional custody order in favor of Eltesa in the March 15, 2011
order.
○ Espiritu v. Court of Appealsà Custody over the child "is not
permanent and unalterable and can always be re-examined and
adjusted."
○ Dacasin v Dacasinà“custody agreement can never be regarded as
"permanent and unbending," the simple reason being that the
situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that
sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be to the
latter’s best interest.”
○ No child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. If already over 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to
which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be
respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit.
■ Geoffrey, Jr manifested his preference for Eltesa (Mom)
■ Geoffrey, Jr., at the time when he persistently refused to be
turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of age.
As such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on
his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.
○ Perez v CAà in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always
the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected in no less than
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides
that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
 administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.
○ Therefore, Judge Sarmiento can’t be held guilty of the charges of
Geoffrey Beckett.
RULING: Complaint dismissed.
69 BAGTAS VS. HON. SANTOS ET AL.
Substitute and Special Parental Authority | November 27, 2009 | J. Carpio
DOCTRINE: Art. 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. Art. 216 states that in default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child.
FACTS:
● Spouses Gallardo are the parents of Maricel. 2 weeks after her HS
graduation, Maricel ran away to live with her boyfriend and eventually got
pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy.
● Maricel returned to her parentes after her boyfriend left her and on the same
day, she ran away again and lived with Bagtas and Sioson in Antipolo.
Maricel then went to Negros Occidental and left her baby in the custody of
Bagtas and Sioson.
o In a letter, Maricel relinquished her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas
and his wife.
● Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of the baby from Bagtas and
Sioson but they refused. Spouses Gallardo then field a petition for habeas
corpus with the RTC.
● RTC granted the petition and the 2 parties entered into a compromise
agreement.
o Child is in custody of the petitioners Friday-Sunday and returned
to the respondents by Sunday 8pm subject to visitorial rights of the
petitioners anytime of the day
● Bagtas and Sioson learned that Gallardo brought the baby to Samar and
prayed to the RTC to produce the baby and explain why the violated the
RTC order.
● RTC: habeas corpus has already become moot since the child has already
been produced and turned over to the petitioners.
o Since the purpose of the petition was already served since the child
was produced and delivered, the petition has already become moot
and academic
o Petitioners are, under Art. 214 FC, authorized to exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the
legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to
make possible and/or enable the petitioners to discharge their
duties as substitute parents.
● Respondents prayed that the child be returned to them to preserve the status
quo ante stating that there is a conflicting order since there was a
compromise order to return the child on certain days but is now being
dismissed by the court for being moot and academic.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON RTC erred in ruling that the sole purpose of the petition for
habeas corpus was the production of the child before the trial court
and that it has become moot and academic - YES
· The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases where the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled. In
cases involving minors, the main purpose is to determine who has
the rightful custody over the child.
· RTC erred when it dismissed the action after it became moot when
it should have conducted a trial to determine who had the rightful
custody over the child.
· Art. 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. Art. 216 states that in
default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
surviving grandparent shall exercise substitute parental authority
over the child.
2. WON RTC properly awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to Spouses
Gallardo
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the
most important consideration.
· The FC authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands,
deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child or
adopt such measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
In Sombong, the court laid down 3 requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors:
a. Petitioner has right of custody over the minor
b. Respondent is withholding the custody over the minor; and
c. The best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in the custody
of the petitioner.
In the present case, these requisites were not clearly established because the RTC
hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of the child to the Spouses
Gallardo without conducting any trial.
RULING: The Court remanded this case to the RTC to receive evidence to determine
the fitness of Spouses Gallardo to have custody over Maryl Joy. While a remand of
the case would mean further delay,, the child’s best interest demands that proper
proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of Spouses Gallardo.

70. VANCIL VS. BELMES
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
“the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood… The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.”
FACTS:
● ·Petitioner Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman
who died in December 1986.
o Respondent Belmes is Reeder’s common law wife, with whom he
has two children, named Valerie and Vincent.
● May 1987: Vancil instituted guardianship proceedings in RTC Cebu City
over the persons and properties of minors Valerie, 6-years old, and Vincent,
2-years old, at the time, claiming the two were residents of Cebu City, and
had an estate consisting of their father’s death pension benefits, amounting
to PhP 100,000.00.
o July 1987: Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over
the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.
● August 1987: Belmes submitted an opposition to the guardianship
proceeding, claiming that she had already instituted similar proceedings in
RTC Pagadian City.
o Belmes then filed a motion for revocation of Vancil’s guardianship
and the assertion of her own parental authority over Valerie and
Vincent, Jr., being in actual custody of the two in Zamboanga del
Sur.
● October 1988: RTC rejected Belmes’ motion to disqualify Vancil as guardian,
and ordered Vancil to post a bond of PhP 50,000.00 and begin exercising her
duties as guardian.
● July 1997: On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC order dismissed Vancil’s
proceeding in favour of Balmes’, because the Civil Code “considers parents,
the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor
children”
o The CA noted that there was nothing on record showing why
Belmes, as the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal
rights as natural guardian of her minor children.
o Further, Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court
confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only
for good reason may another person be named.
● Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO: Did the CA err in considering as absolute the right of a parent
to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors? NO, it did not.
● NOTE: At the time the instant suit was filed, Valerie had already turned
eighteen, and thus this case is moot and academic as to her.
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons
of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
● Being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
○ Sagala-Eslao vs. CA: “the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood…
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.”
● Petitioner's claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by
way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 2141 of the Family
Code.
● Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent.
○ Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner must
prove Balmes’ unsuitability.
○ Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of
Vincent.
1 [1] Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority.shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx.
 ■ Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit
as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner
raped Valerie several times.

■ But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject

of this guardianship proceeding.

○ Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor

Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian,
being an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.

○ Vancil has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987, is of advanced
age, and has previously been convicted of libel against one Danilo
Deen. Thus, prospects of her returning to the Philippines to serve
as guardian to Vincent are uncertain at best.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification in

the sense that Valerie, who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be
under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
 71. ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE ET AL VS. MIRANDA that Petitioner was indeed not inside the classroom when the
Substitute and Special Parental Authority | June 29, 2010 | J. Nachura experiment occurred.

DOCTRINE: This alone showed petitioner’s negligence, but the SC did not stop there, the
The law (Art. 218 of the Fam Code) bestows upon “the school, its administrators and SC also listed down the inadequacies of the petitioner school in the wise:
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care” special parental “Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree
authority over children under their supervision concomitant with this is the of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
corresponding obligation set forth in Art. 2180 NCC: “teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils 1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” and injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class;
FACTS:
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the
● Respondent was a student enrolled in petitioner college. One afternoon students who conduct experiments in class;
during their science class, with petitioner Tabugo as the subject teacher, an
experiment was conducted to test the fusion of sulphur powder and iron 3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,
filings. specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
● At some point during the experiment, petitioner Tabugo, left the classroom
while she was absent respondent looked inside one of the test tubes, while 4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time
doing so the substance exploded directly towards his left eye which led to her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident
him undergoing surgery for the chemical burns brought about by the injury. involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the class—fifty (50)
● Respondent’s parents wrote a letter to the petitioners asking them to students— conducting the experiment is difficult to monitor.”
shoulder the medical expenses, but the request was left unheeded.
● This prompted the respondent’s parents to file an action for damages, on Clearly then, the petitioners are negligent in supervising the experiment that
respondent’s behalf, against the petitioners. was conducted by respondent, therefore they are liable for damages.
● The trial court ruled in favor of respondent as affirmed by the CA. The trial
court found that the proximate cause of injury is the sudden explosion of the
chemicals, which accdg to could have been prevented by the petitioner if it
maintained proper supervision over petitioner Tabugo and providing a safe
and secure environment for conducting dangerous science experiments.
RULING: Because of petitioners’ negligence, they are liable for damages.
● The petitioners are now before the SC questioning such ruling. It argues that
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
the proximate cause of respondent’s injury is respondent’s act in looking
Name of Justice
into the test tubes.
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
● WON PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES - YES
● According to Art. 218 of the FC, “The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care
shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.”
The provision provides the rule that petitioners have special parental
authority and responsibility. With this special responsibility,
petitioners cannot escape liability. As found by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA, while Pet. Tabugo was initially in the classroom,
there was no evidence that she never left the classroom while the
experiment took place, this along with the fact that it was not Petitioner
Tabugo that accompanied respondent to the school clinic, would show
 72. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
Substitute and Special Parental Authority| February 02, 2002 | Pardo, J
DOCTRINE:
Under Art. 219, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.
FACTS:
● Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996.
● A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying.
● As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group.
● Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan
City.
● The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner
and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
● Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result
● Sps. Carpitanos filed a case for damages against St. Mary’s
● The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Carpitanos
● The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under
Arts. 218 and 219 of the FC, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
● WON petitioner St. Mary’s should be held liable - NO
● Art. 218 FC, the following shall have special parental authority over
a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
○ (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
○ (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care.
● This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the
school or its teachers.
● Under Art. 219, if the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
● However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.
● In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
● Respondent spouses admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving
of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep.
● Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the
minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva.
● Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence
of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily.
● The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident.
● Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the
negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
RULING: For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to
respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
 73. REPUBLIC VS. GRANADA requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law | June 13, 2012 | J. Sereno in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. AaCTcI

DOCTRINE: Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
FACTS:
● Respondent Yolanda met Granada at an electric company where they were
both working. They both got married and resulted in the birth of their son.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately 􏰀nal and
executory.
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings 􏰀led under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

● When the company closed down, Granada went to Taiwan to seek

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
employment and Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
him.

● After 9 years, Yolanda filed a petition to have Granada declared

presumptively dead in the RTC and was declared so.
● Republic filed an MR arguing that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead.
RULING: The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, “nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect.”

● In the CA, Yolanda argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death, based on Art. 41 of the FC, was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory, thus no appealable.
o CA granted this citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, ruling that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Art. 41 is a
summary proceeding.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the RTC
decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and
hence, not subject to ordinary appeal - NO
CA correctly dismissed the petition under Art. 41 FC, a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.
NOTES:
Republic argued that Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testi􏰀fed to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter's relatives, these relatives were not presented to
corroborate Diosdado's testimony.
In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the
Taiwanese Consular O􏰂ce or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan
or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did
not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic's arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny
the Petition.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

● Art. 238. Until modi􏰀ed by the Supreme Court, the procedural

rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code
 § CA denied the MR and ruled that the subsequent
74. JARILLO VS. PEOPLE declaration of nullity of the 1st marriage on the
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente ground of Psych Incapacity while it retroacts to the
date of the 1st marriage does not excuse the bigamy
DOCTRINE: committed by Victoria
Jurisprudence has consistently ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
1st marriage is immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of WON Victoria is guilty of Bigamy despite the SUBSEQUENT declaration of nullity of
bigamy had already been consummated. her 1st marriage?

Yes.

Victoria Jarillo v People Jurisprudence has consistently ruled that the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
1st marriage is immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of
Facts: bigamy had already been consummated.
- Victoria and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
solemnized by the mayor of Taguig on May 24, 1974. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo had
o They again celebrated marriage in a church wedding before Rev. no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the case for
Agenl Resultay in Pangasinan. bigamy because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the 1 st
o They had 1 daughter named Rachelle marriage be subsisting at the time the 2nd marriage is contracted.
- Victoria contracted another marriage with Emmanuel Uy in the court of
pasay before Judge Cruz in 1979
On the issue of prescription:
o They then had a church wedding in Manila in 1995
Article 90 of the RPC states that crimies punishable by other afflictive penalties
- Emmanuel filed a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC
prescribes in 15 years.
of manila in 1999
- Thereafter, Victoria was charged with bigamy before the RTC of pasay.
Article 91 states that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
- In 2000, Victoria filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
Alocillo
agents.
o RTC found Victorioa guilty of BIGAMY
o But made no pronouncement on the civil aspect of the case
- Victoria filed an MR but was denied Petitioner asserts that Uy had know of her previous marriage as far back as 1978 thus
o Victoria claimed that her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo prescription began to run from that time. HOWEVER, a close examination of the
were void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to records of the case reveals that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to
Loreta Tilman at the time of the celebration of their marriage support her claims. Therefore since victoria was unable to prove with certainty that
o Her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were void for lack of a the period of prescription began to run in 1978, then her defense is therefore
valid marriage license ineffectual.
o The action had prescribed since Uy knew about her marriage to
Aloccilo as far back as 1978
- CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC
o Victoria is guilty of bigamy as her marriage to Alocillo had not
yet been declared void at the time of her marriage to Uy
- In tne meantime, the RTC declared the 1974 and 1975 marriages of
Alocillo void on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity
o Pursuant to this Victoria filed an MR with the CA