156. TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO VS.

CA
Revocation of Wills | February 29, 1988 | J. Sarmiento Given these circumstances, the revocation of the testator’s will has not been
sufficiently established hence the probate of the discovered will should
DOCTRINE: proceed.
While Animus Revocandi is one of the requisites for a valid revocation by
overt act, it alone does not suffice to validate a purported revocation as
such intention must be coupled by an overt act either by the testator
himself or by a third person in his presence and under his express RULING: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING
direction. ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the
respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
FACTS: Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.
● The present case involves the probate of the will of Adriana Maloto. The
said testator left 4 heirs when she died [the petitioners and respondents], all
of whom were here nieces and nephews. Initially, these 4 heirs SEPARATE OPINIONS:
extrajudicially settled the testator’s estate upon the belief that she did not Name of Justice
execute a will. Points raised
● 3 years after the settlement, the associate of the testator’s lawyer discovered Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
a document purporting to be the testator’s will. The said document was then
filed to the Clerk of Court. Under the terms of the will, petitioners received
substantially bigger portions of the testator’s estate as compared to their
shares under the extrajudicial settlement, the petitioners thus filed an action
for the probate of the will.
● The trial court dismissed the action, upon the finding that the testator
actually revoked her will. This finding was based upon the testimony of the
two witnesses of the respondent-oppositors. The two witnesses attested to
the fact that they allegedly burned the will of the testator.
● Hence, the present petition questioning the above findings of the trial court.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON THERE WAS A VALID REVOCATION OF THE WILL - No
● According to Art 830, there are three ways of revoking a will, the
relevant means in the present case is revocation by execution of over act
[burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating]. In order for there to be a
valid revocation under this, there must be animus revocandi, or
intention to revoke, accompanied by the execution of overt physical acts
by either the testator or a third person in the testator’s presence and
under his express direction.

In this case, the purported execution of physical acts were done by the two
witnesses of the respondents, however, it was not proven that the alleged
burning of the will was done in the presence and under the express direction
of the testator, in fact, according to the testimony of the witnesses, only both
of them (the witnesses) were in the room where the stove is located and
when the will was burned.
Additionally, the document they burned cannot be conclusively determined
as the actual will of the testator given the fact that the two witnesses were
illiterate and they only knew that the document was an alleged will is
because it was described to them as such.
 157. MOLO VS. MOLO ● There is no evidence that directly indicate that the testator deliberately
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in 1939.
DOCTRINE: ● Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily
Under the principle of dependent relative revocation, where the act of destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which
destruction is connected with the making of another will, the revoked the first, the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under
revocation of the old is to depend upon the efficacy of the new the principle of “dependent relative revocation”.
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation of the will is
conditional. ● This principle is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a
will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with intention
to make a new testamentary dispositions, and the new disposition, if
FACTS: made, fails of effect for some reason.

● Mariano Molo dies without leaving any forced heir. He was survived by his ● Under this principle, where the act of destruction is connected with the
wife, herein petitioner Vda. de Modol, and be his nieces and nephews, making of another will, the revocation of the old is to depend upon the
oppositor-appellants efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the
● Mariano left two wills, one executed August 17, 1989, and another executed revocation of the will is conditional.
June 20, 1939. The 1939 will contains a clause which expressly revokes the ● The failure of the new testamentary disposition is equivalent to the non-
1918 will fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence, prevents the
● Petitioner filed a petition seeking the probate of the 1939 will. Upon revocation of the original will.
opposition by the oppositors the probate of the said will was denied on the
ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the will was executed in
accordance with law.
● Petitioner filed another will for the probate of the 1918 will.
● The oppositors again opposed the probate of the said will. They contents
that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will and that
is has been subsequently revoked.

● Oppositors also contend that petitioner voluntarily frustrated the probate of

the 1939 will to enable her to obtain the probate of the 1918 will, however,
this was ruled out be the court for insufficiency of evidence

● The oppositors now contend that notwithstanding the disallowance of said

will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the
prior will of 1918.

● Oppositors also contend that regardless of said revocatory clause, said will
of 1918 cannot still begivien effect because of the presumption that is was
deliberately revoked by the testator himself.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

2. WON the 1918 will is already considered as revoked - NO
● In the case of Samson v. Naval, the court held that
⎼ A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that is was not executed in
conformity with the provisions of the making of wills, cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void.
 158. MERCADO VS. SANTOS
Allowance and Disallowance of Wills | September 22, 1938 | J. Laurel

DOCTRINE: Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit as to

the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It provides:
"No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved
and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme
Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."

FACTS:
● 16 months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa (deceased wife of
petitioner), intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed a case for falsification or
forgery of the probated will.
● The cases were dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been
falsified has already been probated and there was no evidence contrary to
the latter.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

3. WON the probate of the will is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the
alleged forgery - YES, the law creates a CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION as
to the due execution of the will after it is admitted into probate.
Applicable law: Code of Civil Procedure (then governing the law on wills)
1. Sec. 306: the effect on judgments: in case of a judgment/order in respect to
the probate of a will, such judgment/order is conclusive upon the will.
2. Sec. 333 established an incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments
declared by the Code to be conclusive
3. Sec. 625 provides the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probate will
“.. the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.”

Effect of judgment: “In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in

respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a
particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing,
the will or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That
the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate”
In view of these provisions, a criminal action will not lie against the forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction

RULING: Mercado is entitled to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed.
 159. ORTEGA VS. VALMONTE
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
Article 799 states the 3 things that the testator must know in order to
determine WON he is of sound mind:
1. nature of the estate to be disposed of
2. proper objects of the testators bounty
3. character of the testamentary act
Ortega v Valmonte
Facts:
- Placido, at the age of 80, after returning to manila, married josefina (28
years old).
o 2 years thereafter, Placido died
o he executed a notarial last will and testament in 1983, a year
before he died, wherein he bequeathed all his properties and
money to his wife.
- Leticia opposed the will and declared that the wife should not inherit
alone because there are other children from the siblings of placido who
are also entitled to inherit. Leticia attacked the mental capacity of the
testator and claimed that at the time of the execution of the will, the
testator was already 83 and was no longer of sound mind.
- The RTC disallowed the probate of the will
- The CA admitted the will of Placido to probate
o Upheld the credibility of the notary public and the witnesses
who acknowledged the due execution of the will. they claimed
that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will and that his unhygienic, crude and
impolite ways did no make him a person of unsound mind.
WON there was fraud? NO
Article 839 – the will shall be disallowed in any of the ff cases:
1. formalities required by law have not been complied with
2. testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will at
the time of its execution
3. if it was executed through force, undue duress, influence of fear or
threats
4. it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person
5. signature of testator was procured by fraud
6. if testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto
petitioner claims that the wife connived with the notary public and witnesses in
deceiving placido to sign the will which can be seen from the varying dates of the
execution and the attestator of the will
- it was highly dubious for a wome at her young age to marry a man who
was 3x her age who happened to be:
o an fil-american pensionado
- thus casting doubt on her intentions
the court said that the party challenging the will has the burden to prove the existence
of fraud at the time of its execution. In this case, no evidence was presented to prove
the fraud allegedly committed.
- the conflict in the dates appearing on the will does nit invalidate the
document because the law does not require a notarial will to be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
- Omission of some relatives does not affect the execution of a will.
- Failed to prove the conspiracy in the commission of the fraud alleged.
The witnesses stood to reveive no benefit from the allowance of the will.
WON testator had capacity to make a will? Yes.
Article 799 states the 3 things that the testator must know in order to determine WON
he is of sound mind:
1. nature of the estate to be disposed of
2. proper objects of the testators bounty
3. character of the testamentary act
in this case, despite his advanced age, he was sti able to identify accurately the kidns
of property that he owned, the extent of hi shares in them and their locations. With
regard to the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife
as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives will not affect its formal validity.
160. SEANGIO VS. JUDGE REYES
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON blabla – YES/NO
 ● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
2. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
3. Important issues in bold
4. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
5. Make sure to ratio per issue
6. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
161. IN RE: THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE WILL OF RUPERTA 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the
PALAGANAS will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of
Dis/Allowance of Wills | January 26, 2011 | Abad, J. the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether
the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
DOCTRINE: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person
made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death
country. of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left
FACTS: in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
● Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas
(Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the PETITION DENIED.
Philippines and in the U.S.
● Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta,
filed with the RTC a petition for probate of the will but herein petitioners,
nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed. YES.

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be
probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of
the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of
such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate
in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its
laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same,
and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their
execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of
the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country. 6

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections
 162. PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA v.. RIGOR
Institution of Heirs | April 30, 1979 |Aquino, J.
DOCTRINE: Where the parish priest of Victoria, Tarlac, could, under the bequest,
become a trustee only when any of the testator’s nephews living at the time of his
death had not yet entered the seminary or being a priest was excommunicated,
and these contingencies never arose, said parish priest cannot be deemed a
substitute devisee.
FACTS:
● Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935,
leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935.
○ Named as devisees in the will were the testator’s nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters and his cousin.
○ In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
which says that certain real properties which consists of ricelands
be adjudicated in favor of his nearest male relative who shall take
the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual
Catholic Priest of the Church of Victoria, Tarlac.
● The probate court approved the project of partition directed that the
administratrix deliver the devisees their respective shares.
● 13 years after the approval of the partition project, the parish priest of
Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition for the
appointment of a new administrator who should deliver to the church the
said ricelands, and that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an
accounting of the fruits.
● The probate court granted the petition. Thus, the intestate heirs of Father
Rigor countered with a petition praying that the bequest be declared
inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said
ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, “no nearest male
relative of” the testator “has ever studied for the priesthood.
● The lower court granted the petition and declared the bequest inoperative
and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator’s legal heirs. However, upon
second MR by the parish priest, the lower court reversed its ruling on the
ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan
(the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in QC.
● On appeal by the legal heirs to the CA, the appellate court reversed the
order of the lower court and held that Father Rigor had created a
testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy
orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to
enforce it beyond that period would violate “the rule against perpetuities.”
● Hence the present petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the bequest made by Father Rigor in his will involving the said
ricelands is inoperative as claimed by the legal heirs – YES
● Based from the testamentary provisions in Father Rigor’s will, it is clear
that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only in
two situations: (1) during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood; and (2) in case
the testator’s nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
● What is not clear is the question of whether the testator contemplated
only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in
mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
● HELD: the said bequest refers to the testator’s nearest male relative
living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
“In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must
be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper”
⎼ To construe them as referring to the testator’s nearest male relative
at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate.
That could not have been his intention.
⎼ When the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have
had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his
third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he
could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with
certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at
the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male
relative would be his nephew or grandnephews (the sone of his
nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term “nearest male
relative”
● QUESTION: What then did the testator mean by “the interval of time
that there is no conditional legatee (this was written in spanish)”
⎼ The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation
whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would
like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school
or was not yet in the seminary.
⎼ In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the
moment the testator’s nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and
receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be
terminated
● Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether
at the time Father Rigor died, he had a nephew who was studying for
the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the
ecclesiastical career.
⎼ HELD: The parish priest unequivocally admitted that no nearest
male relative of the late Father Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood.
RULING: Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual
or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of
Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise INOPERATIVE. Consequently, the
petition was denied
Note: the following are the applicable provisions in the Civil Code: Arts. 956 and
960 (2)
 163. NUGUID VS. NUGUID
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

2. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
3. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
4. Important issues in bold
5. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
6. Make sure to ratio per issue
7. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
 164.ACAIN VS. IAC ● Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente the direct line.
● However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be denied that
DOCTRINE: she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
● Neither can it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this
is a clear case of preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of
Acain and his siblings to the entire inheritance of the testator results in
FACTS: totally abrogating the will.
● As to the adopted daughter, under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
● May 1984: Pet Constantino Acain filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a petition Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
Acain of letters testamentary. makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
○ When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator.
were instituted as heirs.
○ “All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands
and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson
shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko
Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased
me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and
here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to
his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina,
laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.”
○ The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents.

● Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case
Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed.
● After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez,
legally adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain)
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir
and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. MOTION WAS DENIED
● After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to
the IAC.
● IAC: granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio.
● His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review
of IAC’s decision.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

● WON respondents have been preterited - NO for the widow, YES for
Fernandez.
RULING
● Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited.
 165. VIADO NON VS. CA Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited
heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. The CA was
DOCTRINE: correct in modifying the judgment for the payment of Delia’s share in
the property.

FACTS: RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision, dated 29
May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No special
● Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned the disputed property; pronouncement on costs.
● Both of them died;
● Petitioners are the remaining children of Sps. Viado, while respondents are
the remaining heirs of one of the children of Sps. Viado or the in-laws;
● Since 1977, petitioners and respondents shared a common residence at the
disputed property;
● Tension appeared to have escalated between petitioners and respondents
after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the
two families;
● Respondents claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and
demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter;
● Hence, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question,
filed a case for partition before the RTC;
● Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject
property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late
Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia;
● Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation;
● Petitioner Rebecca, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia, in the
extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter’s preterition that should
warrant its annulment;
● RTC ruled in favor of respondents; CA affirmed but modified by ordering
the remand of the records of the case for further proceedings to determine
the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to
petitioner Delia for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial
settlement.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the preterition of Delia, alleged to be retardate sister, should annul
the partition agreed by the parties - NO
● The exclusion of petitioner Delia, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and
bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the TCT.. The relief, as so
correctly pointed out by the CA, instead rests on Article 1104 of the
 166 MORALES v OLONDRIZ
Succession/Institution of Heirs| February 3, 2016 | J. Brion
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s
inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court
will only determine the will’s formal validity and due execution. However, this rule
is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional
circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the
issue.
FACTS:
· Alfonso Olondriz died and was survived by his widow and his children
(respondent heirs).
· Believing that he died intestate, respondent heirs filed a petition for the
partition of the decedents estate.
· Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the
decedent left a will.
· The will omitted Francisco Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.
· The RTC consolidated the two cases.
· Respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because
Francisco was preterited form the will.
· After reception of evidence, The RTC noted that while testacy is preferred
over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if
it appears that the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony
because the will is intrinsically void.
· Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and
ordered the case to proceed in intestacy.
· Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC.
· CA dismissed the petition, holding that the continuation of the probate
proceedings would be superfluous and impractical because the
inheritance will be adjudicated intestate.
· Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON there was preterition.
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either
because he is not named or, although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither
instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly being
disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires that the
omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or
advances on his legitime.
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from
the testator’s inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul
the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the
legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute any devisees or
legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total
intestacy.
In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,
legatee, or devisee. As the decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in
the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise, Francisco’s omission from the
will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
2. WON the RTC may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during
probate proceedings on grounds of preterition.
Yes. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is
limited to questions on the extrinsic validity of the will; the probate court will only
determine the will’s formal validity and due execution. However, this rule is not
inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon
the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances. When
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon
even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s
preterition annulled the institution of heirs.1avvphi1 The annulment effectively caused
the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the inheritance. The
decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The
conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary
provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we cannot attribute error – much less grave
abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.
RULING: Petition Denied. There was preterition. The RTC correctly ordered the case to
proceed intestate.
 167. RAMIREZ VS. RAMIREZ
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

2. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
3. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
4. Important issues in bold
5. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
6. Make sure to ratio per issue
7. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
 168. KILAYKO VS. TENGCO ISSUE/S & RATIO:
Fideicommissary Substitution | March 27, 1992 | J. Romero
1. WON the petition is barred by prior judgment - YES
● Records will show that the heirs executed an Agreement of Partition
DOCTRINE: It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir wherein they agreed to terminate co-ownership.
and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall ● These show that Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned
succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it ● They are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any
shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. The partition barred
any further litigation on said title.
FACTS: ● The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may
● The late Maria Lizares executed a “Testamento” (spanish provisions) and have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
left its possession and custody with her niece, Eustaquia Lizares. circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
● Eustaquia filed a petition for settlement of testate estate of Maria in RTC. imputable to negligence.
○ Probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and
appointing Eustaquia as executrix of estate of Maria. 2. WON the subject provisions of Maria’s will constitute a fideicommissary
● Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted. substitution - NO.
○ It declared heirs, devisees, legatees as only heirs, devisees and ● It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and
legatees and adjudicated to them the properties assigned to each provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall
and every one of them. succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should
● Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings so that then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the
some properties of Maria which had been omitted in the partition be Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the
adjudicated to her - GRANTED testator.
● Heirs of Maria executed an agreement of partition and subdivision thereby ● In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria
terminating their co-ownership over the properties Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares’
● A year later, Eustaquia died single without descendants death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia.
○ Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed as joint administrators. ● Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the
● Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio and Remedios Vda. de estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy.
Guinto (hereinafter referred as Kilayko et al) filed a motion to reopen the
testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares.
○ They claim that paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will were in the nature RULING: Since only a simple substitution exists and Eustaquia survived Maria Lizares, the
of simple substitution. substitution will not apply. The properties will unconditionally go to Eustaquia.
○ They prayed that a substitute administrator be appointed and the
order be reconsidered by declaring them as heirs to ⅓ of 1/14 of
Hacienda Minuluan and to ⅙ of Hacienda Matabang. (33 hectares)
● 2 sets of intestate heirs of Eustaquia opposed claiming that:
○ Proceedings had long become final
○ Testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void.
● Court denied the motion to reopen. MR - denied.
● Kilayko et al filed a notice of lis pendens.
● Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares (joint administrators of Eustaquia) filed MTD on
the ground of barred by prior judgment.
● Lower court held in abeyance the resolution of the affirmative defenses until
trial on the merits.
● Joint administrators filed petition for certiorari with SC claiming:
○ Cause of action barred by res judicata
○ Claim of Kilayko et al was groundless because par. 10 and 11 of
will conceived of a fideicommisary substitution of heirs - invalid
because Art. 863 of NCC. It constitutes invalid fideicommissary
substitution.
 169. NIEVA VS. ALCALA
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

8. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
9. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
10. Important issues in bold
11. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
12. Make sure to ratio per issue
13. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
 170. SUMAYA VS. IAC
Reserva Troncal| Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE: Reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to
annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal
is applicable to reserva troncal. In reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter
inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
FACTS:
● 2 Civil cases that were consolidated to recover reserve property.
● Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets
of properties subject of this case:
○ 1st property: 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land in Dita,
Lilio Laguna- from father Jose Sr. (died: Jan 28, 1945)
○ 2nd property:1/7 interest, pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of lands- from
maternal grandmother Luisa Bautista (died: Nov 3, 1950)
● June 13, 1952: Raul died, single, without issue and leaving only his mother
Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo as sole surviving heir to the above real
properties.
● Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an
Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo"
● Dec 21 1959: Consuelo sold the property to Mariquita H. Sumaya (1 st
property). Then Mariquita sold it to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963
● January 23, 1967: Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and
assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. Documents of transfers were registered in RD of Laguna
and certificates of title were issued.
● The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of
Sancho Balantakbo.
● Dec 30, 1963: Consuelo sold the 2nd property to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to
the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
which properties are presently in its possession.
● Parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described
properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
● June 3, 1968: Consuelo Died.
● The following filed civil cases (2) to recover the properties alleging the lands
are subject to a reserva troncal: Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto,
all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo. Luisa,
Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of
deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos
● RTC: decision in favor of the Balantakbos
● CA: affirmed in toto. MR denied.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the lands are reserve property and WON it is required to register
the reservable character of the property to protect reservees from innocent
3rd persons? YES to both.
● Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo
vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the
properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., and from his
maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. The fact remains however, that the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the
properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered
with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the
whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration
Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496)
● In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited
from a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from
another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure
of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property
in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
● Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge
of the reservable character of the properties before they bought the same
from Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C")
executed by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of 1st
property.
● Properties litigated in Civil Case SC-957 (the 2 nd property), no such
admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on
notice of the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of self-
adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with the Registry would
still be sufficient notice to bind them.
● Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents were long
time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its
successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are family
corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all along that the
properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his
father and from his maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
● The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo. In Dizon and Dizon v Galang Court ruled that the reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for value.
Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed on a widowed
spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva
viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. In reserva troncal, the reservor (the
ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the latter
inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore,
the duty to annotate also.
○ Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.
 2. WON action has already prescribed? NO
● Cause of action of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause
of action of the reservees did not commence upon the death of the
propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the
reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the
third degree in whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title
of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime
of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the reservees will
the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only
then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom
they are relatives within the third degree.
● The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can
bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised
within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old
Code of Civil Procedure or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the New
Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought
by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of
action has not prescribed yet.

RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the

Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the
necessity to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva troncal.
 171. MENDOZA ET. AL. VS. DELOS SANTOS 2. WON petitioners Mendoza do not have a right to the subject properties by virtue
Reserva Troncal Art. 891 | March 20, 2013 | J. Reyes of the law on reserva troncal - No they do not have any right.

DOCTRINE: First cousins of the descendant are 4th degree relatives

and cannot be considered as reservees/reservatarios Petitioners Mendoza cannot be considered reservees as they are not relatives within
the 3rd degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom
FACTS: the degree should be reckoned is the descendant - the one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent,
● The subject parcel of land was in the name of the respondent but co-owned which is Gregoria in this case. First cousins of the prepositus are 4th degree
by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought ½ of the property from her siblings. relatives and are not reservees.
● Petitioners are the grandchildren of Placido and Dominga Mendoza who
alleged that the properties were part of their properties that were subject of
an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. The only recognized exemption in the case of nephews and nieces of the prepositus,
● After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, who have the right to represent their ascendants are the brothers/sisters of the
Gregoria; but thereafter went to Gregoria when Leonor died after. prepositus and relatives within the 3rd degree.
● Gregoria died intestate and respondent thereafter, who is Leonor’s sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of
Leonor and Gregoria.
● Petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by the RULING: Art. 891 is not applicable because first cousins of the prepositus are 4th
respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying degree relatives and are not reservees
Art. 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.
● The RTC granted their action for recovery of possession by reserva troncal
but CA reversed it on appeal.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

14. WON CA erred in holding that the subject properties are not reservable
properties, coming from the line of the petitioners Mendoza - NO they did
not.
CA is correct. Based on the circumstances, Art. 891 is not applicable.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
2. The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
3. The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property
from the prepositus by operation of law; and
4. The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The point to reckon for the ownership of the properties is from Exequiel since he is
the ascendant from where the 1st transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria
inherited the properties in dispute.
Art. 891 requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant
from an ascendant by gratuitous title. A transmission is gratuitous when the recipient
does not give anything in return. What was clearly established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant) and after his death,
Gregoria (descendant) acquired the properties as inheritance.
 172. Morente vs. dela Santa
Conditional Testamentary Dispositions | Dec. 19, 1907 | Willard, J.
DOCTRINE:
When there is no express condition attached to that legacy in reference
to the second marriage, any condition cannot be implied from the
context of the will.
FACTS:
- The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
"1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my
husband, Gumersihdo de la Santa.
"2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he
shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall
not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof
and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his
children should he have any.
"3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is
located, which is one of the properties belonging to me."
- Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within 4 months of the
death of the testatrix.
- Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding
relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the CFI of
the Province of Tayab
- She alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and
asked that the legacy to him above mentioned be annulled.
- Objection was made by the husband to the procedure followed by the
petitioner.
CFI:
- In its judgment the court denied the petition.
- The husband having married had the right to the use of all of the property
during his life and that at his death 2/3 thereof would pass to Vicente, a
brother of the testatrix, and 1/3 thereof could be disposed of by the
husband.
- The construction given to the will by the court below is not accepted by the
appellant.
- She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost
all rights acquired by the will.
- It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to
the husband since the death of the testatrix.
ISSUE:
1. WON the conditional testamentary provisions was valid in this case -- YES
- Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be
made conditional and article 93 provides that a prohibition against another
marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or
widower.
2. BUT did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift
which is contained in the first clauses of the will? - NO
- RELEVANT CLAUSES and CONSIDERATION
- It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs
that her husband shall not leave her sisters.
- It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to
live in a certain building.
- It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again.
- To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if
he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given
to him by the first clause of the will.
- It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the
testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the
building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property
given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly
said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss.
- But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen
the disposition of the property contained in the first clause
of the will shall be changed.
- It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of
that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the
testatrix.
- SC construed the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and
with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the
case, and after such consideration SC can not say that it was the intention of
the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy
above mentioned.
- There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to
the second marriage, SC can not say that any condition can be implied
from the context of the will.
- Ohiong Joc-Soy vs. Jaime Vaño: Legacy contained in the will therein
mentioned was not conditional. It is true that that case arose under article
797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case,
but we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in
order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must
fairly appear from the language used in the will.
- Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural
children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no such question is
before the SC, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not
having arisen
- The subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the
legacy given to him by the first part of the will.
 - 173. Noble v Noble sentence alleges that oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late
Legitime | December 17, 1966 | J. Barrera Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there is no assertion that she has evidence
that the deceased had recognized or acknowledged her as such a child.
DOCTRINE: [No discussion about Legitime and only discussed
doctrines that have been repealed by the Family Code]
Mere allegation of paternity is not sufficient for an illegitimate child to RULING: For the failure of respondent to prove acknowledgement and recognition as an
inherit, acknowledgement and recognition of the putative father is also illegitimate child, she has no right to inherit.
necessary.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
FACTS: Name of Justice
Points raised
● Respondent-oppositor contested the probate of the will of the decedent Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
before the lower courts, arguing that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent and that the institution of the heirs under the will should be
annulled and that half of the estate of the decedent be given to her.
● The lower court allowed the probate of the court while at the same time
dismissing the claims of respondent finding that her action was barred by
prescription considering that the proof that she intended to present to prove
filiation was brought after the death of the putative father.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

15. WON ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS NECESSARY FOR HIM/HER TO INHERIT -
YES
● Under Art 887 of the NCC, “in all cases of illegitimate children, their
filiation must be duly proved” but the law does not only require mere
proof of paternity of the father but actually requires recognition of the
filiation by the putative father. The SC thus declared:
“The law could not have demanded anything less than proof of an
acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 of the new
Civil Code, the investigation of the paternity or maternity of
children mentioned in the two preceding articles (referring to
illegitimate not natural children) is specifically permitted only in
the circumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the same
code. It must be noted that these two articles refer to compulsory
recognition or acknowledgment. Hence, since the proof of filiation
required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigation
mentioned in Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to
recognition by the putative parent, it follows that the filiation to be
proven must be one that is recognized.”

The respondent in this case merely alleged supposed paternity, to wit:

“2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of the late Don Vicente
Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that the oppositor has in her favor
evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father.”

Clearly, it is merely claimed that she was in continuous possession of the status of a
child, an allegation which is a ground for compelling recognition under Article 283 of
the new Civil Code and, therefore, presupposes no previous recognition. The last
 174. Vizconde vs. CA,
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

16. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
17. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
18. Important issues in bold
19. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
20. Make sure to ratio per issue
21. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be in bold
 175. Arellano vs. Pascual,
Legitime | December 15, 2010 | J. Carpio Morales RULING: The donated property is not subject to collation

DOCTRINE: The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the

compulsory heirs. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs to
determine the legitime and the free portion. Since Pascual does not have any
compulsory heirs, there is no property to subject to collation.

FACTS:
● Pascual died intestate leaving his siblings Arellano and Pascual as heirs.

● In a petitioner for judicial settlement of intestate estate filed by the

respondents, they alleged that a parcel of land (the donated property)
located in Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which the respondents assailed “may
be considered as an advance legitime” of petitioner.

● Trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from
determining the validity of the donation. Further, it held that it is subject to
collation under Art. 1061 of the NCC which provides:

“Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir.”

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the property is subject to collation - NO

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far
as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, is that
inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free
portion. If there is no CH, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

There are no records to show that the decedent left any primary, secondary or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relations and therefore, not entitled to any leigtime. Therefore, he is
allowed to donate all his properties.

His donation to the petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as a donation
made to a stranger, is chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no
compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation.

2. WON the property of the estate should have been ordered equally
distributed among the parties - YES, the remaining estate should be
partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives.