78. SORIANO VS. SPS.

GALIT ● In opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition because
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente respondent spouses failed to move for the reconsideration of the assailed
order prior to the filing of the petition. Moreover, the proper remedy against
DOCTRINE: the assailed order of the trial court is an appeal, or a motion to quash the
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of writ of possession.
stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. CA: Granted the respondent’s petition declaring the writ of possession issued by the
RTC null and void.

FACTS: ISSUE:
● WON the land where the mortgaged building is attached is included the
Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo Soriano, in REM subject of the certificate of sale
the total sum of P480,000.00, evidenced by four promissory notes in the amount of
P120,000.00 each.
RULING: NO.
● This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. After
● Soriano, dwells on the general proposition that since the certificate of sale is
he failed to pay his obligation, Soriano filed a complaint for sum of money
a public document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and all entries
against him with the Regional Trial Court.
therein are presumed to be done in the performance of regular functions.
● Respondents, the Spouses Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, failed to file their
● There are actually 2 copies of the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real
answer. Hence, upon motion of Marcelo Soriano, the trial court declared the
Properties issued namely:
spouses in default and proceeded to receive evidence for petitioner Soriano
○ (a) copy which is on file with the deputy sheriff;
ex parte.
○ (b) copy registered with the Registry of Deeds.
RTC: Ruled in favor of the petitioner Soriano ordering the Galit to pay.
● The object of scrutiny, however, is not the copy of the Certificate of Sale on
● The judgment became final and executory
Execution of Real Properties issued by the deputy sheriff but the copy
● RTC issued a writ of execution in due course, by virtue of which, Deputy
thereof subsequently registered by petitioner with the Registry of Deeds
Sheriff Renato E. Robles levied on the following real properties of the Galit
which included an entry on the dorsal portion of the first page thereof
spouses:
describing a parcel of land covered by OCT No. T-40785 not found in the
a. A parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. T-569
Certificate of Sale of Real Properties on file with the sheriff.
b. STORE/HOUSE CONSTRUCTED on Lot No. 1103 made of strong
○ True, public documents by themselves may be adequate to
materials
establish the presumption of their validity.
c. BODEGA constructed on Lot 1103, made of strong materials
○ However, their probative weight must be evaluated not in isolation
but in conjunction with other evidence adduced by the parties in
At the sale of the above-enumerated properties at public auction, petitioner was the controversy, much more so in this case where the contents of a
the highest and only bidder with a bid price of P483,000.00. copy thereof subsequently registered for documentation purposes
● Accordingly, Deputy Sheriff Robles issued a Certificate of Sale of Execution is being contested.
of Real Property. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of ○ Thus, it has been held that while a public document like a notarized
Appeals assailing the inclusion of the parcel of land covered by Transfer deed of sale is vested with the presumption of regularity, this is not
Certificate of Title No. T-40785 among the list of real properties in the writ of a guarantee of the validity of its contents.
possession.
● Respondents argued that said property was not among those sold on
execution by Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles as reflected in the Certificate
of Sale on Execution of Real Property. The argument that the land on which the buildings levied upon in execution is
necessarily included is, likewise, tenuous.
● Art 415 NCC lands and buildings separately his can only mean that a
building is, by itself, considered immovable.
● Thus, it has been held that while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon,
buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
which it has been built.
○ Such mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the
building would still be considered immovable property even if
dealt with separately and apart from the land.
● In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution
issued by the trial court was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed
on the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-40785,
which by themselves are real properties of respondents spouses, the same
should be regarded as separate and distinct from the conveyance of the lot
on which they stand.
 79. DACANAY VS. ASISTIO, JR.
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
● A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract
FACTS:
● In 1979 Metropolitan Manila Comm enacted an Ordinance designating
certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea
markets.
● Because of this, the Caloocan City mayor opened up 7 flea markets in that
city, wherein 1 of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where Dacanay.
● When vendors and other respondents applied for permits, the respondents
city mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending
activities on said street.
● Later in 1987, Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the
demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96.
● To stop Mayor Martinez's efforts to clear the city streets, the stallowners
filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City
Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies in RTC praying the
court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to discontinue the demolition
of their stalls
● RTC: It dismissed the petition and lifted the WPI it earlier issued
○ Heroes del ‘96 and other streets are of public dominion thus
outside the commerce of men.
○ Properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals.
If possession has already been given, the lessee must restore
possession by vacatiing it and the municipality must restore to him
any sums it may have collected as rent (Municipality of Cavite v
Rojas)
○ If the property being a public one, Manila Mayors didn’t have the
authority to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters and
permits granted are considered null and void (City of Manila v
Garcia)
○ The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and
other public places devoted for public use constitute both public
and private nuisances and nuisance per se, and this applies to even
case involving the use or lease of public places under permits and
licenses issued by competent authority, upon the theory that such
holders could not take advantage of their unlawful permits and
license and claim that the land in question is a part of a public
street or a public place devoted to public use, hence, beyond the
commerce of man. (Umali v Aquino)
● However, the administration change and the incumbent Mayor didnt pursue
the policy of the former Mayor of clearing and cleaning up the streets.
○ The complainant Dacanay went all the way up to the Pres Aquino
then later on filed a complaint before Ombudsman
● As the stallholders continued to occupy the Heroes del ‘96 street. Through
tolerance of the resps Mayor and council, and in clear violation of the Civil
Case decided by RTC in Dacanay’s favor, Dacanay filed this present petition
for mandamus, to order Resps Mayor Asistio to enforce the said decision
and order the demolition of market stalls
ISSUE:
● WON city and public officials can enact an ordinance allowing market
vendors in the streets for lease - NO
RULING:
● A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of
man Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or other contract
● The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away
through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of
the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good
order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.
● The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not
infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose
they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents bad started to look for
feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample
time to relocate the street vendors.
80. DOMALSIN VS. SPS. VALENCIANO
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
Partes cannot take possession of properties which are part of public dominio
FACTS:
● Subject property is a portion of the road-right-of-way of Kennon road which
is located in front of petitioner’s parcel of land;
● Petitioner filed a forcible entry case against sps respondents alleging that he
has been in continuous, adverse possession and in the concept of an owner
of the subject property located in Benguet for the past 19 yrs since 1979, as
evidenced by tax dec;
● Petitioner likewise alleged that sps resps entered his property through force
and strategy to construct a house w/o petit’s permission/knowledge;
● Sps respondents answered saying that they were given permission the
residents in the subject property to construct such house, and that petitioner
has abandoned the subject property after the earthquake that destroyed it;
● MCTC&RTC: in favor of petitioner, ruled that petitioner did not abandon his
possession of the property as evidenced by paying of taxes and also by filing
a case against sps respondents;
● CA: reversed the ruling; petitioner has abandoned his possession of the
property, and that he is barred from pursuing his right over it against sps
respondents.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the subject property can be privately possessed – NO
● The SC ruled differently from the CA and other lower courts. As the
land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of
the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public dominion.
This being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for
themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it. The
parties should not be permitted to take possession of the land, much
more, claim ownership thereof as said lot is part of the public dominion.

2. WON the petitioner has a better right to the possession of the property that
sps respondents – YES
● Though the property are public in nature, the SC ruled that assuming it
is private in nature, petitioner has the better right of possession of the
property bc of its prior physical possession.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby

PARTIALLY GRANTED. Nonetheless, there being a finding that the subject property is a
part of the public dominion, of which neither party is entitled to own nor possess, the
decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 20 August 2002, the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, dated 23 January 2002, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tuba-
Sablan, Tuba, Benguet, dated 20 November 2000 are SET ASIDE. Respondents Juanito and
Amalia Valenciano are ordered to remove their structure on the subject land within sixty (60)
days from receipt of this decision, and to vacate and deliver the physical possession thereof to
the Office of the District Engineer, Benguet Engineering District, Department of Public
Works and Highways.
 81. DepEd v Tuliao
Ownership in General/Rights of a Person as a Consequence of Ownership | June 9,
2014 | J. Mendoza
DOCTRINE: Mere material possession of the land is not adverse as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession was accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.
on Tuliao’s property. Thus, only 2 years have elapsed from the time DepEd resisted
Tuliao’s claims. Clearly, he did not sleep on his rights.
However, the Court cannot order the immediate removal of the structures.
Respondent Tuliao should exercise his option under Art. 448. If not feasible for the
DepEd, its remedy is to file an action for expropriation.
RULING: Petition Denied.

FACTS:
● Respondent Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and removal of
structure against petitioner DepEd with the MTC.
● Resp. alleged that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land
and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his predecessors-in-
interest as an access road.
● Upon discovering that a structure was being constructed on the land, he
demanded that DepEd cease and desist and vacate the property.
● In its defense, DepEd claimed, among others, that the action was barred by
prescription/or laches. Its occupation of the land was adverse, peaceful,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than 50 years.
● MTC, RTC, and CA all ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the action for recovery of property should be granted.
Yes. Respondent Tuliao, as the registered owner, filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and removal of structure. To support his claim, he presented not only tax
declarations and tax receipts, but also a certificate of title. The said pieces of evidence
were sufficient to resolve the issue of who has the better tight of possession. That
being the case, the burden was shifted to DepEd to prove otherwise. Unfortunately,
the DepEd only presented testimonial evidence and nothing more to prove its
defense. As between the certificate of title, which is an inconvertible proof of
ownership, accompanied with a tax declaration and a tax receipt on one hand, and a
testimony of a lone witness, the former prevails in establishing who has a better right
of possession over the property.
As regards DepEd’s defense of laches, it has no merit either. It avers that its
possession of the subject land was open, continuous, exclusive, adverse, notorious
and in the concept of an owner for at least 32 years. It must be noted however, that
the DepEd’s possession of a portion of his land to be used as a passageway was by
mere tolerance. This means that the DepEd’s possession was not truly adverse.
Mere material possession of the land is not adverse as against the owner and is
insufficient to vest title, unless such possession was accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. Accordingly, the DepEd’s possession can only be considered as
adverse from the time the gymnasium was being constructed on the subject portion
 82. DEPT. OF EDUCATION VS. CASIBANG
Rights of a Person as a Consequence of Ownership | January 27, 2016 | Peralta, J.
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by an OCT registered under
the name of Cepeda. A fundamental principle in land registration under the
Torrens system is that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
and incontrovertible title to the property. As registered owners, the respondents
have a right to eject any person illegally occupying their property regardless of the
length of adverse possession. However this is only true if the possession is
unauthorized or merely tolerated.

DOCTRINE: When possession is merely tolerated and without contract, there is an implied
promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.
When possession is merely tolerated and without contract, there is an implied
promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand. In the case at bar, it was out of respect and courtesy to the then Mayor when he
consented to the building. Tolerated acts are acts of little disturbances which a
person In the interest of friendly relations permits others to do on his property. In
light of petitioners admission that it was the Mayor who convinced Cepeda to
allow the use of the land, such use upon Cepeda’s permission is considered a
FACTS: tolerated act. Considering that it was merely an act of tolerance, the implied
promise to vacate upon demand is binding upon the petitioners.
· The land subject of the controversy was covered by an OCT under
Cepeda, the respondent’s father. Upon the request of a Mayor, Cepeda allowed
the construction of a school on a part of his property under the supervision of
the Petitioner. RULING: As the occupation of DepEd was merely by tolerance of the registered
owners, DepEd is ordered to vacate the land.
· Despite Cepeda’s demise, the respondents tolerated the use and
possession of the school. However, eventually they occupied the property
prompting the petitioner to file a complaint for forcible entry before the MTC.
The MTC ruled for the petitioners.

· Respondents then demanded rent from the petitioner but it refused to

pay.

· Respondents then filed an action for Recovery of Possession against the

petitioners claiming that during the time their father allowed Petitioner to use
the land, he did not need it at the time and that now that they need it they are
deprived the use of such land.

· Respondents averred that they owned the land because it was purchased
by civic-minded citizens for them.

· Respondent presented the OCT named under Cepeda, and proof of

payment of realty taxes, whereas the Petitioners did not produce any evidence.
The RTC thus held for the Respondents. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the respondents may recover the land? YES

 83. SPS. BENITEZ VS. CA
Land owner in GF, Builder in BF | January 16, 1997 | J. Panganiban
DOCTRINE: Option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303 sq. m. parcel of land
with improvement from Cavite Development Bank.
● Private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361 sq. m.
lot. They filed a civil case against petitioners for recovery of possession of an
encroached portion of the lot they purchased.
o Parties were able to reach a compromise in which private
respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the
acquisition cost of P1,000 per square meter.
● July, 17, 1989, private respondents purchased another property, a 285.70 sq.
m. lot adjacent to that of petitioners.
o After a relocation survey, respondents discovered that some 46.50
sq. m. of their property was occupied by petitioner’s house.
o Despite verbal and written demands, petitioner refused to vacate.
Las notice to vacate send on Oct. 26, 1989.
● Respondents filed with MTC of San Juan for ejectment against petitioners.
● MTC favored private respondents, ordered petitioners to vacate and
surrender possession of premises to respondents + payment of P930 a month
starting July 17, 1989 until they vacate.
● RTC and CA affirmed:
o Petitioners were fully aware that part of their house encroached on
their neighbor’s property, while respondents became aware only
after purchasing said property. Petitioners cannot claim good faith.
o Petitioners are not builders in good faith, they cannot demand
respondents sell the disputed portion. Builders in bad faith can be
ordered to dismantle said structure at their own expense and pay
reasonable rent as long as their structure remains.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON possession of the portion of respondent’s land encroached by
petitioner’s house can be recovered through ejectment not accion
publiciana - YES
● The jurisdictional requirements for ejectment, as borne out by the facts,
are: after conducting a relocation survey, private respondents
discovered that a portion of their land was encroached by petitioners’
house; notices to vacate were sent to petitioners, the last one being
dated October 26, 1989; and private respondents filed the ejectment suit
against petitioners on January 18, 1990 or within 1 year from the last
demand.
● That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents’
purchase thereof does not negate the latter’s case for ejectment. Prior
possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment
● Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the deed of
sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always
necessary.
● In the case before us, considering that private respondents are
unlawfully deprived of possession of the encroached land and that the
action for the recovery of possession thereof was made within the one-
year reglementary period, ejectment is the proper remedy. The MeTC of
San Juan had jurisdiction.
2. WON lower courts were correct in rejecting the petitioner’s offer to buy the
encroached land - YES
● Article 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land
on which another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the
landowner.
● The option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner’s choice. Not even
a declaration of the builder, planter, or sower’s bad faith shifts this option
to him per Article 450 of the Civil Code.
● This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner because “his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.” There can be no pre-emptive right to buy
even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner.
No compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners
asks from this Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal.
RULING: As the option to sell the land is with the owner or the private respondents herein,
the lower courts correctly rejected the petitioner offer to buy the land.
 84. SPS. NUGUID VS. CA ❖ In addition, Pecson is prohibited from offsetting or
ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL | February 2005 | J. Quisumbing compensating the necessary and useful expenses with the
fruits received by the Nuguid. Otherwise, the security
DOCTRINE: A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the provided by law would be impaired
period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. ❖ Since Spouses Nuguid opted to appropriate the
improvement for themselves as early as June 1993, when
FACTS: they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge
that the auction sale did not include the apartment
● Pedro Pecson is the owner of commercial lot in Kamias Quezon City on building, they could not benefit from the lot’s
which he built four-door two-storey apartment building improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full,
● For his failure to pay realty taxes, lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto based on the current market value of the property
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for 103k to Spouses Nuiguid.
● PECSON → NEPOMUCENO → SPS. NUGUID
● Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC QC RULING: Pecson has right of retention over the subject property until he is full
● Being an uncontested owner of the subject property by virtue of Entry of payment is given to him. He can neither be required to pay rent during the period of
Judgment, Spouses Nuguid moved for delivery of possession of the lot and retention.
the apartment building.
● RULING OF RTC:Upheld Sps. Nuguid’s title but declared that the
apartment building was not included in the auction sale.
- Ordered Sps. Nuguid to reimburse PEcson for his construction cost
of 53,000
- It likewise ordered Pecson to pay monthly rentals to Nuguids as
paid by the tenants occupying the apartment units and allowed the
offset of the amount of 53,000 due from Nuguids against the
amount of rents collected by Pecson [CONTESTED ORDER]
● RULING OF CA: Upheld RTC’s Decision

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON Pecson shall be held liable to pay monthly rentals to Nuguid during
the retention period while Nuguids has not yet paid the full price for
improvements. [NO]
● AS A RULE: A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay
rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his
possession by ordering him to vacate.
❖ Further, the owner of the land is prohibited from
offsetting or compensating the necessary and useful
expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor
in good faith.
● IN THIS CASE: It is undisputed that the construction of the
apartment building was undertaken at the time when Pecson was
still the owner of the lot. When Nuguids became the uncontested
owner of the lot, the apartment building was already in existence
and occupied by the tenants. Clearly, Pecson is in GOOD FAITH.
❖ Being a builder in good faith, Pecson cannot be compelled
to pay rentals during the period when Sps. Nuguid has
not paid the full price for the improvements made by
Pecson in the subject property.

85. JOSEFA VS. SAN BUENAVENTURA
Landowner if GF, Builder in BF | March 3, 2006 | Callejo, Sr.
DOCTRINE:
ART. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable
to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of
the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee
one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
A lessee cannot compel the lessor to reimburse ½ of the value of the improvements if
the lessor refused to appropriate the improvements. Lessee’s right only is to remove
the improvements without causing any more damage upon the property leased than
is necessary.
FACTS:
● Lourdes San Buenaventura is the owner of a 364-square meter parcel of land
in Pasig City.
● July 15, 1990, Johnny Josefa entered into a Contract of Lease with Lourdes
over the said parcel of land. Period: Aug 1, 1990-July 31, 1995, renewable
upon agreement. Exact clause in the contract:
● The period covered by this lease agreement is from August 1, 1990 to July
31, 1995, or a period of five (5) years, renewable upon agreement of the
parties
● Upon expiry, Lourdes informed Josefa that the lease will not be extended
but he may continue with the lease with a P30,000/ month rent. Josefa was
told to vacate the property and pay any arrearages if he opted not to lease
the property after the expiration of the lease contract.
● Josefa refuses to vacate and paid P15,400 for rent which Lourdes received.
On June 3, Lourdes demanded that Josefa should vacate but Josefa still
refused.
● Lourdes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Josefa. à dismissed,
no cert from lupon ng brgy. Lourdes refiled before MeTC.
● Josefa averred that San Buenaventura had no cause of action against him
because, under the contract, she (San Buenaventura) was obliged to renew
the lease. He also made renovations and improvements on the land. He also
filed a counterclaim.
● MeTC Decision: Against Josefa, ordered him to vacate. Josefa Appealed to
RTC.
● RTC DECISION: reversed and set aside MeTC. Dismissed Lourdes’
petition. Lourdes Appealed to CA.
● CA DECISION: reversed RTC.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON Josefa entitled to reimbursements for his improvements? NO
Josefa Argues: CA erred in denying his claim for compensation of one-half of the
value of the improvements he had introduced in the property amounting to
P3,000,000.00. He’s claiming he is not a possessor in good faith but he is a builder in
good faith, therefore entitled to recover ½ of the value of useful improvements.
Josefa is wrong. As a mere lessee, they knew that their occupation of the premises
would depend on the life/ period of the contract of lease therefore he cannot be
considered as a possessor nor builder in good faith. Art 448 in relation to Art 546 only
apply to possessor in good faith. [1] It does not apply where one’s only interest is that
of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the
tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
In this case Josefa was initially a lawful possessor. However, as a mere lessee he
cannot claim to be a builder in good faith. Under Art 1678 NCC, Josefa is entitled to
1/2 of the value of the improvements only if Lourdes, as the owner, decides to
appropriate the improvements. Lourdes refused to appropriate the improvements;
Josefa cannot compel her to reimburse to him 1/2 their value. Therefore, Josefa’s right
only is to remove the improvements without causing any more damage upon the
property leased than is necessary.
2. WON lease contract between petitioner and respondent contained a
"renewal clause," and as such, they had agreed to extend the period of the
lease after July 31, 1995? NO.
Josefa argues: lease contract can be renewed upon its expiration on July 31, 1995
because there’s a clause "renewable upon agreement of the parties" was incorporated
in the lease contract. Therefore, Lourdes can’t unilaterally cancel the lease without
giving him (Josefa) an opportunity to negotiate for a renewal.
Josefa is wrong. He was already unlawfully withholding possession of the leased
premises from Lourdes as to entitle the latter to file her complaint for ejectment
against Josefa as defendant. The lease contract was executed for a determinate time,
such contract ceased on the day fixed without need of further demand. Notice to
vacate constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that he no longer consents to
the continued occupation by the lessee. It is true that both parties agreed that the
lease contract was “renewable upon agreement” however, the effect of Josefa’s
intransigent refusal to pay the P30,000.00 monthly rental proposed by Lourdes was
the failure of the parties to agree on the renewal of the contract.
The clause "renewable upon agreement of the parties" in the lease contract is clear
and admits of no other interpretation: the contract is renewable only upon agreement
of the parties. Lourdes was not obligated to agree to renew the contract or even
negotiate such renewal.
In this case the contract doesn’t specify who may exercise the option to renew but
pursuant to the Fernandez ruling and Article 1196, renewal of the contract may be
had only upon their mutual agreement or at the will of both of them. When the
contract expired/terminated its continuance cannot depend exclusively on the will of
the lessee.

3. WON Josefa liable to pay P30,000/ month by way of compensation for his
continued occupancy? No. Only 15,000 a month.

Josefa Argues: CA erred in ordering him to pay P30,000.00 monthly rental for the
renewal of the lease contract. He maintains that the amount has no factual basis and
is exorbitant.

CA awarded P30,000 monthly rentals as compensation for Josefa’s continued

occupancy of the property even if the lease expired. However, we agree with Josefa’s
contention that the increase of the award to P30,000.00 has no factual basis,
considering that the appellate court failed to state its basis for doubling the amount
adjudged by the trial court. It simply increased the award in the dispositive portion of
its decision.

In this case, there’s no evidence to justify the increase of the award of P30,000.
Lourdes’ bare proposal to increase the monthly rental to P30,000.00 after July 31, 1995
cannot be the factual basis for such increase in the compensation to Lourdes.
However, Josefa also failed to present controverting evidence of the fair rental value
of the property. Lourdes failed to adduce evidence on the fair rental value/
reasonable compensation for the lease of property therefore Josefa was not obligated
to adduce controverting evidence. The burden of proof to show that the rental
demanded is unconscionable or exorbitant rests upon the lessee. The trial court had
the authority to fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the
premises after termination of the lease contract. Court holds that the trial court’s
award of P15,000.00 as reasonable compensation for Josefa’s occupancy of the
property after the expiration of the lease should be maintained.

RULING:PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

WITH MODIFICATION. The award of P30,000.00 a month, by way of reasonable
compensation for petitioner Johnny Josefa’s occupancy of the property from July 31, 1995, is
DELETED, and the award of P15,000.00 a month made by the MeTC of Pasig City, Branch
69, is REINSTATED.

86. HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA
Landowner in GF, Builder in BF | January 15,2014 | J. Perlas-Bernabe
DOCTRINE: To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person asserts title to the land on which he builds.
FACTS:
● Respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact Lourdes via SPA filed a
complaint against Sps. Sarili before the RTC alleging that he is the owner of
a certain parcel of land in Caloocan and has been paying its real estate taxes
since he acquired it in 1974.
○ He claims that he is a resident of California and during his vacation
to the PH, he discovered a new title to the subject property was
issued by the RD in the name of Victorino married to Isabel by
virtue of a 1978 falsified Deed of Absolute Sale that was
purportedly executed by him and his wife.
○ He averred that the falsification of the deed of sale was a result of a
fraudulent, illegal and malicious acts committed by the Sps. Sarili
and the RD to acquire the property.
● Sps. Sarili maintained that they are innocent purchasers for value
○ They purchased the property from Ramon who possessed an SPA
to sell/dispose the same and the 1992 Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying them the property
○ They denied their participation in the participation in the
preparation of the 1992 deed of sale, which may have been merely
devised by the “Fixer” they hired to facilitate the issuance of the
title in their names.
● RTC declared the signature of respondent Lagrosa the same in the SPA in
favor of Lourdes
○ Since Ramon’s authority was established, the RTC declared the
1992 deed of sale is valid, genuine, lawful and binding and has
validly conveyed the subject property in favor of Sps. Sarili.
● CA held that the RTC erred in its ruling
○ The 1992 Deed of Sale was not the source document for the transfer
of the subject property and issuance of the TCT.
○ It was the 1978 Deed of Salefrom the Affidavit of Isabel.
Respondent was also not able to preponderate his claim but proved
that his and his wife’s signatures were forged. Further, the
testimony of respondent denying the authenticity of his purported
signature was not rebutted.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON there was a valid conveyance of the subject property - NO
Sps. Sarili argued that regardless if the 1978 Deed of Sale was a fraud, there was still a
valid conveyance of the property relying on the authority of Ramos in the SPA to sell
the same.
Even if the procurement of a certificate of title was tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation, such defective title may be the source of a completely legal and
valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.Where innocent third
persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate.
The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in
the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the title has been
regularly or irregularly issued.
The general rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued. Where there is nothing in the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore further than what
the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate
right that may subsequently defeat his right.
However, a higher degree of prudence is required from one who buys from a person
who is not the registered owner, although the land object of the transaction is
registered. In such a case, the buyer is expected to examine not only the certificate of
title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any
flaws in the title of the transferor. The buyer also has the duty to ascertain the identity
of the person with whom he is dealing with and the latter’s legal authority to convey
the property.
· There must be proof of capacity of the seller. If it consists of a duly
notarized SPA, mere inspection of the face of such public document
already constituted sufficient inquiry.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Sps. Sarili purchased the subject property
from Ramos on the strength of the latter’s authority to sell under the subject SPA.
· Despite the irregularity in the document where the community tax
certificate number was not indicated, Sps. Sarili failed to show that they
conducted an investigation beyond the SPA.
o Thus, Sps. Sarili cannot be considered as innocent purchasers
for value.
 o Court finds to remand the case to determine the rights and xxxx
obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili
had built on the subject property in bad faith in accordance ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and Article possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
546(1).
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the
land on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that
he be unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
· Sps. Sarili should have known from the very beginning that they were
dealing with a person who possibly had no authority to sell the subject
property considering the palpable irregularity in the subject SPA’s
acknowledgment. Yet, relying solely on said document and without any
further investigation on Ramos’s capacity to sell Sps. Sarili still chose to
proceed with its purchase and even built a house thereon.
· Based on the foregoing it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Sarili
were actually aware of a flaw or defect in their title or mode of
acquisition and have consequently built the house on the subject
property in bad faith under legal contemplation.

RULING: Spouses Sarili cannot be considered as innocent purchasers for value.

NOTES:

· The Court remanded this case to determine the rights and obligations of
the parties with respect to the house that Spouses Sarili built on the
property in bad faith

Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546
of the Civil Code which respectively read as follows:

ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown
in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing
be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the
person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay
the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.

ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to
damages from the builder, planter or sower.

ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for
the necessary expenses of preservation of the land.
 87. BAGAIPO VS. CA
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente
DOCTRINE:
The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. These requisites were
sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change
in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the
presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
FACTS:
● Dionisia Bagaipo is the registered owner of a 146900 sqm agricultural land in
Davao City (TCT No. T-15757)
● Leonor Lozano (resp) is the owner of a registered parcel of land located
across and opposite the southeast portion of Bagaipo’s lot facing the Davao
River.
o Lozano acquired and occupied the property in 1962 when his wife
inherited the land from her father who died the same year.
● May 26, 1989: Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for
o The surrender of possession by Lozano of certain portion of land
(29,162sqm) which is supposedly included in the area belonging to
Bagaipo under her TCT and
o Recovery of a land area (37, 901sqm) which Bagaipo allegedly lost
when the Davao River traversed her propert.
o Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said
river, her property became divided into three lots,namely: Lots 415-
A,415-B and415-C.
● In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented
before the trial court a survey plan prepared by a Geodetic Engineer (GE)
o The area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified as Lot 415-A,
now had an area of only 79,843 square meters;
o Lot 415-B, with an area measuring 37,901 square meters, which cut
across Bagaipo's land was taken up by the new course of the Davao
River; and
o An area of 29,162 square meters designated as Lot 415-C was
illegally occupied by respondent Lozano.
o The combined area of the lots in the survey plan tallied with the
technical description of Bagaipo's land under TCT No. T-15757.
o The GE concluded that the land presently located across the river
and parallel to Bagaipo's property still belonged to the latter and
not to Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-
C and the old abandoned river bed.
● Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay captain and
long-time resident of Ma-a to prove her claim that the Davao River had
indeed changed its course.
o Corias testified that the occurrence was caused by a big flood in
1968 and a bamboo grove which used to indicate the position of the
river was washed away.
o The river which flowed previously in front of a chapel located 15
meters away from the riverbank within Bagaipo's property now
flowed behind it.
o Corias was also present when the GE conducted the relocation
survey in 1988.
● Lozano side:
o The land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled
property.
o Asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that
the reduction in Bagaipo's domain was caused by gradual erosion
due to the current of the Davao River.
o It is also because of the river's natural action that silt slowly
deposited and added to his land over a long period of time.
o He further averred that this accretion continues up to the present
and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the
alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it
continued to increase in size.
o Lozano also presented 3 witnesses to make his case
● The TC then conducted an ocular inspection.
 o Applicable law is Article 457 of the New Civil Code and not Art. 46 - The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiff's
estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot
o The reduction in the land area of plaintiff was caused by erosion preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof.
and not by a change in course of the Davao River. - Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
o Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the complaint. course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers
may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the
● CA affirmed the TC property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code;
Art. 457 of the new).
- Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not
1. Was there no change in course of the Davao River such that petitioner owns affected by the Land Registration Act. (Hodges vs. Garcia)
the abandoned river bed pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code? 3. Should the relocation survey prepared by a licensed geodetic engineer be
- The TC and the CA both found that the decrease in land area was disregarded since it was not approved by the Director ofLands? - YES
brought about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course. - The same must be sent to the Bureau of Lands for verification and
This conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during approval.
ocular inspection that the banks located on Bagaipo’s land are - A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing
sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of
of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondent’s side is which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the
lower and gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally Rules of Court.
received the alluvial soil carried by the river current.
- These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless RULING: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals
there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 37615, sustaining the judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED.
by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a Costs against petitioner.
misapprehension of facts.
- The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding
expansion of respondent’s property were the combined effect of
erosion and accretion respectively.
- Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
- Bagaipo cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned
riverbed because the same is inexistent.
- The riverbed’s former location cannot even be pinpointed
with particularity since the movement of the Davao River
took place gradually over an unspecified period of time,
up to the present.
- The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner
when the following requisites are present:
1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and
3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the bank of the river.
- These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of Lozano.
- In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river
was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption
is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and
erosion.
2. Did private respondent own Lot 415-C in accordance with the principle of
accretion under Article 457? -- NO
 88. REYNANTE VS. CA respondents can show a better title over the subject lots,
Alluvium|April 8, 1992 | J. Paras petitioner's possession over the property must be respected.

DOCTRINE:
Accretion does not automatically become part of registered land just because the
lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Hence, the
additional area is still susceptible to acquistion by prescription

FACTS:
● Petitioner was a tenant of Don Cosme Carlos, for over 50 years, over a
fishpond. During his tenancy, petitioner constructed Nipa huts and planted
nipa palms in Lots 1 and 2 (subject lots) located between the fishpond. After
Don Carlos’ death, his heirs (private respondents) entered into an agreement
with petitioner whereby in consideration of a sum of 200k, petitioner shall
turn over the fishpond in favor of the heirs (priv resp.)
● The Heirs then leased the said fishpond to one Carlos De La Cruz,
meanwhile petitioner is still occupying lots 1 and 2. The Heirs formally
demanded for petitioner to vacate the said lots but petitioner refused.
● Private respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry against petitioner.
● The MTC dismissed the complaint, the RTC reversed said decision, the CA
affirmed hence the present petition

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OVER
THE SUBJECT LOTS
● No. Firstly, in an action for forcible entry, if the plaintiff fails to prove
prior possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry even if he
were the owner. In this case, the party proven to have prior possession
is petitioner, while respondents’ basis of possession is the agreement
that did not actually vest possession in their favor.
● Secondly, the respondent cannot claim to have a better right over the
subject lots (lot 1 and 2) as these are new land formed by alluvial
formation. While Art. 457 of the NCC states that: “To the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” such
accretion to registered land, as in this case, does not preclude
acquisition of the additional area by another person through
prescription.
As applied in this case, while it may be assumed that respondents’
acquired the lots by accretion, their failure to register the same for a
period of over 50 years subjected said lots to acquistion by
prescription by third persons, which in this case is petitioner-
having possession over the property. Thus, unless private

89. Vda. De Nazareno v. CA
Alluvium: Definition, Requisites, Effect| June 26, 1996 | Romero, J
DOCTRINE:
Where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current
of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and
deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion and, as
such, part of the public domain
FACTS:
· Subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Cagayan de Oro formed as a
result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the
banks of the Cagayan river.
· Before he died, Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area
being claimed by him.
· Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,
however, it was protested by private respondents
· Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to
his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code
portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River
bounding their land.
d. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such
boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and
imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
e. The court held that petitioners are estopped from rom denying
the public character of the subject land, as well as the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio
Nazareno led his Miscellaneous Sales Application.
f. The mere filing of said Application constituted an admission
that the land being applied for was public land
g. The accretion was man- made or artificial. In Republic v. CA,
the Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be
due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits
caused by human intervention.
h. In Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., the court held where the
land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water
current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it
was deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the
public domain.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON the subject land is public land - YES
a. Art. 457 provides “To the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters. “
b. In Meneses v. CA, the court held that accretion, as a mode of acquisition
require the ff:
i. That the deposition of
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
ii. That it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and
iii. That the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or
the sea coast)
c. Petitioners admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on
 90. REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS
Alluvium: Definition, Requisites, Effect (Art. 457) | November 12, 2012 | J. Bersamin
DOCTRINE: Accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner of
the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms.
The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river
bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the
riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
FACTS:
● Respondent Arcadio Santos III applied for the registration of his property in
the RTC alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than 10 years.
○ It has an area of 1045 sqm in Paranaque City which was bounded in
the Northeast belonging to respondent Arcadio Jr., in the Southeast
by the Paranaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road
and in the Northwest by another lot also owned by Arcadio III.
● Santos III amended his application for land registration to include Santos, Jr.
because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property alleging that the
property formed through accretion and had been in their joint open,
notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30
years
● City of Paranaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that
it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was
within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to
the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the
reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not
resulted from accretion.
● RTC granted the application for land registration and CA affirmed it apply
Art. 457 NCC
○ RTC ruled that on the basis of the evidence presented by the
applicants, the respondents are the owners of the land which was
previously a part of the Parañaque River that had become an
orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which
adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from
his mother.
○ The Republic argues that the application of Art. 457 is erroneous
since the evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Parañaque River.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the subject property is an accretion to their adjoining land that
would entitle them to register it under Art. 457 of the NCC – NO,
REPUBLIC IS CORRECT
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers. The respondents should establish the concurrence of
the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
registration.
However, the respondents did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-
B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Parañaque River
● The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot
4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this
explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property
was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become
an orchard.
● The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code.
○ The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the
recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up
land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the
effects of the current.
○ In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less
maintained.
○ Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to
claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
· The State exclusively owns Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its
right of ownership.
o Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and
their natural beds are public dominion of the State. It follows
that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to
belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless
there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river
beds should belong to some other person
 2. WON the respondents could claim the property by virtue of
acquisitive prescription under Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) – NO

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties
considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse
possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It
is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

RULING: Since the respondents failed to prove that the subject property was a result of
accretion through its requisites under Art. 457 of the NCC, they cannot register the property.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership
 91. DACLISON VS. BAYTION
Heading/Topic in Syllabus | Date | Ponente

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
● Important facts in bold
● Other facts
● Blabla
● Put everything we need to know here
● yadiyadiyaaa

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

1. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #1 here.
● Judicial decisions and/or findings.
2. WON blabla – YES/NO
● Ratio for Issue #2 here
3. Important issues in bold
4. Pertinent holdings to the issue should be in bold
5. Make sure to ratio per issue
6. Other issues

RULING: As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria
and Syed is void ab initio.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Name of Justice
Points raised
Points raised relevant to the issue as per the syllabus should be
 92. JAGUALING VS. CA
Formation of Island | March 4, 1991 | Gancayco, J.
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian
owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the
land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in
the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. If,
however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to
the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled
under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
FACTS:
● The subject property in this case is a parcel of land in Misamis Oriental
forming part of an island in a non-navigable river.
● Private respondent Janita Eduave (Eduave) claims that she inherited the
subject land from his father, Felomino Factura, together with his co-heirs,
and acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition. Since the death of her father, Eduave had been in
possession of the property although the tax declaration remains in the name
of the deceased father.
● Eduave claims that the land eroded sometime in Nov. 1964 due to typhoon
Ineng, leaving only a coconut tree. In 1966, due to the movement of the river
deposits on the land that was not eroded increased the area to almost half a
hectare and in 1970, Eduave started to plant bananas. In 1973, the petitioners
asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent
squatter to come to the area.
● The dispute arose when petitioners subsequently denied the claim of
ownership of the appellant, and asserted that they are the real owners of the
land in litigation. They claim that during the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river
control was washed away causing the formation of an island, which is now
the land in litigation. The defendants started occupying the land in 1969,
paid land taxes thereto and presented photos showing their actual
occupation of the land, including the improvements constructed.
● Eduave thus filed with the RTC an action to quiet title and/or remove a
cloud over the property in question against petitioners.
● RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to establish by preponderance of
evidence their claim of ownership.
● On appeal, the CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of
the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial
deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code, the CA
reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the
lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to
private respondents
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. Between the one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a
non-navigable and non-floatable river and the owner of the land along the
margin nearest the island, who has the better right thereto?
● Under Art. 465 of the Civil Code, the island belongs to the owner of
the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately because the island is longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of
the river
● QUESTION: What, then, about the adverse possession established by
petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be recognized?
○ AS A RULE: It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong
to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465,
also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the
formed island for the reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no
specified act of possession over the accretion is required.
○ EXCEPTION: If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim
thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third
parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens
system must itself still be registered.
● IN THIS CASE: Petitioners may, therefore, acquire said property by
adverse possession for the required number of years under the doctrine
of acquisitive prescription. Their possession cannot be considered in
good faith, however, because they are presumed to have notice of the
status of private respondents as riparian owners who have the
preferential right to the island as recognized and accorded by law.
○ Note: they may claim ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of
the Civil Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the same
code, an adequate and valid defense to support their claim of good
faith.
● Hence, not qualifying as possessors in good faith, they may acquire
ownership over the island only through uninterrupted adverse
possession for a period of thirty years. By their own admission,
petitioners have been in possession of the property for only about
fifteen years.[1] Thus, by this token and under the theory adopted
RULING: As correctly held by the respondent Court, the island belongs to Private
Respondent as the owner of the land along the nearer margin and as sole owner thereof.
NOTE:
The Court also held that the trial court erred in ruling in favor or petitioners based on
private respondents failure to establish their claim of ownership by sufficient
preponderance of evidence. According to the Court, the RTC failed to consider other
circumstances tantamount to acts of ownership exercised by private respondents over
the property prior to said year as borne out by the evidence, These include, among
others, the payment of land taxes thereon, the monuments placed by the surveyor
whose services were engaged by the private respondent, as evidenced by the pictures
submitted as exhibits, and the agreement entered into by private respondents and
Tagoloan Aggregates to extract gravel and sand, which agreement was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds. Private respondents also presen§ted in
evidence the testimony of two disinterested witnesses.
[1] Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.