Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Security Dilemma refers to the situation when the increase of the security of a country
leads to the decrease of the adversary state’s security. Jervis Robert tackled this issue in his
work “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” His work had been criticized and reviewed
by Charles L. Glaser who wrote “The Security Dilemma Revisited” where he summarizes
Jervis’s ideas and adds what he sees as loopholes within this latter’s work. This short paper
will go through the main arguments that Jervis used to illustrate his ideas and how he
explained this concept. 
First of all, Jervis and Glaser agree on many points concerning the security Dilemma
concept. Jervis explains that the system of international relations is one where everyone pays
attention to the other and act upon it. He gives the example of the “Stag Hunt” where the
action of one state determines the action of the other in order to keep a balance and protection
from any dishonesty one country might think of. He argues that cooperation between
countries is possible if they all agree on certain criteria and if they all want and can achieve
their goals through it; however, even in this “idealistic” case, conflict might arise due to the
variables that characterizes the international system that Jervis called “difficulties.” Leaders
are constantly changing which means even their value and rationality can change. Some
countries need more territory because they are not self-sufficient. And finally, the security
dilemma which is the heart of Jervis’s work. Here he clarifies the variables that, more or less,
keep a balance within the international system and keep humanity still going. He mentions
several situations, CC, CD, DC, DD, which help us know what is best for each country. For
instance, cooperation has higher chances of occurring if both states are willing to cooperate
because the benefit will be larger than if they don’t; nevertheless, if we are in a CD situation
the cost of CD will come to the picture where states are afraid of getting into a cooperation
because the other party might defect. Jervis also tackles the offense defense balance; the issue
is how to distinguish between actions based on a defensive or an offensive approach.  
Essentially, in some cases, it is very difficult to make a clear cut between offensive
and defensive actions. Once we figure out the difference, and we find out that defensive is
larger than offensive weapons, status Quo states will have a massive amount of security and
other states will be secure as well while the ones who have offensive weapons might be
slightly in danger. Jervis says that this offensive defensive weapons approach is related to the
security dilemma especially when the security of one state relies on its expansion and on it
becoming an aggressor. In that case, the state should be on a high level of defense and have
all means to keep its territory safe. It should also be approximately at the same size of the
aggressor to stop the expansion. This will not only stop the expansion but also prevent
aggressions between the states. Jervis mentions the example of nuclear weapons that cannot
be defended; therefore, it is approximately impossible to have defensive weapons against
nuclear weapons. Whitin the defense and offense balance, there is the security dilemma that
can be increased if the defense is strong enough. In other words, if states have enough defense
where offence cannot stand, the international security will rise and limit the aims of
aggression or war. The writer argues that the differentiation between offensive and defensive
weapons id tricky and very relative to the intentions and shifts of intentions that might happen
within the states.  
For Glaser, cooperation between states is not very easy because states do not have a
way to know for sure the intentions of their adversary. It is always a mystery. The adversary
might have only good intentions and want to cooperate for the common good and to achieve
peace in the world as it might want to trick the other country and follow the rabbit. Glaser
rephrase Jervis’s idea. He brings up the offense-defense balance that if played with might lead
to an arm race, therefore, an extremely instable system where countries race to get more arms.
Glaser categorizes Jervis’s work under the structural realism. He disagrees with the fact that
Jervis’s work on security dilemma is not considered as such. Jervis did base his arguments on
the system being anarchic. The author of “Cooperation Under the Security dilemma” did not
classify his own work as realism explicitly since he did make some modifications on the
predictions of structural realism. Glaser did not only summarize Jervis’s ideas, but he also
added his own and criticized the work. He added that there are more variables that can affect
the security dilemma’s significance as well as the offense and defense: Greed and knowledge
of the state’s intentions. Greedy states’ adversary tends to increase their military capacities
because they know that this state is greedy. This is to say that the existence if these states
stand in between the states having a common goal and the same objective. This concept of
greedy states still leaves neorealists unable to explain the functioning of states in the modern
times. Glaser still affirms that offense and defense are crucial factors in war determination
even in a world full of greedy states and where security dilemma is not an essential subject
relatively. He states towards of the articles some critics that came towards Jervis’s work such
as the fact that security dilemma is flawed alongside the offense defense theory as well. Also,
some say that we shouldn’t focus much on the security dilemma since the issue lies because
of the greedy states. At the end of the critic’s part, Glaser states that the offense- defense
theory is mandatory and a “baseline” to predict, to an extent, the behavior that might arise
from a state depending on the actions of its adversary. He suggests widening the scope of
research to fill some gaps that Jervis left in his logic, such as, digging more into the greedy
states and how they affect the security around them and in the international system. Also, the
testing of this theory- offense defense- should be done to get a clearer idea about how states
behave towards one another. Finally, Glaser advises that we need to keep in mind the
rationality of the states and to which extent they think about other states around them.  
The defensive and offensive balance is in my opinion impossible. Even if a country
has defensive weapons, it might use them as offensive once it reaches a Status Quo and the
need of expansion arises; however, nuclear weapons will make a balance since states would
be too afraid to attack a country that has nuclear weapons. Countries avoided to make Japan
insecure since no one can predict what can happen next. The risk is too big to be taken. As
much as the power of the states grow parallelly, the security grows as well. If a country’s
power grows exponentially and more than its peers, an issue in the balance of power will be
created and the fear will increase amongst the international system. The countries will face the
security dilemma and will increase their defensive weapons. Nevertheless, if everyone is more
powerful, no one will get intimidated. I believe that building trust within the international
system is fictional. As realists say, there are no morals in the international relations, there is
only aim for power and interest. Countries want to maximize their power and increase their
security but at the same time not make the adversary offended because that will lead to a
breakout whose consequences cannot be determined. However, Glaser mentions that there is a
disagreement concerning the point of focus -power or military capabilities- in the structural
realist’s sphere. Then he introduces the concept of “contingent realism.” I also believe that
security dilemma is the heart of the international system’s issues. Even if greedy states exist
and even if we don’t know the intentions of our adverbial, we can manage to find the right
balance between the offense and defense acquisition of weapons that will restore the security
without a state having to be afraid of the security rise of the other. The greater example was
mentioned before with the nuclear weapons. If both states have nuclear weapons they will
either both die or both live. In that case, it is more rational to both live and reach an agreement
that will satisfy both parties. I disagree with Schweller who said that “the security dilemma is
logically flawed” (cite). Because we can never be sure of states attention and that they can
change very quickly depending on external factors, we cannot assume their motives.
Therefore, security dilemma is still logical since it takes into consideration the way states deal
with each other and think about each other.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 

[mostly from handout]

PUZZLE

Anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation seemingly impossible. Why
would states cooperate anyway? Presumably, there must be some mechanism
which allows states to bind themselves (and partners) not to "defect," or at least
some mechanism by which to detect defection early enough to respond
appropriately. (170-171)

MAIN VARIABLES AND PREDICTIONS

Jervis identifies two main variables, the offense/defense balance [X1] and the
ability to distinguish between offensive/defensive postures [X2]. Using these two
variables he creates a two-by-two matrix with four possible strategic environments:

1Offensive/Defensive posture indistinguishable - Offensive advantage

This world is very dangerous because countries have an incentive to take offensive
action to increase their security and they have an inherent mistrust of each other
because they cannot determine their neighbors' intentions from their actions. The
security dilemma is strong in this environment

2Offensive/Defensive posture indistinguishable � Defensive advantage

The security dilemma will exist in this world, but the defensive advantage will give
countries an incentive to invest in primarily defensive capabilities. Security needs
could be compatible.

3Offensive/Defensive posture is distinguishable � Offensive advantage

The security dilemma will not operate in this environment, but countries will have
an incentive to use offensive action to protect themselves. Status-quo states can
differentiate themselves from aggressors and there will likely be warning of an
aggressors' intentions

4Offensive/Defensive posture is distinguishable � Defensive advantage

This is the safest possible environment. In this situation the security dilemma does
not have a significant influence because actors can differentiate between types
when analyzing their counterparts. Additionally, the advantage given to defense
will cause nations to invest greater resources in defensive capabilities that do not
threaten their neighbors.

STYLIZED TEST

Jervise uses these variables to illustrate why WWI broke out rapidly (Bismarck's
wars left Europeans expecting offense to be decisive in quick, cheap victories) but
statesmen were more cautious and patient going into WWII (b/c WWI left England
and France expecting defense to have the upper hand, so German preparations were
less worrisome). So the security dilemma was more powerful going into WWI than
going into WWII.

FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE LEVEL OF X1 AND X2:

Defense/offense balances contribute how influential the security dilemma i. If

defense is stronger then the security dilemma doesn't operate as powerfully, if
offense has an advantage over defense then the security dilemma becomes more
acute

Priors and memories of previous events affect decision-makers beliefs as to the

defense/offense balance

Technology and geography have a strong influence on whether defense or offense

have the advantage in a given scenario

If it is possible to clearly differentiate between defensive and offensive military

build-ups or weapons then the security dilemma does not hold because nations can
observe the intentions of their neighbors

Example: ICBMs are not clearly offensive or defensive, since the defense against
ICBMs is ICBMs (deterrence). SLBMs, on the other hand, are clearly defensive
(since they are less accurate). So if we reduced ICBM numbers and relied instead
on SLBMs, we could eliminate the security dilemma (assuming, of course, that
both sides are status quo powers).

FACTORS THAT MAKE COOPERATION MORE LIKELY (some are subsumed

in above):

Cooperation can be enhanced by increasing the gains from mutual cooperation,

decreasing the gains from defection, or increasing the expectations that both sides
will cooperate.
When the costs of being exploited are low, countries will have less need to take
defensive action that would decrease their neighbors' security.

The perception of a functioning collective security also reduces a country's

perception of threat and its need to respond quickly and perhaps to overreact, to its
neighbors' actions.

Mutual defection, or war, is doubly costly. In a mutual defection scenario, the

actors must pay the costs of war and the opportunity costs of the lack of
coordination.

Gains from exploitation of a second country can be decreased if the second

country is both non-threatening and if it provides goods that will be lost if the 1st
country attempts to exploit it.

Monitoring regimes help to support CC solutions because they make it easier for
countries to international agreements

Understanding of the security dilemma can also help to mitigate cooperation

problems because statesmen will realize how their actions affect their neighbors'
perception of security

Geography also has a strong effect � geographically isolated countries

like the U.S. do not need to threaten their neighbors' to increase their security

COMPARE:

 Wendt argues that anarchy does not necessarily preclude cooperation. Jervis
argues that it does:

"Because there are no institutions or authorities that can make and enforce
international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if
others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not. Because states are aware of this,
anarchy encourages behavior that leaves all concerned worse off than they could
be, even in the extreme case in which all states would like to freeze the status quo.
This is true of the men in Rousseau's "Stag Hunt." [continues] from page 1