2022 San Beda PreWeek & LMT - Remedial Law

MB07C FY3AUI9N
SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
RGCT - Bar Operations Center
PRE-WEEK
LAST MINUTE TIPS
REMEDIAL LAW
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SUBJECT CHAIRS
Mary Queenie M. Valino
Aeronn D. Medina
ASSISTANT SUBJECT CHAIRS

Reuben Jade C. Sobrevilla
Jerwin C. Cafiero
SUBJECT ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING

Marco Angelo B. Mercado
Iris Neale S. Enriquez
SUBJECT HEADS
Jerome L. Leafio
Evidence
Bien C. Agraan
Spedal Clvt"lActt"onsand Spedal Proceedt"ngs
EDITORS
Sky Blue C. Samson
Clvt"lProcedure
Rochelle S. Enrile
Giana Danielle M. Larrauri CHAIRPERSON FOR ACADEMICS
Crimt"nalProcedure
ACADEMICS CORE MEMBERS
Kristine Bernadette D. Cruz Mia Carmina Buencamino
AppellatePractt"ce
and Procedure YzzabelDanganan
Ray Robin Ravelas
SUBJECT MEMBERS Jerenel Rendon
Princess Cynthia Nathalie Drilon William Paul Sale
Mark Philip P. Tandog
Gabrielle Anne S. Endona
Recel M. Domingo VICE-CHAIRPERSON FOR
Kristi Anne Sharmaine S. Biares ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING
Via Marie Angela M. Valdez
Zymon Angelo G. Granado ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING
COMMITTEE CORE MEMBERS
Giorgo Luigi T. J uafio
Micah P. Calip
Elizabeth Marino Roemma Kara G. Palo
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
REMEDIAL LAW
PART 1
FIRST LEVEL COURTS
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Substantive Law vs. Remedial Law 6
Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court 6
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy 6
Doctrine of Non-Interference/Judicial Stability 7
Jurisdiction 7
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE

General Provisions (Rule 1) 12
Cause of Action (Rule 2) 13
Parties to Civil Action (Rule 3) 14
Venue (Rule 4) 16
Pleadings 16
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments, Final Orders, and Resolutions 23
Summons 24
Motions 26
Dismissal of Actions 26
Pre-Trial (Rule 18) 27
Intervention (Rule 19) 27
Calendar of Cases (Rule 20) 28
Subpoena (Rule 21) 28
Computation of Time (Rule 22) 29
Modes of Discovery 29
Trial (Rule 30) 32
Consolidation or Severance Rule 31 32
Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33) 32
Judgments and Final Orders 34
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration 37
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments (Rule 39) 38
III. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Nature, Purpose, and Jurisdiction Over Provisional Remedies 40
Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57) 40
Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58) 41
Receivership (Rule 59) 42
Replevin (Rule 60) 43
IV. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Jurisdiction and Venue 43
Interpleader (Rule 62) 46
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63) 47
Prohibition, Certiorari, and Mandamus 47
Quo Warranto (Rule 66) 49
Expropriation 51
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage 53
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Partition (Rule 69) 56

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer 57
Contempt (Rule 71) 59
V. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons 61
Escheat (Rule 91) 65
Guardianship 66
Writ of Habeas Corpus 68
Change of Name (Rule 103) 70
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108) 72
Clerical Error Law (RA 9048) 73
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) 77
Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) 78
Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) 81
VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

General Matters 85
Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) 86
Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111) 88
Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112) 88
Arrest (Rule 113) 89
Bail (Rule 114) 91
Arraignment and Plea (Rule 116) 92
Motion to Quash (Rule 117) 93
Pre-Trial (Rule 118) 94
Trial (Rule 119) 95
Judgment (Rule 120) 97
New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 121) 99
Search and Seizure (Rule 126) 100
Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases (Rule 127) 101
Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases 101
(A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC)
The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC) 102
VII. EVIDENCE
General Concepts 103
Admissibility 104
Object Evidence (Rule 130, A) 106
Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B) 108
Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C) 108
Burden of Proof and Presumptions (Rule 131) 114
Presentation of Evidence(Rule 132) 114
Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC) 116
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence (Rule 133) 117
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC) 117
PART 2
I. APPEALS; GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Nature of the Right to Appeal 120
Judgments and Final Orders Subject to Appeal 121
Matters not Appealable; Available Remedies 122
4s 124

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II. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES OTHER THAN APPEAL

Petition for Relief from Judgment (Rule 38) 124
Annulments of Judgment by the Court of Appeals (Rule 47) 125
Collateral Attack on Judgments; When Proper 127
Rule 65 as Remedy from Judgment 128
III. APPEALS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 40 - Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts 134
Rule 41 - Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts 135
Rule 42 - Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the 137
Court of Appeals
Rule 43 - Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals, Civil Service Commission, 138
and Quasi-Judicial Agencies
Rule 45 - Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court 139
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments or Final Orders of the Commission on Audit 141
and the Commission on Elections
Dismissal, Reinstatement, and Withdrawal of Appeal 146
IV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES

Rule 122 146
Appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman 148
Appeals from Resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor 149
Appeals from the Sandiganbayan 150
V. PROCEDURE IN TAX CASES

Tax Remedies under the National Internal Revenue Code 150
of 1997, as amended
Tax Remedies under the Local Government Code of 1991 165
The Court of Tax Appeals (R.A. 1125, as amended, and the 171
Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals)
VI. PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Rule 44 – Ordinary Appealed Cases 178
Rule 50 - Dismissal of Appeal 179
Rule 51 - Judgment; Harmless Error 180
Rule 53 – New Trial 181
VII. PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Rule 56-A – Original Cases 182
Rule 56-B – Appealed Cases 183
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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PART I
FIRST LEVEL COURTS
General Principles
Substantive Law vs. Remedial Law
Distinguish Substantive Law from Remedial Law.

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action. On the other hand, remedial law prescribes the method of enforcing
rights or obtaining redress for their invasions (People v. Moner, G.R. No. 202206, March 05, 2018).
Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court
What is the scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court?

The scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all the courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. (5)).
Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
What is the Principle of Judicial Hierarchy?

When courts of different levels have original concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, a party does not have
unbridled freedom to choose where his action shall be filed. The appropriate forum is the court lowest in the
judicial hierarchy, the rationale being two-fold, namely: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the
higher courts; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases, that some of these cases may have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or because these courts are better equipped to resolve the issues given that the SC is not a
trier of facts (Linsangan-Maldia v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 241713, January 10, 2019; Rayos
v. The City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, 14 December 2011).
What are the exceptions to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? (G-TICER-NP)

The following are the exceptions to the rule:
1. When there are Genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time;
2. When the issues involved are of Transcendental importance;
3. Cases of first Impression;
4. The Constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;
5. Exigency in certain situations;
6. The filed petition Reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
7. When petitioners rightly claim that they had No other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
court of law; and
8. The petition includes questions that are dictated by Public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy (Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department
of Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019).
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Doctrine of Non-Interference/Judicial Stability
A filed a complaint against B before the Ombudsman for violation of the GSIS Act. The Ombudsman
issued an order of preventive suspension against B to last until the administrative adjudication is
completed but not to exceed 6 months. The propriety of the order of suspension was assailed by B before
the Court of Appeals but the CA affirmed the preventive suspension. B filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief with prayer for TRO, praying that the RTC make a definite judicial declaration on the
rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of
the suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, and to restrain the implementation of the Ombudsman
order. May the RTC issue a TRO?
No. This will violate the principle of judicial stability or non-interference. Pursuant to this principle, where
decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the
RTCs and their actions are beyond the control of the RTC. The Ombudsman’s decisions in disciplinary cases are
appealable to the CA under Rule 43. The RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the
Ombudsman’s decision in disciplinary cases, more so when the CA already affirmed the Ombudsman’s order of
suspension (Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Jurisdiction
Define Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case (Foronda-Crystal v. Son,
G.R. No. 221815, November 29, 2017), as well as to enforce or execute its judgments or final orders (Echegaray v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999).
Distinguish original from appellate jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for
the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the power of a court higher in rank to
re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review. Since
the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from,
nor is inferred from, the other (Garcia v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 88158, March 4, 1992).
Distinguish general from special jurisdiction, and give examples.

Courts of general jurisdiction are those that have jurisdiction over all kinds of cases, such as civil and criminal
cases, and other cases that do not fall within the jurisdiction of special courts or courts of limited jurisdiction.
For instance, the Regional Trial Court is a court of general jurisdiction. Courts of special jurisdiction exercise
limited jurisdiction over specific cases conferred by special law, such as when it acts as Election Court, Court of
Tax Appeals, Family Court, Intestate or Probate Court, Special Commercial Court, Environmental Court, among
others. (Nocnoc v. Vera, G.R. No. L-37737, 27 February 1979; Viola v. Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
47 Phil. 849 (1925); RA 1125; RA 8369; Pacioles, Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, August 9, 2005; Reyes
v. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, G.R. No. 165744, August 1, 2008; Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 23-08, 28 January 2008)
Distinguish exclusive from concurrent jurisdiction.

Exclusive jurisdiction is the court’s power to adjudicate an action or class of actions to the exclusion of all other
courts; Concurrent jurisdiction, also known as confluent or coordinate jurisdiction, is the power conferred upon
different courts, whether of the same or different ranks, to take cognizance of the same stage of the same case
in the same or different judicial territories (BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014); Regalado, Florenz,
Remedial Law Compendium Volume 1, p. 5 (2000 ed.))
What is the Doctrine of Adherence to Jurisdiction (Continuity of Jurisdiction)?

The doctrine provides that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, such jurisdiction cannot be ousted by subsequent
events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired, it continues until the court finally disposes of the case (Barrameda v. Rural Bank
of Canaman, Inc., G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010).
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What does jurisdiction over the parties mean?

Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on the parties (People’s
General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing, G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018).
How does the court acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff?

Jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions together
with the filing of docket fees (People’s General Insurance Corp. v. Guansing, G.R. No. 204759, November 14, 2018).
How does the court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant?

Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through service of summons or through voluntary
appearance in court and submission to its authority (Interlink Movie Houses Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 203298, January
17, 2018).
What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines
its powers (Mitsubishi Motors v. Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 209830, June 17, 2015).
How is jurisdiction over the subject matter conferred?

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Nothing can change the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none, but the legislature
may change (Zamora v. CA, G.R. No. 78206, March 19, 1990).
What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the issue?

Jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal’s power and authority to decide over matters which are either
disputed by the parties or simply under consideration (Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020).
How is jurisdiction over the issues conferred and determined?

Jurisdiction over the issue is determined and conferred:
1. By either express or implied consent of the parties (Denila v. Republic, G.R. No. 206077, July 15, 2020);
2. By stipulations of parties as when in pre-trial, the parties can enter into stipulation of facts and documents
or enter into an agreement simplifying the issues of the case (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 2); or
3. By waiver or failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings (ROC,
Rule 10, Sec. 5).
What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the res?

Jurisdiction over the thing or res is the power of the court over an object or thing being litigated. The court may
acquire jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court’s custody (De
Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014).
How is jurisdiction over the res acquired?

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either:
1. By the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or
2. As a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective (Frias v. Alcayde, G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018).
What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the remedy?

Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court’s competence over the process. Generally, jurisdiction over the
remedy is provided by the Rules of Court. Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which the SC —the authority
that promulgates the Rules of Court—may change ad hoc, or clarify the application or interpretation of, in proper
cases (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October
9, 2019).
Distinguish Jurisdiction from Exercise of Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority to hear, try and decide a case. It is the authority to decide a case, and not
the decision rendered therein (Estate of Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007). Where there is
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PRE-WEEKAND LAST MINUTE TIPS
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the resolution of all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise ofJ urisdiction. The errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors
of judgment which are proper subjects of appeal (Republic v. "G" Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 141241, November 22,
2005).
What are the differences between Jurisdiction and Venue in Civil Cases?
The following are the differences between Jurisdiction and Venue:
Jurisdiction Venue
I
As to Nature
Substantive, it is conferred by law. It is the Procedural, it is provided by the rules. Venue establishes
relationship between the court and the subject a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant.
matter.
As to Definition
Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and Venue deals with the locality, the place where the suit
decide a case.Jurisdiction treats of the power of the maybe had.
court to decide a case on the merits
As to whether it may be a Ground for motu proprio dismissal
It may be a ground for motu proprio dismissal It is not a ground for a motion to dismiss, but may be
(lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) before raised as an affirmative defense
summons is issued, or by motion to dismiss
As to whether it may be Stipulated
Jurisdiction cannot be the subject of the agreement Venue may be changed by the written agreement of the
of the parties. parties.
As to whether it may be waived or not
It is conferred by law and cannot be waived. It may be waived, by agreement of the parties or by
failure to raise it at the appropriate time
(Dacoycoyv. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74854, {Apnl 2, l!)!Jl; ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 1, Rule!), Sec. l;
Rule4)
What are the cases covered by the Rules on Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims, and Summary
Procedure?
The following are the casescoveredby the Rules on Small Claims, Summary Procedure, and Barangay Conciliation:
Barangay Conciliation I 2016 Revised Rules of Rules on Summary Procedure
{Administmtive CirrnlJr 14-9.1) Procedure for Small {as amended by
Claims Cases A.,lf. No. 02-11-09-SC}
Civil Cases Covered
All disputes involving parties who All civil actions that are purely 1. All cases of forcible entry and
actually reside in the same city or civil in nature where the claim unlawful detainer irrespective
municipality may bethe subject of the or relief prayed for the plaintiff of the amount of damages or
proceedings for amicable settlement is solely for the payment or unpaid rentals sought to be
in the barangay except: reimbursement of sum of recovered. Where attorney's fees
1. Where one party is the money that: are awarded, the same shall not
government, or any subdivision 1. Does not exceed exceed Php20,000; and
or instrumentality thereof; Php400,000 for the 2. All other civil cases, except
2. Where one party is a public MeTCs or Php300,000 for probate proceedings, where the
officer or employee, and the MTCCs, MTCs, MCTCs, total amount of plaintiff's claim
exclusiveofinterest; and does not exceed Phpl00,000 or
Php 200,000 in Metro Manila,
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Barangay Conciliation 2016 Revised Rules of Rules on Summary Procedure

(Administrative Circular 14-93) Procedure for Small (as amended by
Claims Cases A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC)
dispute relates to the performance 2. Involves a claim or demand exlusive of interests and costs
of his official functions; owed under any of the (RRSP, Sec. 1 [a]).
3. Where the dispute involves real following:
properties located in different a. Contract of lease;
cities and municipalities, Contract of loan;
unless the parties thereto agree Contract of services;
to submit their difference to Contract of sale; or
amicable settlement by an Contract of mortgage.
appropriate Lupon; b. For liquidated dam-
4. Any complaint by or against ages arising from con-
corporations, partnership or tracts;
juridical entities, since only c. The enforcement of a
individuals shall be parties barangay amicable set-
to Barangay conciliation tlement or an arbitra-
proceedings either as tion award involving a
complainants or respondents money claim covered
(Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang by this Rule pursuant
Pambarangay Rules); to Sec. 417 of the Lo-
5. Disputes involving parties who cal Government Code
actually reside in barangays of (RRSCC, Secs. 2 and
different cities or municipalities, 5).
except where such barangay
units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate
Lupon;
6. Offenses for which the law
prescribes a maximum penalty of
imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine over five thousand
pesos (Php5,000.00);
7. Offenses where there is no private
offended party;
8. Disputes where urgent legal
action is necessary to prevent
injustice from being committed
or further continued, specifically
the following:
a. Criminal cases where
accused is under police
custody or detention (see
Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay
Law);
b. Petitions for habeas corpus
by a person illegally deprived
of his rightful custody over
another or a person illegally
deprived or on acting in his
behalf;
c. Actions coupled with
provisional remedies such
as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of
personal property and
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support during the
pendency of the action; and
d. Actions which may be
barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
3. Any class of disputes which the
President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice;
4. Where the dispute arises from
the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) (Sec. 46 &
47, RA 6657);
5. Labor disputes or controversies
arising from employer-employee
relations (Montoya vs. Escayo,
et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226,
Labor Code, as amended which
grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction over conciliation and
mediation of disputes, grievances
or problems to certain offices of
the DOLE);
6. Actions to annul judgment upon
a compromise which may be filed
directly in court (See Sanchez
vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459)
(Administrative Circular 14-
93) [hereinafter Katarungang
Pambarangay]
Note: The court in which a non-

criminal case is filed may motu
proprio refer the case, at any time
before trial, to the Lupon concerned
for amicable settlement, the foregoing
Rules notwithstanding and even
if the case does not fall within the
authority of the Lupon (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 408).
Criminal Cases Covered
Criminal cases punishable by 1. Violations of traffic laws, Rules

imprisonment of not more than and regulations;
one (1) year or fine of not more 2. Violations of the rental law;
than Php5,000 (Katarungang
Pambarangay). 3. Violations of municipal or city
ordinances;
4. Violations of BP 22 (A.M. No.
00-11-01-SC, April 15, 2003);
5. All other criminal cases where
the penalty is imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months and/or a fine
not exceeding P1,000, or both,
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irrespective of other penalties or
civil liabilities arising therefrom;
and
6. Offenses involving damage
to property thorugh criminal
negligence where the imposable
fine is not exceeding P10,000
(RRSP, Sec. 1 [b]).
Note: A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC or “Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts” was issued by the
Supreme Court beyond the cut-off period of the 2022 Bar Exam.
The owners of the land, through their attorney in fact, MR, brought X before the barangay so that the
demand to vacate against X may be settled amicably before the barangay. No amicable settlement was
arrived at. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against X, who alleged in his answer that the
owners plaintiffs failed to appear before the barangay and as such, the complaint should be dismissed.
During the pre-trial, the parties underwent mediation before the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC),
and before the judge, in Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR).
1. Should the case be dismissed for failure of plaintiffs to personally appear before the Barangay?
No. Although Plaintiffs failed to personally appear during the conciliation proceedings as required by Section
415 of RA 7160, they were, however, represented by MR. Plaintiffs substantially complied with the law. The
representatives appeared to undergo conciliation proceedings before the barangay but they failed to arrive at
an amicable settlement. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued
a Certification to File Action. During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation before the PMC and
JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the purposes of the law, i.e., to
provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the indiscriminate filing of cases
in the courts, have been sufficiently met (Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
2. Will the non-referral of the matter before the barangay deprive of jurisdiction over the case?
No. The non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a responsive
pleading (Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Civil Procedure
General Provisions (Rule 1)
What are the cases governed by the Rules of Court?

The Rules of Court shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings
A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law.
A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (ROC, Rule
1, Sec. 3).
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In what cases are the Rules of Court inapplicable? (ELC-NIO)

The Rules of Court shall not apply to:
1. Election cases;
2. Land registration;
3. Cadastral;
4. Naturalization; and
5. Insolvency proceedings; and
6. Other cases not herein provided for (ROC, Rule 1, Sec. 4).
Cause of Action (Rule 2)
What are the elements of a cause of action?

A cause of action requires the following elements: (a) a legal right of the plaintiff; (b) an obligation on the part of
the defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act on the part of the defendant violating the right
of the plaintiff (Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No 190432, April 25, 2017).
Distinguish Failure to State Cause of Action from Lack of Cause of Action.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action.
The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of
the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of
the proceedings through an Answer by raising it as an affirmative defense pursuant to Section 12, Rule 8, while
dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the
basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff, such as in a Demurrer to Evidence under
Rule 33. In Failure to state a cause of action, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial. In lack of cause of action,
this is invoked after the plaintiff has rested its case, and the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations
based on the evidence presented (Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426, September 20, 2017; Colmenar v.
Colmenar, et al., G.R. No. 252467, June 21, 2021).
What is the test for failure to state a cause of action?

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would
justify the relief demanded (Heirs of Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Spouses S, Indian nationals, purchased a land in Bel-Air and a condominium unit, and placed the title
thereto in the name of one of their sons, G, in trust for said spouses and his siblings. Years later, the
other children filed a complaint for reconveyance, partition, accounting and declaration of nullity of
documents against G, several banks, and the RD of Makati, praying that they be declared lawful owners
of the properties in accordance with the express trust agreement and the provisions of the Civil Code.
Defendant G sought the dismissal on the grounds of prescription, lack of capacity to sue and that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action. RTC dismissed it based on lack of cause of action.
1. Is the RTC correct for dismissing it on the ground of lack of cause of action?
No. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular
action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at
the earliest stages of the proceedings, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after
the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff. Considering that, in this case, no stipulations, admissions, or evidence have yet been presented, it
is perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which plaintiffs assert their cause
of action. Hence, the ground of lack of cause of action could not have been the basis for the dismissal of this
action (Heirs of Sadhwani v. Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
2. Did the complaint sufficiently state a cause of action?
No. Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their purported right over the subject properties. Since
the Spouses, being Indian nationals, were prohibited from owning land in the instant case, they were likewise
prohibited from transmitting any right over the same through succession. Even assuming that the facts alleged
in the complaint were true, plaintiffs would not be entitled to the reliefs demanded because: 1) plaintiffs
premised their right over the subject properties as heirs of aliens who may not own land or transmit rights
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over the same by succession, and 2) plaintiffs failed to allege that they were in fact heirs of the Spouses under
the laws of the Republic of India. The allegations of the complaint failed to sufficiently state the concurrence
of the three elements for a cause of action, particularly, the legal right to the relief demanded. In view of
the foregoing, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (Heirs of Sadhwani v.
Sadhwani, G.R. No. 217365, August 14, 2019, Caguioa Case).
X filed a complaint for sum of money against Y. X filed a motion for leave to file amended complaint
to implead the estate of the late Z, Y’s deceased husband, as additional defendant, represented by Y,
the wife. Y sought the dismissal of the complaint as representative of Z, for failing to state a cause
of action, raising this ground as an affirmative defense. The trial court did not dismiss the claim as
against the estate of Z, ruling that the inclusion of Z’s estate was necessary for a complete relief on the
determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the case. Should the case against the estate of Z
be dismissed against the estate of Z?
Yes. Neither a deceased person nor his estate has capacity to be sued. A deceased person does not have the capacity
to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. A deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as
defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality. When Z died, his legal personality ceased and he could
no longer be impleaded as defendant in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. The complaint against him
should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to
state a cause of action. A complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a
civil action (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Define splitting of cause of action.

Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action, claim or demand into two or
more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. It
is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers,
where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia or res judicata, as the case may be (Marilag v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 201892, July 22, 2015; Chu, et al, v. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011; Quadra v. CA, G.R. No.
147593, July 31, 2006, with ROC, Rule 2, Sec. 4).
When is a joinder of causes of action valid?

A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against
an opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
1. The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;
2. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;
3. Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions,
the joinder may be allowed in the regional trial court provided one of the causes of action falls within the
jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and
4. Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 2, Sec. 5).
X filed a single complaint in the RTC against Y for: (1) Quieting of Title involving a land with an
assessed value of Php1,000,000.00; (2) Sum of money based on a contract of loan between them for
Php5,000,000.00. In Y’s Answer, it was alleged that the Complaint should be dismissed as the causes of
action are misjoined. Is Y correct?
No. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. The causes of action in this case are
misjoined since Quieting of Title is a special civil action under Rule 63 that should not be joined with a sum of
money case governed by ordinary rules. A misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative
of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately (ROC, Rule 2, Sec. 5 and 6). By exception, if X refuses to
accept the severance, it may lead to the dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court (Salvador vs. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 195834, November 9, 2016).
Parties to Civil Action (Rule 3)
May a deceased person be named as a defendant in an action for collection of sum of money?
NO. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case. Section
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1, Rule 3 unequivocally states that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil action. The proper remedy is to file the case against the estate of the deceased, an entity authorized by law to
be a party in a civil action (Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, Caguioa Case)
What is an indispensable party?

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
An indispensable party is one with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so the court cannot proceed without their presence. The interests of such
indispensable parties in the subject matter of the suit and the relief are so bound with those of the other parties that
their legal presence as parties to the proceeding is an absolute necessity and a complete and efficient determination
of the equities and rights of the parties is not possible if they are not joined (Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246,
November 22, 2016, Caguioa Case; ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 7).
Distinguish indispensable party from necessary party.

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
and should be joined either as plaintiff or defendant (ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 7). A necessary party is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties,
or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action (ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 8).
Sps. R owned a parcel of land. After they died, one of their children, L, unilaterally executed a declaration
of heirship. L claims to be the sole heir despite the fact that she had 8 other siblings. The title over the
property was transferred to L’s name. L sold the property to T through a pacto de retro sale, with a right
to redeem within 3 years from date of sale. The 8 other siblings filed a complaint and the court ruled in
their favor, ordering the cancellation of title in L’s name, ordering the partition of the property, where
each child gets 1/9 share each, and L was ordered to pay cross complainant T the sum of the purchase
price with legal interest. The decision in the first case became final and executory. The heirs of T, after
learning of said decision, went to L for her to comply with the decision to pay back the purchase price to
T. L and Heirs of T entered into a verbal agreement where L would transfer title over the land in favor of
Heirs of T. For failing to comply with the verbal agreement despite demands, Heirs of T filed a complaint
against L for specific performance. The RTC in the second case ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The
decision became final and executory. L’s siblings filed a petition for annulment of RTC decision with the
CA, praying that the heirs of T be enjoined from taking the subject land and to annul the RTC decision
in the second case. Was the judgment in the second case valid?
No, for failure to implead the indispensable parties, is ample basis for annulment of judgment, the other siblings
of L, who are co-owners of the subject property. Joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non
of the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In
an action for specific performance compelling the transfer of the subject property co-owned by nine heirs who
have already been adjudged by a final and executory decision as co-owners of the subject property, the latter are
indispensable parties in such an action. In a suit involving co-owned property, all the co-owners of such property
are indispensable parties. Therefore, with the joinder of all indispensable parties being a condition sine qua non to
the exercise of judicial power, RTC in the second case failed to acquire jurisdiction (Fernando v. Paguyo, G.R. No.
237871, September 18, 2019, Caguioa Case).
What are the effects of misjoinder and non-joinder of parties?

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of action. Parties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately (ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 11).
What is the effect if the party refused the court’s order to join the indispensable parties?
The Court may dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. (Pamplona Plantation Co. vs.
Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005)
What are the requisites for a Class Suit to prosper? (IN-PB)

The following are the requisites:
1. The subject matter of the controversy must be of common or general Interest to many persons;
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2. The persons are so Numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties;

3. The parties actually before the court are sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully Protect the
interests of all concerned;
4. The representatives sue or defend for the Benefit of all. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567,
212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019)
Venue (Rule 4)
What is the venue of real and personal actions?

Real actions shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated (ROC, Rule 4, Sec. 1). The venue is local.
Personal action may be commenced and tried in the residence of the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs, or
the residence of the defendant or any of the principal defendants, at the election of the plaintiff. (ROC, Rule 4,
Sec. 2). The venue is transitory. The residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or abode. (Jose Baritua v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 108547, February 3, 1997)
What should be alleged in the information as to venue if the basis of venue of the libel criminal action is
the place where the libel was printed and first published?
The Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers,
magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Pleadings
Kinds (Rule 6)
What is a compulsory counterclaim?

A compulsory counterclaim arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction (G. Holdings, Inc. v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017, Caguioa Case; ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 7).
Should docket fees be collected for compulsory counterclaims?

No. There is no liability to pay filing fees on compulsory counterclaims, as provided by the Supreme Court in
OCA Circular No. 96-2009, which suspended the payment of filing fees provided in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated
21 September 2004 (OCA Circular No. 96-2009 dated 13 August 2009).
Distinguish Permissive Counterclaim from Compulsory Counterclaim.
Permissive Counterclaim Compulsory Counterclaim

As to basis
One which does not arise out of nor is it necessarily One which arises out of or is connected with the
connected with the subject matter of the opposing transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
party’s claim. the opposing party’s claim.
As to necessity of an answer
A permissive counterclaim must be answered by the A compulsory counterclaim that merely reiterates
party against whom it is interposed. Otherwise, he special defenses are deemed controverted even without
may be declared in default as to the counterclaim. a reply. In such a case, failure to answer may not be a
cause for a declaration of default.
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Permissive Counterclaim Compulsory Counterclaim

As to requirement of certification against forum shopping
It shall be accompanied by a certification against It does not need for such certification.
forum shopping, and whenever required by law,
also a certificate to file action issued by the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
As to whether it is initiatory or not
Initiatory pleading Not an initiatory pleading
As to effect of failure to set up the counterclaim
A permissive counterclaim may be set up as an A compulsory counterclaim shall be contained in the
independent action and will not be barred if not answer because a compulsory counterclaim not set up
contained in the answer to the complaint. shall be barred.
As to effect of payment of docket fees
Payment is required. No payment is required as rates for the filing fees is
suspended (OCA Circular No. 96-2009).
(Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004).
When may a Reply be filed?

The plaintiff may file a reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable document to the answer because a
reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
alleged in, or relation to said actionable document (ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 10).
When may a Rejoinder be filed?

A rejoinder may be filed if an actionable document is attached to the reply, and the rejoinder would be based solely
on the actionable document (ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 10).
What are the grounds to deny the admission of a third-party complaint and what is the remedy against
such denial?
The third-party complaint shall be denied admission where: (1) the third-party defendant cannot be located within
30 calendar days from the grant of leave; (2) matter extraneous to the issue in the principal case are raised; or (3) the
effect would be to introduce a new and separate controversy into the action. The remedy would be to institute a
separate action on said complaint. (ROC, Rule 6, Sec. 11)
Parts and Contents of a Pleading (Rule 7)
Will the lack of verification render the pleading fatally defective?

No. While Sec. 4, Rule 7, ROC provides that a pleading that lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading, its non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not automatically render the pleading
fatally defective. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement
is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading
are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is
filed in good faith.
The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that ends of justice may be served thereby
(Jolo’s Kiddie Carts v. Caballa, G.R. No. 230682, November 29, 2017; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. BF Homes,
Inc., G.R. No. 228239, June 10, 2019; ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 4).
X filed an action against Y for specific performance. Attached to X’s complaint are judicial affidavits of
witnesses A, B, and C. During trial, X moved that it be allowed to present D as an additional witness, as
X only realized then that it should include D as a witness. The court denied the motion. Was the court
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correct?
Yes. Every pleading stating a party’s claims or defenses shall state a summary of the witnesses’ intended testimonies,
provided that the judicial affidavits of said witnesses shall be attached to the pleading and form an integral part
thereof. Only witnesses whose judicial affidavits are attached to the pleading shall be presented by the parties
during trial. Except if a party presents meritorious reasons as a basis for the admission of additional witnesses, no
other witness or affidavit shall be heard or admitted by the court. X did not present any meritorious reason as a
basis for admission of additional witnesses. Moreover, X failed to reserve D’s testimonial evidence during pre-trial,
by giving the name of D and the nature of his testimony (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 6; Rule 18, Sec. 2).
Should an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over a foreclosed property be accompanied by a
certificate against forum shopping?
No, the certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The
ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an initiatory pleading but is a mere incident in
the proceeding. It is simply a continuation of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the foreclosure sale
(Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009).
BDO extended a loan to Spouses K secured by chattel mortgage which they failed to pay. BDO filed
a complaint for recovery of possession of personal property with application for writ of issuance of
replevin. Judgement was later rendered in favor of BDO. Spouses K appealed to the CA, which affirmed
the RTC. It was then appealed to the SC, and BDO won. BDO later obtained a writ of execution, by
motion. In an order, the RTC clarified that GD’s liability on the counter-bond was only Php5Million.
BDO filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA dismissed the petition outright because BDO
failed to disclose and mention the pendency of another case involving BDO and Spouses K before the
RTC, Branch 51 for nullification of chattel mortgage with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or WPI.
Was BDO’s failure to disclose the civil case between BDO and Spouses K for the annulment of mortgage
(Civil Case No. CEB-24675) in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 on the required contents of a certification
against forum shopping?
No. There is an absence of identity of causes of action and reliefs being sought between the two cases. An omission
in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia
is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certification are not present. While it is not disputed that BDO failed to disclose the status
of Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in its Verification/Certification, it must be stressed that, despite involving the same
parties, the aforesaid case and the instant case involve two completely different issues. In Civil Case No. CEB-
24675, the issue is on the validity of the mortgage. In the petition for certiorari, the focus is the execution on
the counter-bond. Either decision will not have any bearing as to the other. Thus, the failure to disclose did not
violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the ROC. (BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Great Domestic Insurance Company of the
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case)
What are the three (3) ways of committing forum shopping?

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,
where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata ) (Ao-as v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128464, June 20, 2006).
What are the elements of forum shopping?

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. (Ao-as v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128464, June 20, 2006)
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Manner of Making Allegations (Rule 8)
YBC filed a complaint for a sum of money arising from its main contract with BII for the construction
of a building. YBC’s cause of action is primarily based on BII’s alleged non-payment of its outstanding
debts to YBC arising from their main contract, despite demand. Attached to the complaint was the
accomplishment billing showing the unpaid balance. It was signed by the Chairman of the Board of
YBC, who did not testify in court. Another person, Yu testified on it, without affirming the genuineness
of the signature thereon.
1. What is an actionable document and how do you deny it?
A written instrument or document is “actionable” when an action or defense is based upon such instrument
or document. The specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action or defense must emanate
therefrom or be evident therein. If the document or instrument so qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with
Section 7 — the substance thereof being set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof attached
to the pleading as an exhibit — then the genuineness and due execution thereof are deemed admitted unless
the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts pursuant
to Section 8 of Rule 8. (Young Builders Corp. v. Benson Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 198998, June 19, 2019, J.
Caguioa Case)
2. Is the accomplishment billing an actionable document?
No. If there was a written building or construction contract that was executed between BII and YBC, then
that would be the actionable document because its terms and stipulations would spell out the rights and
obligations of the parties. However, no such contract or agreement was attached to YBC’s Complaint. The
subject Accomplishment Billing is not an actionable document contemplated by the Rules, but is merely
evidentiary in nature. It does not contain the specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action for
sum of money. As such, there was no need for BII to specifically deny its genuineness and due execution under
oath. (Young Builders Corp. v. Benson Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 198998, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case)
How should the court act on the affirmative defenses alleged in the Answer?
For the affirmative defenses under the first paragraph of Section 5 (b), Rule 6, specifically, fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and
any other matter by way of confession and avoidance, the court may either: (1) conduct summary hearing on the
affirmative defenses within 15 calendar days from the filing of the answer, and rule thereon within 30 calendar days
from the termination of the summary hearing (ROC, Rule 8. Sec. 12 (d)): or (2) motu proprio resolve the affirmative
defenses within 30 calendar days from the filing of the answer, without conducting a summary hearing thereon
(ROC, Rule 8, Sec. 12 (c))
If the affirmative defenses are based on: (1) grounds under the second paragraph of Section 5(b), Rule 6, specifically,
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgement; or (2) Rule 8, Section 12, specifically,
the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party, venue is improperly laid, plaintiff has no
legal capacity to sue, the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action, and that a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied with, the court shall motu proprio resolve the affirmative defenses within 30
calendar days from the filing of the answer, without conducting a summary hearing thereon (ROC, Rule 8, Sec.
12 (c)).
What is a denial by disavowal of knowledge?

There is a denial by disavowal of knowledge when the defendant alleges having no knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint (ROC, Rule 8, Sec. 10). Such
denial must be made in good faith (Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd. v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-9531, May 14, 1958).
X wants to have the free patent issued and certificate of title issued in Y’s favor declared void, claiming
that Y fraudulently obtained the free patent solely in Y’s favor. X also wants to have the land covered by
the free patent reconvened such that X is entitled thereto as a co-owner and co-heir. May these actions
be pursued simultaneously?
No. An action for reconveyance recognizes the certificate of title issued pursuant to the free patent as indefeasible.
The action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate does not recognize the free patent as indefeasible.
Given the foregoing differences, an action for reconveyance and an action for declaration of nullity of the free
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patent cannot be pursued simultaneously. They may, however, be pursued alternatively pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on alternative causes of action or defenses. (Mayuga v. Atienza, G.R. No. 208197,
January 10, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Effect of Failure to Plead (Rule 9)
Discuss the effect of failure to plead defenses and objections

As a general rule, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that
the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (ROC, Rule
9, Sec. 1).
What is the effect of failure to plead compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim?

A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred (ROC, Rule 9, Sec. 2). However, when:
(1) a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, excusable negligence,
or when justice requires, he or she may, by leave of court, set-up the counterclaim by amendment to the pleadings
before judgment (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 10); or (2) a counterclaim or cross-claim which either matured or was acquired
by a party after serving his pleading, may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim or a
cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgment. (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 9)
X filed a Complaint against Y, who failed to file an Answer within the reglementary period to do so. On
motion of X, Y was declared in default. From notice of the order of default, what is Y’s remedy?
At any time after notice of the order of default until before judgment, defendant Y may file a motion under oath to
set aside the order of default. The defendant Y’s motion to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions:
(1) defendant must challenge the default order before judgment; (2) defendant must have been prevented from
filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) he must have a meritorious defense
(Ramos v. Costales, G.R. No. 252752, September 14, 2020)
What are the remedies of a defendant declared in default?

One declared in default has the following remedies:
1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion under
oath to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Rule 9, Sec. 3(b));
2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same
has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 1 of Rule 38; and
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even
if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 2).
5. Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trial
court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default,
if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration (National Power Corp. v. Baysic, G.R. No. 213893,
September 25, 2019).
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings (Rule 10)
Discuss how pleadings are amended.

Pleadings may be amended by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that
the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner (ROC, Rule 10, Sec. 1). Amendment may be a matter of right or with leave of
court (ROC, Rule 10, Secs. 2 and 3).
Distinguish amendment of pleadings as matter of right from amendment with leave of court.
The pleading may be amended once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or in
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the case of a reply, at any time within 10 calendar days after it is served. On the other hand, amendment by leave
of court pertains to substantial amendments after a responsive pleading has been served or in the case of a reply,
after the lapse of 10 calendar days from the time it is served. Leave shall be refused if it appears to the court that the
motion was made with intent to delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading stated no cause of action
from the beginning which could be amended (ROC, Rule 10, Secs. 2 and 3).
X borrowed Php500,000.00 from Y, payable after a year. After 11 months, Y filed a collection for sum
of money case against X. After 2 months from the filing of the complaint, may Y amend his complaint
or file a supplemental complaint to cure the lack of cause of action at the time the complaint was filed?
No, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. Such an
action is prematurely brought and is groundless suit, which should be dismissed by the court upon the instance
of the defendant, seasonable raised. A person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for
complaints which are premature (Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8,
2005).
Mr. T, doing business under the name and style of Yon Mitori (sole proprietorship) filed a complaint
against Z for breach of contract of supply of goods to Mr. T, which Mr. T would have used in his business
(Yon Mitori). The complaint was filed solely in the name of Yon Mitori, a single proprietorship.
1. Does Yon Mitori have legal personality to file the case?
No. A single proprietorship is not considered a separate juridical person. As a rule every civil action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, that is, the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of ROC
provides that only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The complaint should have been filed in Mr. T’s name. (Yon Mitori International Industries v. Union Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 225538, [October 14, 2020, Caguioa Case)
2. What is Mr. T’s remedy?
He may amend the complaint, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 10, which provides that a defect in the designation of
the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any
stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party.
The filing of a civil action in the name of a single proprietorship is merely a formal, and not a substantial
defect. Substitution of the party in such cases would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties,
and would not cause any prejudice on the adverse party. No unfairness or surprise to defendant would result
by allowing the amendment, the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to correct a
technical error. While the complaint named the sole proprietorship as plaintiff, the allegations therein show
that said complaint was actually brought by its owner.||| (Yon Mitori International Industries v. Union Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225538, [October 14, 2020, Caguioa Case)
When to File Responsive Pleadings (Rule 11)
What is the period for filing an Answer to the complaint?

Within 30 calendar days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court (ROC, Rule 11,
Sec. 1).
May the period to file the Answer be extended?

Yes. A defendant may, for meritorious reasons, be granted an additional period of not more than 30 calendar days
to file an Answer. A defendant is only allowed to file one (1) motion for extension of time to file an answer (ROC,
Rule 11, Sec. 11)
What is the period for filing an Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity?
1. If it has a resident agent – within 30 calendar days after the service of summons to such agent (ROC, Rule 11,
Sec. 1; Rule 14, Sec. 12);
2. If it has no resident agent but it has an agent or officer or directors/trustees in the Philippines – within 30
calendar days after service of summons to said agent or officer (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 1; Rule 14, Sec. 14); or
3. If it has no resident agent, agent or officer - the service of summons shall be made on the proper government
office which will then forward it by registered mail within 10 days to the corporation’s office. The answer must
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be filed within 60 calendar days after receipt of the summons by the entity (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 2).
What is the period for filing an Answer to an amended complaint?

1. If the amendment is a matter of right, within 30 calendar days after the service of the amended complaint.
2. If the amendment is not a matter of right, the answer must be filed within 15 calendar days from notice of the
order admitting the same (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 3).
What is the period for filing an Answer to a counterclaim or cross-claim?

Within 20 calendar days from service (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 4).
What is the period for filing a Reply?

If allowed, within 15 calendar days from the service of the pleading responded to (ROC, Rule 11, Sec. 6).
G purportedly jumped from the 26th floor of a Condominium to his untimely death. The father of G
filed a criminal complaint for Giving Assistance to Suicide under Article 253 of the RPC against L and
E. An Information for the said crime was filed before the RTC. L was arraigned, while E filed a Motion
to Quash, alleging that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense which was
granted by the RTC. In the same Order, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) Pasig was given ten (10)
days from receipt of the Order to file an Amended Information. 17 days after receipt of the Order, the
OCP filed an Amended Information where OCP dropped E from the charges. May the court admit the
belatedly filed amended information?
Yes. Section 11, Rule 11 provides that the court may allow a pleading to be filed after the time fixed. Also, The
Rules do not prescribe a period for filing an amended information by the prosecution when so ordered by the trial
court in response to a motion to quash. In this case, the ten-day period was set by the RTC in its discretion. Indeed,
the RTC could also validly set a shorter or longer period within reason, in the sound exercise of its discretion. All
the more should the RTC be empowered to allow or admit the amended information despite being filed beyond
the period it initially fixed in its Order dated October 23, 2013. Courts are not precluded, in the sound exercise of
their discretion, to subscribe to a liberal construction of the rules where substantial justice may be served thereby,
and where no undue injury would be suffered by any party (Lazaro v. People, G.R. No. 230018, June 23, 2021,
Caguioa Case).
Bill of Particulars (Rule 12)
What is the purpose of a Motion for Bill of Particulars?

Before responding to a pleading, a party may move for a definite statement or for bill of particulars of any matter
which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive
pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten days from service thereof. Such motion
shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired (ROC,
Rule 12, Sec. 1).
State the period within which a party must comply with the order granting a motion for bill of
particulars.
If the motion is granted, either in whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected within 10 calendar
days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more
definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, serving a copy
thereof on the adverse party (ROC, Rule 12, Sec. 3).
What is the effect of a motion for bill of particulars as to the period to file a responsive pleading?
The filing of a motion for a bill of particulars suspends the running of the period to file a responsive pleading.
From the service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion for
bill of particulars, the moving party may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he was entitled to
the time of filing his motion (the balance of the period from the time it is tolled to the last day to file the responsive
pleading), which shall not be less than 5 calendar days in any event (ROC, Rule 12, Sec. 5; Dumanon v. Butuan City
Rural Bank, G.R. No. L-27675, December 15, 1982).
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Efficient Use of Paper Rule; E-Filing
When will the Efficient Use of Paper Rule apply?

This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-Judicial bodies under the administrative supervision of the Supreme
Court (A.M. NO. 11-9-4-SC, Sec. 2).
What is the required format and style for all pleadings, motions, and similar court-bound papers under
the Efficient Use of Paper Rule?
All pleadings, motions, and similar papers intended for the court and quasi-judicial body’s consideration and
action (court-bound papers) shall be written in single space with a one-and-a-half space between paragraphs,
using an easily readable font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13-inch by 8.5-inch white bond
paper (A.M. NO. 11-9-4-SC, Sec. 3(a)). All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial
bodies under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court shall comply with these requirements. Similarly
covered are the reports submitted to the courts and transcripts of stenographic notes (A.M. NO. 11-9-4-SC, Sec.
3(b)).
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments, Final Orders, and Resolutions
What is the effect of non-payment of the docket fees?

Non-payment of docket fees will prevent the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case as jurisdiction is vested
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees (Manchester Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 75919, May
7, 1987). However, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period if it is shown that a party has demonstrated his willingness to comply with the rules by paying
additional docket fees. This relaxed rule on the payment of docket fees as enunciated in the case of Sun Insurance
will not apply if there is a showing that the non-payment of the correct docket fees is done with intent to defraud
the government (Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 79937, February 13, 1989).
X filed a complaint against Y for damages. In the body of the complaint, X alleged that Y is liable to X
for the amount of Php68Million. However, in the prayer, X alleged that X was praying for damages that
the court may deem just and warranted under the circumstances, without mentioning the Php68Million
amount in the body of the Complaint. Will X be excused from payment of docket fees in the meantime
and it will just constitute as a lien in the judgment award?
No. This case is similar to the Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals case where there is a
fraudulent attempt to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. To put a stop to this irregularity, the Supreme
Court has ruled that all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. There being no proper payment of docket fees
and there being an attempt to circumvent such proper payment, the Complaint in this case should be dismissed.
(Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. (IBC-13) v. Alonzo Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006)
X filed an action against Y, praying for the recovery of the sum of the principal loan of Php100,000.00,
and prayed for such as may be awarded by the court as it may deem proper under the circumstances.
The court, in its ruling, directed Y to pay said principal amount and moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00. Y objects to the award of moral damages since no docket fees were paid therefor as it was
not alleged in the complaint and therefore not included in the assessment of docket fees. Decide.
The additional filing fee for the claim not specified in the pleading or the claim specified but left for the
determination of the court shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall then be the responsibility of the clerk
of court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee (Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. V. Asuncion, G.R Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989).
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Summons
Discuss the purpose of summons in relation to action in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem.
In actions in personam, the service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the
court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard
on the claim brought against him. In action in rem and action quasi in rem, the purpose of summons in such
action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of due process (Macasaet v. Co, G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013).
X filed a complaint for sum of money against Y and the estate of Z, Y’s deceased husband. At this point,
no settlement of estate proceedings were instituted as to Z’s estate. Summons for Z’s estate was served
on Y, as the surviving spouse of Z and the alleged representative of Z’s estate. Was there valid service of
summons?
No. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Z. As Z was dead at the time the complaint
was filed and no special proceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over either the deceased or his estate. Summons served upon Y purportedly as the representative of
her late husband was thus invalid, particularly since Y was never appointed as administrator/executor of Y’s estate
(Gaffney v. Butler, G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017, Caguioa Case).
X filed an action for sum of money against Y. In the return of service of summons, it was alleged that
Y refused to receive summons, constraining the process server to tender it on Y. No Answer was filed
and upon motion, Y was declared in default. X was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court
later ruled in favor of X. After the decision became final and executory, X moved for execution, which
was granted. Later on, Y’s property, after being attached was scheduled to be sold at an execution sale. Y
allegedly learned of this through another, more than 6 months from the finality of judgment, and thus
filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
his person. Y claimed that summons was not validly served on Y, because at the time of the service of
summons, Y allegedly was not residing in the address provided by X in the complaint. Y alleged in the
petition that his lease in the former address was expired already, showing he was no longer residing in
said address, but no lease contract was submitted. The lease is established by affidavits of neighbors but
there was no affidavit from the alleged lessor. Will the petition prosper?
No. The process server being a public official, enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of his official
duties and functions. In the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons on Y is deemed
regular and valid. The Return of Service of the process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of
the facts set out therein. Y did not show any clear and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption. The
statements of neighbors with respect to a purported lease contract between petitioner Y and his landlord in lieu of
a statement from the landlord himself or the lease contract, are insufficient. The self-serving assertions made by an
aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard the statements made in the sheriff’s certificate after service of summons
(Yap v. Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, Caguioa Case).
When may there be a substituted service?

If for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable period after at least three (3)
attempts on two (2) different dates, substituted service may be effected. (ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 6)
Distinguish personal service and substituted service under Rule 13 from Rule 14.
Rule 13 Rule 14
Coverage of Service
Service of all pleadings, motions and other court Service of summons only (Rule 14)
submissions, except summons (ROC, Rule 13, Sec.
1)
Manner of Personal Service
1. By personal delivery to the party or party’s 1. By handing a copy to the defendant in person and
counsel, or to their authorized representative informing the defendant the he is being served; or
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Rule 13 Rule 14
I
named in the appropriate pleading or motion; 1. By handing a copy to the defendant in person and
or informing the defendant the he is being served; or
2. By leaving in his office with his clerk or with the 2. Ifhe refuses to receive and sign by it, by leaving the
person having charge thereof; summons within the view and in the presence of
3. If no person is found in his office, or if his office the defendant (ROC, Rule 14, Sec. S)
is not known or he has no office, by leaving be-
tween the hours of 8:00 am and 6:00 pm, at the
party's or counsel's residence, if known, with a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing
therein (ROC, Rule 13, Sec. 6)
Grounds for Substituted Service
If the service cannot be made personally or by reg- If for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
istered mail and the office and place of residence personally after at least 3 attempts on 2 different dates
of the party or his counsel being unknown (ROC, (ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 6)
Rule 13.Sec. 8)
Manner of Making Substituted Service
By delivering to the clerk of court, with proof of 1. By leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
failure of both personal service and service by mail residence to a person at least eighteen (18) years of
(ROC, Rule 13. Sec. 8) age and of sufficient discretion residing therein;
2. By leaving copies of the summons at the defen-
dam's office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. A competent
person includes, but is not limited to, one who
customarily receives correspondences for the de-
fendant;
3. By leaving copies of the summons, if refused en-
try upon making his or her authority and purpose
known, with any of the officers of the homeown-
ers' association or condominium corporation, or
its chief security officer in charge of the commu-
nity or the building where the defendant may be
found;and
4. By sending an electronic mail to the defendant's
electronic mail address, if allowed by the court
(ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 6)
In what instances may extraterritorial service of summons be resorted to?

It may be resorted to by leave of court when: (1) the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines,
and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within
the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the
relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property
has been attached within the Philippines; or (2) the defendant ordinarily resides within the Philippines but is
temporarily out of the Philippines (ROC, Rule 14, Secs.17 and 18).
X filed an action against Y, who later filed an Answer, with counterclaims, and participated in the trial.
Judgment was rendered in favor of X. On appeal, Y alleged that the proceedings in the trial court were
void since there was improper substituted service of summons, and so the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the person ofY. Is Y's argument meritorious?
No. Yis estopped for raising the question oflack of jurisdiction after Y's voluntary appearance in the action, which
was equivalent to the service of summons. Y filed an Answer with counterclaim, seeking affirmative relief from the
court, and participated in the proceedings. Y cannot also raise for the first time on appeal such alleged issue (Spouses
Rebamontev. SpousesLucero,G.R. No. 237812, October2, 201!),Caguioa Case).
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Motions
What are the prohibited motions under the Rules of Court?

The following motions shall not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss except on the following grounds:
2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
3. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
4. That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment;
5. That the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.
6. Motion to hear affirmative defenses;
7. Motion for reconsideration of the court’s action on the affirmative defenses;
8. Motion to suspend proceedings without a temporary restraining order or injunction issued by a higher
court;
9. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other papers, except a motion for extension
to file an answer as provided by Section 11, Rule 11; and
10. Motion for postponement intended for delay, except if it is based on acts of God, force majeure or physical
inability of the witness to appear and testify (ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 12).
D filed his complaint for annulment of contract against E who filed a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The Court granted the motion. Is the Court
correct?
No. A motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action is a prohibited motion to dismiss. The only
allowable motions to dismiss are based on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, or statute of limitations (ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 12).
What affirmative defenses raised in the answer, if granted, will result in a dismissal with prejudice?
Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting an affirmative defense that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable
under the provisions of statute of frauds, shall result in dismissal with prejudice and shall bar the refiling of the
same action or claim. (ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 13)
What is the Omnibus Motion Rule?

A motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 9)
Dismissal of Actions
A filed a case against B, who filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
which was granted. A re-filed the complaint against B with the appropriate court. Before summons
could be served on B, A moved to dismiss the case without prejudice, which the court granted. B filed a
motion for reconsideration of the second order of dismissal, arguing that the dismissal should have been
with prejudice under the Two-Dismissal Rule. Decide.
I will deny the motion for reconsideration since the two-dismissal rule does not apply in this case because the first
dismissal was upon the instance of the defendant. The second dismissal was upon the instance of the plaintiff
before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment, where a dismissal without prejudice is allowed.
For the two-dismissal rule to apply where the second dismissal would be with prejudice, the following requisites
must be present: (1) there was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court; (2) both cases were based
on or include the same claim; (3) both notices of dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4) when the motion to
dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all
the claims of the former (Ching v. Cheng, G.R No. 175507, October 8, 2014).
Z obtained a loan from Y secured by postdated checks which was later dishonored. Y filed a case for
collection of sum of money against Z who filed an answer with counterclaim, claiming among others,
extinguishment of the obligation and damages incurred for defending against Y’s frivolous suit. Y
moved to dismiss the complaint. If the court grants the dismissal of the complaint, will this result in the
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dismissal of the counterclaim, barring Z from later asserting the same against Y?
No, under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him or her of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The
dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his or her counterclaim in a separate
action unless within fifteen (15) calendar days from notice of the motion he or she manifests his or her preference
to have his or her counterclaim resolved in the same action. (ROC, Rule 17, Sec. 2)
Pre-trial (Rule 18)
A complaint was filed against A. In A’s answer, A alleged the affirmative defenses of prescription and
laches. However, the issues of prescription and laches were not raised in A’s pre-trial brief, nor were they
included in the pre-trial order. Trial ensued and A participated in the trial, without raising the issues of
prescription and laches. Judgment was rendered without ruling on the issues of prescription and laches.
May these issues be raised and considered on appeal?
No. These issues can no longer be raised for the first time on appeal as A is deemed to have waived them when he
failed to have them included in the pre-trial order, his pre-trial brief and to raise it during trial, where A actively
participated in. (Republic v. Capital Resources Corp., G.R. No. 217210, November 7, 2016, Caguioa Case)
X, Y and Z are siblings and are registered owners of two parcels of land. Y and his wife sent written and
verbal demands to the other siblings for the partition of the land. As their demands left unheeded, Y
filed a complaint to partition and damages before the RTC. After submission of their pre-trial briefs and
the conduct of pre-trial conference, Judge M, issued a pre-trial order stating “all evidence to be adduced
and presented by both parties shall be limited to those identified.” None of the parties manifested their
intent to revise the said order. During the hearing, Y orally manifested in open court that they would be
presenting six additional witnesses in place of one witness. These additional witnesses were not among
those listed in the pre-trial order. Judge M denied the oral motion. Is the judge correct?
Yes, no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party’s evidence-in-
chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the
court for good cause shown. In this case, the pre-trial order provides that all evidence to be adduced and presented
by both parties shall be limited to those identified. Neither Y nor his counsel took the necessary steps to cause the
revision of the Pre-Trial Order (Chua v. Spouses Cheng and Sihiyon, G.R. No. 219309, November 22, 2017).
May additional evidence not previously pre-marked during pre-trial be allowed during trial?
Yes, provided that the evidence was not available during pretrial and was reserved in the following manner during
pre-trial: (1) for testimonial evidence, by giving the name or position and the nature of the testimony of the
proposed witness; and (2) for documentary and other object evidence, by giving a particular description of the
evidence. No reservation shall be allowed if not made in the foregoing manner (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 2(g)(4)).
May the trial court render judgment after pre-trial?

Yes, should there be no more controverted facts, or no more genuine issue as to any material fact, or an absence of
any issue should the answer fail to tender an issue, the court shall, without prejudice to a party moving for judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment, motu proprio include in the pre-trial order that the case be submitted for
summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings, without need of position papers or memoranda. In such cases,
the court shall render judgment within 90 calendar days from termination of the pre-trial. (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 10)
Intervention (Rule 19)
ST filed a complaint against WG for cancellation of title. WG moved to dismiss the complaint because
G, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the TCT, was not impleaded as defendant.
If the case should proceed to trial without G being impleaded as a party to the case, what is his remedy
to protect his interest? (2015 Bar)
G may file a motion for intervention. Under Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, a person who has legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or either disposition of property in the custody of the court of
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an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. G is a person having legal interest
in the matter in litigation being the person to whom Wagner mortgaged the property as annotated in the TCT.
(2015 Bar)
Spouses M and F have 6 children, A, B, C, D, E, X. The mother, M, died. A year later, A, one of the
children, died. Years later, father, F, died. B, C, D, E, X filed a petition for the probate of F’s wills. The
will was allowed to probate and the settlement of estate proceedings followed. The children of A also
brought an action for the intestate settlement of estate of A. W moved to intervene in the settlement
of F’s estate proceedings, claiming that she married A the year before he died and as such, has legal
interest in F’s estate to inherit from F. The children of A opposed the intervention because they claim
the marriage with A is bigamous, for having been contracted with W while W has a previous valid and
existing marriage and without nullifying the said previous marriage, and W has no legal interest in F’s
estate because she cannot inherit by right of representation, and her interest is better to be resolved in
settlement of A’s estate where probate court can rule on her right to inherit. Should intervention be
allowed?
No. First, W has no legal interest in the estate of F. W could not inherit from F’s estate because A predeceased F
and the children of A are the ones who would succeed by right of representation. W cannot do so because she is
only related by affinity to F and not related by blood. Second, the validity of W and A’s marriage is in issue, and it
is the court where settlement of A’s estate is pending that has jurisdiction to determine who the heirs of A are and
to whom the estate shall be distributed to. The court where settlement of F’s estate is pending cannot rule on the
issue of who are A’s heirs. Allowing W’s intervention would allow an independent controversy to be injected into
the settlement of F’s estate because the issue of whether W is a lawful heir of A will enlarge F’s settlement of estate
proceedings, and would involve determination of facts peculiar only to W, that has nothing to do with the original
parties. This should not be allowed for it will cause undue delay or prejudice in the adjudication of rights of the
original parties. Third, W’s intervention in the probate proceeding for F’s estate is unnecessary because her right
or interest in the estate of A can be fully protected in a separate proceeding. namely, the settlement of A’s estate
proceeding (Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Calendar of Cases (Rule 20)
Which cases shall be given preference in the calendar of cases?

The preference shall be given to habeas corpus cases, election cases, special civil actions, and those required by law
(ROC, Rule 20, Sec. 1).
Subpoena (Rule 21)
What are the grounds for quashing subpoena?

For subpoena duces tecum – unreasonable, oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does
not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the
production thereto, and the witness and kilometrage fees were not tendered when the subpoena was served
For subpoena ad testificandum – the witness is not bound thereby, or the witness and kilometrage fees were not
tendered when the subpoena was served (ROC, Rule 21, Sec. 4)
What is the effect of disobeying a subpoena?

1. General Rule: Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a subpoena served upon him or her shall
be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued. If the subpoena was not issued by a
court, the disobedience thereto shall be punished in accordance with the applicable law or Rule (ROC, Rule
21, Sec. 9). The court may also issue a warrant to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or officer
where the attendance is required, and the cost of such warrant and seizure of such witness shall be paid by the
witness if the court issuing it shall determine that his failure to answer the subpoena was willful and without
just excuse (ROC, Rule 21, Sec. 8)
2. Exception: The foregoing will not apply to a witness who resides more than 100 kilometers from his residence
to the place where he is to testify by ordinary course of travel, or to a detention prisoner if no permission of the
court in which his case is pending was obtained (ROC, Rule 21, Sec. 10)
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Computation of Time (Rule 22)
How will you compute the time prescribed or allowed by the Rules?
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and
the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day (ROC, Rule 22,
Sec. 1).
The last day to appeal counted from the date of receipt by the part of the decision fell on a Sunday. The
following Monday was a legal holiday. The party filed the appeal on the next working day following the
holiday or on Tuesday. Was the appeal filed on time?
Yes, because of the pretermission of holidays. Where the last day of the period fixed by law to appeal falls on a
Sunday or a Legal Holiday, the appeal can be filed on the next business day. In such case, the supposedly last day
to appeal will not be deemed the last day because it happens to be a Sunday or Legal Holiday and instead, the act
can be done on the next business day following that Sunday or Legal Holiday, as in this case (University of Nueva
Caceres v. Torres, G.R. No. 92234, August 30, 1990).
The trial was set on February 2, 2020, which was subsequently declared a holiday. Will the rule on
pretermission of holidays apply and the trial would be automatically moved to the next working day
following the holiday or on February 3, 2020?
No. The rule does not apply to a day fixed by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done, which
may be on any day within that specified period. If a party is required by law to file his answer to a complaint within
fifteen days from receipt of the summons and the last day falls on a holiday, the last day is deemed moved to the next
succeeding business day. But, if the court fixes the trial of a case on a certain day but the said date is subsequently
declared a public holiday, the trial thereof is not automatically transferred to the next succeeding business day, as in
this case (Rural Bank of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 230296, April 2, 2018).
The last day to file an Answer fell on a Sunday, October 23, 2022. When is the last day to file a motion
for extension of time for an additional period of 5 days to file the Answer, and when is the reckoning
period for counting the 5-day extension?
The motion for extension of time may be filed on the next working day or Monday, October 24, 2022, following
the last day that fell on a Sunday, October 23, 2022, but the reckoning period should be from the expiration of the
period, regardless of it falling on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Thus, the computation of the extension shall
be reckoned from October 23, 2022, and the Answer shall be filed no later than 28 October 2022, or 5 days from
October 23, 2022 (A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, Katipunan Food Service, Inc. v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 230296, April 2, 2018).
Modes of Discovery
Depositions (Rule 23-24)
When may a party take a deposition pending action?

A party may take the deposition of another under the following circumstances:
1. Upon ex parte motion of a party, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories;
2. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21; or
3. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the
court prescribes (ROC, Rule 23, Sec. 1).
Define commission and letters rogatory.

A commission may be defined as an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to
authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal (Feria, J., Civil
Procedure, 1969 ed., p. 415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be
defined as an instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter
to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within
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the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters are addressed (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary, p. 653) (Dasmarinas Garments Inc. vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229, August 24, 1993).
Interrogatories to Parties (Rule 25)
Briefly explain the procedure on “Interrogatories to Parties” under Rule 25 and state the effect of failure
to serve written interrogatories. (2016 Bar)
The mode of discovery is availed by filing and serving upon the adverse party written interrogatories to be answered
by the party served. If a party is a juridical entity, the written interrogatories shall be answered by any of its officers
competent to testify in its behalf (ROC, Rule 25, Sec. 1). It shall be answered fully in writing and shall be signed and
sworn to by the person making them and shall be filed within 15 calendar days after service thereof (ROC, Rule 25,
Sec. 2). Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after service thereof, with
notice as in the case of the motion; and answers shall be deferred until the objections are resolved, which shall be at
as early a time as is practicable (ROC, Rule 25, Sec. 3). A party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or give deposition pending appeal, unless allowed
by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice (ROC, Rule 25, Sec. 6).
What is the effect of failing to serve written interrogatories on the adverse party?
1. General Rule: A party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal
2. Exception: Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice
Admission by Adverse Party (Rule 26)
What is the effect of failure to answer the request for admission?

Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless. However, any admission
made by a party pursuant to such request is for the purpose of the pending action only and shall not constitute an
admission by him or her for any other purpose nor may the same be used against him or her in any other proceeding
(ROC, Rule 26, Sec. 2 and 3).
What is the effect of failure to file and serve request for admission on the adverse party of a material and
relevant fact at issue which is or ought to be within the personal knowledge of the adverse party?
A party who fails to file and serve a request for admission on the adverse party of material and relevant facts at
issue which are, or ought to be within the personal knowledge of the other party, shall not be permitted to present
evidence on such facts. The court, however, may allow the presentation of such evidence for good cause and to
prevent failure of justice (ROC, Rule 26, Sec. 5).
Production or Inspection of Documents or Things (Rule 27)
CCC filed a complaint for a sum of money against BTC the latter’s failure to pay for its purchases of
industrial chemicals. In its answer, BTC contended that it refused to pay because CCC misrepresented
that the products it sold belonged to a new line, when in fact they were identical with CCC’s existing
products. To substantiate its defense, BTC filed a motion to compel CCC to give a detailed list of the
products’ ingredients and chemical components, relying on the right to avail of the modes of discovery
allowed under Rule 27. CCC objected, invoking confidentiality of the information sought by BTC.
Resolve BTC’s motion with reasons. (2009 Bar)
The motion filed by BTC shall not be granted. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control (ROC, Rule 21, Sec. 1). In this
case, the detailed list of the products’ ingredients and chemical components are considered as trade secrets that are
privileged matters in nature. Hence, the motion to compel under Rule 27 cannot be availed.
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Distinguish Production or Inspection of Documents or Things from Subpoena duces tecu,n

The following are the distinctions:
Production or Inspection of Documents or Subpoena duces tecum
Things
I
As to nature/purpose
A mode of discovery A means of compelling production of evidence
To whom directed
Limited to all parties (ROC, Rule 27, Sec. 1) May be directed to any person, whether a party or not
As to necessity of motion and notice to adverse party
The order for production, etc. is issued upon mo- May be issued ex parte
tion with notice to the adverse parry
As to scope
The scope is broader as it may involve entry upon Since land is incapable of manual delivery, it cannot be
designated land or other property for the purpose of subject to subpoena duces tecum
inspecting, measuring, surveying or photographing
the properry (ROC, Rule 27, Sec. 1)
Physical and Mental Examination of Persons (Rule 28)
What is required before an order for the physical and mental examination of a witness may issue under
Rule 28? (MeMoGoN-TiP)
The following are the requisites to obtain an order for examination:
1. The M.£ntal or physical condition of a party is in controversy in the action;
2. A .M.2tion showing Q..oodcause must be filed for the physical and mental examination;
3. ~otice must be given to the party to be examined and to all other parties; and
4. The motion shall specify the llme, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
£erson or persons by whom it is made (ROC, Rule 28, Secs.1 and 2).
What are the consequences where the party examined refuses to deliver a report upon request?
If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and notice may make an order requiring
delivery on such terms as are just, and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report, the coun may exclude his
or her testimony if offered at trial (ROC, Rule 28, Sec.3).
Refusal to Comply with Modes of Discovery (Rule 29)
What is the effect of refusal to answer any question upon oral examination or any written interrogatory?
1. The examination may be completed on other matters or adjourned as the proponent of the question may
prefer;
2. The proponent may thereafter apply to the proper court of the place where the deposition is being taken, for
an order to compel an answer.
3. If the application is granted and refusal to answer is without substantial justification, the court shall require the
refusing party or deponent to answer and the court may require the refusing party or deponent or the counsel
advising the refusal, or both of them, to pay the proponent the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including attorney's fees;
4. If the application is denied and filed without substantial justification, court may require the proponent, or
his counsel advising the filing of the application, or both of them, to pay the refusing party the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the application, including attorney's fees (ROC, Rule 2!),Sec.1).
Note: Expenses and attorney's fees are not to be imposed upon the Republic of the Philippines (ROC, Rule 2!),
Sec.6).
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Ernie filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of his father, Ernesto. Upon
receipt of the notice of hearing, Ernesto filed an opposition to the petition. Ernie, before the hearing
of the petition, filed a motion to order Ernesto to submit himself for mental and physical examination
which the court granted. If Ernesto defies the court’s order directing him to submit to physical and
mental examinations, can the court order his arrest? (2015 Bar)
No, if any of the party refuses to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court cannot direct the arrest of
such party for disobeying the order (ROC, Rule 29, Sec. 3 (d)).
Trial (Rule 30)
May the parties stipulate upon facts to avoid trial?

Yes. The parties to any action may agree in writing, upon the facts involved in the litigation, and submit the case for
judgment on the facts agreed upon, without the introduction of evidence. No trial shall thus be held. If the parties
agree to only some facts in issue, trial shall be held as to the disputed facts in such order as the court shall prescribe
Consolidation or Severance Rule 31
When may a court order for the consolidation of action?

When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay (ROC, Rule 31, Sec. 1).
What is quasi consolidation?

Where all, except one of several of actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in one trial is
conclusive as to the others (Neri v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 202243, August 7, 2013).
When may a court order for the separation of trial?

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-
claim, counter-claim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, crossclaims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues (ROC, Rule 31, Sec. 2).
Demurrer to Evidence (Rule 33)
What is demurrer to evidence?

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy available to
the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true
or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017).
Plaintiff D assails the grant of demurrer to evidence by appeal, alleging that D was sufficiently able to
establish the burden of proof by preponderance of evidence. Is this ground proper in assailing the grant
of demurrer to evidence?
No. In a demurrer to evidence, it is premature to speak of preponderance of evidence because it is filed prior
to the defendant’s presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously
terminate the case without the need of the defendant’s evidence. Preponderance of evidence means evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. What is crucial is the
determination as to whether the plaintiff’s evidence entitles it to the relief sought. (Republic v. De Borja, G.R. No.
187448, January 9, 2017).
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Distinguish demurrer to evidence in a civil case from demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
The following are the distinctions:
Civil Case Criminal Case
I
As to how instituted
By motion of the defendant after the plaintiff has After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
completed the presentation of his evidence (ROC, dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
Rule 33, Sec1). evidence:
1. On its own initiative after giving the prosecution
the opportunity to be heard; or
2. Upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court (ROC, Rule 11!),
Sec.23)
As to necessity of leave of court
The filing of a demurrer to evidence does not need leave The filing of a demurrer to evidence may be filed with
of court or without leaveof court (ROC Rule 113.Sec.23)
As to effect of denial of demurrer
If the demurrer is denied, the defendant will present If demurrer was filed with leave - accused may
his evidence (ROC, Rule 33, Sec.1) present his evidence
If demurrer was filed without leave - accused can
no longer present his evidence and submits the case for
decision based on the prosecution's evidence (ROC,
Rule 11!),Sec.23)
As to remedy against denial of demurrer
The order denying the demurrer to evidence shall The order denying the motion for leaveof court to file
not be subject of an appeal or petition for certiorari, demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
prohibition or mandamus before judgment (ROC, reviewable by appeal or by certioraribefore judgment
Rule 33, Sec.2) (ROC, Rule 11!),Sec.23)
However, by exception, when the denial of the demurrer

is tainted with grave abuse of discretion as when the
demurrer to evidence was denied despite the absence
of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment and despite the absence of factual bases to
expect a guilty verdict. In the absence of the foregoing
circumstances, the proper remedy is to proceed to
presentation of accused's evidence, if the demurrer was
with leave of court, or to later on appeal the judgment
of conviction rendered, if the demurrer was without
leave of coun (Arroyov. People,G.R. No. 220538, April
18, 2017)
As to effect of grant of demurrer
The granting of the demurrer results in the dismissal The granting of the demurrer results in the acquittal of
of the case the accused
As to appeal of grant of demurrer

The grant of the demurrer to evidence may be No appeal is allowed, as a rule, when a demurrer to
appealed and if on appeal the dismissal of the case evidence is granted in a criminal case because the
is reversed by the appellate, the defendant is deemed dismissal is deemed an acquittal (Peoplev. Tan, G.R. No.
to have waived the right to presentation of evidence 167526,July 26, 2010)
(ROC, Rule 33, Sec.1)
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Civil Case Criminal Case

The finality-of-acquittal rule applies. It makes a
judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately
executory upon its promulgation. By exception, the
rule is inapplicable where the court that rendered the
acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion, in which
case, certiorari under Rule 65 is the remedy (People
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021,
Caguioa Case)
Judgments and Final Orders
Judgment on the Pleadings (Rule 34)
When does an answer “fail to tender an issue” or “otherwise admit the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleadings?”
The answer would fail to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out
in Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings not only where it expressly
confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all (Asian Construction & Development
Corp. v. Sannaedle Co., Ltd, G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014).
What are the instances wherein judgment on the pleadings is not allowed?
In actions of declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts allege in the
complaint shall always be proved (ROC, Rule 34, Sec. 1).
Spouses A had 3 children, B, C and D. The spouses owned a parcel of land registered in their name,
which was cancelled and a new title was issued in D’s name. After Spouses A died, B and C brought a case
against D for the annulment of deed in D’s name (First Case). D manifested to the court that he and his
siblings had entered into a compromise agreement. However, no compromise agreement or answer was
filed in court. The First Case was dismissed on manifestation of B and C that a compromise agreement
was entered into between the siblings, where they agreed to share the land among themselves. The land
was never actually partitioned so the title in D’s name remained intact. The Heirs of B brought an action
against the Heirs of D (Second Case). Heirs of B claimed that they acquired B’s share from B, by means
of donation, and that B’s share is proven by the Partition Agreement entered into among B,C and D.
The Deed of Donation and the Partition Agreement were attached to the Complaint. In their Answer,
D’s heirs claim exclusive ownership, since the title of the land was in D’s name only. D’s heirs specifically
denied the due execution and genuineness of the deed of partition and deed of donation. The Heirs of
B moved for judgment on the pleadings because the denial was not made under oath. RTC granted it
finding that the answer did not tender an issue. The RTC also applied res judicata because of the ruling
in the First Case.
1. Was it correct for the RTC to apply the rule on res judicata?
No. There was no judgment on the merits in the first case. No answer was filed and no compromise agreement
was filed in court and neither was it judicially approved No judgment on a compromise was entered. Without
a judgment on the merits in the First Case, it was incorrect to apply the rule of res judicata.
2. Was it correct to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings?
No. The requirement that the actionable documents, in this case, the deed of donation and deed of partition,
be specifically denied under oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to
the instrument. The heirs of D are not the parties to the Deed of Donation between B and B’s heirs, nor
are they parties to the Deed of Partition among B, C, D. Heirs of B need to introduce evidence to prove the
genuineness of the subject documents, which were denied by Heirs of D. With Heirs of D’s specific denial of
said documents, the answer tendered factual issues (Abad v. Heirs of Gallardo, G.R. No. 229070, November
10, 2020, Caguioa Case).
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Summary Judgments (Rule 35)
When may the court properly render a summary judgment?

Unless the court orders the conduct of a hearing, a summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (ROC,
Rule 35, Sec. 3).
What is the effect if there is only a partial summary judgment?

If on motion under Rule 35, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial
is necessary, the court may, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel,
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and direct such further proceedings in the actions as are just. The facts
so ascertained shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly
C entered into a loan agreement with D. The loan of D was guaranteed by G. When the loan fell due,
D did not pay, despite demand. C filed an action against D for sum of money, praying that the court
also grant interest and damages. In D’s Answer, D admitted its obligation in the loan agreement but
argued that the action cannot proceed, for the court’s lack of jurisdiction, since G was placed under
rehabilitation in a separate case. All claims against G should be brought there. Also, the rehabilitation
court issued a stay order enjoining enforcement of all claims, actions and proceedings against G. C filed
a motion for summary judgement. Should it be granted?
Yes. There was no genuine issue, which calls for the presentation of evidence if the issues raised by a party are a
sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue
for trial. In this collection case, where the obligation and the fact of non-fulfillment of the obligation, as well as
the execution of the debt instrument, are admitted by the debtor, D, by not specifically denying the same, with the
rate of interest and/or amount of damages being the only remaining issue, there is no genuine issue and a summary
judgment may be rendered upon proper motion. D failed to proffer a plausible ground of defense of a substantial
character, considering that in its Answer, the only special and/or affirmative defense raised by D was the argument
on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC in light of the Rehabilitation Court’s Stay Order. G, the guarantor, is
only subsidiarity liable, and will only answer if the debtor cannot fulfill his obligation. There is still the benefit of
excussion in favor of a guarantor. Since expressly admitted its obligations under the Agreement, and that it failed to
offer any substantial defense against the claim of C, the there is no genuine issue as to a material fact extant in the
instant case. (Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R.
No. 233850, [July 1, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Distinguish demurrer to evidence (civil case), judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment.
Demurrer to Evidence Judgment on the Pleadings Summary Judgment
As to kind of motion
Litigious motion
As to how initiated
Upon motion Upon motion or by the court motu proprio, without prejudice to the mo-
tion
As to whom available
Defendant Claimant 1. A claimant or party seeking
to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory
relief; or
2. Defendant or party againsy
whom a claim, counterclaim,
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Demurrer to Evidence I Judgment on the Pleadings I Summary Judgment
or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory relief is sought
In both instances, the motion

should be accompanied by sup-
porting affidavits, depositions or
admissions.
As to ground and when filed
After plaintiff has completed the If it is apparent that the answer fails to A summary judgment may be used
presentation of his evidence, on tender an issue, or otherwise admits to expedite the proceedings and
the ground that upon the facts the material allegations of the adverse to avoid useless delays, when the
and the law, plaintiff has not parry's pleadings pleadings, depositions, affidavits
shown a right to relief or admissions on file show that
there exists no genuine question
or issue of fact in the case, and
It is a motion to dismiss for lack
the moving party is entitled to a
of cause of action judgment as a matter oflaw
1. If by the claimant, filed at

any time after the pleading in
answer to the claim has been
served; or
2. If by the defendant, filed at
any time.
As to remedy
If defendant's motion to dismiss Any action of the court on a motion to Any action of the court on a
or demurrer to evidence is denied, render judgment on the pleadings shall motion to render summary
the defendant shall have the right not be subject of an appeal, petition for judgment shall not be subject of
to present evidence. certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. an appeal, petition for certiorari,
It may be the subject of a motion for prohibition or mandamus. It may
reconsideration. be the subject of a motion for
The order denying demurrer to reconsideration.
evidence shall not be subject of
an appeal, petition for certiorari, The motu proprio order of the court
prohibition or mandamus before as contained in the pre-trial order to The motu proprio order of the
judgment. It may be the subject submit the case for judgment on the court as contained in the pre-
of a motion for reconsideration. pleadings shall not be subject of appeal trial order to submit the case for
or certiorari. It may be the subject of a summary judgment shall not be
motion for reconsideration. subject of appeal or certiorari. It
The defendant may only appeal may be the subject of a motion for
after an adverse judgment is reconsideration.
rendered against him. If judgment on the pleadings is
rendered, remedy is motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal If summary judgment is
If the motion is granted, the
rendered, remedy is motion for
remedy of the plaintiff is to file reconsideration and/or appeal
a motion for reconsideration or
appeal.
If on appeal the order of dismissal

is reversed, the defendant shall be
deemed to have waived the right
to present evidence
(ROC, Rule 15, Sec. 5; Rule 18, Sec. 10; Rules 33, 34, 35}
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Rendition and Entry of Judgments and Final Orders (Rule 36)
What are the requisites for a valid judgment? (AJO-WES)

The following are the requisites for a valid judgment:
1. The court or tribunal must be clothed with Authority to hear and determine the matter before it; (Acosta
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131488, August 3, 1988)
2. The court must have Jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter; (Id.)
3. The parties must have been given an Opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf; (Id.)
4. The Evidence must have been considered by the tribunal in deciding the case; (Id.)
5. The judgment must be in Writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge;(Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004);
6. The judgment must State clearly the facts and the law upon which it is based, signed by the judge and filed
with the clerk of court (South Cotabato Communications Corporation v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 217575, June
15, 2016).
What is a judgment nunc pro tunc?

A judgment nunc pro tunc (literally, “now for then”) is made to enter into the record an act previously done by the
court, which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. It neither operates to correct judicial errors
nor to supply omitted action by the court. Its sole purpose is to make a present record of a judicial action which has
been actually taken (Mercury Drug v. Spouses Huang, G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017).
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
What are the grounds for a motion for new trial?

The following are the grounds:
1. Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
2. Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result (ROC, Rule 37, Sec. 1).
What are the requisites for a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to prosper?
The requisites for the introduction of newly discovered evidence are:
1. The evidence was discovered after trial;
2. Such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
3. It is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
4. The evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. (Mandin-Trotin
v. Bongo, G.R. No. 212840 (August 28, 2019, Caguioa Case)
In a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, movant alleged that “After diligent
search last month, June 2014, I found these two (2) Agreements, each signed by S and A, which were
inserted among the voluminous documents in my own personal files and the files of the Bohol Divers
Resort, and I turned over these Agreements to my legal counsel.” The agreements were executed in the
years 2000 and 2001. The action was commenced in 2014 by the movant. Should the motion for new
trial be granted?
No. The agreements are not newly discovered evidence, having been executed in the years 2000 and 2001, over a
decade before the action was commenced. If the alleged evidence could have very well been presented during the
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same could not be considered newly discovered evidence, as in
this case (Mandin-Trotin v. Bongo, G.R. No. 212840 (August 28, 2019, Caguioa Case)
What are the grounds for a motion for reconsideration?

The grounds are that the damages awarded are excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. (ROC, Rule 37, Sec. 1)
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A motion for reconsideration was timely filed against the judgment of the RTC was filed. It was denied
by the RTC for being pro forma, as it did not raise new issues or arguments. Within 15 days from notice
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, a notice of appeal was filed, which was denied for being
filed out of time because it was ruled that the pro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the
reglementary period to file an appeal. Should the notice of appeal be denied?
No. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the
court does not make a motion pro forma. Otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision but a new trial or some other remedy. Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed,
one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence
and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for
reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. The motion for reconsideration is
not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the court. A movant
may raise the same arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous. Since the motion for
reconsideration is not a pro forma motion, the notice of appeal timely filed should be given due course. (Valencia
(Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Heirs of Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984, April 3, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Give instances when a motion for reconsideration is considered pro forma.

The following are instances where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma: (1) it was a second
motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and
conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the
alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party
was not given notice thereof (Valencia (Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Heirs of
Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984, April 3, 2019, Caguioa Case).
A decision was rendered by the court. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, which
was denied. Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied outright. Was the
denial proper?
Yes. No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order (ROC, Rule 37,
Sec. 5)
What is the remedy when the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied?
An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order (ROC, Rule 37, Sec. 9).
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments (Rule 39)
When may there be execution pending appeal?

Execution pending appeal is the exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be executed and
as such, there must be good reasons that consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution,
lest judgment becomes illusory. The good reason yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency
that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party, such as when there is danger of the judgment becoming
ineffectual or the appeal is for the purpose of delay if coupled with other reasons. (Centennial Guarantee Assurance
Corporation v. Universal Motors Corporation, G. R. No. 189358, October 8, 2014; Scottish Union v. Macadaeg, G.R.
Nos. L-5717 & L- 5751-56, August 20, 1992 Home Insurance Co. v. CA, G.R. No. 47916, April 17, 1990).
A, a resident of Tuguegarao City, secured a favorable judgment in an ejectment case against X, a resident
of Dagupan City, from the MTC of Pangasinan. The judgment, entered on June 15, 2010, had not as
yet been executed. In July 2016, A decided to enforce the judgment of the MTC of Pangasinan. What is
the procedure to be followed by A in enforcing the judgment? With what court should A institute the
proceedings? (1997 Bar)
A can enforce the judgment by another action reviving the judgment because it can no longer be enforced by
motion as the five-year period within which a judgment may be enforced by motion has already expired (ROC,
Rule 39, Sec. 6). A may institute the proceedings in the RTC in accordance with the rules of venue because the
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enforcement of the judgment is a personal action incapable of pecuniary estimation (BP 129, Sec. 19 (1)).
JK’s real property is attached by the sheriff in a civil action for damages filed by A against B. JK claims
that he is not a party to the case; that his property is not involved in said case; and that he is the owner
of said property. What is JK’s remedy?
JK’s remedy is to file a third-party claim by making an affidavit of his title to the property attached, stating the
grounds of his title thereto, and serve such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the attached
property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party (ROC, Rule 57, Sec. 14). JK, as a third-party claimant, may
also intervene or file a separate action to vindicate his claim to the property involved and secure the necessary reliefs,
such as preliminary injunction, which will not be considered as interference with a court of coordinate jurisdiction.
What may be the subject of levy for purposes of execution sale?

Section 9 (b), Rule 39 authorizes a levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution. It presupposes that
the property to be levied belongs to and is owned by the judgment debtor. Only property incontrovertibly or
unquestionably belonging to the judgment obligor may be subject of a levy on execution (Miranda v. Spouses
Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case).
What is the effect of the levy on execution of a property not belonging to the debtor or claimed to be
belonging to a third person?
Under Section 12, Rule 39, the effect of levy on execution as to third persons is to create a lien in favor of the
judgment obligee over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. If the judgment obligor no longer has any right, title or interest in
the property levied upon, then there can be no lien that may be created in favor of the judgment obligee by reason
of the levy. Should a third party appear to claim the property levied upon by the sheriff, such claim should be the
subject of a separate and independent action (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018,
Caguioa Case).
X filed an action against Y for sum of money and won. A writ of execution was issued, upon motion,
after the judgment became final and executory. A notice of levy was issued covering a land registered in
the name of Y. A public auction was held and the property was sold to X, the highest bidder in 2003. A
certificate of sale was issued and annotated to the title. X then inspected the property and discovered
that it was in the possession of M, who claimed to be the owner thereof, after purchasing it from Y
several years ago in 1996. X filed an action for recovery of possession over the property against M, who
filed a third party complaint against Y. In his Answer, Y admitted to the sale but argued Y can no longer
be liable to M since it was M who failed to register the property in his name since 1996. M executed an
affidavit of adverse claim and registered it on the title. RTC ruled in favor of X, ruling M was estopped
for failing to registered the title in his name. The third party complaint was dismissed.
1. Was the RTC correct in ruling in favor of X?
No. M has a better right of possession over the subject property having acquired ownership thereof prior to
the levy on execution that X had caused to be made upon the subject property. A judgment debtor, such as
Y, can only transfer property in which he has interest to the purchaser at a public execution sale. Ownership
had already transferred to M in 1996, before the execution sale, when there was constructive delivery to M
upon execution of the deed of sale between M and Y, although not registered. The non-registration of the
sale does not affect the validity of the sale. Since ownership of the subject property had been transferred to
M in 1996, it ceased to be owned by Y as early as then. The levy made on the subject property could not have
created any lien in favor of X because his judgment debtor, Y, had no more right, title or interest thereto or
therein at the time of the levy. Not being owned by Y, the subject property could not be made answerable
for any judgment rendered against Y. There was nothing that was sold and transferred to X at the time of the
execution (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case; Civil Code,
Art. 1477 and 1497).
2. If the court rules in favor of M, does this establish that M is the true owner of the property?
No. The case only involves accion publiciana, and is limited only to the issue of determining who between the
parties has a better right to possession — and this adjudication is not a final and binding determination of
the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018,
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Caguioa Case; Civil Code).

3. Will your answer be the same if there was a perfected sale between Y and M in in 1996 before the
execution sale in 2003 (with registered levy on execution but there was no actual or constructive
delivery of property to M and no registration thereof as well?
No. Ownership is transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery of the thing. Without actual
or constructive delivery, no ownership is transferred. As between the registered levy on execution and an
unregistered sale (without actual delivery), the execution sale purchaser, X, prevails over the buyer in the prior
unregistered sale, such as M, provided there was no prior transfer of ownership to M (Miranda v. Spouses
Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case; Civil Code, Art. 1477 and 1497).
What are the two aspects of res judicata? Define each.

The two aspects of res judicata are the following:
1. Bar by former judgment- The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the litigation between parties and privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal
2. Conclusiveness of judgment – Any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree
is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims, demands, purposes, or subject matters of
the two suits are the same (Noceda v. Arbizo-Directo, G.R. No. 178495, July 26, 2010).
What are the effects of foreign judgments?

Foreign judgments or final orders of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to render the judgments or
final orders shall have the following effects:
1. In case of judgment or final order upon a specific thing, it shall be conclusive upon the title to thing; and
2. In case of judgment or final order against a person, it is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by subsequent title (ROC, Rule 39, Sec. 48).
What is the law of the case?

The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. It precludes departure from a rule previously made
by an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same case (Philippine Ports Authority
v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc., G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017, Caguioa Case)
Provisional Remedies
Nature, Purpose, and Jurisdiction Over Provisional Remedies
When does a court have jurisdiction to issue provisional remedies?

A provisional remedy can be issued by a court, having jurisdiction over a main case, in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction to resolve an incident in that case (Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120640, August 8, 1996).
Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57)
M filed an action for Sum of Money with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment against MS
before the RTC. M entered into a contract with MS for the supply and financing of the latter’s housing
project. MS issued checks to M with the with agreed interests of 5% per month. MS defaulted on its
obligation to pay M. M filed an action for Sum of Money with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment over the piece of land registered under the name of MS before the RTC. The subject
properties were attached. Later, Y, the real owner, became aware of the case and later filed a Motion
for Leave to Intervene, claiming that Y has legal interest in the properties subject of the preliminary
attachment. Y alleged that though the land was registered in the name of MS, Y was the real owner
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as Y only transferred titles to MS to facilitate MS’ loan and the Deed of Sale Y executed in MS’ favor
was void for lack of consideration. Y also alleged that he has a pending case against MS to recover the
subject property. RTC rendered its decision granting the complaint, which eventually became final and
executory. The motion for leave to intervene was denied because Y was not the registered owner of the
property, and his rights may be protected in a separate proceeding. Y then assailed the order denying the
motion for leave to intervene. Should the intervention be granted?
No. First, the RTC decision is already final and executory. The case where Y seeks to intervene in has already ceased.
Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Second, the case is centered on the recovery of sum of money pursued by M against MS, T, and L on the basis of
the latter’s obligation to pay. Y has no participation whatsoever in the transaction entered into by MS with M. The
case does not concern itself with the question of ownership over the subject properties
Third, intervention is not even absolutely necessary and indispensable for Y to question the inclusion of the subject
properties in the coverage of the writ of preliminary attachment. Under Sec. 14, Rule 57, if the property attached is
claimed by any third person, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right of possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession
of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the
property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond
approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied
upon. No such affidavit was made by Y.
Fourth, a writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an
action is pending; it is an ancillary remedy. Attachment is only adjunct to the main suit. Therefore, it can have
no independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. An attachment or
garnishment is generally ancillary to, and dependent on, a principal proceeding, either at law or in equity, which
has for its purpose a determination of the justice of a creditor’s demand. Any relief against such attachment could
be disposed of only in that case. Hence, with the cessation of the recovery of sum of money case, with the RTC’s
Decision having attained the status of finality, the attachment sought to be questioned by Y has legally ceased to
exist.
Finally, Y acknowledged he is already pursing another remedy to recover the subject properties in another pending
case. It cannot be said that there is no remedy available on the part of Y (Yu v. Miranda, G.R. No. 225752, March
Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)
May the court’s determination of whether or not to grant injunctive writ be subject of review?
As a rule, no. The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance
of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the
conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered
with, except upon a finding of grave abuse of discretion. (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents’ Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, Caguioa Case)
A filed a complaint praying that A be granted easement of right of way over B’s property, so that A may
pass through it to be able to construct the building on A’s property, with prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction so A may be granted temporary easement. B sought issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain such construction pending determination of the case, which
was denied, there being no clear legal right to the injunctive writ. With the denial of B’s application for
writ of preliminary injunction, without presentation of evidence, the trial court granted A’s application
for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and granted temporary easement in favor of A. Was this
proper?
No. The denial of the application for writ of preliminary injunction against the construction of the building does
not translate to entitlement to a temporary easement before the resolution of the complaint for declaration of
easement of right of way. In granting A’s application for preliminary mandatory injunction, the RTC prematurely
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decided disputed facts and disposed of the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-blown trial wherein
testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and exhaustively presented, heard and refuted by the
parties. The temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code, similar to the permanent
easement of right of way pursuant to Articles 649 and 650, can only be granted after proof of compliance with
the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly adduced during a full-blown trial (AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack
Residents’ Association, Inc., G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017, Caguioa Case).
May a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction be issued against the extrajudicial or judicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage?
Yes, provided that there is compliance with the requirements under Section 3 of Rule 58 and additionally, with the
following rules in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended:
1. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the
allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application
is verified and supported by evidence of payment;
2. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation
that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least the legal rate of
interest percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure
sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending (12% before effectivity of Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013 on 1 July 2013, 6% after the effectivity);
3. Where a WPI has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily
resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and above;
and
4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a TRO or WPI, such as the posting of a
bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity,
shall apply as well to a status quo order. (Spouses Tumon v. Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 243999,
March 18, 2021, Caguioa Case)
Receivership (Rule 59)
In what cases may a receiver be appointed?

Upon a verified application, one or more receivers of the property subject of the action or proceeding may be
appointed by the court where the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court, or a
member thereof, in the following cases:
1. When it appears from the verified application, and such other proof as the court may require, that the party
applying for the appointment of a receiver has an interest in the property or fund which is the subject of
the action or proceeding, and that such property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially
injured unless a receiver be appointed to administer and preserve it;
2. When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a mortgage that the property is in
danger of being wasted or dissipated or materially injured, and that its value is probably insufficient to
discharge the mortgage debt, or that the parties have so stipulated in the contract of mortgage;
3. After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of an appeal, or to dispose of it according
to the judgment, or to aid execution when the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment
obligor refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to carry the judgment
into effect;
4. Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is the most convenient and feasible
means of preserving, administering, or disposing of the property in litigation. (ROC, Rule 59, Sec. 1).
DEF was appointed as a receiver of a land by the court. He subsequently entered into agreement with
a third-party involving the subject property. This agreement caused the postponement of the sale at a
public auction of the land. Do DEF’s acts bind the court in charge of the receivership?
No, a receiver is not an agent or representative of any party to the action.. He is an officer of the court exercising
his functions in the interest of neither the plaintiff nor defendant, but for the common benefit of all the parties in
interest. He performs his duties subject to the control of the Court. DEF as a receiver, has no right or power to make
any contract binding the property or fund in his custody or to pay out funds in his hands without the authority or
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approval of the court. In this case, DEF did not secure the court's approval for the agreement he entered into. As
such, such agreement is not binding to the court {PacificMerchandising Corporationv. ConsolacionInsuranceand
Surety, G.R. No. L-30204, October2!),1376).
REPLEVIN (RULE 60)
Does one need to be the holder of the legal title to the subject property before he can apply for replevin?
No, one does not necessarily need to be such holder. It is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant
who seeks the immediate possession of the property need not be the holder of the legal tide to the property. It is
sufficient that, at the time he applied for a writ of replevin, he is found to be entitled to a possession thereof (Alim
v. CA, G.R. No. 33213,August .9,l!J!Jl).
How may the defendant recover property seized by way of replevin?

To recover possession of the personal property, which was taken under a writ of replevin, the defendant must:
Post a redelivery bond (double the value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit); and
Serve a copy of such bond on the applicant. Both requirements are mandatory {Tung v. Valdez,G.R. No. 73317,
ROC, Rule 60, Sec.5).
August 31, 1!)8!)-,
Special Civil Actions
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
I Jurisdiction I Venue
Interpleader 1. MTC 1. If the subject matter is a Real Property

(Rule 62) - venue lies where the property is
a. If the value of the personal located or any portion thereofis situated
property does not exceed (ROC, Rule 4, Sec.1).
Php300,000 outside MM, or
Php400,000 within MM; or 2. If the subject matter is a Personal
Property - venue may be, at the
b. If the assessed value of the
election of the plaintiff:
real property does not exceed
a. Where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides;
PhpS0,000 within MM {BP 12.9,
b. Where the defendant or any of the
as amended, Sec.33).
principal defendants resides; or
2. RTC c. In the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found
a. If the value is beyond that (ROC, Rule 4, Sec.2).
prescribed for MTC's jurisdiction,
for personal or real property; or
b. If the subject matter is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation
{BP 12.9,as amended, Sec.l!J).
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Declaratory Relief RTC - Incapable of pecuniary estimation 1. Declaratory Relief and Reformation
(Rule 63) (BP 123, as amended, Sec.lJ). of Instrument • venue may be, at the
Reformation of RTC - Incapable of pecuniary estimation a. Where the plaintiff or any of the
Instrument (BP 123, as amended, Sec.lJ). principal plaintiffs resides;
Action to Quiet title 1. MTC - If the assessedvalue of the real
to Real property properry does not exceed Php20,000
c. In case of a non-resident defendant
or remove clouds outside MM, or PhpS0,000 within
where he may be found (ROC, Rule
therefrom MM (BP 123, as amended, Sec.33).
4, Sec.2).
2. Action to Quiet Title to Real
2. RTC
Property or Remove Clouds
a. If the value is beyond that
Therefrom • venue lies where the
prescribed for MTC's jurisdiction,
property or any portion thereof is
for personal or real properry; or
situated (ROC, Rule 4, Sec.1).
b. If the subject matter is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation
(BP 123, as amended, Sec.lJ).
Consolidation of 1. MTC - If the assessedvalue of the real
ownership under properry does not exceed Php20,000
Article 1607 of the outside Metro Manila, or PhpS0,000
Civil Code within Metro Manila (BP 123, as
amended, Sec.33).
2. RTC- If the value is beyond that
prescribed for MTC's jurisdiction, for
personal or real property (BP 123, as
amended, Sec.lJ).
Review of Supreme Court Where the Supreme Court sits
Judgements and
Final Orders or
Resolutions of the
COMELEC and the
COA (Rule 64)
Certiorari, Prohibi- SC, CA, Sandiganbayan, or RTC - 1. As to SC, CA, Sandiganbayan -
tion, Mandamus depending on the appropriate court hav• where the court sits
(Rule 65) ing jurisdiction over the lower court, tri•
bunal, board, or officer. 2. As to RTC - court exercising jurisdic-
tion over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court (ROC, Rule 65,
Sec.4).
These petitions, when relating to election
cases from the RTC or MTC, shall be
filed with the COMELEC, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 65, Sec.
4).
Quo Warranto 1. If commenced by the Solicitor General 1. SC, CA where the court sits
(Rule 66) · SC, CA or RTC of Manila
2. RTC exercising jurisdiction over the
2. If commenced by a person other than territorial area where the respondent or
the Solicitor General • SC, CA or any of the respondent resides
RTC exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area where the respondent 3. RTC in the City of Manila, CA, SC -
or any of the respondents resides. when the Solicitor General commences
the action (ROC, Rule 66, Sec.7)
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Expropriation RTC - because expropriation is incapable 1. If the subject matter is a Real Property
(Rule 67) of pecuniary estimation (if action Starrs - venue lies where the property is
with the first stage of expropriation, i.e., located or any portion thereof is
determination of whether expropriation situated(ROc; Rule 4, Sec.I}.
is proper) (Bardillon v. Masili, G.R. No.
146886,April 30, 2003). 2. If the subject matter is a Personal
If inverse condemnation involving a. Where the plaintiff or any of the
real property {action starts in the second principal plaintiffs resides;
stage of expropriation, i.e., determination
of just compensation): b. Where the defendant or any of the
1. MTC - If the assessedvalue of the real
property does not exceed Php20,000 c. In the case of a non-resident
outside MM, or PhpS0,000 within defendant where he may be found
MM (BP 12!), as amended, Sec. (ROG; Rule 4, Sec.2).
33(1)€1(3)},
2. RTC - If the value is beyond that
prescribed for MTC's jurisdiction, for
real actions.
Foredosure of Real 1. MTC - If the assessedvalue of the real Where the property is located or any
Estate Mortgage property does not exceed Php20,000 portion thereof is situated (ROG; Rule 4,
outside MM, or PhpS0,000 within Sec.1).
(Rule 68) MM (BP 12!),as amended, Sec.33).
2. RTC - If the value is beyond that pre-

scribed for MTC's jurisdiction, for
personal or real property.
Partition 1. MTC 1. If the subject matter is a Real Property

- venue lies where the property is
(Rule 69) a. If the value of the personal located or any portion thereof is
property does not exceed situated(ROc; Rule 4, Sec.I}.
Php400,000 within MM; or 2. If the subject matter is a Personal
b. If the assessed value of the election of the plaintiff:
real property does not exceed
Php20,000 outside MM, or a. Where the plaintiff or any of the
PhpS0,000 within MM (BP 12!), principal plaintiffs resides;
as amended, Sec.33(1)€1(3)).
2. RTC - If the value is beyond that pre- principal defendants resides; or
scribed for MTC's jurisdiction, for
personal or real property. c. In the case of a non-resident defen-
dant where he may be found (ROG;
Rule 4, Sec.2).
Forcible Entry and MTC (BP 12!),as amended, Sec.33(2)) In the municipality or city wherein the real
Unlawful Detainer property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated (ROG; Rule 4, Sec.4).
(Rule 70)
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Jurisdiction Venue
I I
Indirect Contempt All Courts (MTC, RTC, CA and SC) If committed against MTC, venue is:
(Rule 71) 1. RTC of the place in which the low-
er court is sitting; or
2. In the MTC where such indirect
contempt was committed (ROC,
Rule 71, Sec. 5).
If committed against RTC or a court of

equivalent or higher rank, or against an of-
ficer appointed by it, venue is where such
court sits (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 5).
If committed against persons, entities,
bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial
power and its rules grant it authority to
punish for contempt - before such qua-
si-judicial agency itself where the contempt
was committed
If committed against persons, entities,

bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial
power and its rules do not grant it author-
ity to punish for contempt - RTC of the
place where the contempt has been com-
mitted (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 12)
Direct Contempt All courts (MTC, RTC, CA, and SC) The court where such direct contempt was
committed (ROC, Rule 71, Sec.1)
(Rule 71)
INTERPLEADER (RULE 62)
Define interpleader.
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he
may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims
among themselves (ROC, Rule 62, Sec.1).
DPWH expropriated land. A portion thereof is claimed by several parties A, B, C and D. All of them
claimed for just compensation. The Republic of the Philippines filed an interpleader against them to
settle the payment of just compensation. A presented to the court a compromise agreement for the
allocation of just compensation among the defendants, but it was only A and B who agreed on this
allocation. RTC rendered partial judgment on compromise and ordered partial execution of judgment.
CA affirmed the RTC's orders. Was the CA correct in affirming the RTC?
No. The allocation of the remaining balance was determined without the participation of all other claimants
who likewise stand as parties to the lnterpleader. The immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving
the Compromise Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without
affording the other claimants (C and D) of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to compensation
beyond the amounts unilaterally set by A and B. This defeats the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader
had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also
between said claimants and the Republic. By affirming the RTC Orders, the CA erroneously exposed the Republic
to the very risk against which it sought protection through its Interpleader. The RTC Orders were declared void,
and the case was ordered remanded to the RTC for proper disposition and determination of the issue raised in the
Complaint-in-Interpleader filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republicv. Heirs of Cruz, G.R. No. 208356,
October17, 2018, Caguioa Case).
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Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63)
When will there be a conversion of a petition for declaratory relief to an ordinary action?
If before the final termination of the case, a breach or violation of the instrument or statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation occurs, then the action for declaratory relief may be
converted into an ordinary action, and the parties shall be allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper (ROC, Rule 63, Sec. 6).
A breach occurred before the filing of a petition for declaratory relief. Once the petition is filed, will it
be converted to an ordinary action?
No. The conversion only happens if the petition was filed before any breach and the breach occurs after the
filing of the petition. If the breach occurred before the filing of the petition, it shall be dismissed as the action is
not properly one for declaratory relief. A court can no longer assume jurisdiction over an action for declaratory
relief if its subject, i.e., the deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance or any other governmental regulation, had already been infringed or transgressed before the institution
of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action already accrued in favor of one or the
other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. The proper
remedy is to bring the appropriate ordinary action instead (Tambunting, et al., v. Spouses Sumabat, et al., G.R. No.
144101, September 16, 2005; ROC, Rule 63, Sec. 5).
A filed a complaint against B before the Ombudsman for violation of the GSIS Act. The Ombudsman
issued an order of preventive suspension against B to last until the administrative adjudication is
completed but not to exceed 6 months. The propriety of the order of suspension was assailed by B before
the CA but the CA affirmed the preventive suspension. B filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for TRO, praying that the RTC make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and
obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of the
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. Should the petition prosper?
No. Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are not included
within the purview of the words “other written instrument” in Rule 63. The same principle applies to orders,
resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata. A judgment
rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The
losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory relief. The
petition puts into question the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension, a matter beyond the ambit of the
RTC’s jurisdiction (Erice v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Prohibition, Certiorari, and Mandamus
A criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed before the
MTCC. The driver was convicted and damages were awarded in favor of the private complainant. The
judgment was not appealed and became final and executory. The prosecution filed a motion for execution
against the driver, which was granted. The writ was returned unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no
properties that can be levied to satisfy the money judgment. Hence, upon motion, the MTCC issued a
writ of execution against the employer ACF of accused. The employer ACF filed a motion to recall the
writ of execution, assailing the alleged erroneous award of damages. The court denied the motion and
held in abeyance the implementation of writ pending the hearing for the determination of subsidiary
liability of the employer ACF. The employer assailed such order by certiorari, claiming that there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC for ordering the execution upon ACF for subsidiary
liability based on a judgment that is supposedly void as there was an alleged erroneous awarding of civil
indemnity. Will the petition prosper?
No. First, the factual premise of the allegation of grave abuse of discretion is wrong because the MTCC did not
order execution upon ACF but rather the court held in abeyance the implementation of the writ of execution
pending determination of the existence of the requisites for subsidiary liability to attach. Second, certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when
the error was committed. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
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case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. The primary argument of ACF is centered
on the supposed erroneous award of damages against the ACF’s employee, made by the MTCC in its Judgment
convicting the latter. Such supposed errors merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus
putting them beyond the ambit of certiorari. ACF’s act of assailing the award of damages made by the MTCC
in its Judgment is tantamount to an attack against a final and executory judgment, being a clear violation of the
doctrine of immutability of judgment (Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang, G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
X filed a complaint for sum of money. The RTC issued an order directing X to pay additional docket
fees within 15 days. X complied but before X could file its compliance, the RTC dismissed the case for
failure to file docket fees. X filed a motion for reconsideration against the dismissal, which was denied.
X timely filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal on the ground that
said appeal is not the proper remedy. X then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA,
which was denied, for failure to file first a motion for reconsideration against the RTC order denying to
give due course to the notice of appeal. X filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. X filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC, to assail the CA decision.
1. Was the petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC the proper remedy against the CA
decision?
No, the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45, which provides that decisions, final orders, or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing
a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Rule
65, an independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided, cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. When a party adopts an improper
remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 218901, February 15, 2017, Caguioa Case).
2. May the SC give due course to the petition for certiorari and mandamus although it is a wrong
mode of appeal?
Yes, the SC, under exceptional circumstances, when stringent application of the rules will result in manifest
injustice, may set aside technicalities and proceed with the appeal. For persuasive reasons the rules may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure, such as when what is at stake is an appellant’s statutory right to appeal (Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, Caguioa Case).
X lost before the NLRC in a labor case. After his motion for reconsideration was denied, X filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA, which affirmed the decision of the NLRC. X then elevated the
CA decision to the SC under Rule 45. X claims the SC, in this case, may review questions of facts. Is X
correct?
No, only questions of law may be raised against the CA decision and the CA decision will be examined only using
the prism of whether it correctly determined the existence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC, and not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. The CA,
in the Rule 65 petition, did not have to assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence on which the NLRC based
its decision. The CA only had to determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure that factual findings of the NLRC if
the same are not supported by substantial evidence (San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union v. Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017, Caguioa Case).
X, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose fundamental beliefs include the strict
observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day, was enrolled in Mindanao State University, College of
Medicine. To avoid potential conflict, X wrote a letter to respondent, the College’s Dean, requesting
that he be excused from attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled
to a Saturday. At the same time, X expressed his willingness to make up for any missed activity or session
due to his absence. Later on, exams and classes were rescheduled on Saturdays, causing X to miss the same
and to fail.
X thus brought the matter before CHED, who directed the College to comply with 2010 CHED
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Memorandum. In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption
of teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due to compliance
with religious obligations. The said memorandum addressed to Higher Education Institutions (HEis)
also provides that it is for their strict compliance. The college still did not heed the CHED directive. May
X file a petition for mandamus to compel the College to comply with said Memorandum?
Yes,the CHED memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEis. It provides that a
student's religious obligations takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. The CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEis
to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their
religious obligations. Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within the bounds of school rules
and regulations," the same relates only to the requirement of remedial work, which, based on the language used, is
merely optional on the part of the HEI. Neither can such phrase be said to have conferred discretion as the use of
the words "shall be enjoined" and "strict compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI to excuse
its students upon submission of the certification prescribed in the same memorandum (Va/moresv.Achacoso,G.R.
No. 217453,july 13, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Quo JVARRANTO (RULE 66)
Distinguish impeachment from quo warranto.

The distinctions are the following:
Impeachment Quo 1f7.1rmn to
I
As to Nature
Political in nature Judicial, a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts
As to Scope
A political proceeding undenaken by the legislature to It involves a judicial determination of the eligibility
determine whether the public officer committed any of or validity of the election or appointment of a public
the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of official based on predetermined rules.
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corrup•
tion, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
As to Cause of Action
The commission of an impeachable offense The usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or

exercising of a public office
As to Crux of Controversy
Impeachment is for the respondent's prosecution for The determination of whether or not the respondent
cenain impeachable offenses. It presupposes that the legally holds the subject position to be considered as an
respondent legally holds the public office and thus, is impeachable officer in the first place
an impeachable officer.
As to Relief Sought
A conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses The respondent shall be adjudged to ceasefrom holding
shall result in the removal of the respondent from the a public office, which he is ineligible to hold.
public office that he is legally holding.
(Republicv. Sereno,G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
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Distinguish quo warranto under the Rules of Court from quo warranto under the Omnibus Election
Code.
Quo 1lfonmto under ROC Quo 117.irmnto under OEC
I
As to Governing Law
Governed by the Rules of Court (ROC, Rule 66). Governed by the Omnibus Election Code and related
rules (BP 881, Sec.253).
As to Issues
The issue is the legality or illegality of appointment (Re- The issue is the eligibility or disloyalty to the Republic
publicv. Sereno,G.R. No. 237428,june 1!),2018). of the respondent (BP 881, Sec.253).
As to Prescriptive Period
Action must be commenced within one (1) year from Petition must be filed within 10 days from the
the petitioner's ouster from office or from the time the proclamation of the results of the election (BP 881, Sec.
right of petitioner to hold office arose if it is institut- 253).
ed by a private individual claiming a right to the office
(R OC,Rule 66, Sec.11).
As to Applicability
Subject of the petition is in relation to an appointive Subject of the petition is in relation to an elective office
office (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,June 1!), (BP881}.
2018).
As to Effects
The Court will oust the person illegally appointed and The occupant who was declared ineligible will be
will order the seating of the person who was legally unseated and the petitioner may be declared the rightful
appointed and entitled to the office (Republicv. Sereno, occupant of the office if the respondent is disqualified
G.R. No. 237428,june 1!),2018). and the petitioner received the second highest number
of votes (Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No 1!)564!),
April 16, 2013).
As to Who may File
The petitioner must be the person claiming to be enti- Any voter even if he is not entitled to office (BP 881,
tied to the office and would assume it if action succeeds Sec.253).
(R OC,Rule 66, Sec.5).
As to Where Filed
SC, CA, or RTC, concurrent original jurisdiction 1. COMELEC - to contest the election of those
(R OC,Rule 66, Sec.7) who ran for Congress, regional, provincial or city
officer;
2. RTC - municipal officer; or
3. MTC - barangay officer (BP 881, Sec.253; 2010
Rules ofProcedurefar Municipal ElectionContests,
Rule 2, Sec.5; COMELEC RulesofProcedure,Rule
21, Sec.1;A ..M No. 07-4-15-SC,Rule 2, Sec.6).
Note: Once the there is an oath and assumption of

office by a member of Congress after proclamation, the
HRET/ SET will have jurisdiction over the petition
for quo warranto (CONST., Sec. 17, Art IV; Rivera v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 210273 & 21306!),April 1!),
2016; Velascov.Belmonte,jr., G.R. No. 211140,january
12, 2016)
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A petition for quo warranto under the OEC was filed on the ground of ineligibility. Who has the
burden of proving ineligibility?
The burden to prove the ineligibility of a duly elected public official is upon the person asserting such ineligibility.
A petitioner in a quo warranto case must first prove the very fact of disqualification of the candidate by substantial
evidence. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the burden of evidence shifts to the candidate who should
now defend himself or herself with countervailing evidence. A taint of doubt is not enough to discharge the
burden. (Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, June 28, 1996)
X, having granted with a legislative franchise, is alleged to have violated the same. What is the remedy?
Quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 may be availed of to determine whether a franchisee is in breach of
the legislative franchise specifically enacted for it by the Congress, as would warrant the cancellation of the said
franchise or the prevention of its exercise (Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. No.
162272, 7 April 2009).
X wants to oust Y, who was elected president of Z Corp., on the ground that Y usurped such office. Will
Quo Warranto under Rule 66 govern the proceedings?
No. Actions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation are
governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under RA 8799 and not
by Rule 66 (A.M. No. 01-2-04, 13 March 2001;Calleja, et al., v. Panday, G.R. No. 168696, 28 February 2006).
Expropriation
Rule 67
Define the power of eminent domain.

Eminent domain is the inherent power of a nation or a sovereign state to take, or sanction the taking of, private
property for a public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation. In other
words, eminent domain is a coercive measure on the part of the state whereby private interests are impaired for the
general welfare (Republic v. Gamir-Consuelo, G.R. No. 218732, November 12, 2018).
What are the requisites for the valid exercise of the right? (PNP-CD)
1. The property taken must be a Private property;
2. There must be genuine Necessity to take the private property;
3. The taking must be for Public use;
4. There must be payment of just Compensation; and
5. The taking must comply with Due process of law (Manapat v. CA, G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007).
Define Inverse Condemnation.

Inverse condemnation is when the government takes property for public purpose without payment of just
compensation or instituting expropriation proceedings, which constrains the landowner to bring an action for
the payment of just compensation. In this case the valuation of just compensation must reckoned from the time
of taking or filing of the complaint, whichever comes first (National Transmission Corp. v. Oroville Development
Corp., G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the DPWH, filed with the RTC a complaint for the
expropriation of the parcel of land owned by X. After deposit equivalent of the assessed value of the
property was made, the DPWH filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. X filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there are other properties which would better serve the
purpose. Will X’s motion to dismiss prosper? Explain. (2009 Bar).
No, the motion to dismiss is not permitted. The “motion to dismiss” contemplated in Section 3, Rule 67 of the
ROC clearly constitutes a responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation.
Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendant’s property for
the use specified in the complaint (Lourdes Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006).
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The expropriating authority, a public utility corporation endowed with the power of eminent domain,
took the property of the landowner for public use without any negotiated sale and without instituting
an expropriation case for such taking. This constrained the landowner to file an ejectment suit against
the expropriating authority, although the works on the property were already done.
1. Should the ejectment suit prosper?
No, the ejectment case would not prosper because of: (1) equitable estoppel since the landowner was estopped
from questioning the propriety of expropriation, not having filed the case earlier, before the works on its
property were done; (2) public policy and public necessity, since the service being rendered by the public
utility on the subject property should not be interfered with (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, 3 April 2019, Caguioa Case).
2. What should the trial court do?
The trial court may: (1) dismiss the case without prejudice to the landowner filing the proper action for recovery
of just compensation and consequential damages; (2) dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation
to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and
determine the just compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67, if the ejectment court has
jurisdiction over the value of the subject land (National Transmission Corporation v. Bermuda Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, 3 April 2019, Caguioa Case)
A complaint for expropriation was filed. After proceedings, the RTC issued an order of expropriation.
Should the order be assailed by petition for certiorari?
No. The remedy is appeal, and not to file a certiorari. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Will the appeal of the order of expropriation suspend the expropriation proceedings?
No. Such appeal shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid (PNOC Alternative
Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, Caguioa Case)
What is the effect if the order of expropriation is not appealed?

If no appeal is taken, the order becomes final, the authority to expropriate and the public use of the property can
no longer be questioned. (PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.
224936, September 4, 2019, Caguioa Case)
The RTC issued an order of expropriation. The landowner wants to question the order on the ground
that the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines had no authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain and therefore the expropriation is invalid. What is the proper remedy?
The proper remedy is to appeal the ruling by Rule 45 to the Supreme Court, since the argument that the
expropriation of the subject property by NGCP is invalid because such exercise of eminent domain was neither
done directly by Congress nor pursuant to a specific grant of authority. This is legal in nature. The SC will be able
to decide on the validity of the Order of Expropriation by merely looking at the applicable law and jurisprudence
on eminent domain, as well as the law granting respondent NGCP the right of eminent domain, i.e., RA 9511
(PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4,
2019, J. Caguioa Case).
When may consequential damages be awarded to the landowner in expropriation?

Consequential damages may be awarded to the owner if, as a result of the expropriation, the remaining portion
not so expropriated suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. If the entire property is taken, and there is no
remaining portion, consequential damages is not proper (Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, G.R. No. 205473, December
Is the fact that there is a remaining portion of property not expropriated sufficient, by itself, to award
consequential damages?
No. It must still be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining portion suffers from an impairment or decrease
in value (Republic v. San Miguel Vda. De Ramos, G.R. No. 211576, February 19, 2020, Caguioa Case).
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May the value of Capital Gains Tax be awarded to the landowner in expropriation proceedings, in the
form of consequential damages?
No. Transfer of property through expropriation is a sale or exchange and the profit from the transaction constitutes
capital gain. Sine CGT is a tax on passive income, it is the seller who is liable to shoulder the tax. Consequential
damages may be awarded to the owner if, as a result of the expropriation, the remaining portion not so expropriated
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. However, courts are not precluded from considering the value
of CGT and other transfer taxes in determining the amount of just Compensation. Since just compensation
requires that real, substantial, full and ample equivalent be given for the property taken, the loss incurred by the
affected owner necessarily includes all incidental costs to facilitate the transfer of the expropriated property to the
expropriating authority, including the CGT, other taxes and fees due on the forced sale. These costs must be taken
into consideration in determining just compensation in the same way these costs are factored into the selling price
of real property in an arm’s length transaction (Republic v. Spouses Bunsay, G.R. No. 205473, December 10, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings of National Government Infrastructure Project

(Sec. 4, RA 8974)
Note: The 2022 Bar Syllabus provides Infrastructure Projects under RA 8974 but “The Right-of-Way Act” or
RA 10752, dated March 7, 2016, already repealed RA 8974. Sec. 16 of RA 10752 provides that RA 8974 is hereby
repealed and all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the Act are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly (Sec. 16, RA 10752).
RA 8974 (now RA 10752) provides for standard of assessment of value of land. Does it mean that just
compensation in expropriation for national infrastructure projects ceased to be a judicial determination?
No, determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The Standard for Assessment of Value of Land under
RA 8974 is merely a standard which the court may consider to facilitate the determination of just compensation. It
is still the court that renders judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such an amount.
In the absence of a finding of abuse, arbitrariness, or serious error, the exercise of such discretion may not be
interfered with (Republic v. Decena, G.R. No. 212786, July 30, 2018).
The DPWH filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation over a parcel of land to be used as an
extension of a national highway. Attached to the complaint is a bank certificate showing that there is,
on deposit with the Land Bank of the Philippines, an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. Then DPWH filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. As a judge, will you grant
the writ of possession prayed by the DPWH? (2009 Bar)
No, RA 10752 requires that the implementing agency shall immediately deposit to the court in favor of the owner
the amount equivalent to the sum of: (1) 100% of the value of the land based on the current relevant zonal valuation
of the BIR issued not more than three years prior to the filing of the expropriation complaint; (2) the replacement
cost at current market value of the improvement and structures; and (3) the current market value of crops and
trees located within the property as determined by a government financial institution or an independent property
appraiser, before the government can take possession of the property under expropriation (RA 10752, Sec. 6 (a)).
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
Judicial Foreclosure (Rule 68)
When will the real estate mortgage be judicially foreclosed?

When the defendant fails to pay the amount of the judgment in the first stage in the judicial foreclosure proceedings
within the period specified therein (equity of redemption period), the court, upon motion, shall order the property
to be sold in the manner and under the provisions of Rule 39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate
under execution (ROC, Rule 68, Sec. 3).
What is the equity of redemption period?

It is the period to make payment of the amount due, as adjudicated by the court in its judgment in the first stage,
which is within a period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from entry of such judgment. Such
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payment, if made, prevents the judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. (HuertaAlba Resort,Inc. v. Courtof
Appeals,G.R. No. 128567, 1 September2000)
May there be exercise of right of equity of redemption beyond the equity of redemption period?
By exception, yes, it may be exercised even beyond the period indicated in the judgment and after the foreclosure
sale but before the order of confirmation of the sale (Rosalesv. Suba, G.R. No. 1377!)2,12 August 2003)
Is the right of legal redemption available in judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage proceedings?
As a rule, no, as only the right of equity of redemption is present. In judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage,
the right of redemption, where the debtor may repurchase his property within 1 year from registration of the
certificate of sale, is not recognized, except where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or
banking institution within the purview of the General Banking Law of2000 (Huerta Alba Resort,Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,G.R. No. 128567, 1 September2000)
X obtained a loan from Y, and to secure the loan, X executed a real estate mortgage. When the loan fell
due, X was unable to pay despite demand. May Y file against X a complaint for a sum of money and an
action for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?
No, a creditor-mortgagee cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt,
and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mongage. The filing of one bars the other. The cause of
action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. One of the two remedies available to
the creditor is as complete as the other. He cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of
procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and unexpensive administration of justice (Pineda v. De liega,G.R.
No. 233774, 10April201!), Caguioa Case).
Extrajudicial Foreclosure (Act No. 3135, as amended)
What is extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage?

Extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mongage is when a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached
to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following election shall govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption
shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.(Act No. 3135, Sec.1}.
Distinguish judicial foreclosure from extrajudicial foreclosure.

Judicial Foreclosure Extrajudicial Foreclosure
I
As to Governing Law
Governed by Rule 68 of the Rules of Coun. Governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118 or RA 8791, as the case may be.
As to Necessity of Court Intervention
It requires court intervention (ROC, Rule 68, Sec2} No court intervention is necessary (Act No. 3135, Sec1}
As to Necessity of SPA
No special power of attorney from the mortgagor There must be a special power of attorney where
authorizing the mortgagee to judicially foreclose is re- mongagor authorizes mortgagee to extrajudicially
quired (Fiestanv. Courtof Appeals,G.R. No. 81552, 28 foreclose (Act No. 3135, Sec.1)
Mayl!J!J0)
As to Existence of Right of Redemption
General Rule: NONE. There is only an equity of General Rule: Right of redemption exists within one
redemption and no right of redemption (Huerta Albra ( 1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale in
Resort,Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 128567,September1, 2000). the register of deeds (Huerta Albra Resort,Inc. v. CA,
supra).
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Judicial Foreclosure Extrajudicial Foreclosure

Exception: Those granted by banks or banking Exception: Juridical persons shall have the right to
institutions as provided by the General Banking Act redeem until, but not after, the registration of the
(RA 8791) (Huerta Alba Resort Inc. v. Court of Appeals, certificate of foreclosure sale with the Register of Deeds
G.R. No.128567, September 1, 2000). which in no case shall be more than 3 months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier (RA 8791, Sec. 47).
Note: A mortgagor may exercise right of redemption
within one (1) year after the registration of the certifi-
cate of sale, when the loan or credit accommodation is
granted by a bank (RA 8791, Sec. 47).
As to Manner of Recovering Deficiency
The court may render a deficiency judgment (ROC, The recovery of the deficiency is allowed through an
Rule 68, Sec. 6) independent action (Sps. Rabat v. PNB, G.R. No.
158755, June 18, 2012)
As to Action for Deficiency of Judgement
There could be a Deficiency Judgment, in the third No deficiency judgment because there is no judicial
stage, in the same judicial foreclosure of real estate pro- proceeding but recovery of deficiency is allowed (Sps.
ceedings, by motion (ROC, Rule 68, Sec. 6) Rabat v. PNB, G.R. No. 158755, June 18, 2012)
X obtained a loan from Y, subject to interest of 50% per month, and to secure the loan, X executed a
real estate mortgage. When the loan fell due, X was unable to pay despite demand. Y extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. Subsequently, in an action filed by X, the RTC found that the interest rate of
the loan obligation was iniquitous and unconscionable, and therefore void. What is the effect of this
ruling on the foreclosure?
In a situation wherein null and void interest rates are imposed under a contract of loan, the non-payment of the
principal loan obligation does not place the debtor in a state of default, considering that under Article 1252 of
the Civil Code, if a debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have been made until
the interests have been covered. Since the obligation of making interest payments in the instant case is illegal and
thus non-demandable, the payment of the principal loan obligation was likewise not yet demandable. With X
not being in a state of default, the foreclosure of the subject properties should not have proceeded. A foreclosure
of mortgage is conditioned on the finding of the correct amount of the unpaid obligation and the failure to pay
said amount. The foreclosure should be invalidated (Bulatao v. Estonactoc, G.R. No. 235020, December 10, 2019,
Caguioa Case).
May a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction be issued against the extrajudicial or judicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage?
Yes, provided there is compliance with the requirements under Rule 57 and additionally, with the following rules
in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended:
1. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the
allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application
is verified and supported by evidence of payment.
2. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation
that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least the legal rate of
interest percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure
sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending (12% before effectivity of Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013 on 1 July 2013, 6% after the effectivity).
3. Where a WPI has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily
resolved. To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and above.
4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a TRO or WPI, such as the posting of a
bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity,
shall apply as well to a status quo order (Spouses Tumon v. Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 243999,
March 18, 2021, Caguioa Case).
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The General Banking Act of 2000 (Sec. 47, RA 8791)
What is the right of a purchaser at the auction sale after the date of the confirmation?
The purchaser at the auction sale concerned whether in a judicial or extrajudicial foreclosure shall have the right to
enter upon and take possession of such property immediately after the date of the confirmation of the auction sale
and administer the same in accordance with law (RA 8791, Sec. 47).
What is the redemption period for juridical persons on extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage involving
banks?
Notwithstanding Act No. 3135, juridical persons whose property is being sold pursuant to an extrajudicial
foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after, the
registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deeds which in no case shall be
more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. (RA 8791, Sec. 47).
What is the redemption period for natural persons on judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage
involving banks?
In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially or extra-judicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is security
for any loan or other credit accommodation granted, the mortgagor or debtor whose real property has been sold
for the full or partial payment of his obligation shall have the right within one year after the sale of the real estate, to
redeem the property by paying the amount due under the mortgage deed, with interest thereon at rate specified in
the mortgage, and all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank or institution from the sale and custody of said
property less the income derived therefrom (RA 8791, Sec. 47).
Partition (Rule 69)
What is partition?
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom
it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1079).
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to
be a partition. Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus,
after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed (Marcos v. Heirs of Isidro Bangi, G.R. No.
185745, October 14, 2014).
A donated to B and C a parcel of land, which they accepted. There was no provision in the donation,
preventing B and C to partition. May B, upon acceptance of the donation, bring an action for partition?
Yes. The law does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity
or through onerous consideration. A person who derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through
gratuity may compel partition (Logrosa v. Spouses Azares, G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Petitioner filed a complaint for partition, alleging that he, together with respondents are co-owners of
8 parcels of lands, covered by Torrens titles which indicate that petitioner, together with respondents
are co-owners. Petitioner alleged that in 1987, the original owner of the subject properties, G, sold
the subject properties collectively to petitioner and the other respondents. The records show that a
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 14, 1987 was executed by the parties, bearing the signatures
of G, petitioner, respondents. Some of the respondents, did not file an answer. Spouses S, the answering
respondents, in their answer, alleged that while it is true that petitioner’s name appeared in the titles
of the properties, however, they belied petitioner’s claim that he is a co-owner of the same, as he never
contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes
due thereon. Spouses S alleged that petitioner was their cousin and used to work for them as their
trusted laborer. Petitioner then was young and inadequately schooled and so Spouses S answered the
expenses for petitioner’s schooling and petitioner was allowed to construct his house on one of the
properties, upon condition that petitioner would pay and reimburse them for all his expenses when
petitioner ‘s finances allow. Spouses S allegedly purchased all properties subject of this case. During trial,
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petitioner presented a witness, his own testimony and the titles over the property as well as deed of sale
showing he was among the buyers of the properties. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
that petitioner was not a co-owner.
Was it correct for the RTC to dismiss the complaint?

No. A document evidencing a sale transaction, such as a deed of sale, which is duly notarized is considered a public
document and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due execution. Section 23,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court state that public documents are prima facie evidence of the fact which gave rise
to their execution. The Torrens tides show petitioner as one of the co-owners. The certificate of tide serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible tide to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. One's assertion of ownership is further
strengthened and buttressed by the fact of possession, i.e., by building and occupying a house on the subject lot,
coupled with the lack of opposition of such possession on the pan of the other parties. In the instant case, it is
not disputed that petitioner possesses a ponion of the subject property with no opposition by the other parties,
aside from respondents Sps. S, who disclaimed petitioner's status as co-owner only after more than two decades
since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and only as a mere reaction to the Complaint for Partition filed
by petitioner. Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by the eight certificates of tide and duly notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale that petitioner is a co-buyer and co-owner of the subject properties, the burden to prove
otherwise was shifted to respondents Sps. S, who have not successfully hurdled this burden (ugrosa v. Spouses
Azares, G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2013, Caguioa Case).
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Distinguish Accion Interdictal, Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvindicatoria.

The distinctions are as follows:
Accion Intenlictal (Forcible
Accion Publid.uw Acdon Reilwidimtoria
Entry and Unlawful Detainer)
I I
As to Nature
Summary action for the recovery Plenary action for the recovery of An action for the recovery of
of physical possession where the the real right of possession where ownership, which necessarily
dispossessionhas not lasted for more the dispossession has lasted for more includes the recovery of
than one ( 1) year (Encarnacion v. than one (1) year (Sercwncillo v. Sps. possession by vinue of his
Amigo, G.R. No. 16!)7!)3,September Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, October ownership (Viray v. Usi, G.R.
15, 2006). 8, 1!)!)8). No. 1!)2846, November 21,
2012}.
As to Purpose
It is intended to provide an It is a proceeding to determine the It is an action whereby a party

expeditious means of protecting better right of possession of realty claims recovery of ownership
actual possession or right to independently of tide (Valdez v. CA, over the property including
possession of property {Javier v. G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006). the possession thereof by
De Guzman, G.R. No. 186204, virtue of his ownership
September 2, 2015). (Valdez v. CA, G.R. No.
132424, May 2, 2006).
As to Jurisdiction
All cases of forcible entry and The RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value of the real property
unlawful detainer (a.ccion exceedsPhp20,000 outside Metro Manila; or exceedsPhpS0,000 within
interdictal), irrespective of the Metro Manila. MTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value of the real
amount of damages or unpaid property does not exceedthe above amounts (Vda. De Barrera v. Heirs
rentals sought to be recovered, of Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, September 12, 2008).
should be brought to the MTC
(Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v.
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Accion Interdictal (Forcible

Accion Publiciana Accion Reinvidicatoria
Entry and Unlawful Detainer)
Ley Construction and Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 161589, No-
vember 24, 2014).
As to Procedure
Governed by summary procedure Governed by ordinary procedure
Note: RA 11576, or “An Act Further Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purposes Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as ‘The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,’ As Amended,” was signed
into law on July 30, 2021 and took effect on August 14, 2021. RA 11576 amended Sections 19 and 33 of BP
129. The jurisdictional amount cognizable by the RTCs in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein is now Php400,000.00. The MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs, and MCTCs have
jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Php400,000.00.
What is an accion interdictal?

It is a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material possession (possession de facto) where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court (Macutay v. Samoy, G.R. No.
205559, December 2, 2020)
What is accion publiciana?

It is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure), which should be brought in the
proper court (depending upon the assessed value of the property) when the dispossession has lasted for more than
one year or for less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70. (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R.
No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case).
What is the issue in accion publiciana?

The issue in an accion publiciana is the “better right of possession” of real property independently of title. This
“better right of possession” may or may not proceed from a Torrens title.
A lessee, by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract with a term longer than one year,
may file, as against the owner or usurper, an accion publiciana if he has been dispossessed for more than one year.
A registered owner or one with a Torrens title can likewise file an accion publiciana to recover possession if the one-
year prescriptive period for forcible entry and unlawful detainer has already lapsed (Miranda v. Spouses Mallari,
G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case).
May the issue of ownership be resolved in ejectment and accion publiciana cases?
As a rule no, since the only issue to be resolved in said cases is who has the better right of possession. By exception,
the court in such cases may provisionally determine ownership to determine the better right of possession (Rejas v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 241576 & 241623, November 3, 2020, Caguioa Case)
Where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the
parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership;
it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue
of ownership.
The resolution of the issue of ownership in an accion publiciana, like forcible entry and unlawful detainer, is passed
upon only to determine the issue of possession, the defense of ownership raised by the defendant (i.e., that he,
and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner). It will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s certificate of title
(Miranda v. Spouses Mallari, G.R. No. 218343, November 28, 2018, Caguioa Case).
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Distinguish forcible entry from unlawful detainer.
Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer

I
As to Nature of Possession
Possession of the real property by the defendant The possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful
is unlawful from the beginning because it was but it becomes illegal by reason of the expiration
obtained by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or or termination of his right to the possession of the
stealth (Dela Cruz v. Hermano, G.R. No. 160!)14, property under his contract with the plaintiff (Santos
March 25, 2015; ROC, Rule 70, Sec. 1). v. Ayon, G.R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005; ROC, Rule 70,
Sec.1).
As to Necessity of Demand to Vacate
A demand to vacate is not required before the filing As a rule, demand to vacate is necessary and jurisdictional
of the action (Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 13!)442, in nature (Lanuzo v. Munoz, G.R. No.147372, May 27,
December 06, 2006). 2004), unless there is an agreement that there is no need
for demand.
As to Prescriptive Period
Action prescribes after one ( 1) year from the date of Action prescribes after one year counted from the date
entry or taking of possession by use of force, intimi- oflast demand to vacate or last letter of demand (DBP
dation, threat or strategy. (ROC, Rule 70, Sec. 1). v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-23422, September 30, 1370).
Exception: When the entry was done through Exception: When the subsequent demands were mere-
stealth, the one-year time bar is reckoned from ly in the nature of reminders of the original demand,
the time the entry was discovered (Philippine in which case the one-year period is counted from the
Long Distance Company v. Citi Appliance M.C first demand (Republic ofthe Philippines v. Sunvar Re-
Corporation, Gr no. 214546, October0!), 2016). alty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 1!)4880,june
20, 2012).
As to Nature of Action
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular
individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Heirs of Yusingco v. Busilak, G.R. No.
210504,January 24, 2018).
As to Prior Physical Possession

As a rule, the plaintiff must prove that he was in The plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
prior physical possession of the premises until he possession (Go v. Looyuko, G.R. No. 1!)652!),July 1,
was deprived thereof by the defendant (Mangaser v. 2013).
Ugay, G.R. No. 204326).
CONTEMPT (RULE 71)
Distinguish direct contempt and indirect contempt.

Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt
(Contempt in fi1cie curiae) (Constructive Contempt)
I
As to How Committed
It is committed in the presence of or so near a court It is not committed within the presence of the court
(ROC, Rule 71, Sec.1). (Re: Erlinda Ilusorio-Bztdner, AM. No. 07-11-14-SC,
April 14, 2015) through any ofthe acts enumerated un-
der Section 3 ofRule 71).
As to Necessity of Hearing
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Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt

(Contempt in facie curiae) (Constructive Contempt)
Court summarily adjudges respondent in contempt There is charge and hearing (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 4).
of court. (ROC, Rule 71, Sec.1).
As to Penalty
If committed against: If committed against:
1. RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank 1. RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank
– fine not exceeding P2,000 or imprisonment – fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not
not exceeding 10 days or both. exceeding six (6) months or both.
2. MTC - fine not exceeding P200 or imprison- 2. MTC - fine not exceeding P5000 or imprisonment
ment not exceeding one (1) day or both (ROC, not exceeding one (1) month or both (ROC, Rule
Rule 71, Sec.1). 71, Sec. 7).
As to Available Remedy
Certiorari or prohibition and posting bond (ROC, Appeal if Civil Contempt or Criminal Contempt
Rule 71, Sec. 2). finding respondent liable; Certiorari if criminal
contempt absolving respondent (ROC, Rule 71, Sec.
11).
What acts constitute direct contempt? (MDOSAF)

The following acts constitute direct contempt:
1. Misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
same
2. Disrespect towards the court
3. Offensive personalities towards others;
4. Refusal to be Sworn or to answer as witness;
5. Refusal to subscribe an Affidavit or deposition when lawfully required (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 1); and
6. Acts of a party or counsel which constitute willful and deliberate Forum shopping (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 5).
What acts constitute indirect contempt? (PDP-CASRF)

The following acts constitute indirect contempt:
1. Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the Performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
2. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged or entitled thereto;
3. Any abuse or any unlawful interference with the Proceedings not constituting direct contempt;
4. Any improper Conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice;
5. Assuming to be an Attorney or an officer of the court without authority;
6. Failure to obey a Subpoena duly served; or
7. Rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or
process of a court held by him (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 3);
8. Submission of False certification against forum shopping or non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein (ROC, Rule 7, Sec. 5)
What is civil contempt?

It is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party (Remman Enterprises, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107671, 26 February 1997).
What is criminal contempt?

It is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (Yasay, Jr., v.
Recto, G.R. No. 129521, 7 September 1999).
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What is the remedy of a person adjudged in direct contempt?

The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the
remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned
that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him (ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 2).
What is the remedy of a person adjudged in indirect contempt?

It depends. If the contempt is civil in nature, the remedy is appeal, whether the ruling is in favor of or against
the respondent. If the contempt is criminal, it partakes of a criminal proceeding, such that a ruling absolving the
respondent cannot be appealed it being in the nature of an acquittal, and may instead be the subject of certiorari,
if there is grave abuse of discretion. If the criminal contempt ruling holds respondent in indirect contempt, as in
criminal cases, respondent may appeal. (The Insurance Commissioner v. Globe Assurance Co., Inc., No. L-27874, 30
January 1982; Ceniza v. Wistehuff, G.R. No. 165734, 16 June 2006ROC, Rule 71, Sec. 11).
A verified complaint was filed with the HLURB. The Decision of the HLURB was appealed to the CA,
and thereafter to the SC. During the pendency of appeal with the SC, one of the parties filed a petition
for indirect contempt with the SC on the ground that the other party violated the injunction order
issued by the HLURB. Was it proper to file the indirect contempt case with the SC?
No. It should be dismissed. Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in stating that,
with respect to contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the HLURB, it is the RTC of
the place where the contemptuous acts have been committed, and not the SC, that acquires jurisdiction over the
indirect contempt case. There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to support the theory that the SC
has jurisdiction over a case for indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because
the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the SC. To the contrary, the Rules of Court
unambiguously state that it is the RTCs that have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect contempt cases involving
disobedience of quasi-judicial entities (Spouses Rodriguez v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos.
183324 & 209748, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Special Proceedings and Special Writs
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Venue and Process (Rule 73)
Which court has jurisdiction over settlement of estate?

It depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent:
1. In Metro Manila - MTC: gross value does not exceed P400,000.00; otherwise, RTC; and
2. Outside Metro Manila - MTC: gross value does not exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, RTC (BP 129, Sec. 19,
par. (4), Sec. 33, par. (1)).
Note: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the material allegations in the petition (Cadimas v.
Carrion, G.R. No. 180394, September 29, 2008); hence, it is not the actual gross value of the estate which is the basis
of jurisdiction but the alleged gross value of the estate.
Note: The 2022 Bar Examination Remedial Law Syllabus does not include RA 11576 which was signed into law
on July 30, 2021 and took effect on August 21, 2021. Said law amended BP 129 by expanding the jurisdiction of
the lower courts.
What is the venue in judicial settlement of estate if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death?
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or alien, the venue of
the action shall be the court of the province, city, or municipality where he resides at the time of his death. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country at the time of his death, the venue of the action shall be in the court
of any province, city, or municipality in which he had estate (ROC, Rule 73, Sec. 1).
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Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74)
After a decedent dies without leaving a will, may the heirs divide the estate among themselves?
Yes, provided that the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument or a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement that should be filed in the office of the register of deeds. If there is only one heir, and no
debts left behind, the sole heir may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit or an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication, also to be filed in the office of the register of deeds (ROC, Rule 74, Sec. 1)
The decedent dies without leaving any will or debts but the heirs cannot agree on how to divide the
estate among themselves. What is their remedy?
Should the parties fail to agree on how to divide the estate among themselves, they may do so in an action for
partition. (ROC, Rule 74, Sec. 1)
The decedent left a will and no debts, may the heirs execute a deed of extrajudicial settlement and divide
the estate among themselves?
No. If the decedent left a will and no debts, the will must be admitted to probate and the estate divided in
accordance with the will. The heirs may not do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate,
because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil 479,
December 29, 1943)
When may an estate be summarily settled?

1. Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed Php10,000, the court may summarily settle the estate, provided the following requirements are met:
2. The application must contain an allegation of the gross value of the estate which does not exceed Php10,000;
3. Date of hearing shall be set by the court not less than 1 month nor more than 3 months from the date of
last publication of the notice of such hearing;
4. There shall be an order of hearing published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province;
5. Notice shall be served upon such interested persons as the court may direct; and (ROC, Rule 74, Sec. 2)
6. The court, before allowing the partition, may require the distributees, if property other than real is to
be distributed, to file a bond in an amount fixed by the court, conditioned upon the payment of any just
claims which may be filed by excluded heirs or unpaid creditors (ROC, Rule 74, Sec. 3).
Allowance or Disallowance of Wills (Rule 76)
What are the contents of a petition for the allowance of a will? (JN-VLC)
A petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
1. The Jurisdictional facts;
2. The Name, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent;
3. The probate Value and character of the property of the estate;
4. The name of the person for whom Letters are prayed; and
5. If the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having Custody of it (ROC, Rule
76, Sec. 2).
What are the jurisdictional facts required to be alleged in the petition for probate of a will?
The jurisdictional facts required to be alleged in the petition for probate of a will are the following:
1. The fact of the death of a decedent (Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011);
2. His residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province (Palaganas v. Palaganas, G.R. No.
169144, January 26, 2011); and
3. The gross value of the estate (Frianela v. Banayad, Jr., G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009).
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What are the grounds for the disallowance of a will? (ExITUS)

The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
1. If not Executed and attested as required by law;
2. If the testator was Insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;
3. If it was executed under duress, of the influence of fear, or under Threats;
4. If it was procured by Undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit; or
5. If the Signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto (ROC, Rule 76, Sec. 9).
Claims against the Estate (Rule 86)
What is the statute of non-claims?

Statute of non-claims means that all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise, they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants (ROC, Rule 86, Sec. 5).
Within what period should the court set the filing of money claims against the estate?
The court shall state the time for filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than 12 nor less than 6
months after the date of first publication of notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered,
on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time to do so, for cause shown and on such
terms equitable, the court may allow a claim to be filed within a time not exceeding 1 month (Rule 86, Sec. 2; Afan
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-14713, April 28, 1960).
A claim was belatedly filed by the BIR for payment of deficiency income tax, which the administrator
opposed for being time barred. The court denied the claim for being time barred, pursuant to Section
5, Rule 86. Is this correct?
No. Section 5, Rule 86 makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent created by law, such
as taxes which is entirely of different character from the claims expressly enumerated therein, such as: all claims
for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent and judgment for
money against the decedent. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent’s
estate in the form of exception from the application of the statute of non-claims is that taxes are the lifeblood of
the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need (Commissioner of Internal Revenue
vs. Pineda, G. R. No. L-22734, September 15, 1967; Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979).
Creditor alleges his claim for unpaid services for repair is one arising from law and not covered by the
statute of non-claims. Is he correct?
No. It arises from contract. Obligations arising ex lege are in the common law system merged into the category of
obligations imposed by law (Maclan v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-7622, May 27, 1955).
Is the filing of money claim an initiatory pleading that requires certification against forum shopping?
No. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. A
money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent’s estate; more so
if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim
(Sheker v. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007).
Will the death of the debtor extinguish the obligation arising from contract?
No. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations
are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties,
or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves
are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a
contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is
only the creditor’s action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court since the claim
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shall now be brought with the probate court (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corp., G.R.
No. 147561, June 22, 2006).
Payments of the Debts of the Estate (Rule 88)
Give an outline of how the executor or administrator shall pay the debts of the estate of the decedent.
The following rules shall be followed:
1. If, after hearing all the money claims against the estate, and after ascertaining the amount of such claims,
it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay the debts, the executor or administrator shall pay the same
within the time limited for that purpose (ROC, Rule 88, Sec. 1);
2. If the testator makes provisions by his will or designates the estate to be appropriated for the payment of his
debts, the expenses of administration, or the family expenses, they shall be paid according to the provisions
of the will (ROC, Rule 88, Sec. 2);
3. If the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated is not sufficient for that purpose, such part of
the estate of the testator, real or personal, as is not disposed of by will, if any, shall be appropriated for that
purpose (ROC, Rule 88, Sec. 2);
4. The personal estate of the deceased not disposed of by will shall be first chargeable with the payment of
debts and expenses (ROC, Rule 88, Sec. 3);
5. If the said personal estate is not sufficient for that purpose, or its sale would redound to the detriment of
the participants of the estate, the whole of the real estate not disposed of by of will, or so much thereof
as is necessary, may be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered for that purpose by the executor or
administrator, after obtaining the authority of the court therefor (ROC, Rule 88, Sec. 3);
6. In case of deficiency, where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the
estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid, and have become liable to contribute
to the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for
that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what
manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require (ROC, Rule 88,
Sec. 6); and
7. If the court is satisfied that a contingent claim duly filed is valid, it may order the executor or administrator
to retain in his hand’s sufficient estate to pay a such contingent claim when the same becomes absolute,
or if the estate is insolvent, sufficient to pay a portion equal to the dividend of the other creditors (ROC,
Rule 88, Sec. 4).
Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent (Rule 89)
When may the court authorize the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of real property to pay debts
and legacies, even though the personal property of the debtor had not yet been exhausted?
1. When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and
legacies; or
2. Where the sale of such personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the
estate; and
3. Where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and
legacies;
The court, on the application of the executor or administrator and written notice of the heirs, devisees,
and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage,
or otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the
purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or
encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the
sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or
beneficial under the circumstances (ROC, Rule 89, Sec. 2).
4. Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest
therein (ROC, Rule 89, Sec. 8).
5. Where the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another person (ROC, Rule 89, Sec. 9).
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May the court authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of the real or personal
estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or administration expenses?
Yes, when it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs,
devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator
and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the
executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies or
expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of the will.
In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions
(ROC, Rule 89, Sec 4).
Distribution and Partition (Rule 90)
What is a project of partition?

Project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate that the
court may accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons
entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled, and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that
vests title in the distributees (Reyes v. Datu, G.R. No. L-17818, January 20, 1967).
Note: The heirs may, by agreement, submit a project of partition to serve as a basis for the order of distribution.
The heirs who do not agree thereto may submit, a counter-project of partition (de Reyes v. Reyes de Llano, G.R.
No. L-42092, October 28, 1936).
Will the judicial partition in probate proceedings bar an excluded heir from claiming his share?
No. A judicial partition in probate proceedings will not stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived
of his lawful share. Such co-heir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reinvindication in the
province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. (Mari v. Bonilla, G.R. No. L-852, March
19, 1949).
Escheat (Rule 91)
What is a petition for escheat?

When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law
entitled to the same, the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file
a petition in the RTC of the province where the deceased last resided or in which he had an estate, if he resided out
of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated (ROC,
Rule 91, Sec. 1).
What are the kinds of escheat?

The kinds of escheat are:
1. Intestate leaving no heir - when a person dies intestate leaving no heir but leaving real property within the
Philippines (ROC, Rule 91, Sec. 1);
2. Reversion - Actions for reversion of properties alienated in violation of the Constitution or statute (ROC,
Rule 91, Sec. 5); and
Note: The proceedings must be instituted in the province where the land lies in whole or in part. It may
be instituted as a consequence of violation of Article XIII of the Constitution which prohibits transfers
of private agricultural land to aliens (Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, G.R. No. L-1411, September 29, 1953).
However, reversion will not be allowed even if the original buyer was an alien, if later on the title to the
property was transferred by succession to the buyer’s heirs who are qualified parties, i.e. Philippine citizens
(Republic v. Registry of Deeds of Roxas City, G.R. No. 158230, July 16, 2008).
3. Unclaimed balances - Dormant accounts for 10 years (Unclaimed Balances Act, Act 3936, as amended by
P.D.679).
Note: An action to recover unclaimed balances shall be commenced by the Solicitor General in an action
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for escheat in the name of the People of the Philippines in the RTC of the province where the bank is
located, in which shall be joined as parties the bank and such creditors or depositors (Republic v. Pres.
Roxas Rural Bank, Inc., G.R. No. L-30381, August 30, 1988).
Guardianship
Venue (Rule 92)
What is the jurisdiction and venue of a guardianship proceeding?

The jurisdiction and venue are as follows:
1. Guardianship over incompetents: RTC of the place where the incompetent resides. If a non-resident, with
the RTC of the place where the incompetent’s property or part thereof is situated (ROC, Rule 92, Sec 1).
2. Guardianship over minors: Family Court of the place where the minor resides. If a non-resident, with the
Family Court of the place where the minor’s property or part thereof is situated (Rule on Guardianship of
Minors, Sec. 3).
Who are the persons considered incompetent as to warrant guardianship under the Rules of Court?
The persons considered as incompetent under the rules of guardianship are the following:
1. Persons suffering from civil interdiction;
2. Persons who are hospitalized are lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write;
3. Persons who are of unsound minds, even though they have lucid intervals; and
4. Persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, diseases, weak mind, and other similar causes
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation (ROC, Rule 92, Sec. 2).
If the ward is both a minor and of unsound mind, will the rules on guardianship under Rules of Court
apply?
No. The Rule on Guardianship of Minors amends Rules 92-97, ROC. Guardianship of incompetents who are
minors shall be covered by the Rule on Guardianship of Minors. Guardianship of incompetents who are not
minors shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and governed by the Rules of Court (A.M.
No. 03-002-05-SC, Sec. 27).
Appointment of Guardians (Rule 93)
Who may file for the appointment of a guardian of incompetent under the Rules of Court?
Any relative, friend or other person on behalf of a resident incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian may
petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both,
of such incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may also
file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be
hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper (Rule 93, Sec. 1).
What should be contained in a petition for appointment of guardian?

A verified petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The
jurisdiction facts; (b) The incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient; (c) The names, ages,
and residence of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the person having him in their care; (d) The
probable value and character of his estate; (e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed
After the petition is filed, the court issues a notice setting the time for hearing. Should the incompetent
be served a copy of such notice?
Yes. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition
residing in the province, including the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof
to be given. Service of the notice upon the incompetent, is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires
no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian (Nery v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. L-23096, April 27, 1972, ROC, Rule 93, Sec. 3).
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Is it required that the creditors of the incompetent be likewise notified of the hearing?
No. The rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or incompetent be likewise identified and notified.
The reason is simple: because their presence is not essential to the proceedings for appointment of a guardian.
It is almost a given, and understandably so, that they will only insist that the supposed incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to preserve the validity of said contracts and keep the supposed minor or
incompetent obligated to comply therewith (Alamayri v. Pabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008).
On whom will the judgment granting the petition be served?

It shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the incompetent person resides or where
his property or part thereof is situated (Rule 93, Sec. 8).
General Powers and Duties of Guardians (Rule 96)
What are the general powers and duties of a guardian of an incompetent or minor? (CaPS-MaPIA)
The powers and duties of a guardian of an incompetent are the following:
1. To have the Care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the
management of the estate only, as the case may be (ROC, Rule 96, Sec. 1);
2. To Pay the ward’s just debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not,
then out of his real estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance thereof (ROC, Rule 96,
Sec. 2);
3. To Settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for ward (ROC, Rule 96, Sec. 3);
4. To Manage the estate of the ward frugally and without waste, and apply proceeds to the maintenance of
5. ward (ROC, Rule 96, Sec. 4);
6. To join in an assent to a Partition if the court grants the guardian such authority after hearing (ROC, Rule
96, Sec. 5);
7. To render to the court an Inventory of the estate of his ward within three (3) months after his appointment,
8. and annually after such appointment an inventory and account, which must be under oath (ROC, Rule
96, Sec. 7); and
9. To present his Account to the court for settlement and allowance upon the expiration of a year from the
time of his appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required (ROC, Rule 96, Sec. 8).
X was granted guardianship over the person of W. One of their relatives, R, took incompetent W away
and would not disclose to X where R is. What is X’s remedy?
X may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. X, as the judicial
guardian of W, is duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, X must have
custody of W. Thus, she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her
ward. (Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, G.R. Nos. 166470 & 169217, August 7, 2009)
The guardian suspects that a relative, R, embezzled money and goods belonging to the ward, W. It is not
clear whether such money and goods indeed belong to W. May the court order R to return the property
to W?
No. The court may cite the suspected person R to appear for examination touching such money, goods, interest, or
instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
However, in so doing, the court will only elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of having
embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward. In such proceeding the court has no
authority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the court finds
sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the proper
action to obtain the possession of and secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests of the
ward (Cui v. Piccio, G.R. No. L-5131, July 31, 1952)
Termination of Guardianship (Rule 97)
When is guardianship terminated?

If upon a petition by the person declared incompetent, or his guardian, relative, or friend, and after trial, it is judicially
determined that a person is no longer incompetent, his competency shall be adjudged and the guardianship shall
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cease (ROC, Rule 97, Sec. 1). The guardian of any person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon the
application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer necessary (ROC, Rule 97, Sec. 3).
Is removal of a guardian the same as termination of guardianship?

No. In termination of guardianship, there will no longer be a guardian having charge over the ward, who would
have been declared already to be competent. In removal of guardian, it is only the person of the guardian who will
be removed and replaced with the appointment of another guardian. In other words, in removal of guardian, the
guardianship is not necessarily terminated. (ROC, Rule 97, Secs. 1-2)
What are the grounds for removal of a guardian?

When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has
wasted or mismanaged the estate, or failed for 30 days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the
court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the
ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto. A guardian may also resign when it appears proper to
allow the same; and upon his resignation or removal the court may appoint another in his place. (ROC, Rule 97,
Sec. 2)
Are the grounds for removal of guardian under Sec. 2, Rule 97 an exclusive list?
No, it does not attempt to make an exhaustive enumeration of the grounds of removal. It uses a more general
and inclusive expression. For instance, the use of the word “unsuitable” renders unnecessary any exhaustive
enumeration of the particular grounds of removal. In any case, a guardian should not be removed except for the
most cogent reasons; otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal (Sanz v. Fanlo, G.R. No. 26203, February
21, 1927; Vda. de Bengson v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-17066, December 28, 1961).
On whom will the judgment terminating the guardianship or removing the guardian be served?
Final orders of judgments under Rule 97 shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated (ROC, Rule 97, Sec. 5).
Writ of Habeas Corpus
Rule 102
What is a writ of habeas corpus?

Called the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy, which is summary in nature, consistent with the law’s zealous regard for personal liberty; it may be invoked
only under extraordinary circumstances. The writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another,
more proper remedy. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. (Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prison, G. R. No. 158802, November 17, 2004;
In re Salibo v. Warden, G.R. No. 197597, 8 April 2015)
Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. (In re: Abellana v.
Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019, Caguioa Case)
When will the writ of habeas corpus be disallowed?

If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if
the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 4)
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Note: The term “court” in Section 4, Rule 102 includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration (Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, 24 November 2003)
X was standing outside his house, not doing anything else, when the police arrested him without
a warrant. He was then frisked and shabu was found in his possession. X was detained and inquest
proceedings were conducted. Subsequently, an Information was filed against X. May a petition for
habeas corpus for the release of X prosper?
No. Although X was initially illegally arrested as such arrest did not fall under any of the allowable instances when
an arrest without a warrant may be made, it does not follow that X will be discharged. Even if the arrest of X was
illegal, supervening events, such as the filing of Information charging X, bars his release or discharge from custody.
What is to be inquired into in habeas corpus is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same
supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, i.e., the issuance of a judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
(Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255, 24 November 2003)
Note: This does not mean that X no longer has any remedy but that habeas corpus is no longer a proper remedy
since the habeas corpus court is of limited jurisdiction. X may file administrative, civil or criminal cases against the
police for the illegal arrest. Also, in the criminal case against X, he may file a motion to wash information for lack
of jurisdiction over the person, before he enters his plea (Caballes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163108, February
23, 2005; In Re: Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985).
X was convicted by the RTC. X filed a petition for habeas corpus, on the ground that he was deprived of
due process because: (1) accused was not allowed to present evidence when the court submitted the case
for decision after accused and counsel were repeatedly absent for the scheduled presentation of evidence
for the defense; (2) Accused’s counsel did not inform him of the date of promulgation of judgment
although his counsel filed on his behalf a motion for deferment of promulgation and accused, despite
notice, did not attend as a sign of protest; and (3) he was denied the right to competent counsel who was
absent during the promulgation. IUs the writ of habeas corpus warranted?
No. There was no denial of right to due process as there were numerous settings and defendant as well as his
counsel were repeatedly absent. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process, as in this case. As to the promulgation, accused had notice
thereof, through counsel and this notwithstanding he did not appear at the promulgation, causing him to lose the
remedies available against such judgment. While accused’s counsel was negligent, such negligence is binding upon
X, in the absence of showing gross negligence on the part of counsel that is not accompanied by the client’s own
negligence or malice. Such absence of the counsel during promulgation is not gross negligence as to amount to
clear abandonment of X’s cause. X was also negligent.
While the rule is that when there is a deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of
his detention, X, however, failed to convince the court that the proceedings were attending by violations of rights
to due process or competent counsel to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. (In re: Abellana v. Paredes, G.R. No.
232006, July 10, 2019, Caguioa Case)
When may habeas corpus be availed of as a post-conviction remedy?

It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy provided the following requisites are present:
1. There has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
2. The court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
3. An excessive penalty has been imposed; as such sentence is void as to the excess (Barredo v. Vinarao, G.R.
No. 168728, August 2, 2007).
Note: If the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict, the convict or the prosecution
may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court or with
any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin
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and issue appropriate orders. If after due hearing the court finds the petition to be meritorious, it shall reverse or
modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for
a lawful cause (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, Sec. 10).
Will the person detained be immediately released upon issuance of the court of the judgment granting
the petition?
No. When the court or judge has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is satisfied
that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, the court shall forthwith order his discharge from confinement, but
such discharge shall not be effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the
prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith
released. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 15)
Note: Conversely, if the officer or person detaining the prisoner desires to appeal, then the prisoner shall not be
released. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec. 15)
Writ of Habeas Corpus In Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. NO. 03-04-04-SC)
What is the territorial extent of a writ of habeas corpus in relation to the custody of minor?
A writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family Court shall be enforceable within the judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs and, if such writ was granted by the SC, CA, or any of its members, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 20).
Widow A leaves her two minor daughters with her brother every night that she goes to work as a
prostitute in Milagros City. B, the father of the deceased husband of A, filed a petition for habeas corpus
against A for the custody of the girls in the Family Court in Legaspi City, which the court granted. Upon
learning of the petition, A brought her children to Cebu City. B sought to have the writ enforced against
A in Cebu City. Resolve the petition in the light of the following defenses of A:
1. The enforcement of the writ of habeas corpus in Cebu City is illegal.
The writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family Court in Legaspi City may not be legally enforced in Cebu
City. Under the law, a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court
belongs. Here, the petition was filed in Legaspi City hence, the writ should not be enforced in Cebu City,
which falls under a different judicial region (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, Sec. 20).
2. B has no personality to institute the petition.
B, the father of the deceased husband of A, has the personality to institute the petition for habeas corpus
of the two minor girls. Under the law, the award of custody may be given to the grandparent, or if there
are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age and of sufficient
discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified. Here, the father of the decease husband,
as the grandparent, has the legal personality to seek custody over the children. In fact, if the court finds that
the parents are unfit to care for and to have custody of the minors, the court may designate either the paternal
or maternal grandparent of the minors, among others, to take charge of the said minors. (A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC, Secs. 2, 13, 18).
Change of Name (Rule 103)
What are the grounds for change of full name or surname for a petition in accordance with Rule 103?
(RDD-LAC2UDEE)
The following are sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name:
1. Name is Ridiculous, Dishonorable or extremely Difficult to write or pronounce;
2. Change is a legal consequence of Legitimation or Adoption;
3. Change will avoid Confusion;
4. One has Continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was Unaware of
alien parentage;
5. Change is based on a sincere Desire to adopt a Filipino name to Erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; or
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6. Surname causes Embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest (Republic of the Philippines
v. CA, G.R. No. 88202, December 14, 1998).
Petitioner Francis Luigi G. Santos filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 seeking to change
his surname from “Santos” to “Revilla” in his Certificate of Live Birth. He alleged that sometime in
1991, his parents, Lovely Maria T. Guzman and Jose Marie Bautista, Jr., also known as Ramon Bong
Revilla, Jr. (Bong Revilla), met and engaged in an intimate relationship. He was later born as “Francis
Luigi Guzman. His parents were never married as Bong Revilla was already married to Lani Mercado.
Petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname and his father was marked as
unknown. However, on April 24, 1996, Bong Revilla executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment
recognizing petitioner as his son. In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P. Santos (Patrick
Santos), who, in turn, legally adopted petitioner in 2001. Thus, petitioner’s name was changed from
“Francis Luigi Guzman” to “Francis Luigi G. Santos.” Although petitioner lived with his mother, he
grew up close to Bong Revilla and the latter’s wife and children and was treated by the family as a
legitimate son. He also claimed that he used the name “Luigi Revilla” when he entered show business.
Thus, he filed the instant petition in order to avoid confusion, to show his sincere and genuine desire
to associate himself to Bong Revilla and to the Revillas, and to ensure that his records show his true
identity as Bong Revilla’s son. The OSG argues that Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy and that
he should have filed a petition under Rule 108, and should have impleaded his adoptive and biological
fathers, as indispensable parties.
1. Was Rule 108 the correct remedy?

No. Petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy under Rule 103 in order to change his surname from
“Santos” to “Revilla” to avoid confusion and to show his sincere desire to associate himself to Bong Revilla
and the Revillas. By these allegations, petitioner seeks to alter the designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives and is best known and not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections.
Unlike Rule 108, Rule 103 only requires that the order reciting the purpose of the petition and the date and
place of the hearing be published and that any interested person be allowed to appear and oppose the petition.
By virtue of the publication, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. The failure to implead petitioner’s biological father and adoptive father did
not render the proceedings void as said requirement does not apply to Rule 103. (Santos v. Republic, G.R. No.
250520, May 5, 2021, Caguioa Case)
2. Will the change of surname from Santos to Revilla result in his change of status?
No. While a change in status may legally result in a change of name, such as in marriages, annulments,
legitimations, or adoptions, et al., the reverse is not equally true. A change of surname under Rule 103 does
not necessarily result in a change of petitioner’s status, i.e., from legitimate to illegitimate. A change of name
as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one’s existing family relations, or
in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before
were existing. It does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name,
which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he
bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of
or dealing with him. Indeed, petitioner cannot change his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos to an
illegitimate child of Bong Revilla by the mere expedient of changing his name as an adoption may only be
rescinded in accordance with law. (Santos v. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5, 2021, Caguioa Case)
3. Should the petition for change of name be granted?

No, petitioner failed to prove that there is any compelling reason to justify a change of surname from “Santos”
to “Revilla.” The use of the surname “Revilla” would create further confusion rather than avoid it, given that:
(1) petitioner has never legally used the name “Revilla” despite having been acknowledged in 1996; (2) he was
legally adopted by Patrick Santos in 2001; (3) he has used the name “Santos’’ for all documentary purposes
since his adoption; (4) although he is publicly known to be the son of Bong Revilla, he is known by his peers
as “Luigi Santos”; (5) even after a change of surname, Patrick Santos shall continue to be the father named in
his birth certificate; and (5) he only began using the surname “Revilla” when he entered show business.
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While petitioner may factually identify and associate with his biological father and his family, he remains to
be the legitimate son of Patrick Santos by virtue of the adoption. The latter and not the former is thus his true
legal identity. As adoption severs all legal ties between the adoptee and his or her biological parents, there is
no basis to allow petitioner to change his name to “Revilla” simply because he is, biologically, the son of Bong
Revilla and wants to associate himself with the Revilla family. Petitioner’s reasons for change of name does not
fall under any of the jurisprudential grounds for change of name.
The mere fact that petitioner began using a different name, i.e., “Luigi Revilla,” when he joined show business
does not constitute a proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. Any confusion
created by the use of said name is mainly due to the unauthorized use of a name other than petitioner’s true
legal name. Convenience is not a recognized ground for change of name, which may be allowed only for
compelling reasons that must be alleged and proved. A sincere desire to associate oneself to a certain person
or family, without more, does not justify a change of surname. (Santos v. Republic, G.R. No. 250520, May 5,
2021, Caguioa Case)
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108)
What are the effects of the enactment of RA 9048 on the judicial remedies under Rule 103 and Rule
108?
RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 correction of clerical or typographical errors and that Rule 108
applies only to substantial changes or correction of entries in the civil register (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No.
166676, Sept. 12, 2008). A person may still avail judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 after the petition in
the administrative proceedings under RA 9048, as amended, is filed and later denied (Bartolome v. Republic, G.R.
No. 243288, August 28, 2019).
Petitioner did not avail of the administrative correction of typographical error under RA 9048, and
instead filed a Petition for Correction under Rule 108 for her first name and sex. The trial court ruled
in favor of Petitioner. On appeal, considering that petitioner did not first file an administrative case,
OSG claims petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction under RA 9048. Is the OSG correct?
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction may be waived, as in this case,
where there is failure to timely raise such ground (failure to state a cause of action). The OSG only raised it for the
first time on appeal. Estoppel on the part of the party invoking such doctrines is among the exceptions to said rules.
Non-compliance with such doctrines does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. (Republic
v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018)
What are the exceptions to the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary
jurisdiction?
1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
10. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. When strong public interest is involved; and,
12. In quo warranto proceedings (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018).
Petitioner sought to change his surname from “Labayu” to “Labayo” under Rule 108, as it involved a
misspelling in his surname. Is the procedure taken correct?
No. RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172, already expressly removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. To obviate any further confusion on the matter, the SC ruled
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that typographical or clerical errors in a person's surname must likewise be corrected through the administrative
proceeding under RA 9048 (as amended by RA 10172). The same rule applies with the correction of spelling in the
surname from "Bartholome" to "Bartolome". Petitioner may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies (filing
a Rule 108 petition with the RTC) when the changes/corrections sought through the administrative proceeding
are denied (Bartolome v. Republic G.R. No. 243288, Augu.;t 28, 2013, Caguioa Case).
CLERICAL ERROR LAW (RA 9048)
Is it correct to say that RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 only covers correction of entries?
No. It covers the following: (1) Correction of clerical or typographical error; or (2) Change of first name or
nickname; (3) The day and month in the date of birth; or (4) Sex of a person where it is patently clear that there
was a clerical or typographical error to mistake in the entry (RA 3048, Sec. 1, as amended).
What is a clerical or typographical error?

It refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth,
mistake in the en tty of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records (RA 3048, Sec 2,par. 3, as amended).
Distinguish Rule 103, Rule 108, and RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172

Rule 103 I Rule 108 I RA 9048, as amended
Scope of Subject Matter
Change of name (First Name, Correction of substantial errors or 1. Correction of clerical or

Middle Name, Surname) cancellation of entries in the civil typographical error; or
registry (substantial corrections). 2. Change of first name or nick-
name;
3. The day and month in the
Note: As a rule, if the correction
date of birth; or
is clerical, the party must resort
4. Sex of a person where it is
to administrative proceedings patently clear that there was a
under RA 9048 as amended.
clerical or typographical error
However, the failure to exhaust to mistake in the entry (RA
administrative remedies (by
!)048, Sec. 1, as amended).
direct resort to court to correct a
clerical error) may be waived, and
it will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction. The only effect is that
the action will be dismissible if the
ground off ailure to state a cause of
action is timely raised; otherwise,
it is deemed waived, and the
action may proceed to be heard
by the court despite failing to
previously resort to administrative
proceedings (Republic v. Gallo,
G.R. No. 207074, January 17,
2018)
Nature of Proceedings
1. Judicial; and 1. Judicial; 1. Administrative; and

2. Hearing is necessary, and 2. Hearing is necessary;and 2. No hearing is required.
the date set for hearing shall 3. Adversarial in nature because
not be within 30 days prior it involves substantial changes
to an election nor within 4
and affects the status of the
months after the last
individual.
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Rule 103 I Rule 108 I RA 90➔8, as amended

publication of notice (ROC,
Rule 103, Sec.3}
Who may File
A person desiring to change one's Any person interested in any act, Any person having direct
name (ROC, Rule 103, Sec.1}. event, order or decree concerning and personal interest in the
the civil status of persons which correction of a clerical or
has been recorded in the civil typographical error in an entry
register (ROC, Rule 108,Sec.1). and/or change of first name or
nickname (RA !)048,Sec.3).
Initiatory Pleading
Signed and verified petition Verified petition for the Verified petition in the form of
(ROC, Rule 103, Sec.2}. cancellation or correction of any affidavit(RA !)048,Sec.3 and 5).
entry (R OC, Rule 108, Sec.1).
Where to File
RTC of the province in which 1. RTC of the dry or province 1. Local civil registry office
petitioner resided for three ( 3) where the corresponding civil of the ciry of municipaliry
years prior to filing (ROC, Rule registry is located (ROC, Rule where the record being
103, Sec.2). 108, Sec.1). sought to be corrected or
changed is kept;
2. Local civil registrar of the
place where the interested
parry is presently residing or
domiciled, if petitioner has
already migrated to another
place in the country and
it would not be practical
in terms of transportation
expenses, time and effort
to appear in person before
the local civil registrar
keeping the documents to be
corrected or changed; or
3. Nearest Philippine consulate
in case of citizens of the
Philippines residing or
domiciled in foreign
countries (RA !)048,Sec.3).
Contents of Petition
1. That petitioner has been 1. Entry sought to be cancelled 1. Facts necessary to establish
a bona fide resident of the or corrected; the merits of the petition;
province where the petition 2. Civil Registry where the entry 2. That the petitioner is
is filed for at least three ( 3) is located; competent to testify to the
years prior to the date of 3. Grounds for correction or matters stated;
such filing; cancellation of entry; and 3. Particular erroneous entry
2. The cause for which the 4. All persons who have or claim or entries, which are sought
change of petitioner's name any interest which would be to be corrected and/or the
is sought; affected by the cancellation or change sought to be made;
3. The name asked for; and correction (ROC, Rule 108, and
Sec.1-3)
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Rule 103 Rule 108 RA 9048, as amended

4. All names by which peti- 4. Petition shall be supported by
tioner is known (ROC, Rule a. A certified true machine
103, Sec. 2). copy of the certificate or
of the page of the registry
book containing the entry
or entries sought to be
corrected or changed;
b. At least two (2) public or
private documents show-
ing the correct entry or
entries upon which the
correction or change shall
be based;
c. Other documents which
the petitioner or the city
or municipal civil regis-
trar or the consul general
may consider relevant and
necessary for the approval
of the petition;
d. Petition for correction of
erroneous entry concern-
ing the date of birth or
the sex of a person must
be accompanied by earli-
est school record or ear-
liest school documents
such as, but not limited
to, medical records, bap-
tismal certificate and oth-
er documents issued by
religious authorities; nor
shall any entry involving
change of gender correct-
ed except if the petition
is accompanied by a cer-
tification issued by an ac-
credited government phy-
sician attesting to the fact
that the petitioner has not
undergone sex change or
sex transplant (RA 9048,
Sec. 5, as amended by RA
10172, Sec. 3).
Grounds
1. Name is ridiculous, Good and valid grounds for 1. Change of first name or
dishonorable or extremely correction/cancellation of entry nickname:
difficult to write or in civil registry (ROC, Rule 108, a. Petitioner finds the first
pronounce; Sec. 2). name or nickname to be
2. Change is a legal ridiculous, tainted with
consequence of legitimation dishonor or extremely
or adoption; difficult to write or
3. Change will avoid pronounce;
b. The new first name
confusion;
or nickname has
4. One has continuously used been habitually and
and been known since continuously used by
childhood by a Filipino
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Rule 103 I Rule 108 I RA 9048, as amended

name and was unaware of petitioner and he has
alien parentage; been publicly known
S. Change is based on a sincere by that first name
desire to adopt a Filipino or nickname in the
community; or
name to erase signs of
c. The change will avoid
former alienage, all in good confusion;
faith and without prejudice
to anybody; or 2. Clerical or typographical
6. Surname causes errors in entries in the civil
embarrassment and there is registry;
no showing that the desired 3. Day and month in the date
change of name was for a of birth;
fraudulent purpose, or that 4. Sex of a person {RA 3048,
the change of name would Sec. 4).
prejudice public interest
(Republic Philippines v. CA,
G.R. No. 88202, December
14, l!J!J8).
Notice and Publication
At least once a week for three (3) At least once a week for three (3) The petition for change of first
consecutive weeks in a newspa• consecutive weeks in a newspaper of name or nickname, or for correc•
per of general circulation in the general circulation in the province tion of erroneous entry concerning
province (notice and hearing) (notice and hearing) (ROC, Rule the day and month in the date of
(ROC, Rule 103, Sec. 3). 108, Sec. 4). birth or the sex of a person, as the
case may be, shall be published at
least once a week for two (2) con•
secutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation (RA !)048, Sec.
5, as amended byRA 10172, Sec. 3).
Posting
Not required. Not required. 1. The petition shall be posted

by the concerned City or
Municipal Civil Registrar,
Consul General or District/
Circuit Registrar in a
conspicuous place provided
for that purpose for ten
(10) consecutive days after
he finds the petition and
its supporting documents
sufficient in form and
substance.
2. In the case of migrant
petitioner, the petition shall
be posted first at the office
of the Petition-receiving
civil registrar for ten ( 10)
consecutive days before
sending it to the Record•
keeping civil registrar
(RKCR). Upon receipt,
the RKCR shall post again
the petition in his office for
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Rule 103 Rule 108 RA 9048, as amended

another ten (10) consecutive
days. (IRR of RA 9048,
Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 2001).
Persons to be Notified
1. Solicitor General; 1. Civil Registrar; and 1. Civil Registrar or consul
2. Provincial fiscal; and 2. All persons who have or claim general concerned; and
3. Interested parties (ROC, any interest which would be 2. Office of the Civil Registrar
Rule 103, Sec. 4). affected by the cancellation or General
correction
Where to Appeal
Court of Appeals under Rule 41. Court of Appeals under Rule 41. Civil Registrar General under
Section 7, RA 9048 or filing the
appropriate petition in RTC
(whether Rule 103 or 108, de-
pending on the ground) (RA
9048, Sec. 7)
If the prayer to administratively

change petitioner’s first name
is denied, the same may be
brought under Rule 103. If the
prayers to administratively cor-
rect entries are denied, the same
may be brought under Rule 108
(Bartolome v. Republic, G.R. No.
243288, August 28, 2019)
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)
Define writ of amparo.

The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity. It covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 1).
Who may file a petition for writ of amparo?

A petition for writ of amparo may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the
following order: (1) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party; (2) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding number; or (3) Any
concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family
or relative of the aggrieved party. The filing of the aggrieved party himself suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. The filing of the petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party
suspends the right of all others, observing the foregoing order established (A.M. 07-9-12-SC, Sec. 2).
What is the relaxed rule on the admissibility of evidence in amparo cases?

It provides that the court will consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and will consider any
evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, rules are reduced to the most basic test of reason — i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test. However, the relaxed rule on admissibility of evidence
did not dispense with the substantial evidence rule (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010).
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May the doctrine of command responsibility apply in amparo cases notwithstanding the fact that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not determine civil, criminal and administrative liability?
Yes, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it
considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible
and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which is still subject to
further investigation by the appropriate government agency (Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805,
November 15, 2011).
Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC)
Define writ of habeas data.

The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Sec. 1).
Who may file a petition for writ of habeas data?

Petitions for writ of habeas data may be filed by the aggrieved party. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, it may be filed by: (1) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or (2) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
number (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, Sec. 2).
What are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of habeas data?
The requisites for the issuance of a writ of habeas data are:
The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy; and
An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence). Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014).
Is the mere allegation of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person sufficient for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data?
No. Availment of the writ of habeas data requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. The existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended. Without
an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not
prosper (Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014).
X and Y, both minors, were graduating high school students. They were subjected to disciplinary actions
by the school’s Discipline Officer in view of their Facebook posts containing pictures of them wearing
only their undergarments and while drinking liquor, which were shown to the school after several
students viewed said post. The students who saw the post were Facebook friends of X and Y, and this
was never disputed. As a penalty, X and Y were barred from joining the commencement exercises. X and
Y’s parents filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data against the school,
arguing that the privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts were set at “Friends Only”, in
that only 5 friends could access the same, and thus, they have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected. No proof thereof was shown, however. The school contends that the writ of habeas
data may not issue, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
1. Is the contention of the school correct?

No, the writ of habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
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individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or
her correspondences, or about his or her family. To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavor. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It does not necessarilymean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting, or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavor, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ
from getting to said person or entity {Vivaresv. St. Theresa'sCollege,G.R. No. 202666, September2J, 2014).
2. Should the petition prosper?

No, while it was claimed that the posts were only limited to 5 friends, there were others who were Facebook
friends of X and Y who were able to view the posts and showed the same to the school, which was never
disputed. No special means were ever resorted to by said students to view the alleged private posts. It is
reasonable to assume that the photos were in reality viewable either by Facebook Friends or the public at
large. Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students' Facebook friends, the
school can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors' Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to the school, who was only a mere recipient of what were posted. They did not
resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who
had legitimate accessto the said posts.
The records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook's privacy settings
to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. Had it been proved that the accessto
the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
user's contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of
being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user's friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable
{Vivaresv. St. Theresa'sCollege,G.R. No. 202666, September2J, 2014).
Distinguish the return in writ of habeas corpus, writ of amparo and writ of habeas data.
Writ of Habeas Corpus I Writ of Amparo I Writ of Habeas Data

When the person to be produced Within five (5) working days after The respondent shall file a
is imprisoned or restrained by an service of the writ, the respondent verified written return together
officer, the person who makes the shall file a verified written return with supporting affidavitswithin
return shall state therein, and in together with supporting affidavits 5 working days from service of
other cases the person in whose which shall, among other things, the writ, which period may be
custody the petitioner is found shall contain the following: reasonably extended by the court
state, in writing to the court or judge for justifiable reasons.
before whom the writ is returnable, a. The lawful defenses to show
plainly and unequivocally: that the respondent did The return shall, among other
not violate or threaten with things, contain the following:
a. Whether he has or has not the violation the right to life,
party in his custody of power or liberty and security of the a. The lawful defenses such
under restraint; aggrieved party, through any as national security, state
act or omission; secrets, privileged commu-
b. If he has the party in his b. The steps or actions taken by nication, confidentiality of
custody or power, or under the respondent to determine the source ofinformation of
restraint, the authority and the fate or whereabouts of media and others;
true and whole cause thereof, the aggrieved party and the b. In case of respondent in
set forth of large, with a copy person or persons responsible charge, in possession or
of the writ, order, execution, for the threat, act or omission; in control of the data or
or other process, if any, upon c. All relevant information information subject of the
which the party is held; in the possession of the petition;
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1'Vrit of Habeas Corpus I Writ of Amparo I 1'Vritof Habeas Data
c. If the party is in his custody respondent pertaining to the i. A disclosure of the

or power or is restrained by threat, act or omission against data or information
him, and is not produced, the aggrievedparty; and about the petitioner,
particularly the nature and d. If the respondent is a public the nature of such
gravity of the sickness or official or employee, the data or information,
infirmity of such party by return shall further state the and the purpose for its
reason of which he cannot, actions that have been or will collection;
without danger be brought still be taken: ii. The steps or
before the court or judge; actions taken by the
i. To verify the identity of respondent to ensure
d. If he has had the party in his the aggrievedparty; the security and
custody or power, or under confidentiality of the
restraint, and has transferred ii. To recover and preserve
evidence related to the data or information;
such custody or restraint to and,
another, particularly to whom, death or disappearanceof
the person identified in iii. The currency and
at what time, for what cause accuracy of the data or
and by what authority such the petition which may
aid in the prosecution information held; and,
transfer was made (ROC, Rule c. Other allegations relevant
102, Sec.JO). of the person or persons
responsible; to the resolution of the
If it appears that the prisoner is proceeding.
in custody under a warrant of iii. To identify wimessesand
obtain statements from A general denial of the allegations
commitment in pursuance of law, in the petition shall not be
the return shall be considered them concerning the
death or disappearance; allowed (A.M No. 08-1-16-SC,
prim.a facie evidence of the cause Sec.JO).
of restraint; but if he is restrained iv. To determine the
of his liberty by any allegedprivate cause, manner, location In case the respondent fails to
authority, the return shall be and time of death or file a return, the court, justice
considered only as a plea of the disappearance as well as or judge shall proceed to hear
facts therein set forth, and the party any pattern or practice the petition ex parte, granting
claiming the custody must prove that may have brought the petitioner such relief as the
such facts. (ROC, Rule 102, Sec.13) about the death or petition may warrant unless the
disappearance; court in its discretion requires
the petitioner to submit evidence
v. To identify and (A.M No. 08-1-16-SC,Sec.14)
apprehend the person or
persons involved in the
death or disappearance;
and
vi. To bring the suspected

offenders before a
competent court.
The period to file return cannot

be extended on highly meritorious
ground. The return shall also
state other matters relevant to the
investigation, its resolution and
the prosecution of the case.
All defenses shall be raised in the

return, otherwise, they shall be
deemed waived (A.M No. 07-3-
12-SC,Sec.JO).
San Beda University College of Law BO RGCT Bar Operations Center 2022
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Writ of Habeas Corpus Writ of Amparo Writ of Habeas Data

A general denial of the allegations
in the petition shall not be allowed
(A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, Sec.9).
The respondent public official

or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability (Sec.17)
In case the respondent fails to file

a return, the court, justice or judge
shall proceed to hear the petition
ex parte (Sec.12)
Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
What is the precautionary principle in environmental cases?

It states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment that
is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC, Rule 1, Sec. 4, par. [f]).
What is an Environmental Protection Order (EPO)?

It refers to an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any person or government agency to perform or
desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or rehabilitate the environment. (Rule 1, Sec. 4 (d)).
What is a Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO) and when may it issue?
The TEPO may issue if it appears from the petition with a prayer for the issuance of EPO that the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury.
The executive judge of the multiple-sala court before raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court as the case
may be, may issue ex parte a TEPO effective for only 72 hours from date of the receipt of the TEPO by the party
or person enjoined. Within the 72-hour TEPO period, the court where the case is assigned, shall also conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the TEPO may be extended until the termination of the case. (Rule 2, Sec.
8).
What is a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)?

It refers to an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person, institution or any
government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert
undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may
take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental
rights. In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed merely
as a harassment suit against environmental actions.
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules. It may only be exercised in the manner and
within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. It is a defense that can only be invoked in the same
action, before the same court. (Rule 1, Sec. 4, par. (g); Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018, Caguioa
Case).
How is SLAPP as a defense alleged?

In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment,
or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a
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SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim,
pray for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. In a criminal case, upon the filing of an information in court and
before arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal action is a SLAPP
(Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018, Caguioa Case).
May TRO or WPI be availed of to restrain enforcement of environmental laws?

Except the Supreme Court, no court can issue a TRO or WPI against lawful actions of government agencies that
enforce environmental laws or prevent violations thereof (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2, Sec. 10).
What is a citizen’s suit?

It is a suit filed by any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2, Sec. 5; Segovia v. Climate
Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Writ of Continuing Mandamus
Define writ of continuing mandamus.

A writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government
or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, RULE 1, Sec. 4(c)).
Is there also a liberalized rule on legal standing in petitions for writs of continuing mandamus?
No, A petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus is only available to one who is personally
aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7,
2017, Caguioa Case).
X filed a petition for continuing mandamus with the RTC but the court dismissed the petition on the
ground that there was no previous judgment in a separate case finding that respondents violated the
subject environmental law, which was a condition for the issuance of the writ because Section 4 (c), Rule
1, of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides that a “continuing mandamus is a writ
issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or
officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective
until judgment is fully satisfied. Was the RTC correct?
No. It is not necessary that there should have first been a previous judgment in a separate case finding the
respondents to have violated an environmental law before the writ of continuing mandamus may be issued. The
final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC in Section 4 (c), Rule 1, of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently
become final. After the court renders judgment in conformity with Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, and such judgment becomes final, the issuing court will retain jurisdiction over the case
to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the
effective performance of the said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the judgment that a final return of the
writ shall be made to the court. If the court finds that the judgment was already fully implemented, the satisfaction
of judgment shall then be entered in the court docket (Dolot v. Paje, G.R. No. 199199, 27 August 2013).
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippine, representing their children, who in turn represent
Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation
were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable. They filed a petition for writ of continuing
mandamus against respondents public officials, claiming that they failed to implement the road sharing
principle that would divide roads, allowing the use thereof by carless people or bikers, to reduce air
pollution. The basis of the petition is the failure to implement rules and issuances that would prevent or
reduce air quality degradation. Respondents showed they implemented projects but not in accordance
with that provided in the petition, there being no law requiring the same. Will the petition prosper?
No, first, petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to
be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general
rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus. Second, the Road Sharing Principle
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is precisely as it is denominated — a principle. There is no rule or law that requires the respondents to implement
the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle in the manner provided in the petition. What
the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act. The
determination of the means to be taken by the respondents in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or
executive policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the respondents
are guilty of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority, the general rule applies that
discretion cannot be checked via the petition for continuing mandamus. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission,
G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, Caguioa Case).
How shall the judgment be enforced in petitions for writ of continuing mandamus?
After the judgment becomes final, the court retains jurisdiction to ensure the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance thereof. The court shall require
respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment. The court may, by
itself or through a commissioner or appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. Periodic
reports shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. The Petitioner may submit comments or observations on
the execution of the judgment (A.M. No, 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec 7-8)
Writ of Kalikasan
What are the requisites for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan?

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or private individual or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. (Segovia v.
Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, Caguioa Case)
A petition for writ of kalikasan was filed with the SC. Respondent opposed this on the ground that
the direct filing of the petition with the SC violated the hierarchy of courts. Is the opposition correct?
No, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow
but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide
a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s constitutional right to a healthful and
balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential
nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated
under the rules satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is
allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the rules allow direct resort to the Supreme Court, it is
ultimately within the Court’s discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it (Segovia v.
Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, Caguioa Case).
X filed a petition for writ of kalikasan against respondents’ government officials, invoking the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology, without stating any rule or regulation violated or that would be
violated. Will the petition prosper?
No. A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation
was violated or would be violated. Here, apart from invocation of the constitutional right to health and a balanced
and healthful ecology, there is no showing that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that
constitutes a violation of X’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission,
G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, Caguioa Case).
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Distinguish writ of continuing mandamus and writ of kalikasan.

~'rit of Continuing ,lfmul,unus ~'rit of K,1lik,u.1n
I
Subject matter
Is directed against: Availableagainst an unlawful act or omission of a public

1. The unlawful neglect in the performance of an official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
resulting from an office, trust or station in con- in two or more cities or provinces {A.M No. 03-6-8-SC,
nection with the enforcement or violation of an Rule 7, Sec. I}.
environmental law rule or regulation or a right
therein; or
2. The unlawful exclusion of another from the use
or enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordi-
nary course of law {A.M. No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule
8, Sec. I}.
Who may file
The person aggrieved thereby (A.M No. 03-6-8-SC, Available to a natural or juridical person, entity
Rule 8, Sec. I}. authorized by law, people's organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest
group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is violated or threatened to be
violated (A.M No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. I}.
Respondent
Agency or instrumentality of the government or Public official or employee, or private individual or

officer {A.M. No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec. I}. entity {A.M. No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. I}.
Venue
1. The Regional Trial Court exercisingjurisdiction Only be filed the in Supreme Court or any of the
over the territory where the actionable neglect stations of the Court of Appeals {A.M No. 03-6-8-SC,
or omission occurred; Rule 7, Sec. 3).
2. The Court of Appeals; or
3. The Supreme Court (A.M. No. 03-6-8-SC,
Rule 8, Sec.2).
Discovery measures
Does not contain any provision for discovery Incorporates the procedural environmental right of
measures. access to information through the use of discovery
measures such as ocular inspection order and
production order (A.M No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec.
12}.
Damages for personal injury
Allows damages for the malicious neglect of the No damages may be awarded to individual petitioners
performance of the legal duty of the respondent, in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan
(A.M. No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Sec.7). consistent with the public-interest character of the
petition (A.M No. 03-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 15{e)).
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Criminal Procedure
General Matters
What are the requisites for the valid exercise of criminal jurisdiction? (STP)
To acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases, the court must have:
1. Jurisdiction over the Subject matter;
2. Jurisdiction over the Territory where the crime was committed; and
3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the accused (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002).
Distinguish custody of the law from jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either
by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015).
May there be custody of law without jurisdiction over the person?

One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such
as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant (David v.
Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015).
May there be jurisdiction over the person without custody of law?

One can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18,
2015).
Is venue an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases?

Yes, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction; and second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses
and other facilities for his defense are available. Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences. (Union Bank of the PHL v. People, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012).
Note: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases.
May injunction be issued to restrain criminal prosecution?

It is an established judicial policy that injunction cannot be used to thwart criminal prosecutions because
investigating the criminal acts and prosecuting their perpetrators right away have always been in the interest of the
public (Home Development Mutual Fund v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018).
Hence, as a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary or final, to enjoin or
restrain, criminal prosecution. However, in extreme cases, exceptions to the rule will apply: (1) when the injunction
is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial
question which is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7)
where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Samson v. Hon.
Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 123504, December 14, 2000).
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Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
How are criminal actions instituted?

Criminal actions shall be instituted as follows:
1. For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 112, by filing the
complaint with the proper officer purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation;
2. For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in
their charters (ROC, Rule 110, Sec.1).
Distinguish formal from substantial amendment of information.

Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been included
in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a formal
amendment that can be made at any time. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense,
surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. On the other hand, a substantial
amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the court (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018).
The need for arraignment in an amended information or complaint pertains only to substantial amendments and
not to formal amendments (Villarba vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020).
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave
of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment
before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court (ROC, Rule 110, Sec. 14). Under this rule, any amendment—be it formal or substantial—may be made
without leave of court before the arraignment. Once the arraignment is conducted, however, formal amendments
may be made but only if there is leave of court and if such amendment does not prejudice the rights of the accused.
A substantial amendment, on the other hand, is no longer allowed unless it “is beneficial to the accused (Villarba
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020).
X filed a complaint for bigamy against Y. X claims that when she married Y, he was already previously
married to A. Prior to arraignment, Y filed motion to quash information, on the ground that the first
element of bigamy, that Y was previously married to A, was not present. Allegedly, there was a previous
final decree of nullity declaring void the marriage between A and Y, before Y married X. The trial court
granted the motion to quash. X appealed and the CA sustained the dismissal, X filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the SC. Should the petition be given due course?
No. X has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. Section 5, Rule 110, provides that all
criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor. In criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be appealed by the
prosecutor or the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
In appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the State is vested solely in the
Office of the Solicitor General. In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court. X, the private offended party is but a
witness in the prosecution of offenses. The interest of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil
liability. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action
on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the
present case (Bumatay v. Bumatay, G.R. No. 191320, April 25, 2017, Caguioa Case).
An information for estafa was filed before the RTC Davao against SY. The information named TN as
private offended party. During trial, the prosecution proved SY’s receipt of the various pieces of jewelry.
For her part, SY neither denied receipt nor accounted for the jewelries; instead she proved that it was
not TN who filed the criminal complaint for estafa; rather, it was filed by TN’s mother. Is the variance
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between the person named in the information as offended party and the person who filed the criminal
complaint result in a denial of the SY’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal?
No, the variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not
of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a
mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. However, if the subject matter
of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would
result in the acquittal of the accused. If the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial (Senador v. People, G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013).
Is the use of the word “treachery” in the information sufficient as factual averment in order to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance to convict an accused of murder?
No, Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides, among others, that the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the
specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts stated in the indictment, that
is, the actual recital of the facts in the body of the information, and not the caption or preamble of the information
or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. The mere usage of the term
treachery in the information, without anything more, did not suffice for such term was a conclusion of law, not a
factual averment (People v. Dasmarinas, G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017).
Note: In People v. Solar (Caguioa Case), the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines for the Bench and the Bar
for the protection of the constitutional rights of the accused:
1. Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a
broad term to embrace various situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery;
(2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the ultimate
facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash under
Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules.
2. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his right to question the
defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently,
the same may be appreciated against him if proven during trial.
3. Alternatively, prosecutors may sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding probable cause against the
accused, which resolution should be attached to the Information in accordance with the second guideline
below.
4. Prosecutors must ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure that mandates the attachment to the Information the resolution finding probable cause against
the accused. Trial courts must ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of this Decision prior to the
arraignment.
5. Cases which have attained finality prior to the promulgation of this Decision will remain final by virtue of
the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
6. For cases which are still pending before the trial court, the prosecution, when still able, may file a motion
to amend the Information pursuant to the prevailing Rules in order to properly allege the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance pursuant to this Decision.
7. For cases in which a judgment or decision has already been rendered by the trial court and is still pending
appeal, the case shall be judged by the appellate court depending on whether the accused has already
waived his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the
Information, (i.e., whether he previously filed either a motion to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117, or a
motion for a bill of particulars) pursuant to this Decision.
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Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111)
When should the reservation of the right to institute the civil action separately be made?
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation (ROC, Rule 111, Sec. 1).
Does the acquittal of the accused automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case?
No. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished
if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him (Estate of Poblador, Jr., v. Manzano, G.R. No.
192391; June 19, 2017).
Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112)
Distinguish executive determination of probable cause from judicial determination of probable cause.
Executive determination of probable cause ascertains whether a criminal case must be filed in court. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and should be
held for trial. On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause ascertains whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. It is one made by a judge who must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
presented there is necessity in placing the accused under custody so that the ends of justice will not be frustrated
(People v. Borje, G.R. No. 170046, December 10, 2014).
Are the findings of the prosecutors with respect to the existence of probable cause subject to judicial
review?
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of the public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence
or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal information, unless such findings are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
v. Gidwani, G.R. No. 234616, June 20, 2018).
When is preliminary investigation required?

Except in cases of lawful warrantless arrests, a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the
filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day without regard to the fine (ROC, Rule 112, Sec. 1).
During the preliminary investigation, does the accused have the right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present?
No, Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit
a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing
to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015).
If an investigating prosecutor dismisses a complaint filed, what is the remedy of the aggrieved party?
The party may file a verified petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, and by furnishing copies thereof to
the adverse party and the Prosecution Office issuing the appealed resolution (DOJ Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, Sec. 4).
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Mr. A filed a complaint for Plunder against B before the Office of the Ombudsman. B received from the
Ombudsman a copy of Mr. A’s Complaint-Affidavit and its annexes, as well as the Affidavits of his two
witnesses, B’s twin sister, C, and their mother, D. Atty. F, counsel of B, filed an Omnibus Motion with
the Ombudsman requesting (1) for copies of the counter-affidavits of B’s co-respondents in the Plunder
complaint, G and H; and (2) for the examination and photocopying of the two volumes of the Stock and
Transfer book of X Company Inc. The Ombudsman denied all prayers in the Omnibus Motion. Was the
Ombudsman’s denial of the Omnibus Motion correct:
1. On the first prayer for copies of G’s and H’s counter affidavit?
Yes, in Reyes v. Office of the Ombudsman (G.R. No. 208243, June 5, 2017) and Estrada v. Ombudsman (G.R.
Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015), the Supreme Court ruled that during preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman is not required to furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. The
section 4(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman A.O. No. 7) refers to are affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, not affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of
the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant.
2. On the second prayer for the examination and photocopying of the Stock and Transfer Book?
Yes, the Ombudsman’s denial of the request for examination and photocopying of the Stock and Transfer
book is correct. The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense (ROC, Rule 112, Sec. 3). X Company
Inc.’s Stock and Transfer books are not indicated as evidence submitted by the complainant. Thus, B has no
right to examine said books.
In a neighborhood bicycle race, Mr. A bumped the bicycle of one of his competitors, Mr. B, in order to
get ahead. This caused the latter to lose control of the bike which hit the concrete pavement and sent
Mr. B crashing headfirst into the sidewalk. By the time the organizers got to him, Mr. B was dead. Law
enforcement authorities who witnessed the incident arrested Mr. A without a warrant, and immediately
brought him to the inquest prosecutor for the conduct of an inquest. Thereafter, an Information for
Homicide was filed by the inquest prosecutor without the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
next day, Mr. A requested for the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
1. Is the inquest prosecutor’s filing of the Information without the conduct of preliminary investigation
proper?
Yes. The initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine whether the respondent was arrested pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 113. If that was so, then he can file the information immediately in the proper court. Since
Mr. A was arrested in flagrante delicto, the action of the inquest prosecutor in filing the Information without
conducting a preliminary investigation was correct (Section 8, Rule on Inquest).
2. Is Mr. A’s request permissible? Explain.
The request of Mr. A to conduct a preliminary investigation was correct and the same is supported by the
Revised Guidelines on Continuous trial because it was made within the five (5)-day reglementary period from
inquest and filing of the Information in Court. Mr. R’s request was made a day after the Information for
Homicide was filed in court by the inquest prosecutor (A.M. No. 15-06-10- SC, otherwise known as the Revised
Guidelines for Continuous trial in Criminal cases).
Arrest (Rule 113)
X, a Bantay Bayan operative was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man
showing off his private parts. Thus, he went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, Y,
urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. X
approached Y and asked for an ID card, but the latter failed to produce one. Thus, X frisked Y and took
from the latter’s pocket a cigarette box. Upon opening the container, X found dried marijuana leaves.
Forthwith, X seized the marijuana leaves and took Y to the police station. An information was filed
before the RTC charging Y of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11 of RA 9165.
Y argued that arrest made on his person was illegal and, thus, the marijuana purportedly seized was
inadmissible as evidence. Is Y’s contention tenable?
Yes. The arrest of Y, without any overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime, is illegal. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113, two elements must
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concur. First, the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Second, such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. In this case, X simply responded to a purported report of a man showing off his
private parts which led to petitioner’s arrest. Y went out to the street to urinate when X chanced upon him. These
circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest. There was no overt act constituting a
crime committed by Y in the presence of the arresting officer (Remegio v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017).
During the trial, X contended that the arrest made upon Y is valid on the ground that the latter had a
reputation of being a notorious criminal and even had a past criminal record. Is X’s contention tenable?
No, to interpret “personal knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations would create
a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless
arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous
requisites laid out under Section 5 of Rule 113 (People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013).
Two police officers on board a patrol car were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street,
Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the
men came. Seeing the door slightly ajar, one officer pushed the door in order to peep inside. The officers
saw X holding an improvised tooter and a lighter. This prompted the officers to enter the house and
arrest X. On the table in front of X, 10 sachets of shabu were seized. Was the arrest valid?
No, Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a “peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense.” This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The police officers were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out. Since they suspected that
a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. But the officers instead gave priority to the
house even when they heard no cry for help from it. Even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it. No crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers
that authorized the arrest of X without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. The warrantless arrest was not
valid (Antiquera v. People, G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013).
What are the instances of valid warrantless arrest?

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe, based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (ROC, Rule 113, Sec. 5).
Other grounds for a valid warrantless arrest:

1. When a person, previously lawfully arrested, escapes or is rescued. Any person may immediately pursue or
retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines (ROC, Rule 113, Sec. 13).
2. A warrant of arrest is not necessary if the bondsman arrests the accused for the purpose of surrendering
him. The bondsman may even cause the arrest of the accused by a police officer or any other person of
suitable age and discretion upon a written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking (ROC,
Rule114, Sec. 23).
3. When an accused released on bail attempts to depart from the Philippines without permission of the court
where the case is pending, he may be re-arrested without a warrant (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 23).
PO2 DC and SPO1 DZ were conducting a checkpoint when they flagged the motorcycle driven by the
P with his wife as the back rider. The officers noticed that the accused-appellant was not wearing shoes
and helmet and the motorcycle did not have a license plate. When asked for the license plate, P opened
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the motorcycle's utility box and presented the plate as well as the expired registration of the motorcycle.
At this instance, P02 DC noticed two sachets containing a crystalline substance in the utility box
which he confiscated. Thereafter, a body search was conducted on P where two more plastic sachets
were recovered. P was brought to the Barangay Hall where the seized items were photographed and the
substance inside the sachets tested positive for shabu. Is the arrest valid under the plain view doctrine?
Yes.In People v. Lagman, the Court laid down the following parameters for the application of this doctrine: The
'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. First, the police officers
were conducting a routine checkpoint when they flagged down the accused on board his motorcycle. The police
officers noticed that the accused, as abovementioned, was committing several traffic infractions, thus the police
officers had a prior justification for their act of flaggingdown the accused and their subsequent intrusion. Second,
upon asking the accused for his registration papers, the accused opened his utiliry box, and the two (2) sachets of
shabu were plainly visible to the police officers. The discovery of the sachets was inadvertent and the illicit items
were immediately apparent. Lastly, the police confiscated the sachets containing white crystalline substance since it
appeared that the same could be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure (De Villa y Guinto
v. People G.R. No. 22403!>,September 11, 2013, Caguioa Case)
BAIL (RULE 114)
What are the instances when bail is a matter of right, is a matter of discretion, and when bail should be
denied?
When bail is a matter of right I When bail is discretionary I When bail will be denied
a. Before conviction by the a. Upon convtcnon by the a. Before convtcnon by the
inferior court; RTC of an offense not RTC when accused is charged
b. After conviction by the punishable by death, with an offense punishable
inferior court; redusion perpetua or life by reclusion perpetua, life
c. Before conviction by the RTC imprisonment, admission to imprisonment or death and
of an offense not punishable bailis discretionary; or the evidence of guile is strong
by death, redusion perpetua b. After conviction by the (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 7};
or life imprisonment (ROC, RTC wherein a penalty of b. After conviction by the RTC
Rule 114, Sec. 4}; or imprisonment exceeding 6 when penalty imposed is
d. Before conviction by the RTC but not more than 20 years is death, life imprisonment or
when the imposable penalty imposed, and not one of the redusion perpetua (Leviste v.
is death, reclusion perpetua circumstances enumerated in CA, G.R. No. 183122, March
or life imprisonment and the Sec. S is present and proved 17, 2010};
evidence of guileis not strong (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 5). c. After conv1ct1on by the
(Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, RTC imposing a penalty
G.R. No. 213847, August 18, of imprisonment exceeding
2015). 6 years but not more than
20 years and any of the
circumstance enumerated and
other similar circumstance
is present and proved (ROC,
Rule 114, Sec. 5},
d. Judgment is final and
executory unless accused
applied far probation before
commencing to serve sentence
ofpenalty and offense is within
the purview of probation law
(ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 24}; or
e. Court martial cases
(Commendador v. De Villa,
G.R. No. !)Jl 77, August 2,
1!)!)1}.
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When the accused is entitled as a matter of right to bail, may the court refuse to grant him bail on the
ground that there exists a high degree of probability that he will abscond or escape?
No, if a bail is a matter of right, it cannot be denied on the ground that there exists a high degree of probability that
the accused will abscond or escape. What the court can do is increase the amount of the bail. One of the guidelines
that the judge may use in fixing a reasonable amount of bail is the probability of the accused appearing in trial.
(ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 9(g), as amended by Circular No. 12-94).
Does an application for bail bar the accused from questioning the validity of: his arrest, the warrant, and
the manner of conducting the preliminary investigation?
No, an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case (ROC, Rule 114, Sec. 26).
AL was charged with murder in the lower court. His Petition for Bail was denied after a summary
hearing on the ground that the prosecution had established strong evidence of guilt. No Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition for Bail. During the reception of the evidence of
the accused, the accused reiterated his petition for bail on the ground that the witnesses so far presented
by the accused had shown that no qualifying aggravating circumstance attended the killing. The court
denied the petition on the grounds that it had already ruled that: (i) the evidence of guilt is strong; (ii)
the resolution for the Petition for Bail is solely based on the evidence presented by the prosecution;
and (iii) no Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the denial of the Petition for Bail. If you are the
Judge, how will you resolve the Incident?
If I were the Judge, I would grant the second Petition for Bail. Under Section 7, Rule 114, no person charge with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
In this case, the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not strong, as shown by the prosecution’s failure to prove
the circumstance that will qualify the crime to, and consequently convict the accused of, murder. Accordingly, the
accused should be allowed to post bail because the evidence of his guilt is not strong (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 13)
JW was charged with murder. JW filed a petition for bail and after hearing thereon, the court denied
bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt was strong. Trial on the merits ensued and the prosecution
rested its case. JW filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied. JW filed a motion to fix bail, alleging
that the prosecution was able to show that the crime charged should be homicide only and not murder,
relying on the case of People v. Rivera, a case with substantially the same facts where the victim was killed
during a heated argument, the crime was only homicide due to the absence of treachery because there
was no preparation made in a manner to ensure the killing of the victim. The RTC denied the motion
on the ground that the evidence of guilt for the death of the victim was strong and it was incumbent
on the accused to take the witness stand, to show otherwise. JW moved for reconsideration which was
denied. JW filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Was the denial of the motion to fix bail proper?
No, the denial of the motion to fix bail was not proper. The RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to fix bail because the prosecution could at best, only convict JW of homicide and not murder.
Treachery is not present when the killing was preceded by a heated argument. The determination of whether the
evidence of guilt is strong should be applied in relation to the crime charged, in this case, murder. The RTC should
only have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed to simply determining if the
evidence that he was responsible for the victim’s death was strong. Here, the evidence of JW’s guilt — for Murder
— was not strong. The RTC should have granted JW’s Motion to Fix Bail. (Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461,
December 5, 2018)
Arraignment and Plea (Rule 116)
When is plea bargaining allowed?

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case. As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not
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amount to a grave abuse thereof (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
What are the instances when arraignment of the accused may be suspended?
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
1. The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him
unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court
shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
2. There exists a prejudicial question; and
3. A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or
the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (ROC, Rule 116, Sec. 11).
Note: The list is exclusive. A motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds not stated under Sec. 11, Rule
116 is a prohibited motion (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, Subheading III, item no. 2).
X is charged with murder. At his arraignment, the prosecution witnesses appeared in court together
with the heirs of the victim. Realizing the gravity of his offense and the number of witnesses against
him, X consulted his counsel de oficio who explained to him the nature of the offense charge and the
consequences of his plea. The information was read to X in a language he clearly understood after which
he pleaded guilty. The judge asked him if he indeed fully understood the implications of his plea and X
readily and without hesitation answered in the affirmative. The judge then pronounced sentence on X.
Comment on the action of the judge.
The judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise
degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. The judge is required to accomplish three
things: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the accused’s plea; (2) to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him
to do so if he so desires. This procedure is mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe it commits a grave abuse of
discretion (People v. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990).
When may an accused enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense?

The accused may enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense if the following requisites are present:
1. There is consent of the offended party;
2. There is consent of the prosecutor;
Note: If the accused entered a plea to a lesser offense without the consent of the prosecutor and offended
party and he was convicted, his subsequent conviction of the crime charged would not place him in double
jeopardy (ROC, Rule 117, Sec.7 (c)).
3. A plea to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged; and approval of the court
must be obtained (ROC, Rule 116, Sec. 2; Daan v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos.
163972-77, March 28, 2008).
Motion to Quash (Rule 117)
X, through his counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the information against him on ground of illegality
of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of his personal possessions. The public prosecutor opposed the
motion on the ground that illegality of arrest was not one of the grounds for a motion to quash. Is the
prosecutor correct?
No, the alleged illegality of the arrest assails the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Thus, contrary
to the prosecution’s claim, the supposed illegality of the arrest of X is a valid ground for a motion to quash under
Rule 117, Sec. 1(c) of the Rules of Court, which provides that the complaint or information may be quashed on the
ground that “the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused.”
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Two informations were filed against A for violation of RA 9165. During trial, B, the arresting officer
and the principal witness for the prosecution, failed to appear. The officer likewise failed to appear
during the rescheduled hearing. Thus, the Presiding Judge issued an order provisionally dismissing the
cases with the express consent of A. However, B moved to reopen the case explaining that his failure to
appear during the hearings of the cases was due to the untimely death of his father. The Presiding Judge
granted the motion and ordered the reopening of the cases against A and set the cases for continuation
of hearing. A moved for reconsideration, arguing, among others, that the provisional dismissal of the
cases is considered an acquittal. Rule on the motion.
The motion should be denied. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused,
as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods provided under the second paragraph of Sec.
8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been
previously charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction,
or dismissed in any other manner without his consent. Here, A is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy
with the reopening of the case against her as the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The
requirement of double jeopardy that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not
present in this case (Saldariega v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 211933, April 15, 2015).
AY was charged before the RTC with frustrated homicide for the multiple wounds sustained by PL.
Upon arraignment, AY entered a plea of guilty to said crime. Neither the court nor the prosecution
was aware that PL had died two days earlier on the account of the stab wounds. Due to his guilty plea,
AY was convicted of frustrated homicide and meted the corresponding penalty. When the prosecution
learned of PL’s death, it filed within fifteen (15) days therefrom a motion to amend the information
to upgrade the charge from frustrated homicide to consummated homicide. AY opposed the motion
claiming that the admission of the amended information would place him in double jeopardy. Resolve
the motion with reasons.
The amended information to consummated homicide from frustrated homicide does not put the accused in double
jeopardy. As provided in the second paragraph of Section 7, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, the conviction of the
accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information when: a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from
the same act or omission constituting the former charge; or b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
known or were discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information. Here, when the
plea to frustrated homicide was made, neither the court nor the prosecution was aware that the victim had died two
days earlier on account of stab wounds.
Before the arraignment for the crime of murder, the private complainant executed an Affidavit of
Desistance stating that she was not sure if the accused was the man who killed her husband. The public
prosecutor filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that with private complainant’s
desistance, he did not have sufficient evidence to convict the accused. On 02 February 2001, the court
without further proceedings granted the motion and provisionally dismissed the case. The accused
gave his express consent to the provisional dismissal of the case. The offended party was notified of the
dismissal, but she refused to give her consent.
Subsequently, the private complainant urged the public prosecutor to refile the murder charge because
the accused failed to pay the consideration which he had promised for the execution of the Affidavit
of Desistance. The public prosecutor obliged and refiled the murder charge against the accused on 01
March 2003. The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the provisional
dismissal of the case had already become permanent. Resolve the motion to quash?
The motion to quash the information should be denied because, while the provisional dismissal had already
become permanent, the prescriptive period for filing the murder charge had not prescribed. There was no double
jeopardy because the first case was dismissed before the accused had pleaded the charge (ROC, Rule 117, Section 7).
Pre-Trial (Rule 118)
What is the effect of a party’s failure to appear during pre-trial?

In a criminal case, if the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and
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does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties
What is the rule as regards agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference?
All agreements and admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be (a) reduced in writing;
and (b) signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements
covering matters referred to Section 1 of Rule 118 shall be approved by the court (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC effective
August 16, 2004).
Mayor ME was charged of malversation through falsification of official documents. Assisted by Atty.
KO as counsel de parte during pre-trial, he signed together with Ombudsman Prosecutor MO a Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Documents” which was presented to the Sandiganbayan. Before the court could
issue a pre-trial order but after some delay caused by Atty. KO, he was substituted by Atty. NA as
defense counsel. Atty. NA forthwith filed a motion to withdraw the “Joint Stipulation”, alleging that
it is prejudicial to the accused because it contains, inter alia, the statement that the “Defense admitted
all the documentary evidence of the Prosecution,” thus leaving the accused a little or no room to defend
himself, and violating his right against self-incrimination. Should the court grant Atty. NA’s motion?
No, the court should not grant Atty. NA’s motion. For a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must
satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by
both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the
parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable
it to control the flow of the proceedings. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties
and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the
fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage (Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143689- 91,
November 12, 2002).
If in the pre-trial agreement signed by the accused and his counsel, the accused admits the documentary evidence
of the prosecution, it does not violate his right against self-incrimination. His lawyer cannot file a motion to
withdraw. A pre-trial order is not needed. The admission of such documentary evidence is allowed by the rules
Trial (Rule 119)
What are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia? (ANA)

The following are the requisites of a valid trial in absentia:
1. The accused has been Arraigned;
2. He has been duly Notified of the trial; and
3. His failure to Appear is unjustified (CONST., Art. III, Sec. 14, Par. 2; Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 166980,
April 4, 2007).
After the prosecution has presented its evidence in a case for illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution
on such evidence rested its case. Within a period of five days therefrom, the accused filed a demurrer to
evidence, in sum contending that the prosecution evidence has not established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt and so prayed that he be acquitted of the offense charged. The trial court
denied the demurrer to evidence and deemed the accused as having waived his right to present evidence
and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the prosecution evidence. Is the trial court correct?
Yes. The trial court is correct. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides that when the demurrer to
evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. In the case at bar, the accused did not ask for leave to
file the demurrer to evidence. He is deemed to have waived his right to present evidence (People v. Flores, G.R. No.
106581, March 3, 1997).
A complaint-affidavit was filed against the accused before the prosecutor in 1999. The prosecutor
dismissed without prejudice the complaint more than 8 years from the filing of the complaint or in
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2007. Dismissal was on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue. Thereafter, the DOJ
found probable cause against the accused and an information against him was filed in 2008. Accused was
arraigned 2 months later. A day after arraignment, Accused filed a motion to dismiss based on the right
to speedy disposition of the case. Is the accused barred by laches or waiver?
No. The length of delay must be commensurate with the reason thereof. The complaints filed before the prosecutor
was dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction by reason of improper venue. It took the Prosecutor
more than eight years from the filing of the complaints to dismiss without prejudice the complaint. The issue on
venue in libel cases is neither a novel nor difficult one. The more than eight years it took the Prosecutor to resolve
a rather routine issue is inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified.
The silence of the accused during such period could not be viewed as an unequivocal act of waiver of their right
to speedy determination of their cases. The more than eight years delay the Prosecutor incurred before issuing
his resolution of the complaint is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice and such delay could only be
perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner. The dismissal is warranted because of the violation
of the right to speedy disposition of their cases. (People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March
5, 2018, Caguioa Case)
What are the effects of discharge of an accused as a state witness under Rule 119?
The following are the effects of discharge of an accused as a state witness:
1. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial (ROC, Rule 119,
Sec. 17); and
2. Discharge of accused operates as an acquittal and shall bar further prosecution for the same offense,
unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis of his discharge (ROC, Rule 119, Sec. 18).
What are the requisites to be a State Witness under RA 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security, and
Benefit Act? (GrAD-CoMM)
A person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and,
if qualified as determined by the Department of Justice, shall be admitted under the Witness Protection, Security,
and Benefit Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
1. The offense in which his testimony will be used is a Grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code
or its equivalent under special laws;
2. There is Absolute necessity for his testimony;
3. There is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
4. His testimony can be substantially Corroborated on its material points;
5. He does not appear to be Most guilty; and
6. He has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving Moral turpitude. (RA 6981 otherwise known
as “Witness Protection, Security, and Benefit Act”, Sec. 10)
Is it required that the witness be charged before it can be admitted into the Witness Protection and
Security Benefit Program?
No, the Witness need not be charged. Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the
commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body,
or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program (RA 6981, Sec. 3).
An information was filed charging A, B and C with Carnapping with homicide. The prosecution moved
to discharge A as a state witness. During the hearing on the discharge, A testified and was cross-examined
by the defense, who manifested that the cross-examination was limited to the incident of discharge and
reserved the right to further cross-examine A during the prosecution’s presentation of its evidence in
chief. The court granted the motion to discharge A as state witness. Shortly, A was found dead. Should
A’s testimony be stricken from the records?
No, the testimony of the witness A during the discharge proceeding shall automatically form part of the trial
and it will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness, which
denial is not present in this case. While it is true that Section 18, Rule 119 requires the accused to testify again
during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness, the non-compliance therewith would only prevent the
order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of rendering all the testimonies of the state
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witness during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. The testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the
discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse
to testify in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge (People v. Dominguez,
G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018).
Judgment (Rule 120)
What are the formal requisites of a valid judgment? (WPC)

The following are the formal requisites of a valid judgment:
1. It must be Written in the official language;
2. It must be Personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him; and
3. It must Contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based (ROC,
Rule 120, Sec. 1).
What must be contained in a judgment of conviction and in a judgment of acquittal? (LAPIC)

A judgment of CONVICTION shall state the:
1. Legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused;
2. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending its commission;
3. Participation of the accused, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory;
4. Penalty Imposed upon the accused; and
5. Civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 2, Par. 1)
A judgment of ACQUITTAL shall state:

1. Whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
2. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 2, Par. 2)
What is the Variance Doctrine?

Under the Variance Doctrine, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved.
If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted
thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation contained in the information and the conviction resulting
from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included
in the other (Malabanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186329, 186584-86 & 198598, August 2, 2017).
When the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 4).
An information was filed against X for acts of lasciviousness. During trial, it was proven that he raped
the victim. The information was never amended. May X be conviction of rape?
No. X can only be convicted of the crime charged, acts of lasciviousness, and not the crime proven, rape. When
there is variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense charged is
included or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proven, which
is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged, which is included in the offense proved. The offense
charged, acts of lasciviousness, is included in the offense proved, rape. X may only be convicted of the offense
charged, acts of lasciviousness (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 4; People v. Bongbonga y Nalos, G.R. No. 214771 , August 9,
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Accused was charged with rape but during trial it was only proven that accused got the victim’s hand
and placed it on his genitals. Will accused be acquitted?
No, pursuant to the variance doctrine, accused shall be convicted of the proven lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness,
which is necessarily included in the crime of rape. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 226467, October 17, 2018, Caguioa
Case).
Accused is charged with rape. The private complainant testified against him on direct examination.
Before she may be subject of cross examination, she died. What is the effect of the death of the private
complainant on her testimonial evidence?
Her direct testimony shall be excluded because the accused is guaranteed by the constitution the right to cross-
examine a witness. The right of an accused to cross-examine a witness is essential to test the credibility and
truthfulness of the testimony offered and likewise provides an opportunity for the accused to demonstrate
substantial inconsistencies that could create reasonable doubt as to his guilt. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888,
August 22, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Note: Despite the death of the private complainant, the case shall proceed because in criminal cases, the offended
party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the
accused. The death of the private complainant did not extinguish the criminal liability of the accused. (Id.)
AX was charged before the RTC with theft of jewelry valued at P20,000.00, punishable with
imprisonment of up to 10 years of prison mayor under the Revised Penal Code. After trial, he was
convicted of the offense charged, notwithstanding that the material facts duly established during the
trial showed that the offense committed was estafa, punishable by imprisonment of up to eight years of
prision mayor under the said Code. No appeal having been taken therefrom, said judgment of conviction
became final.
1. Is the judgment of conviction valid?
Yes, the judgment of conviction for theft upon Information for theft is valid because the court had jurisdiction
to render judgment. However, the judgment was erroneous. The variance between the evidence (one for
estafa) and the judgment of conviction (one for theft) is substantial. The elements of the two crimes are not
the same. Further, one offense does not necessarily include or is included in the other. (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 5)
Hence, AX would have had reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. (Santos v. People, G.R. No. 77429, January 29, 1990)
2. What should have been the proper action of the court once the variance has become manifest?
The RTC should have committed the accused to answer for the proper offense (estafa) and dismiss the original
case (one for theft) upon the filing of the proper information (ROC, Rule 119, Sec. 19)
Is the said judgment reviewable thru a special civil action for certiorari?
Yes. The judgment is reviewable by certiorari because the judge committed a grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of his jurisdiction in convicting the accused of theft and in violating due process and his right to
be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, which make the judgment void. (ROC Rule
65, Sec. 1)
When may the presence of the accused in the promulgation be dispensed with?
The presence of the accused in the promulgation may be dispensed with when (1) the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative or (2) the judgment is
for acquittal. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regardless of the gravity of the offense, promulgation of judgment
in absentia is allowed under the Rules. The only essential elements for its validity are: (a) that the judgment be
recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. (Pascua v.
CA, G.R. No. 140243, December 14, 2000).
When does a judgment of conviction become final? (ASWP)

Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final:
1. After the lapse of the period for perfecting an Appeal;
2. When the sentence has been partially or totally Satisfied or served;
3. When the accused has Waived in writing his right to appeal; or
4. Has applied for Probation (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 7)
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New Trial or Reconsideration (Rule 121)
What are the grounds for new trial and reconsideration?

The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
1. That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
2. That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change
the judgment. (ROC, Rule 121, Sec. 2).
The court shall grant reconsideration on the ground of errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no
further proceedings (ROC, Rule 121, Sec. 3).
What are the requisites for granting a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence? (EDMA)
The requisites are the following:
1. That the Evidence was discovered after trial;
2. That such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable Diligence;
3. That it is Material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
4. The evidence is of such a weight that it would probably change the judgment if Admitted (Ybiernas v.
Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011).
What are the effects of a grant of the motion for a new trial or reconsideration?
The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
1. When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all
proceedings and evidence not affected by the commission of such errors and irregularities shall stand, but
those affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the
introduction of additional evidence;
2. When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence already taken shall
stand, and the newly discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to
be introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record; and
3. In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside and
a new judgment rendered accordingly (ROC, Rule 121, Sec. 6).
What is the Fresh Period Rule?

There shall be a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal, to be continued from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration (Neypes v. CA, G.R. No. 141524, September
14, 2005).
Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable in criminal cases?

Yes, Yu v. Samson-Tatad (G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011) held that the “fresh period rule” previously laid
down in Neypes v. CA (G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005) shall likewise be applicable to criminal cases for the
following reasons:
1. Section 39 of BP 129 does not distinguish between a civil and criminal case in setting the period to appeal
at 15 days from the “notice of the final order” appealed from. Note that the court in Neypes held that the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration or for New Trial is the “final order” referred to in BP 129; and
2. The provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 and Section 6 of Rule 122, though differently worded mean exactly
the same. That the appeal period stops running from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed, and begins to run again upon receipt of the order denying such motions. There is then no reason
why the period of appeal which is stayed in civil cases should likewise not be stayed in a criminal case when
a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed.
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Search and Seizure (Rule 126)
Where should the application for search warrant be filed with?

An application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction the crime is
committed; or (b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has been filed, the application shall only be
made in court where the criminal action is pending (ROC, Rule 126, Sec. 2).
In applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession
of firearms, which shall be filed by the PNP, NBI, Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and
Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF), it may be filed with the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and
Quezon City, where the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of said courts shall be authorized to act on
said applications. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of said agencies. The search warrants
issued in such may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said courts (A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC).
Does a search warrant have the same period of validity as a warrant of arrest?
No, a search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void (ROC, Rule 126, Sec.
10). Unlike a search warrant, no time limit is fixed for the validity of a warrant of arrest. The return mentioned in
Sec. 4, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court [for the warrant of arrest] refers not to the physical delivery of the very same
copy of the process to the issuing court, but the report of the officer charged with its execution on the action taken
by him thereon. In short, the ten-day period is only a directive to the officer executing the warrant to make a return
to the court (People v. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, January 18, 2001).
Are both the complainant and the witnesses he may produce required to be personally examined by the
judge before a search warrant can be issued against the accused?
No, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need
to examine both the applicant and the witnesses if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient,
the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. (People v. Gabiosa, Sr., G.R. No. 248395; January 29, 2020,
Caguioa Case).
Judge X of RTC Malabon City was found to have granted 758 search warrant applications even though
the places of commission of the crimes involved therein were outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC
Malabon City and out of 758 applications, 130 completely failed to cite compelling reasons to warrant
their filing in the RTC of Malabon City. It is argued that the Judge should motu proprio deny said
applications outright. Decide.
The argument is not correct. The absence of a statement of compelling reasons is not a ground for the outright
denial of a search warrant application, since it is not one of the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant under
Sec. 4 of Rule 126, which provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines
The statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the proper venue for the filing of
search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of a search
warrant. An application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in itself a criminal
action. The rule that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply to applications for search warrant,
where venue is only procedural and not jurisdictional. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, September 5, 2017).
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Provisional Remedies in Criminal Cases (Rule 127)
What are the provisional remedies available in criminal proceedings?

The provisional remedies available in criminal proceedings are the following:
1. Attachment – Preliminary attachment is available in the following cases:
a. When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;
b. When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently
misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation,
attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other
person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
c. When the accused has concealed, removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so; and
d. When the accused resides outside the Philippines (ROC, Rule 127, Sec. 2).
2. Preliminary Injunction;
3. Receivership;
4. Delivery of personal property; and
5. Support pendente lite (ROC, Rule 127, Sec. 1).
May a provisional remedy of a writ of preliminary attachment be availed of in a criminal case where
there is a reservation of the right to institute the civil action ex delicto separately?
No, it may only be availed of when the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action and the following
grounds therefor are present: (a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines; (b) the criminal
action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of
the accused who is a public officer, officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course
of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty; (c) the
accused has concealed, removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so; and (d) When the accused resides
outside the Philippines (ROC, Rule 127, Sec. 2).
Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC)
What cases are covered by the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases?
The Revised Guidelines shall apply to all newly-filed criminal cases, including those governed by Special Laws and
Rules, in the First and Second Level Courts, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals as of September
1, 2017. It shall also apply to pending criminal cases with respect to the remainder of the proceedings. Unless
otherwise specifically provided, it shall not apply to cases under the Rule on Summary Procedure (A.M. No. 15-
06-10-SC, Subheading I).
What are prohibited motions under the Revised Guidelines?

The following motions are prohibited:
1. Motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
2. Motion for preliminary investigation:
a. When it is filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period in inquest proceedings under Sec. 6, Rule 112;
or
b. When required under Sec. 8, Rule 112, or allowed in inquest proceedings and the accused failed to
participate in the preliminary investigation despite due notice.
3. Motion for reinvestigation of the prosecutor recommending the filing of information once the information
has been filed before the court:
a. If the motion is filed without prior leave of court;
b. When preliminary investigation is not required under Sec. 8, Rule 112; and
c. When the regular preliminary investigation is required and has been actually conducted, and the
grounds relied upon in the motion are not meritorious, such as issues of credibility, admissibility of
evidence, innocence of the accused, or lack of due process when the accused was actually notified,
among others.
4. Motion to quash information when the ground is not one of those stated in Sec. 3, Rule 117.
5. Motion for bill of particulars that does not conform to Sec. 9, Rule 116.
6. Motion to suspend the arraignment based on grounds not stated under Sec. 11, Rule 116.
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7. Petition to suspend criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question, when no civil case has been
filed, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 111 (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, Subheading III, 2(b)).
Note: Prohibited motions shall be denied outright before the scheduled arraignment without need of comment
and/or opposition (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, Subheading III, 2(b)).
The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC)
What procedures are covered by the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants?

The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants covers the procedure for the application and grant of warrants and related
orders involving the preservation, disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, as well as the
custody, and destruction of computer data, as provided under RA 10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012” (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 1.2).
Will the Rules of Court apply in cases covered by the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants?
Yes. The Rule on Cybercrime Warrants supplements the existing Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provisions
shall continue to govern the preliminary investigation and all stages of prosecution of criminal actions involving
violations of RA 10175, including all crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, committed by, through, and with the use of information and communications technologies (A.M.
No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 1.3).
What are the different types of Cybercrime Warrants?

There are four (4) kinds of Cybercrime Warrants, to wit:
1. A Warrant to Disclose Computer Data (WDCD) is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge, upon application of law enforcement authorities, authorizing the
latter to issue an order to disclose and accordingly, require any person or service provider to disclose or
submit subscriber’s information, traffic data, or relevant data in his/her or its possession or control (A.M.
No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 4.2).
2. A Warrant to Intercept Computer Data (WICD) is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge, upon application of law enforcement authorities, authorizing the
latter to carry out any or all of the following activities: (a) listening to, (b) recording, (c) monitoring, or
(d) surveillance of the content of communications, including procuring of the content of computer data,
either directly, through access and use of a computer system or indirectly, through the use of electronic
eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same time that the communication is occurring (A.M. No. 17-11-
03-SC, Sec. 5.2).
3. A Warrant to Search, Seize and Examine Computer Data (WSSECD) is an order in writing issued
in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge, upon application of law enforcement
authorities, authorizing the latter to search the particular place for items to be seized and/or examined
(A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 6.1)
4. A Warrant to Examine Computer Data (WECD) is required to be applied for and obtained by law
enforcement authorities, upon acquiring possession of a computer device or computer system via a
lawful warrantless arrest, or by any other lawful method, and before searching the said computer device
or computer system for the purpose of obtaining for forensic examination the computer data contained
therein (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC, Sec. 6.9).
Where should an application for a Cybercrime Warrant be filed?

The application for a Cybercrime Warrant shall be filed as follows:
1. For violations of Sec. 4 (Cybercrime offenses) and/or Sec. 5 (Other offenses) of RA 10175 - before
any of the designated cybercrime courts of the province or the city
a. Where the offense or any of its elements has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be
committed;
b. Where any part of the computer system used is situated; or
c. Where any of the damage caused to a natural or juridical person took place.
Note: The cybercrime courts in Quezon City, the City of Manila, Makati City, Pasig City, Cebu City,
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Iloilo City, Davao City and Cagayan De Oro City shall have the special authority to act on applications and
issue warrants which shall be enforceable nationwide and outside the Philippines.
2. For violations of Sec. 6 (All other crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code and
other special laws, committed by, though, and with the use of cyber) - with the regular or other
specialized Regional Trial Courrs, as the case may be, within its territorial jurisdiction in the places above-
described (A.M No.17-11-03-SC,Sec.2.2).
What should be the procedure prior to issuance of a Cybercrime Warrant?

The judge must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the judicial affidavits submitted. (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC,Sec.2.4).
What is the period of effectivity of a Cybercrime Warrant?

Any warrant issued under the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants shall only be effective for the length of time as
determined by the court, which shall not exceed a period of ten ( 10) days from its issuance. The coun issuing the
warrant may, upon motion, extend its effectivity based only on justifiable reasons for a period not exceeding ten
(10) days from the expiration of the original period (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC,Sec.2.5).
Note: A search warrant shall be valid for ten {10) days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void (ROC, Rule 126,
Sec.JO).
May Cybercrime Warrants be served extraterritorially?

Yes.For persons or service providers situated outside of the Philippines, service of warrants and/or other court
processes shall be coursed through the Depanment of Justice - Office of Cybercrime, in line with all relevant
international instruments and/or agreements on the matter (A.M No. 17-11-03-SC,Sec.2.8).
Evidence
GENERAL CONCEPTS
Distinguish evidence from proof.

Evidence Proof
I
As to Definition
It is the medium or means by which a fact is proved It is the effect or result of evidence. It is the logically
or disproved. sufficient reason for assenting to the truth of a propo-
sition advanced.
As to Scope
"Evidence" is a narrower term, and includes only In its juridical sense it is a term of wide import, and
such kinds of proof as may be legally presented at a comprehends everything that may be adduced at a tri-
trial, by the act of the parries, and through the aid al, within the legal rules, for the purpose of producing
of such concrete facts as witnesses, records, or other conviction in the mind of judge or jury, aside from
documents. mere argument.
(Black'sLaw Dictionary4th ed).
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Distinguish Burden of Proof from Burden of Evidence.

Burden of Proof Burden of Evidence
As to Nature
The duty of a party to present evidence on the facts The duty of a party to present evidence sufficient to
in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by establish or rebut a fact in issue to establish a prima
the amount of evidence required by law (ROC, Rule facie case. (ROC, Rule 131, Sec. 1).
131, Sec. 1).
As to Charge of Burden
It does not shift and remains throughout the entire It may shift from party to party depending upon the
case exactly where the pleadings originally placed developments in the case. Initially, the party having the
it (BPI v. Spouses Royeca, G.R. No. 17664, July 21, burden of proof also has the burden of evidence (Id.)
2008).
What is the equipoise rule in relation to criminal cases?

Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the
evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor
of the accused (People v. Erguiza, G.R. No. 171348, November 26, 2008).
What is the equiponderance doctrine in relation to civil cases?

When the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt as to which side the evidence preponderates,
the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. Where neither party is able to establish its cause of
action and prevail with the evidence it has, the courts have no choice but to leave them as they are and dismiss the
complaint/petition (Sabellina v. Doloresburay, G.R. No. 187727, September 2, 2015).
Admissibility
What are the requisites for admissibility of evidence?

For evidence to be admissible, two elements must concur:
1. The evidence must be relevant; and
2. The evidence is not excluded by the Constitution, the law or these Rules (ROC, Rule 128, Sec. 3).
What is the Doctrine of Multiple Admissibility?

Where the evidence is relevant and competent for two or more purposes, such evidence may be admitted for any or
all the purposes for which it is offered provided it satisfies all the requirements of law for its admissibility therefor
(2 REGALADO, supra at 706).
What is conditional admissibility?

Conditional admissibility means evidence which appears to be immaterial but may be allowed by the court
subject to the condition that its connection with other facts subsequently to be proved will be established (Albano
Remedial Law Reviewer, 2010, p.1198).
What is curative admissibility?

Where improper evidence was admitted over the objection of the opposing party, he should be permitted to
contradict it with similar improper evidence. This is evidence introduced to cure, contradict or neutralize improper
evidence presented by the other party (5 HERERRA, supra at 26).
What is the Exclusionary Rule under the Constitution?

To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides
an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the fruit of a poisonous tree. Evidence
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obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding (Comerciante y Gonzales v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015).
What are the rules that exclude certain type of evidence?

The following, among others, are rules that exclude certain types of evidence:
1. Original Document Rule (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3)
2. Parol Evidence Rule (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 10)
3. Hearsay Evidence Rule (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 37)
4. Offer of Compromise in Civil Cases (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 28)
5. Disqualification by Reason of Marriage (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 23)
6. Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communications (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 24)
7. Any confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in
any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing
torture (RA 9745, Sec. 8; RA 11479, Sec. 33)
8. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications, or any listened to,
intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence,
content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent
provisions The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 shall be inadmissible (RA 11479, Sec. 23)
9. Evidence obtained in violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Law shall not be admissible in evidence in judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings (RA 4200, Sec. 4)
What is judicial notice?

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them (People v. Tundag, G.R. Nos. 135695-96, October 12, 2000). Judicial notice can either be
mandatory or discretionary (ROC, Rule 129, Sec. 1-2).
When is judicial notice mandatory? (EP-NAPON-TG)

A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the following matters:
1. The Existence and territorial extent of states;
2. Their Political history, forms of government, and symbols of nationality;
3. The law of Nations;
4. The Admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals;
5. The Political constitution and history of the Philippines;
6. The Official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the
Philippines;
7. The laws of Nature;
8. The measure of Time; and
9. The Geographical divisions (ROC, Rule 129, Sec. 1).
When is judicial notice discretionary? (PUJ)

Judicial notice is discretionary on the following matters:
1. Matters which are or Public knowledge;
2. Matters capable of Unquestionable demonstration; or
3. Matters ought to be known to Judges because of their judicial functions (ROC, Rule 129, Sec.2).
Can the Philippine courts take judicial notice of foreign laws?

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can a court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved (Garcia-Recio v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001). Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself (Juego-Sakai v. Republic, G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018).
What is the Doctrine of Processual Presumption?

It is when a foreign law is not pleaded or even if pleaded, it is not proved, the presumption is that the foreign
law is the same as ours. It is also referred to as the Doctrine of Presumed-Identity Approach (EDI-Staffbuilders
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International, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007) Additionally, the rule is that there is no judicial
notice of any foreign law. As any other fact, it must be alleged and proved. If the foreign law is not properly pleaded
or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity of the foreign law to our own laws, otherwise known as
processual presumption, applies (Continental Micronesia, Inc. V. Basso, G.R. No. 178382-83, September 23, 2015).
What is a judicial admission?

A judicial admission is an admission, oral or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in a same
case. It does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made (ROC, Rule 129, Sec. 4).
X sues Y for collection of the purchase price of a land, in the amount of Php2,200,000. Y in her answer
stated that she had paid Php2,000,000 and therefore she owes X only Php200,000. During the trial,
Y, without objection, presented a receipt showing a payment of the Php200,000. X also did not object
to the admissibility of the receipt when it was formally offered. The trial court rendered judgement
dismissing the case. Can the evidence of payment be considered?
Yes, the benefit of judicial admission may be lost by failure to object to the presentation of evidence contradicting
it. When Y presented the evidence of payment, X did not object thereto. When the receipt was formally offered as
evidence, X did not manifest objection to the admissibility of said document on the ground that payment was not
an issue. Since there was an implied consent on the part of X to try the issue of payment, even if no motion was filed
and no amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting Y’s testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove payment (Dela Cruz v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 172825, October 11, 2012).
Accused X was in a detention cell when he voluntarily confessed to the commission of the crime before
members of the media. Is this an inadmissible extrajudicial confession?
No. X was not in a custodial investigation when he made a confession. The fact that the extrajudicial confession
was made while inside a detention cell does not render it inadmissible, especially since the same was given freely and
spontaneously. An extrajudicial confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence
from police authorities, as in this case, is admissible (People v. Dacanay y Tumalabcab, G.R. No. 216064, November
7, 2016, J. Caguioa Case).
Object Evidence (Rule 130, A)
What are the requisites for admissibility of object evidence? (RACFA)

1. The object must be Relevant to the fact in issue (ROC, Rule 128, Sec. 3);
2. The object must be Authenticated before it is admitted;
3. The authentication must be made by a Competent witness;
4. The object must be Formally offered in evidence (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 34); and
5. It must meet any other Additional requirement set by law.
In a case for libel, three (3) tape recordings allegedly made by X were introduced in evidence by the
prosecution. During his testimony, X admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and
that he asked his adopted daughter to record the accused’s alleged libelous remarks made in his radio
program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place and
had actually heard the accused while it was being taped. This prompted the accused to pose a continuing
objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for lack of proper authentication by the person
who actually made the recordings. Decide on the admissibility of the tape recordings.
The tape recordings are inadmissible for failure to lay the proper foundation. It is a rudimentary rule of evidence
that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be
established, to wit: (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony; (2) a showing that the
operator of the device was competent; (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a
showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation
of the recording; (6) identification of the speakers; and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily
made without any kind of inducement (Torralba v. People, G.R. 153699, August 22, 2005).
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Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B)
What is Documentary Evidence?

Documents as evidence consist of writings, recordings, photographs or any material containing letters, words,
sounds, numbers, figures, symbols, or their equivalent, or other modes of written expression offered as proof of
their contents. Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray films, motion pictures or videos
May a private document be offered and admitted in evidence both as documentary evidence and as object
evidence? (2005 Bar)
Yes, a private document may be offered and admitted in evidence both as documentary evidence and as object
evidence depending on the purpose for which the document is offered. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court (ROC, Rule 130, Sec 1). When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than
the original document itself, (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3).
What is the Best Evidence Rule?

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3).
What are the exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule?

1. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record,
no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
2. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
3. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial
processes or procedures;
4. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole;
5. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and
6. When the original is not closely related to the controlling issue (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 3).
What is Secondary Evidence?

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated(ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 5)
How to lay the predicate in offering secondary evidence?

The offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely:
1. 1. The existence or due execution of the original;
2. 2. the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and
3. 3. the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attribute (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 198799, March 20, 2017).
Before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no
excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are
unavailable (Heirs of Dela Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 117384, October 21, 1998).
What is the Parol Evidence Rule?

Under the Parol Evidence Rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
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Note: The term “agreement” includes wills (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 10).
What are the requisites for the Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule? (VW-PIT)
They are the following:
1. There is a Valid contract;
2. The terms of agreement are reduced to Writing;
3. The dispute is between Parties and/or their successors in interest
4. Ground(s) for applicability must be put in Issue in the verified pleadings
5. The dispute is as to the Terms of the agreement (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 10; 5 HERRERA, supra at 207).
Note: The written agreement is already considered to contain all the things agreed upon. Being a final agreement,
any extraneous evidence or “parol” evidence is inadmissible for any of the following purposes: (a) to modify; (b) to
explain; or (c) to add to the terms of the written agreement (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 10).
A, an illiterate, sold a parcel of land to B. A was made to believe by B that the document she thumbmarked
was a deed of sale of Lot 1 when in fact it described Lot 2. B filed a suit to recover Lot 2 from its present
possessor. X, the defendant, called A to testify for him that what she really intended to sell was Lot 1.
Can B object to the testimony on the ground of violation of the parol evidence rule?
No, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. The deed of sale was
executed by A in favor of B. The dispute over what was actually sold is between B and X. Thus, X was a stranger to
the deed of sale (Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300, August 6, 1986).
When is evidence from experts or interpreters admissible in evidence?

When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not
understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who understand the
language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the language. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 17)
Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C)
When is corroboration concerning the testimony of a child dispensed with?

Generally, corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall
be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in
criminal and non-criminal cases (Rule on ECW, Sec. 22).
Prior to the filing of the arson case, W and H were separated de facto for 6 months. It was alleged
that H poured gasoline on the house of X and thereafter ignited the said house, knowing fully well
that W was in the house. During the trial, H moved to disqualify W from testifying based on marital
disqualification rule. Is he correct?
No, the act of H in setting fire to the house of X, knowing fully well that X and W were there, had the effect of
directly impairing the conjugal relation. The marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other, it is where
the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. (Alvarez v.
Ramirez, GR No. 143439, October 14, 2005).
What is Marital Disqualification Rule?

During their marriage, the husband or the wife cannot testify against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 23).
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What are the requisites of the rule on marital communication privilege? (MOO)
It has the following requisites:
1. That the spouses must have been legally,Married
2. The spouse against whom such evidence is being offered has not given his/her .!:,onsent to such testimony;
3. That the privilege is claimed with regard to .!:,ommunication, oral or written, made during the marriage;
4. That said communication was made.!:,onfidentially; and
S. That the action or proceeding where the privilege is claimed is not in a civil case by Q.ne against the other,
or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or latter's direct descendants or
ascendants ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 24, par. (a); 2 REGALADO, Remedial Law Compendium {2010) p. 748
[hereinafter, 2 REGALADO]).
Does the attorney-client privilege cover future crimes?

No, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed
and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. A distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the
client. Corollary, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within
the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.{Peoplev. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 115433-41,july 16,
1337).
What is parental and filial privilege?

No person shall be compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct ascendants, children, or other direct
descendants, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against that person or by one parent against
the other (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 25).
Is blood relationship essential for parental/filial privilege?

Yes, a blood relationship is essential for parental/filial privilege. The court ruled that the rule applies only to
"direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by common ancestry (Lee v. CA G.R. No. 177861,july
13, 2010).
Distinguish admission from confession.

The distinctions between admission and confession are the following:
Admission Confession
I
As to Nature
Merely a statement of fact not directly involving an There is an acknowledgment of guilt.
acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which one is charged.
As to Scope
An admission includes confessions, the former be- A specific type of admission which refers only to an ac-
ing a broader term because accordingly, a confession knowledgment of guilt.
is also an admission.
Asto Manner
Express or implied. Always express; cannot be implied.
In a Criminal Case
A statement by the accused, direct or implied, of An acknowledgment in express terms, by a parry in a
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connec- criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged.
tion with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.
(5 HERRERA, supra at 114-115).
What is the principle of Res Inter Alios Acta Alteri Nocere Non Debet?
The principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non dcbet means that "things done between strangers ought not
to injure those who are not parties to them" (Dynamic Signmaker Outcwor Advertising Services, Inc., et al. v.
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Potongan, G.R. No. 156589, June 27, 2005). This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant and not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered hearsay against them (People v.
Cachuela, G.R. No. 191752, June 10, 2013).
What are the two branches of the res inter alios acta rule?
1. Rule 130, Section 29 (First Branch) – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided such as vicarious admissions.
2. Rule 130, Section 35: Previous Conduct Rule (Second Branch) – Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he or she did or did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time.
What are the exceptions to the res inter alios acta rule?
The exceptions are the so-called vicarious admissions under Sections 30 to 32 of Rule 130. These are the admissions
by:
1. Co-partner (Rule 130, Sec. 30)
2. Agent (Rule 130, Sec. 30)
3. Joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party. (Rule 130, Sec. 30)
4. Co-conspirator (Rule 130, Sec. 31)
5. Privies (Rule 130, Sec. 32)
The accused was the suspect in the murder of his wife. Upon meeting his sister-in-law, the accused
pleaded for her forgiveness. May this be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt?
Yes. The accused’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise, which can be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Sec. 28. (People
v. Espanol, G.R. No. 175603 February 13, 2009)
What is the Previous Conduct Rule?

Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible in evidence to prove that he did or
did not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom, or usage, and the like (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 35).
May evidence of similar acts or previous conduct be admissible as evidence?

As a general rule, no. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that
he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 35). It is a well-settled rule that
evidence is not admissible which shows or tends to show that the accused in a criminal case has committed a crime
wholly independent from the offense for which he is on trial. (People v. Galo, G.R. Nos. 70306-07, July 30, 1986).
What is testimonial knowledge?

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. (NOTE: This provision has been transposed to Sec.
22 of Rule 130)
What is hearsay?
Hearsay is a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered to prove
the truth of the facts asserted therein. A statement is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) non-verbal conduct of a
person if it is intended by him as an assertion.
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is (a) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition; (b) consistent
with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive; or (c) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him or
her. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 37)
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What is an independently relevant statement?

When the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement
in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. (People v.
Mallari y Sanchez, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999)
X, the owner of XYZ Bank, was charged with corruption of public officials. A, a former treasurer in
XYZ Bank submitted an affidavit stating that X instructed A to deposit money to B (former employee
of BSP)’s account as his “professional fee” as B would give X “advance warning” of impending surprise
bank examinations. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. Is A’s affidavit
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay considering that B is the source of the “advance warnings”
received by X?
No, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not
be applied in the course of its proceedings. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties. It was held
that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay (Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 206866; September 2, 2015).
What are the exceptions to the hearsay rule?

The following are exceptions to the hearsay rule:
1. Dying declaration (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 38);
2. Statement of decedent or person of unsound mind (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 39);
3. Declaration against interest (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 40);
4. Act or declaration about pedigree (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 41);
5. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 42);
6. Common reputation (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 43);
7. Res Gestae (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 44);
8. Records of regularly conducted business activity (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 45);
9. Entries in official records (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 46);
10. Commercial lists and the like (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 47);
11. Learned treatises (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 48);
12. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 49); and
13. Residual Exceptions (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 50).
What are the requirements for a dying declaration to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule?
The requirements for a dying declaration are the following: (DICC)
1. The declarant is Dead.
2. His death is the subject of Inquiry in the case.
3. The declaration was made under the Consciousness of an impending death.
4. The declaration is about the Cause and surrounding circumstances of his death. (ROC, Rule 130, Sec.38)
What are the requisites for a statement of decedent or person of unsound mind to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule? (A-CPURM)
1. In an Action against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person
of unsound mind;
2. Upon a Claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound
mind;
3. Where a Party or assignor of a party or a person in whose behalf a case is prosecuted testifies on a matter
of fact occurring before the death of the deceased person or before the person became of Unsound mind;
4. Any statement of the deceased or the person of unsound mind, may be Received in evidence if the
statement was made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased or the person of unsound mind; and
5. Made at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by him or her and while his or her recollection
was clear (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 39).
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What are the requisites for a declaration against interest to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule? (DRAM)
1. The declarant is Dead or unable to testify;
2. The declaration Relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3. Declaration is made at the time the declarant was Aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and
4. The declarant had no Motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 40;
People v. Bernal, G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997).
What are the requisites for an act or declaration about pedigree to be admissible as an exception the hearsay rule?
1. The declarant is already dead or unable to testify;
2. The pedigree of a person must be at issue;
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question;
4. Declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred; and
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004).
What are the two kinds of res gestae and what are their requisites?
The first kind of res gestae is Spontaneous Exclamation which is a statement of exclamation made immediately
after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is
observed by him (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 44).
The requisites of Spontaneous Exclamation are the following: (SBUC)

1. That the principal act, the res gestae, be a Startling occurrence
2. That the statements were made Before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood
3. The statements were Under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence and
4. That the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending Circumstances
(People v. Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017)
The second kind of Res Gestae are Verbal Acts which are utterances which accompany some act or conduct to
which it is desired to give legal effect (Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc., G.R. No. 172031, July
14, 2008).
The requisites of Verbal Acts are the following: (PESS)

1. The Principal act to be characterized must be equivocal;
2. The Equivocal act must be material to the issue;
3. The Statement must accompany the equivocal act; and
4. The Statements give a legal significance to the equivocal act (Alecson Shipping Lines v. CGU International
Ins. Plc., G.R. No. 217311; July 15, 2020).
The victim walked to X’s house from her house, crying, and told X that she was raped by her father
three times, a few hours earlier. The houses of X and the victim were in the same municipality. The
victim told X how the rapes happened. The victim later died. X testified on what the victim told her and
further testified that the period the victim told her when the crime happened to the time X arrived at
her house, was the period it would take to arrive at X’s house from the victim’s house by walking. Will
the testimony of X as to what the victim said as to the rape be admissible under res gestae?
Yes. When the victim uttered her statements to X, a few hours after the incidents, the effect of the occurrence on
her mind continued. Her demeanor showed that she was still suffering as a result of the violation of her person and
honor by her father. While the utterances were not made contemporaneous to the act described, they remained
to be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable. There is no
showing that an intervening event between the time of the rape incidents and the time of the victim’s revelation to
X would indicate a restoration of her mental balance. In fact, she was still in distress when she arrived at X’s home.
(People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018, J. Caguioa Case)
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What are Prior Consistent Statements?

These statements are used to rehabilitate the witness where such statements are consistent with the trial testimony
of the witness. This evidence is admissible to bolster the credibility of a witness whose credibility had been attacked,
but it could not be used as substantive evidence. It is imperative, however, that the prior consistent statement
predates the alleged corrupting influence or purported fabrication (PERALTA, Insights on Evidence (2020), p.485)
[hereinafter PERALTA])
What are Prior Inconsistent Statements?

The proponent of the statement offers it to show that on another occasion the witness gave an account that differed
from, and is inconsistent with, his testimonial account. Therefore, the proponent will argue, that the witness is
not reliable. A prior inconsistent statement used only to impeach does not violate the hearsay rule because it is
not offered for the truth of the assertions it contains, but rather, the earlier inconsistency is offered to show that
at another time the witness has given a conflicting version of the same event and therefore his account from the
witness stand is not reliable (LILLY, Vide, p. 168).
What are the requisites for entries in official records to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule?
The following are the requisites: (PDK)
1. That the entry was made by a Public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so
2. That it was made by a public officer in the performance of his Duty, or by another person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
3. The public officer or the other person had sufficient Knowledge of the facts stated by him, which must
have acquired personally or through official information (DST Mover’s Corp v. People’s General Insurance
Corporation, G.R. 198627, January 13, 2016).
What are the requisites for a testimony or deposition at a former proceeding be allowed as an exception
to the rule on hearsay evidence? (FOPUS)
1. The testimony or deposition was given in a Former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative
2. The adverse party had an Opportunity to cross-examine the witness
3. The former case or proceeding was between the same Parties
4. The witness is deceased or out of the Philippines or who cannot, with due diligence be found therein, or is
Unavailable or otherwise unable to testify; and
5. The former testimony relates to the same Subject matter of issues (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 49)
Is the opinion of a witness admissible in evidence?

As a general rule, it is not admissible. Witnesses must give the facts and not their inferences, conclusions or
opinions, except for the following:
1. Opinion of an Expert Witness –The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence (RULES OF COURT,
Rule 130, Sec. 52);
2. Opinion of an Ordinary Witness – The opinion of an ordinary witness for which proper basis is given,
may be received in evidence regarding:
a. The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
b. A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity;
c. The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted;
d. The witness’ impression on the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person (testimony of
collective facts) (ROC, Rule 130, Sec. 53).
What is the rule on Character Evidence?

Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
1. In Criminal Cases:
a. The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
b. The accused may prove his or her good moral character, pertinent to the moral train involved in the
offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad moral character unless on
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rebuttal.
2. In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of
character involved in the case.
3. In Criminal and Civil Cases:
Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until the such character has been impeached
Burden of Proof and Presumptions (Rule 131)
What are conclusive presumptions?

Conclusive presumptions are those that may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the evidence is
(University of Mindanao v. BSP, G.R. 194964, January 11, 2016). The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
1. Whenever a party has, by his or her own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he or she cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; and
2. The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the commencement of the
relation of landlord and tenant between them. (ROC, Rule 131, Sec. 2).
What are disputable presumptions?

These are presumptions that may be overcome by contrary evidence. They are disputable in recognition of the
variability of human behavior and its application to a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain
facts on which they are meant to operate. Disputable presumptions apply only in the absence of contrary evidence
or explanations (University of Mindanao v. BSP, et. al, G.R. Nos. 194964-65, January 11, 2016).
An Information was received that X is engaged in selling drugs. Police officers Y and Z conducted a
test buy and they were able to purchase suspected shabu from X which eventually led to the arrest of
the latter. X claimed that the seized illegal drug was not marked accordingly. Further, another break
in the chain of custody was due to the failure of the prosecution to present officer YZ, the person who
allegedly received the Request for Laboratory Examination. The non-presentation of YZ became fatal
considering that there is an additional marking “RGE” on the plastic sachet. Did the failure to elaborate
the additional marking of RGE create a reasonable doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized illegal drug?
Yes. The lapses themselves are affirmative proof of irregularity. Any divergence from the prescribed procedure
must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent
any of the said conditions, the non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag, that casts reasonable doubt on the
identity of the corpus delicti. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the
constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent (People v. Fatallo y Alecarte, G.R. No. 218805, November
Presentation of Evidence (Rule 132)
When are leading questions allowed? (CP-DUA)

1. On Cross-examination;
2. On Preliminary matters;
3. When there is Difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant or a child
of tender years, or is of feeble mind or a deaf-mute;
4. Of an Unwilling or hostile witness; or
5. Of a witness who is an Adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 10).
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What are the methods of impeaching the adverse party’s witness?

A witness may be impeached through the following modes:
1. By contradictory evidence;
2. By evidence that the general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity of the witness is bad; or
3. By evidence that he or she has made at other times statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony
How is the witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements?

Impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent statements requires the “laying of the predicate,” the elements of which
are as follows:
1. The alleged statements must be related to the witness including the circumstances of the times, places and
persons present;
2. He must be asked whether he made such statements and if so, he must be allowed to explain them; and
3. If the statements are in writing, they must be shown to the witness; (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 14).
What are public documents ? (ON-TP)

Public documents are:
1. The written Official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
2. Documents acknowledged before a Notary public except last wills and testaments; and
3. Documents that are considered public documents under Treaties and conventions which are in force
between the Philippines and the country of source; and
4. Public records, kept in the Philippines, or private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Note: All other writings are private (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 19)
How may private writing be proved?

Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved by any of the following means:
1. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
2. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; or
3. By other evidence showing its due execution and authenticity (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 20).
When is evidence of the authenticity of private writing not necessary?

Evidence of authenticity of private writing is not required:
1. When the document is an ancient one within the context of Sec. 21, Rule 132;
2. When the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied
under oath;
3. When the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted;
4. When the document is not being offered as genuine (Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012).
How is an official record proved?

The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his or her deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a contracting party to a treaty or convention
to which the Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty or convention pursuant
to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall be in the form prescribed by such treaty
or convention subject to reciprocity granted to public documents originating from the Philippines.
For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty or convention
referred to in the next preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his or her office.
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A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and genuineness of the
document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or convention between a foreign country
and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the document itself from this formality (ROC,
Rule 132, Sec. 24)
How and when is an offer made?

All evidence must be offered orally. The offer of the testimony of a witness in evidence must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify. The offer of documentary and object evidence shall be made after the presentation
of a party’s testimonial evidence (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 35).
How is an objection to the offer of evidence made and when is the proper time to object?
Objection to offer of evidence must be made orally immediately after the offer is made. Objection to the testimony
of a witness for lack of a formal offer must be made as soon as the witness begins to testify. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness must be made as soon as the grounds therefor
become reasonably apparent. The grounds for the objections must be specified (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 36).
Note: A protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not
so made, it will be understood to have been waived (Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, G.R.
No. 121506, October 30, 1996). This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely
been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time (Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, June
6, 1990). In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified (ROC, Rule 132, Sec. 36).
May objections to documentary evidence be made during the presentation of testimonial evidence?
No, objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier. The
identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the
document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document
is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit (Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, G.R.
No. 86062, June 6, 1990).
Note: Documents which may have been marked as exhibits during the hearing but which were not formally
offered in evidence cannot be considered as evidence nor can they be given any evidentiary value (Barut v. People,
G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014).
A copy of the Deed of Undertaking was presented during trial. During its formal offer, the opposing
party did not raise its inadmissibility for violating the original document rule. May the opposing party
raise such ground on appeal?
No. When a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived, even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and would have surely
been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time. Having failed to timely raise the objection when the
Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in the trial court, the opposing party is deemed to have waived the same. (Spouses
Tapayan v. Martinez, G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017, Caguioa Case)
Judicial Affidavit Rule (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)
In what instances does the Judicial Affidavit Rule apply in criminal actions?
This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:
1. Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed 6 years;
2. Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or
3. With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Sec.
9).
When may a court admit judicial affidavits that are not compliant with the requirements of Section 3
and Section 4?
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The court may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement affidavits
before the hearing or trial provided:
1. The delay is for a valid reason;
2. Would not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and
3. That public or private counsel responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than
Php1,000 nor more than Php5,000, at the discretion of the court (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Sec. 10).
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence (Rule 133)
When is circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction?

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
What quantum of evidence is required to prove facts in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies?
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion (ROC, Rule 133, Sec. 6).
May the guilt of the accused be established through circumstantial evidence?

Yes. Establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence is akin to weaving a tapestry of events that culminate in a
vivid depiction of the crime of which the accused is the author (People v. Pentecostes y Cronico, G.R. No. 226158,
November 8, 2017, Caguioa Case)
A testified that when he returned home from work, he discovered that his saved money was missing.
Witness W testified that on the day of the incident, she saw X climb the fence, scale the tree in front of
A’s house, and enter the house. When he returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket, which
she later found to be a plentiful sum of money. X then bought two mobile phones. A further testified
that he had treated X as his kumpare and would often invite the latter to drinking sessions inside his
house. He would sometimes call X to repair his vehicle because Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow
X to follow him to his bedroom to get cash whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair of his
vehicle. X alleges that the evidence presented before the trial court is insufficient to convict him of theft.
Decide.
No the evidence is not sufficient, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that the evidence must exclude the
possibility that some other person committed the crime. Here, however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even
allege, that it was impossible for some other person to have committed the crime of theft against A. The prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that at the time the theft was committed, there was no other person inside the house of
A, or that no other person could have taken the money from the closet of A. (Zabala v. People, G.R. No. 210760,
January 26, 2015).
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
What is Electronic Document?

An electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored
processed, retrieved or produced electronically (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 2, Section 1 (h)).
What is the Original of an Electronic Document?

An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule
if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately (A.M No. 01-7-
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01-SC, Rule 4, Sec. 1).

What are the requisites for admissibility of Electronic Evidence
For electronic evidence to be admissible:
1. The evidence must be relevant;
2. The evidence is not excluded by the rules, or otherwise stated, it must be competent; and
3. The evidence must be authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M
No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 3, Sec. 2).
How are private electronic documents authenticated?

Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved
by any of the following means:
1. By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
2. By evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme
Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
3. By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge (A.M No. 01-7-01-SC,
Rule 5, Sec. 2).
Note: The burden of proving the authenticity of an electronic document lies with the person seeking to introduce
such document in any legal proceeding (A.M No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 5, Section 1).
What is Ephemeral Electronic Communication?

Ephemeral electronic communication refers to phone talks, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio and
video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained (A.M No.
01-7-01-SC, Rule 2, Section 2(k)).
A complaint for sum of money was filed by B Bank against M, for the alleged use of the credit card issued
by plaintiff bank. The case fell under summary procedure. Attached to the complaint are “duplicate
original” copies of statements of account that has a stamp “duplicate original (signature) Charito O.
Ham, Senior Manager”, the stamp marks show that the signatures appearing therein on top of the name
Charito O Ham are not original signatures but are part of the stamp marks. Plaintiff contends that
since the attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-generated print-outs which it caused to be
reproduced directly from the computer, they qualify as electronic documents which should be regarded
as the equivalent of the original documents pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4, Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Is the plaintiff correct?
No, the photocopies are not admissible as evidence. The Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary
evidence in question are indeed electronic documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are
considered functional equivalent of paper-based documents and regarded as the equivalent of original documents
under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect
the data accurately.
For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility. According to
Section 2, Rule 3 of Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies
with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the rules. Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process
of electronic documents. Plaintiff could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed
to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. What plaintiff had
in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as
the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint
of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value. In the
absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person, the said annexes
or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and excepted from the rule on hearsay
evidence.
It was correct for the MTC and RTC to apply the Best Evidence Rule (now original document rule). They correctly
regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs, and not necessarily the original thereof.
Being substitutionary documents, they could not be given probative value and are inadmissible based on the Best
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Evidence Rule (now original document rule), which requires the presentation of the original document.
The fact that a stamp with the markings was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs did not make
them “duplicate original copies” as described above. The necessary allegations to qualify them as “duplicate original
copies” must be stated in the complaint and duly supported by the pertinent affidavit of the qualified person. The
signatures of the “certifying” person in the SOAs are not original but part of the stamp thus even if all the signatures
of Charito O. Ham, Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head of petitioner’s Collection Group are
original, the required authentication so that the annexes to the complaint can be considered as “duplicate original
copies” will still be lacking. If plaintiff intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the
proper allegations should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of authentication as “print-
outs,” “outputs” or “counterparts” should have been complied with. (RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr.,
G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Suspect X was invited by the police to come aboard their car. Thereafter, the police got involved in
a firefight at a 7-11 store, resulting in the death of one gunman and one officer. On that occasion, X
disappeared but left his cellphone in his cab. The police officer obtained the phone and while pretending
to be X, he was able to cause the entrapment and arrest of the suspects in the killing. X was arrested and
was charged with murder. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by X made
references to the 7-11 shootout. May the transcript of the text messages be used in evidence against the
accused?
Yes, such transcript of text messages may be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, the police officer, posing as the accused X, exchanged text messages with the
other accused to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone
in his possession, the police officer had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify to them
(People v. Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014)
A foreign vessel bumped and damaged a power barge of X Corp. The corporation sued A, the local
ship agent. During the trial, X Corp offered in evidence photocopies of letters, protest forms, and
written computations to prove damages. Such documents were reproduced and printed using a software
program and contained written signatures and some handwritten notations on the date of receipt. May
the photocopies be admitted in evidence without the offeror accounting for the non-production of the
original?
No, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the
information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. A perusal of the information contained in
the photocopies submitted by X Corp. will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of
the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch
of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. (National Power Corporation v. Codilla, Jr., G.R.
No. 170491, April 3, 2007).
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PART II
APPELLATE PRACTICE, PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND THE SUPREME COURT
Appeals; General Principles
Nature of the Right to Appeal
What is the nature of the right to appeal?

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which, the right to appeal is lost (Siquinia v. Penta-
Shimizu-Toa Joint Venture, G.R. No. 202833 (Notice), November 21, 2018).
X was convicted by the MTCC for the crime of violation of BP 22. X filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. Subsequently, X filed Petition for Certiorari with the RTC which was also denied.
X then filed a Petition for Review before the CA but was denied on the ground of improper appeal.
According to the CA, X should have resorted to an ordinary appeal by notice of appeal and not a petition
for review. Is the CA correct?
Yes. The proper remedy was to appeal the judgment of the RTC denying the petition for certiorari by notice of
appeal. Sec. 2, Rule 41 of the ROC provides that the appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from. The petition for certiorari filed with the RTC is an original action. The CA is correct in
denying the Petition for Review being an improper appeal.
When is appeal a matter of right?

Appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 40 and Rule 41 is a matter of right. It refers to the right to seek the review
by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court. It exists after the trial in the first instance (Heirs of
Garcia I v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015).
In criminal cases where the RTC imposed the death penalty, the CA shall automatically review the judgment
(ROC, Rule 122, Sec. 3, Par. (d)). Whenever the CA finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court
shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its
entire record to the SC for review (ROC, Rule 124, Sec. 13, Par. (a)).
When is an appeal discretionary?

An appeal is discretionary if taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary
appellate jurisdiction under Rule 42. The CA has the discretion whether to give due course to the petition for
review or not (Heirs of Garcia I v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015).
An appeal by certiorari is not a matter of right but merely a matter of discretion (Spouses Babayen-on v. Heirs of
Hughes Sr., G.R. No. 235645, March 7, 2018). A review of decisions by the SC under Rule 45, petition for review
on certiorari, is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 6).
What are the different modes of appeal? (OPA)

The different modes of appeal are:
1. Ordinary Appeal;
2. Petition for Review; and
3. Appeal by Certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 2).
Discuss the Fresh Period Rule or the Neypes Rule as applied to rules on appeal.
If the Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration is denied, the movant has a fresh period of fifteen (15) days from
the receipt or notice of the order denying or dismissing the motion for reconsideration within which to file an
appeal. The new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed. Otherwise, the decision becomes
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final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided under the Rules (Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005). The Neypes Rule is also applicable in criminal cases (Yu v. Samson-
Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011).
Is the Fresh Period Rule applicable to administrative proceedings?

As a rule, the “fresh period rule” applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative decisions, when
the specific administrative rules of procedure explicitly precludes the application of the fresh period rule. By
exception, when an administrative body’s rules of procedure does not explicitly preclude the application of the
fresh period rule, as when it provides for the same and also provides that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to
such administrative body’s rules, then the fresh period rule may be applied. What prevails in administrative cases is
the period provided (Puerto del Sol Palawan, Inc. v. Gabaen, G.R. No. 212607, March 27, 2019).
Judgments and Final Orders Subject to Appeal
Which judgments and final orders are subject to appeal?

An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 1).
The court, upon motion, rendered a summary judgment, finding that the Answer gave no genuine issue
with respect to defendant’s liability, except as to the amount of damages. Is such ruling appealable?
Yes. A court, in granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, adjudicates on the merits of the case, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right. Such order or
resolution takes the nature of a final order susceptible to appeal. In leaving out the determination of the amount of
damages, a summary judgment is not removed from the category of final judgments.
Note: In a collection case, where the obligation and the fact of non-fulfillment of the obligation, as well as the
execution of the debt instrument, are admitted by the debtor, with the rate of interest and/or amount of damages
being the only remaining issue, there is no genuine issue and a summary judgment may be rendered upon proper
motion (Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No.
233850, July 1, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Plaintiff filed a civil action against Defendant, who moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The
trial court granted the motion and dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the
order dismissing the case on the ground of res judicata was interlocutory and not appealable. Is Plaintiff
correct?
No. The dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a final order and not an interlocutory order because it
terminated the proceedings and left nothing to be done. A dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a final order
that completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done. Under Section 1, Rule 41, an appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, as in this case. Where appeal
is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including
petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive (Medina v. Spouses Lozada,
G.R. No. 185303, August 1, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Moreover, Sec. 13, Rule 15 provides that an order granting a motion to dismiss or an affirmative defense on the
ground of res judicata is a dismissal with prejudice and subject to the right of appeal (Rules of Court, Rule 15, Sec.
13; Pillars Property Corp. v. Century Communities Corp., G.R. No. 201021, March 4, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Note: Sec.13, Rule 15 provides that if the dismissal is based on: (1) res judicata; (2) statute of limitations; (3)
that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; or (4) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of statute
of frauds, the dismissal is with prejudice and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to appeal the order granting the
motion to dismiss (Philippine Bank of Communications v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet, G.R. No.
222958, March 11, 2020, Caguioa Case).
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Is it correct to say that a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion may always be assailed by
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?
No. Since a judgment is appealable, the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order,
or resolution is appeal, even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or
of law set out in the decision, order, or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits
the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for certiorari is the unavailability of appeal (Chua v. People,
G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017).
Matters not Appealable; Available Remedies
What may not be the subject of appeal? (RID-CEx-SW)

No appeal may be taken from an:
1. Order denying a petition for Relief of judgment or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
2. Interlocutory order;
3. Order Disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
4. Order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by Consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
5. Order of Execution;
6. Judgment or final order for or against one or more of Several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims
and third party-complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom;
7. Order dismissing an action Without prejudice.
Note: In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as
provided under Rule 65 (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 1).
What is an interlocutory order?

An interlocutory order is one that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the court’s task of
adjudicating the parties’ contention, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done (Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Carlito Lee, G. R. No. 190144, August 1, 2012).
X filed before the RTC a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Y. RTC granted the
complaint. X subsequently filed for a motion for execution. The motion was granted. X sought the release
of the garnished deposits of Y in Z Bank, who refused to do so. X filed another motion for execution to
enforce garnishment, this time, directed against Z Bank for it to release the deposits. The court denied
the second motion for execution. X assailed the order denying the second motion for execution before
CA by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
1. Did X avail of the proper remedy?
Yes. The order assailed involved the implementation of a writ of execution, and as such, is interlocutory in
nature. Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 41, the remedy from such interlocutory order is certiorari under Rule 65
(Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Lee, G. R. No. 190144, August 1, 2012).
2. May decisions in Small Claims cases be appealed?
No, these decisions in Small Claims cases shall be final, executory, and unappealable. The remedy against such
ruling, assuming there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where
appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 (2016 Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, Sec. 24; A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v.
Emma Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014).
MTC dismissed an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, without trial on the merits.
Is it correct to say that certiorari under Rule 65 the remedy against such dismissal, pursuant to Sec. 1,
Rule 41, providing that an order of dismissal without prejudice may be the subject of a petition under
Rule 65?
No. A more specific rule applies to MTC orders of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 40, Sec. 8. It
states that the remedy of appeal is available against the MTC order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. If
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an appeal is taken from an order of the MTC dismissing the case without trial on the merits and the ground of
dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In
case of affirmance and the RTC has jurisdiction, it shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed
with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded to the MTC for further proceedings. (ROC, Rule 40, Sec. 8).
Note: If the case was tried on the merits by the MTC without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall try the decide the case, without
prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice (ROC, Rule 40,
Sec. 8).
Note: Rule 40 covers appeals from MTC to the RTC, while Rule 41 covers appeals from the RTC.
An action for forcible entry is filed with the RTC. It was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Should the
plaintiff assail the order of dismissal by Rule 65 as provided under Section 1, Rule 41?
No. While Section 1, Rule 41 provides, among others, that an order of dismissal without prejudice such as lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be the subject of the appropriate Special Civil Action under Rule
65, certiorari is not an available remedy. First, Section 1, Rule 41 only provides that as to matters that are not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate Special Civil Action as provided in Rule 65. It means that
certiorari is not the automatic remedy. Second, the requirements for a Rule 65 petition to prosper must still be
complied with, i.e., that there is grave abuse of discretion and that there is no appeal or any other adequate, plain,
and speedy remedy. Here, while appeal is not available, the plain speedy adequate remedy is to refile it with the
proper court, the MTC, which has exclusive original jurisdiction over such forcible entry action. There is also no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC in dismissing since RTC has no jurisdiction over forcible entry cases
(ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 1; Rule 65, Sec. 1).
An information for perjury was filed against X in the MTC. X filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that the allegations do not constitute an offense, which was denied. X filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, to assail the order denying the motion to quash. Did X avail
of the proper remedy?
No. A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. When such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law
While as a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable under Section 1,
Rule 41, such cannot be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari since such remedy can be used only in the
absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial
of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above (Maximo v. Villapando, Jr., G.R. Nos. 214925 &
214965, April 26, 2017)
An information for perjury was filed against X in the MTC. The information was filed without the
approval of the City or Provincial Prosecutor. X filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the officer who filed it had no authority to do so. The MTC denied the motion to quash. X moved
for reconsideration of the denial. The MTC denied the motion for reconsideration. X filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, to assail the order denying the motion to quash. The petition
for certiorari and prohibition was opposed for being an improper remedy against the denial of a motion
to quash. It was argued that the plain speedy adequate remedy is to proceed to trial from the denial of
the motion to quash. Are the grounds opposing the petition for certiorari and prohibition correct?
No. While as a rule, the proper remedy against an order denying a motion to quash information is to proceed
to trial and appeal the judgment later on rendered, such rule is subject to exceptions, where there may be resort
to a special civil action for certiorari, such as when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion, as in this case. The MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash notwithstanding that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. The filing of
an Information by an Officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity
which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. The MTC committed an error
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of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying the motion to quash the Information (Maximo v.
Villapando, Jr., G.R. Nos. 214925 & 214965, April 26, 2017)
Note: The SC has recognized that in certain situations, and by exception, certiorari is considered an appropriate
remedy to assail an interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash information in the following
instances: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; (d) to promote public welfare
and public policy; and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof (Maximo v. Villapando, Jr., G.R. Nos. 214925 & 214965, April 26, 2017).
Doctrine of Finality/Immutability of Judgment; Exceptions
What is the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, and is it subject to exceptions?

It provides that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down. Its exceptions are:
1. Correction of clerical errors;
2. Nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
3. Void judgments; and
4. Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable (FGU Insurance v. Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011).
Note: A correction pertaining to the substance of the controversy is not a clerical error and does not fall under
any of the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgments (Mercury Drug v. Huang, G.R. No. 197654,
August 30, 2017).
Post-Judgment Remedies other than Appeal
Petition for Relief from Judgment (Rule 38)
What are the grounds for a petition for relief from judgment? (RT-FAME-S)
A petition for relief from judgment may be availed of when a judgment or final order is Rendered, or any proceeding
is thereafter Taken against a party in any court through Fraud, Accident, Mistake, or Excusable negligence
(FAME), praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be Set aside (ROC, Rule 38, Sec. 1).
What is the period for filing a petition for relief?

A verified petition for relief of judgment must be filed:
1. Within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be
set aside; and
2. Not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken (ROC, Rule 38, Sec. 3).
Note: The double period required under Sec. 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A
petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period must be dismissed outright (Madarang v.
Sps. Morales, G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014).
What are the formal requirements of a petition for relief? (VAF)

The following are the formal requirements of a petition for relief:
1. The petition must be Verified;
2. The petition must be accompanied by an Affidavit or merit showing the FAME relied upon; and
3. The affidavit of merit accompanying the petition must also show the Facts constituting the petitioner’s
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be (ROC, Rule 38, Sec. 3).
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Within what time should a petition for relief from judgment be answered?
If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief, the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order
requiring the adverse parties to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof. The order shall be
served in such manner as the court may direct, together with copies of the petition and the accompanying affidavits
X was unable to participate in the proceedings of the case due to extrinsic fraud. X was surprised when
on 3 February 2022, he timely received from the RTC a copy of the Decision against him which was
rendered on 1 February 2022. Since there is extrinsic fraud, is it correct to say that from notice of the
judgment, X may file a petition for relief from judgment?
No. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 may not be availed of where a party has another adequate remedy available
to it, which is either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he is not
prevented from filing such motion or taking the appeal. The proper remedy is for X to file a motion for new trial or
to appeal, since he received the decision from the court on 3 February 2022, and has within fifteen (15) days from
said notice to do so (JRT Construction and Trading Corp. v. Hyosung Corp., G.R. No. 230793, March 21, 2018).
X timely received a copy of the decision of the RTC from said court on 1 February 2022. X claims that he
was deprived of the opportunity to participate in the trial due to extrinsic fraud. X, without justifiable
reason, failed to timely file an appeal or motion for reconsideration within 15 days from notice of the
judgment. An entry of judgment was later made. Within 6 months from said entry, may X file a petition
for relief from judgment?
No. A party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment is barred from such relief when the loss of the
remedy at law is due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will
be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost (JRT Construction and Trading Corp. v.
Hyosung Corp., G.R. No. 230793, March 21, 2018).
Annulments of Judgment by the Court of Appeals (Rule 47)
What is annulment of judgment?

It is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no available or other remedy.
Judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or denial of due process (Biaco
v. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007). It is independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was rendered and its purpose is to have the final and executory judgment set aside
so that there will be no renewal of litigation (Alaban v. CA, G.R. No. 144273, October 20, 2005).
Where may an action for annulment of judgment or final orders be filed?

The action may be filed in the following courts:
1. RTC – in case of judgments or final orders of the MTCs (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 10); and
2. CA – in case of judgments or final orders of RTCs (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 1).
What are the grounds for annulment of judgment or final orders? (ELa²)
An action for annulment of judgment may be based only on the ground of Extrinsic fraud, Lack of jurisdiction
and Lack of due process (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 2; Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013).
What is the period to file an action to annul a judgment? (E4-La²BLE)

The period within which an action to annul a judgment should be filed is as follows:
1. Where the ground is based upon Extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery; or
2. If the ground is based on Lack of jurisdiction or Lack of due process, the action must be brought Before
the action is barred by Laches or Estoppel (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 3; Arrieta v. Arrieta, G.R. No. 234808,
November 19, 2018).
What are the formal requirements of a petition for annulment of judgment? (FF-SOL-FAN)
The action shall be commenced by:
1. Filing a verified petition alleging therein
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2. Alleging with particularity the Facts and the law relied upon for annulment; and
3. Those Supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be;
4. Filed in one (1) Original copy (properly marked) and two clearly Legible copies, together with sufficient
copies corresponding to the number of respondents;
5. A certified true copy of the judgment or Final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of
the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner;
6. Affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and
7. Certificate of Non-forum shopping (ROC, Rule 47, Sec. 4).
What are the effects of the judgment of annulment?

On the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the questioned judgment or order shall be set aside and rendered void.
The nullity shall be without prejudice to the re-filing of the original action in the proper court; and the prescriptive
period to refile shall be deemed suspended from the filing of such original action until the finality of the judgment
of annulment but the prescriptive period shall not be suspended if the extrinsic fraud is attributable to the plaintiff
in the original action.
On the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court, upon motion may order the trial court to try the case as if a motion
for new trial was granted.
If the questioned judgment or final order or resolution had already been executed, the court may issue such orders
of restitution or other relief as justice and equity may warrant under the circumstances (ROC, Rule 47, Secs. 7-9).
In a civil action between N and M, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of the N. M appealed and the
MTC judgment was affirmed by the RTC and the CA. M filed a Petition for Annulment of the Judgment
before the RTC, alleging that M was a victim of extrinsic fraud because his counsel failed to submit the
documents in support of his defense. RTC rendered a judgment dismissing the Petition for Annulment
as the decision sought to be annulled had been affirmed by the RTC and CA. Is the filing of the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment proper?
No, the petition is improper. First, the petition for annulment of judgment is available only when the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner. Given that M had earlier availed of the remedy of appeal, he can no longer resort to the
remedy of annulment of judgment. Second, for purposes of Rule 47 of the ROC, only extrinsic fraud is recognized
as a ground. Fraud is extrinsic when it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which
the judgment is procured. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented the petitioner from having his day in court. In this case, however, N, as the prevailing party, had no part
in the commission of the fraud committed by M’s counsel. As such, the dismissal of the petition for annulment is
proper (Estrellado v. Presiding Judge of the MTC, G.R. Nos. 164482 & 211320, November 08, 2017).
Sps. X and Y owned a parcel of land. After their death, their 9 children inherited the land. One of the
children, L, unilaterally executed a Declaration of Heirship, claiming to be the sole heir of her parents.
The title to the property was transferred in L’s name. L then sold the property to a third person, T.
L’s siblings filed a complaint and the RTC ruled in their favor, ordering the cancellation of title in
L’s name as the property is co-owned by L and her siblings, each being entitled to 1/9 share each. L
was also ordered to pay cross complainant T the sum of the purchase price with legal interest. This
decision became final and executory. T later goes to L, demanding the payment of the purchase price.
They then entered into a verbal agreement where L would be given more time to surrender the title over
the property to T instead. After L failed to transfer title to T despite demand, T filed a complaint against
L for specific performance. The RTC ruled in favor of T. The decision became final and executory. More
than 6 months after the finality of the decision, L’s siblings learned of the decision in favor of T. What is
the remedy of the siblings and why?
Their remedy is to file a petition for Annulment of judgment with the CA since the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the siblings. The ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction, owing to the failure to implead the siblings as
indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. In the action for
specific performance compelling the transfer of the subject property co-owned by nine heirs who have already been
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adjudged by a final and executory decision as co-owners of the subject property, the latter are indispensable parties
in such an action (Fernando v. Paguyo, G.R. No. 237871, September 18, 2019, Caguioa Case)
An Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over a parcel of land located at Isabela was issued in D’s favor
pursuant to a patent, who was then still a minor. Years later, D’s father, G, represented D who was then
a minor in filing before the RTC an action for recovery of ownership, possession with damages against
A, who had been squatting on the subject land and refused to vacate despite repeated demands. In his
Answer, A interposed the special and affirmative defenses of his actual possession and cultivation of the
subject parcel of land in an open, adverse, and continuous manner and asked for the reconveyance of
the property for having been fraudulently titled in D’s name. In the course of the trial, A died and was
substituted by his heirs. D’s counsel repeatedly failed to attend the hearings, and D was deemed to have
waived the right to cross examine.
The RTC ruled in favor of A’s heirs, dismissing the complaint because A had become the owner of the
land by acquisitive prescription and directing D to reconvey the same. D filed a petition for relief from
judgment because his counsel’s negligence in handling the case prevented him from participating in the
proceedings and from filing his appeal. The RTC denied the petition for relief for being filed out of time.
D filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Should the petition for annulment of judgment be denied since D was able to previously
file a petition for relief from judgment?
As to the remedy of annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud, since D already availed himself of
the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, raising the issue of extrinsic fraud, he is effectively
barred from raising the same issue via his petition for annulment of judgment. However, the same cannot be
said for the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which should prosper because the RTC was bereft of jurisdiction to
rule with finality on the issue of ownership and consequently was without the power to order the reconveyance
of the subject land to the heirs of A given the fact that the original complaint was only an accion publiciana filed
by the registered owner, where the issue is the better right of possession of real property independently of title.
The objective in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise
the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to
possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
While defendant raised the defense of ownership, that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner,
such defense will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff’s Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution
of the issue of ownership in accion publiciana is done only to determine the issue of possession.
When A filed his Answer raising the defense of ownership on the ground that D obtained such title by fraud, it
had already been years since the OCT was issued in D’s name. The OCT had already become indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the lapse of the one-year period from issuance thereof to question it by reason of actual
fraud as provided in Sec. 32, PD 1529.
The RTC was without jurisdiction to rule that A became the owner of the land through acquisitive prescription
and that D should reconvey the same to A. The RTC can only resolve the issue of ownership to provisionally to
determine the better right of possession, which is allowed in an accion publiciana (Heirs of Alfredo Cullado v.
Dominic Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Collateral Attack on Judgments; When Proper
What is the concept of a collateral attack and when is it proper?

A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made
as an incident in said action (Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93687, May 6, 1991). It is proper only when the
judgment, on its face, is null and void, as where it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has no
jurisdiction (Pacasum, Sr. v. Atty. Zamoranos, G.R. No.193719, March 21, 2017).
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Rule 65 as Remedy from Judgment
When may a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 be availed of?

Petition for certiorari may be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Under the expanded certiorari jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the writ may be availed of when there is grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 1; Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014).
Within what period may a petition for certiorari be filed?

The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4).
May a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari be filed? (PIGS-WELUF-PS-ID)
As a rule, no, because petitions under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies and the party who seeks to avail of the
same must strictly observe the rules (Matagumpay Maritime Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 144638, 9 August
2005). Under exceptional cases, the period may be extended subject to the court’s discretion, such as when:
1. There is most Persuasive and weighty reason therefor;
2. It is necessary to relieve a litigant from an Injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure;
3. There is Good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time
of the default;
4. There exists Special or compelling circumstances;
5. The merits of the case Warrant the same;
6. There is a cause not Entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules;
7. There is a Lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
8. The other party will not be Unjustly prejudiced thereby;
9. There is Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault;
10. Peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case warrant the same;
11. It is in the name of Substantial justice and fair play;
12. The Importance of the issues involved warrants the same; and
13. It is granted by the exercise of sound Discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
Note: In all the foregoing instances, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance
a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his failure to comply with the rules (Themaris Philippines, Inc., v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014; Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010).
Where should a petition for Certiorari be filed? (SC-CR)

The petition is filed before the:
1. Supreme Court (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4);
2. CA or Sandiganbayan, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction – when it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
cognizable only by the CA (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4);
3. COMELEC, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction - if it deals with election cases involving an act or omission
of the MTC or RTC (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC); or
4. RTC – when it involves acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in
the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the SC (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4).
When may the Supreme Court treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45? (EWS)
The Supreme Court, on appropriate occasions, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly when:
1. The petition averred Errors of judgment;
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2. The petition was filed Within the period to file a petition for review on certiorari; and
3. There was a Sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules and to do so would serve the higher ends
of justice (Navarez v. Abrogar III, G.R. No. 191641, September 2, 2015).
When may the Supreme Court treat a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65?
Only in exceptional circumstances, the Court has treated a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, where the subject of the recourse was one of jurisdiction, or the act
complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
(China Banking Corp. v. Asian Construction & Development Corp., G.R. No. 158271, April 8, 2008).
May the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause in a preliminary investigation be
the subject of judicial review by the Supreme Court?
As a rule, no. The SC defers to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. The consistent policy has been to maintain
non-interference in the determination by the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause on account of the
recognition that both the Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, give
the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees.
Since it is armed with the power to investigate, coupled with the principle that the SC is not a trier of facts, the
Ombudsman is in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make
a finding of probable cause. The foregoing general rule, however, is subject to an exception — where there is
an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In such a case, the Ombudsman’s act cannot escape judicial scrutiny
under the Court’s own constitutional power and duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 223972, November 03, 2020, Caguioa
Case)
Discuss the rule on the effect of a dismissal of an administrative case before the Ombudsman on the
related criminal case filed against the same public officer.
As a rule, in cases where both an administrative case and a criminal case are filed against a public officer for the
same act or omission, the absolution from an administrative case does not necessarily bar a criminal case from
proceeding, and vice versa. An offense may have been committed but the evidence adduced to prove liability
failed to obtain the threshold required by law in one case (substantial evidence in administrative cases or proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases) which would have established that the actor is either administratively
or criminally liable. For this reason, the parallel case should not be dismissed ipso facto without a showing that its
own threshold of evidence has not been reached as well.
If the dismissal is only because the quantum of evidence had not been met, the respondent is not completely absolved
in all remaining proceedings. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure
followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in
one should not necessarily be binding on the other. The evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. The prosecution is not precluded from
adducing additional evidence to discharge the burden of proof required in the criminal cases.
However, if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in the administrative
case, and the court trying the administrative case already squarely ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances
sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting
evidence despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a futile and
useless exercise. The dismissal of the administrative case based on the same subject matter and after examining the
same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding that the act from which
liability is anchored does not exist (Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 223972, November
03, 2020, Caguioa Case)
Public Officer X allegedly committed an irregular and improper act in the performance of his official
actions, for which he was charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, based on
the same facts, act or omission and evidence. In the criminal case, the Ombudsman issued a resolution
finding probable cause against X. Later, a resolution was issued in the administrative case, finding X
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administratively liable and ruling that he should be dismissed from the service. X timely filed a motion
for reconsideration, and the Ombudsman reversed its earlier administrative ruling, and found that
X had no direct participation in the alleged anomalies. Because of this ruling, X filed a motion for
reconsideration against the resolution in the criminal case, but it was denied outright for being filed out
of time. X filed a Petition for Certiorari to assail the resolution in the criminal case before the SC. Will
the petition prosper?
Yes.There is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman since there is a categorical finding in the
administrative case against X that he had no direct participation in the anomalies, and yet, the Ombudsman
sustained the resolution in the criminal case finding probable cause against X on a sheer technicality, that is, the
lapse of the reglementary period to file the motion for reconsideration. If X was already found not to have had
any participation in the anomalies, then this finding merits his exoneration as well from the criminal case. It falls
well within the exception to the general rule that administrative and criminal cases based on the same operative
facts may proceed independently. The ruling of the Ombudsman is much more than a finding that there was
"insufficient evidence" to hold X administratively liable, but rather, that X did not commit anything at all which
can potentially incriminate him administratively or criminally {Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
G.R. No. 223372, November 03, 2020, Caguioa Case)
Distinguish among appeals by certiorari under Rule 45, certiorari under Rule 65, and Article VIII, Sec.
1 of the Constitution.
Expanded Scope
Appeal by Certiomri Petition for Certiomri
of Petition for Certiomri
{RO(,: Rule 45) (Roe: Rule 65)
{CONST., Art. VIII, Se,·. 1}
I I
As to Issues Involved
Issues raised or involved are purely Whether a tribunal board or officer Grave abuse of discretion
oflaw (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 1}. exercising judicial or quasi-judicial amounting to lack or excess
functions has acted without or of jurisdiction not only by a
in excess of its jurisdiction, or tribunal, corporation, board or
with grave abuse of discretion officer exercising judicial, quasi-
amounting to lack or excess of judicial or ministerial functions,
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, but also to set right, undo and
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate restrain any act of grave abuse
remedy in the ordinary course of of discretion amounting to lack
law {Philippine National Bank or excess or jurisdiction by any
v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 134344, branch or instrumentality of the
September 18, 2017; ROC, Rule 65, Government even if the latter
Sec. 1}. does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions
(Villanueva v. judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7,
2015).
As to Nature
Appeal {Arba v. Nicolas, G.R. No. Original Action {Agranan Reform Original Action {Arau/lo v. Aquino
168334 October6, 2008). Beneficiaries Association v. Nicolas, III, G.R. No. 203287,July 1, 2014).
G.R. No.168334, October8, 2006)
As to Jurisdiction Exercised
Court is in the exerciseof its appel· Court is exercising original juris- Expanded judicial power {Arau/lo
late jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 41, Sec diction {Albor v. CA, G.R. No. v. Aquino, G.R. No. 203287, July
2{c)). 136538,January 17, 2018) 1, 2014).
Subject of the Action
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Expanded Scope
Appeal by Ce11iomri Petition for Ce11iomri
of Petition for Certiomri
(ROC~ Rule 45) (ROC, Rule 65)
(CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
I I
Seeks to review final judgments or Directed mostly against
With respect to the SC, however,
final orders (ROC, Rule 45, Sec.J). interlocutory orders or matters the remedies of certiorari and
where no appeal may be taken prohibition are necessarily broader
from, or where the judgement or in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may
final order is rendered without
be issued to correct errors of
or in excess of jurisdiction or jurisdiction committed not only
with grave abuse of discretion by a tribunal, corporation, board
amounting to lack or excess of or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequatebut also to set right, undo and
remedy (Prime Savings Bank v. restrain any act of grave abuse
Sps. Santos, G.R. No. 208283, of discretion amounting to lack
G.R. No. 208283, June l!J, 201!)). or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-
(Villanueva v. judicial and Bar
Council,G.R. No. 211833, April 7,
2015).
As to Time of Filing
Appeal is taken within 15 days Petition is filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order
from notice of the judgment, final or resolution sought to be assailed(ROC, Rule 65, Sec.4).
order, or resolution or of denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial
or reconsideration (ROC, Rule 45,
Sec.2).
As to Stage of Proceedings
Appeal by certiorarimay beavailed Petition for certiorarimay be availed of during the pendency of the case or
of only after a final judgment. It even before judgment. It may be availed of against an interlocutory order.
seeks to review final judgments or
final orders (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 1).
As to Pre-condition
No need for a Motion for Recon- Motion for Reconsideration is a prerequisite (ProgressiveDevelopment
sideration (ROC, Rule 45, Sec.2). Corporationv. CA, G.R. No. 123555,january 22, 1!)!)!)).
As to Parties
Parties are the original parties with Tribunal, board, or officer has to be impleaded in the action as nominal
the appealing party as the petition- party respondent (HeirsofGuiambangan v. Municipality ofKAmansig,
er and the adverse party as the re- G.R. No. 20488!),July27, 2016).
spondent without impleading the
lower court or its judge (ROC, Rule
45, Sec.4).
As to the Stay of Execution
Stays the judgment, final order, or The challenged proceeding is not stayed unless the court issues a TRO or
resolution (Ocampo v. RPN!J, G.R. injunctive writ (De Ocampov. RPN-!), supra).
No. 1!)2!)47,December0!),2015).
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Expanded Scope
Appeal by Certiorari Petition for Certiorari
of Petition for Certiorari
(ROC, Rule 45) (ROC, Rule 65)
(CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
As to Where Filed
SC (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 1). May be filed with the SC, CA, RTC, May be filed with the SC, CA,
Sandiganbayan, COMELEC RTC (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4).
As to Binding Effects of the Findings of the Fact of CA

Absent any clear showing of abuse, In original action for certiorari under this Rule, the findings of fact of the
arbitrariness or capriciousness CA are not conclusive or binding upon the SC (Medran v. CA, G.R. No.
committed by the lower court, its L-1350, March 26, 1949).
findings of facts, especially when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding and conclusive upon
this Court (Castillo v. CA, G.R. No.
106472, August 7, 1996).
Why are the remedies of appeal and certiorari mutually exclusive?

Certiorari is not a remedy when an appeal, or other plain speedy and adequate remedy is available (Bernardo v.
Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019). Certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible
by appeal; errors of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari (Casil v. CA, G.R. No. 121534, January 28, 1998).
What are the instances where a petition for certiorari is treated as prohibited pleading against an
interlocutory order? (SHAP-MOD-PS)
Petition for certiorari is a prohibited pleading against an interlocutory order in the following cases:
1. Small Claims Cases (A.M. 08-8-7-SC, Sec. 14 (g));
2. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Data (A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC Sec. 11 (l));
3. Petition for a Writ of Amparo (A. M. No. 07-9-12-SC Sec. 11 (l));
4. Cases governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure (RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Sec.
19(g));
5. Denial of affirmative defenses; instead, the denial should be among the matter raised on appeal after
judgment on the Merits (ROC, Rule 8, Sec. 12(e));
6. The motu proprio Order of the court to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment after pretrial (ROC, Rule 18, Sec. 10);
7. Order denying the Demurrer to evidence before judgment (ROC, Rule 33, Sec. 2);
8. Any action of the court on a motion for judgment on the Pleadings (ROC, Rule 34, Sec. 2); and
9. Any action of the court on a motion for Summary judgment (ROC, Rule 35, Sec. 3).
What are the exceptions to the rule on filing a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition?
(PRN-PUD-CLEI)
The following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
1. Where the order is a Patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
2. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly Raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
3. Where there is an urgent Necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner;
4. Where the subject matter of the action is Perishable;
5. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be Useless;
6. Where petitioner was deprived of Due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
7. Where, in a Criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable;
8. Where the proceedings in the Lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
9. Where the proceedings were Ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
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10. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public Interest is involved (Philippine Bank of
Communications v. CA, G.R. No.218901, February 15, 2017).
H and W got married. W left to go on a vacation for 3 months, but after leaving, H could no longer
contact W. H received information that W was already cohabiting with another man and would no
longer come back. While at work in another city, H received news that W was going back home to visit
the children, but when H got there, W had already left. H tried to look for W in other cities where
other relatives of W were located, but never found W. H filed in the RTC a Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death, claiming that W could not be found despite his search for her for 10 years.
RTC granted the petition. Since the RTC judgment in such summary proceeding was immediately final,
executory, the Republic filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which petition was denied for failing
to file a motion for reconsideration before resorting to a petition for certiorari. The Republic argued
that the case fell among the exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration before resort
to petition for certiorari, since the case involved a pure question of law, as the Republic does not dispute
the truthfulness of H’s allegations, and his claimed acts done to locate W. What the Republic questions
is the sufficiency of such acts, that is whether they are sufficient to merit a legal declaration of W’s
presumptive death. Is the Republic correct?
Yes. As a rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court before the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari is resorted to, since a motion for reconsideration is considered a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. This general rule admits of exceptions, one of which is when the issue raises a pure
question of law. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of the alleged facts. The Republic does not dispute the truthfulness of H’s allegations and his acts done
to locate W. What it does question is the sufficiency of these acts to merit a legal declaration of presumptive death.
The Republic’s Petition for Certiorari raised a pure legal question, hence the CA may entertain direct resort to it
of a Petition for Certiorari (Republic v. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020, Caguioa Case).
What are the grounds for the dismissal of the petition under Rule 65? (MDUS)
The court may dismiss the petition if it finds it to be:
1. Patently without Merit;
2. Prosecuted manifestly for Delay;
3. If the questions raised are too Unsubstantial to require consideration (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 8); or
4. If the petition is not Sufficient in form and substance (ROC, Rule 46, Sec. 3, as amended by Bar Matter
No.803; Resolution of the Supreme Court, July 21, 1998; ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 6).
What are the remedies against the ruling of the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation and the
rulings of the Ombudsman in an administrative case and in a preliminary investigation, after motions
for reconsideration assailing the foregoing have been denied?
Provided there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the remedies are as follows:
1. Against the ruling of the Secretary of Justice – Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA;
2. Against the ruling of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation – Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari filed
with the SC;
3. Against the ruling of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty is not light or does not
absolve the respondent of the charge – Rule 43 Petition for with the CA; and
4. Against the ruling of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the penalty is light or absolves the
respondent of the charge – Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed with the CA (Fabian v. Disierto, G.R. No.
129742, September 16, 1998; Dagan v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013; Go v. King,
G.R. No. 194063, March 11, 2015).
Note: In an administrative case before the Ombudsman, where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
(1) month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. The
remedy in such cases against the Ombudsman ruling is Rule 65 with the CA (Ancheta v. Villa, G.R. No. 229634,
January 15, 2020, Caguioa Case; Sec. 7, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 7)
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X was charged administratively before the Ombudsman, which found X administratively liable and
meted X with the penalty of a fine equivalent to 1 month salary. What is the remedy to assail such ruling?
The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, since such ruling imposing a fine
equivalent to 1 month salary is final, executory, and unappealable (Ancheta v. Villa, G.R. No. 229634, January 15,
X, Chairman of the COMELEC, was charged with violation of Section 3 (h) of RA 3019 before the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan acquitted X, ruling that the prosecution’s evidence was only able
to prove that X was brokering the collaboration between ZTE Company and AHI Company, a firm
interested in partnership with ZTE, but not that he brokered the contract between ZTE Company and
the Philippine Government for a fee. The prosecution failed to prove X’s alleged financial interest. The
prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on the ground that it failed to raise
any errors of law or fact in the judgment, and that the Assailed Decision, being one of acquittal, was
immediately final and executory in light of the accused’s right to be protected against double jeopardy.
Hence, prosecution filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the SC, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
understanding, evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Will the Petition for Certiorari prosper?

No, because the petition raises arguments anchored on perceived errors made by the Sandiganbayan in its
appreciation of the prosecution’s evidence or errors of judgment, rather than errors of jurisdiction. Errors of
judgment are not correctible by certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that
errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. For as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction,
any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
reviewable and may be corrected by a timely appeal. The rationale of this rule is that, when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment will be a void judgment. Certiorari will not lie for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of
a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Certiorari cannot be resorted to in order to correct perceived errors of fact or law by a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers where said tribunal is not shown to have acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021, Caguioa Case).
What is the finality-of-acquittal rule and does it have an exception?

It makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation. By exception,
the rule is inapplicable where the court that rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is
strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution’s right to due process such as when it is denied the
opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of
acquittal void (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021, Caguioa Case).
Since there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion, what will be the effect of granting the petition
for certiorari?
Accused will be unjustly subjected to double jeopardy if the petition for certiorari is granted, despite the absence
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. Because there is no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Sandiganbayan in acquitting the accused, the finality-of-acquittal rule applies. The acquittal should be
upheld, lest the accused be unjustly subjected to double jeopardy (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 228281, June
Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or

Final Orders of Various Court/ Tribunals
Rule 40 - Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts
How is an appeal taken from a judgment or final order of the MTC?

An appeal from a judgment or final order of the MTC may be taken either by:
1. Filing a notice of appeal with the MTC and payment of appeal and docket fees, within fifteen (15) days
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after notice of the judgment or final order appealed from; or

2. Where a record on appeal is required, by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal and payment of
appeal and docket fees with the MTC within thirty (30) days after notice of judgment or final order
(ROC, Rule 40, Sec. 2, 3 and 5).
Note: f the judgment in the MTC is rendered under Small Claims Procedure, the decision is final, executory, and
unappealable. The remedy is petition for certiorari under Rule 65, if there is grave abuse of discretion (A.L. Ang
Network, Inc., v. Emma Mondejar, G.R. No. 200804, 22 January 2014).

What is the effect of filing a Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial to the period of appeal?
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration (ROC, Rule 40, Sec.
2). Where a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed and then denied, the movant has a fresh period of fifteen
(15) days to file an appeal from notice of the order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided
that a motion for reconsideration or new trial is not prohibited (Spouses Lee v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No.
218867, February 17, 2016).
Note: A motion for new trial or for reconsideration of a judgment is prohibited under Summary Procedure and
Small Claims. The filing thereof against a judgment will not toll the running of the period to appeal in the case
of Summary Procedure, or Petition for Certiorari, in the case of Small Claims (1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, Sec. 19(c); 2016 Revised Rules of Procedures for Small Claims Cases, Sec. 16(c)).
Is a motion for extension of time to file a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration allowed?
No. No motion for extension of time to file a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration shall be allowed (ROC,
Rule 40, Sec. 2).
What should be contained in the notice of appeal?

The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment or final order or part thereof
appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the
timeliness of the appeal (ROC, Rule 40, Sec. 3, Rule 41, Sec. 5).
What are the material dates showing the timeliness of an appeal?

The following are the material dates:
1. The day notice of the judgment or final order was received;
2. The day when a motion for reconsideration or new trial, if any, was filed;
3. The day when notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial was received (Lapid v.
Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002).
Note: These dates should be reflected to enable the reviewing court to determine if the appeal was filed on time
because as a rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and failure to perfect an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory (Yu v. SR Metals, Inc.,
G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017).
Rule 41 - Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
How is an appeal taken from a judgment or final order rendered by the RTC in its original jurisdiction?
Appeal may be taken by:
1. Filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and payment of appeal and docket fees, within fifteen (15) days
after notice of the judgment or final order appealed from, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order
denying a motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial; or
2. Where a record on appeal is required, by filing a notice of appeal and a record on appeal and payment of
appeal and docket fees with the RTC, within thirty (30) days after notice of the judgment or final order or
from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial upon approval of the
record on appeal (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 2(a), 3 and 9).
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Note: In habeas corpus cases, appeal shall be taken within 48 hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from (ROC, Rule 41, Sec. 3).
Plaintiff X timely appeals the judgment by notice of appeal. Defendant Y has no notice of the judgment
yet. Will X’s perfection of appeal prevent defendant Y from assailing the judgment by Motion for
Reconsideration since giving due course to the notice of appeal would divest the court of jurisdiction to
decide the defendant’s motion for reconsideration?
No. Each party has a different period within which to appeal, which is counted from the party’s respective notice
of the assailed judgment or final order. A party’s ability to file his own appeal within the reglementary period is not
affected by the other party’s exercise of discretion to file his motion for reconsideration. The timely filing of the
motion for reconsideration by one party does not affect the period to appeal of the other party.
If a notice of appeal is perfected by X, the court would not be deprived of jurisdiction to rule on Y’s motion for
reconsideration. Section 9, Rule 41 provides that the court loses jurisdiction in appeals by notice of appeal, upon
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Here, there
is no expiration of time to appeal yet as Y still has the time to appeal considering that Y has not yet had notice of the
decision. Not having notice of the decision, the period to appeal for Y has not started to run (Bernardo v. Soriano,
G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Discuss the concept of Residual Jurisdiction of the trial court.

It is the power of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which
do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal, after it has lost jurisdiction from perfection of
appeal or approval or the record on appeal but prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Carpio, G.R. No. 195450, February 01, 2017).
What are the modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction in relation to the issues to be raised on appeal?
Under Section 2, Rule 41, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction. First, if the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law,
the proper recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44. Second, If
the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the SC by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 (Pfleider v. Court of Appeals-Cebu City, G.R. No. 196058, November 12, 2018, Caguioa
Case).
May an appeal by ordinary appeal under Rule 41 be availed of raising purely a question of law?
No. An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. The proper remedy is to bring the matter raising pure
questions of law from the RTC ruling in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the SC by Rule 45 petition for
review on certiorari (ROC, Rule 50, Sec. 2; Rule 45, Sec. 1).
A complaint was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of litis pendentia. Appellant perfected his appeal
to the CA, questioning the dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia, which was denied outright by
the CA for being the wrong remedy since the appeal raised only questions of law. Was the CA correct?
Yes, because Sec. 2, Rule 50 provides that an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed outright, as issues purely of law are not reviewable by the said court. Here, the
appeal involves a pure question of law as it does not call for an application of the probative value of the evidence
presented. The appeal is about the propriety of the dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia and a dismissal based
on this ground does not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of law and applicable
jurisprudence on litis pendentia (Pfleider v. Court of Appeals-Cebu City, G.R. No. 196058, November 12, 2018,
Caguioa Case).
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RULE 42 - PETITION FOR REVIEW FROMTHE REGIONALTRIAL COURTS

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
How is appeal taken from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exerciseofits appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the CA, within 15 days from notice of the decision or of the denial of petitioner's
motion for reconsideration or new trial, pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, and depositing
Php500 for costs, furnish the RTC and the adverse party with a copy of the petition, and file together with the
petition the proofof such service (ROC, Rule 42, Sec.1).
Is an appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 extendible?

Yes.Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementaty period, the CA may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days (ROC, Rule 42, Sec.1).
Is a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping required even if a petition for review is not an initiatory
pleading?
Yes.A Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping is required even if a Petition for Review is not an initiatoty pleading
{Andersonv. Ho, G.R. No. 1725!)0,january 7, 2013).
X filed a case in the MTC and lost. X appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC ruling. X appealed
to the CA by filing a notice of appeal. Will the appeal prosper?
No. An appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review to the CA from the judgment of the RTC
rendered in the exerciseof its appellate jurisdiction shall be dismissed (ROC, Rule 50, Sec.2).
Will the appeal under Rule 42 stay the judgment or final order of the RTC?
Yes,except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure or unless the CA, the law, or the ROC
provide otherwise (ROC, Rule 42, Sec.8).
Distinguish between Ordinary Appeal from Petition for Review.

They are distinguished as follows:
Ordinary Appeal Petition for Review
I
As to Governing Rule
Rules 4-0and 41 Rule42
As to Transfer of Records
All the records are elevated from the court of origin No records are elevated unless the court decrees it
after perfection of appeal (ROC, Rule 41, Sec.12}. (ROC, Rule 42, Sec.7).
As to Where Filed
Notice of appeal or record on appeal is filed with the Petition for Review is filed with the CA (ROC, Rule
court of origin (ROC, Rule 41, Sec.12}. 42, Sec.l).
As to the Court Whose Judgment is being Appealed
The judgment was rendered by the MTC/RTC pursu- The case was decided by the RTC pursuant to its ap-
ant to its original jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 40, Sec.1). pellate jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 42, Sec.1).
As to Court Action
Since it is a first appeal, the court has no discretion Review of a decision through a petition for review is
to deny the notice of appeal or record of appeal if it discretionary.
is filed within the reglementaty period and complies
with the requirements set forth in Rule 41, Sec. 5 and The CA may require the respondent to file a comment
6. An appeal under these rules is a matter of right. on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10
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Ordinary Appeal Petition for Review

The notice of appeal does not require the approval of days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds
the court. the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised
The function of the notice of appeal is merely to notify therein are too insubstantial to require consideration
the trial court that the appellant was availing of the (ROC, Rule 42, Sec. 4).
right to appeal, and not to seek the court’s permission
that he be allowed to pose an appeal (Crisologo v.
Daray, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2036, August 20, 2008).
Rule 43 - Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals,

Civil Service Commission, and Quasi-Judicial Agencies
Are the judgments or final orders issued by the NLRC covered under Rule 43?
No. The rule does not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines (ROC,
Rule 43, Sec. 2). The judgments and final orders or resolutions of the NLRC are reviewable by the CA in an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 (St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998).
How is an appeal under Rule 43 from the awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function ns taken?
An appeal may be taken to the CA by verified Petition for Review under Rule 43, whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 3).
The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from
the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 4).
Is the period of appeal under Rule 43 extendible?

Yes. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the CA may grant an additional period of 15 days only within which to file the petition for
review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed 15
days (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 4).
What is the effect of findings of fact by the court or agency on the CA?
The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding
on the CA (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 10).
Will an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA stay an execution?

No. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the CA
shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 12).
Company G engaged the services of R International for the construction of its hospital. In 2015, R
International filed a complaint and request for arbitration before the CIAC since a dispute arises on
the issue of the correct computation of the amount due of Company G to R International under their
progress billing. The CIAC issued an arbitral award which denied in part the reliefs sought by R
International. With this, R International appealed the award to the CA in 2016 through a petition for
review under Rule 43 which allows an appellant to raise issues of fact or law or mixed questions of fact
and law on appeal.
1. Was Rule 43 the proper remedy?
Yes. For appeals from CIAC arbitral awards that have already been filed and pending before the CA on or
before May 11, 2021, which is the date of promulgation of the case of Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc.
v. Ross Systems International, Inc., appeal under Rule 43 is proper.
2. Supposing the appeal was made on May 12, 2021, or onwards raising pure question of law, what is
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the proper mode of appeal?

If the issue to be raised by the parties is a pure question of law, the appeal should be filed directly and exclusively
with the SC through a petition for review under Rule 45.
3. Supposing the appeal was made on May 12, 2021 and the parties will appeal factual issues, what is
the remedy?
If the parties seek to challenge the CIAC’s finding of fact, the same may only be allowed under either of two
premises, namely: (1) assailing the very integrity of the composition of the CIAC tribunal (i.e., allegations of
corruption, fraud, misconduct, evident partiality, incapacity or excess of powers within the tribunal); or (2)
alleging the arbitral tribunal’s violation of the Constitution or positive law, in which cases the remedy is to
file before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on these limited grounds (Global Medical Center of
Laguna, Inc. v. Ross Systems International, Inc., G.R. Nos. 230112 & 230119, May 11, 2021, Caguioa Case).
May you assail the decision of the CSC by petition under Rule 65 with the CA?
No. Rule 65 petition may only be availed of when there is no appeal, or any other plain speedy adequate remedy.
There is an available remedy of appeal against the CSC decision, which is by Rule 43, petition for review with the
Court of Appeal (Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, November 22, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Rule 45 - Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
When may appeals to the SC by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 be made?
Appeals to the SC by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be taken from a judgment or final order
of the following, raising only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth:
1. The Court of Appeals;
2. Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
3. Court of Tax Appeals en banc;
4. RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; or
5. Such other courts, as may be authorized by law (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 1; RA 1125, Sec. 19, as amended by
RA 9282, Sec. 12).
What is the period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45?
It shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment
Is the period to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 extendible?
Yes. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the SC may for justifiable reasons, grant an extension of 30
days only within which to file the petition (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 2).
May a Notice of Appeal be filed with the SC?

As a rule, no. An appeal taken to the SC by notice of appeal shall be dismissed. By exception, notice of appeal may
be taken to the SC: (1) as provided in Sec. 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal cases from the CA where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction (ROC, Rule 57, Sec. 6, Rule 122, Sec. 3, Rule 124, Sec. 13(c); A.M. No. 13-
7-05-SC, 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, Rule XI, Sec. 1(a)).
When may the SC decide on questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45?
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Court is generally limited to reviewing only errors of law
which must be distinctly set forth. The SC is not a trier of facts and is not to review or calibrate the evidence on
record (Boston Bank of the PHL v. Manalo, G.R. No. 158149, February 9, 2006).
Nevertheless, the SC has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as when: (AHK-SAMG-Con3-BVON)
1. From a judgment in a petition for a:
a. Writ of Amparo;
b. Writ of Habeas Data; and
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c. Writ of Kalikasan, which may raise questions of law or fact, or both.

2. When the finding is grounded entirely on Speculations, surmise, or conjecture;
3. When inference made is manifestly Absurd, mistaken, or impossible;
4. When the judgment is premised on a Misrepresentation of facts;
5. When there is Grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
6. When the findings of fact are Conflicting;
7. When the findings of fact are Conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
8. The findings of fact of the CA is premised on supposed evidence and is Contradicted by the evidence on
record;
9. When the CA in making its findings went Beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to both
the admissions of appellants and appellees;
10. When the findings of fact of the CA are at Variance with those of the trial court, the SC has to review the
evidence to arrive at the correct findings based on the record;
11. When certain material facts and circumstances have been Overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into
account, would alter the result of the case in that they would entitle the accused to acquittal; and
12. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are Not disputed
by the respondents (Asian Terminals, Inc., v. Simon Enterprises, Inc, G.R. No. 177116, February 27, 2013).
X filed a complaint against Y for recovery of possession of real property. The RTC dismissed the
complaint for X’s failure to establish that the portion occupied by Y belonged to X. On appeal with the
CA, X argued that the Relocation Plan proved the encroachment. The CA affirmed the RTC, finding
that the Relocation Plan did not indicate that X’s property was encroached by Y. X appealed to the SC
by Rule 45, arguing that the CA misconstrued the Relocation Plan. Will the appeal prosper?
No, because the petition puts forward a purely factual issue calling for the reversal of the decision on the argument
that the Relocation Plan is allegedly competent proof of encroachment. The SC cannot be asked to re-weigh and
re-assess the evidentiary value of the Relocation Plan, a question of fact, via petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. The SC is not a trier of facts. It is not the SC’s function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence
presented in the proceedings below (Heirs of Lupena v. Medina, G.R. No. 231639, January 22, 2020, Caguioa
Case).
When is there a question of fact?

A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence
and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation (Heirs of Lupena v. Medina, G.R. No. 231639, January 22, 2020, Caguioa Case).
X was charged administratively before the Ombudsman because of the alleged baseless adjustment of
Y’s salary grade. The Ombudsman found X guilty of grave misconduct. X appealed to the CA, which
affirmed the Ombudsman. From the CA, X appealed to the SC by petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, arguing that the evidence shows that X had no participation in the alleged act of increasing Y’s
salary grade. May the SC entertain the petition?
Yes. While the SC, as a rule, does not entertain questions of facts in a Rule 45 petition, such rule is subject to
exceptions, such as when the findings of fact of the lower tribunal, which was upheld by the CA, was based
on misapprehension of facts and was clearly not supported by extant evidence, as in this case where X had no
participation in the questionable act of increasing Y’s salary grade (Rejas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
241576 & 241623, November 03, 2020, Caguioa Case).
C Corporation filed an application for registration and confirmation of title of a land before the RTC
which was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG arguing that the subject
property still remained part of the public domain and hence, not subject to private ownership. The
RTC granted the application for registration but said Decision was reversed and set aside by the CA. In
its MR filed before the CA, C Corporation presented documents to support the claim of C Corporation
that the land is now part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. From the denial
of the MR by the CA on the ground that the documents submitted are vague and inconclusive as to
whether the land is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, C Corporation then seeks a
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review by the SC of the findings of the CA by filing a Rule 45 certiorari petition. Was the remedy sought
by C Corporation proper?
No. The remedy sought is not correct. A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the ROC cannot be
availed to assail factual findings of the CA. In giving due course and granting of review or appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the ROC, only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth in the petition, shall be raised. In
this case, the issue raised in the Petition is not a pure question of law because its resolution requires a review of the
correctness of the factual determination of the CA that the documents which petitioner belatedly submitted to the
CA are vague and inconclusive as to whether the subject lot falls within the areas that have been declared alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by
petitioner should be denied as it seeks to assail factual findings of the CA which is not permitted under said Rule
(Ususan Development Corp. v. Republic, G.R. No. 209462; July 15, 2020, Caguioa Case).
X filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019 against Y which was,
however, dismissed by the Sandiganbayan for lack of probable cause. X filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was also denied and was received by him on November 16, 2009. On January 19, 2010, where 48
days has lapsed from the receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, X filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. Did X availed the proper remedy in assailing the
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration he filed?
No, the proper remedy being a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rule 45,
Section 2 of the same Rule provides that the petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In this case, X received the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration
on November 16, 2009, petitioner had fifteen (15) days or until December 1, 2009 to file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Instead, X filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on January 19, 2010 or 48 days
after the lapse of the reglementary period to file an appeal via Rule 45. X’s resort to a Special Civil Action after
failing to appeal within the 15-day reglementary period may not be allowed for the special civil action of certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which he already lost (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 190728-29,
November 18, 2020, Caguioa Case).
X filed a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage with Prayer for Injunction against
PS Bank with the RTC, which later decided in favor of X. PS Bank later received a notice of garnishment
and writ of execution, attached to the entry of final judgment. PS Bank filed a motion to lift the writ
and notice, which was granted. X filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the RTC reversed itself,
ordering the enforcement of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. PS Bank filed a Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI. The CA denied the application for
TRO and/or WPI. PS Bank filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC, to assail the denial
of the TRO and/or WPI. Was the Petition for Review on Certiorari proper?
No, the petition should be dismissed outright for being a wrong remedy since the resolution of the CA denying
the TRO and/or WPI is merely an interlocutory order, and such prayer for TRO/WPI is only ancillary to the main
case for the petition for certiorari with the CA. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgments or
final orders, not interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment
is rendered for one party or the other. The proper remedy against an interlocutory order is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 (Prime Savings Bank v. Sps. Santos, G.R. No. 208283, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments or Final Orders of the

Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections
How may a judgment, resolution, or final order of the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) and the
Commission of Audit (COA) be assailed?
A judgment, resolution, or final order of the COMELEC and the COA may be brought by the aggrieved party to
the SC on Certiorari in relation to Rule 64 by filing the petition within 30 days from notice (ROC, Rule 64, Secs.
1 and 2).
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What is the proper subject of review of judgments or final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC or
COA?
Review extends only to final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc and not to interlocutory orders
issued by a Division (Sahali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201736,January 15, 2013). Funhermore, the review does
not apply to judgments or final orders by COA or COMELEC in the exercise of their administrative functions
(Querubinv. COMELEC, G.R. No. 218787, December8, 2015).
The COMELEC promulgation Resolution No. 10015, providing for the rules and regulations on the
gun ban during the election period. X assailed the same by petition for certiorari, filing the petition
within the 60-day period to do so under Rule 65. Was the petition filed out of time since Rule 64
mentions that the period to file the petition thereunder is 30 days and not 60?
No. The 30-day reglementary period under Rule 64 does not apply since Resolution No. 10015 was issued by
the COMELEC under its rule-making power to implement the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and
RA 7166. Rule 64 and the 30-day period therein apply to the review of final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC en bane rendered in the exerciseof its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers (PhilippineAssociationof
Detectiveand ProtectiveAgency Operatorsv. Commissionon Elections,G.R. No. 223505, October3, 2017, Caguioa
Case).
Distinguish Appeal by Certiorari (Rule 45), Review of Judgments, Final Order or Resolutions (Rule
64), and Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65).
They are distinguished as follows:
Review of Judgments, Final
Orders or Resolutions
(Rule ➔ 5) (Rule 65)
(Rule 6➔)
I I
As to Scope
Involves the review of the Involves the review of judgments, Directed mostly against an
judgment, award, or final order on final orders, or resolutions of the interlocutory order of the court
the merits. COMELEC and COA. or where judgment or final order
was rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and there
is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy.
As to Basis
Petition is based on questions of Petition is based on questions oflaw. Petition is based on question of
law. jurisdiction.
Appeal or Original Action

It is a mode of appeal. It is a mode of review of the order It is an original action.
The SC is exercising appellate or resolution of the COMELEC or
jurisdiction (CONST. Art. VIII, COA. It is an independent special civil
Sec. 5, par. 2). action not a continuation of the
The SC is exercising appellate original action.
jurisdiction.
As to Time of Filing
Within 15 days from notice Within 30 days from notice of Not later than 60 days from notice
of judgment, final order, or judgment, final order, or resolution of judgment, order, or resolution
resolution appealed from. sought to be reviewed. sought to be reviewed.
IfMR or MNT is filed and allowed In case MR or MNT is timely filed,

under the rules of the Commission whether such motion is required
concerned, the 30-day period to file or not, the petition shall be filed
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Review of Judgments, Final

Orders or Resolutions
(Rule ➔ 5) (Rule 65)
(Rule 6➔)
I I
the petition shall be interrupted not later than 60 days from the
and shall begin to run upon receipt notice of the denial of the motion
of denial of the said motion. (ROC, Rule 65, Sec. 4).
The movant is not given a fresh
period to file the petition (Pates v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 184915,
June 30, 2009).
Whether Appeal Stays the Judgment or Not
Stays the judgment or order Shall not stay the execution unless Unless a Writ of Preliminary
appealed from. SC shall direct otherwise upon such Injunction or Temporary
terms as it may deem just. Restraining Order is issued, does
not stay the challenged proceeding.
As to Parties Involved
..
The appellant and the appellee are The peaaoner and private The petitioner and private
the original parties to the action, respondent are the original parties respondents are the original parties
and the lower court or quasi- to the action. to the civil action.
judicial agency is not impleaded.
The COMELEC and COA shall be The judge, court, quasi-judicial
impleaded as public respondenrs. agency, tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person shall be
impleaded as public respondents.
Necessity of Filing a Motion for Reconsideration
MR is not required. The filing of MR or MNT is not MR or for MNT is required.

required.
As to Where Filed
The petition shall be filed with the The petition shall be filed with the The petition shall be filed with
SC. SC. the RTC, CA, Sandiganbayan or
COMELEC.
Does the Fresh Period Rule under the Neypes ruling apply to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64?
No. Under Rule 64, the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules
of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file
the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the
notice of denial (Fortune Life Insurance Co., v. COA, G.R. No. 213525,january 27, 2015; ROC, Rule 64, Sec. 3).
Discuss the types of questions that may be raised in different modes of appeal.
The following are the types of questions that may be raised in various modes of appeal:
Types of Questions Raised Proper Mode of Appeal
All Cases Decided by the Questions of fact, questions oflaw, Ordinary Appeal (ROC, Rule
MTC or mixed questions of fact and law. 40).
All Cases Decided by the RTC Questions of fact or mixed Ordinary Appeal (ROC, Rule 41
in the Exercise of its Original questions of fact and law. and ROC, Rule 44, Sec. JJ(e)).
Jurisdiction
Only questions oflaw. Appeal by Certiorari (ROC, Rule
45).
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All Judgments Rendered by Questions of fact, questions oflaw, Petition for Review (ROC, Rule
the RTC in the Exercise of its or mixed questions of fact and law. 42).
Appellate Jurisdiction
All Judgments Rendered by Questions of fact, questions oflaw, Petition for Review (ROC, Rule
Quasi-Judicial Agencies in the or mixed questions of fact and law. 43).
Exercise of its Quasi-Judicial
Functions
All Judgment, Final Order Only questions of law, subject to Appeal by Certiorari(ROC, Rule
or Resolution of the CA, the exceptions. 45).
Sandiganbayan, or the Court
of Tax Appeals
(Sevzllenov. Carilo,G.R. No. 146454, September14, 2007; Carpiov. Sulu ResourcesDevdopment Corp.,G.R. No.
148267,August 8, 2002}
Discuss how appeal may be taken under the Rules of Court.

Appeal may be taken as follows:
Decisions of
I Appeal to
I How Taken
I Period
MTC RTC Ordinary Appeal, Within 15 days after notice to the appellant of
by notice of appeal or the judgment or denial of the appellant's MR/
record of appeal. MNT.
Note: Where a record on appeal is required, the

appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order, or the denial of the mo-
tion for reconsideration or motion for new trial
(ROC, Rule 40, Sec.2, 3 and 5, Rule 41, Sec.J;
Brual v. Contreras,G.R. No. 205451, March 7,
2022;SpousesLee v. Land Bank of the Phils.,G.R.
No. 218867, February17, 2016).
RTC (Original CA Ordinary Appeal, Within 15 days after notice to the appellant of
Jurisdiction) by notice of appeal or the judgment or final order or denial of the ap•
record of appeal. pellant's MR/MNT.
Note: Where a record on appeal is required, the

appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a re-
cord on appeal within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or final order, or the denial of the mo-
tion for reconsideration or motion for new tri•
al. However, appeal in habeas corpus cases shall
be taken within 48 hours (ROC, Rule 41, Sec.3;
SpousesLee v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No.
218867, February17, 2016).
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Decisions of Appeal to How Taken Period
RTC (Original SC, for pure Appeal by Within 15 days from notice of the judgment or
Jurisdiction) questions of Certiorari. final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
law denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
the judgment.
Note: On motion duly filed and served, with full

payment of the docket and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the SC may for justifiable
reasons grant an extension of 30 days only within
which to file the petition (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 2).
RTC (Appellate CA Petition for Review Within 15 days from notice of the judgment
Jurisdiction) (ROC, Rule 42). sought to be reviewed or of denial of petitioner’s
MR/MNT.
Note: Upon proper motion and the payment of

the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expira-
tion of the reglementary period, the CA may
grant an additional period of fifteen 15 days only
within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen 15 days (ROC, Rule 42, Sec. 1).
Quasi- Judicial CA Petition for Review The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
Agencies under (ROC, Rule 43). notice of the award, judgment, final order or res-
Rule 43 olution, or from the date of its last publication,
or of the denial of petitioner’s MNT or MR duly
filed in accordance with the governing law of the
court or agency a quo.
Note: Upon proper motion and the payment

of the full amount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the CA
may grant an additional period of 15 days only
within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
15 days (ROC, Rule 43, Sec. 4).
CA, SB, CTA SC Appeal by Certiora- Within 15 days from notice of the judgment or
En Banc ri (ROC, Rule 45). final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
the judgment.
Note: On motion duly filed and served, with full
payment of the docket and other lawful fees and
the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the SC may for justifiable
reasons grant an extension of 30 days only within
which to file the petition (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 2).
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Dismissal, Reinstatement, and Withdrawal of Appeal
X timely filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, which denied to give due course to the same on the
ground that a notice of appeal was not the proper remedy. Was the RTC’s order proper?
Section 13, Rule 41 provides that the prior to transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the
appellate court, the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to instances when: (1) the appeal was filed
out of time; or (2) non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. The RTC has
no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely different ground, such as that an appeal is not a proper
remedy. The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and
not the RTC, as provided under Section 1, Rule 50. The RTC order denying due course to X’s notice of appeal on
the ground that it was a wrong remedy is a patent nullity, and the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
(Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, Caguioa Case).
On what grounds may the SC dismiss an appeal? (TM-PR-CEN)

The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent of the following grounds:
1. Failure to Take the appeal within the reglementary period;
2. Lack of Merit in the petition;
3. Failure to Pay the requisite docket fee and other lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs;
4. Failure to comply with the Requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition;
5. Failure to comply with any Circular, directive or order of the SC without justifiable cause;
6. Error in the choice or mode of appeal; and
7. The fact that the case is Not appealable to the SC (ROC, Rule 56, Sec. 5).
When can the court reinstate an appeal which has been dismissed?
An appeal may be reinstated when deemed just and proper considering the greater interest of justice. For instance,
where the appeal was dismissed due to insufficient payment of docket fees, appeal was reinstated as it was shown
that there was failure to pay, not due to lack of interest but due to lack of notice (Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128967, May 20, 2004).
Appeals in Criminal Cases: Modes of Appeal from Judgments

or Final Orders of Various Courts/ Tribunals
Rule 122
In a charge of rape with homicide, the prosecution moved to discharge one of the accused as a state
witness but refused to present evidence in support of the motion. When the motion was denied, the
prosecution refused to present evidence and the court passively watched the prosecution bungle the case
and did not direct the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. The prosecution rested its case, and
a demurrer to evidence was filed and granted. The state did not assail the acquittal. Private complainant,
the mother of the deceased victim, assailed the acquittal. May this be allowed?
Yes. While as a rule, private complainant has no legal standing to bring an action questioning a judgment of
acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is concerned, however, in this case, the private
complainant has an interest in the maintenance of the prosecution for being deprived of the right to due process.
There is no violation of the rule against double jeopardy because the acquittal is void for violation of due process
and as such, the first jeopardy did not attach (Merciales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124171, March 18, 2002).
In an RTC Criminal Case, the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt but was found civilly
liable. What is the procedure for assailing such ruling?
The OSG, representing the People, may assail the acquittal by certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA, if there is grave
abuse of discretion, and private complainant/accused may appeal to the CA the civil aspect by Rule 41, ordinary
appeal by notice of appeal. Only the acquittal is final and unappealable. The civil aspect is appealable, and thus,
certiorari is not available against the civil aspect (Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February
12, 2007; People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010).
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X filed a bigamy case against her husband Y, who filed a Motion to Quash the information on the ground
that the element of the offender being previously legally married is not present. Y attached a copy of the
RTC decision which declared his previous marriage void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the complaint.
May X assail the dismissal?
No. In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest, and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal
proceedings before the CA and SC. X, the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses. The
interest of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability. In criminal cases, the dismissal of
the case against an accused can only be assailed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. Hence, X,
as the private offended party, does not have legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case (Bumatay v.
Bumatay, G.R. No. 191320; April 25, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the information, which was granted on the ground that
the information does not sufficiently allege an offense. The order of dismissal was appealed, which was
opposed for violating the right against double jeopardy. Was the right against double jeopardy violated?
No. There was no valid arraignment or plea to the charge and the accused was not convicted or acquitted or the
case otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent, since the accused moved for the dismissal.
Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an order sustaining a motion to quash anchored on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since such ground is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010).
X and Y was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. After arraignment and trial, the court
issued a notice of promulgation but only X was served the notice, and not Y. During the promulgation,
X was present, but Y was not. Both accused were convicted. What is Y’s remedy?
Within 15 days from the promulgation of judgment, Y must surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail
of the remedies against the judgment, such as appeal or motion for reconsideration, and state the reasons for his
absence at the scheduled hearing, showing that his absence was for justifiable cause, specifically, that he did not
receive any notice of promulgation. If the court grants leave after he proves such justifiable cause, Y shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 6).
X and Y were convicted in the MTC for slight physical injuries.

1. What are their remedies against the conviction?
X and Y may file a: (A) Motion for a New Trial, on either ground of: errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial; or (2) new
and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment; (B) Motion for Reconsideration, errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no
further proceedings; or (C) appeal to the RTC by ordinary appeal (notice of appeal) (ROC, Rule 121,
Sec. 1-3, Rule 122, Sec. 3).
2. X appealed to the RTC, which affirmed the MTC ruling. What is X’s remedy?
X’s remedy against the RTC judgment rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is to file a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (ROC, Rule 122,
Sec. 3).
3. On appeal, X was acquitted. What is the effect of such acquittal on Y, who did not appeal?
The acquittal of X on appeal would also have the effect of acquitting Y. As a rule, an appeal taken by one
or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter, as in this case (ROC, Rule 122, Sec. 11).
An Information for Estafa was filed against B with the RTC. During the presentation of evidence for
the accused, B and his counsel failed to appear. A warrant of arrest was issued against B and he was
deemed to have waived his right to present evidence. Later the RTC promulgated in absentia, convicting
B. Almost 2 years from the promulgation of judgment, B filed a petition for annulment of judgment
with the CA, alleging that extrinsic fraud was committed upon him by his counsel of record. Will the
petition prosper?
No, it should not be even entertained because Sec. 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court limits the scope of the remedy of
annulment of judgment to judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of RTC for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
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fault of the petitioner. While certain rules of civil procedure may apply to criminal cases, Sec. 18, Rule 124 limits
this to the provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 50, and excluded Rule 47. There is no basis in law or the rules,
therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. When there is no law or rule providing for this remedy,
recourse to it cannot be allowed (People v. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26, 2007).
In criminal cases, when may the CA dismiss an appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute?
The CA is authorized to dismiss an appeal, whether upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, and with notice
to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant:
1. Fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a
counsel de officio; or
2. Escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during pendency of the appeal
What are the instances where certification or appeal of case to the SC is necessary?
The following are the instances where certification or appeal of case to the SC is necessary:
1. When the CA finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain
from making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the SC for
review;
2. Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed,
and the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the SC; and
3. In cases where the CA imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and
enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the SC by notice of appeal filed
with the CA (ROC, Rule 124, Sec. 13).
Appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman found probable cause to charge with plunder the provincial governor, vice governor,
treasurer, budget officer, and accountant. An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against the provincial officials except for the treasurer who was granted immunity when he agreed to
cooperate with the Ombudsman in the prosecution of the case. Immediately, the governor filed with
the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari against the Ombudsman claiming there was grave abuse
of discretion in excluding the treasurer from the Information. Was the remedy taken by the governor
correct?
No, the remedy taken by the governor was not correct. The SC has held that the proper remedy from the
Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in criminal cases is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the
SC. Here, the Petition for Certiorari was filed not with the SC but the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the remedy taken
was not correct. Moreover, the governor did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s order
or resolution, a condition precedent before one may avail of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari (Quarto v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011; Cortes v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 187896-97, June 10, 2013).
As a result of an anonymous complaint, Mr. J, a local public official, was held administratively liable for
Grave Misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in Administrative Case No. 1234. As
such, he was imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The Ombudsman also found probable cause to
indict him for violation of Section 3(b) of RA No. 3019, or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,”
in Criminal Case No. 4321. Mr. J moved for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision
but was denied. Unperturbed, Mr. J filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA assailing the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision in Administrative Case No. 1234 and Criminal
Case No. 4321. Was the proper remedy availed of?
No, because the proper remedy from the decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case is
a petition for review to the CA under Rule 43 (where the penalty is not light or exculpatory) and not a Special
Civil Action for Certiorari; and the proper remedy an aggrieved party from a decision or order of the Office of
the Ombudsman in a criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Here, while Mr. J
availed of a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, he filed it with the CA and not the SC. Hence, the dismissal of Mr.
J’s Petition for Certiorari was correct (Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998; Estrada v. Desierto,
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G.R. No. 156160, December 9, 2004).
S was a stockholder in ESBI Bank. A complaint was filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman
for violations of Sec. 3(e)(g) of RA 3019, Malversation, and violation of the provisions under the Manual
of Regulations for Banks due to the sale of his ESBI shares to Local Water Utilities Administration, a
GOCC. The Ombudsman found probable cause. S filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC with the CA pursuant to Morales v.
CA, which involved a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in an administrative case.
CA held that it had no jurisdiction and Morales does not apply in this case. Should the Petition for
Certiorari be dismissed?
Yes. Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases (where the penalty
is not light or exculpatory) should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. However, it is the SC which
has jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a criminal action. A Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC questioning the finding of the existence of probable cause – or lack thereof
– by the Ombudsman should be filed with the SC. In this case, the assailed decision of the Ombudsman involves
the issue of the existence or lack of probable cause for the crimes charged against S. This involves a criminal case and
not an administrative case. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari with the CA should be dismissed (Gatchalian v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288; August 1, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Appeals from Resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor
Are the findings of the prosecutors with respect to the existence of probable cause subject to judicial
review?
Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of the public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence
or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal information, unless such findings are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
v. Gidwani, G.R. No. 234616, June 20, 2018).
If an investigating prosecutor dismisses a complaint filed, what is the remedy of the aggrieved party?
The party may file either a Motion for Reconsideration or a verified petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice, and by furnishing copies thereof to the adverse party and the Prosecution Office issuing the appealed
resolution (DOJ Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, Sec. 4).
An information was filed against X, Y, and Z before the RTC. X filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation.
Without resolving the motion, the RTC arraigned the accused. The prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation
and recommended the dismissal of the case against X and the filing of an amended information. The
Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the information, with the amended information dropping
X from the list of those originally charged, which was granted by the court without making its own
assessment. The order of the court had no evaluation of the evidence. Private complainant filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied. Private complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
which was denied since the interest of private complainant is only limited to the civil liability. Was the
CA correct in denying the petition on the ground that private complainant had no legal personality to
pursue it?
No. While as a rule, the OSG has the sole authority to represent the state before the CA or SC in case of dismissal
of a criminal case or acquittal, this rule admits of exceptions as when the private complainant may file the petition
for certiorari when there is grave abuse of discretion, and the right of the private complainant is anchored on
his interest on the civil aspect of the case that is deemed instituted in the criminal case, as in this case. Here, the
amended information dropped X as an accused after arraignment. As she is no longer included therein, the
proceeding for the charge for estafa against X was effectively terminated. The nature of the offense charged, i.e.,
estafa, immediately connotes civil liability and damages for which the accused may be held liable for in case of
conviction, or even acquittal based on reasonable doubt. The dismissal forecloses the right of private complainant
to the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case against X because private complainant neither reserved
the right to file the same nor filed a case ahead of the criminal case. X has the standing to pursue the remedy of a
petition for certiorari before the CA.
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There is grave abuse of discretion when the trial court abdicated its exclusive prerogative in deference to the
prosecution’s conclusion that X should be dropped from the charge as shown in the court order which contained
no evaluation of the evidence (Rural Bank of Mabitac v. Melanie Canicon, G.R. No. 196015, June 27, 2018).
After an information was filed, the court proceeded to issue a warrant of arrest after determination that
probable cause exists for its issuance. The warrant was executed. Accused argues that the execution of
the warrant should have been suspended in view of the pendency of his petition for review before the
DOJ. Is the accused correct?
No. Section 11, Rule 116 pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending petition for review before
the DOJ. It does not suspend the execution of the warrant of arrest for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of the accused. Moreover, the suspension of arraignment in view of the pendency of the petition before
the DOJ is up to a period not exceeding 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Once that 60-day period lapses, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment, if any is filed (Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018).
Appeals from the Sandiganbayan
An information was filed against X for malversation of public funds with the RTC and he was later
convicted. X timely filed through his counsel a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision, stating that X
intended to appeal the decision to the CA. In turn, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. X elevated his
case to the SC, invoking the liberal interpretation of the rules, and prayed that the SC endorse and
transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice. Should X’s
plea for relaxation of the rules be allowed?
Yes. Since the appeal involves a criminal case, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a
procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court should grant X’s plea for a
relaxation of the Rules. Rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must
always be avoided. The slapdash work of X’s former counsel and the trial court’s apparent ignorance of the law
effectively conspired to deny X the remedial measures to question her conviction. While the negligence of counsel
generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so require. X’s case can fall under any
of these exceptions. Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and
defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would
do well to assuage X that her appeal is decided scrupulously (Cariaga v. People, G.R. No. 180010, July 30, 2010).
Procedure in Tax Cases
Tax Remedies under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as Amended
General Concepts
After examining the books and records of MAD Corporation, the BIR mailed to said corporation its
2004 final assessment notice, showing a tax of Php1,000,000.00, deficiency interest of Php400,000.00,
and due date for payment of April 30, 2007 but without the demand letter on April 15, 2007. The
registered letter containing the tax assessment was received by MAD Corporation on April 25, 2007
(2008, 2013 Bar).
1. What is an assessment notice? What are the requisites of a valid assessment? Explain.
An assessment notice is a formal notice to the taxpayer stating that the amount thereon is due as a tax and
containing a demand for the payment thereof (CIR v. Pascor Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 128315,
June 29, 1999). To be valid, the taxpayer must be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the
assessment is made (NIRC, Sec. 228). Moreover, the assessment must comply with the following essential
requisites:
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a. The Final Assessment Notice (FAN) (BIR Form 17.08) which contains the name, address, and TIN
of the taxpayer; the kind of tax, period covered, basic tax and penalties; signed by the authorized BIR
official, and the date of payment of the tax. The demand letter (DL) contains the computation of the
deficiency tax, including penalties, if any, the factual and legal bases of the assessment, and the demand
for payment of the tax. Thus, the FAN and DL must always go together (R.R. No. 18-2013, Sec. 3.1.3);
b. The FAN/DL must be issued on account of or covered by a validly issued letter of authority (RMC
No. 75-2018) (Medicard Phil Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 222743, April 5, 2017);
c. The FAN/DL must state the factual and legal bases of the assessment and jurisprudence on which it
is based; otherwise, the assessment is void (R.R. No. 18-2013, Sec. 3.1.3);
d. The FAN/DL must be signed by the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative (R.R. No.
18-2013, Sec. 3.1.3);
e. The FAN/DL must be issued within the original prescriptive period as validly agreed between the
BIR and the taxpayer; and served by personal delivery or by registered mail (R.R. No. 18-2013, Sec. 3.1.6)
(Sec. 222 (b) and (d), NIRC); and
f. The FAN/DL must be addressed and served to correct person in his/its registered or duly notified
address (R.R. No. 18-2013 Sec. 3.1.6).
2. As the tax lawyer of MAD Corporation, what legal defense would you raise against the assessment?
Explain. (2008 Bar)
I will question the validity of the assessment because of the failure to send the demand letter which contains a
statement of the law and the facts upon which the assessment is based. If an assessment notice is sent without
informing the taxpayer in writing about the law and facts on which the assessment is made, the assessment is
void (R.R. No. 18-2013, Sec. 3.1.3).
Distinguish tax deficiency from tax delinquency.

Tax deficiency is the amount by which the tax due exceeds the sums of tax shown in the taxpayer’s return, plus
amounts previously assessed or collected as deficiency, less payments, credits or refunds due to the taxpayer (NIRC,
Sec. 56, Par. (b)). On the other hand, tax delinquency refers to the state of a person upon whom the personal
obligation to pay the tax has been fixed by lawful assessment and who thereafter fails to pay the tax within the time
limited by law (U.S. v. Abejo, G.R. No. L-12362, August 29, 1917).
What is the prescriptive period for the assessment of taxes?

As a general rule, the period for assessment prescribes within three (3) years (a) after the last day prescribed by law
for the filing of the return or (b) if the return was filed beyond the period prescribed by law, from the day the return
was filed, whichever is later (NIRC, Sec. 203). However, in case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade
tax or of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may
be filed without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission:
Provided, That in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially
taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof (NIRC, Sec. 222 (a)).
May the period of assessment be extended?

Yes. Under Sec. 222(b) of the NIRC, before the expiration of the 3-year prescriptive period, both the CIR and
the taxpayer may agree in writing to extend the period of assessment. The period so agreed upon may be further
extended by subsequent agreement made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.
What are the requisites of the waiver of Statute of Limitations? (FoSNA-DeDaT)

The requisites are as follows:
1. The waiver must be in the proper Form prescribed by RMO No. 20-90;
2. The waiver must be Signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized representative. In the case of a
corporation, the waiver must be signed by any of its responsible officials;
3. The waiver should be duly Notarized;
4. The CIR or the revenue official authorized by him must sign the waiver indicating that the BIR has
Accepted and agreed to the waiver;
5. Both the Date of execution by the taxpayer and Date of acceptance by the Bureau should be before the
expiration of the period of prescription or before the lapse of the period agreed upon in case a subsequent
agreement is executed; and
6. The waiver must be executed in Three copies, the original copy to be attached to the docket of the case,
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the second copy for the taxpayer and the third copy for the Office accepting the waiver (CIR v. Systems
Technology Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Note: The waiver may be, but not necessarily, in the form prescribed by RMO No. 20-90 or Revenue Delegation
Authority Order (RDAO) No. 05-01. The taxpayer’s failure to follow the aforesaid forms does not invalidate the
executed waiver for as long as the following are complied with:
1. The Waiver of the Statute of Limitations under Section 222 (b) and (d) shall be executed before the
expiration of the period to assess or to collect taxes. The date of execution shall be specifically indicated in
the waiver;
2. The waiver shall be signed by the taxpayer himself or his duly authorized representative. ln the case of a
corporation, the waiver must be signed by any of its responsible officials;
3. The expiry date of the period agreed upon to assess/collect the tax after the regular three-year period of
prescription should be indicated (RMO No. 14-2016).
Note: In the case of CIR v. Systems Technology Institute, Inc. (G.R. No. 20835, dated July 26, 2017), the Supreme
Court ruled that the requirements laid down by RMO No. 20-90 and RDAO No. 05-01 are mandatory and
must strictly be followed; which is in conflict with the liberality and relaxed guidelines of RMO No. 14-2016. The
Supreme Court in this case did not touch upon RMO No. 14-2016 nor mentioned the same for this RMO was
raised by neither party.
STI was subjected to BIR audit and examination for its fiscal year 2003. On three instances, waivers
were executed by STI extending the prescriptive period for fiscal year 2003. In all those instances, the
signatory did not have a notarized written authority from STI’s Board of Directors. The CTA cancelled
the assessment finding that the waivers executed by STI were defective for failure to comply with RMO
No. 20-90 and RDAO No. 05-01, rendering the assessment barred by prescription. The CIR asserts that
the waivers executed by the parties are valid and that STI’ s active participation in the administrative
investigation amounts to estoppel that prescription can no longer be invoked. Is the contention of the
CIR correct?
No. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as an exception to the statute of limitations on the assessment of
taxes considering that there is a detailed procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, which the BIR must
strictly follow. The BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure to comply with RMO No.
20-90 and RDAO No. 05-01, which the BIR itself had issued. Having caused the defects in the waivers, the BIR
must bear the consequence. It cannot simply shift the blame to the taxpayer (CIR v. Systems Technology Institute,
G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017, Caguioa Case).
XYZ received a Letter of Authority for the examination of its books of accounts for internal revenue
purposes for the taxable year 2004. On October 9, 2007, the parties allegedly executed a Waiver of
the Defense of Prescription (First Waiver). In this supposed First Waiver, the prescriptive period for
the assessment of XYZ’s internal revenue taxes for the year 2004 was extended to June 20, 2008. The
document was signed by XYZ’s Finance Manager and by the BIR’s Revenue District Officer. This was
followed by another supposed Waiver of the Defense of Prescription (Second Waiver) dated June 2,
2008, the prescriptive period was supposedly extended to November 30, 2008.
Thereafter, the BIR issued a PAN. XYZ filed a protest against the PAN arguing that it is not liable for
the deficiency taxes. It did not raise as an issue the invalidity of the waiver and the prescription of the
BIR’s right to assess. In its protest against the FAN, XYZ argued that the year being audited in the FAN
has already prescribed at the time such FAN was mailed on December 4, 2008. XYZ received the FAN on
December 5, 2008 which is 5 days after the waiver it issued had prescribed. In the CTA, XYZ contested
the validity of the waivers by arguing that the signatories in the waivers were not duly sanctioned to
act on its behalf. CIR argued that XYZ repeatedly failed to comply with CIR’s notices, directing it to
submit its books of accounts and related records for examination and since the waivers were necessary
to give respondent time to fully comply with the notices, having benefited from such waiver, XYZ is
estopped from questioning its validity.
1. Rule on the propriety of XYZ’s defense that there was an invalid waiver.
XYZ is estopped from questioning the validity of the waivers for failure to raise the same at the earliest possible
opportunity. First, XYZ never raised the invalidity of the Waivers at the earliest opportunity, either in its
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Protest to the PAN, Protest to the FAN, or Supplemental Protest to the FAN. It impliedly recognized these
Waivers’ validity and its representatives’ authority to execute them. Second, XYZ did not dispute CIR’s
assertion that XYZ repeatedly failed to comply with CIR’s notices. Hence, estoppel applies against a taxpayer
who did not only raise at the earliest opportunity its representative’s lack of authority to execute two waivers
of defense of prescription, but was also accorded, through these waivers, more time to comply with the audit
requirements of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (CIR v. Transitions Optical Philippines, G.R. No. 227544,
November 22, 2017).
2. Is the assessment barred already by prescription?
Yes, the assessment is already barred by prescription. It was found that the date indicated in the envelope/mail
matter containing the FAN and the FLD is December 4, 2008, which is considered as the date of their mailing.
Since the validity period of the second Waiver is only until November 30, 2008, prescription had already set
in at the time the FAN and the FLD were actually mailed on December 4, 2008. The assessment being barred
by prescription, the same becomes void (CIR v. Transitions Optical Philippines, G.R. No. 227544, November
22, 2017).
Note: Compare the doctrine in the previous number and in this number, wherein the latter applied the doctrine
of estoppel.
The BIR conducted an audit and investigation on Y Cooperative’s books of account and other accounting
records for income and withholding taxes for the period 1997 to 1999. The CIR sent a Notice for Informal
Conference indicating the income and withholding tax liabilities, with an attached letter containing a
summary of the report and an explanation of the findings of the investigators. Y Cooperative requested
for copies of working papers indicating how the deficiency withholding taxes were computed, and the
CIR responded in a letter-reply containing the explanation of the legal basis of the issuance of the
questioned tax assessments. The CIR issued a PAN which was protested by Y Cooperative. The CIR
dismissed the protest and recommended the issuance of a FAN which was subsequently issued with a
demand letter. Y Cooperative filed its protest to the FAN but Y Cooperative was still held liable for the
alleged tax liabilities. Y Cooperative contends that the Final Demand Letter and Assessment Notices
were silent as to the nature and basis of the assessments, it was denied due process, and the assessments
must be declared void. Did the CIR comply with the due process mandated by Section 228 of the NIRC?
Yes. Substantial compliance is enough. Although the FAN and demand letter issued to Y Cooperative were not
accompanied by a written explanation of the legal and factual bases of the deficiency taxes assessed against it, the
CIR in its letter responded to its letter-protest, explaining at length the factual and legal bases of the deficiency
tax assessments and denying the protest. Considering the exchange of correspondence and documents between
the parties, the requirement of Section 228 was substantially complied with. The CIR had fully informed Y
Cooperative in writing of the factual and legal bases of the deficiency taxes assessment, which enabled the latter to
file an “effective” protest (Samar-I Electric Cooperative v. CIR, G.R. No. 193100, December 10, 2014).
Y Cooperative filed false returns and substantially underdeclared its withholding taxes in the amount of
Php2,000,000.00. The BIR failed to assess them within the three-year prescriptive period. Y Cooperative
now contends that BIR’s right to assess and collect already prescribed. Is Y Cooperative correct?
No. Section 222 of the NIRC provides exceptions to the three-year prescriptive period under Section 203. Under
Section 222, in the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return, the tax
may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be filed without assessment, at any time
within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission. Hence, prescription had still not set in
against BIR’s right to assess and collect taxes since what was filed was a false return (Samar-I Electric Cooperative v.
CIR, G.R. No. 193100, December 10, 2014).
Note: That the law should be interpreted to mean a separation of the three different situations of false return,
fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return is strengthened immeasurably by the last
portion of the provision which segregates the situations into three different classes, namely “falsity,” “fraud” and
“omission.” That there is a difference between “false return” and “fraudulent return” cannot be denied. While
the first merely implies deviation from the truth, whether intentional or not, the second implies intentional or
deceitful entry with intent to evade the taxes due (Samar-I Electric Cooperative v. CIR, supra).
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When is the running of the statute of limitations in case of assessments suspended? (PRC-DO)
The running of the statute of limitations on the making of assessment and the beginning of distraint or levy or a
proceeding in court for collection, in respect of any deficiency, shall be suspended:
1. For the Period during which the Commissioner is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning
distraint or levy or a proceeding in court and for sixty (60) days thereafter;
2. When the taxpayer requests for Reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner;
3. When the taxpayer Cannot be located in the address given by him in the return filed upon which a tax is
being assessed or collected; except if the taxpayer informs the Commissioner of any change in address;
4. When the warrant of Distraint or levy is duly served upon the taxpayer, his authorized representative, or a
member or his household with sufficient discretion, and no property could be located; and
5. When the taxpayer is Out of the Philippines (NIRC, Sec. 223).
What are the requisites of a valid Letter of Authority (LOA)? (INC-30)

The following are the requisites of a valid letter of authority:
1. It must be Issued by the proper approving official. The approving official depends on the investigating
office:
a. Regional Director (RD);
b. Assistant Commissioner-Large Taxpayer Service (ACIR-LTS) – LTS and its Divisions;
c. Deputy Commissioner-Legal and Inspection Group – Enforcement Service and its Divisions; and
d. CIR or any authorized official – Task Force and Special Teams (RMO No. 44-10);
2. It must Not contain any manually-written character, notation or erasure (RMO No. 44-10);
3. It must Cover only one (1) taxable year, except in tax fraud cases authorized by the CIR or Deputy
Commissioner and excise tax cases (RMO No. 44-10); and
4. It must be served to the taxpayer within thirty (30) days (RAMO No. 1-00).
A Letter of Authority (LOA) was issued authorizing the BIR officers to examine the books of account
of L Corporation for the taxable year 1998 only or, since the taxpayer adopted a fiscal year, from April
1, 1997 to March 31, 1998. The LOA provides in part: “The bearer(s) hereof x x x is/are authorized
to examine your books of accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the
period from taxable year, 1998 to __, 19_.” The deficiency tax assessment which the BIR eventually
issued against the taxpayer was based on disallowance of expenses reported in fiscal year 1999, or for the
period from April 1, 1998 to March 31, 1999.
1. Is the assessment valid?

No. The LOA gives notice to the taxpayer that it is under investigation for possible deficiency tax assessment;
at the same time, it authorizes or empowers a designated revenue officer to examine, verify, and scrutinize
a taxpayer’s books and records, in relation to internal revenue tax liabilities for a particular period. Under
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 43-90, the LOA shall cover a taxable period not exceeding one
taxable year.
In this case, even though the date after the words “taxable year 1998 to” is unstated, following the
abovementioned RMO, the period of examination is the whole taxable year 1998. This means that the
examination of L Corporation must cover the FY period from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998. The taxable
year covered by the assessment being outside of the period specified in the LOA, the assessment issued against
the taxpayer is void (CIR v. Lancaster, G.R. No. 183408, July 12, 2017).
2. Is the issuance of Notice of Discrepancy required for an assessment to be valid?

Yes. lf a taxpayer is found to be liable for deficiency tax or taxes in the course of investigation conducted by
a Revenue Officer, the taxpayer shall be informed through a Notice of Discrepancy in lieu of a Notice of
Informal Conference. The taxpayer must submit all necessary documents that support his explanation within
thirty (30) days after the receipt of the Notice of Discrepancy (RR No. 22-2020).
The BIR issued a Preliminary 15-day letter to Mr. S stating the deficiency taxes due from the latter
for taxable year 1999. Five months later, Mr. S received a Formal Letter of Demand from the BIR
for the same deficiency taxes. After being served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce
the collection of taxes, Mr. S appealed to the BIR but was denied. Claiming that it did not receive a
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Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and was, therefore, not accorded due process, S appealed to the
CTA. Was the Formal Letter of Demand valid even if Mr. S did not receive the PAN?
No. Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer must first be informed that he is liable for
deficiency taxes through the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the facts and the law upon which the
assessment is made. Under R.R. No. 12-99, the sending of a PAN to the taxpayer to inform him of the assessment
made is but part of the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment, the absence of which
renders nugatory any assessment made by the tax authorities. Thus, for its failure to send the PAN stating the facts
and the law on which the assessment was made as required by Section 228, the assessment made by the CIR is void
(CIR v. Metro Star Superama, Inc., G.R. No. 185371, December 8, 2010).
LLL was issued an FLD/FAN, assessing it for deficiency expanded withholding tax (EWT) and deficiency
fringe benefits tax (FBT). After the taxpayer protested the assessment, the BIR issued the final decision
on disputed assessment (FDDA) still finding the taxpayer liable, but the amounts were different from
those stated in the FAN without stating the factual bases. LLL contends that a void FDDA will lead to
a void assessment because the FDDA ultimately determines the final tax liability of a taxpayer. Will the
invalidity of the FDDA ipso facto render the assessment void?
No. A decision of the CIR on a disputed assessment differs from the assessment itself. Hence, the invalidity of one
does not necessarily result to the invalidity of the other — unless the law or regulations otherwise provide. What
is appealable to the CTA is the “decision” of the CIR on disputed assessment and not the assessment itself. An
FDDA that does not inform the taxpayer in writing of the facts and law on which it is based renders the decision
void. Therefore, it is as if there was no decision rendered by the CIR. It is tantamount to a denial by inaction by
the CIR, which may still be appealed before the CTA and the assessment evaluated on the basis of the available
evidence and documents (CIR v. Liquigaz Philippines Corp., G.R. Nos. 215534, April 18, 2016).
On April 30, 2004, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) to EFG Corp. for deficiency
Documentary Stamp Tax and Gross Receipts Tax on the industry issue for the taxable year 2001. EFG
Corp. received the PAN on May 18, 2004 and filed a protest against it on May 27, 2004. On July 16,
2004, the BIR wrote a Formal Letter of Demand (FLD) with Assessment Notices to EFG Corp., which
partly shows: “xxx This is our final decision based on the investigation. If you disagree, you may appeal
the final decision within 30 days from receipt thereof, otherwise said deficiency tax assessment shall
become final, executory and demandable.”
EFG Corp. received the FLD with Assessment Notice on August 30, 2004. On September 29, 2004, it
filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. The CIR filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that EFG
Corp. failed to file an administrative protest on the FLD with Assessment Notice. The CTA granted the
motion to dismiss. Did the CTA correctly dismiss the Petition for Review?
No. The dismissal was not proper. The CIR as well as his duly authorized representative must indicate clearly
and unequivocally to the taxpayer whether an action constitutes a final determination on a disputed assessment.
In the FLD with Assessment Notices, the CIR used the word “appeal” instead of “protest”, “reinvestigation”,
or “reconsideration”. The terms “protest”, “reinvestigation” and “reconsideration” refer to the administrative
remedies a taxpayer may take before the CIR, while the term “appeal” refers to the remedy available to the taxpayer
before the CTA. Thus, the CIR is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the FLD with Assessment
notices to be a final decision. EFG Corp. cannot be blamed for not filing a protest against the FLD with Assessment
Notices since the language used and the tenor of the demand letter indicate that it is the final decision of the CIR
on the matter (Allied Banking Corporation v. CIR, G.R. No. 175097, February 5, 2010).
What is considered a disputed assessment?

It is when the taxpayer indicates its protest against the delinquent assessment of the Revenue Officer for
reconsideration, through a letter. After the request is filed and received by the BIR, the assessment becomes a
disputed assessment (CIR v. Isabela Cultural Corporation, G.R. No. 135210, July 11, 2001).
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Taxpayer’s Remedies
What is the effect of failure to file protest?

If the taxpayer fails to file a valid protest against the FLD/FAN within thirty (30) days from date of receipt thereof,
the assessment shall become final, executory, and demandable. No request for reconsideration or reinvestigation
shall be granted (R.R. No. 12-99, Sec. 3.1.4, as amended by R.R. No. 18-2013).
What is the rule on submission of supporting documents after protest?

In requests for reinvestigation, the taxpayer shall submit all relevant supporting documents in support of his
protest within 60 days from the date of filing of his letter of protest (R.R. No. 18-2013, Sec. 3.1.4). In requests
for reconsideration, the 60-day period shall not apply because this involves re-evaluation of assessment based on
existing records (R.R. No. 12-99, Sec. 3.1.4, as amended by R.R. No. 18-2013).
What is the effect of failure to submit relevant supporting documents in request for reinvestigation?
Failure to submit relevant supporting documents in support of request for reinvestigation does not render the
assessment final and executory. For failure to submit documents, the request for reinvestigation will be denied
with the issuance of a Final Decision on a Disputed Assessment (FDDA). Moreover, the term “relevant supporting
documents” should be understood as those documents necessary to support the legal basis in disputing a tax
assessment as determined by the taxpayer. The BIR can only inform the taxpayer to submit additional documents.
The BIR cannot demand what type of supporting documents should be submitted. Otherwise, a taxpayer will be
at the mercy of the BIR, which may require the production of documents that a taxpayer cannot submit (CIR v.
First Express Pawnshop Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 172045-46, June 16, 2009).
GGG received a Post Reporting Notice (September 28, 2007) from the BIR for an informal conference.
It was found that GGG has tax deficiencies. On January 14, 2008, GGG received FAN. On January 24,
2008, GGG filed a protest to the FAN with the RD. On August 14, 2008, it elevated its protest to CIR
claiming that no action was taken thereon. On March 11, 2009, GGG filed a Petition for Review alleging
BIR’s inaction in its protest. The CTA 1st Division ruled that the Petition for Review was filed beyond
the reglementary period for appeal depriving the court of jurisdiction. The CTA en Banc affirmed the
decision. Did GGG correctly appeal?
No. A textual reading of Section 3.1.5 of R.R. No. 12-99 gives a protesting taxpayer only three options:
1. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR or his authorized representative, then the taxpayer may
appeal to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest.
2. If the protest is wholly or partially denied by the CIR’s authorized representative, then the taxpayer may
appeal to the CIR within 30 days from receipt of the whole or partial denial of the protest.
3. If the CIR or his authorized representative failed to act upon the protest within 180 days from submission of
the required supporting documents, then the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse
of the 180-day period.
When GGG filed its petition before the CTA, it is clear that GGG failed to make use of any of the three options
described above. GGG ‘s petition before the CTA may only be made after a whole or partial denial of the protest by
the CIR or the CIR’s authorized representative. GGG still should have waited for the RD’s decision until October
27, 2008, or 180 days from April 30, 2008. GGG then had 30 days from October 27, 2008, or until November 26,
2008, to file its petition before the CTA. GGG, however, did not make use of the third option. GGG did not file a
petition before the CTA on or before November 26, 2008. When GGG filed its petition before the CTA on March
11, 2009, there was still no denial of GGG’s protest by either the RD or the CIR. Therefore, under the first option,
GGG’s petition before the CTA had no cause of action because it was prematurely filed (Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 208731, January 27, 2016).
Pursuant to the finding of deficiency taxes due from ABC Corp., the BIR issued a Formal Demand
Letter. After being served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce the collection of taxes,
ABC Corp. appealed to the BIR. ABC Corp. opted to wait for the decision of the CIR, and hence, failed
to appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the lapse of the 180-day period. If the CIR fails to act on the
appeal by ABC Corp. within 180 days, will the assessment become final and executory?
No. In case of the inaction of the CIR on the protested assessment, the taxpayer has two options, either: (1) file a
petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await the final
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decision of the CIR on the disputed assessment and appeal such final decision to the CTA within 30 days after the
receipt of a copy of such decision. These options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of
the other. Considering that ABC Corp. opted to await the final decision of the CIR on the protested assessment,
it then has the right to appeal such final decision to the CTA by filing a petition for review within thirty days after
receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, even after the expiration of the 180-day period fixed by law for the CIR
to act on the disputed assessments (Lascona Land, Co., Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 171251, March 5, 2012).
On April 15, 2002, TOC filed its 2001 income tax return with the BIR, reporting an income tax
overpayment in the amount of Php69,562,412.00 arising from unutilized creditable taxes withheld
during the year. It marked the appropriate boxes manifesting its intent to have the said overpayment
refunded. On March 19, 2003, TOC filed with the BIR a letter requesting for refund or issuance of a tax
credit certificate. TOC also submitted numerous documentary evidence during the proceedings, such as
its Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for taxable years 2001 and 2002, various Certificates of Creditable Tax
Withheld at Source for taxable year 2001 duly issued to it by its withholding agents, and Report of the
Commissioned Independent Certified Public Accountant dated March 15, 2004, among others. Was
TOC able to establish its entitlement to the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate?
Yes. There are three essential conditions for the grant of a claim for refund of creditable withholding income tax,
namely:
1. The claim is filed with the CIR (CIR) within the two-year period from the date of payment of the tax;
2. It is shown on the return of the recipient that the income payment received was declared as part of the gross
income; and
3. The fact of withholding is established by a copy of a statement duly issued by the payor to the payee
showing the amount paid and the amount of the tax withheld therefrom.
All are present in this case. The claim for refund was filed within the two-year prescriptive period. TOC was able to
present various certificates of creditable tax withheld at source from its payors. Lastly, in compliance with Section
76 of the NIRC, TOC opted to be refunded of its unutilized tax credit as evidenced by the mark in the appropriate
box of its 2001 income tax return. Therefore, the entire amount of Php69,562,412.00 may be a proper subject of
a claim for refund/tax credit certificate (CIR v. Team Operations Corporation, G.R. No. 179260, April 2, 2014).
LH Corporation made payments to MB Bank on March 2, 2001. Pursuant to their agreement, LH

Corporation withheld, and eventually paid to the BIR, the 10% final tax on the interest portions of the
aforesaid payments, on the same months that the payments were made to MB Bank. According to MB
Bank, it mistakenly remitted the aforesaid amounts to the BIR as well when they were inadvertently
included in its own Monthly Remittance Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld for the months of
March 2001 and October 2001. Thus, on December 27, 2002, it filed a letter to the BIR requesting for
the refund thereof. Thereafter and in view of the CIR’s inaction, MB Bank filed its judicial claim for
refund via a petition for review filed before the CTA on September 10, 2003. The CIR ruled that such
claim must be filed within the prescriptive period laid down by law.
MB Bank contends that the prescriptive period should be reckoned not from April 25, 2001 when it
remitted the tax to the BIR, but rather, from the time it filed its Final Adjustment Return or Annual
Income Tax Return for the taxable year of 2001, or in April 2002, as it was only at that time when its
right to a refund was ascertained. Did MB Bank’s claim for refund relative to its March 2001 final tax,
already prescribe?
Yes. Under Sec. 229 of the NIRC, the claim for refund must be filed within two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause. Final withholding taxes are considered as full and final
payment of the income tax due, and thus, are not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the 2-year prescriptive period
commences to run from the time the refund is ascertained, i.e., the date such tax was paid, and not upon the
discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that
MB Bank’s final withholding tax liability in March 2001 was remitted to the BIR on April 25, 2001. As such, it
only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial claims for refund. However, while MB Bank’s
administrative claim was filed on December 27, 2002, its corresponding judicial claim was only filed on September
10, 2003. Therefore, MB Bank’s claim for refund had clearly prescribed (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. CIR,
G.R. No. 182582, April 17, 2017).
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AA, acting as the withholding agent of BB, a non-resident corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Malaysia and thinking that the payments made by BB to AA were royalties, withheld
the amount representing the 25% royalty tax under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty. AA subsequently filed
for a refund of the amount withheld. Can a withholding agent claim a refund of erroneously or illegally
withheld taxes which was paid by the principal taxpayer?
Yes.The term "taxpayer" is defined in the NIRC as referring to "any person subject to tax imposed by this Title
[on Tax on Income]." It thus becomes important to note that under Section 53(c) of the NIRC, the withholding
agent who is "required to deduct and withhold any tax" is made "personally liable for such tax" and indeed is
indemnified against any claims and demands which the stockholder might wish to make in questioning the amount
of payments effected by the withholding agent in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC. In this connection,
it is however significant to add that while the withholding agent has the right to recover the taxes erroneously or
illegallycollected, he nevertheless has the obligation to remit the same to the principal taxpayer. As an agent of the
taxpayer, it is his duty to return what he has recovered; otherwise, he would be unjustly enriching himself at the
expense of the principal taxpayer from whom the taxes were withheld, and from whom he derives his legal right to
file a claim for refund (CIR v. Smart Communication, G.R. No. 17!)045-46,August 25, 2010).
ABC Company, a VAT registered entity, is engaged in the operation of electric power-generating plants.
It entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with National Power Corporation (NPC) for the
building of Power Station for a period of 25 years. On the construction and development of the power
station, it incurred excess input VAT amounting to Php559 Million for taxable year 2001. The VAT
returns were filed as follows:
Quarter Date Filed Amendment

I I
l" April 25, 2001 March 28, 2003
2•d July 25, 2001 March 28, 2003
3rc1 October 23, 2001 March 28, 2003
4th January 24, 2002 March 28, 2003
ABC Company filed a claim for VAT refund and filed its separate claims on July 10, 2001, October 10,
2001, February 21, 2002, and May 9, 2002 for the first, second, third, and fourth quarters of 2001,
respectively. Subsequently, it filed amended claims for all quarters on March 28, 2003. Due to BIR's
inaction of the claim, ABC was construed to file a Petition for Review with the CTA on April 10, 2003.
Did ABC Company correctly file its claim of refund with the CTA on April 10, 2003?
No, it failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the time expressly given by law to the Commissioner to
decide whether to grant or deny application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the
120-day waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to comply with the 120-day waiting period violates
a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and renders the
petition premature and thus without a cause of action, with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction
over the taxpayer's petition. On April 10, 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claim
with the Commissioner on March 28, 2003, ABC Company filed a Petition for Review with the CTA. Thus, for
violating the mandatory period, ABC Company did not correctly file its claim with CTA warranting dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction (CIR v. San Roque PowerCorp.,G.R. No. 187485, February12, 2013).
Note: Since the claims for refund were filed prior to the effectivity of the TRAIN Law, the waiting period for
the CIR's decision shall be 120 days. However, if such claims were filed after effectivity of the TRAIN Law or on
January 1, 2018, the waiting period shall be 90 days.
X Corp. filed an administrative claim for refund or tax credit of its alleged over/erroneous payment of
VAT on April 20, 2010. Three days thereafter, it filed with CTA a judicial claim for refund or issuance
of tax credit certificate, presenting its financial employees as witnesses in support of its case. Invoking
Sec. 229 of the NIRC, X Corp. claims that its claim for refund/tax credit is based on its employees'
inadvertence of applying the undeclared input tax against the output VAT. Does X Corp.'s claim for
refund/tax credit fall within the purview of Sec. 229 of the NIRC?
No, X Corp. cannot rely on Sec. 229 of the NIRC, which is inapplicable to claims for the recovery of unutilized
San Beda University College of Law 15B RGCT Bar Operations Center 2022
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input VAT. In CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, the SC explained that input VAT is not “excessively” collected
as understood under Sec. 229 because at the time the input VAT is collected, the amount paid is correct and proper.
If said input VAT is in fact “excessively” collected as understood under Sec. 229, then it is the person legally liable to
pay the input VAT, and not the person to whom the tax is passed on and who is applying the input VAT as credit
for his own output VAT, who can file the judicial claim for refund or credit outside the VAT system (Coca–Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 222428, February 19, 2018).
S Corp. A VAT-Registered Taxpayer, filed its quarterly VAT tax returns for the period covering January
2004 to December 2004. On March 28, 2006, S Corp. filed claims for refund or issuance of Tax Credit
for unutilized input VAT attributable to zero-rated transactions before the BIR. Two (2) days after, on
March 30, 2006, S Corp filed a judicial claim via petition for review before the CTA. The CTA Division
granted S. Corp’s claim.
While the case is pending, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc. (Aichi) that compliance with the 120-day period granted to the CIR to act on such administrative
claim is mandatory and jurisdictional in filing an appeal with the CTA. Hence, CTA En Banc reversed
the division’s ruling and held that CTA Division did not acquire jurisdiction. Was the CTA En Banc’s
dismissal proper?
No. The CTA Division acquired jurisdiction over the judicial claim as it is deemed timely filed pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the case of CIR vs San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque). In Aichi, the
SC ruled that the 120-day period granted to the CIR was mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-observance of
which was fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA.
However, in San Roque, the SC clarified that the 120-day period does not apply to claims for refund that were
prematurely filed during the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, on December 10, 2003,
until October 6, 2010, when Aichi was promulgated. The SC explained that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which
expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims with the CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period, provided
for a valid claim of equitable estoppel because the CIR had misled taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial
claims before the CTA (Sitel Philippines Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No. 201326, February 08, 2017, Caguioa Case).
M Corp. is a VAT-Registered Taxpayer. On April 25, 2000, M Corp. filed its Quarterly VAT return
for the 1st quarter of 2000. On March 27, 2002, M Corp. filed with the BIR a claim for refund and/or
issuance of TCC. On April 25, 2002, M Corp. filed a Judicial claim via petition for review before the
CTA. The CTA Division denied due course to the judicial claim and dismissed the petition.
CTA En Banc affirmed the dismissal on the ground that the judicial claim is premature citing the case
of Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi). M Corp. filed its
petition for review without waiting for the mandatory and jurisdictional 120-day period requirement.
M Corp. filed its judicial claim on April 25, 2002, which is only 29 days after the filing of administrative
claim on March 27, 2002. Was the CTA En Banc’s dismissal proper?
Yes. The CTA Division did not acquire jurisdiction over the judicial claim. The Supreme Court ruled in CIR vs
Aichi that the compliance with the 120+30-day period in Section 112(C) of the 1997 Tax Code was mandatory
and jurisdictional. M Corp. failed to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirement of Section 112(C)
when it filed its petition for review with the CTA on April 25, 2002, or just 29 days after filing its administrative
claim before the BIR on March 27, 2002. Since M Corp. filed its judicial claim for refund on April 25, 2002,
it could not benefit from BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 that was subsequently issued on December 10, 2003
(Marubeni Philippines Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No. 198485, July 05, 2017, Caguioa Case).
Lily’s Fashion, Inc. is a garment manufacturer located and registered as a Subic Bay Freeport Enterprise
under RA 7227 and a non-VAT taxpayer. As such, it is exempt from payment of all local and national
internal revenue taxes. During its operations, it purchased various supplies and materials necessary in
the conduct of its manufacturing business. The suppliers of these goods shifted to Lily’s Fashion, Inc.
the 12% VAT on the purchased items amounting to Php500,000.00. Lily’s Fashion, Inc. filed with the
BIR a claim for refund for ‘the input tax shifted to it by the suppliers. If you were the CIR, will you
allow the refund? (2006 Bar)
No, the refund should not be allowed. Sec. 112 (A) of NIRC provides that any VAT-registered person, whose sales
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are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable
to such sales. In this case, Sec. 112 (A) which allows only VAT-registered taxpayers to apply for claim of refund will
not apply because Lily’s Fashion is not a VAT taxpayer. Thus, the claim for refund shall not be allowed.
On July 21, 2018, X Inc. filed an Application for Tax Credit/Refund of VAT Paid, which was not acted
upon by the CIR. On January 9, 2019, X Inc. filed a petition for review before the CTA. Is the petition
for review filed on time?
No. The CIR had 90 days from the filing of the administrative claim on July 21, 2018, or until October 19, 2018,
to decide on the respondent’s application. Since the CIR did not act at all, respondent had until November 18,
2018, the last day of the 30-day period, to file its judicial claim. However, X Inc. filed its petition for review with
the CTA only on January 9, 2019 and, thus, was late on its filing (CIR v. Burmeister and Wain Scandinavian
Contractor Mindanao, Inc., G.R. No. 190021; October 22, 2014).
Note: In the above-cited cases, since the claims for refund were filed prior to the effectivity of the TRAIN Law, the
waiting period for the CIR’s decision shall be 120 days. However, if such claims were filed after effectivity of the
TRAIN Law or on January 1, 2018, the waiting period shall be 90 days.
In its 2007 ITR, University Physician Services Inc. – Management, Inc. (UPSI-MI) utilized the total
credits of Php5,159,341.00 as prior year credits but immediately filed an amended 2007 return opting
to utilize as prior year credits only the amount Php2,231,507.00. It then filed a request for refund
by issuance of a tax credit certificate with the BIR. On appeal, the CTA also denied the petition and
ruled that UPSI-MI was barred by Section 76 of the NIRC when it elected to carry over the credits in
its original return despite amending the same. Is the carry-over of tax credits by UPSI-MI irrevocable,
thereby also barring it from requesting a refund of its tax credits?
Yes, UPSI-MI is barred from requesting a refund of its tax credits because the choice to carry-over its tax credits is
irrevocable. Section 76 of the NIRC provides that once the taxpayer chooses the option to carry-over and apply
the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has
been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for cash refund
or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor. Thus, UPSI-MI’s constructive choice to carry over
its tax credits in its original ITR is irrevocable and it is barred from reverting instead to the refund of its credits
(University Physician Services Inc. – Management, Inc. vs. CIR, G.R. No. 205955, March 7, 2018).
Should the administrative and judicial claim be both filed within the 2-year prescriptive period?
No, the 2-year prescriptive period in Sec. 112(A) refers to the period within which the taxpayer can file an
administrative claim for tax refund or credit. Stated otherwise, the two-year prescriptive period does not refer to
the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing of the administrative claim with the Commissioner.
The CIR will have 90 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 90th day, or
does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file its judicial claim with the CTA (CIR v. Burmeister
and Wain Scandinavian Contractor Mindanao, Inc., G.R. No. 190021, October 22, 2014).
How does the application of the 2-year prescriptive period under Sec. 112 (Refunds or Tax Credits of
Input Tax) differ from that of Sec. 229 (Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected)?
Under Sec. 112, the 2-year prescriptive period applies only to the administrative claim before the CIR and not
to judicial claim before the CTA because the taxpayer always has 30 days from the decision of the CIR or from
the lapse of the 90-day period even after the lapse of 2 years from the taxable quarter where the sales were made.
Thus, it is only the administrative claim that must be filed within the two-year prescriptive period. The judicial
claim need not fall within the two-year prescriptive period (CIR v. Mindanao Geothermal II Partnership, G.R. No.
191498, January 15, 2014).
Under Sec. 229, the taxpayer need not wait for the action of the CIR on the claim for refund before taking his
claim to the CTA. Both the claim for refund and the appeal to the CTA must be done within the two-year period.
Hence, if the period is about to expire, and the CIR has not acted upon the claim, the taxpayer may file and appeal
with the CTA, without waiting for the CIR. The suit or proceeding must be filed in the CTA before the end of the
two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.
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BIR sent a letter dated July 13, 1987 to AF demanding the payment of its deficiency tax, Php
342,616,217.88. AF offered a Php10 Million compromise settlement and it was approved by BG, former
commissioner of BIR.
1. Was the proposal a compromise or an abatement?
The proposal is an abatement of taxes. Although referred to as a compromise, the matter at hand is actually
an abatement or a cancellation. Abatement is the “diminution or decrease in the amount of tax imposed;” It
refers to “the act of eliminating or nullifying, of lessening or moderating”. To abate is “to nullify or reduce
in value or amount” while to cancel is “to obliterate, cross out, or invalidate” and “to strike out; delete; erase;
make void or invalid; annul; destroy; revoke or recall” (People v. Sandiganbayan and Tan, G.R. No. 152532,
August 16, 2005).
2. Is the BIR empowered to abate taxes?
Yes. The BIR, through the CIR, may abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability, inclusive
of increments, if its assessment is excessive or erroneous; or if the administration costs involved do not justify
the collection of the amount due. No mutual concessions need be made, because an excessive or erroneous
tax is not compromised. It is abated or canceled. Only correct taxes should be paid (People v. Sandiganbayan
and Tan, supra).
Several private corporations and the City of Manila entered into a Universal Compromise Agreement
(UCA), wherein they agreed to amicably settle all cases between them involving claims for tax refund/
credit. Included in the UCA is the agreement that there shall be no tax refund/credit as to the local
business taxes they paid to the City of Manila. The City of Manila and Treasurer of the City of Manila
confirmed the authenticity and due execution of the UCA which was approved by the court. What is the
effect of the judicially approved compromise agreement and what is the remedy of either of the parties
to enforce its execution?
When given judicial approval, a compromise agreement becomes more than a contract binding upon the
parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force
and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery.
The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution. In such an instance,
execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court (Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. v. Toledo, G.R. No.
190818, November 10, 2014).
ARZ Corporation is a corporation engaged in the importation of used motor vehicles and heavy equipment
which it sells to the public through auction and is operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone.
It received from the CIR a Formal Letter of Demand containing an assessment for deficiency VAT and
excise tax. ARZ Corporation claimed that it filed a protest letter through registered mail. The CIR filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction citing the alleged failure of ARZ Corporation
to timely file its protest. Thereafter, ARZ Corporation filed a Manifestation and Motion with Leave
to Defer or Suspend the Proceedings on the ground that it availed of the Tax Amnesty Program under
RA 9480 (Tax Amnesty Act of 2007). CIR argued that ARZ Corporation is not qualified to avail the
tax amnesty program since Section 8 of RA 9480 provides that tax amnesty shall not extend to, among
others, to withholding agents with respect to their withholding tax liabilities.
1. What is a tax amnesty?
A tax amnesty is a general pardon or the intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties
on persons otherwise guilty of violating a tax law. It partakes of an absolute waiver by the government of its
right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean slate (Asia
International Auctioneers, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 179115, September 26, 2012).
2. Is ARZ Corporation qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9480?
Yes because ARZ Corporation is not a withholding agent and that VAT and excise taxes are not withholding
tax liabilities but indirect taxes. To distinguish, in indirect taxes, the incidence of taxation falls on one person
but the burden thereof can be shifted or passed on to another person, such as when the tax is imposed upon
goods before reaching the consumer who ultimately pays for it. On the other hand, in case of withholding
taxes, the incidence and burden of taxation fall on the same entity, the statutory taxpayer. The burden of
taxation is not shifted to the withholding agent who merely collects, by withholding, the tax due from income
payments to entities arising from certain transactions and remits the same to the government. Hence, ARZ
Corporation is qualified to avail the tax amnesty (Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No.
179115, September 26, 2012).
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Government Remedies for Collection of Delinquent Taxes
When is a tax deemed collected?

1. If collection is through summary remedies (distraint and levy) – when government avails of a distraint and
levy procedure prescribed under the NIRC (CIR v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, G.R. No. 197945,
July 9, 2018). Distraint and levy proceedings are validly begun or commenced by the issuance of the warrant
and service thereof on the taxpayer (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CIR, G.R. No. 139736, October 17, 2005).
2. If collection is through judicial remedies (civil or criminal) – when the government files the complaint
with the proper regular trial court, or where the assessment is appealed to the CTA, by filing an answer to the
taxpayer’s petition for review wherein payment of the tax is prayed for (Philippine National Oil Co. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 109976, April 26, 2005).
What is the period of limitation on collection?

Generally, the prescriptive period to collect the taxes due is five (5) years from the date of assessment (NIRC, Sec.
222(C)). However, for false or fraudulent returns filed with intent to evade taxes the period is within 10 years from
discovery without need for prior assessment. The government may file a proceeding in court (NIRC, Sec. 222(a)).
For failure or omission to file a return, the period is within 10 years from discovery without need for assessment
(NIRC, Sec. 222(a)). If a waiver in writing executed before the 5-year period expires, the period shall be that agreed
upon (NIRC, Sec. 222(d)).
The BIR issued an assessment finding XYZ Bank liable for deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) on
its sales of foreign bills of exchange to the Central Bank. In 1989, it received the assessment notice and
demand letter from the BIR. XYZ Bank filed a protest letter requesting for the reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation of the assessment based on a question of law, in particular, whether or not XYZ Bank was
liable for DST on its sales of foreign currency to the Central Bank. The same protest letter did not raise
any question of fact; neither did it offer to present any new evidence. Will the filing of the protest letter
suspend the running of the prescriptive period to collect the deficiency DST by the BIR?
No, the filing of the protest letter will not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. There is a distinction
between a request for reconsideration and a request for reinvestigation. A reinvestigation, which entails the
reception and evaluation of additional evidence, will take more time than a reconsideration of a tax assessment,
which will be limited to the evidence already at hand; this justifies why the former can suspend the running of the
statute of limitations on collection of the assessed tax, while the latter cannot. In this case, the protest letter of XYZ
Bank essentially raises the same question of law, that is whether XYZ was liable for DST on its sales of foreign bills
of exchange to the Central Bank. Moreover, the BIR admitted that XYZ did not present any new or additional
evidence to substantiate its allegations. Hence, the protest letter of XYZ was a request for reconsideration, which
did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period to collect (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CIR, G.R. No.
181836, July 9, 2014).
What are the remedies available to the Government to collect the tax liabilities of delinquent taxpayers?
The Government has the following remedies:
1. Administrative Remedies:
a. Tax lien (NIRC, Sec. 219);
b. Distraint and levy (NIRC, Sec. 205);
c. Forfeiture of real property (NIRC, Sec. 224);
d. Further distraint and levy (NIRC, Sec. 217);
e. Suspension of business operations (NIRC, Sec. 115); and
f. Non-availability of injunction to restrain collection of tax (NIRC, Sec. 218).
2. Judicial Remedies:
a. Civil (NIRC, Sec. 205); and
b. Criminal (NIRC, Sec. 205).
When can there be constructive distraint? (RLR-HO)

To protect the interest of the Government, the Commissioner may place under constructive distraint the property
of a delinquent taxpayer or any taxpayer, who in his opinion is:
1. Retiring from any business subject to tax;
2. Intending to Leave the Philippines;
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3. Intending to Remove his properties therefrom;

4. Intending to Hide or conceal his property; or
5. Intending to perform any act tending to Obstruct the proceedings for collecting the tax due or which may
be due from him (NIRC, Sec. 206).
The DOJ filed two criminal informations for tax evasion against Mr. M. At the time the Informations
were filed, the CIR has not issued a final decision on the deficiency assessment (FDDA) against Mr. M.
Halfway through the trial, the CIR issued the FFDA against Mr. M, assessing him of deficiency income
tax and VAT covering taxable years 2007 and 2008.
With respect to the deficiency assessment against Mr. M for the year 2007, he filed a petition for review
with the CTA. However, the deficiency assessment against Mr. M for the year 2008 involves the same tax
liabilities being recovered in the pending criminal cases. Thus, he was confused if he has to separately
file an appeal with the CTA and pay the corresponding filing fees considering that the civil action for
recovery of the civil liability for taxes and penalties was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
Mr. M filed before the CTA a motion to clarify as to whether petitioner has to file a separate petition
to question the deficiency assessment for the year 2008. On June 6, 2012, the CTA issued a Resolution
granting his motion and held that the recovery of the civil liabilities for the taxable year 2008 was
deemed instituted with the consolidated criminal cases.
1. Is the civil action filed by Mr. M questioning the FDDA deemed instituted with the criminal case
for tax evasion?
No. Rule 111, Section 1 (a) (44) of the ROC provides that what is deemed instituted with the criminal action
is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime. Civil liability arising from a different source
of obligation, such as when the obligation is created by law, such civil liability is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action.
It is well-settled that the taxpayer’s obligation to pay the tax is an obligation that is created by law and does not
arise from the offense of tax evasion, as such, the same is not deemed instituted in the criminal case (Gaw, Jr.
v. CIR, G.R. No. 222837, July 23, 2018).
2. Is a previous assessment necessary before a criminal action may be filed against a taxpayer?
No. Under Sections 254 and 255 of the NIRC, the government can file a criminal case for tax evasion against
any taxpayer who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed in the tax code or the
payment thereof. The crime of tax evasion is committed by the mere fact that the taxpayer knowingly and
willfully filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade and defeat a part or all of the tax. It is therefore not
required that a tax deficiency assessment must first be issued for a criminal prosecution for tax evasion to
prosper (Gaw, Jr. v. CIR, G.R. No. 222837, July 23, 2018)
Civil Penalties
What are the classes of interest as civil penalties?

The classes of interest are as follows:
1. Deficiency Interest or one which is imposed on any deficiency in the tax due. Any deficiency in the
tax due shall be subject to the interest rate, which interest shall be assessed and collected from the date
prescribed for its payment until the full payment thereof, or upon issuance of a notice and demand by the
CIR, whichever comes earlier (NIRC, as amended by TRAIN Law, Sec. 249 (B)).
2. Delinquency Interest which is imposed in case of failure to pay:
a. The amount of tax due on any return required to be filed;
b. The amount of tax due for which no return is required; or
c. A deficiency tax, surcharge or interest thereon on the due date appearing on the notice and demand
of the CIR. In such a case, there shall be assessed and collected on the unpaid amount, interest at the
rate prescribed in (a) until the amount is fully paid, which interest shall form part of the tax (NIRC,
as amended by TRAIN Law, Sec. 249 (C)).
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Can delinquency interest and deficiency interest be imposed simultaneously?

No. At present, the NIRC provides that in no case shall the deficiency and delinquency interest be simultaneously
imposed (NIRC, as amended by TRAIN Law, Sec. 249 (A)). Before the passage of TRAIN law, however,
delinquency and deficiency interest may be imposed simultaneously.
What is the interest rate for deficiency and delinquency interest?

Interest in general is computed based on any unpaid amount of tax at the rate of double the legal interest rate for
loans or forbearance of any money in the absence of an express stipulation as set by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
from the date prescribed for payment until the amount is fully paid (NIRC, as amended by TRAIN Law, Sec. 249
(A)).
Note: Per BSP Circular No. 799, s. 2013, the interest rate is 6%. Therefore, the rate of general interest is 12% (R.R.
No. 21-2018, Sec. 2). The application of the general interest rate of 12% is effective starting January 1, 2018. Prior
to such date, the previous interest rate of 20% per annum shall be applied.
ABC Corp. is a non-life insurance corporation. After submitting its corporate income tax return for
taxable year ending December 31, 2018, ABC received a Letter of Authority, dated October 30, 2019
from the CIR to allow it to examine their books of account and other accounting records for 2018
and other unverified prior years. On December 29, 2020, CIR issued internal revenue tax assessments
for deficiency income, withholding, expanded withholding, final withholding, value-added, and
documentary stamp taxes for taxable year 2018. Records reveal that ABC failed to pay the deficiency
taxes within 30 days from receipt of the demand letter, thus, delinquency interest accrued from such
non-payment. Is ABC Corp. liable for delinquency interest?
Yes. The imposition of delinquency interest under Section 249 of the NIRC is proper because failure to pay the
deficiency tax assessed within the time prescribed for its payment justifies the imposition of the interest at the rate
of 12% per annum which interest shall be assessed and collected from the date prescribed for its payment until full
payment is made (First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No. 197117, April 17, 2013).
Note: The cited case occurred prior to the effectivity of TRAIN Law. Thus, the interest rate of 20% per annum
was applied in that case. The dates in this problem were altered to apply the TRAIN Law provisions. Please be
mindful of the dates given in the bar exam.
What is a surcharge?
A surcharge is a civil penalty imposed by law as an addition to the basic tax required to be paid. A surcharge added
to the main tax is subject to interest.
Note: The following are the additions to the basic tax imposed by reason of the taxpayer’s refusal to comply with
the legal requirements or due to refusal or failure to pay taxes on time, or for violations of the tax laws:
25% Surcharge (NIRC, Sec. 248 (a)) 50% Surcharge (NIRC, Sec. 248 (b))
1. Failure to file any return and pay the tax due 1. Willful neglect to file the return within the period
thereon as required by the NIRC or the rules; prescribed by the NIRC or the rules;
2. Filing a return with an internal revenue officer 2. Willful filing of a false or fraudulent return
other than those with whom the return is
required to be filed; Note: Substantial under-declaration of taxable sales or
3. Failure to pay the deficiency tax within the time income or substantial overstatement of deductions shall
prescribed for the payment of the same in the constitute prima facie evidence of a false or fraudulent
notice of assessment; and return. Failure to report sales, receipts or income in an
4. Failure to pay the full or part of the amount of amount exceeding 30% of that declared per return and
tax shown on any return, or the full amount of a claim of deductions in an amount exceeding 30% of
the tax due for which no return is required to the actual deductions shall render the taxpayer liable
be filed, on or before the prescribed date for its for substantial under-declaration of sales, receipts or
payment. income or for overstatement of the deductions (NIRC,
Sec. 248 (b)).
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A domestic corporation failed to withhold and remit the tax on income received from Philippine sources
by a non-resident foreign corporation. In addition to the civil penalties provided for under the Tax
Code, a compromise penalty was imposed for violation of the withholding tax provisions.
1. What is a compromise penalty?
A compromise penalty is an amount paid by the taxpayer in lieu of criminal prosecution. It is an amount paid
to compromise a violation for the penal provisions of the NIRC. Since a compromise is in the nature of a
contract, it is now a well-settled doctrine that a compromise penalty cannot be imposed or collected without
the agreement or conformity of the taxpayer (Wonder MechanicalEngineering Corp.v. CTA, G.R. L-22805,
June 30, 1375).
2. What is the remedy of the CIR if the taxpayer failed to comply with the compromise agreement?
The remedy of the CIR is to file a criminal action against the taxpayer for the tax violation. The CIR may not
collect the compromise penalty through an action in court or by distraint and levy because the compromise
penalty is neither a tax nor an administrative penalty for tax delinquency (RMO No. 1!}-2007,III (5)).
3. May the CIR legally enforce the collection of compromise penalty?
No. There is no showing that the compromise penalty was imposed by the CIR with the agreement and
conformity of the taxpayer which is required by law (Wonder MechanicalEngineeringCorp.v. CTA, supra).
TAX REMEDIES UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
Local Governnumt Taxation
What is the prescriptive period for assessment and collection oflocal taxes, fees or charges?
Local taxes, fees, or charges shall be assessed within S years from the date they became due. No action for the
collection of such taxes, fees, or charges, whether administrative or judicial, shall be instituted after the expiration
of such period. In case of fraud or intent to evade the payment of taxes, fees, or charges, the same may be assessed
within 10 years from discovery of the fraud or intent to evade payment.
Local taxes, fees, or charges may be collected within S years from the date of assessment by administrative or judicial
action. No such action shall be instituted after the expiration of such period (LGC, Sec.1!)4).
MNO Corporation was organized on July 1, 2006 to engage in trading of school supplies, with its
principal place of business in Cubao, Quezon City. Its book of account and income statement show its
gross sales as follows:
Fiscal Year Gross Sales
July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006 PhpS,000,000
January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007 Phpl0,000,000
July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007 PhplS,000,000
Since MNO Corporation adopted the fiscal year ending June 30 as its taxable year for income tax
purposes, it paid its 2% business tax for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2007 based on gross sales of
Php 15 Million. However, the Quezon City Treasurer assessed the corporation for deficiency business tax
for 2007 based on gross sales of P25 million alleging that local business taxes shall be computed based on
calendar year. Is the position of the city treasurer tenable? Explain. (2008 Bar)
Yes,the contention of the city treasurer is with merit. Unless provided in the LGC, the tax period of all taxes, fees
and charges shall be the calendar year (LGC, Sec.165). Thus, regardless of the fact that MNO Corporation adopted
the fiscal year, pursuant to the LGC, for payment oflocal business taxes, it must observe the calendar year to avoid
surcharges, penalties and interests.
X, a taxpayer who believes that an ordinance passed by the City Council of Pasay is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory against him, wants to know from you, his tax lawyer, whether or not he can file an
appeal. In the affirmative, he asks you where such appeal should be made: to the Secretary of Finance,
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or the Secretary of Justice, or the CTA, or the regular courts. What would your advice be to your client,
X? (2003 Bar)
The appeal should be made to the Secretary of Justice. Sec. 187 of LGC provides that questions on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party, X, may file appropriate proceedings
with a court of competent jurisdiction.
After the receipt of decision or the lapse of period in case there is inaction on part of the Secretary of
Justice regarding question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance or revenue measure or
treasurer regarding the protest of assessment or claim for refund or credit, when can the court action
be availed of?
The court action may be availed of within the following periods:
1. Within 30 days after receipt of decision or lapse of 60 days in case of Secretary of Justice’s inaction before
RTC (LGC, Sec. 187);
2. Within 30 days from the receipt when protest of assessment is denied or lapse of 60 days in case of local
treasurer’s inaction before MTC, RTC, or CTA Division depending on amount of tax (LGC, Sec. 195);
and
3. If no action is taken by treasurer in refund cases and the 2-year period is about to lapse before MTC, RTC,
or CTA Division depending on the amount of tax (LGC, Sec. 196).
When taxing law or ordinance is unconstitutional or illegal, may taxpayer avail the remedy of filing a
petition for declaratory relief?
Yes. A petition for declaratory relief may be filed with the RTC to prevent an impending violation of the right of
the taxpayer (RULES OF COURT, RULE 63).
For the first quarter of 2007, the City of Manila assessed Space Ink local business taxes and regulatory fees
in the total amount of Php1,000,000.00. Space Ink paid Php1,000,000.00 and protested the assessment.
Subsequently, Space Ink received a letter from the City Treasurer denying their protest. On March 1,
2007, Space Ink filed a written claim for refund with the Office of the City Treasurer raising the same
grounds as discussed in their protest. On March 8, 2007, Space Ink filed its complaint with the RTC of
Manila praying for the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of Php900,000.00.
1. Is Space Ink required to pay under protest in this case?

No. When a taxpayer is assessed a deficiency local tax, fee or charge, he may protest it under Section 195 even
without making payment of such assessed tax, fee or charge. The local government taxation, save in the case
of real property tax, does not expressly require “payment under protest” as a procedure prior to instituting
the appropriate proceeding in court. This implies that the success of a judicial action questioning the validity
or correctness of the assessment is not necessarily hinged on the previous payment of the tax under protest.
However, there is nothing to prevent the taxpayer from paying the tax under protest or simultaneous to a
protest (City of Manila and Office of The City Treasurer of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No.
196681, June 27, 2018).
2. Can a taxpayer who had initially protested and paid the assessment may shift its remedy to one of
refund? Explain.
Yes, a taxpayer who had initially protested and paid the assessment may shift its remedy to one of refund. A
taxpayer facing an assessment may protest it and alternatively:
a. Appeal the assessment in court; or
b. Pay the tax and thereafter seek a refund.
Where payment under protest was made, the taxpayer may thereafter maintain an action in court questioning
the validity and correctness of the assessment (LGC, Sec. 195) and at the same time seeking a refund of the
taxes. In truth, it would be illogical for the taxpayer to only seek a reversal of the assessment without praying
for the refund of taxes. Once the assessment is set aside by the court, it follows as a matter of course that all
taxes paid under the erroneous or invalid assessment are refunded to the taxpayer (City of Manila and Office
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of The City Treasurer of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No. 196681, June 27, 2018). Here, Space
Ink had protested and paid the assessed tax, hence, it is permitted by law to seek a refund after assailing the
validity or correctness of the assessment.
Electric Corp. was granted a legislative franchise to maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and
power system for generating and distributing electric light, heat and power for sale. Its payment of
franchise tax for gross earnings from electric current sold was in lieu of all taxes, fees and assessments.
After the enactment of the LGC, a city tax ordinance was passed imposing franchise tax. Thereafter,
Electric Corp. has been paying the local franchise tax to the Office of the City Treasurer under protest,
in addition to the national franchise tax it pays to the BIR. The protest was denied by the City Treasurer,
prompting the filing of an appeal before the RTC. Meanwhile, the City Treasurer levied on Electric
Corp.’s properties and announced the public auction of the levied properties. Electric Corp. then filed
an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin the City Treasurer from levying, annotating the levy, seizing, confiscating, garnishing, selling
and disposing at public auction the properties of Electric Corp. The City argues that the collection of
taxes cannot be enjoined by the RTC. Electric, on the other hand, claims that the issuance of the writ
of injunction was proper since the tax assessment issued by the City Treasurer is not yet final. Is an
injunction available to Electric Corp.?
Yes, the trial court may issue the injunction. The prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the
collection of taxes applies only to national internal revenue taxes, and not to local taxes. In line with the principle
that taxes being the lifeblood of the government, the NIRC expressly provides that no court shall have the authority
to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the
code. An exception to this rule obtains only when in the opinion of the CTA the collection thereof may jeopardize
the interest of the government and/or the taxpayer. The situation, however, is different in the case of the collection
of local taxes as there is no express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain
local governments from collecting taxes (Angeles City v. Angeles City Electric Corp., G.R. No. 166134, June 29,
2010). Hence, the remedy of injunction is available to Electric Corp. as it is resorted to stop the scheduled auction
sale in which its right of ownership and possession over the properties subject of the auction sale is at stake.
The City of Liwliwa assessed local business taxes against ABC Company. Claiming that there is double
taxation, ABC Company filed a Complaint for Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
collected Local Business Tax; Prohibition with Prayer to Issue Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC. The RTC denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Since its motion for reconsideration was denied, ABC Company filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA. The government lawyer representing the City of Liwliwa prayed for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that the same should have been filed with the CTA. ABC
Company, through its lawyer, Atty. X, countered that the CTA cannot entertain a petition for certiorari
since it is not one of its powers and authorities under existing laws and rules. Decide. (2014 Bar)
The contention of ABC Company is unmeritorious. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to
act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks
jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it. With respect to the CTA,
its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of
RA 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal
the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction
Hence, a petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory order issued in local tax cases falls under the
jurisdiction of the CTA (Ce Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc. v. The Province of Nueva Ecija, et al., G.R.
No. 196278, June 17, 2015).
Real Property Taxation
What is the prescriptive period for collection of real property tax?

The basic real property tax and any other tax levied under this Title shall be collected within five (5) years from the
date they become due. No action for the collection of the tax, whether administrative or judicial, shall be instituted
after the expiration of such period. In case of fraud or intent to evade payment of the tax, such action may be
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instituted for the collection of the same within ten (10) years from the discovery of such fraud or intent to evade
payment (LGC, Sec. 270).
Distinguish real property taxes and local government taxes as to protest.

Payment under protest is necessary so that the protest on real property taxes would be entertained; while payment
under protest is not necessary in local taxes (LGC, Sec. 252 in relation to Sec. 195).
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tagum City passed an ordinance approving the new schedule of
market values, its classification, and assessment level of real properties in the City of Tagum. The citizens
of the city filed a complaint questioning the validity of the ordinance. They claim that the ordinance
imposes exorbitant real estate taxes because of the Sangguniang Panlungsod’s erroneous classification
and valuation of real properties. The City argues that the citizens should have paid first the real
property taxes under protest. On the other hand, the citizens believe that upon receipt of an assessment,
they would be precluded from questioning the excessiveness of the real property tax imposed by way of
protest. Moreover, they contend that the taxpayers of Tagum City would not be able to comply with this
rule due to lack of money. If you were the judge, to whose contention will you subscribe?
If I were the judge, I will rule in favor of the citizens. In cases where the validity or legality of a tax ordinance is
questioned, the rule that real property taxes must first be paid before a protest is lodged does not apply. Prior
payment under protest is not required when the taxpayer is questioning the very authority of the assessor to
impose taxes. In this case, the citizens are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely
and independently, to impose the assessment, and of the treasurer to collect the tax (Aala, et al v. Uy, et al, G.R. No.
202781, January 10, 2017). They are not questioning merely the amounts of the increase in the tax but the very
validity of any increase. Thus, prior payment of the payment under protest is not necessary.
Mr. X acquired a parcel of land and his title thereto was registered and bears “2118 Apolinario, Makati,
Rizal” as his postal address. He filed with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Makati a Sworn
Statement and wrote “1772 Evangelista, Bangkal, Makati, M.M.” as his postal address. Mr. X failed
to pay the real property taxes due on the subject property from 1998 up to 2006. As a result, the City
Treasurer of Makati sent him billing statements, notice of realty tax delinquency, and warrants of levy at
the address “2118 Apolinario St., Bangkal, Makati City”. Without posting and publication of the notice
of delinquency, the subject property was then sold at a public auction to Ms. A. Almost two years after,
Mr. X filed a petition to declare as null and void the auction sale and to cancel the certificate of sale issued
in favor of Ms. A on the ground that he did not receive the notices sent by the City Treasurer, who failed
to comply with Sec. 258, Chapter VI, Title II, Book II of the LGC. Will the action of Mr. X prosper?
Yes, the action will prosper. Section 254 of the LGC mandates that the notice of delinquency must be posted and
published. The warrant of levy must be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of the real property, or
person having legal interest therein as stated under Section 258. The public auction of land to satisfy delinquency
derogates or impinges on property rights and due process. Thus, the steps prescribed by law are mandatory and
must be strictly followed; if not, the sale of the real property is invalid and does not make its purchaser the new
owner. Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for the protection of the taxpayers,
but also to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce
the laws. Here, the notice of tax delinquency is not posted and published in accordance with the requirement
of LGC. Furthermore, the notice of delinquency, which was allegedly sent via registered mail, was improperly
addressed. Mr. X’s act of providing a different address had the effect of notifying the City Treasurer of changing his
postal address in the tax records of Makati. In the absence of registry return card or an affidavit of service, it cannot
be definitely ascertained that the documents were in fact received by Mr. X or any of his authorized representative
(Salva v. Magpile, G.R. No. 220440, November 8, 2017).
Hence, the action of Mr. X will prosper because of the failure of the City Treasurer to comply with all the essential
and indispensable requirements of the LGC for a valid tax delinquency sale.

National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into an Energy Conversion Agreement (ECA) with M
Corporation (M Corp.). The ECA provided for a build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement between M
Corp. and the NPC. M Corp. will build and finance a coal-fired thermal power plant on the lots owned
by the NPC in Pagbilao, Quezon for the purpose of converting fuel into electricity, and thereafter,
operate and maintain the power plant for a period of 25 years. Under ECA’s terms regarding the power
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plant’s machineries, it clearly vests their ownership with M Corp. The NPC, in turn, will supply the
necessary fuel to be converted by M Corp. into electric power, take the power generated, and use it to
supply the electric power needs of the country. At the end of the 25-year term, M Corp. will transfer
the power plant to the NPC without compensation. According to the NPC, the power plant is currently
operational and is one of the largest sources of electric power in the country. The Municipality of Pagbilao
assessed M Corp.’s real property taxes on the power plant and its machineries in the total amount of
Php1 Billion for the period of 1997-2000. The NPC objected to the assessment against M Corp. on the
claim that it (the NPC) is entitled to the tax exemptions provided in Section 234, paragraphs (c) and (e)
of the LGC. Did NPC initiate a valid protest against the assessment before the Local Board Assessment
Appeals (LBAA)?
No, the NPC did not initiate a valid protest against assessment. A person legally burdened with the obligation
to pay for the tax imposed on a property has legal interest in the property and the personality to protest a tax
assessment on the property. The unpaid realty tax attaches to the property but is directly chargeable against the
taxable person who has actual and beneficial use and possession of the property regardless of whether or not that
person is the owner (National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon, et al, G. R No. 171586, July 15, 2009).
Here, the NPC does not have the “legal interest” that the law and jurisprudence require to give it personality to
protest the tax imposed by law on M Corp. Hence, M Corp., instead of NPC, may initiate a valid protest.
Quezon City published on January 30, 2006 a list of delinquent real property taxpayers in two newspapers
of general circulation and posted this in the main lobby of the City Hall. The notice requires all owners
of real properties in the list to pay the real property tax due within thirty (30) days from the date of
the publication, otherwise the properties listed shall be sold at the public auction. Mr. J is one of those
in the list. He purchased a real property in 1996 but failed to register the document of sale with the
Register of Deeds and secure a new real property tax declaration in his name. He alleged that the auction
sale of his property is void for lack of due process considering that the City Treasurer did not send him
personal notice. For his part, the City Treasurer maintains that the publication and posting of notice are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. (2006 Bar)
1. If you were the judge, how will you resolve this issue?
I will resolve the issue in favor of Mr. J. After the expiration of the time required to pay the basic real property
tax, the warrant of levy shall be mailed to or served upon the delinquent owner of the real property or person
having legal interest therein, or in case he is out of the country or cannot be located, to the administrator or
occupant of the property (LGC, Sec. 258). Assessment in the name of the previous owner is no longer deemed
an assessment in the name of the actual owner (Estate of the Late Mercedes Jacob v. Court of Appeals, G.R No.
120435, December 22, 1997). It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send notice directly to the taxpayer
in order to protect the latter’s interest, and failure to do so will render an auction sale void (Tan v. Bantegui,
G.R. No. 154027, October 24, 2005). Here, Mr. J is the owner of the real property since 1996, furthermore, the
name of Mr. J is included in the list of owners of delinquent real property tax issued, posted and published by
Quezon City. Hence, the failure of the City Treasurer to send him personal notice invalidates the auction sale.
2. Assuming Mr. J is a registered owner, will your answer be the same?
Yes. The auction sale of real property for the collection of delinquent taxes is in personam, not in rem. Although
sufficient in proceedings in rem, mere notice by publication will not satisfy the requirements of proceedings
in personam. Publication of the notice of delinquency will not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax
sales is in personam. It is still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -
the registered owner of the property - in order to protect the latter’s interests. Although preceded by proper
advertisement and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer (Tan v.
Bantegui, G. R. No. 154027, October 24, 2005). Hence, the failure of the City Treasurer to send notice to Mr.
J invalidates the auction sale.
The Municipal Assessor of Pasig City sent a notice of assessment of real property tax respecting certain
real properties of Mr. A. In a letter, Mr. A. through counsel requested the Municipal Assessor to
reconsider the subject assessments. Unsatisfied, Mr. A filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for
prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and
void the new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments.
The Judge denied the petition for lack of merit. Mr. A directly filed a petition for review directly before
the Supreme Court arguing that Court a quo gravely erred in blaming Mr. A for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies provided for by law. The assessor argue that the case is premature because Mr.
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A neither appealed the questioned assessments on their properties to the Board of Assessment Appeal,
pursuant to Sec. 226, nor paid the taxes under protest, per Sec. 252. Is the contention of the Assessor
proper?
No, the contention of the assessor is not proper. In general, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before
resort to judicial action can prosper, however, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the controversy does
not involve questions of fact but only of law. In laying down the powers of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(LBAA), RA 7160 provides in Sec. 229 (b) that “the proceedings of the Board shall be conducted solely for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts xxx”. It follows that appeals to LBAA may be fruitful only where questions of fact
are involved. Again, the protest contemplated under Sec. 252 of RA 7160 is needed where there is a question as to
the reasonableness of the amount assessed. Hence, if a taxpayer disputes the reasonableness of an increase in a real
estate tax assessment, he is required to “first pay the tax” under protest. Otherwise, the city or municipal treasurer
will not act on his protest (Ty, et al v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995). In the case at bench however,
Mr. A are questioning the very authority and power of the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the
assessment and of the treasurer to collect the tax. Hence, the argument of the assessor is untenable.
The City Government of Taguig (Taguig City) sent two letters to B Corporation (B Corp.) requiring
the settlement of real property taxes on the two subject lots which was immediately paid by B Corp.
However, even prior to the letters, the subject two lots had already been declared delinquent and were
sold at public auction.
B Corp. then filed a Complaint against Taguig City and its officials alleging that there was no valid
justification to sell the subject two lots at public auction given the fact that it had paid and settled the
required real property taxes. The city officials and filed a Motion to Dismiss for non-compliance with
the requirements for an action to assail the validity of a tax delinquency sale under Section 267 of the
LGC such as the deposit requirement. Does non-compliance with Section 267 of the LGC render the
subject action dismissible?
No. Where the property sold at a public auction sale is not tax delinquent there being full payment already of
the tax due on the property, then the envisioned purpose of the deposit requirement under Section 267 becomes
irrelevant, if not oppressive. As expressed in Section 267, the amount deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at the
auction sale if the deed is declared invalid; otherwise, it shall be returned to the depositor. The deposit, equivalent
to the value for which the real property was sold plus interest, is essentially meant to reimburse the purchaser of the
amount he had paid at the auction sale should the court declare the sale invalid.
On the assumption that the subject two lots are not tax delinquent, then there is no need for the deposit
requirement under Section 267 because the realty taxes due on the subject two lots have already been paid and
there are no tax delinquencies to be collected or satisfied. The motion to dismiss shall not be granted (Beaumont
Holdings Corpọration v. Attys. Rosario V.E. Reyes, G.R. No. 207306; August 7, 2017, Caguioa Case).
How may a taxpayer assail the validity of the valuation made by the local assessor?
Any owner or person having legal interest in the property who is not satisfied with the action of the provincial, city
or municipal assessor in the assessment of his property may, within 60 days from the date of receipt of the written
notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the province or city by filing a petition under
oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with copies of the tax declarations and such affidavits or
documents submitted in support of the appeal (LGC, Sec. 226).
The owner of the property or the person having legal interest therein or the assessor who is not satisfied with the
decision of the Board, may, within 30 days after receipt of the decision of said Board, appeal to the CBAA. The
decision of the Central Board shall be final and executory (LGC, Sec. 229).
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C. The Court of Tax Appeals (RA 1125, as Amended,

and the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals)
Jurisdiction
Summary of Jurisdiction in Judicial Tax Cases
Jurisdiction CTA En Banc
Exclusive Original The Court shall sit En Banc in the exercise of its administrative, ceremonial, and
non-adjudicative functions.
Exclusive Civil Cases

Appellate
1. Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the
Court in Division in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over: (ALT)
a. Cases arising from Administrative agencies – BIR, BOC, DOF, DTI, DA;
b. Local tax cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction; and
c. Tax collection cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges
and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is
less than Php1 Million
2. Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
3. Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection

cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions, resolutions or orders on Motions for Reconsideration or New Trial

of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over
tax collection cases; and
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise

of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 2(a) to (e)).
Criminal Cases
1. Decisions, Resolutions or Orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of

the court in division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the NIRC or CMTA and
other laws administered by the BIR or BOC (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 2(f)).
2. Decisions, Resolutions or Orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial

of the court in division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
criminal offenses mentioned in paragraph A (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 2(g)).
3. Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the RTCs in the exercise of their appellate

jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in paragraph A (RRCTA, Rule 4,
Sec. 2(h)).
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Jurisdiction CTA in Division

Exclusive Civil Case
Original
Tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges
and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is Php1 Million or more; (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(c)(1)) and
Criminal Case
Criminal offenses arising from violations of the NIRC or CMTA and other laws
administered by the BIR or BOC, where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is Php1 Million or more (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(b)(1)).
Exclusive Civil Case: (DIReCSS)
Appellate
1. Decisions of the CIR involving:
a. Disputed assessments;
b. Refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges,in relation thereto; or
c. Other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR
(RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(c)(1)).
2. Inaction by the CIR involving:
a. Disputed Assessments;
b. Refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges and penalties imposed
thereto; and
c. Other matters arising under NIRC or other laws administered by the BIR,
Where the NIRC provides a specific period for action (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec.
3(a)(2)).
3. Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the RTC in Local Tax Cases decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their Original Jurisdiction (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(a)(3))
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs involving:
a. Liability for customs Duties, fees or other money charges
b. Seizures, detention or release of other property affected;
c. Fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto; or
d. Other matters arising under the customs law or other laws administered by the
BOC (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(a)(4))
5. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on Customs cases elevated for automatic

review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the
Government under the CMTA (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(a)(5));
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry in the case of non-agricultural

product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing
duties and safeguard measures under RA 8800 (Safeguard Measures Act) (RRCTA,
Rule 4, Sec. 3(a)(6)).
7. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts
in tax collection cases originally decided by them within their respective territorial
jurisdiction (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(c)).
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Jurisdiction CTA in Division

Exclusive Criminal Cases
Appellate
Appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTCs in their original
jurisdiction in criminal offenses where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive
of charges and penalties, claimed is less than Php1 Million or where there is no specified
amount claim (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(b)(2)).
Jurisdiction Regular Courts
EXCLUSIVE Civil Case

ORIGINAL
(Either MTC or 1. Tax collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
RTC depending charges and penalties, claimed is less than Php1 Million (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec.
on jurisdictional 2(a)); and
amount) 2. Local Tax Cases (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 2(b)).
or Criminal Case
EXCLUSIVE Criminal offenses arising from violations of the NIRC or CMTA and other laws
APPELLATE administered by the BIR or BOC, where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
(RTC, over tax exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than Php1 Million or where there is
cases originally no specified amount claimed (RRCTA, Rule 4, Sec. 3(b)(2)).
decided by the
MTC)
In view of the CIR’s assessment, PPP filed before the CTA a petition for review raising the issue of
whether its importation of alkylate as a blending component is subject to excise tax as contemplated
under Section 148 (e) of the NIRC. The CTA gave due course to PPP’s petition. The CIR alleged that
the CTA committed grave abuse of discretion when it assumed authority to take cognizance of the case
despite its lack of jurisdiction to do so. The CIR argued that the interpretation of Sec. 148(e) is an
exercise of its quasi-legislative function, which is reviewable by the Secretary of Finance, thus the CTA
has no jurisdiction to decide on the matter. Did the CTA correctly assume jurisdiction over the case?
Yes, the law intends the CTA to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems, including administrative
issuances by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation
of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings are official positions of the BIR on inquiries of taxpayers.
Hence, the determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the CTA under Section 7(l) of RA 1125, as amended, subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance, as
required under RA 8424 (CIR v. CTA and Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 207843, February 14, 2018).
Ms. Y, filed before the RTC- Br. 85 a Complaint for Annulment of Warrant of Levy, Public Auction
Sale, Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, Recovery of Ownership and Possession, and Damages (Annulment
Complaint) against the City Treasurer, the City Assessor, and the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City
(city officials), and Spouses CD. Ms. Y alleged that she is the registered co-owner of a real property
covered by TCT No. 11111 which the city officials, with malice and bad faith, sold at a public auction in
2009 to spouses CD without notice of the levy and auction sale proceedings.
The RTC-Br. 85 dismissed with prejudice the Annulment Complaint on the ground of res judicata by
virtue of the final judgment in a Cancellation Case rendered by the RTC-Branch 83, acting as a land
registration court. Ms. Y appealed to the CA. The city officials argue that the RTC-Br. 85’s Decision has
already become final, maintaining that Ms. Y should have elevated the case to the CTA, and not to the
CA since the case involves a tax issue (i.e. annulment of warrant of levy and public auction sale, among
others). Did the CA properly acquire jurisdiction?
Yes. Before the case can be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the RTC must be in the nature of a tax
case. If the case is essentially one for recovery of ownership and possession of the property, with damages, which
is not anchored on a tax issue, the RTC’s ruling could not be characterized as a local tax case over which the CTA
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could have properly assumed jurisdiction on appeal. In this case, the Annulment Complaint shows that Teresa’s
action before the RTC-Br. 85 is essentially one for recovery of ownership and possession of the property, with
damages, which is not anchored on a tax issue, but on due process considerations. As such, the RTC-Br. 85’s ruling
thereon could not be characterized as a local tax case over which the CTA could have properly assumed jurisdiction
on appeal. In fine, the case was correctly elevated to the CA (Ignacio v. Office of City Treasurer of Quezon City, G.R.
No. 221620, September 11, 2017).
Procedures
What is the form and mode of proceeding for civil and criminal actions involving internal revenue taxes?
Both in civil and criminal actions involving Internal Revenue Taxes, the following rules shall be observed:
1. It shall be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines;
2. It shall be conducted by legal officers of the BIR; and
3. No civil or criminal action for recovery of the taxes shall be filed in court without the approval of the CIR
(NIRC, Sec. 220).
When should the action for collection of national taxes be filed in court?
The action for collection should be filed in court within the following periods:
1. Generally – 3 years from the filing of the return or from the last date prescribed by law for the filing of such
return, whichever comes later (NIRC, Sec. 203).
2. Exception – In cases of false return, fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file a return,
anytime within 10 years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission (NIRC, Sec. 222 (A)).
How may the Government enforce collection of internal revenue taxes through judicial action?
The Government may enforce collection of internal revenue taxes by filing either a civil case for collection of a sum
of money with the proper regular court (NIRC, Secs. 203 and 222) or an answer to the petition for review filed
by taxpayer with CTA (Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-21551, September 30, 1969), or by filing a
criminal action.
How may LGUs enforce the collection of local taxes through judicial action?
The LGU concerned may enforce the collection of delinquent taxes, fees, charges or other revenues by civil action
in any court of competent jurisdiction (LGC, Sec. 183).
The City of Manila assessed X and Y together with their sister companies (parties), increased rates of
business taxes for the year 2003 and the first quarter of 2004. They paid the additional taxes under
protest. X and Y and their sister companies then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Refund and/
or Issuance of Tax credit of Taxes Illegally Collected. The RTC granted the same. The City of Manila
appealed but asked for an extension of time. After the CTA granted its request for extension of time,
the City of Manila filed a petition for review with the said court. The parties now assail this extension,
arguing that the 30-day period under the Revised Rules of the CTA (RRCTA) is clearly non-extendible.
Decide.
Sec. 11 of RA 9282 states that the Petition for Review shall be filed with the CTA following the procedure
analogous to Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (RRC). Sec. 1 of Rule 42 of RRC provides that the
Petition for Review must be filed with the CA within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or
of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
Following by analogy, the 30-day original period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA, may be extended for
a period of 15 days. No further extension shall be allowed thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons,
in which case the extended period shall not exceed fifteen (15) days (SM Land, Inc. v. City of Manila, G.R. No.
197151, October 22, 2012). Thus, X and Y’s contention regarding the 30-day period to appeal decisions of the RTC
to the CTA is non-extendible is not correct.
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Who should institute the civil action for collection of local taxes?
The civil action shall be filed by the local treasurer within the period prescribed in Section 194 of the LGC (LGC,
Sec. 183).
When should the civil action for collection of local taxes be filed?
As a general rule the civil action for the collection of taxes, fees, or charges, shall be instituted within 5 years from
the date such taxes, fees, or charges become due (LGC, Sec. 194 (a)). However, in case of fraud or intent to evade
the payment of taxes, fees, or charges, the same may be filed within 10 years from the date of the discovery thereof
(LGC, Sec. 194 (b)).
What are the requisites for the suspension of collection of taxes?

1. When there is an appeal to the CTA from a decision of the CIR;
2. In the opinion of the CTA, the collection may jeopardize the interest of the Government and/or the
taxpayer; and
3. The taxpayer may be required to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than
double the amount with the Court (RA 1125, Sec. 11).
When may the bond required for the suspension of the collection of tax be dispensed with?
The required posting of a bond for the suspension of the collection of the tax liability may be dispensed with:
1. When prescription has set in; or
2. When it is determined by the courts that the method employed by the Collector of Internal Revenue in the
collection of tax is not sanctioned by law.
Note: The purpose of the rule is not only to prevent jeopardizing the interest of the taxpayer, but more importantly,
to prevent the absurd situation wherein the court would declare that the collection by the summary methods of
distraint and levy was violative of law, and then, in the same breath require the petitioner to deposit or file a bond
as a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of injunction (Pacquiao v. CTA, G.R. No. 213394, April 06, 2016).
A Corp. commenced a civil case with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction for the
determination of the constitutionality of Section 108 and 184 of NIRC with respect to the taxes paid by
non-life insurance companies before RTC. Thereafter, RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
CIR argued that trial court gravely erred in granting injunctive relief in favor of A Corp. as the same is
being prohibited by Section 218 of NIRC. Is the CIR correct?
Yes. Section 218 of NIRC expressly provides “No court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain
the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee, or charge imposed by NIRC.” By way of exception pursuant
to Sec. 11 of RA 1125 as amended, it is only the CTA that has jurisdiction to suspend the collection of taxes but
only under certain conditions that when its opinion the collection by the BIR may jeopardize the interest of the
government and/or the taxpayer and which case the CTA may suspend the collection of taxes and require the
taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount being
assessed. Hence, RTC grossly erred in deciding to permanently enjoin the enforcement of the specified provisions
of the NIRC against A Corp. as it acted without jurisdiction (CIR v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No.
219340, November 7, 2018).
How shall criminal actions be instituted before the CTA?

All criminal actions before the CTA in Division in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be instituted by
the filing of information in the name of the People of the Philippines. The institution of the criminal action shall
interrupt the running of the period of prescription.
Note: In criminal actions involving violations of the NIRC and other laws enforced by the BIR, the CIR must
approve their filing. Those that involve violations of the Tariff Code and other laws enforced by the BOC, the
Commissioner of Customs must approve their filing (RRCTA, Rule 9, Sec. 2).
Who may prosecute criminal actions in the CTA Division?

All criminal actions shall be conducted and prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
In criminal actions involving violation of the NIRC or other laws enforced by the BIR, and violations of the
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CMTA or other laws enforced by the BOC, the prosecution may be conducted by their respective duly deputized
legal officers (RRCTA, Rule 9, Sec. 3).
What is the rule on inclusion of civil action in criminal action?

The criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall
be deemed jointly instituted in the same proceeding. The filing of the criminal action shall necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action. No right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be allowed or recognized (ROC, RULE 111, Sec. 1, par. (a)(1)).
After filing an Information for violation of Section 254 of the NIRC (Attempt to Evade or Defeat
Tax) with the CTA, the Public Prosecutor manifested that the People is reserving the right to file the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of the civil liability for taxes. Is the manifestation to reserve
the right to file the corresponding civil action proper?
No, the manifestation to reserve the right to file the corresponding civil action is not proper. Any provision of law
or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly
determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized. Hence, the manifestation in the criminal case to reserve the right to file the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes is not proper.
How is an appeal on criminal cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA Division
made?
An appeal to the CTA in Division in criminal cases decided by a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Sections 3(a) and 6, Rule 122 of the ROC within
15 days from receipt of a copy of the decision or final order with the court which rendered the final judgment or
order appealed from and by serving a copy upon the adverse party (RRCTA, Rule 9, Sec. 9 (a)).
Appeal to the CTA En Banc
What may be the subject of an appeal to the CTA En Banc?

According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised ROC, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. Said
provision, thus, explicitly states that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. It is, therefore, clear that
the CTA en banc has jurisdiction over final order or judgment but not over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA
in division.
Note: The CTA merely adopts the procedure for petitions for review and appeals long established and practiced
in other Philippine courts. Accordingly, doctrines, principles, rules, and precedents laid down in jurisprudence by
the SC as regards petitions for review and appeals in courts of general jurisdiction should likewise bind the CTA,
and it cannot depart therefrom (CIR v. CTA, G.R. Nos. 203054-55, July 29, 2015).
What is the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory orders of the CTA Division?
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, applies suppletory to proceedings before
the CTA. Thus, where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 before the SC (CIR v. CTA, G.R. Nos. 203054-55, July 29, 2015). Jurisdiction
is conferred by law, and nothing under RA 9282 confers certiorari jurisdiction upon the CTA En Banc over
interlocutory orders of the CTA Division.
What are the remedies of the party affected by:

1. A ruling, order or decision of a Division of the CTA?
File a motion for reconsideration or new trial before the same Division within 15 days from notice thereof:
Provided, however, that in criminal cases, the general rule applicable in regular courts on matters of prosecution
and appeal shall likewise apply (RA 1125 as amended, Sec. 11).
2. The resolution of the Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial?
File a petition for review with the CTA En Banc (RRCTA, Rule 8, Sec. 3(b)).
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3. The decision or ruling of the CTA En Banc?

File with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari within 15 days from receipt of the
decision or ruling pursuant to Rule 45 of the ROC (RRCTA, Rule 16, Sec. 1).
The City of Manila assessed G Corporation local business taxes and regulatory fees. G Corporation
protested the assessment, arguing that the tax ordinances amending the Revenue Code of Manila have
been declared null and void and that the collection of local business tax under the Revenue Code of
Manila constitutes double taxation. The protest was denied by the City Treasurer. The RTC in its
decision ruled in favor of G Corporation but denied the claim for refund. In the petition for review,
the CTA division reversed the decision of the RTC. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration or
new trial, the City of Manila directly filed with the CTA En Banc a petition for review praying that the
decision of the CTA Division be reversed or set aside. CTA En Banc dismissed the case and ruled that
the direct resort to it without a prior motion for reconsideration or new trial before the CTA Division
violate RA 1125. G Corporation counters that the rules should not be lightly disregarded by harping on
substantial justice and the policy of liberal construction. Is the dismissal proper?
Yes. The filing of a motion for reconsideration or new trial before the CTA Division is an indispensable requirement
for filing an appeal before the CTA En Banc. Failure to file such motion for reconsideration or new trial is a cause
for dismissal of the appeal before the CTA En Banc. The rules may be relaxed when to do so would afford a litigant
substantial justice which, however, the City of Manila was not able to prove in this case. Hence, the CTA En Banc
is correct in dismissing the said petition (City of Manila v. Cosmos Bottling Corporation, G.R. No. 196681, June
27, 2018).
What are the grounds for filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial?
The grounds for filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial are as follows:
1. Fraud, Accident, Mistake, or Excusable negligence (FAME) which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
2. Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced
at the trial and which, if presented, would probably alter the result (RRCTA, Rule 15, Sec. 5).
The Bureau of Customs filed a collection suit for unpaid taxes and customs duties against X before the
RTC. The RTC dismissed the suit. Dissatisfied, the Bureau appealed to the CA. While the CA admitted
that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent’s appeal, it nevertheless opted to relax
procedural rules in not dismissing the appeal outright. The CA simply referred the matter to the CTA,
considering that the government stands to lose the amount of Php46,844,385.00 in taxes and customs
duties. Was the action of CA correct?
No, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action on the same except
to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50. The act of the CA in referring respondent’s wrongful appeal
before it to the CTA under the guise of furthering the interests of substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and
thus, stands to be corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, the SC held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a
magic wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules. Further, in view of the wrong appeal of
respondent, it is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law renders
the judgment appealed from final and executory (Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs,
G.R. No. 209830, June 17, 2015).
Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court
When may a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court be taken in Civil Cases?
Any party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA En Banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on Certiorari within 15 days from receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution, as provided in
Rule 45 of the ROC (RRCTA, Rule 16, Sec. 1).
What is the effect of appeal filed with the Supreme Court in relation to the pending motion for
reconsideration or new trial to the CTA En Banc?
The pending motion for reconsideration or for new trial in the CTA en Banc shall be deemed abandoned (RRCTA,
Rule 16, Sec. 2).
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K Corp. filed with the BIR its claim for refund for input tax incurred for the 1st and 2nd quarters of
calendar year 2000 from its importation and domestic purchases of capital goods and services preparatory
to its production and sales of electricity to NAPOCOR. For failure of BIR to act upon the claim for
refund or issuance of tax credit certificate, K Corp. filed a Petition for Review. Thereafter, K Corp.
filed its Memorandum, but BIR failed to file its Memorandum despite notice, thus the case was deemed
submitted for decision. Subsequently, the CTA 1st Division rendered a Decision, holding that K Corp.
is entitled to a refund for its unutilized input VAT paid. There being no Motion for Reconsideration
filed by BIR, the decision became final and executory. Aggrieved, BIR filed a petition for annulment of
judgement with the CTA En Banc but it was dismissed, and its motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Does the CTA En Banc have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed by BIR?
No. The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and CTA En Banc cannot annul judgment of their divisions.
Annulment of Judgment (Rule 47 of the ROC) involves exercise of original jurisdiction and implies power
by a superior court against the final judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court based on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Divisions are not separate and distinct courts but are divisions of one
and the same court. There is no hierarchy of courts within the SC, CA, and CTA, for each remain as one court
notwithstanding that they also work in divisions (CIR v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation, G.R. No. 199422, June 21,
2016).
CIR issued RMO No. 23-2014 which consolidated the responsibilities of the public sector to withhold
taxes on its transactions as a customer (on its purchases of goods and services) and as an employer (on
compensation paid to its officials and employees) under the NIRC. C, an organization of government
employees filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65 with the Supreme
Court (SC) seeking to nullify some of the provisions of the RMO for being ultra vires and violative
of the equal protection clause and the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by government agencies and that its
implementation results in diminution of benefits of government employees, a violation of Article 100
of the Labor Code. CIR and Secretary of Finance counter that the petition is barred by the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts and it was issued pursuant to the CIR’s power to interpret the NIRC.
1. Is the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 proper?
No. Certiorari under Rule 65 will only lie if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against the assailed issuance of the CIR. The plain, speedy and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is an appeal of the assailed RMO with the Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the
NIRC. Hence, C violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when it directly filed its Petition under Rule 65
in the SC (Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 213446 & 213658; July 03, 2018, Caguioa Case).
2. Assuming C violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, may the SC take cognizance of the case?
Yes. A direct invocation of the SC’s jurisdiction should only be allowed when there are special, important
and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition. In this case, the petition assails the
validity of the actions of the CIR that affect thousands of employees in the different government agencies and
instrumentalities. Hence, despite the procedural infirmities of the petition that warrants its outright dismissal,
the SC may take cognizance of, and accordingly act on the petition to promote the vital interest of justice
(Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees v. Commissioner, Bureau
of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 213446 & 213658; July 03, 2018, Caguioa Case).
Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Rule 44 – Ordinary Appealed Cases
What is the effect of Appellant’s failure to serve the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provided by the rules?
The CA may dismiss the appeal on its own motion or on that of the appellee (ROC, Rule 44, Sec. 10; Rule 50, Sec.
1(e)).
May the period to file a brief be extended?

As a rule, extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and only
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if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended (ROC, Rule 44, Sec. 12).
How shall the briefs be served upon several appellants or appellees or several counsel for each party?
Where there are several appellants or appellees, each counsel representing one or more but not all of them shall be
served with only one copy of the briefs. When several counsels represent one appellant or appellee, copies of the
brief may be served upon any of them (ROC, Rule 44, Sec. 11).
Rule 50 - Dismissal of Appeal
What are the grounds for the dismissal of appeal in the CA? (RF-PUSANAN)
An appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken within the period fixed by
these rules;
2. Failure to File the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period prescribed by these rules;
3. Failure of the appellant to Pay the docket and other lawful fees (ROC, Rule 40; Rule 41, Sec. 4);
4. Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on appeal (ROC, Rule 44, Sec 4);
5. Failure of the appellant to Serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within
the time provided by these Rules;
6. Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record ROC,
Rule 44, Sec. 13 (a), (c), (d), and (f));
7. Failure of the appellant to take the Necessary steps for the correction or completion of the record within
the time limited by the court in its order;
8. Failure of the appellant to Appear at the preliminary conference (ROC, Rule 48) or to comply with the
orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable cause; and
9. The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is Not appealable (ROC, Rule 50, Sec. 1).
If any of the grounds for dismissal under Sec. 1, Rule 50 are present, is it mandatory on the part of the
CA to dismiss?
No. The grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Sec.1, Rule 50 are discretionary upon the appellate court. The
very wording of the rule uses the word “may”, instead of “shall”. This indicates that it is only directory and not
mandatory. Sound discretion must be exercised in consonance with the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in
mind the circumstances obtaining in each case (Mercury Drug Corporation v. De Leon, G.R. No. 165622, October
17, 2008).
R filed a complaint for damages against M. The RTC ruled in favor of R. M appealed to the CA. In
M’s Appellant’s Brief, there were no page references to the records but instead referred to the exhibits,
stenographic notes, and attachments of the case. Should the case be automatically dismissed pursuant to
Sec. 1, Rule 50?
No, the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Rule 50 Sec. 1 are discretionary upon the appellate court.
Sound discretion must be exercised in consonance with the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in mind the
circumstances obtained in each case. While the absence of page reference is a ground for dismissal, such dismissal
is not mandatory, but discretionary on the part of the appellate court. The failure to properly cite reference to
the original records is not a fatal procedural lapse. When citations found in the appellant’s brief enable the court
to expeditiously locate the portions of the record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the Rules. In
this case, although there were no page references to the records, M referred to the exhibits, stenographic notes,
and attachments of the case. Despite its deficiencies, the brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the
appellate court of the essential facts, nature of the case, the issues raised, and the laws necessary for the disposition
of the same (Mercury Drug Corporation v. De Leon, G.R. No. 165622, October 17, 2008).
What is the effect of an improper appeal to the CA?

An appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be dismissed (ROC, Rule 50, Sec. 2).
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What is the remedy if an appeal is dismissed for being an improper or erroneous appeal?
The remedy is to re-file it in the proper forum, but it has to be within the prescribed period to appeal (Torres v.
People, G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011).
Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against B, for the unpaid use of credit card issued by the
bank. Attached to the complaint are duplicate original copies of statements of account. MTC dismissed
for failure to establish by preponderance of evidence since the signature in the statements of account
are mere photocopies, and there is no showing that the original was lost or destroyed, and as such,
the photocopied documents were disregarded. On appeal, bank argued that the duplicate originals
were attached. RTC affirmed the MTC, as the documents and signatures were photocopies. On further
appeal, Bank claims for the first time that there was failure of the lower courts to comply with the Rules
of Electronic Evidence to consider the documents as electronic documents and therefore should have
regarded the same as original. May the Bank raise this for the first time on appeal?
No. Issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained because to do so would be anathema to the
rudiments of fairness and due process. Bank cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal and abandon its theory before
the lower court. Estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings before the
lower courts, for the first time on appeal (Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018;
RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr., G.R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
May an appeal be withdrawn from the CA?

An appeal may be withdrawn as a matter of right at any time before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the
withdrawal may be allowed at the discretion of the court (ROC, Rule 50, Sec. 3).
In an appeal before the CA, X’s counsel of record was A Law Office. Later, A Law Office filed a motion
with the CA to withdraw as counsel for X. On the same date, BB Law Office, on behalf of X, filed a
notice of withdrawal of appeal as a matter of right since no appellee’s brief was yet filed, but without any
conformity from appellant X. Did this have the effect of withdrawing the appeal?
No. First, there was no valid substitution of counsel of record, because BB Law Office did not file a written request
for substitution with the written consent of the client and the attorney to the substituted or if the consent of
the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof of notice that the motion for
substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the rules. Second, while an appeal may be withdrawn
as a matter of right at any time before the filing of the appellee’s brief, such rule will not apply because the notice
of withdrawal of appeal filed by BB Law Office did not bear X’s conformity thereto. Absent a special power of
attorney expressly authorizing X’s counsel, as this agent, to withdraw the appeal or in lieu thereof, the written
conformity of X to the withdrawal of appeal, the notice of withdrawal of appeal by BB Law Office was a mere scrap
of paper (Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp v. De Dios Transportation, G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003).
Rule 51 - Judgment; Harmless Error
When is a case deemed submitted for judgment in ordinary appeals?

A case shall be deemed submitted for judgment in ordinary appeals:
1. Where no hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules or by the court itself, or the expiration of the period for its filing; or
2. Where such a hearing is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum
as may be required or permitted to be filed by the court, or the expiration of the period for its filing (ROC,
Rule 51, Sec. 1).
When is a case deemed submitted for judgment in original actions and petitions for review?
A case shall be deemed submitted for judgment in original actions and petitions for review:
1. Where no comment is filed, upon the expiration of the period to comment;
2. Where no hearing is held, upon the filing of the last pleading required or permitted to be filed by the court,
or the expiration of the period for its filing; or
3. Where a hearing on the merits of the main case is held, upon its termination or upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum as may be required or permitted to be filed by the court, or the expiration of the
period for its filing (ROC, Rule 51, Sec. 1).
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What is the Harmless Error Rule?

Under the harmless error rule, the court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice (ROC, Rule 51,
Sec. 6).
May the appellate court rule in favor of some of the appellants and against the other appellants in the
same case?
Yes. In all actions or proceedings, an appealed judgment may be affirmed as to some of the appellants, and reversed
as to others, and the case shall thereafter be proceeded with, so far as necessary, as if separate actions had been begun
and prosecuted; and execution of the judgment of affirmance may be had accordingly, and costs may be adjudged
in such cases, as the court shall deem proper (ROC, Rule 51, Sec. 7).
What questions may be raised in the appellate court? Are there exceptions to this rule?
The appellate court can only rule on the basis of grounds raised as errors on appeal.
Exceptions: (JES-F-RD)
1. Those affecting Jurisdiction over the subject matter;
2. Evidently plain and clerical errors within the contemplation of law (ROC, Rule 51, Sec. 8; ROC, Rule 56,
Sec. 4);
3. Those which the consideration thereof is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of
the case or to Serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
4. Matters raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue which the
parties Failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
5. Matters closely Related to or dependent on an error assigned; and
6. Those upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is Dependent (Catholic Bishop of
Balanga v. Court of Appeals, as cited in Heirs of Teodora Loyola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188658,
January 11, 2017).
When may a motion for execution of judgment be filed?

Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory,
the motion for execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
In original actions in the CA, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the entry of
judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion of execution pending appeal is filed in the CA at a time that it is in possession
of the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be transmitted to the lower
court from which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment or final order to executed,
with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement (ROC, Rule 51, Sec. 11).
Rule 53 – New Trial
When may a Motion for New Trial with the CA be filed?

A motion for new trial under Rule 53 is filed at any time after the perfection of the appeal from the decision of the
lower court and before the CA loses jurisdiction over the case (Rule 53, Sec. 1).
What is the only ground for filing a Motion for New Trial with the CA under Rule 53?
The only ground is newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court
below by the exercise of due diligence and which is of such character as would probably alter the result (Rule 53,
Sec. 1).
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What will accompany the motion for new trial under Rule 53?
The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor, and the newly
discovered evidence (Rule 53, Sec. 1).
What will the CA do with the Motion for New Trial?

The CA shall consider the new evidence together with that adduced at the trial below, and may grant or refuse a
new trial, or may make such order, with notice to both parties, as to the taking of further testimony, either orally
in court or by depositions, or render such other judgment as ought to be rendered upon such terms as it may deem
just (Rule 53, Sec. 2).
When must the CA resolve the motion for new trial?

The CA shall resolve the motion within 90 days from the date when the court declares it submitted for resolution
What is the procedure in the New Trial in the CA?

The procedure in the new trial in the CA shall be the same as that granted by a Regional Trial Court, unless the
court otherwise directs (Rule 53, Sec. 4)
Note: The CA shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including
the power to grant and conduct new trial or further proceedings (BP 129, Sec. 9).
Procedure in the Supreme Court
Rule 56-A - Original Cases
What is the procedure in original cases in the SC?

The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus shall be
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and Rule 56,
subject to the following provisions:
1. All references in said Rules to the CA shall be understood to also apply to the SC except those dealing
strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases in the CA;
2. The portions of the rules dealing strictly with and specifically intended for appealed cases in the CA shall
not be applicable;
3. For the Division, one original (properly marked) and four copies shall be filed, and if the case is referred to
the Court En Banc, the parties shall file ten additional copies. For the En Banc, the parties need to submit
only two sets of annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. For the Division, the parties need
to submit also two sets of annexes, one attached to the original and an extra copy. All members of the
Court shall share the extra copies of annexes in the interest of economy of paper (Efficient Use of Paper
Rule, A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC);
4. The required number of copies shall be filed with proof of service on all adverse parties; and
5. There shall be compliance with the Rule on Electronic Filing with the Supreme Court (Rules on E-Filing,
A.M. No. 10-3-7-SC).
Note: The proceedings for disciplinary action against members of the judiciary shall be governed by the laws and
rules prescribed therefor, and those against attorneys by Rule 139-B, as amended (ROC, Rule 56, Sec. 2).
For original actions of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus filed with
the SC, will summons be served to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent?
No. The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction (ROC,
Rule 46, Sec. 4).
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May the SC delegate the reception of evidence to a lower court?

Yes, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, the SC may delegate the reception of evidence on such issues to an
appropriate court, agency of officer (ROC, Rule 46, Sec. 7).
Rule 56-B - Appealed Cases
How may an appeal to the SC be taken?

An appeal to the SC may be taken only by a petition for review on certiorari, except when notice of appeal to the
SC is allowed in: (1) as provided in Sec. 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal cases from the CA where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; (2) in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction (Rule 56, Sec. 3 and 6, Rule 122, Sec. 3, Rule 124, Sec. 13(c); A.M. No. 13-7-
05-SC, 2018, 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, Rule XI, Sec. 1(a)).
When may the SC dismiss or deny a petition for review on certiorari?

The SC may dismiss the petition for review on certiorari if:
1. The petitioner fails to comply with any of the requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition; or
2. The appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are
too unsubstantial to require consideration (ROC, Rule 45, Sec. 5).
What are the other grounds for the SC to dismiss an appeal? (RL-DP-CEF)
The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or ion motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
1. Failure to take the appeal within the Reglementary period;
2. Lack of merit in the petition;
3. Failure to pay the requisite Docket fee and other lawful fees or to make a deposit for costs;
4. Failure to comply with the requirements regarding Proof of service and the contents of the documents
which should accompany the petition;
5. Failure to comply with any Circular, directive, or order of the SC without justifiable cause;
6. Error in the choice of mode of appeal; and
7. The Fact that the case is not appealable to the SC (ROC, Rule 56, Sec. 5).
What is the effect of improper appeal made to the SC?

Except as provided in Sec. 3, Rule 122 regarding appeals in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and appeal of criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal shall be dismissed (Rule 56,
Sec. 3 and 6, Rule 122, Sec. 3, Rule 124, Sec. 13(c); A.M. No. 13-7-05-SC, 2018, 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, Rule XI, Sec. 1(a)).
What is the effect of erroneous appeal made to the SC?

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of fact may
be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court
on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final (ROC, Rule 56, Sec. 6).
What is the procedure if the SC En Banc is equally divided in opinion?

Where the Court En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall
again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached:
1. The Original Action commenced in the court shall be dismissed;
2. In Appealed Cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and
3. On all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied (ROC, Rule 56, Sec. 7).
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CA Court of Appeals
CIAC Construction Industry Arbitrary Commission
COA Commission on Audit
COMELEC Commission on Elections
CSC Civil Service Commission
DOJ Department of Justice
GOCC Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation
GSIS Government Service Insurance System
MAB Mines Adjudication Board
MNT Motion for New Trial
MR Motion for Reconsideration
MTC Municipal Trial Court
MTCC Municipal Trial Courts in Cities
NFA Note Facility Agreement
OCP Office of the City Prosecutor
OSG Office of the Solicitor General
PA Panel of Arbitrators
RD Registry of Deeds
ROC Rules of Court
RTC Regional Trial Court
SC Supreme Court
TRO Temporary Restraining Order
WPI Writ of Preliminary Injunction
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SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

ASSISTANT SUBJECT CHAIRS

SUBJECT ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING

II. CIVIL PROCEDURE

III. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

IV. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

Partition (Rule 69) 56

V. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

I. APPEALS; GENERAL PRINCIPLES

II. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES OTHER THAN APPEAL

III. APPEALS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

IV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES

V. PROCEDURE IN TAX CASES

VI. PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

VII. PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Substantive Law vs. Remedial Law

Distinguish Substantive Law from Remedial Law.

Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court

What is the scope of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court?

Principle of Judicial Hierarchy

What is the Principle of Judicial Hierarchy?

What are the exceptions to the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts? (G-TICER-NP)

Doctrine of Non-Interference/Judicial Stability

Distinguish original from appellate jurisdiction.

Distinguish general from special jurisdiction, and give examples.

Distinguish exclusive from concurrent jurisdiction.

What is the Doctrine of Adherence to Jurisdiction (Continuity of Jurisdiction)?

What does jurisdiction over the parties mean?

How does the court acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff?

How does the court acquire jurisdiction over the defendant?

What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

How is jurisdiction over the subject matter conferred?

What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the issue?

How is jurisdiction over the issues conferred and determined?

What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the res?

How is jurisdiction over the res acquired?

What is the meaning of jurisdiction over the remedy?

Distinguish Jurisdiction from Exercise of Jurisdiction.

As to whether it may be a Ground for motu proprio dismissal

As to whether it may be Stipulated

As to whether it may be waived or not

Civil Cases Covered

Barangay Conciliation 2016 Revised Rules of Rules on Summary Procedure

Barangay Conciliation 2016 Revised Rules of Rules on Summary Procedure

Note: The court in which a non-

Criminal Cases Covered

Criminal cases punishable by 1. Violations of traffic laws, Rules

Barangay Conciliation 2016 Revised Rules of Rules on Summary Procedure

General Provisions (Rule 1)

What are the cases governed by the Rules of Court?

In what cases are the Rules of Court inapplicable? (ELC-NIO)

Cause of Action (Rule 2)

What are the elements of a cause of action?

Distinguish Failure to State Cause of Action from Lack of Cause of Action.

What is the test for failure to state a cause of action?

Define splitting of cause of action.

When is a joinder of causes of action valid?

Parties to Civil Action (Rule 3)

What is an indispensable party?

Distinguish indispensable party from necessary party.

What are the effects of misjoinder and non-joinder of parties?

What are the requisites for a Class Suit to prosper? (IN-PB)

2022 San Beda PreWeek & LMT - Remedial Law

2022 San Beda PreWeek & LMT - Remedial Law