3

'Around-the-Table' Negotiations

If prenegotiations are successfully concluded, the next task for the

negotiators is to move into around-the-table mode. This stage is gener-
ally more formal and there is usually more public awareness of what, in
broad terms, is going on. After wrapping up any outstanding procedural
points, first comes the task of trying to agree on the basic principles of
a settlement: the formula stage. If this is achieved, the details then have
to be added. This chapter will begin by looking at the formula stage
and conclude with an examination of the details stage. The latter is
often more difficult, not least because it is the moment of truth for the
negotiators.

The formula stage

For the broad principles of a settlement there are many deliberately ano-
dyne synonyms, among the more common of which are 'guidelines',
'framework for agreement', and 'set of ideas'. Zartman and Berman pre-
fer 'formula' and, since it is short and clear, so do 1. A classic example
of a successful formula was the 'one country [China], two systems
[communism and capitalism]' idea for a solution to the relationship
between the PRC and the British colony of Hong Kong, the lease from
China on the greater part of which was due to expire in 1997. This for-
mula had evolved in the course of Chinese thinking about Taiwan and
was originally resisted by the British, who wanted to retain adminis-
trative control of Hong Kong after relinquishing sovereignty. However,
it became the basis of the Anglo-Chinese Joint Declaration on Hong
Kong in 1984. Other instructive examples of agreed formulas include
those on Cyprus and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The high-level agree-
ments on Cyprus of 1977 and 1979 provided for a deal in which the

44
G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy
© G. R. Berridge 2010
 'Around-the-Table' Negotiations 45

Turks would give up some of the territory seized following their inter-
vention in 1974 provided the Greeks would admit replacement of the
unitary constitution of the island state by a federal one, thereby grant-
ing Turkish Cypriots sovereignty over some of their affairs in a defined
geographical zone: the land for federation formula. As for the Middle
East, in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967, passed
following the Six Day War, it was agreed that Israeli forces would with-
draw 'from territories [not, famously, from the territories] occupied in
the recent conflict' provided the Arab states would recognize the state
of Israel and end the condition of belligerency with it: the land for
peace formula.
The chief characteristics of a good formula are simplicity, compre-
hensiveness, balance, and flexibility. Simplicity is important because
this makes the formula a straightforward guide for the negotiators to
follow. It also lends itself to publicity, and it is often the intention of
at least one of the parties to broadcast the formula to the world; this
rallies supporters, unnerves rivals, and makes it more difficult for the
other side to wriggle out of its undertakings. When, in 1939, the British
government was desperate to claim progress in constructing an anti-
Axis 'peace front' in the Balkans and the Mediterranean but found itself
unable to rush a nervous Turkey into signing up, it persuaded Ankara
to agree to an early, joint declaration of the principles of Anglo-Turkish
solidarity. This produced cheers in the House of Commons and relief in
the press (see Box 3.1).
The best formula will also be comprehensive; that is, it will promise
solutions to all major points of dispute between the parties. However,
this is often not practical politiCS, and a formula is not vitiated if this is
impossible. Some issues might be registered but postponed for later con-
sideration, as was the case with Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique
in February 1972. Other issues might be fudged if simplicity's price
in embarrassment is too high, as with the question of a state for the
Palestinian Arabs in the Camp David Accords of September 1978,
another well-known formula. Others might be omitted altogether, as
with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) in
the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms produced
at the end of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in May 1972.
Whichever strategy is employed will depend on the priorities of the
moment and the nature of the external pressure on the parties. It was,
for example, unnecessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to
fudge, or pretend to have made progress on MIRVs in SALT I since nei-
ther party was under overwhelming pressure on this particular score.