International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908

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International Journal of Drug Policy

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Research Paper

The socio-economic context of entry and exit from retail drug dealing:
Exploring the narratives of Nigerian dealers
Ediomo-Ubong E. Nelson a,b,∗
a
Global Drug Policy Observatory, Swansea University, United Kingdom
b
Centre for Research and Information on Substance Abuse, Nigeria

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Key words: Background: There is a significant body of research that shows how economic decline, poor livelihood conditions
Drug policy and limited employment opportunities influence entry into retail drug distribution. Available research, however,
Human rights neglects the lived experiences and accounts of these dynamics and how they inform exit from the trade, especially
Retail drug distribution
in African countries. This study explores the socio-economic context of entry and exit from retail drug distribution
Sustainable development goals
in Nigeria.
Methods: Data were gathered through in-depth interviews with 31 male retail drug dealers (aged 26-45 years)
in Uyo, Nigeria. They were recruited via snowball sampling from diverse drug networks in the city. Recorded
interviews were transcribed verbatim, and a framework approach was applied to code and analyse the data.
Results: Most participants took up retail drug trade as a means of income generation under difficult socio-
economic conditions. Others entered the trade as part of a youthful search for social autonomy or to pursue
entrepreneurial opportunities, although economic conditions formed the wider backdrop of their choices. Partic-
ipants’ social networks, including friends and relations, facilitated their entry into drug trade through linkages
to suppliers. For many, the drug trade was seen as offering limited scope for social and economic mobility. This
made them to aspire to quit the trade, with some seeing it as a pathway to legitimate livelihoods. Exit prospects
were constrained by limited social support and entrenchment in the drug economy.
Conclusions: Since socio-economic conditions are central to both entry and exit from drug trade, these should form
the focus of policies addressing retail drug distribution. A development-based approach to policy that seeks to
guarantee social and economic rights through the realization of key sustainable development goals offer potential
to curb retail drug distribution in Nigeria.

Introduction
A significant body of research has shown how involvement in
low-level drug distribution is shaped by the imperatives of depen-
dent drug use and day-to-day survival in the context of extreme ur-
ban poverty (Bretteville-Jensen & Sutton, 1996; Cross et al., 2001;
DeBeck et al., 2007; Small et al., 2013; Werb et al., 2008). More specif-
ically, Dunlap et al. (2010) have described how extreme poverty, racial
segregation, family distress and neighbourhood characteristics in inner
cities constrained life chances and opportunities for income generation
so that the residents adopted retail drug distribution, which was already
rampant within families and neighbourhoods, as means of economic
and social capital. Further, econometric studies have shown that retail
drug dealing increases during periods of economic decline (Arkes, 2007;
Levitt & Lochner, 2001; Mocan & Rees, 2005). Economic recession lim-
its the availability of legitimate jobs, making drug dealing more attrac-
tive as a means of income generation (Arkes, 2011). Available research
has, however, neglected the lived experiences and accounts of how poor
socio-economic conditions shape entry into retail drug distribution, and
the dynamics that inform exit from the drug trade. Consequently, there is
a dearth of evidence needed to undergird the call to situate drug policies
in development priorities, especially the UN-driven Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) (Health Policy Action, 2015; Tinasti et al., 2015;
UNDP, 2015).
Drawing on 31 in-depth interviews with male retail drug dealers in
Nigeria, this study explores how socio-economic conditions and social
relations shaped entry into retail drug distribution. It also shows how
limited prospects for realizing social and economic mobility through

∗
Corresponding author at: Centre for Research and Information on Substance Abuse, 84 Aka Itiam Road, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria.
E-mail address: degreatnelson@yahoo.com

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2022.103908

0955-3959/© 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

E.E. Nelson
drug trade, along with the risks and perils imposed by drug policies,
encouraged aspirations to exit the drug trade and move onto legitimate
livelihoods. In doing so, the study will fill gaps in the existing literature,
including the dearth of insights from African states which are often char-
acterized by severe poverty and stark social inequalities, and limited
exploration of exit from retail dealing. Conceptually, previous research
in Africa have explained drug markets in terms of political and moral
economies (Carrier & Klantschnig, 2016; Klantschnig, 2021; McCurdy &
Kaduri, 2016; Vigh, 2017). These studies have highlighted the material
conditions and moral logics that shape and rationalize drugs trade on the
continent. Building on this literature, the current study describes how
material conditions and social relations combine to shape drug market
entry for socially disadvantaged male adults. Below, a description of the
Nigerian drug market and the wider political economic context in which
it is embedded is offered to set up the analysis.
The political and moral economies of illegal drugs in Nigeria
The consumption of prohibited substances in Nigeria has a long
history that stretches back to the pre-independence period. To date
the most comprehensive national-level data on drug use prevalence
comes from the national survey of drug use conducted in 2018. The
survey reported a past year drug use estimated at 14.4% of the adult
population (corresponding to 14.3 million people aged 15-64 years)
(UNODC, 2019). Geographically, the highest past year prevalence of
drug use was found in the southern geopolitical zones, which includes
the south-south zone where the setting of the present study is located.
Cannabis was the most commonly used drug (10.8% or 10.6 million peo-
ple), distantly followed by pharmaceutical opioids such as tramadol and
cough syrup (4.7% or 4.6 million people) (UNODC, 2019). Initially con-
fined to wealthy indigenes and tourists, the drug market has expanded
into lower-income urban groups and some parts of the rural populace
(Klantschning, 2014; Klein, 1999; Ogunsola & Fatusi, 2017).
Nigeria is more a consumer market than a producer country of drugs,
rumours of coca or poppy cultivation notwithstanding (Klein, 2009).
While clandestine laboratories for methamphetamine production have
been discovered in southern parts of the country, production mostly
serves domestic consumer markets (Kane, 2019). For the moment, the
only prohibited drug produced in Nigeria in commercial quantity is
cannabis. The drug crop, which is reported to have been introduced
to the country by ex-service men returning from Asia and North Africa
after the second world war (Asuni, 1964), found a conducive environ-
ment in the tropical climate (Klantschnig, 2014; Obot, 2004), and was
soon exported to Europe and the United States on a scale large enough
to attract official attention (Akyeampong, 2005; Ellis, 2009). A recent
survey conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
found an estimated 8,900 hectares of cannabis in six states in Nigeria
(UNODC, 2022). By supplying foreign markets, in addition to domestic
demand, the cannabis trade has overlapped with the trafficking of other
drugs through West Africa (Allen, 1999).
Although Nigerians had been involved in cannabis smuggling since
the 1960s, involvement in the international drug trade became promi-
nent during the 1980s (Ellis, 2009; Obot, 2004). The period was marked
by rapid economic decline linked to corruption, incompetence of the
civilian government and structural adjustment policies (SAP), which
were largely imposed on African countries as conditionalities for ac-
cessing loans from international financial institutions (Allen, 1999;
Ellis, 2009). The SAP, which entailed drastic reductions in public ex-
penditures and down-sizing of the public sector, plunged many Nigeri-
ans into severe economic difficulties and incentivized illegal economic
activities, which expanded as the state’s regulatory capacity became
weaker (Allen, 1999). Involvement in illegal activities, such as retail
trade in illegal drugs and serving as couriers, morphed into a means of
livelihood in a context of significant declines in employment and real
incomes during the SAP years (Allen, 1999). The period also marked an
increase in the involvement of Nigerians in international drug trafficking
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International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
(Ellis, 2009). The adverse impact of cuts in public budgets on agricul-
tural production via declines in the prices of commodities encouraged
local farmers to resort to cannabis cultivation for income diversifica-
tion (Klantschnig, 2014). To date, drug distribution and consumption
in Nigeria remains entwined with conditions of poverty and social ex-
clusion that characterizes the lives of large segments of the population
(Klein, 2009; Nelson, 2018), and this has only worsened with recent
macro-economic declines.
Since the 1980s, Nigerians have been involved in networks of in-
ternational trafficking of heroin and cocaine, and transit routes have
been developed through West African ports and airports for bulk con-
signments of cocaine and heroin bound for consumer markets in Europe
and North America (Akyeampong, 2005; Ellis, 2009). Nigerian criminal
groups have served as suppliers of couriers (or ‘mules’) for the inter-
national trade, and are credited with inventing the swallow method of
drug smuggling where couriers swallow drugs in condoms and trans-
port them in their bodies across borders (Ellis, 2009). There are entire
networks, operated by Nigerians and other African nationals, which im-
port, repackage and distribute heroin and cocaine from Asia and South
America (Allen, 1999; Klein, 2009). The trafficking of drugs through
Nigeria (and other West African countries) to Europe and North America
has long been of concern to international drug control agencies, which
often view all activities related to the production, distribution and con-
sumption of drugs from the narrow prism of trafficking and are more
concerned about the interests of destination countries of the west than
those of the transit countries of West Africa (Allen, 1999). Often ig-
nored by domestic policy makers and their international partners are
the political-economic conditions that create vulnerability to entry into
illegal drug trade in these transit countries.
The trafficking of illegal drugs through Nigeria, which has been at-
tributed to entrepreneurial ingenuity, widespread poverty and lack of
state and policing capacity (Cockayne & Williams, 2009; UNODC, 2007),
has contributed to the development of domestic markets so that the
country is now a bona fide consumer market, and not just a tran-
sit hub. Felbab-Brown (2010) has described how endemic corruption,
widespread poverty and limited opportunities for social advancement in
Nigeria have created a context where illegal activities are seen as legit-
imate undertakings to secure livelihoods. The trade in illegal drugs op-
erates within this moral economy, seen in many contexts as a legitimate
form of commerce since it involves transactions between willing buy-
ers and sellers (Ellis, 2009). Retail trade in illegal drugs (e.g., cannabis,
heroin, cocaine) serves as a viable means of income generation for many
young Nigerians trapped in a depressed economy. In Nigeria, poverty is
pervasive1 and living conditions are so difficult that any activity that
promises even meagre income for basic survival could be seen as justi-
fiable (Nelson & Tasha, 2021).
Nigeria, a signatory to the three UN conventions that form the basis
of international drug control, has historically relied on repressive mea-
sures in attempt to control the production, distribution and consump-
tion of illegal drugs. The existing legislation provides 10 years prison
sentence for simple possession of an illegal drug and life imprisonment
for cultivation and trafficking. Described as a military-style policy of so-
cial reform, the Nigerian drug law supports punitive law enforcement
including raids on street-level markets by police officers, and arrest of
dealers and users (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Tasha, 2021). Improving the
living conditions of the populace through provision of basic amenities
such as education, healthcare, employment and housing are not pur-
sued with the same enthusiasm, and this perpetuates the very conditions
that create vulnerability to illegal activities (in this case, drug dealing).
On the other hand, drug offenders are rarely detained or charged to
court. They are usually released by police officers upon the offer of bribe
(Nelson, 2018; Nnam et al., 2020). Criminalization of drug consump-
1
An estimated 82.9 million Nigerians live in poverty, according to a 2021
World Bank report.
E.E. Nelson
tion and distribution imposes risks and economic costs on drug dealers
which, often too great to be passed onto users in the form of increased
prices of drugs, could make the drug trade unviable especially for low-
level distributors. This level of the drug market is dominated by youths
and young adults living in conditions of extreme poverty and severe so-
cial marginalization (Nelson, 2018). They bear a disproportionate bur-
den of law enforcement, but access little of the social and economic
benefits of drug trade when compared to traffickers and large-scale dis-
tributors (Gyong & Tanimu, 2010; Williams, 2014). This situation indi-
cates a need to explore the factors that shape entry and exit from retail
drug distribution in Nigeria.
Methods
Research design and setting
The study was designed as a qualitative exploration of retail drug
distribution. The aim was not only to provide information on an under-
researched subject in Nigeria (and West Africa more broadly), but also
to inform appropriate policies. Recruitment of study participants and
data collection lasted for 6 months (November 2019 to April 2020). The
study was conducted in Uyo, the political and administrative capital
of Akwa Ibom State in Nigeria. The city has an estimated population
of 1,143,689 people (World Bank, 2020). It ranks high in poverty, but
low on indices of human development. A large proportion of the pop-
ulation (51%) lives in absolute poverty, which is living on less than
one US dollar per day (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). This trans-
lates into significant social and material deprivation, including inabil-
ity to meet basic subsistence needs (e.g., food, shelter, healthcare) for
a vast majority of people. Urban expansion has provided impetus for
massive in-migration, resulting in a rapidly growing ethnically-diverse
urban population. Population growth has exceeded infrastructural de-
velopment and provision of basic social amenities such as healthcare
services, housing, electricity and safe water supply. The local economy
is characterized by commerce, services and a variety of low-level office,
administrative and salaried positions mostly in the civil service. A large
segment of the city’s population is employed in the informal economy,
where state regulation is conspicuous by its absence and the boundary
between what is legal and illegal is fluid. In this context, a growing num-
ber of people have turned to illegal activities such as drug distribution
to earn income to meet subsistence needs (Nelson & Tasha, 2021).
Participants and sampling
Study participants were male retail distributors. Severe stigma at-
tached to women’s drug use impeded the recruitment of female dealers
(Nelson, 2021). The participants (n=31) where aged 26 to 45 years,
with a mean age of 35 years. Of the 31 participants, 14 were unem-
ployed, 6 were students and 11 were engaged in other (informal) eco-
nomic activities (e.g., carpentry). They retailed different types of drugs,
including crack cocaine (26), heroin (29), Amphetamine-type stimulants
(ATS) (17), cannabis (31) and diverted prescription drugs (27). On av-
erage, the participants had been selling drugs for 16.5 years (range = 3
to 27). Recruitment was through snowball sampling (Noy, 2008), were
participants are asked to refer others who meet the inclusion criteria
and those they refer are also asked to refer others. To be included in the
sample, the individual had to be an active commercially-oriented retail
drug dealer (which means currently retailing illegal drugs for commer-
cial profit at the time of the interviews). Contacts established during
previous researches were used to recruit the first 6 dealers from dif-
ferent networks and locations to generate a more diverse sample. This
improved external validity where representativeness is difficult to deter-
mine due to the fact that the parameters of the population are unknown
(Wright & Decker, 1996). The author is well-known among people who
use or sell drugs in the city because he has been involved in provision
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International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
of services for people who use drugs (PWUD). The participants could
speak with him freely, and this helped to put them at ease.
Interviews and data analysis
Interviews were semi-structured and conducted by the author in a
conversational manner that allowed the participants to respond freely
and openly as well as introduce new themes and concepts. Some of the
topics covered included policing, drug market violence, and entry and
exit from drug trade, which is the focus of the present analysis. In re-
gards to entry and exit, interviews focused on the factors that influenced
drug trade entry, risks and perils of selling drugs, and how and why they
would leave the trade. To improve internal validity, participants were
not asked for names and were assured of the researcher’s confidentiality
and anonymity of responses. Interviews took place at locations chosen
by the participants (e.g., eateries, drop-in centres). The reason was to
maximize their comfort and sense of safety during the interviews. In-
terview sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and responses were
recorded digitally with participants’ consent.
Recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and all identifying
information were removed. Transcripts were cross-checked with the
recorded versions to ensure accuracy. The framework approach was
used for data coding and analysis. This approach is suited for enabling
different aspects of a phenomenon (such as the nuances of drug trade
entry) to be captured (Ritchie et al., 2010). After immersing in the data
and gaining a broad overview of the participants’ responses, the author
developed a ‘coding index’ from initial themes and sub-themes identi-
fied in the data (e.g., livelihood conditions, social autonomy, economic
flair). This was applied to code the data through line by line reading of
each transcript. Following this, thematic charts were created to capture
interpretations of the themes and sub-themes, which were further de-
veloped by working backwards and forwards across each transcript to
make sense of the data, clarify information and select relevant quotes.
Ethical issues
The researcher painstakingly explained the research to potential re-
cruits, and those who took part in the interviews did so based on in-
formed verbal consent. They were given assurance that the interviews
will be confidential and responses will be anonymized. They were reim-
bursed five hundred naira (US$1.31) for their time. Previous researches
and personal experience show that financial incentives stimulate inter-
est in interviews among people who use or sell drugs (see Jacobs, 1996;
Topalli et al., 2002). Ethics approval was obtained from the research
ethics committee of the Ministry of Health, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria
(MH/PRS/101/Vol. IV/269).
Results
Entering retail drug trade
Accounts revealed different social factors that influenced the partic-
ipants’ entry into retail drug distribution. These factors fall into two
broad categories: economic conditions and social networks. Each of
these categories are explored in succession below.
Economic conditions
Precarious livelihood conditions, linked to economic recession and
declining opportunities for gainful employment, was a key economic
factor that shaped entry into retail drug distribution. Participants vari-
ously described how concerns about earning income to meet basic needs
in the context of worsening economic conditions impelled them to take
up retail trade in illegal drugs. This is exemplified by the following com-
ment:
E.E. Nelson
I started selling when I was 17 years old. I have been in this busi-
ness for a long time… The reason I started selling is because of how
condition is. Things are very difficult in this country. You cannot tell
someone give me this or that all the time. You have to earn income
for yourself. So, I decided to do this business to make money so I can
take care of myself.
Persons who migrate from rural areas to urban centres in search of
economic opportunities may turn to illegal alternatives when legitimate
opportunities do not materialize. The drug trade offered a means of in-
come generation for survival for such persons. This is seen in the quote
below, wherein a participant, who relocated to the city after complet-
ing primary school in the village, described how entry into retail drug
trade, facilitated by contacts developed on the streets, offered a means
of livelihood in the context of lack of skills for legitimate employment:
Going to school in the village, I didn’t really have much skilled job.
So, along the line I came to the city and I mixed up with people in
the streets. From hanging out with people in the streets I ventured
into selling of drugs. I have been a dealer for sometimes now.
Retail drug trade also served as a means of economic support for the
participants, in some cases enabling participants to support themselves
through school. A student, who was awaiting resumption of school fol-
lowing a strike action by lecturers, described how proceeds from selling
drugs enabled him to procure the basic things he needs for schooling,
even though he saw the trade as socially unacceptable:
I am still in the University. I suspended my studies because of lack
of finances. I expect to resume when ASUU (Academic Staff Union of
Universities) calls off strike. It is the reason why I am into this thing,
even though I know it is bad. It helped me to like buy my text books
and do other things in school.
Reliance on a trade he recognizes to be illegitimate to meet his
schooling needs shows how illegal activities may be seen as justifiable
under difficult economic conditions. It is important to note that the par-
ticipant in view had earlier suspended studies due to lack of finances. In
this context, drug dealing is justifiable because it enables the attainable
of a legitimate aim that was unattainable due to economic conditions.
Another participant who dropped out of the university due to lack of
financial support to pay tuition fee took up retail drug distribution to
generate income in the hope of one day returning to school. These ex-
amples indicate that retail drug dealing needs to be understood within
the social and economic contexts that shape it.
Interviewer: why did you suspend studies?
Participant: it was because of lack of finances. The money I had be-
fore I gained admission was not enough. At my two hundred level
(i.e., second year in the university), the money that I had was not
enough for me. So, instead of losing the admission that I had worked
at for five years, I decided to suspend studies and venture into some-
thing doing that will give me money to go back to school.
The phrase “instead of losing the admission I had worked at for five
years” highlights how structural constraints on the realization of no-
ble goals could rationalize illegitimate activities. Current drug policies,
however, focuses on these illegitimate activities (drug dealing), ignor-
ing the underlying motivations and the context of structural inequality
that shapes how they are realized. But not all participants were driven
to retail drug trade by poverty and economic necessity. There were also
participants who took to the trade to fulfil a desire for economic inde-
pendence. For example, a participant stated:
I just felt I should start selling it so I can get money. So that I will
not be disturbing my parents about money. Anything I need, I can
just buy from my own money, my pocket money.
Others saw illegal drug trade as an entrepreneurial opportunity.
While some in this category were street-involved young adults from
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International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
poor households, they did not see their involvement in drug trade as
a product of necessity, but as capitalizing on available opportunity to
generate income to meet basic needs. A participant who took advantage
of his presence in drug hotspots, due to lack of skills for employment,
and started selling drugs, stated:
The primary reason was to make money. Cos I was unable to get
a skill. After my secondary school, no body was like come and get
money and do this, go and do that. After sitting down and being idle
for a long time. Cos when you are idle like that you can do a lot of
things. You can go and stay in the bunk from morning till night. So,
like that the life that I was living, you don’t have any money that
is coming into your pocket. Sometimes, there in the bunk you don’t
have any money, but when you arrive there, they will give it to you
freely. Cos those guys there, they just take everybody as the same.
So, the primary reason was to make money because there was an
opportunity there in all the people who are taking drugs.
The ability to recognize and take advantage of an opportunity to
make income from drug trade underlines the entrepreneurial flair of this
participant. This flair, however, has to be seen within the context of his
livelihood conditions at the time, including lack of legitimate employ-
ment and social support. Even his presence in drug hotspots was due
to lack of employment, which shows how opportunities for illegitimate
activities could be the flipside of limited access to legitimate opportu-
nities. Another participant entered the trade because of its profitability,
which offered potential for social mobility (what he called “success”):
There is interest in the business. If you buy something worth one
thousand, you make one thousand, especially if you don’t use it. Then
I noticed that with the interest involved; if you do it well, you will
succeed. So, I went into the business.
The accounts presented in this sub-section shows how economic con-
ditions, including both necessity and a desire for financial autonomy, in-
fluenced entry into retail drug distribution. The accounts highlight how
illegal drug trade is seen as justifiable under prevailing socio-economic
conditions.
Social network
Social network dynamics played a key role in the participants’ en-
try into retail drug trade. In most cases, economic factors operated at
a more remote level while the social networks of the participants were
more proximal influences on drug trade entry. Economic conditions op-
erated as wider structural forces that created vulnerability to taking up
illegal drug trade as a means of income generation. But it was the social
networks of the participants that facilitated their entry into the drug
market. To illustrate, a participant who stated that economic conditions
made him take up drug trade went on to explain the role of social rela-
tionships in his entry into the drug trade:
I got into the business of selling when someone that was in the busi-
ness introduced me to it. When he saw my personal way of living, he
now said come, if you carry this substance and sell it to people you
are going to make some money. You said that you are a good person,
you know how to socialize with people and you know some of these
people that use it. The business is about knowing who is taking it.
You are not going to sell your product to someone who is not using
your product. So, when he introduced me to it, I ventured into it and
I now saw the outcome. It was the outcome that now pushed me into
it. That is, the profit.
In the above quote, the participant indicated that he continued in
the trade because of the profit, a point that circles back to economic
concerns as an underlying determinant. However, it is clear from the
quote that both his entry into the trade and his ability to make sales
depended on his social relationships. This point was corroborated by
E.E. Nelson
other participants, including one who started out with the help of a
friend who employed him as a street peddler:
I had a friend, like before you start something, you will not just start
like that. I had a friend. He was buried last month. So, he used to
give me drugs. When he ties them up, he will give me and I will go to
circus in those days and hang around. People who know me will buy
and when they buy like that I will see that there is interest. Then,
this guy used to give me and I hawked and bring back money to him,
and make some money on top for myself.
In other cases, friends and associates connected participants to a drug
supplier, which enabled them to purchase drugs to retail on the streets.
The threat of police detection and arrest makes drug market actors warry
of initiating transactions with strangers. Would-be dealers, therefore,
leverage social networks to gain access to drug suppliers. A participant
told us:
Someone out there must introduce you to the dealer because it is all
about trust. Like me, someone introduced you to the whole-seller.
When you go to the whole-seller, you carry a certain amount of
money and give to the whole-seller he knows how much substance
you want. So, you will buy from the whole-seller… When he buys
and brings it I go and pick it up.
Another participant described how he tricked a friend of his who
retailed drugs into introducing him to his supplier, which further high-
lights the importance of social leverage in gaining access to drug sup-
plies under conditions of drug criminalization:
When I was in school, my friend used to bring drugs to school to sell.
Then I asked him how did you get it? Since we were moving together,
one day I told him to show me were he gets it. He asked if I wanted
to smoke it, I said yes. I said I wanted to give it to my cousin. He took
me there and I met the person he used to buy from. The person now
knows me. So, from there I started selling and people who knew me
in the neighbourhood will ask if I have it and I will say yes, I do.
Still another participant began retailing drugs by obtaining supply
from a relative who was a major supplier (see Dunlap et al., 2010).
The relationship made it possible for him to obtain supply of drugs,
which he retailed on the streets and used the profit to meet basic needs.
Here again, the participants’ social network mediated the influence of
economic conditions on their entry into drug trade.
What made me enter the business was that my brother-in law brings
it from Benin (one of the major cannabis producing states in Nigeria).
When it arrives, there are customers who get it, and I also get like a
bag and sale and so I can get money to buy food. That one bag can
take up to 3 weeks to finish selling before I buy again.
The participant went on to explain that his relation was also intro-
duced to the drug trade by a friend with the intention that it will serve
as a way to supplement his meagre income so that he could provide ad-
equately for his family. Once again, we see how economic conditions
and social networks interact to shape entry into the drug trade.
Someone introduced my brother in-law into this business. My sister
is married to him and has five children. My in-law does not have
any work. He sells these drugs and also sells dog-meat (a common
delicacy in the southernmost parts of Nigeria) to support. This helps
in raising money for food. His friend introduced him to it so that he
can make money and be able to take care of his family because he
was struggling.
The accounts canvassed in this sub-section shows how social net-
work dynamics (relationships, trust etc.) operated as proximal factors
that facilitated entry into drug trade for individuals who were seeking
a means of income generation to meet subsistence needs under difficult
economic conditions.
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International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
Exiting retail drug trade
Interviews also probed intention to exit the trade in illegal drugs. A
number of participants (18) expressed a desire to leave the trade. They
gave reasons for their intention to exit, with some describing how they
planned to exit. A key reason why participants intended to quit illegal
drug trade was the problems often associated with an illegal activity. For
these participants, there was no future for them in drug trade because
of the risks. Like others, the participant quoted below planned to quit
the trade, after making enough money, because of the volatility of the
drug market due to drug criminalization. He explained:
My plan is that, like the business, it is a drugs game… There is a lot
of problems. When you bring goods and distribute it to your boys
then when they go, the stuff you gave them someone will collect
from them and many souls will go. So, me when I make the money I
want I will lose interest in it. Because it might hang you at the end.
Unlike participants such as the one quoted above, others did not see
a prospect of accumulating wealth from the drug trade. They attributed
this limited prospect to law enforcement problems. While the partici-
pants recognized that the drug trade was lucrative, they explained that
most of the profit from the trade was spent resolving problems with the
police. Street market policing is characterized by corrupt and unlawful
practices, including extortion of drug dealers and users (Nelson, 2018;
Nnam et al., 2020). Dealers frequently get into trouble with police due
in part to snitching, and spend most of their earnings seeking to resolve
these troubles. This shows that law enforcement has a limited effect on
drug market participation through its effect on profits. A participant
who considered expenses on police as wastage explained:
In terms of profit, there is profit. But it involves a lot of wastage.
You can’t really use the money to do anything meaningful. It also
depends on our friends, spies who may sit with us and when they
get up they will say, ‘he will not sell’. They will call police on you.
When it is like that, you are a target. When you are a dealer, you
have to always be ready. You won’t use the money to do something
good. When they arrest customers, you will go and bail them. Like
they can arrest five people at your place. You will have to contribute
money so that they can be bailed. When you look at all that, it is a lot
of waste. That is why people don’t use the money to do something.
That is why I don’t want to continue long in this business.
The above quote highlights important dynamics in the Nigerian
street drug markets. First, the spies who say “he will not sell” are users
who act as snitches for police officers (Nelson, 2018). Snitches could
undermine drug trade through their role in facilitating police raids on
hotspots. Another issue highlighted in the quote is police extortion in
the form of ransom payments to police officers for persons arrested at
drug hotspots. This payment, popularly referred to as ‘bail’ in Nigeria,
is extortionary and illegal since administrative bail is free according to
section 35 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999).
Loss of income due to ransom payments to police officers could disin-
centivize retail drug dealing.
Another participant similarly described how repeated police raids
and arrest may cause dealers to spend excessively thereby under-cutting
their profits. For this reason, he too did not intend to stay long in the
trade. Accounts emphasized that it is the financial consequences of po-
lice raids (e.g., extortion through bribes and ransom payments) that dis-
incentivized the drug trade. In the participant’s words:
Sometimes, in a month police can enter up to seven times and my in-
law will spend money up to N15, 000 (US$35.22) to bail each person.
Last year they arrested people and took them to the station. He paid
N5,000 (US$11.74) for bail for each person. My in-law escaped and
they didn’t catch him. It was my sister who took the money and went
and bailed them, including innocent tenants. Police officers who are
E.E. Nelson
looking for promotion, when they catch you with exhibit like that.
That is why I don’t want to stay long in this business.
As an exit plan, most participants intended to build up savings which
they could invest in legitimate economic activities as an alternative to
the drug trade. For example:
Interviewer: How do you intend to leave the trade?
Participant: I have a plan that will make me leave the business of
selling drugs. I decided that at the end of the month I will not sell
drugs again. Once I get enough money to start the oil business I will
stop. I want to sell engine-oil2 by the road-side.
Another participant, who had dropped out of school due to lack of
support, planned in the long term to go back and complete schooling.
In the interim, he intended to use the tech skills he has learned to earn
income as an alternative to selling drugs.
Interviewer: So, what are your plans for the future? Do you still want
to continue selling drugs?
Participant: No, I don’t want to continue selling. Perfectly, I don’t
want to continue selling because I know the stresses, the risks that I
do take in selling. The risk is so much. So, my plan is to finish school
from where I stopped. I have been learning some skills presently.
I have some skills now. So, I won’t think of going back to selling
anymore. I have some skills to use to make some small money.
For yet another participant, the exit plan involved learning a legit-
imate trade (barbering). The actualization of the plan, however, de-
pended on the support of his relations. This suggests that social networks
could also play a role in exit from retail drug trade.
I have plans to do something else. This year is when I wanted to start
learning barbering. So, my sister has given me N5,000 (US$11.74)
to add but it was not enough. My in-law had promised that when he
returns from market whatever is left he will give me. When I start
the work, I will not be in the business anymore. In the morning, I
will go to work. I will not have the time to sell it anymore. My sister
will not allow me.
On the other hand, some dealers may become deeply entrenched in
the trade that they cannot leave it. Participants explained that this situ-
ation could be due to diverse factors, including the fact that dealers may
have grown accustomed to the profit and the lifestyle. Others attributed
this to lack of alternative means of livelihood, and still others to lack
of social support to make the transition. The following quote sums up
these views:
Sometimes you do find out that people that are selling it, it is so
difficult for them to go into something else. For someone that has
been selling it for say fifteen to twenty years. Maybe such person
is being caught by the authorities for a while, and maybe put in
detention, and released latter. If God is not by his side or someone
really there to push him into want he wants to do, such a person will
find himself falling back to the selling of it. The fun, the enjoyment
of taking something and going into the streets and you’ve made a lot
of money might go to the person’s head and he might not want to
get out of it.
Taken together, the participants who indicated a willingness to exit
the drug trade intended to do so because of the risks and dangers asso-
ciated with the trade. Some had developed plans to enable them transit
from the drug trade to legitimate economic activities. But this depended
2
This refers to engine lubricant (consisting of base oils and additives such
as dispersants) used to lubricate internal combustion engines. Engine lubricants
are often sold by the road-side to motorists. It is a legitimate economic activity
in Nigerian cities.
6
International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
among other things on the existence of social support and the availabil-
ity of viable alternatives.
Discussion
Studies have reported how conditions of poverty and social marginal-
ization shape involvement in retail drug distribution (Bretteville, Jensen
& Sutton, 1996; Cross et al., 2001; DeBeck et al., 2007; Werb et al.,
2008). More specifically, retail drug dealing has been shown to be a
means of securing livelihoods amidst limited opportunities for employ-
ment and economic decline (Arkes, 2007; 2011; Dunlap et al., 2010).
Building on this literature, this study shows how livelihood conditions in
a low-income African country shapes entry into retail drug distribution
for socially disadvantaged males. The study develops previous research
further by showing how material conditions linked with social relations
in shaping drug market entry, and how limited scope for the realization
of social and economic mobility through the trade, along with the risks
and perils associated with drug criminalization, encouraged some to as-
pire to exit the drug trade and transit onto alternative livelihoods. The
major limitations of the study are the small sample size and the absence
of female perspectives.
Corroborating research by Arkes (2007, 2011) and
Dunlap et al. (2010)), this study shows that livelihood conditions
in Nigeria, characterized by economic decline, widespread poverty and
limited employment opportunities, are major structural factors shaping
entry into retail drug distribution. Existing studies from Nigeria and
elsewhere in Africa have conceptualized drug trade as operating within
moral economies. Klantschnig and Dele-Adedeji (2021) showed that, in
contrast to its categorization as an illegal activity by policy actors, drug
sellers often rationalized their activities in moral and economic terms.
Vigh (2017) explored the moral evaluations that uphold the cocaine
trade in popular imaginations in Guinea-Bissau, particularly how
earnings from the trade could enable men to attain moral and social
personhood under conditions of masculine retrenchment. The findings
of this study do not lend themselves to strictly moral interpretations of
drug trade. They, however, corroborate these studies by showing how
retail drug trade, though known to be illegal, is considered justifiable
within the context of economic decline and poor livelihood conditions
in contemporary Nigeria.
The findings further depart from a purely moral economic under-
standing since, as some of the accounts presented here have shown,
drug market entry was not always strictly the product of constraints
imposed by socioeconomic conditions. In a number of cases, the deci-
sion to enter retail trade in illegal drugs was part of a youthful search
for social and economic autonomy or a reflection of the participants’
entrepreneurial ingenuity. Although livelihood concerns were not to-
tally absent, these accounts go beyond economics to show how earning
income through retail drug trade could enable youths to realize aspira-
tions to social autonomy, which is undermined by their dependence on
their parents and guardians for their needs. In this sense, the findings
resonate with Vigh’s (2017) ethnographic work on the cocaine trade
in Guinea-Bissau, which I mentioned earlier. They, however, provide an
important nuance to the literature on retail drug trade under poor socio-
economic conditions. Specifically, they highlight the dealers’ agency and
capacity for choice, even though these choices were often made from a
structurally constrained menu of options. This has a significant impli-
cation for drug policy. It suggests that drug dealers could choose le-
gitimate alternatives to illegal trade if such choices are made available
to them.
The findings reported here portrays economic conditions as operat-
ing more remotely to shape young people’s decisions to enter the retail
trade in illegal drugs. Unemployment, poverty and social marginaliza-
tion featured in the accounts presented here as wider structural influ-
ences on young people’s livelihood decisions. Conversely, their social
relationships served as the more immediate facilitators of drug mar-
ket entry. Put differently, while the participants decided to sell drugs
E.E. Nelson
as a means of generating income to provide for their livelihoods, their
ability to obtain supplies of drugs and to sell them depended on their
social networks. Dunlap et al. (2010) have shown how socially disad-
vantaged inner-city residents were introduced to drug trade by family
members as a means of social and economic capital in the context of
poverty, neighbourhood segregation and limited employment oppor-
tunities. Similar to Dunlap et al. (2010) study, the findings presented
here suggests that retail trade entry is not only shaped by political eco-
nomic forces, but also by social relations. In other words, participation
in retail drug distribution is not solely the product of economic fac-
tors but reflects the different ways economic conditions and social rela-
tions interact to shape the livelihood choices of socially disadvantaged
Nigerian men.
An important difference between this study and previous researches
on retail drug trade is that it investigated both entry and exit. The find-
ings showed that most of the dealers wanted to exit drug trade. This is
an important finding, which offers critical scope for policies that focus
on the retail-level of the drug market. Limited prospects for achieving
economic advancement due to the risks and perils of dealing drugs in
a context of criminalization was a major reason for the participants’ in-
terest in exiting the trade. The participants entered retail drug trade to
achieve socio-economic mobility; they wanted to leave because the trade
was fraught with perils but offered limited scope for the realization of
their aspirations. Although policing contributed to disincentivizing drug
dealing, its effect was limited due to lack of viable alternatives. Offer-
ing opportunities for economic advancement and social inclusion could
provide leverage for exiting drug trade. But instead of adopting a devel-
opment approach to drug policy, the Nigerian state remains fixated on a
failed war on drugs that, going by available evidence, have not reduced
the availability and consumption of drugs (Klein, 1999; Nelson, 2018).
These considerations are significant because the findings also show that
the absence of viable alternatives to drug trade and lack of support to
transition to legitimate employments are key impediments to exiting
the drug trade. A development-centered approach to drug policy that
focuses on improving livelihood conditions for socially disadvantaged
men could produce better outcomes than current policies, which would
only perpetuate the conditions that drove these men into drug trade in
the first places
Conclusion
This study has shown how macro-structural factors, including poor
livelihood conditions and limited opportunities for legitimate employ-
ment, intersects with social relations to shape entry into retail drug dis-
tribution among socially disadvantaged Nigerian men. Drug trade entry
was a product of structurally-constrained choices made based on aspi-
rations to social and economic mobility, and the limited prospects of
realizing these aspirations due to risks imposed by drug criminalization
made alternative choices (that of exit) desirable. Socioeconomic condi-
tions are central to both entry and exit from drug trade; they should form
the focus of policies addressing retail drug distribution. The findings sug-
gest a need for drug policies that are development-centered and address
human rights issues, including social and economic rights. In this con-
text, securing the sustainable development goals of ending poverty, edu-
cation, work and economic growth, and reduction of inequalities could
reduce vulnerability to entry into drug distribution by expanding op-
tions for legitimate livelihoods available to the socially disadvantaged.
This calls for linkages between drug control policy and social policies
and programmes designed to improve the livelihood conditions of Nige-
rians, including poverty reduction programmes that provide access to
interest-free loans for micro enterprises, scholarships schemes, job cre-
ation and measures to improve equity in access to employment oppor-
tunities. A development-centered and human rights-based approach to
illegal drug control offers greater potential to curtail retail drug distribu-
tion than the narrow focus on prohibition that dominates current drug
policy in Nigeria
7
International Journal of Drug Policy 111 (2023) 103908
Author Contribution Statement
Ediomo-Ubong E. Nelson is responsible for data collection, analysis,
writing and revision of this paper.
Declaration of Ethics
Have you obtained ethical approval for the conduct of your study?
Yes.
Conflioct of interests
None.
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