Three Essays On Trade Barriers and Trade Volumes

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Three Essays on
Trade Barriers and Trade Volumes
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor o f Philosophy in
Economics
by
Johannes Moenius
Committee in charge:
Professor James E. Rauch, Chair

Professor Roger E. Bohn
Professor John Conlisk
Professor Elisabeth R. Gerber
Professor Clive W.J. Granger
2000
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Copyright
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The Dissertation of Johannes Moenius is approved, and
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Jolw* Oo^lisk
Chair
University o f California, San Diego
2000
iii
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To my parents
iv
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Signature Page................................................................................................... iii

Dedication.......................................................................................................... iv
Table of Contents............................................................................................. v
List o f Symbols................................................................................................. vii
List o f Figures................................................................................................... ix
List o f Tables..................................................................................................... x
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................... xii
Vita and Publications........................................................................................ xiii
Abstract.............................................................................................................. xiv
I. Trade Barriers andThe Volatility o f Comparative Advantage 1
1. Introduction.................................................................................... 2
2. Volatility and Openness in the Quality LaddersM odel 4
2.1 The Benefits of International TechnologicalLeadership .... 5
2.2 The Research Contest.............................................................. 7
2.3 Equilibrium Relative Research Effort................................... 11
2.4 The Transition Probabliiities.................................................. 13
2.5 The Volatility of Import Penetration..................................... 14
2.6 Constructing the Volatility and OpennessMeasures 16
3. Data Description........................................................................... 18
4. Regression Analysis...................................................................... 21
4.1 Regression Analysis with Time Aggregated Data............... 21
4.2 Regression Analysis with Annual Volatility M easures 24
5. Conclusion.................................................................................... 27
References............................................................................................. 37
II. The BISTAN Technical Reference M anual...................................... 40
1. Introduction................................................................................... 41
2. Content o f the Data Set................................................................. 44
3. Content o f the Perinorm Database................................................ 48
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4. Remarks on Data-Retrieval Procedures...................................... 49
5. Some Final Comments.................................................................. 57
Appendix A: Summary Statistics....................................................... 61
Appendix B: Data Retrieval................................................................ 73
Appendix C: Concordances and Concatenation............................... 77
Appendix D: Links between Documents.......................................... 90
References............................................................................................. 92
III. Information Versus Product Adaptation: The Role o f Standards in
Trade..................................................................................................... 94
1. Introduction.................................................................................... 95
2. Theoretical Framework................................................................ 97
2.1 What are Standards?............................................................... 98
2.2 Previous Research................................................................... 100
3. Empirical Specifications.............................................................. 104
4. Data Description........................................................................... 106
5. Estimation R esults........................................................................ 109
5.1 Shared Standards and Trade Volumes.................................. 109
5.2 Estimation Results for the Import Equation........................ 113
6. Reconciling the Evidence with Economic T heory................... 114
7. Concluding Remarks.................................................................... 119
Appendix A: T ables............................................................................. 120
Appendix B: Data Construction......................................................... 131
References............................................................................................. 133
vi

LIST OF SYMBOLS
a constant in estimation
a, industry fixed effect
P estimation parameter
7. time fixed effect
e Error term
S Indicator variable
X Profit margin o f the technological leader
Cost parameter o f the research contest
n Total Profits from an innovation
CT Standard deviation
e Cost parameter of the research contest
B Per Period operating profits
b, Expenditure share on product j

c Index o f countries
CSTE Country specific standards o f the exporter
CSTI Country specific standards o f the importer
D Trade barriers
Dkt Four-digit industry time fixed effect
E Expenditure
F Freight charges
F,, Country-pair industry fixed effect

G, Number of differentiated products in industry j
IMj Imports, inclusive of trade costs
j Industry index
kc number o f differentiated products manufactured in country c
M Number o f countries

N Global number of researchers on a particular product
n; Number o f researchers in industry j
P Probability
R Relative Market Size
Sc Expenditure share on all country c producers
SST Shared Standards
T Tariff charges
t Time period
V Volume o f Trade
Var Variance
Vol Volatility measure
Xj Exports o f industry j, net o f trade costs
Yj Value of industry j output
viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Links between Documents in a Specific Industry and Year for

Germany and S pain ............................................................................. 90
Figure 2: How Links between Documents Were Found................................... 91
ix

LIST OF TABLES
Chapter I
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics...................................................................................... 28
Table 1.2: Regressions Comparing the Alternative Measures o f Openness 29
Table 1.3: Regression Analysis with Time Aggregation into Four-Year Periods 30
Table 1.4: Regressions with Alternative Definitions o f Hi-Tech Industries.... 31
Table 1.5: Regression Analysis with Time Aggregation over the Entire Sample 32
Table 1.6: Pooled Regression Results with Annual Volatility Measures and
the Trade Flow Measure o f Openness..................................................... 33
Table 1.7: Industry-Level Regressions with the Trade Flow Measure

of Openness................................................................................................ 34
Table 1.8: Pooled Regression Results with Annual Volatility Measures and
the Tariff Measure o f Openness............................................................... 35
Table 1.9: Industry-Level Regressions with the Tariff Measure o f Openness. 36
Chapter II
Table II. 1: The Content o f the BIST AN Data-table.................................................... 61
Table II.2: Countries and Documents in the PERINORM Database........................ 62
Table II.3: Types o f Documents by Country............................................................... 63
Table II.4: Counts o f Documents by 2-digit SITC and Country................................ 64
Table II.5: Entries into PERINORM by Year and Country....................................... 67
Table II.6: Types of International Links by 2-digit SITC (with Total Counts) 69
Table II.7a: Analysis o f Variance o f the Log o f Shared Standards for

Five European Countries.......................................................................... 71
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Table II.7b: Analysis of Variance o f the Log o f Shared Standards
for all Countries in the Sample........................................................... 72
Table II.8: Content of the PERINORM Database................................................ 73
Table II.9: Missing Values and Recovery Statistics by Variable........................ 75
Table II. 10: Previous and Consecutive Documents by Country........................... 76
Table II. 11: The PERINORM Classifications and there unique counterparts.... 77
Table II. 12: Matching ICS with SITC...................................................................... 78
Chapter III
Table III. 1: Predictions o f the Theoretical Literature............................................ 120
Table III.2: Countries and Number o f Documents in the PERINORM Database 121
Table III.3: Regression Analysis: Trade Volumes on Shared Standards:

the Basic Relationship......................................................................... 122
Table III.4: Number of Shared Standards by Country in 1993 ............................ 123
Table III.5a: Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect o f Shared Standards

on Trade Volumes............................................................................... 124
Table III.5b: Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect o f Trade Volumes

on Shared Standards............................................................................ 125
Table III.6a: Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect o f Shared Standards

on Trade Volumes............................................................................... 126
Table III.6b: Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect o f Trade Volumes

on Shared Standards............................................................................ 127
Table III.7: Regression Analysis: Imports on Shared and Country-Specific

Standards: the Basic Relationship..................................................... 128
Table III.8: Regression Analysis: Imports on Standards by Industry.................. 129
Table III.9: Imports on Standards interacting with Country Size........................ 130
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A doctoral dissertation cannot be written without input from others. First and
foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Jim Rauch, for his guidance and full
support o f my work. Although his student explored numerous other paths parallel to
the road that would have lead directly to finishing this dissertation, he always had an
open door and advice when it was needed.
David Riker, who co-authored the first chapter, introduced me to the fascination o f the
research in the field of international trade. He spend uncounted hours o f discussion
with me, shaping my way of thinking and understanding of the field probably more
than anyone and anything else.
Many others influenced my work in discussions and written comments. Amongst
others, I would like to thank my other committee members, Roger Bohn, John
Conlisk, Elisabeth Gerber and Clive Granger for the discussions and the helpful input
they provided. Martha Stacklin has corrected my English in the second chapter.
Finally, without the full support o f friends and family, this road would have been
considerably harder to travel. Marge and Gene Plante have provided shelter in any
kind o f difficult situation that occurred. Many others helped me to not forget that there
is a life outside of the department. And o f course, my parents have undertaken all
possible effort to support their son from the first days o f his education to the very last.
This is why this work has been dedicated to them.
xii

VITA
1987 - 94 Information Technology Consultant
1988 - 89 Software-Trainer, Bamberg, Germany
1992 Dipl.-Kfm., Bamberg University, Germany
1992 - 94 Lecturer at the Institute o f Economic Policy Research at the Technical

University of Dresden and Bamberg University, Germany
1994 - 1999 Teaching and research assistant at the Economics Departments o f

Queen’s University, Canada, and the University o f California, San
Diego
1995 M.A., Queen's University, Kingston, Canada
1999 Summer Associate, McKinsey and Company, Munich, Germany
2000 Ph.D., University o f California, San Diego
PUBLICATIONS
"Sunk Costs and Economic Policy" (with U. Blum), WiST January 1998 (in German)
"Economic Perspectives of Saxony" (with U.Blum, M. Greiner, and R. Oberthur),

Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Technischen Universitat Dresden 45 Heft 4 1996, p.
37-42 (in G erm an).
Macro-Library fo r MS-WORD 4.0/5.0 (with J. Kirschbaum), Verlag Markt & Technik,

Haar bei Munchen 1990 (in German)
“ The Innovative Potential o f the Region around Bamberg” (with U. Blum, F.

Leibbrand, and A. Muller) Volkswirtschaftliche Beitrage der Universitat Bamberg
1989 (in German)
xiii
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Three Essays on
Trade Barriers and Trade Volumes
by
Johannes Moenius
Doctor o f Philosophy in Economics
University o f California, San Diego, 2000
Professor James E. Rauch, Chair
The dissertation's focus is on trade barriers and their effects on first and second
moments of trade-related measures. The first essay empirically investigates the link
between the level o f trade barriers and its effect on the volatility o f market shares. The
second essay describes the construction o f an international data set for product specifi
cations, standards, which are often claimed to act as a technical barrier to trade. The
final essay uses a gravity model to determine the effects standards on trade.
The theory developed by Grossman and Helpman suggests that with trade bar
riers decreasing, the volatility o f market shares should be increasing due to more fre
quent innovation. Lower trade barriers make individual researchers perceive a larger
market with higher innovation rents and therefore higher incentives to participate in
the race. Since researchers are spread out over different countries, market shares
xiv

should switch across borders more frequently. The empirical results from panel-data
estimation support this theoretical assertion impressively.
Conventional wisdom suggests that lower trade barriers should ceteris paribus
be correlated with higher trade volumes. One type o f technical barrier to trade is dif
fering standards for goods, especially if these goods need complementary products. A
prominent example is the German-produced coffee-maker, operating at 220 Volts, that
needs to be adapted to operate at 110 Volts if exported to the US, thereby incurring
costs o f modification. A database was created that contains annual data on total counts
o f standards as well as bilaterally shared standards in 16 countries and 471 SITC
industries from 1965 - 1998.
This data set was combined with trade-data. Then the effects o f standards on
trade were estimated using a gravity model. The analysis shows that harmonization of
standards promotes trade. It also reveals that goods specifications that differ between
countries are only a barrier to trade for simple products, while for complex manufac
tured products they seem to promote trade. The evidence suggests that the reduction of
variety and provision of information that arises from the use of standards in the im
porting country reduces the costs for exporters to adapt their products to foreign mar
kets and therefore promote trade.
xv

Chapter I
Trade Barriers and the Volatility of
Comparative Advantage
Johannes Moenius
David Riker
Charles River Associates, Washington
August 1999
ABSTRACT
We examine the empirical relevance o f the Quality Ladders model of
Grossman and Helpman (1991). In our econometric analysis o f the U.S. manufactur
ing sector, we confirm the model’s prediction that the volatility o f industry-level
import penetration ratios is greater in industries where barriers to trade are relatively
low (and therefore product markets are more fully integrated). The predicted correla
tion is greater in magnitude and in statistical significance for relatively R&D-intensive
industries. The empirical results are robust to alternative measures of trade barriers
and alternative measures o f volatility.
Corresponding author: J. Moenius, Department o f Economics, UCSD, 9500

Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0508. We would like to thank John Conlisk,
Graham Elliott, Robert Feenstra, Elizabeth Gerber, James Rauch, an anonymous
referee, and participants at the 1998 EIIT Conference at Purdue University for helpful
comments. All remaining errors are our own.

2
1. Introduction
The Quality Ladders model o f Grossman and Helpman (1991) relates techno
logical innovation to international trade. The model predicts that open economies will
typically grow more rapidly than closed economies. The model also implies “turbu
lence” in the pattern o f comparative advantage, as technological innovations shift the
pattern o f production between firms and possibly across borders (Grossman and
Helpman, 1995). Lower barriers to trade imply a larger product market for innova
tions, which motivates a greater amount o f research effort. The implication is that we
should observe more frequent changes in technological leadership and comparative
advantage in industries with lower barriers to trade. We focus on this turbulence
effect.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the empirical relevance of
Grossman and Helpman’s model. In doing so, we contribute to an empirical literature
that addresses the theory from a number o f directions. A series o f interesting papers,
including Edwards (1992) and Harrison (1996), investigate the empirical relationship
between a country’s openness to trade and its growth rate. These studies provide evi
dence that growth and openness are positively correlated across countries, though they
recognize that trade and innovation theories are not the unique explanation of this cor
relation. Other papers focus on specific aspects o f the link between trade and innova
tion. Coe and Helpman (1995) document evidence of international technological
spillovers. They examine how a country’s productivity level depends on its cumula
tive R&D spending as well as an import-weighted sum o f its trade partners’ cumula

3
tive R&D spending. Gagnon and Rose (1995) examine the persistence of industry-
level trade balances and find no support for product cycle models o f trade. Proudman
and Redding (1997) examine fluctuations in the export patterns of the United King
dom and Germany. They find that there is a surprising amount o f fluctuation in the
sectoral pattern of trade, which they interpret as evidence of international technologi
cal transfer.
As a complement to these empirical approaches, we test the implications o f the
trade and innovation models for the volatility o f import penetration ratios. Our meth
odology is similar to Razin and Rose (1994). That study documents an empirical link
between openness and the volatility of aggregate production, consumption, and
investment at business cycle frequencies. Razin and Rose do not include measures o f
technological innovation in their analysis. On the other hand, our analysis focuses on
the volatility o f industry-level trade and production data. Using more disaggregated
data, we allow for heterogeneity across industries with different R&D intensities. In
this way, our empirical analysis addresses the theory of endogenous technological
innovation.
First, we derive the model’s prediction that the volatility o f import penetration
ratios is lower in industries with relatively large barriers to trade. The intuition is
straightforward: lower barriers to trade increase the effective market for an innovation
and thereby increase the innovation rate. Suppose instead that international fluctua
tions in comparative advantage were driven by exogenous shocks to relative produc
tion costs that are unrelated to market size (e.g., shifts in factor endowments, produc-

tivity, or both). In this alternative scenario, there would be no relationship between
effective market size (defined in part by barriers to trade) and the volatility o f trade
flows.
We test this theoretical prediction using an assortment o f measures o f volatility
and openness. Overall, we find that the model fits the data reasonably well. The
empirical link between openness and the volatility of import shares is typically
stronger for industries in which expenditures on research and the development o f new
technologies are a relatively large share o f the value of the industry’s output.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we extend the Quality
Ladders model to relate openness to imports to the volatility o f industry-level import
penetration ratios. Following this theoretical derivation, we describe our volatility and
openness measures and the data set that we analyzed. Finally, we present our main
empirical results and discuss their robustness.
2. Volatility and Openness in the Quality Ladders Model
We extend the Quality Ladders model o f Grossman and Helpman (1991a, b, c)
to provide a framework for our empirical analysis. First, we describe the factors that
determine the profitability o f technological leadership in an open economy. Next, we
define the costs and productivity of research efforts. In the following section, we
derive the equilibrium research efforts in each country and the implied probability of
an international shift in comparative advantage. From these results, we derive the
implied volatility o f industry-level import penetration ratios. Finally, we describe the

5
theory-based formulas that we use to construct the variables in the empirical specifi
cation.
2.1 The Benefits oflntemational Technological Leadership
Consider a world with M countries. The countries trade a wide range o f differ
entiated products. We group these products into industries and assume that industry j
is composed o f G j symmetrically differentiated products. Consumers in all countries
have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences. They spend a constant share o f their total
expenditure, b j , on each product in industry j .
There is complete international specialization in the production o f each differ
entiated product. Since each consumer purchases all o f the varieties, there is intra
industry trade between the countries. The level o f aggregate consumption expenditure
in country c in period t is labeled E f . Global expenditure on a particular good that is
produced in country c is equal to b j E ct E ‘tDj, . The term b j is the constant
expenditure share o f product j, and the term Z)“ e (0,1) denotes barriers to industry j
exports from country c to country i. D " is an export discount factor that is decreasing
in the tariff rate as well as any shipping costs. These barriers to trade are represented
by ad valorem charges. For example, if the only barriers to trade are tariff charges T ‘‘
and freight charges F f , then the export discount factor is

6
f 7 1f / )
To simplify the model, we assume that the export discount factor is time-varying and
industry specific but is otherwise identical for all exports from each country (i.e., we
assume that D “ = D cjt for all i * c ) .
Each product is manufactured using labor and a proprietary technology. The
unit labor requirements are invariant to the scale o f production but vary across firms
according to their proprietary technologies. We assume that there is wage equalization
across the two countries, as is the case in the general equilibrium models o f Grossman
and Helpman (1991a).1
There is a unique technological leader who produces each good. This leader
has a cost advantage over potential rivals in both countries: the leader’s marginal costs
of production are a fixed fraction (/ - A j) o f the costs o f his or her rivals, with
Aj e (0,1). The technological leader maintains a monopoly by limit pricing potential
competitors. The leader’s price is a shade below the marginal cost of the leader’s
closest rival. Given its cost advantage and its limit pricing strategy, the leader’s profit
margin per unit is a share Aj of this limit price.
1 To minimize the exposition o f the theoretical framework, we do not re-derive the general
equilibrium setting o f Grossman and Helpman (1991a). Instead, we simply derive the volatility
implications o f their theory.

7
The benefits o f technological leadership are defined in equation [2]. B jct is the
per-period manufacturing profits of the technological leader o f a product line in
industry j . 2
[2 ]
Equation [2] applies when the monopolist produces the good in country c. This simple
expression for manufacturing profits reflects the limit pricing strategy and the Cobb-
Douglas preferences that we have assumed. It also reflects an assumption that barriers
to trade restrict the effective size of the global market but do not block the export
competitiveness of the technological leader. Therefore, the technology leader o f each
differentiated good supplies the market in all o f the countries. This is the case if and
only if 1 - A j < D cjt ?
2.2 The Research Contest
At each point in time, firms in country c manufacture the differentiated pro
ducts in which they have a technological advantage relative to foreign producers. The
set of goods produced in each country fluctuates over time with shifts in technological
leadership. Technological advantage in producing each good is the outcome o f a
2 Unlike total profits, manufacturing profits do not reflect the cost o f research and
development.
3 This simplifying restriction is not essential to the qualitative implications o f the model. The
inequality is satisfied in the Grossman and Helpman model, since there are no barriers to trade.

research contest that is international in scope but specific to each product line within
each industry.
The probability of an international shift in comparative advantage depends on
the entry decisions o f researchers. In country c in period /, n jct researchers attempt to
create innovative improvements in the production processes in industry j . Since the
Gj differentiated goods within industry j are symmetric, the researchers distribute
their innovative efforts evenly across the differentiated product lines.
The research contest takes the form of a lottery with costly entry and a random
outcome. We assume that the research costs of potential innovators are 0 j t (njt Y in
country c. 0jt is a positive constant. A positive value o f the cost parameter //
reflects country- and industry-specific resource scarcity, e.g., an upward-sloping sup
ply curve for scientists with industry-specific skills. In contrast, a negative value o f
the cost parameter fu reflects the dominance of country- and industry-specific external
economies o f scale in research. The sign o f this parameter, which is ambiguous in the
theoretical model, is implicitly estimated in the empirical analysis below.
Following Grossman and Helpman, we assume that research costs are the same
for the incumbent leader and for new entrants in the same country. While this assump
tion of identical research costs is certainly restrictive, and not entirely realistic, it is a

9
standard feature in the Quality Ladders model.4 One justification for this assumption
is that there are important knowledge spillovers in the research sector. If previous
innovations are public rather than proprietary knowledge, then the incumbent techno
logical leader does not have an advantage in subsequent innovation.
The main consequence o f identical research costs (within each country) is that
the net benefits from innovation are always lower for the incumbent technological
leader. A leader’s innovations increase its manufacturing profit margin from A}
to / - (/ - Aj )*’ , while innovations of a non-leader increase its manufacturing profit
margins from zero to A j. The increase is greater for non-leaders. If the expected
profits from research are zero for potential entrants (i.e., non-leaders), then they are
strictly negative for an incumbent who engages in research. Therefore, it is never
profitable for the incumbent to attempt to innovate. In this case, the pattern o f com
parative advantage fluctuates over time but is independent o f the history of techno
logical leadership (i.e., it is not path-dependant).
The prize of the research contest is a process innovation that confers techno
logical leadership in manufacturing a particular product line (i.e., a variety within
industry j). The global number of researchers that concentrate on a particular product
4 In contrast, if only the incumbent technological leader conducted research, then there would
be no volatility in the pattern o f production or in the import penetration ratio. This case can be viewed
as an observationally distinct alternative to our model - an alternative that the empirical evidence
rejects.

10
line is N j( = , where / is an index of countries. The probability that an innova
tion occurs each period is an increasing function of the global number of researchers
working on the particular product line. This probability is represented by
With probability none of the researchers working on a particular product
line is successful. However, if there is an innovation, only one researcher gains tech-
nological leadership.5 There are constant returns to scale in research effort in expec-
tation, and each researcher (i.e., each unit of research effort) has an equal chance o f
generating a successful innovation. The probability that a particular researcher inno
vates on a particular good in industry j, conditional on an innovation occurring glob-
ally, is N jt 1, the reciprocal of the number of rival researchers in each of the G j
symmetric product lines. Therefore, the unconditional probability that a particular
researcher succeeds in innovating is equal to
When there is a new innovation in the production technique, the previous state-
of-the-art production technique become common knowledge in both countries,
reflecting international technological diffusion. The cost o f manufacturing each good
using the common-knowledge technique is the production cost of the leader’s closest
5 This “unique innovator” result occurs if the researchers never duplicate each other’s research
efforts and the path to successful innovation is unique. The m onopolistic competition model o f Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) provides micro-foundations for this first simplifying assumption. Assuming that

11
rival, the previous technological leader. The innovator’s new technology reduces its
costs to a fraction of the rival’s costs, and therefore the innovator displaces the incum
bent leader of the product line. The new technological leader gains the global monop
oly in the differentiated good until he or she is in turn displaced by subsequent inno
vation.
2.3 Equilibrium Relative Research Effort
Our specific interest is the determinants o f the probability that technological
leadership will shift between countries. This probability is determined by the relative
amount of research effort in each country, which depends on profitability.
Equation [3] represents the expected stream o f profits o f a researcher in coun
try c. The manufacturing profit earned from producing in country c and exporting to
the rest of the world, B cjt in equation [2], is discounted by the per-period probability o f
displacement by a subsequent innovator, pji {N jt j, and the cost of research effort is
subtracted. To simplify the notation, we assume that the real interest rate used to dis
count future revenues is zero.
}-* M Y pi
there is a large number o f potential directions for research on a product line and the alternatives are
symmetric ex ante, individual researchers will choose to differentiate their research efforts.
R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p rohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

12
We assume that investors expect that the future values of B jt and PJt {NJ t) will
remain at approximately their current level. The assumption of static expectations6
implies the following simplification o f [3]:
[4|
We assume that the researchers are risk-neutral. Therefore, the equilibrium
number of researchers is determined by the condition that the expected profits from
research are equal to zero for innovators in each country. The fraction of industry j
researchers who are in country c is implied by these free entry conditions. We derive
this fraction by substituting [2] into the expression for expected profits in [4].
[51
We define the relative market size o f country c as R ct = ------ — - . To simplify the
analysis, we also assume that D hjt is approximately equal for all countries other that /
and c. Using this definition and simplification, we can rewrite equation [5],
[6 ]
where M is the number o f countries in the world. Suppose that / / = 1. Recall
that this is the case if there are constant returns due to scarcity o f research resources
6 These expectations are rational if the economies remain in a steady state.

13
and that this scarcity effect offsets any industry-specific external economies of scale.
First, we examine how the ratio in [6] changes with an increase in the openness meas
ure D c]t. The ratio is increasing in D cJt. The intuition is that an increase in D cjt in
creases the export market o f home producers. The ratio is increasing in R ct if the third
term in the denominator is not too large. A larger relative size o f the home market
increases the market for domestic producers, but it also increases the export market of
foreign producers. The net effect is positive if barriers to trade significantly reduce the
level of imports into country c. On the other hand, the cross derivative is negative.
2.4 The Transition Probabilities
If the incumbent leader manufactures the product outside of country c in period
t, then the probability that technological leadership for that particular product shifts
«f t P i M f i )
back to country c in period t+1 is —— — . This transition probability is simply
-
Nj‘
the probability o f an innovation in country c. Similarly, if the incumbent technologi
cal leader manufactures the product in country c in period t, then the probability that
technological leadership shifts to a foreign country in period t+1 is
. The steady-state probability that country c is the technological
leader in producing any particular good in industry j in period t is simply country c ’s
n it
share of global research effort in industry j, —— .
N jt

14
Following Grossman and Helpman, we have assumed that incumbent techno
logical leaders do not possess a distinct advantage in developing new innovations.
Alternatively, we could assume that there is an incumbent advantage. One way to
represent an incumbent advantage is to reduce the transition probabilities above by a
scalar factor. However, if the incumbent advantage implies an equal scalar reduction
in both probabilities, then this scalar is irrelevant to the steady-state relative research
efforts — .
N it
2.5 The Volatility of Import Penetration
We define kj, as the number of the differentiated products o f industry j that
are manufactured in country c in period t. The number manufactured in the rest of the
world is G j - k j , . We assume that the research contests for each o f these differenti
ated product lines have probabilistically independent outcomes. The industry-specific
outcomes are identically distributed across the countries, since relative research effort
is allocated symmetrically across the product lines. Given these simplifying assump
tions about the G j research contests, the variance of kj, is
f C \ ( C \
: \ _ Gj nC
j t {Njt - n jct ) _ n jl
Var(k jt = G j 17]
N J'2 KJ

15
Next, we define S C
j t as the expenditure share in country c o f all o f the industry j pro
ducers that are located in country c.
°S jc.t ~- h k c-
° j Kjt |8 |
This expenditure share is the measure o f comparative advantage that we examine in
the empirical analysis. It is simply the market share of the country c producers in their
domestic market and is equal to one minus the industry-level import penetration ratio,
a common measure o f import competition.
Since we have assumed that the expenditure share b j is constant, the variance
o f S cjt (and likewise the variance o f the import penetration ratio) is equal to
var(s%)=b/yar(k^) [91
Substituting [7] into [9], the standard deviation of S jt is simply
( C \ ( ^
n jt
\G ; / - n * [10J
N Jt
n jt
where —— is defined in terms o f the fundamentals of the model in [6]. The standard
N Jt
n
deviation of S jt is increasing in as long as this measure o f relative research
N ji
effort is less than one-half. This is the case if the number o f countries, M, is large.
(Formally, the ratio is less than one-half if /?,c + Dcjt < R, D'Jt +(M - 2)D jht ). This

16
volatility measure depends only on relative research effort —which is endogenously
determined as a function o f national expenditure levels and barriers to trade.
2.6 Constructing the Volatility and Openness Measures
In order to investigate the qualitative predictions o f the model, we construct
measures o f DJ( and S j t from trade flow and production data using the functional
forms in the model. We define Yjt as the value o f the industry j output in country c in
year i. According to the theory, Yjt is equal to the value o f world expenditure on the
industry j products o f country c, net of trade costs.
[H I
Again, E f denotes aggregate expenditure levels in country c, and D p is the measure
of openness defined above. The value of foreign expenditures on the industry j
exports of country c, net o f trade costs, is defined in [13].
[12]
The total expenditure o f country c on industry j imports, inclusive o f tariffs or trade
costs, is defined in [13].
[131
Combining [11], [12], and [13], we can calculate S j t and D cjt as follows:

We review the interpretation o f these two measures, since they lie at the center
o f our analysis. S cJt is the expenditure share in country c o f domestic producers of
industry j products in period t. The import penetration ratio is / - S cjt, so the standard
deviation of S cjt is equal to the standard deviation of the import penetration ratio. D cjt
is the export discount factor. It reflects the reduction in exports due to barrier to trade
(i.e., it is decreasing in the level of barriers to trade).
The assumptions o f Cobb-Douglas preferences and complete international spe
cialization in production, which are restrictive features of the Quality Ladders model,
provide a measure of openness in [15] that is derived explicitly from the theory and
has modest data requirements. In the empirical work that follows, we supplement this
trade flow measure o f openness with direct measures of tariff rates. Specifically, the
tariff measure o f openness is constructed as a ratio— -— that is calculated from

1 + Tjt
industry-level tariff rates. Unlike the construction of the trade flow measures of open
ness, the construction of the tariff measures does not rely on the theoretical model’s
assumption that expenditure shares are price-inelastic.
In the empirical analysis that follows, we examine multi-lateral trade flows o f a
single country rather than bilateral trade flows. This choice reflects data constraints.

The expenditure share-based measure o f comparative advantage in [14] requires an
industry-level measure o f country c ’s absorption of the products manufactured in
country c (in the numerator) and its absorption of all o f the industry’s products (in the
denominator). This measure of comparative advantage cannot be constructed without
adding together bilateral trade flows.
Country c ’s share of global production in industry j , Vjt , is an alternative
measure o f comparative advantage.
Vjt , the production share o f Home in industry j , is perhaps a more intuitive measure of
the international pattern of comparative advantage. However, the variance o f Vjt
depends in a complicated way on the variances and covariances o f aggregate expen
ditures, the openness measures and the variance of S jt , and therefore the theory does
not offer any clear qualitative predictions for the effect o f openness on the volatility o f
the production share in [16]. For this reason, we focus our empirical analysis on the
expenditure shares defined in [14].
3. Data Description
We investigate the empirical relevance of the model for U.S. manufacturing
industries. The analysis focuses on measures of trade flows and production from the
NBER Trade Database, which is described in Feenstra (1996). This data set includes

19
the value o f U.S. production, the value of U.S. imports from all countries, and the
value o f U.S. exports to all countries by four-digit SIC industry. Gagnon and Rose
(1995) provide arguments for the appropriateness of using data disaggregated to the
industry level. The sample includes annual trade flow and production data from 1958
to 1994. We include 368 four-digit industries in the sample. We exclude from the
sample the four-digit industries for which there is incomplete data over the sample
period or for which re-exporting is prevalent (as evidenced by reported export values
in excess of reported production values).
We calculate S Jt, the market share of domestic producers (or one minus the
import penetration ratio), from the formula in [14]. The trade flow measure o f open
ness is calculated using the formula in [15].
The data on tariff rates come from SIC-level import-weighted tariff measures
constructed in Magee (1997). They are available for a shorter time period that extends
from 1974 to 1988. The tariff measure is not explicitly derived within the theoretical
framework in Section 2. Nevertheless, it provides a useful alternative measure o f
openness in the empirical analysis.
We construct an indicator variable, labeled Hi-Tech, to designate four-digit
industries with relatively high R&D intensity, measured as the ratio of industry-wide
R&D expenditures to industry sales. The R&D intensity data come from OECD
(1995). The indicator variable attempts to distinguish industries for which the trade
and innovation theory is most applicable.

20
The GDP data that we use to calculate relative market size is from various
issues of International Financial Statistics. The relative GDP o f the U.S. was slightly
less than one in 1958 and declined thereafter.
We use three alternative methodologies for measuring the volatility o f the
domestic market share. The first methodology, which we call time aggregating,
divides the 1958-1994 sample into four-year time periods. We calculate the sample
mean and standard deviation of the model’s variables within each industry within each
four-year time period. This methodology creates a panel o f observations. The second
methodology is another form o f time aggregation. The difference is that we define a
single time period over the entire sample period; consequently, the second methodo
logy creates a pure cross-section of industry observations. The third methodology
allows for the volatility measure to vary year-by-year. The methodology is most
similar to the computation of time-varying volatility in ARCH models. This third
methodology is described in more detail in Section 4 below.
Table 1.1 summarizes the averages and standard deviations that we calculate by
time aggregating that data in four-year time periods (i.e., the first methodology). The
Table reports the means and standard deviations of these measures across industries.
The first two columns describe the two measures of openness. The third column
describes the volatility o f the import penetration ratio. The fourth column describes
the series from which the third column is derived. The rows of the table refer to nine
time periods within the 1958-1994 sample. The tariff measures are available for only
a subset of the time periods. The measures in the first three columns increase over

21
time. Moreover, there is a considerable amount of cross-industry variation in all o f the
variables (as evidenced by the ratio o f the standard deviations to the means).
Table 1.2 relates the two empirical measures o f openness that we examine. We
regress the (within time period) mean o f the trade flow measure o f openness on the
(within time period) mean of the tariff measure of openness and a set o f fixed effects.
Tariff barriers to trade are clearly a subset of all of the barriers represented in the trade
flow measure (as evidenced by the vast difference in the average magnitude o f the
two measures in Table 1.1). The within-industry correlation between the measure o f
openness is significantly positive. On the other hand, the correlation without industry-
specific fixed effects is negative.
4. Regression Analysis
There are two groups o f regressions that vary in the method of measuring
volatility. Both are designed to test whether openness, as defined above, increases the
volatility of the industry-level expenditure shares.
4.1 Regression Analysis with Time Aggregated Data
Equation [17] is the basic regression specification when we use the time-
aggregated measure of volatility.
VolJt = a } +y, + j3,Djt + p 2[Djt x 3{Hi - 7ec/i)J+ ejt [171
Volj, is the measure of the standard deviation of S jt (the expenditure share o f dome
stic producers) within each time period. Djt (the export discount factor) is one o f the

22
two openness measures described in Section 3. 3{Hi - Tech)j is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if industry j is relative R&D-intensive. The parameters and y t
represent industry- and time-fixed effects, respectively. The theory predicts that
/3, + f i , > 0 and f i 2 > 0 if / / > 0 (and that the signs are reversed if / / < 0).
We use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator to correct for
industry heteroskedasticity in the error term ejt . It is a two-step procedure. First, we
estimate [17] using OLS. From the residuals of this regression, we calculate estimates
o f the variances of the error terms within each industry and then use these as weights
in a second round o f least-squares regressions. This FGLS procedure improves the
efficiency of the estimates relative to the unweighted OLS estimates. Moreover, the
standard errors that we report are White-corrected to allow for residual (i.e., unspeci
fied) heteroskedasticity.
The data set is a panel. Relative market size as well as other time-varying
factors that are not industry-specific are captured in the time fixed effects. In the
regressions, we pool the coefficient estimates of /3Xand across industries. A posi
tive estimate of indicates that the relationship between openness and volatility is
relatively stronger in relatively R&D-intensive industries.
Table 1.3 presents the core regression results for the two measures o f openness.
Subsequent tables examine the sensitivity of these core results. The columns report
variations on the specification in [17]. The regressions vary in the set o f fixed effects
and Hi-Tech interaction terms that are included.

23
The coefficient estimates indicate that there is a significant positive relation
ship between the volatility o f the domestic market share measure and the measures of
openness. The probability o f the null hypothesis —that there is no relationship -- is
generally less than five percent. The /?-values are lower for relatively R&D-intensive
industries, which are the most likely candidates for an endogenous innovation model.
In the regressions in Table 1.3, we define the indicator variable Hi-Tech by whether
R&D expenditures in the industry are greater than three percent o f sales. The open
ness measure also has a significant positive effect on the volatility of industries that
are not classified as Hi-Tech by this standard. No doubt the three percent cutoff level
used to construct the Hi-Tech indicator variable does not identify all innovative indus
tries for which an endogenous innovation model applies. This point is developed fur
ther in the next table.
Table 1.4 investigates the sensitivity of the result in Table 1.3 to the definition
o f Hi-Tech industries. We estimated the equations using cutoff percentages that
ranged from 1% to 5%. We report the results for 2%, 3%, and 4% cutoff percentages.
The results for 1% and 5% cutoffs are not reported, since they are nearly identical to
the 2% and 4% results. A higher cutoff percentage increases the magnitude and sig
nificance level o f the interaction term (the additional effect o f openness for Hi-Tech
industries); however, it also increases the significance level o f the general openness
measure (which estimates the effect o f openness for non-Hi-Tech industries). This is
because an increase in the cutoff percentage places more R&D-intensive industries
outside of the Hi-Tech classification. Finally, as an alternative specification, the

industries’ R&D intensity in 1973 (the midpoint of the sample) are interacted with the
openness measure. We estimate these specifications using both the trade flow meas
ure o f openness and the tariff measure of openness. The results reaffirm the core
results in Table 1.3.
Table 1.5 investigates the sensitivity of the results in Table 1.3 to the length of
the time periods used to measure volatility (i.e., the method o f time aggregation).
Rather than using four-year time periods, we time-aggregated over the entire sample
for which data is available. The resulting regression analysis is a pure cross-sectional
analysis (across industries). Therefore, there are neither time nor industry fixed
effects. Once again, the results o f Table 1.3 are generally confirmed.
4.2 Regression Analysis with Annual Volatility Measures
The second group o f regressions is based on annual volatility measures. We
calculate these measures as absolute deviation from the industry mean. The mean is
calculated over the entire sample period. This methodology is modeled after estima
tors of ARCH models o f time-varying variances. By construction, this methodology
creates a panel with a larger inter-temporal dimension (thirty-seven years rather than
nine time periods). The enhanced time dimension allows us to investigate other pre
dictions o f the model that cannot be “identified” using the earlier methodology. Spe
cifically, we can attempt to identify the effect of relative country size, since relative
country size varies across time but does not vary across industries. The theory pre

25
diets that the volatility of import shares is increasing in relative country size. It also
predicts that the effect of openness should be decreasing in relative country size.7
Equation [18] is the regression specification that includes relative country size,
R,.
v j: = a j + / , + P ,D Jt + P 2 1P j, x &(Hi ~ Tech); J+ /3}Rt + 0 4 [Djs x/?,J+ s ]t [18]
In terms of the regression coefficients, the theory predicts that 0 , + /?, > 0 , 0 2 > 0 ,
0 j > 0 , and 0 4 < 0 if / /> 0 (and the signs are reversed if / / < 0 ).
The enhanced time dimension also allows us to estimate these regression coef
ficients at the industry-level (i.e., without imposing cross-industry pooling restric
tions). The drawback of this method for estimating volatility is that we need to
assume that S jt has a constant mean over the sample period, which is an arbitrary
assumption.8
In this specification, serial correlation may cause standard errors to be unreli
able and estimates to be inefficient. We find the error terms in [18] to follow a first-
order autoregressive process employing a heteroskedasticity-consistent test suggested
by Davidson and MacKinnon (1985). In what follows, we therefore correct for first-
order autocorrelation with the method suggested in Greene (1997).
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of regressions that use the trade flow measures
of openness. Table 1.6 pools the industries together to estimate a common set o f coef-
7 These predictions are discussed in detail in Section 2.

26
ficients. The results confirm our core results in Table 1.3 using both forms o f interac
tion between openness and R&D intensity. In addition, the results match the model’s
prediction for the effect o f relative country size.
Table 1.7 does not impose cross-industry pooling restrictions but instead esti
mates industry-specific regression coefficients. We summarize the 380 industry
regressions in two ways. First, we report the cross-industry average by groups of
industries (R&D intensity) and the /-statistic o f the hypothesis that the group average
value o f the coefficient on openness is greater than zero. Second, we tabulate the
share o f industries for which we estimated significant coefficients o f the predicted
sign. The results confirm our findings in earlier Tables that Hi-Tech industries are a
better fit for the model.
Tables 8 and 9 reproduce Tables 6 and 7, respectively, using the tariff meas
ures o f openness. The estimated coefficients on the openness measure are similar and
confirm our core results in earlier tables. In contrast, the coefficients on the relative
country size terms are rarely significantly different from zero. This result does not
support the predictions of the model. However, it may reflect an unresolved problem
with identification, in the sense that the relative country size term may be a proxy for
other time-varying factors, such as relative production costs or exchange rates. The
earlier methodology combined all o f these factors in the time fixed effect, whereas the
third methodology “loads” them all onto the relative country size term.
8 ARCH models typically assume that the series has a zero mean.

27
5. Conclusions
The Quality Ladders model of Grossman and Helpman (1991a) imposes sev
eral restrictive structural assumptions, but it offers predictions for the correlation
between the volatility o f import penetration ratios and the size o f barriers to trade.
The evidence from U.S. manufacturing industries is generally consistent with these
predictions. The empirical support is typically stronger for relatively R&D-intensive
industries, as the model predicts. The results hold when openness to trade is calculated
from data on international trade flows or from data on tariff rates.
Critics of trade liberalization argue that reductions in trade barriers leave
domestic workers susceptible to import competition. To the extent that increased
volatility in import penetration ratio leads to costly job loss, our results support this
provocative claim. For example, displaced workers may suffer significant declines in
the returns to their human capital investments if they are forced to switch industries.
While this link between volatility in import penetration and the welfare of workers is
certainly possible, it is not directly addressed in our study. Empirical evidence that
this volatility implies significant welfare effects remains an important extension for
future work.

28
Table 1.1
Summary Statistics
/
Time Periods mean [ DJt | mean ( - —— | st.dev. ( S jt | mean | S jt \
1958-1961 0.0141 0.0065 0.9559

(0.0523) (0.0123) (0.0581)
1962-1965 0.0146 0.0068 0.9546

(0.0447) (0.0103) (0.0589)
1966-1969 0.0178 0.0055 0.9555

(0.0411) (0.0081) (0.0560)
1970-1973 0.0218 0.0074 0.9470

(0.0473) (0.0099) (0.0666)
1974-1977 0.0229 0.9321 0.0091 0.9317

(0.0427) (0.0546) (0.0121) (0.0752)
1978-1981 0.0273 0.9382 0.0110 0.9210

(0.0392) (0.0525) (0.0120) (0.0778)
1982-1985 0.0363 0.9494 0.0089 0.9275

(0.0451) (0.0469) (0.0084) (0.0736)
1986-1989 0.0582 0.9578 0.0170 0.9148

(0.0834) (0.0416) (0.0178) (0.0898)
1990-1994 0.0681 0.0157 0.8763

(0.1061) (0.0168) (0.1074)

29
Table 1.2
Regressions Comparing the Alternative Measures of Openness
Regressand: Mean o f D Jt
Regressors'.
Mean o f (/ + TJt)~‘ 0.4266 0.8503 -0.1802

(3.929) (10.165) (-4-751)
Constant 0.2063
(5.709)
Time Period yes no no

Fixed Effects
Industry yes yes no

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R 2 0.6633 0.6412 0.0242
The regression estimates are based on a sample with 1472 observations.

Robust /-statistics for the parameter estimates are reported in parentheses.

30
Table 1.3
Regression Analysis with Time Aggregation into Four-Year Periods
Regressand: tim e-aggregated standard deviation o f S Jt
All regressions in this table define a Hi-Tech industry as one with an R&D intensity o f at least 3%.
I. T rade Flow Measure o f Openness (3312 observations)
Openness 0.0799 0.0725 0.0855 0.0799

(10.51) (9.84) (11.81) (11.50)
Interaction Term: 0.0790 0.0518

Openness and (4.028) (2.780)
Hi-Tech Dummy
Dummy for Hi-Tech 0.0029

Industries (4.314)
Time Period yes yes yes yes

Fixed Effects
Industry no no yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R 2 0.2205 0.2563 0.5276 0.5312
II. Tariff Measure o f Openness (1472 observations)
Openness 0.0264 0.0206 0.0850 0.0633

(4.887) (3.774) (4.170) (3.047)

Openness and (3.213) (3.832)
Hi-Tech Dummy
Dummy for Hi-Tech -0.1198

Industries (-3.093)
Time Period yes yes yes yes

Fixed Effects
Industry no no yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2 0.0664 0.0942 0.5055 0.5148
The robust t-statistics o f each coefficient estimate are reported in parentheses.

31
Table 1.4
Regressions with Alternative Definitions of Hi-Tech Industries
Regressand: time aggregated standard deviation o f S Jt
The data is time aggregated into four-year time periods.
I. Trade Flow Measure of Openness
Definition o f a Hi-Tech Industry
Minimum R&D Interaction: R&D Int.

Intensity (Hi-Tech) 2% 3% 4% and Openness
Openness 0.0813 0.0799 0.0802 0.0782

(11.528) (11.504) (11.722) (11.017)
Interaction Term: 0.0345 0.0518 0.0607

Openness and (1.783) (2.780) (2.966)
Hi-Tech Dummy
Interaction Term: 0.0073

Openness and (2.589)
R&D Intensity
Adjusted R~ 0.5293 0.5312 0.5313 0.5315
All regressions are based on 3312 observations and include time period and industry fixed effects.
II. Tariff Measure of Openness
Minimum 2% 3% 4% Interaction
R&D Intensity
Openness 0.0644 0.0633 0.0762 0.0594

(3.089) (3.047) (3.717) (2.770)
Interaction Term: 0.2118 0.2485 0.5593

Openness and (3.696) (3.832) (3.695)
Hi-Tech Dummy
Interaction Term: 0.0362

Openness and (3.189)
R&D Intensity
Adjusted R~ 0.5130 0.5148 0.5167 0.5144
All regressions are based on 1472 observations and include time period and industry fixed effects.

32
Table 1.5
Regression Analysis with Time Aggregation over the Entire Sample
Regressand: time-aggregated standard deviation o f S Jt
The data is time aggregated over the entire sample.
All regressions in this table define a hi-tech industry as one with an R&D intensity >= 3%.
Openness Measures Trade Flow Measure Tariff Measure of Openness
Openness 0.2319 0.1980 0.1579 0.1301

(4.669) (4.866) (4.384) (3.618)

Openness and (1.734) (2.955)
Hi-Tech Dummy
Dummy 0.0158 0.0017

For Hi-Tech (1.949) (0.633)
Industries
Constant 0.0270 0.02336 0.0120 0.0115

(14.363) (14.148) (10.156) (9.575)
Adjusted 0.1253 0.2756 0.1724 0.2343
All regressions are based on 368 (cross-section) observations.


33
Table 1.6
Pooled Regression Results with Annual Volatility Measures
and the Trade Flow Measure of Openness
Regressand: annual measure o f the standard deviation o f S Jt
Regressors:
Openness 0.2428 0.2302

(9.599) (8.825)
Interaction Term:
Openness and 0.1447
Dummy for (6.588)
Hi-Tech Industries
Interaction Term:
Openness and 0.0229
Measure of (6.385)
R&D Intensity
Relative GDP 0.0354 0.0356

o f the U.S. (6.443) (6.463)
Interaction Term:
Openness and -0.2377 -0.2314
Relative GDP (-5.980) (-5.836)
of the U.S.
Constant 0.0031 0.0030

(2.687) (2.632)
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes
Adjusted R 2 0.3291 0.3269
Observations 13,616 13,579

34
Table 1.7
Industry-Level Regressions with the Trade Flow Measure of
Openness
Regressand: annual measure of the standard deviation o f S Jt
Cross-Industrv Average of Industry-Specific Coefficients

(robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses)
All Industries Hi-Tech Onlv Not Hi-Tech
Regressors
Openness 1.276 1.645 1.210

(1.284) (3.220) (1.035)
Relative GDP 0.0409 0.0927 0.0317

o f the U.S. (4.374) (4.119) (3.080)
Interaction
Term -1.900 -2.402 -1.810
(-1.205) (-2.785) (-0.976)
Percent o f Industries with Significant Coefficients o f the Predicted Sign

(Five percent significance level)
Openness 52.17% 82.14% 46.79%
Relative GDP 56.52% 82.14% 51.92%

of the U.S.
Interaction Term 50.27% 85.71% 43.91%
All Three Coefficients 42.94% 73.21% 37.50%

35
Table 1.8
Pooled Regression Results with Annual Volatility Measures
and the Tariff Measure of Openness
Regressand-. annual m easu re o f the standard d ev iatio n o f S Jt
R egressors :
O p e n n ess 0.0531 0 .0547

(5.041) (4.873)
Interaction Term :
O p en n ess and 0.0110
D u m m y for (0.684)
H i-T ech Industries
In teraction Term :
O p en n ess and 0 .0007
M ea su re o f (0.240)
R & D Intensity
R elativ e G D P -0 .0397 -0.0348

o f the U .S. (-0 .6 9 9 ) (-0.609)
In teraction Term :
O p e n n ess and -0 .0259 -0.0312
R elativ e G D P (-0 .4 1 4 ) (-0.497)
o f the U .S.
Constant 0.0086 0.0084

(1.936) (1.875)
In d u stry Fixed E ffects y es yes
A d ju sted R~ 0.3531 0.3519
O b serv atio n s 5,520 5,505

36
Table 1.9
Industry-Level Regressions with the Tariff Measure of Openness
Regressand: an n u al m easure o f th e stan d ard deviation o f S jt
C ro ss-In d u stry A v e ra g e o f In d u stry -S p e cific C oefficients
Groups of Industries All Industries Hi-Tech Only Not Hi-Tech
Regressors
O penness 0 .1 5 1 9 0 .1 0 3 9 0 .1 6 0 6
(0 .2 3 6 2 ) (0 .9 7 0 4 ) (0 .2 1 1 7 )
R e la tiv e G D P -0 .5 6 3 2 -2 .7 2 1 -0 .1 7 6 0
o f th e U .S . (-0 .1 1 7 0 ) (-0 .9 6 4 7 ) (-0 .0 3 1 1 )
In te ra c tio n
T e rm 0 .5 3 5 5 2 .7 1 1 5 0 .1 4 5 0
(0 .1 1 1 1 ) (0 .9 5 6 6 ) (0 .0 2 5 6 )
P ercent o f In d u stries w ith S ig n ific an t C oefficients o f th e P re d ic te d S ign

(F ive p e rc e n t sig n ifican c e level)
O p e n n e ss 3 3 .4 2 % 4 4 .6 4 % 3 1 .4 1 %
R e la tiv e G D P 18.21% 8 .9 3 % 19.87%

o f th e U .S .
In te ra c tio n T erm 19.57% 14.29% 2 0 .5 1 %
A ll T h re e C oefficients 6 .2 5 % 5 .3 6 % 6.41 %

37
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39: 859-887.
D av id so n , R ., M acK innon, J. “ H eteroskedasticity R o b u st T ests in R eg re ssio n D irectio n s”,

(1985) Annales de I 'INSEE 5 9 /6 0 : 183-218.
D av id so n , R ., M acK innon, J. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. New York:

(1993) Oxford University Press.
D ixit, A ., S tig litz, J. (1977) “ M onopolistic C o m p e titio n and O p tim u m P ro d u c t D iv ersity .”
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E dw ards, S. (1 9 9 2 ) “T ra d e O rientation, D isto rtio n s, and G ro w th in D evelo p in g

C o u n tries”, Journal o f Development Economics 39: 31-57.
F eenstra, R. (1 9 9 6 ) “ U .S. Im ports, 1972-1994: D a ta an d C o n c o rd a n c e s.” NBER

Working Paper 5515.
G a g n o n , J., R o se, A . (1995) “ D ynam ic P ersistence o f In d u stry T ra d e B alan ces: H o w

P ervasive is th e P ro d u ct C y c le ” , Oxford Economic Papers 47:
229-248.
G reene, W . (1 9 9 7 ) Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed itio n . N e w Jersey : P ren tice Hall.
G ro ssm an , G ., H elpm an, E. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. M IT Press.
(1991a)
G ro ssm an , G ., H elpm an, E. “Q u a lity L adders and P ro d u c t C y cles” , Quarterly Journal of

(1 991b) Economics 106: 557-586.
G ro ssm an , G ., H elpm an, E. “Q u a lity Ladders in th e T h e o ry o f G ro w th ” , Review o f

(1991c) Economic Studies 58: 4 3 -6 1 .
G ro ssm an , G ., H elpm an, E. “ T echnology an d T ra d e” , in G ro ssm an a n d R o g o ff, eds.

(1995) Handbook of International Economics, V o lu m e III. N ew
Y ork: E lsevier S cien ce B .V .
H arrison, A . (1 9 9 6 ) “O p en n ess and G ro w th : A T im e-S erie s, C ro ss-C o u n try

A n aly sis for D ev elo p in g C o u n trie s” , Journal o f Development
Economics 48: 41 9 -4 4 7 .
H siao, C . (1 9 8 6 ) Analysis o f Panel Data. N e w Y ork: C a m b rid g e U n iv ersity

P ress.

38
M agee, C .(1997) Tariffs and Trade Adjustment Assistance in Declining

Industries. U n iv ersity o f W isc o n sin D octoral D issertation.
O E C D (1995) Industry and Technology: Scoreboard o f Indicators 1995.

Paris: O EC D .
P roudm an, J., R edding, S. “ P ersistence an d M o b ility in In tern atio n al T rade” , B ank o f
(1 997) E ngland W orking P ap er S eries N o. 64.
R azin, A ., Rose, A. (1 9 9 4 ) “ B usiness-C ycle V o latility a n d O p e n n ess: A n E xploratory

C ross-S ectional A n aly sis” , in L eid e rm an and Razin, eds.
Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment,
and Growth. N ew Y ork: C a m b rid g e U niversity Press.
Trefler, D. (1993) “Trade Liberalization and the Theory o f Endogenous

Protection: an Econometric Study of U.S. Import
Policy,” Journal o f Political Economy 101: 138-160.
W hite, H. (1980) “A H eteroskedasticity C o n siste n t C o v arian c e M atrix

E stim ato r and a D irect T est o f H etero sk ed a sticity ” ,
Econometrica 48: 817-838.

39
T his chap ter, in full, w as subm itted fo r publication. It is co -a u th o re d w ith D avid R iker. T h e
d issertatio n a u th o r w as the prim ary in v estig ato r o f this p ap e r.

Chapter II
The BISTAN
Data Retrieval Reference
Johannes Moenius
May 2000
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the construction o f a dataset, dubbed BISTAN, that con
tains annual data on total counts of standards as well as bilaterally shared standards in
16 countries (plus Europe and the international community), 471 SITC industries from
1965 to 1998. The counts o f shared standards are sorted into four different categories
that refer to different qualities of the matches between shared standards. Also included
is a brief description o f the original data-source, the PERJNORM database, to allow
for judgement of the quality o f the source data.
The author is indebted to Jim Rauch and David Riker for numerous
discussions.
40
R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of th e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

41
1. INTRODUCTION
Internationally differing product and process specifications, generally referred

to as standards, are often viewed as a technical barrier to trade (Deardorff and Stem
1998). The two most important categories are (mandatory) quality requirements and
the necessity to ship goods that are compatible with the existing economic and techni
cal environment in the importing country. Two prominent examples o f the former are
the on-going disputes regarding the low hormone levels in beef required by the Euro
pean community and the Russian rejection o f American poultry with the claim that the
United States poultry producers would not meet Russian sanitary standards (Ames
1998).
The European Community has pushed hard for harmonization o f product
specifications amongst their members. In order to reduce trade barriers within the
European Community, the standardization institutions in Europe (e.g. CEN,
CENELEC) developed procedures to guarantee that new standards are implemented
on a European scale. Efforts have shifted from national to European or International
standardization (DIN, undated, p.6) on the one hand and from mandatory, government
regulated standards to those that are voluntary on the other (Casella 1997). Enormous
amounts of money are spent every year in the standardization bodies alone. Therefore,
it is surprising to find not only that the available theoretical literature on standardiza
tion and trade is small1, but that empirical research has been virtually non-existent
until recently. The only exceptions in the empirical literature are Swann et. al. (1996)
who explore the PERJNORM database in a somewhat crude way to study the effects
1 Exceptions include Kende (1992), W allner (1998), Gandal and Shy (1996) who study the
political economy side, Jeanneret and Verdier (1996) as well as Fischer and SetTa (1999), who study
quality standards.

42
of standards on trade for Great Britain. Blind et. al. (1999) redo the exercise of Swann
et. al. (1996) for Germany. Both papers are not able to study bilaterally shared stan
dards due to the lack of data.
In an effort to close this gap, this paper describes the construction o f a data set,
dubbed BISTAN. It contains annual data on total counts of standards as well as
bilaterally shared standards in 16 countries (plus Europe and the international com
munity) and 471 SITC industries from 1965 to 1998. The counts of shared standards
are sorted into four different categories which refer to different qualities o f the
matches between shared standards, resulting in about 2.7 million records. A large part
of this data set was first employed in a companion paper (Moenius 1999) to study the
importance of standards for trade volumes. The analysis indicates that the harmoniza
tion efforts of the European Union have been fruitful in the past: possibly more than
20% of the increases in trade volumes have been due to harmonization efforts.
As in Swann et. al. (1996), the data was retrieved from the PERJNORM data
base issued cooperatively by the British BSI, the French AFNOR and the German DIN
Institute. The Version used was that of December 1998 and it contained about 522,000
records. Each record refers to a single standard, technical rule or law. Amongst others,
it contains information about the country where it is listed, the date implemented and
expired, a classification code, the issuing institution and information about previous
and consecutive documents as well as similar documents in other countries. This last
field is at the core of the retrieval procedure, since it allows the extraction o f informa
tion about bilaterally shared standards, whose effects could not be studied by previous
authors.
There are some major weaknesses o f the PERJNORM database that are inher
ited in the data-table on bilateral standards. The quality of the data varies by country

43
and year. For example, o f the more than 200.000 national standards, regulations and
technical rules that are currently listed in the United States, only 21,000 are included
in this database. The data seems most likely to be incomplete in the 60s and 70s,
especially on standards that have either been replaced by newer versions or elimi
nated. Therefore, all information before the 90s should be treated with care. Moreover,
the PERINORM database is not maintained by a single institution but by the national
standardization institutions whose sources submit the raw data. Since the countries in
this sample have different quality requirements for maintaining their data on stan
dards, this will inevitably be reflected in the data on bilateral standards. Some o f these
weaknesses can be eliminated as explained below, but the problems in general persist.
Another major weakness o f the current version of the database is that it pro
vides only the counts o f total and bilaterally shared standards in particular countries,
industries and years. Standards differ by certain characteristics as well as by economic
importance. For example one should expect quality standards as studied by Jeanneret
and Verdier (1996) and Fischer and Serra (1999) to have a different effect on trade
than compatibility standards.2 It is also to be expected that the technical specifications
for electric current are o f higher economic importance than the ones on safety features
o f matches. The database in its current version does not provide any information on
these two issues. Information on economic importance is quite hard to find, since one
can only know about a fraction o f products that were designed to conform with these
2 It displays the infancy o f this literature in the trade context that the effects o f com patibility
standards have not yet been studied to the best o f my knowledge. For a sim ilar view, see Matutes and
Regibeau (1996)

44
voluntary standards.^ As will be indicated below, the former issue can at least to some
degree be resolved to allow for more detailed analysis in the future.

The paper continues as follows: in the next section, there is a short description
o f the content o f each field in the BISTAN data table. An overview o f the content o f
the PERJNORM database follows to allow for quality assessment o f the raw data used
for this data retrieval exercise. In section four details about the retrieval procedures
and data recovery issues are explained. In section five there are some final comments.
Appendix A contains some summary statistics and tabulations. Appendix B lists the
content of the PERJNORM database by fields as well as evaluation tables o f the
retrieval Procedures. Concordance / concatenation tables can be found in appendix C.
Finally, an illustration o f how links between related documents are counted can be
found in appendix D.
2. CONTENT OF THE DATA SET
The data table contains 10 columns. The first and second columns refer to the
countries that share the standards, column three contains the SITC code and the fourth
column identifies the year this data refers to. The next four columns contain the
bilaterally shared standards, sorted by their degree o f similarity. These degrees are:
identical, equivalent, not equivalent and related (see below) and are listed in that order
in columns five to eight. Column nine states the total count o f standards in that year
and industry for country one, while column ten does so for country two. The data-
^ Standardization bodies offer conformity assessment for products with their standards
(certification). For exam ple, about 2.500 certificates are issued each year in Germ any (DIN CERTO,
undated). It could be assum ed that the standards more frequently used in certification procedures are
also more important economically.

45
table therefore takes the form shown in table II. 1 in appendix A, where a specific
example is chosen for clarification.
The PERJNORM Database contains 29 non-unique characterizations for the
types of documents listed. These were sorted into five mutually exclusive groups:
regulations, technical rules, technical rule drafts, standards and standard drafts. The
assignments and counts in the original database are listed in table II. 11 in appendix C.
Counts of documents in the five final categories are provided in table II.3 in appendix
A. The BISTAN data table is based only on standards (ST). The field contents are
described in some detail in the following subsections.
Country 1 / Country 2
There are 14 European countries (counting Turkey as European) plus the

United States and Japan. A list o f all the countries, their codes and the amounts of
documents available in the PERJNORM international database are provided in table
II.2 in appendix A. The amount of European and other international documents are
also listed. In table II.3 in the same appendix, all the counts of documents in the
PERJNORM database are listed by country and type (standard, technical rule, regula
tion).
SITC
The PERJNORM database lists a so called ICS-code (International Classifica

tion for Standards) with each document.4 There are about 1,300 ICS codes. ICS codes
are a priori designed to meet the requirements of a mainly technical environment.
4 A list o f the ICS codes can be found at the ISO webpage.
R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e cop y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p ro d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

46
They categorize terminology, units, testing procedures as well as nuts and bolts and
road vehicle systems. Inevitably, certain ICS-codes sort into multiple product / indus
try categories. For this reason, tabulations based on aggregate industry codes show
considerably higher counts than those based on ICS-classification.
To use the standards data for economic analysis, an industry classification

code had to be chosen that allowed for sufficient disaggregation but was not too fine
given the number o f ICS-codes available. The SITC code on a four digit level met
these requirements and also offered to simply match the standards data with the trade
data from the World Trade Database (Statistics Canada). The SITC codes are provided
by the United Nations (1975). The United Nations actually provide information down
to a 5/6 digit level. This information was used to determine whether an ICS code
belongs to a certain SITC group.
The Standard International Trade Classification (Revision 2) lists 786 four
digit industries. The World Trade Database uses 471 o f them in all the years from
1970 to 1995. 170 o f the original four digit industries were omitted and 145 were
aggregated into 49 three-digit industries. These 471 SITC industries were used as a
basis for concatenation and concordance with the ICS codes. Table 11.12 in appendix
C provides this information. In addition, table II.4 in appendix A provides a list o f the
number o f documents by SITC and country.
Year
The years in the BISTAN table range from 1965 to 1998. This time-period was
chosen although it exceeds the time-period for which trade-data is available and
although earlier years may not be as reliable. The reasons are first, that for some
countries like Germany and France, even earlier data may actually be sufficiently

47
reliable. Secondly, extra out o f sample data allows for potential leads and lags when
time series or panel models are estimated. A standard was included in a particular year
if it was issued in that year, so a standard that was issued on 12/31/80 would still be
counted in 1980. Similarly, it was also counted for the full year 1985 even if it was
withdrawn on 1/1/85. For details, see below in section 4. It should be noted that
bilaterally shared standards denote stocks since it states how many standards were
shared in a particular year, industry and country pair.
Bilaterally shared
A standard counts as shared between two countries when two conditions are
met: it must be listed under a national or international code in both countries and at
least one country had a link to the document in the other country or to a (international)
document that points to the document in the other country. This implies that linkages
were treated as transitive. The restriction was imposed that at least one o f the linkages
involved had to be of high quality: the two documents had to be either identical or
equivalent to each other. For further detail see the next section on retrieval and recov
ery issues.
There are four categories: Two documents can either be identical (IDT),
equivalent (EQV), not equivalent (NEQ) or only related to each other (REL), in order
of quality. These are listed as separate variables.5
5 The rules for assigning a certain category to a pair o f documents are stated in the ISO/IEC
Guide 21:1999

48
Total counts of standards
In addition to the bilaterally shared standards, the database also contains the
total counts of standards in each country, industry and year. These total counts of
standards include the bilaterally shared standards. The retrieval procedures are identi
cal to the procedures used for bilaterally shared standards. Since total counts o f stan
dards only vary by country, but not by country-pair, there are identical data-entries for
a particular country, industry and year if only the second country changes.
3. THE CONTENT OF THE PERINORM DATABASE
This section discusses the content o f the PERJNORM database to allow for a
quality assessment o f the raw data and the validity o f the retrieval procedures in the
next section. In addition, the possibilities and limitations of future versions o f the
current data set can be evaluated.
The PERINORM database is the result o f a joint effort o f the British Standards
Institution (BSI), the French Association frangaise de normalisation (AFNOR) and the
German DIN Deutsches Institut fu r Normung. It was constructed as a reference for
companies to facilitate access to national and international product specifications that
are relevant to their activities. In its 12/1998 international edition, PERINORM inter
national, it contained about 522,000 documents in 29 categories. It covers 14 countries
in addition to International standards, which are listed separately.
Due to the fact that the PERINORM database was designed according to the
needs o f an industry practitioner, it does provide the information o f interest to econo
mists either in a somewhat obstructed way or not at all. On the other hand, there is
also an upside to this: the amount o f technical specification provided allows for addi
tional data extraction that is unusually rich in detail. Table II.8 in appendix B lists the

49
fields in the PERINORM database, a sample record and remarks in which way the
field was used or is intended for future use.
4. REMARKS ON DATA-RETRIEVAL PROCEDURES
There are two issues to be discussed for each separate field that is listed in this
data table: which way it was retrieved and what was the treatment for missing values,
if there were any. In order to get an idea o f how important the treatment of missing
values are, some information on this is provided in table II.9 in appendix B. All the
variables needed to retrieve the final data table are listed there. The table shows the
amounts of missing values by variable. Some o f these missing values could actually
be recovered by other information provided in the PERINORM database. Information
on that is also shown in the same table. In what follows there is a description o f the
retrieval method for each field and which procedures were employed to recover mis
sing values.
Countries
In the PERJNORM database, each document has a unique code. It consists of

two letters that indicate the country where the document was implemented and a
numerical code o f variable length. To determine the country-codes, these first two
letters were simply extracted from the code. There is only one international two-letter
code, IX. In order to distinguish between European and other international documents,
the following procedure was used: All issuing institutions in Europe that are in charge
of European standardization have the string "euro" in their name. Moreover, all inter
national documents had information on their issuing institution. So whenever the

50
name of the issuing institution contained the search string "euro", the country-code
was changed from IX to EN. There were no missing values.
Industries
The classification code used in the PERINORM database was specifically

developed for standards. It is called International Classification fo r Standards (ICS).
Some standards do not fit into one particular ICS-classification and therefore about
thirteen percent o f the standards-documents have more than one ICS-code assigned to
it. As we shall see below, this poses a problem.
The structure o f the ICS-Codes is as follows: ##.###.##, where each pound-
sign stands for a number. More general codes have fewer digits and can be viewed as
truncated versions o f the more specific ones. But the truncation can only happen after
the second or fifth digit. Some documents had invalid ICS-codes listed in the respec
tive field. Some o f them were identified as systematic input-faults (like adding two
zeros as the last two digits for more general codes) and were replaced by the correct
ones. Others were partly recovered by truncation if only the latter part o f a code was
ill-specified (e.g. 01.030.24a was truncated to 01.030.24, 01.030-24 was truncated to
01.030, 01.03 was truncated to 01). That means that some standards get assigned a
higher degree o f generality than they actually deserve. It should be noted that this
number is small though and comprises less than 1000 documents. After deleting all
non-usable codes, 1,292 ICS codes were used for further analysis.
There is a considerable number o f missing values for industries in some coun
tries (see Table II.9 in appendix B). Therefore the attempt was made to use the indus
try-classi fication o f the related documents to identify the industry the document in
question belongs to. In order to do so, the fields in the original database PERINORM

51
that contained information on previous documents, consecutive documents or interna

tionally related documents were examined. If there was any information on these, the
related documents were searched for in the database and if they could be found, their
industry code was used as a replacement for the missing original one. If more than one
was found, all o f them were added and later on subjected to an elimination procedure
described in the next paragraph. As can be seen from the table, about 74,000 docu
ment - industry linkages were found. But this displays an important weakness: even
linked documents are not sorted into the same ICS codes. There seems to be no good
remedy for that: if one was to just choose one (or the most general) industry that was
attached to a document and its linked counterpart, then part o f the information was
lost. On the other hand, sorting into multiple industries leads to substantial double
counts. (See table II.9 in appendix B) The way the problem was "solved" here was to
only accept one ICS-code that should be as specific as possible. Recall that an ICS
code is constructed o f seven digits in three groups. The lower digits are more general,
so if there were codes with more digits, then the lower digit codes were eliminated
first. As a next step, all the ICS codes with a group-code (first two digits o f the ICS-
code) lower than 10 were eliminated, since these codes refer only to terminology,
mathematical symbols and the like. In a next step, the codes lower than 20 were elimi
nated, since these only refer to measurement, testing, health and environment and
health care, which were regarded as less specific than the groups with a code larger
than 20 (like mechanical systems, engineering, etc.). If there were still multiple ICS-
codes in the record, the code that appeared most frequently for this document was
used. In some cases, there were none or more than one with the same number of
occurrences. In this case one o f them was chosen randomly.

52
The Industry-Code ICS is not directly comparable to any o f the regular indus-
try-classiflcations. As mentioned before, in order to combine them with other eco
nomic data, these 1,292 codes were concatenated with 471 SITC industries. This
attempt resulted in table II. 12 in appendix C. Often one standard applies to a whole set
of four-digit SITC industries. In these cases, it was assigned to each one of them.6
This implies that on a more aggregate level (say, in two-digit SITC industries), the
documents that were assigned to more than one four-digit industry within a two-digit
industry are counted multiple times. Any analysis that does not use the four-digit
industry but a higher level o f aggregation should take that into account.
YEAR
The original data provides information on when a standard was issued and
when it was withdrawn. For a standard to be included in the bilateral counting, it has
to be active in the year referred to in both countries. As mentioned above, a standard is
counted as active in a particular year when it was introduced in that year, regardless of
the month, and has not yet been withdrawn. A standard is also counted as active in the
year o f withdrawal, regardless of the month it was withdrawn in. Some specifics on
the years of issuing and withdrawal have to be accounted for.
In the year of issue, a comparatively small number o f documents had missing
values. Nevertheless, recovery attempts were undertaken in the following form: if
there was a previous document or draft listed, its withdrawal date was used as the
issuing date of the document in question. If there was more than one previous docu
6 This is why it is important to assign a unique ICS code to each document. A document that
listed more than one ICS codes could be counted multiple times even within a four-digit industry, if the
two ICS-codes were sorted into the same four-digit SITC industry. The assignment o f a unique ICS
code avoids that.

53
ment found and none o f them could be determined as the exact predecessor, then the
previous document that gave the document in question the shortest life span (the latest
issuing date) was used. Only a very small number o f documents could be recovered by
this procedure though. All the documents with missing values in this field after reco
very attempts were unsuccessful were discarded.
More important than the recovery of the year o f issue is the year o f withdrawal
- recovery. The problem that arises here is that all documents that are still active do
not have a withdrawal date. Therefore, it is impossible to determine by the fact that
there is no date in the withdrawal field in a particular record that the document is still
active or whether someone had just forgotten to input the date o f withdrawal. This is
important for two reasons: standards that have been withdrawn and not been replaced
count even though they are no longer active. Secondly, standards that have been
replaced but have no withdrawal date count in addition to the document that has
replaced them. Therefore, a similar procedure as for the year o f issue was employed. If
there was a consecutive document listed, its issuing date was used as withdrawal date
for the document in question. Again, if there was more than one consecutive document
listed, the one that resulted in the shortest life span for the document in question was
employed. Although the amount of recoveries seems to be small relative to the total
number of documents, since all of them apply to the earlier periods of the sample, this
is taken to be a considerable success in improving the earlier years of the BISTAN
data table.
International links
Since document contents are not identical across countries, one has to be spe
cific about what counts as a bilaterally shared standard. In fact, what is named a

54
bilaterally shared standard is rather a link established between two documents. To

illustrate this, it is easiest to think o f the informational content of a document (a stan
dard). The same amount of technical information that is packaged into one document
(one standard) in, say, Germany, could be written into three documents in Spain, (see
picture 1 in appendix D) Assuming that the German document is linked to the three
documents in Spain, two potential measures can now be referred to as bilaterally
shared standards: the minimum o f the two (in our example one document, that from
Germany) or the maximum of the two numbers (that would be the three documents
from Spain) There is no clear answer to which o f these measures would be superior to
the other, so the maximum was chosen for technical reasons.
The information in the field “ international relationships” in the PERINORM
database simply lists the document-id's and the years o f issuing o f the foreign docu
ments the current document has some kind o f relation to. Most of the time, these
linkages are not bilateral (say, between Germany and Spain), but between Germany
and an international document on the one hand and between the international docu
ment and Spain (and potentially some others) on the other hand (see picture 2 in
appendix D). The search procedure attempted to find all direct and indirect bilateral
links. It worked as follows:

First, each linked document was separated from the year it was issued, and
then the remaining document id was searched for in the original data-table. If it was
found, the years of issue were compared to each other. If they were identical or one o f
them was missing, the document was accepted as being the one the original document
was linked to. This procedure resulted in about 440,000 direct linkages. To establish
indirect links, now the second document o f these pairs was searched for in the data
table. If it had additional linkages attached to it (other than the one it was originally

55
attached to), a link was also established between the original document and the (third)
document that the original partner (the second document) had a link to (again, see
picture 2 in appendix D). In the previous example this amounts to adding the bilateral
linkages between Germany and Spain to the linkages between Germany and the inter
national institution on the one side and the international institution and Spain on the
other. This procedure was restricted to documents in which at least one link was
strong, meaning that the two documents in that link were either identical or equiva
lent. The link to the third document involved could be of any quality. The category
assignment to the transitive link (the one linking the first and the third document) was
that o f the weaker o f the two linkages. The total number of linkages found (either
bilateral or international) was about 2.1 million.
This procedure does not yet guarantee that all bilateral linkages are added to
the data set. As explained in the introduction, quality o f data-input varies by country,
leading to the problem that linkages may be unbalanced. As a made-up example,
Norway may report 20% more linkages to Sweden as Sweden does to Norway. To
avoid this, all documents were checked as to whether they were listed in both direc
tions. If not, missing links were added.
The question that remains to be answered is: what are the sources of variation?
Institutionally, one has to distinguish between the European countries and all others.
The reason for this is that all European Union members are required to embody all
European standards into their national standards bodies within six month. Withdrawal
o f national standards that are replaced by the new European standards is allowed to
take longer. The amount o f time depends on the type of standard. New and prospec
tive members are granted extensions. If this was the only source o f harmonization
within Europe, there should be no country-pair variation, at least for long-term mem-

56
bers. As table II.7a in appendix A reveals, there is considerable variation across coun
tries, although we restrict our attention to Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom and use only data from 1980 to 1995.7 There are several
institutional sources o f this variation. First, there are harmonized standards between
pairs of countries that existed before the European harmonization efforts started. Only
a fraction o f those were replaced by European standards. Second, the European stan
dardization institutions (CEN8, CENELEC9, ETSI10) only accept suggestions for
harmonization if there is sufficient importance for a large enough group of members
(CEN/CENELEC 1994). This means, if only Belgium, France and Austria are inter
ested in a certain project, but no one else, they will establish a harmonized standard in
each of their national standards bodies, but no European standard would be initiated in
this case. Germany, for example, would not share this standard. The European Union
actually promotes this procedure. Each member has to inform all others about its
standardization projects well in advance (European Commission 1983, 1988, 1994). If
a proposal is o f no interest to anyone else, the national standardization body can

launch the national standardization process. If it is perceived to be of major impor
tance to many members, it will be undertaken as an European project. If it is o f minor
importance or only of interest to a small number of countries, the countries that are
interested have the right to participate in the national standardization process of the
7 Since the United Kingdom has entered the European Union in 1973, there should have been
plenty o f time to incorporate all European standards by 1980.
8 Com ite Europeen de Normalisation
9 C om ite Europeen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
European Telecommunication Standards Institute

57
originating country. If this results in a standard that is acceptable to all parties

involved, these parties may voluntarily incorporate the new standard in each one of
their national standards bodies. Finally, standards from supranational standardization
bodies, such as the ISO or IEC, can be adopted by the national standardization bodies,
but they don’t have to. Within Europe, about 40% o f all CEN standards are identical
with ISO standards and 95% o f all CENELEC standards are related to IEC standards.
But there is no automated mechanism that all the members o f the ISO have to imple
ment newly created ISO standards in their national standards bodies. This is specific
to the European countries in our sample.
Comparison of table II.7a and II.7b in appendix A shows that within Europe
cross-industry variation is considerably larger than cross-country variation. This is
reversed in the whole sample, indicating that harmonization has reached a higher level
within Europe than in all the countries in our sample (including Europe).
5. SOME FINAL COMMENTS
Inspection o f the summary statistics in appendix A reveals that only for a few
countries (namely Austria, France and Germany) the underlying data from the
PERINORM database is reliably complete for all types o f documents. During an
Interview conducted in the summer o f 1998, the Information Center at the DIN Insti
tute in Berlin also judged the data on standards as reliable and sufficiently complete
for all other European Countries, including all Eastern European countries. More
problematic is the information on the United States and Japan, but previous studies
(Blind et. al. 1999) showed that the data included in the PERINORM database may be
considered as representative for US and Japanese industries.

58
Especially for older documents, data is most likely incomplete except for few
countries (see table II.5 in appendix A). If documents were replaced by newer ver
sions, some institutions may not have submitted information on replaced documents.
To get a very rough estimate on how large the errors are, one can count the number of
documents that have previous documents attached to them and compare them with the
number that have consecutive documents listed. This was done in table 11.10 in appen
dix B. Based on these numbers, incomplete information on older documents should be
expected for the following countries: Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Great
Britain, Japan, Poland, Slovakia and the United States. Turkey and the European
Standardization bodies create another peculiarity: they list approximately twice as

many documents with consecutive documents attached to them than there are docu
ments that have previous documents recorded. This casts some doubt on the reliability
o f the reporting qualities o f some countries. One might wonder whether these differ
ences in qualities are a general feature or limited to some fields that might have been
viewed to be of lower importance to the organizers of the data-input.
Furthermore, it should be noted that all retrieval was undertaken automatically,
eliminating all documents that did not match the requirements described above. While
typographic errors can be assumed to occur randomly, non-matching and missing keys
in the search procedures described above may represent systematic selection bias
when not so frequently used documents were left out by the country submitting the
data.
Although the PERINORM database seems to allow for more detailed analysis
in several respects, only a few o f these options are actually viable for all countries and
years. The distinction between standards, technical rules and general regulation as
well as their respective drafts is only meaningful for Austria, France and Germany,

59
and partially Great Britain. It was therefore left out. More promising are distinctions
between safety and environmental standards and product versus process standards that
can be extracted from the descriptors and the ICS-codes combined. Finally there is
information on prices of standards (what companies have to pay for the documents)
and how long they are (page-counts). Interpreted as measures of informational con
tent, these will be exploited in future versions o f the data table (see again table II.8 in
appendix B).
The BISTAN data set allows for numerous studies in basically two major
fields o f economics: its bilateral features suggest themselves to be used for interna
tional trade topics. Trade-flow analysis, as has been done in a first step by Moenius
(1999), and foreign direct investment are immediate applications. Questions in em
pirical industrial organization can also possibly be addressed with this data. Its inter
national dimension allows for cross country comparisons.
In order to improve the quality and reliability o f the data set, there are a few
natural next steps:
1. The data should be subjected to more rigorous quality checks by means of

comparison with other data sources. Since the field named “ international rela
tionships” is crucial to the value o f the data, it should be at the core o f these
efforts.
2. To study trade barrier effects o f standards that are specific to a country and not
shared with its trading partner, information on country-specific standards in a
bilateral context needs to be added. These are the standards in a country,

industry and year that have no links to documents in the country o f the trading
partner (see graph 1 in appendix D).

60
3. Distinctions between quality and compatibility standards need to be included.

It is intuitive to expect that these two types may have very different effects on
trade variables and the organization o f industries.
4. Measures of informational content like the number of pages o f a document
could be used as a proxy for the complexity o f the technical specifications and
the amount o f information provided to firms that design products according to

a standard.
The original Database PERINORM is updated monthly. A considerable num
ber o f countries is about to join this database-project. As newer versions become
available, more insights into the effects o f standards on the economy should be possi
ble.

61
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table II.1: The Content o f the BIST AN Data Table

Bilaterally shared Total counts o f
standards
Country Country SITC Y EA R Identical Equi Not Related Total in Total in
I 2 valent Equi country country
valent 1 2
...
AT BE 6920 94 21 13 6 11 101 65
AT BE 6920 95 21 14 8 11 111 67

62
Table II.2: Countries and Documents in the PERINORM Database
Code Country Number of Documents
AT Austria 18,948
AU Australia 11,157
BE Belgium 8,416
CH Switzerland 13,872
CZ Check Republic 22,444
DE Germany 120,284
ES Spain 20,240
FA France (Standards) 48,980
FR (FA) France (Regulations) 20,983
GB Great Britain 35,899
EN European Documents 31,928
IX International Documents 41,333
JP Japan 14,174
NL Netherlands 29,408
NO Norway 7,709
PL Poland 18,714
SK Slovakia 17,990
TK Turkey 18,492
US United States of America 21,131
Remark: France listed its regulations and standards under different codes. In the final
table only the country-code FA is used. European documents were listed separately
from other international documents. It should be noted that many documents are listed
both in single countries and in the two international groups. This is due to the fact that
standardization bodies in participating countries have to incorporate European stan
dards into their national stocks o f standards.

63
Table II.3: Types of Documents by Country

CTRY RC ST STD TR TRD UN SUM
AT 1314 9286 4948 3398 2 18948
AU 28 10389 10 3 727 11157
BE 8276 19 121 8416
CH 13388 459 25 13872
CZ 22444 22444
DE 6258 47294 34103 29951 2678 120284
EN 1960 10100 17971 1894 3 31928
ES 20240 20240
FA 20996 40934 21 684 0 7328 69963
GB 27597 4488 12 1 3801 35899
IX 20972 15675 4685 1 41333
JP 13804 370 14174
NL 24837 3079 363 1129 29408
NO 7600 109 7709
PL 18714 18714
SK 17990 17990
TR 63 18427 1 1 18492
US 21130 1 21131
RG Regulation
TR Technical Rule
TRD Technical Rule Draft
ST Standard
STD Standard Draft
UN unspecified (classification missing)

64
© ©
1.849
15,394
10,350
10,010
7,490
16,509
3,576
1,793
23,092
19,244
12,584
5,709
2,775
18,063
6,883
27,962
5,395
2,183
9,627
41,028
5,065
Sum
p-» OO ©
CN
CO
VI © vO CO VI SO OO © © ©
20
135
981
589
84
468
1,611
US
CN 3 3 CO
©
r - sC CO CN vo
606
216
490
3,279 1,354 1.603
256
715
122
460 2,270
89
82
246
917 1.219
238
265
1,328
588 3,078 1,432 2,986

429
4,004 2,463 4,236
1,351
TR
CO vo CN CO CN
© © CN
VO 00 CO © ©
284
148
2,271 3,256
168
278
48
296
360
227
280
668
1,021
SK
SO •ci CN oo CO
co vo
•Cl VI VO o CN © CO
182
1,067
190
1 844
1,049
1,096
282
490
1,035
675
543
395
473
PL
CN r^ CN CO
ro CN ©
VO
s CO vO CN vo VO 00 VO © VO VO 00
oci
691
OC
LL
NO
vo co VO CN CN CN CO CN
CN 00 CO CN
1
vo © vo NO vO VI OC o CN oo CN
ZZ
286 1,147
266
269
400
44
895
1,332
1,051
© CO © CO r - VI CO CN CN
z © vo co CN CN r-* OO
NO sO SO vo VO CN CO © © © © CN © ©
ZZ
469
VO VO CN VO
1 JP
— © ©
O o co o sO Os VO CO © CO © 00 VO
1,261 1,010
©
430
248
290
308
2,312 8,793 1,687 1,774
1,572 2,258
2,165
X r^ ON 00 VI CO o CN vo N* 00 CN
co CN vo CO © CN
vo oo ro Os VI o CO vo CN 00 © VI
1,387
582
205
328
GB
00 00 CN VN Os SO r-* 00 CO r - CO
NO vo <«r VO CN CO CN ©
Tabic 11.4: Counts of Documents by 2-digit SITC and C ountry
00 O V0 r** CO VO © VO vo © © © © 00 vo
320 1,165
1,426
986 1,555 3,820

1,740
3,851
FR
SO sO r - OO vo r- vo © CO CN © © 00
CN VI © CO CO
cn
oVI NO vo NO VO CN © CO © n* CO CN ©
1,096 1,225
1,684
208
1,043
920
1,291
FA
NO r- vo © © 1^* CN Tf
VO CN •*r CN CO
ON SO 00 CN Os oo vo © r - © CN o © CN vo
S3
260
90
2,417 1 889 1 202
ro SO r r CO CN CO
c-
OC CO 3 r-
© OO VO VO CN
i
|
NO 1/1 o •<r © 00 CN SC r - ^r c- CN
1 2,095] 1,270
5,304 1,810
2,592 1,136
4,294 2,166
165
6,973 2,101
EN
vo 00 CO Os CO © r- CN — 3 3
sO SO Os CO r*» © CO
VO vo SO © r» vC © © ©
2,570
1,324
299
1,319
4,847
1,399
2,738
1 4,902
DE
•*r ro CN o OO
OC CO CO tj- N; © VO
00 CN CN VI 00 © VO
184
©
967
2,959
275
1,907
2,867
412 1,331
365
307
40
344
465
261
CZ
sO vO 00 CO CN CO oo CO
co CN vO © ©
VI o VI oo 00 vo CO CN CN
001
os
346
60
159
104
25
CO CO vo CO
CH
co oo ro CO CN
CN
vo o © Os Os SO VI r-* ■*r
OS
OS
134
24
86
124
25
BE
CN •*r CN vo 3 CO
CN CN
00 ro vO vo vo CO r- © •*r © r- CN o
302
324
519
363
315
AU
CN © c- CO
CO co CO
sO r - Os CN SO © CO
132
06
144
1 495
1 1315
081
407
465
481
246
506
778
45
882
432
861
AT
SO VI CO CN CO CN
CN CN CN
o CN vo SO r-» 00 O n CN CO T vo © CO CN
27
C
28
32
o o O o o o © o © O — CN CN rsi CN CN CO CO
S IT

o
m
w
r-
00
Tf
Os
sO
226
CN
CO
SO
58 20
CN
58
sO
CN
1,500
sO C
cn
255 186 204
cn
CN
288 285 489
90 SO
N
3,233
OO
I/O
CN CN
241 132
Os C
©
n-n © ©
CN CN cn
rr cn oo
wn n*
cn
cn
sO
CN
388 59
Os N
445 265 394 275 513 249 4,122
O
661 861
cn
so
cn
cn
m •*r
586
C-
wn
00
en
SO m sO
2,092
wn
wn
221 401 388 462 784 9,766
r-
© r- ©
TT cn
©
52
oo
r - 00
156
CN CN
334
cn
wn wn wn Wn
Os
-'T
67 88 27 1,359
66
© C
cn
00
©
cn
n*
oo 00
sO
wn
176
N
678 269
r^* SO
CN
—
OO Wn
CN
287 65 270 129 3,341
cn SO r- 5
r- 00
wn ©
cn
00
©
156
cn
C- sO sO
00
496] 208 608
CN
CN
220
sC
CN
192 500 224 52 3,812
1,088
Os Os
1,148 1,036 4,840 1,591 1,286 2,916 2,250 3,427 519 898 1,345 1,520 29,184
784 465 750 2,262 962
rr
CN cn TT wn SO 00 O s
cn
wn
sC
CN
344 1,102 212 290
W“>
269 154 400 469 344 707 7,052
cn cn
Os
n*
wn
sC
>0
CN Os
oo
CN wn
o r- oo SCI
wn
CN
wn
Wn
SO CN
82 60 47 1,008
wn C
cn sO cn
00 cn
V*i
Os
n
333
wn
CN
3,582]
wN
wn
Os Os
wn
1,252
wn
sO
cn SO
683
scn sO OO
122 170 268 109 434 12,095

899'1
en C
5
(N c n
Os m Os r -
r-
464
CN r - CN cn
cn
cn
229 503 526
e' wn
sO
842
wn
306 359 8,861
r—
412 170 425
wn wn wn © <o vo s
©
m
© sO m
cn
©
^r r -
sO
Os
r- wn
1,013 216 1,301 3,610 1,281 1,685 1,167 1,290 1,226 1,450 802 1,396 19,097
224 623
©
cn
sO
3,158 3,035 1,391 4,010 2,270 4,153] 1,961 6,564
OO
5,630 4,506 2,036 4,372 2,602 5,291 1,666 4,169 67,016
CN
660‘1
r-
c-
1,650 1,094 516
r - 00
00
1,613
N P-* OO wn
wn
5,692] 2,047 1,968 2,733 2,218

r**
CN
2,341
CN
638 1,085 1,534 1,324 1,495 30,790

4,820 1,410 1,250 2,638 8,820 30,267 4,327 3,266
©s.
OO
262 4,544 4,676 2,554 5,099 2,275 3,864 8,789 2,356 3,310 102,505
r-
00
©
©
wn
wn
wn \o r '' OO
Os
Os
355 515 2,105 5,737
© SO SO v©
1,633
Os
1,331 1,216 666 [1,091 2,037 970 1,113

OO
956 429 24,064

669
3
Os
096
SO
386 1,003 1,863 11,433 1,629 1,642 3,218 360 2,651 2,787 2,022 1,135 37,725
1,174 569 1,892
90
r-
1,696
Os
1,319 | 8,693 1,912 1,106 1,944 2,081 1,760 1,757

wn
387 314 2,192 685 1,080 1,120 902 30,586
SC §
©
©
r-
Vi
cn
CN cn
wn
cn
cn
00
2,824
<N
2,482 | 12,5711 3,709 1,777 4,873 3,182 3,244 4,000 880 1,718 2,001 2,531 52,467
7,4
cn
823 2,431 6,922 865 2,145 803 1,199 1,604 I , 121 25,206
178 175 572 723 396 1,118 2,441 671 370
2,031 10,474 2,194 1,355] 2,654
90
OC
2,211 2,325 2,749 1,001 38,071

458 385 763 647 1,525 1,685
8
96
r- r-
Vi

90
90
wn
wn
90
3 wn cn
cnO Os r- Os 2 cn
Os
2177
Os TT
cn
cn
cn cn
wn
sC
CN
wn
747 1,525
CN sC
CN
350 296 428 10,773
cn Os C
wn ©
wn 9 0
r-
C
CN wn
sC
cn
© Os
CN
N
© cn
90
2,023] 2,420 848

CN
630 4,256
N
17,242
OO
346 554 2 ,7 239 377 206
©
cn 90
wn
2,954 1,384
cn CN 90
Os 90 wn
2,651 3,086 18,502 6,218 3,753 5,881

cn"
4,353 6,257 4,245 1,816 2,427 2,765 1,999 73,423

284
C
sC
cn
202
N
cn
685 | 4,611 1,072 1,986 889 1,436

sO
SC
l ,374
CN
934 471 17,591
00
r-
^r
©
cn
r- ©
m
cn
r-
r-»
c-
CN 90 wn cn
CN cn
| 4,416 498
00 ©S
365 854
wn wn
OS wn CN
CN
845 1,418 13,994

c
00 3
cn
cn
90
r-
O
cn
cr— r-
cn Os
wn r -
C
r-*
00 Os wn
r- cn
wn
Os CN CN
© r^-
c CN
| 2,082
wn
00
[ 292
cn
CN
Os
00 cn Os
CN
603
r - wn wn
356
CN
7,408
CN
65
82 130 105 38 31 173 1,045 190 171 245 42 260 135 64 163 67 120 169 218 33 3,399
83 3 2 3 14 75 3 2 12 4 16 3 14 7 2 22 27 3 212
84 260 263 52 599 8,527 164 171 672 87 362 277 684 134 842 979 587 699 597 15,956
85 33 2 24 100 34 21 51 3 80 23 23 31 6 44 27 19 20 541
87 985 458 463 959 944 6,110 1,898 1,016 2,298 518 1,949 3,091 805 1,380 298 693 642 924 940 26,371
88 79 26 13 461 248 3,051 79 44 629 2 801 1,600 274 64 4 295 173 126 268 8,237
89 973 425 312 700 850 5,116 1,376 936 1,968 422 1,479 1,551 351 1,363 419 732 710 787 671 21,141
95 394 27 435 1 22 8 10 249 94 6 1,246
Remark: counts exceed those based on ICS codes due to multiple assignments o f documents to two-digit SITC codes.
Tabic 11.5: Entries into PERUSORM by Year and C ountry
3
u
u
u
<
IV
S
*
3
•<
X
SB
Vi
u.
H
M
D E
ffi
E N
ec
Year GB I jp |I n l I n o 1PL I Sum 1
CN
en
Vi
n*
80 603 205
OO
1,630 10,276
>
242 1,256
c
Miss. 23 76
r-
00
en
en
(N
wn
OC
CN
86
wn
1965 1 28 170 528 60 46 150 186 68 2,631
8
n
>o
cm
NO
en
en
126 218 697 22
CM
1 196 6 ! 75 905 337 49 174 89 228 35 3,199
£
O
r-
©
wn
Vi
CN
r-*
en
Vi
cm
I 19671 252 766 1,249 555 80 255 44 45 3,813
V
r«*
081
OO
en
1 1968| 47 162 899 28 990 427 140 124 62 48 3,487
(N
6961
oo
861
en
CM
vO
wn
oo
en
65 1,092 44 1,392 154 62 216 59 158 216 79 70
o
o
-r
©
©
en
PM
en
1—
PM
©
CM
r**
IN
CM
Vi
Vi
107
OC
1,240
•e i
r—
wn
1,778
CM
e-M
1970 167 183 67 5,663
en
en
©
r»
m
Vi
r-
LIZ
NO
CM
CM
Os
OC
en
85 271 1,484
OC
287 1,658 799

CM
86 126 265 92 93 6,228
3
o
©
LI
en
106
en
O'
CM
en
CM
168
OO
1972 1,652 95 266 1,993 797 147 103 276 152 122 7,575
©
III
en
sO
066'1
Vi
NO
en
081
r-N
©V
268 50 439 1,904
On
905 1,444 92 140 245 89 8,747
3 S
©
en
c-
891
CM
en
59 296 2,314
On
195 too 2,037 1,524
CM
I 1974| 145 148 524 444 95 9,914
©
©
69
en
r -
wn
en
sO
O'
wn
IT )
79
NO
213
wn
167 3,134
NO
746 2,295 1,678 404 75 240 469 79 11,467
00
en
185 445 396 4,112

CM
OC
132
CM
1976 1 2541| 443 2,553 1,386 2,016 349 587 417 553 132 14,428
00
wn
00
r-
N<r
300 232 386
r**
1977 413 4,015 359 2,440 971 1,837 289 549 202 446 598 138 14,155
601
I 1978| 164 1 505 1 106 656 577 3,732 255 608 2,489 1,783 1,783 194 437 426 645 630 143 15,242
en
en
168
wn
258 403 598 255 4,179

wn
335 2,755
wn
465 1,645 1,474 242 381

NO
CM
CM
I 1979| 107 296 187

©
00
1 19801 227 419 408 682 395 7,134 239 590 2,731 1,667 2,298 210 370 168 457 162
661
18,836
en
en
*T
00
wn
en
009
00
I 19811 275 416 490 499 7,228 238 3,049 1,846 2,156 269 432 590 265 255 1 19,718
en
en
r-»
278 446 277 509 7,446

CM
557 346 2,989

CM
I 19821 473 1,857 2,298 457 495 624 336 282 20,186
©
1 cic
nC
r-
en
OC
r-
en
wn
en
en
en
en
wn
1983 6 2 41 8,130 3,956 1,435 2,605 685 176 780 [ 23,239

884 1 474 1
i
c
en
en
en
Os
OC
r**
NO
se n
r-»
642 8,028 514
CM
1984 705 3,173 1,750 2,981 841 449 404 23,257

797
o
009
r-
en
"T
en
00
00
478
en
en
wn
1985 481 820 674 8,038 513 1,065 4,182 1,714 3,328 189 624 570 25,698
en
©
196
en
1 19861 1,007 285 539 848 7,628 758 3,664 1,936 2,551 450 1,236 877 1,016 595 602 25,547
en
696
P».
998
wn
r-
en
en
492 307
OO
775 7,866 1,135 3,362

wn
r**
CM
1987 2,156 3,409 457 824 1,059 759 26,465

•*
wn
1988 7,934 1,402 592 3,828 2,025 5,608 583 939 882 1,158
T
614 098 841 782 1 6 3 7 1 1,006 1,533 106 767 31,585

696
I 19891 754 1 329 824 884 7,814 2,389 850 3,540 2,655 3,652 601 926 501 977 2,503 31,929
3
868'8
wn
642 357 941 755 3,261

wn
N
3,510
©
1,048 4,114 4,354 1,201 409 1,036

’T
1990 1,051 813 1,189 35,689
en
en
©
090*1
nC
00
©
718 431 1,261

r*-
r-*
1991 10,651 5,897 1,038 3,696 4,212 744 1,241 1,213 1,030 1.628 1.451 45,173
r-
r*
en
001*1
*T
wn
|
©
2,218 || 1.784) 1,195 11,964 7,646

r«T
1992 92. 1,714 4,433 4,836 2,374 817 1,673 1,055 1,349 1,678 56,076
$
2,260 1,954 1,372 10,989 8,719 2,542 5,720

CM
749 1 2,525 4,996 6,452 1,056 2,649 2,264 952 1,077 2,473 59,411
1
©
en
en
00
wn
px-
wn
CM
en
oo
CM
1—
■*r
2,105 3,190 11,704

CM
11,179
CN
2,518 6,249 4,429 5,312 586 2,089 382 744
N©
2,424 | 67,333
67
1995 4,400 943 2,843 3,210 3,123 11,530 10,734 2,024 6,044 7,041 7,113 1,533 7,318 1,146 305 1,234 1,333 3,503 75,377
1996 5,050 1,178 5,219 2,646 4,067 11,248 10,567 4,982 6,050 7,420 6,926 1,120 6,802 827 2,836 562 7,639 3,088 88,227
1997 5,506 1,138 3,591 2,947 6,174 11,729 9,465 3,786 5,676 8,789 8,524 975 8,199 1,244 3,230 1,080 3,049 1,405 86,507
1998 5,589 1,223 2,093 1,882 4,316 10,228 6,661 2,299 3,481 6,334 5,593 1,321 5.408 691 2,457 341 1,531 599 62,047
1999 2 21 23
Remark: counts exceed those based on ICS codes due to multiple assignments o f documents to two-digit SITC codes.
69
Table II.6: Types o f International Links by 2-digit SITC (with Total Counts)
SITC EQV IDT NEQ REL UN Sum
00 840 225 415 110 395 1,985
01 4,369 1,354 2,459 240 1,469 9,891
02 4,400 897 2,483 720 811 9,311
03 2,984 608 960 224 1,144 5,920
04 8,313 2,034 2,191 710 3,060 16,308
05 8,373 393 883 694 1,996 12,339
06 2,388 168 200 221 370 3,347
07 1,752 552 655 63 619 3,641
08 800 270 400 no 570 2,150
09 501 110 2531 27 204 1,095
11 2,118 51 114 176 231 2,690
12 1,135 525 875 140 645 3,320
21 597 60 199 102 120 1,078
23 11,317 2,045 7,382 3,803 2,686 27,233
24 13,407 161 1,293 1,177 1,572 17,610
25 1,500 257 734 199 389 3,079
26 8,670 283 4,733 1,547 2,039 17,272
27 39,913 2,331 6,070 4,549 2,867 55,730
28 382 357 545 11 324 1,619
32 76 28 216 12 52 384
33 9,009 1,138 2,912 4,519 3,454 21,032
34 35 1 1 2 9 48
41 2,670 460 690 264 438 4,522
42 7,195 1,320 650 1,005 1,090 11,260
43 386 32 42 12 104 576
51 774 77 1,192 2,441 922 5,406
52 11,142 169 842 5,059 4,224 21,436
53 11,171 720 6,047 5,195 2,613 25,746
54 943 80 372 192 140 1,727
55 2,073 264 985 2,271 364 5,957
56 1,524 320 576 176 476 3,072
58 45,722 3,089 28,887 12,666 9,313 99,677
59 7,350 467 1,734 1,580 987 12,118
61 414 41 285 242 78 1,060
62 9,947 1,127 5,179 3,099 1,722 21,074
63 14,289 288 1,957 2,102 1,461 20,097
64 15,574 2,297 6,483 2,059 3,397 29,810
65 160,141 14,478 57,446 53,450 17,241 302,756
66 76,466 4,538 10,376 11,278 5,281 107,939

70
67 105,848 14,831 39,586 32,742 11,355 204,362

68 16,151 1,956 5,336 6,801 2,075 32,319
69 41,455 3,861 28,535 9,593 7,205 90,649
71 30,483 2,438 4,219 3,735 3,291 44,166
72 50,1661 3,234 7,445 7,405 7,500 75,750
73 16,668 1,332 13,760 2,484 2,649 36,893
74 32,342 2,674 8,992 5,154 4,778 53,940
75 11,625 1,566 7,654 1,419 6,429 28,693
76 9,742 2,723 4,486 495 1,048 18,494
77 81,085 9,657 44,974 10,979 8,905 155,600
78 9,915 1,296 3,142 4,131 2,128 20,612
79 3,495 504 454 191 491 5,135
81 12,048 1,006 10,169 1,838 919 25,980
82 2,658 44 764 314 223 4,003
83 87 10 19 17 44 177
84 2,976 220 2,421 249 1,425 7,291
85 187 3 23 8 221
87 40,242 4,172 13,574 7,287 5,195 70,470
88 3,807 262 2,852 121 910 7,952
89 32,038 2,721 9,317 5,517 4,765 54,358
Remark: counts exceed those based on ICS codes due to multiple

assignments of documents to two-digit SITC codes.

71
Table II.7a: Analysis o f Variance of the Log of Shared Standards for Five
European Countries
Source Partial Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Prob >

Squares Freedom Squares statistic F
Model 114,981.67 499 230.42 343.41 0.00
Country- 21,167.40 14 1,511.96 2,253.34 0.00

Pairs
Year 15,017.19 15 1,001.15 1,492.06 0.00
SITC 78,797.08 470 167.65 249.86 0.00
Residual 75,512.48 0.67
Total 190,494.15 1.69
Table based on 113,040 bilateral observations. Years covered are 1980-95. Countries
included are Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

72
Table II.7b: Analysis of Variance of the Log o f Shared Standards for All Coun
tries in the Sample
Source Partial Sum of Degrees of Mean F- Prob >

Squares Freedom Squares statistic F
Model 204,074.07 575 354.91 905.58 0.00
Country- 119,512.03 90 1,327.91 3,388.27 0.00

Pairs
Year 20,020.28 15 1,334.69 3,405.55 0.00
SITC 64,541.77 470 137.32 350.39 0.00
Residual 268,539.87 0.39
Total 472,613.93 0.69
Table based on 685,776 bilateral observations. Years covered are 1980-95.

73
APPENDIX B: DATA RETRIEVAL
Table II.8: Content of the PERINORM Database

Field Sample Record Description Current (C) / Future (F)
Use
Origin code GB Country
Document BS 2048:Part 1:1961 Unique code
identifier
Publication 1961-09-13 Start date for life-span o f
date standard if effective date
was missing (C)
Status CF ST Type o f document, ST = Selection criteria (C)
standard
Title Specification for dim ensions o f Distinction between types
(English) fractional horse-power motors. o f standards (quality /
Dimensions o f m otors for general compatibility) (F)
use
Abstract Five frames sizes having foot, Distinction between types
(English) flange or resilient base m ountings o f standards (quality /
(with or without belt-tensioning compatibility) (F)
devices), with sleeve or ball
bearings. Single and polyphase
a.c. motors and d.c. motors.
Except m ounting dim ensions for
frame 42 and flange mountings,
frames specified permit inter-
changeability with frames in
(American) N.E.M .A. standard
M.G.l. - January 1959.
Effective 1961-09-13 Start date for life-span o f
date standard (C)
Confirm a 1989-09-15 Consistency check for
tion date life-span o f standard (C)
W ithdrawal End date for life-span o f
date standard (C)
Expiry date End date for life-span o f
standard (C)
Amends Reference to other Recovery o f ICS code (C)
documents that is
amended by the current
document
Amended by AMD 275 published 15 July O ther documents that Recovery o f ICS code (C)
1969 effective 15 July 1969 Free amend the current
o f charge incorporated; AMD document
1074 published 19 December
1972 effective 19 Decem ber
1972 Free o f charge incorporated
Replaces BS 2048:1953 Recovery o f ICS code,
start date and document
type(C )

74
Draft AA(ELE)3593 DC Recovery o f ICS code,

superseded start date and document
type (C)
Replaced by Recovery o f ICS code,
end date and document
type (C)
Notes Provide additional Distinction between types
comments o f standards (quality /
compatibility) (F)
International NEMA MG I Reference to other Establishing the bilateral
relationship documents that are link (C)
related to the current
document
Classifica 29.160.30 Industry code (ICS) Concatenation and
tion concordance to SITC (C),
distinction between types
o f standards (F)
Cross BS 46:Part 1; BS 170; BS 1038; Documents that cite the Recovery o f ICS code
references BS 1802; BS I916:Part 1 current one (supplem entary only) (C)
Original EN Classification o f stan
language dards by available lan
guage (F)
Translations Classification o f stan
dards by available lan
guage (F)
Issuing body British Standards Institution Distinguish European
from International Stan
dards (C)
Committee PEL/2 Name o f committee Possible future use to
reference responsible for the construct instruments (F)
development o f the
standard
Format/Page A4, 16 pages Proxy for informational
s content (F)
Price GBP 10.00 to subscribing mem Proxy for informational
bers o f BSI, GBP20.00 to non content (F)
members
Descriptors ELECTRIC M OTORS * Distinction between types
(English) ALTERNATING-CURRENT o f standards (quality /
MOTORS * DIRECT- com patibility) (F)
CURRENT M OTORS *
FRACTIONAL HORSEPOW ER
MOTORS * DIM ENSIONS *
STATOR FRAMES
Remark: foreign language fields that are only translations of the English versions and
organizational fields like sort criteria are omitted here

75
Table II.9: Missing Values and Recovery Statistics by Variable
original recovered rec from rec from Sum

org rec
missing 14,917 14,917
YEARF
present 969,013 308 969,321
assumed 665,559 665,559
YEART
active
withdrawn 300,631 18,048 318,679

missing 15,221 15,221
DOCTYP
present 943,549 25,468 969,017
E
missing 52,563 52,563

ICS
present 509,634 74,441 204,149 143,451 931,675
Remark: the numbers are based on the apparent counts of documents. These are higher
than the actual numbers, since many international documents were listed with differ
ent ICS-Classifications than the original documents. Since these had to be added to get
the same number o f observations in each direction and industry, the numbers are
considerably higher. A measure o f that is presented in the fields ICS recovered from
original and recovered from recovered: these are the numbers that were added due to
differences in ICS-codes of internationally linked documents.

76
Table 11.10: Previous and Consecutive Documents by Country

COUNTRY Docs with links to Docs with links to Ratio cons./prev.
previous docs consecutive docs
AT 10,780 181 2%
AU 4,652 5,919 127%
BE 1,421 215 15%
CH 2,595 2,604 100%
CZ 0 699 0%
DE 65,080 75,803 116%
EN 10,231 18,267 179%
ES 4,554 5,224 115%
FA 42,834 35,980 84%
GB 41,341 22,120 54%
IX 14,289 20,907 146%
JP 494 124 25%
NL 15,034 14,908 99%
NO 0 0 0%
PL 16,726 6,746 40%
SK 11,506 6,125 53%
TR 1,251 2,642 211%
US 9,612 1,269 13%

77
APPENDIX C: CONCORDANCES AND CONCATENATION
Table 11.11: The PERINORM Classifications and their Unique Counterparts

Previous Previous Description N um ber New Code New Description
Code (not
unique)
B Announcement 235 RG Regulation
CF Confirmed 4,296 ST Standard
DC Draft 97,368 RG, STD, Depends on Character o f Doc.
TRD
DR (Draft) 370 STD Standard Draft
G Law 1,049 RG Regulation
GD Guide 2 ST Standard
N Standard 158,825 ST Standard
N-E Standard-Draft 69,249 STD Standard Draft
N-E-S Standard Final Draft 6 STD Standard Draft
N-V Pre-Standard till 3/85 887 STD Standard Draft
OB Revised 639 ST Standard
PC Suggested for Approval 257 ST Standard
PO Proposed as Being Revised 37 ST Standard
PR Partly Replaced 158 ST Standard
PVV Proposed for Withdrawal 114 ST Standard
RG Regulation 30,591 RG Regulation
RV Revised 3,879 RG, ST, TR Depends on Character o f Doc.
SS Replaced 2,533 RG, ST, TR Depends on Character o f Doc.
ST Standards 342,452 ST Standard
TD Technical Directive 43,784 TR Technical Rule
TR Technical Rule 39,320 TR Technical Rule
TR-E Technical Rule Draft 2,684 TRD Technical Rule Draft
UVV Accident Prevention Reg. 633 RG Regulation
V General Regulation 3,171 RG Regulation
VN Pre-Standard 2,359 STD Standard Draft
VN-E Pre-Standard Draft 656 STD Standard Draft
VV Accounting Regulations 5,126 RG Regulation
WH Under Revision, Draft avail 1,477 RG, ST, TR Depends on C haracter o f Doc.
able
WN Withdrawn 7,432 RG, ST, TR Depends on Character o f Doc.

78
Table 11.12: Matching ICS with SITC

SITC ICS
0011 01.040.65. 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.30
0012 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.30
0013 01.040.65, 65, 65.020.65.020.01, 65.020.30
0014 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.30
0015 01.040.65, 65, 65.020,65.020.01, 65.020.30
0111 01.040.67, 67.040, 67.120.01, 67, 67.120, 67.120.10
0112 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0113 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0114 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.20
0115 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0116 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01,67.120.10
0118 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0121 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0129 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0142 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0149 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.10
0223 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.100, 67. i 00.01, 67.100.10
0224 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.100, 67.100.01, 67.100.10
0230 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.100, 67.100.01, 67.100.20
0240 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.100, 67.100.01, 67.100.30
0251 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.20, 67.120.01
0252 01.040.67, 67, 67.040,67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.20
0341 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 65.150, 67.120.30
0342 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0343 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040, 67.120. 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0344 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0350 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0360 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040. 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0371 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150, 67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0372 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.150,67, 67.040, 67.120, 67.120.01, 67.120.30
0411 65.020.01, 67, 67.040,01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.20, 67.060
0412 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0421 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0422 01.040.65, 01.040.67,65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0430 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20. 67, 67.040. 67.060
0440 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0451 01.040.65, 01.040.67,01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0452 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0459 01.040.65, 01.040.67,01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0460 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0470 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0481 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0483 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0484 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.020.20, 67, 67.040, 67.060
0488 01.040.67, 67, 67.040
0541 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080.01, 67.080,67.080.20
0542 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.20

79
0544 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.20

0545 01.040.67. 67. 67.040, 67.080,67.080.01, 67.080.20
0546 01.040.67, 67,67.040, 67.080,67.080.01, 67.080.20
0561 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.20
0565 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.20
0571 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0572 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080,67.080.01, 67.080.10
0574 01.040.67. 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0575 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0577 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0579 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0583 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0585 67, 67.040, 67.160, 67.160.20, 67.160.01
0586 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.10, 67.080.01
0589 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.080, 67.080.01, 67.080.10
0611 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.180, 67.180.10
0612 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.180, 67.180.10
0616 01.040.65, 01.040.67, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 67, 67.040, 65.140, 65.140.10, 65.140.20,
65.140.30
0619 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.180.67.180.10
0620 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.180,67.180.10
0711 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.140.20
0712 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.140.20
0730 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.190
0741 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.140.10
0742 67, 67.040
0750 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.220, 67.220.10
0811 01.040.65, 65. 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.120
0812 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.120
0813 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.120
0814 01.040.65, 65. 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.120
0819 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.120
0910
0980 01.040.67, 67.040, 67.220, 67.220.10, 67.220.20
1110 01.040.67, 67.160.01, 67.160, 67.160.20
1121 01.040.67, 67.160, 67.160.01, 67.160.10
1123 01.040.67, 67.160, 67.160.01, 67.160.10
1124 01.040.67, 67.160, 67.160.01, 67.160.10
1211 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.160
1212 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.160
1213 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.160
1222 01.040.65, 65. 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.160
1223 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.160
2111 01.040.59, 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.20
2112 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.20
2117 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.20
2119 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.20
2120 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.20
2222
2224

80
2225
2226
2234
2235
2238
2320 83.040.01, 83.040.30, 83.140, 83.140.40, 83.140.99, 01.040.83, 83.040, 83.040.10, 83.040.20,
83.060, 83.140.01, 83.140.50
2331 01.040.83, 83.040, 83.040.01, 83.040.10, 83.040.20, 83.040.30, 83.060, 83.140, 83.140.01,
83.140.40, 83.140.50, 83.140.99, 83.160.01, 83.160.20, 83.160.99, 83.160, 83.160.10,
83.160.30
2332 01.040.83, 83.040, 83.040.01, 83.040.10, 83.040.20, 83.040.30, 83.060, 83.140, 83.140.01,
83.140.40, 83.140.50, 83.140.99, 83.160.10, 83.160.30
2440 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.100
2450
2460 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.060.01, 79.060.20, 79.060, 79.060.10, 79.060.99
2471 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.040
2472 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.040
2481 01.040.79, 01.040.93, 45, 45.080, 79.020, 79.040, 93, 93.010,45.020, 93.100, 01.040.45
2482 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.040
2483 01.040.79, 79.020, 79.040
2511 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
2512
2516
2517
2518
2614 59.060.01, 01.040.59. 59.060.10
2630 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2640 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2650 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2660 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.20
2681 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2682 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2683 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2685 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2686 01.040.59, 59.060.01, 59.060.10
2690
2710 01.040.65, 01.040.73, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.080, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2731 01.040.73, 01.040.91, 73, 73.020, 73.080, 91. 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100.01,91.100, 91.100.20
2732 01.040.73, 01.040.91, 73, 73.020, 73.080, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.10
2733 01.040.73, 01.040.91, 73, 73.020, 73.080, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.20
2740 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2771 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2772 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2782 01.040.73, 01.040.81, 73, 73.020, 73.080, 81.060, 81.060.01, 81.060.10, 81.060.99
2783 01.040.67, 01.040.73, 67.040, 67.220, 67.220.10, 73. 73.020, 73.080
2785 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080, 01.040.81, 81.040, 81.040.01, 81.040.10
2786 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2789 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.080
2815 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.10
2816 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.10

81
2820 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01

2871 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.99
2872 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.99
2873 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.40
2875 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.99
2879 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01, 73.060.30
2881 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01
2882 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01
2890 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.060, 73.060.01
2911
2919
2922
2924
2925
2926
2927
2929
3221 73.020, 01.040.73, 73, 73.040
3224 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.040
3231 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.040
3232 01.040.73, 73, 73.020, 73.040
3341 75.160.01, 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.160, 75.160.20
3343 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.160, 75.160.01, 75.160.30
3344 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.160, 75.160.01, 75.160.20
3345 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.100, 75.120
3351 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.140
3352 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.140
3353 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.160, 75.160.01, 75.160.10
3354 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.080, 75.140
3410 01.040.75, 75.020, 75.060
3510
4111 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.10
4113 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.10
4232 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.20
4239 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.20
4241 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.20
4243 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.040, 67.200, 67.200.20
4249 01.040.67, 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.040,67.200, 67.200.20
4313 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.200
4314 01.040.67, 67, 67.040, 67.200
5110 01.040.71,71,71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01,71.080.10, 7 1.080.15,71.080.20
5121 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01, 71.080.60
5123 01.040.71,71,71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01,71.080.90
5130 01.040.71,71,71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01,71.080.40, 71.080.50
5140 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01, 71.080.30
5150 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01, 71.080.99
5161 01.040.71,71,71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01,71.080.60
5162 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01, 71.080.80
5169 01.040.71,71,71.020, 71.080, 71.080.01,71.080.99
5221 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 29.045, 71.060, 71.060.01. 71.060.10

82
5222 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.060.30

5224 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.060.20
5225 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.060.30, 71.060.40
5231 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.060.50
5239 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.100.01, 71.060.99, 71.100, 71.100.20
5240 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.060, 71.060.01, 71.060.10
5331 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 01.040.87, 01.070, 87, 87.020, 87.040, 87.060, 87.060.01, 87.060.10,
87.060.20, 87.060.30, 87.060.99
5334 01.040.59, 01.040.71,01.040.87, 01.070, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.10, 71, 71.020, 87, 87.020,
87.040, 87.060, 87.060.01, 87.060.10, 87.060.20, 87.060.30, 87.060.99
5411
5413
5414
5415
5416
5417 11.120, 11.120.01, 11.120.10, 11.200,01.040.11
5419 11.120, 11.120.01, 11.120.20,01.040.11
5513 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.100, 71.100.01, 71.100.70
5530 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.100, 71.100.01, 71.100.70
5542 01.040.71, 71, 71.020, 71.100, 71.100.01, 71.100.01, 71.100.40
5543 01.040.71,71,71.020
5621 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.080
5622 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.080
5623 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.080
5629 01.040.65, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.080
5820 01.040.83, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 83.040, 83.040.20, 83.140, 83.140.01, 83.140.10, 23.040.20,
83.040.01, 83.040.30, 83.080, 83.080.01, 83.080.10, 83.140.20, 83.140.30, 01.040.23
5830 01.040.83, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.20, 83.040, 83.040.01, 83.040.20, 83.040.30, 83.080,
83.080.01, 83.140, 83.140.01, 83.140.10, 83.140.20, 83.140.30, 83.080.20, 01.040.23
5840 01.040.85, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.20, 83.040, 83.040.01, 83.040.20, 83.040.30, 83.080,
83.080.01, 83.140, 83.140.01, 83.140.10, 83.140.20, 83.140.30, 85.020, 83.120, 85.040,
01.040.23
5910 01.040.65, 01.040.71, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 71, 71.020, 65.100
5921 0 1.040.67, 01.040.71, 67.180, 71, 71.020, 71.100, 71.100.01, 67.180.20, 71.100.99
5922 01.040.67, 01.040.71, 01.040.83, 67, 67.040, 67.220, 71, 71.020, 67.220.20, 83.180
5981 01.040.71,71,71.020
5989 01.040.59, 01.040.71, 59.140.01, 71, 71.020, 71.100, 71.100.01, 71.100.99, 25.160, 25.160.01,
25.160.20, 59.140, 59.140.10, 01.040.25
6110 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.30
6120 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.35
6130
6210 01.040.83, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 83.060, 83.140, 83.140.01, 23.040.70, 23.040.72, 83.140.40,
01.040.23
6250 01.040.83, 83.160, 83.160.10, 83.160.30, 83.160.01, 83.160.20, 83.160.99
6282 01.040.83, 43.020, 43.040,43.040.50, 53, 53.040.01, 83.140.99, 43.040.01, 53.040, 53.040.10,
53.040.20, 01.040.43, 01.040.53
6289 01.040.83, 83.140.50, 83.140.99
6341 01.040.79, 79.040, 79.060, 79.060.10, 79.060.01
6342 01.040.79, 79.060, 79.060.01, 79.060.10
6343 01.040.79, 79.060, 79.060.01, 79.060.99, 79.060.20
6351 01.040.55,01.040.79, 55, 55.020, 55.140, 55.160, 79.080

83
6353 01.040.97, 79.080. 97.020, 97.150

6359 01.040.79, 79.080
6411 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
6412 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
6413 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
6415 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
6416 01.040.85. 85.020, 85.060
6417 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.060
6418 01.040.85. 85.020, 85.060, 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.060, 91.060.01, 91.060.20
6419 01.040.85, 01.040.91, 85.020, 85.060, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.180
6421 01.040.55, 01.040.85, 55, 55.020, 55.160, 85.020. 85.080
6424 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.080
6428 01.040.85, 85.020, 85.080
6512 01.040.59, 59.080.01, 59.080, 59.080.20
6514 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.20
6517 01.040.59. 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.20
6519 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.20
6521 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6522 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6531 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6539 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6542 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6549 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6550 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6560 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01. 59.080.30
6571 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.30
6573 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.40
6575 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.50
6577 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.99
6581 55.020, 01.040.55. 55, 55.080
6583 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.99
6584 01.040.59, 01.040.97, 59.080, 59.080.99, 97.020, 59.080.01, 97.160
6589
6591 01.040.59, 01.040.97, 59.080, 59.080.01, 97.020, 97.150, 59.080.60
6592 01.040.59, 59.080, 59.080.01, 59.080.60
6611 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.10
6612 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.10
6613 01.040.91, 01.040.93, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.20, 93, 93.010, 93.080,
93.080.01,93.080.30
6618 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.30, 91.100.01, 91.100.40
6623 01.040.81, 01.040.91, 81.060.99, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.20,
81.060.20, 81.080, 91.120, 91.120.01, 91.120.10
6624 0 1.040.81,01.040.91, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01,81.060.20, 81.060.99, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01,
91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.20, 23.040.50, 01.040.23
6631
6632
6633 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.100, 91.100.01, 91.100.30
6638
6650 01.040.71,55, 55.020, 71,71.020, 55.100, 71.120. 71.120.01, 71.120.10, 81.040.30, 01.040.55
6664 01.040.81,81.060.20

84
6665 01.040.81,81.060.20
6666
6672
6674
6712 77.080.01, 77.080.20, 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.10
6713 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.160
6716 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.100
6724 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.10, 77.140.20, 77.140.40, 77.080.01, 77.080.20, 77.140,
77.140.01, 77.140.10, 77.140.30
6725 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.50
6731 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.65
6732 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.60
6733 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.70, 77.140.75
6740 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40
6760 01.040.77, 01.040.93,45.020, 45.040, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20,
77.140, 77.140.01, 93, 93.100, 01.040.45, 45, 45.080, 93.010
6770 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.65
6781 01.040.77, 23, 23.040.01, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140,
77.140.01, 23.040, 23.040.10, 77.140.80, 01.040.23
6782 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.10, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10,
77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.85, 77.140.20,
77.140.40,01.040.23
6783 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.10, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10,
77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10, 77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.40,
77.140.85,01.040.23
6785 01.040.77, 23, 23, 23.040, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.01, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01,
77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10, 77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40,
77.140.40, 77.140.85, 23.040.40, 23.040.60, 01.040.23
6793 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.40, 77.140.85
6794 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.080, 77.080.01, 77.080.10, 77.080.20, 77.140, 77.140.01, 77.140.10,
77.140.20, 77.140.30, 77.140.40, 77.140.40, 77.140.80
6811 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01
6812 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01
6821 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 29.050, 77.120.30
6822 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 29.050, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.30, 23.040.15,
77.150.01, 77.150.30,01.040.23
6831 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.40
6832 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.15, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.40,
77.150.01, 77.150.40, 01.040.23
6841 01.040.71, 01.040.77, 71. 71.020, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 71.100.10, 77.120.10
6842 01.040.71, 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.15, 71, 71.020, 71.100.10, 77, 77.020,
77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.10, 77.150.01, 77.150.10, 01.040.23
6851 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.60
6852 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.60, 77.150.01, 77.150.60

85
6861 01.040.77. 77. 77.020. 77.120. 77.120.01. 77.120.60

6863 01.040.77, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 23.040.15, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.60,
77.150.01, 77.150.60,01.040.23
6890 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.120, 77.120.01, 77.120.20, 77.120.50, 77.120.70, 77.120.99
6910 01.040.77, 01.040.91, 77, 77.020, 91, 91, 91.010, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.010.01, 93.010,
01.040.93, 91.080, 91.080.01, 91.080.10, 91.190, 93, 93.040
6920 01.040.55, 01.040.77, 23.020.01, 23.020.10, 55, 55.020, 55.180.01, 77, 77.020, 01.040.23, 23,
23.020, 23.020.30, 23.020.99, 55.140, 55.180, 55.180.10, 55.180.30, 55.180.40
6931 01.040.77, 77, 77.020
6935 01.040.77, 77, 77.020
6940 01.040.77, 21.020, 77, 77.020, 01.040.21, 21, 21.040, 21.040.01, 21.040.10, 21.040.20,
21.040.30, 21.060, 21.060.01, 21.060.10, 21.060.20, 21.060.30, 21.060.31,21.060.40,
21.060.50. 21.060.60, 21.060.70, 21.060.99
6951 01.040.65, 01.040.65, 01.040.77, 25.140, 53, 65, 65, 65.020, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.060,
65.060.01, 65.060.70, 77, 77.020, 25.140.01, 25.140.30, 53.120, 65.060.40, 65.060.80,
01.040.25,01.040.53
6953 01.040.65, 01.040.77, 25.140, 25.140.01, 25.140.30, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.060, 65.060.01,
65.060.70, 65.060.80, 77, 77.020, 01.040.25
6954 01.040.65, 01.040.77, 25.140, 25.140.01, 25.140.30, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.060, 65.060.01,
65.060.70, 65.060.80, 77, 77.020, 01.040.25
6960 01.040.77, 01.040.97, 77, 77.020, 97.020, 97.040, 97.040.01,97.040.60
6973 01.040.77, 01.040.97, 77, 77.020, 97.020, 97.040, 97.040.01, 97.030, 97.040.20
6974 01.040.77, 01.040.97, 77, 77.020, 97.020, 97.040, 97.040.01, 97.040.99
6991 01.040.77, 01.040.91, 21, 21.020, 21.080, 77, 77.020, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.190.01.040.21
6992 01.040.77, 77, 77.020, 77.140.65
6996 01.040.77, 77, 77.020
6997 01.040.77, 77. 77.020
6998 01.040.77, 23, 23.020, 23.020.01, 77, 77.020, 23.020.10, 01.040.23
6999 01.040.77, 77, 77.020
7110 01.040.91, 13, 13.020, 27, 27.010, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.140, 91.140.01, 91.140.65,
01.040.13,01.040.27, 13, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 27.040,27.060, 27.060.01,27.060.10,
27.060.20, 27.060.30
7120 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 27, 27.010, 27.040, 27.060, 27.060.01, 27.060.10,
27.060.20, 27.060.30, 01.040.13, 01.040.27
7133 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 27.010,47.020.01,01.040.47, 27, 27.020,47,
47.020,47.020.20, 01.040.13,01.040.27
7139 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,27,27.010,27.020,47,47.020,47.020.01,
47.020.20, 01.040.13, 01.040.27, 01.040.47
7140 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 27,27.010,27.040, 49.020, 49.050,01.040.13,
01.040.27,01.040.49
7160 13, 13.020, 13.110, 21, 29, 29.020, 21.020, 21.240, 29.160, 29.160.01, 29.160.10, 29.160.20,
29.160.30, 29.160.40, 29.160.99, 01.040.13,01.040.21,01.040.29
7188 13, 13.020, 13.110. 27, 27.010, 27.140, 27.180,01.040.13,01.040.27
7211 01.040.65, 13, 13.020, 13.110, 65, 65.020, 65.020.01, 65.060,65.060.01, 65.060.20, 65.060.25,
65.060.30,01.040.13
7212 01.040.65, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,65, 65.020,65.020.01,65.060,
65.060.01, 65.060.50, 65.060.70, 01.040.13
7213 01.040.65, 13, 13.020, 13.110, 65, 65.020. 65.020.01, 65.040, 65.040.01, 65.040.10, 01.040.13
7219 01.040.65, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,65,65.020, 65.020.01,65.060,
65.060.01, 65.060.60. 01.040.13
7220 01.040.65, 13, 13.020, 13.110, 65,65.020, 65.020.01,65.060.01,65.060, 65.060.10,01.040.13

86
7230 01.040.73,01.040.91, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,53,53.100, 73.100,

73.100.01, 73.100.10, 91.220, 91.220.10, 01.040.13,01.040.53
7243 01.040.61, 13, 13.020, 13.110.61,61.080,01.040.13
7247 01.040.59,01.040.61, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,61,61.080, 59.120,
59.120.01, 59.120.50, 01.040.13
7248 01.040.59, 13, 13, 13.020. 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,59.140,59.140.01,59.140.40,01.040.13
7251 01.040.85, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 85.020, 85.100,01.040.13
7252 01.040.85, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,85.020,85.100,01.040.13
7259 01.040.85, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 85.020.85.100,01.040.13
7260 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,37.020,37.100,37.100.01,37.100.10,01.040.13,
01.040.37
7270 01.040.67, 13, 13.020, 13.110, 67, 67.040, 67.260, 01.040.13
7281 01.040.65,01.040.73,01.040.79, 13, 13.020, 13.110,65,65.020, 65.020.01,65.060,65.060.80,
79.120.01. 65.060.01, 73.120, 79.120.10, 01.040.13
7283 01.040.73,01.040.81, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 73.120,81.100,01.040.13
7284 01.040.65,01.040.81,01.040.83, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 65, 65.020,
65.160, 81.100, 65.020.01, 83.200, 01.040.13
7361 01.040.77, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,25.060,01.040.25,25.060.01,25.060.10,
25.060.20, 25.060.30, 25.060.99, 25.080, 25.080.01, 25.080.10, 25.080.20, 25.080.25,
25.080.30, 25.080.40, 25.080.50, 25.080.60, 25.080.99, 25.100, 25.100.01, 25.100.10,
25.100.20, 25.100.25, 25.100.30, 25.100.40, 25.100.50, 25.100.60, 25.100.70, 25.100.99,
77.180,01.040.13
7369 01.040.77, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,25.060.01,25.060.10, 25.060.20,
25.060.30, 25.060.99, 25.080, 25.080.01, 25.080.10,25.080.20, 25.080.25, 25.080.30,
25.080.40, 25.080.50, 25.080.60, 25.080.99, 25.100, 25.100.01, 25.100.10, 25.100.20,
25.100.25, 25.100.30, 25.100.40, 25.100.50, 25.100.60, 25.100.70, 25.100.99, 77.180, 25.060,
01.040.13,01.040.25
7371 01.040.77, 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 25.120, 77.180,25.120.01,25.120.30,
25.120.99, 01.040.13,01.040.25
7413 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,25.180.01,25.180.20, 25.180,25.180.10,01.040.13,
01.040.25
7414 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,27,27.010,27.200,01.040.13,01.040.27
7416 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,25.180,25.180.10,25.180.01,25.180.20,25.200,
01.040.13,01.040.25
7420 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,23,01.040.13.01.040.23
7430 13, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110,23,53, 53.040,53.040.01,23.120, 23.140,
23.140.40, 23.160, 53.040.30, 01.040.13, 01.040.23, 01.040.53
7441 13. 13.020, 13.110, 53, 53.040, 53.040.01, 53.040.99, 53.080, 01.040.13, 01.040.53
7442 01.040.91, 13, 13.020, 13.110, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.140, 01.040.53, 53, 53.020,
53.020.01, 53.020.20, 53.020.30, 53.020.99, 91.140.01, 91.140.90, 01.040.13
7451 01.040.79, 25.140.01, 79.120.10, 25.140, 25.140.10, 79.120.01, 01.040.25
7452 01.040.55, 25.120.01, 55, 25.120, 25.120.20, 55.020, 55.200, 55.230, 01.040.25
7491 21. 21.020, 21.100, 21.100.01, 21.100.10, 21.100.20,01.040.21
7492 23, 23.060, 23.060.01, 23.060.10, 23.060.20, 23.060.30, 23.060.40, 23.060.50, 23.060.99,
01.040.23
7493 21,21.020,43.020, 43.040, 43.040.01, 43.040.50, 21.120.01, 21.120.10, 21.120.20, 21.120.30,
21.120.40, 21.120.99, 21.200, 21.220.01,21.220.10, 21.220.20, 21.220.30, 21.220.99,
01.040.21,01.040.43
7499 21,21.020, 23, 23.040, 21.140, 21.180, 23.040.01. 23.040.80, 01.040.21,01.040.23
7511 35.020, 35.260.01, 35.260.10, 35.260, 01.040.35
7512 35.020, 35.260, 35.260.01. 35.260.10, 01.040.35

87
7520 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.40, 13.110, 01.040.35, 35.020, 35.040, 35.160, 35.180, 35.200,
35.220, 35.220.01,35.220.10, 35.220.20, 35.220.30, 01.040.13
7591 35.020, 35.260, 35.260.01, 35.260.10, 01.040.35
7610 33.020, 33.160, 33.160.01, 33.160.20, 01.040.33
7620 33.020, 33.160, 33.160.20, 33.160.01, 01.040.33
7641 01.040.33, 33.020, 33.040.60, 33.040.70
7642 33.020, 33.160.01,33.160, 33.160.10. 33.160.50, 01.040.33
7649 31,31.020, 31.220, 31.220.01,31.220.10, 3 1.220.20, 31.220.99, 01.040.31
7710 13, 13.020, 13.110, 29, 29.020, 29.180, 29.200, 29.240, 29.240.01, 29.240.10, 01.040.13,
01.040.29
7720 13, 13.020, 13.110, 29, 29.020, 29.120, 29.120.01, 29.120.30, 29.120.40, 29.120.50, 29.120.60,
29.120.70, 01.040.13,01.040.29
7731 13, 13.020, 13.110, 29.020, 29.050, 01.040.29, 29, 29.060, 29.060.01, 29.060.10, 29.060.20,
01.040.13
7732 13, 13.020, 13.110, 29, 29.020, 29.035.01, 29.035.10, 29.035.20, 29.035.30, 29.035.40,
29.035.99, 29.080, 29.080.01, 29.080.10, 29.080.20, 29.080.99, 01.040.13, 01.040.29
7742 13, 13.020, 13.110,01.040.13
7751 01.040.97, 13, 13.020,97.020, 13.120, 97.060,01.040.13
7752 01.040.97, 13, 13.020, 13.120, 97.020, 97.030, 97.040, 97.040.01, 97.040.30, 01.040.13
7754 13, 13.020, 13.120,01.040.13
7757 01.040.97, 01.040.97, 13, 13.020, 13.120, 97.020, 97.020, 97.030, 97.040, 97.040.01,
97.040.50, 97.080, 01.040.13
7758 01.040.97, 13,13.020. 13.120,97.020,97.100,97.100.30,01.040.13
7760 31,31.020, 31.080,31.080.01,31.080.10, 31.080.20, 31.080.30, 3 1.080.99, 31.100, 31.120,
31.140,31.200,01.040.31
7781 29, 29.020, 29.220, 29.220.01, 29.220.10, 29.220.20, 29.220.30, 29.220.99, 01.040.29
7782 29, 29.020, 29.140, 29.140.10, 29.140.01, 29.140.20, 29.140.30, 29.140.40, 29.140.50,
29.140.99,01.040.29
7783 43.040, 43.040.01, 01.040.43,43.020, 43.040.10, 43.040.20, 43.040.30, 43.040.40,43.060,
43.060.01,43.060.50
7784 25.140, 25.140.01, 25.140.20, 01.040.25
7788 13.31.020, 45,45.020, 01.040.31, 13.020, 13.320, 31,31.040, 31.040.01,31.040.10,
31.040.20, 31.040.30, 31.040.99, 31.060, 31.060.01,31.060.10, 31.060.20, 31.060.30,
3 1.060.40, 31.060.50. 31.060.60, 31.060.70, 31.060.99, 31.240, 45.040, 01.040.13,01.040.45
7810 13, 13.020, 13.040,43.020, 13.040.50, 43.100,01.040.43
7821 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50,43.020,43.080.01,43.080,43.080.10,01.040.43
7822 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50,43.020, 43.020,43.080,43.080.01,43.080.99,43.160,
01.040.43,01.040.43
7831 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50, 43.020, 43.080, 43.080.01, 43.080.20, 01.040.43
7849 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50,43.020. 43.040.01,43.040.40,43.040,43.040.50, 43.040.60,
43.040.70, 43.040.99, 01.040.43
7852 43.020,43.150,01.040.43
7860 01.040.55, 23, 23.020,43.020,43.080, 43.080.10, 43.100, 55, 55.020, 55.180, 55.180.40,
23.020.01, 23.020.20,43.080.01, 55.180.01, 01.040.23, 01.040.43, 01.040.43
7910 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50, 29, 45, 45.020, 45.020, 29.020, 29.280,45.060, 45.060.01,
45.060.10,45.060.20.45.120, 01.040.29, 01.040.45
7920 01.040.95, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50, 95.020,01.040.49,49.020,49.045,49.060,49.061,
49.080, 49.090
7930 01.040.95, 13, 13.020, 13.040, 13.040.50, 47, 47.020, 95.020, 47.020.01, 47.040, 47.060,
47.080,01.040.47
8121 01.040.91, 91, 91.010,91.010.01, 91.140.01, 91.140, 91.140.10, 91.140.20, 91.140.65

88
8122 01.040.91, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.140, 91.140.01, 91.140.70

8124 01.040.91, 29, 29.140.01, 91, 91.010, 91.010.01, 91.160, 29.140, 29.140.10, 91.160, 91.160.01,
91.160.10, 91.160.20, 01.040.29
8210 01.040.79, 79.080, 97.020, 97.040.01, 01.040.97, 11.140, 97.020, 97.040, 97.040.10, 97.140,
97.140.97
8310 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.35
8421 01.040.61,61,61.020
8422 01.040.61,61,61.020
8423 01.040.61,61,61.020
8429 01.040.61,61,61.020
8431 01.040.61,61,61.020
8432 01.040.61,61,61.020
8433 01.040.61,61,61.020
8434 01.040.61, 61,61.020
8441 01.040.61,61,61.020
8442 01.040.61,61,61.020
8451 01.040.61,61,61.020
8452 01.040.61,61,61.020
8459 01.040.61,61,61.020
8461 01.040.61,61,61.020
8465 01.040.61,61,61.020
8471 01.040.61,61,61.040
8472 01.040.61,61,61.040
8481 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.35
8482 01.040.61.61,61.040
8483 01.040.59, 59.140, 59.140.01, 59.140.35
8484 01.040.61,61,61.040
8510 01.040.61,61,61.060
8710 17.020,37.020,01.040.17, 17, 17.180, 17.180.01, 17.180.10, 17.180.20, 17.180.30, 17.180.99,
01.040.37
8720 11.060, 11.040, 11.040.01, 11.040.10, 11.040.11, 11.040.20, 11.040.30, 11.040.40, 11.040.50,
11.040.60, 11.040.70, 11.040.99, 11.060.01, 11.060.20, 11.220,01.040.11
8741 47, 47.020, 47.020.01, 47.020.70, 01.040.47
8745 17, 17.020, 19. 19.060,01.040.19, 17.200, 17.200.01, 17.200.10, 17.200.20, 19.020, 19.040,
77.040, 77.040.01, 77.040.10, 01.040.17
8748 17, 19.020,43.020, 17.020, 17.220, 17.220.01, 17.220.10, 17.220.20, 17.220.99, 17.240, 19,
19.080, 43.180, 01.040.17, 0 1.040.19, 01.040.43
8749 19, 19.020, 19.040, 19.080,43.020,43.180, 19.060,01.040.19,01.040.43
8811 37.020, 37.040.01, 37.040.10, 37.040, 01.040.37
8813 37.020, 37.040, 37.040.01, 37.040.10, 01.040.37
8822 37.040, 37.040.01, 37.040.20, 01.040.37
8830 37.020, 37.060, 37.060.01, 37.060.10, 37.060.20, 37.060.99, 01.040.37
8841 01.040.37,37.020
8842 37.020,01.040.37
8851 39.040.01, 01.040.39, 39.020, 39.040, 39.040.10
8852 39.020, 39.040, 39.040.01, 39.040.20, 39.040.99, 01.040.39
8921
8922
8928 01.100, 01.100.01, 01.100.10,01.100.20. 01.100.30
8931 01.040.55, 01.040.83, 55, 55.020, 83.140, 83.140.01, 83.140.99, 55.120

89
8939 01.040.83, 21, 21.020, 23, 23.040, 23.040.01, 83.140.01, 83.140.99, 21.080, 23.040.45, 83.140,
83.140.10, 01.040.21, 01.040.23
8942 01.040.97, 97.020, 97.200.50, 97.220, 97.220.01, 97.220.30
8946 01.040.65, 01.040.97, 65, 65.020,65.020.01, 97.220, 97.220.01, 97.220.30, 65.145, 97.220.20,
97.220.40
8947 01.040.65, 01.040.97, 65, 65.020,65.020.01, 65.150, 97.220, 97.220.01,97.220.20, 97.220.30,
97.220.40
8950 35.020, 35.260, 01.100.40, 35.260.01, 35.260.20, 01.040.35
8960 01.040.97, 97.020, 97.195
8970 39.020, 39.060,01.040.39
8981 01.040.97, 97.020, 97.200, 97.200.01, 97.200.20
8982 01.040.97, 97.020, 97.200, 97.200.01, 97.200.20
8983 01.040.97, 83.140.01, 97.020, 97.200.01, 97.200
8991
8996 11.040.40, 11.060.01,01.040.11, 11.060, 11.060.10
8997
8998
8999
9310
9410
9510 01.040.95, 95.020
9710

90
APPENDIX D: LINKS BETWEEN DOCUMENTS
Figure 1; Links between Documents in a Specific Industry and Year for Germany and
Spain
Germany links Spain
DIN UNE
403 488
UNE
DIN
4238 123
UNE
124
DIN UNE
4239 431 UNE

432
UNE
DIN
433 UNE
798
467
In this example, Germany has three standards, Spain has seven and
there are five links (bilaterally shared standards) between those two countries.

91
Figure 2: How Links between Documents Were Found
Case 1: Direct Links

Germany links Spain
UNE
DIN
123
4321
Case 2: Indirect Links via International Documents
ISO
UNE
DIN 1234
876
4567
Link in PERINORM
Link in BISTAN
Remarks: In some cases there also existed links via national documents. In this case,
the ISO-document would have to be replaced by a national document in the picture.
Although only one intermediate step is shown for illustrative purposes, indirect links
were also found via multiple intermediate steps.

92
REFERENCES
Ames, G., (1998) “ Non-tariff Barriers and Political Solutions to Trade

Disputes: A Case Study of U.S. Poultry Export to
Russia” , Review o f Agricultural Economics v20, n 1
(Spring-Summer 1998):pp. 238-47
Blind, K., Grupp, H., “ Der Zusammenhang zwischen Normung und Aussen-
Hullmann, A., Jungmittag, handel” , Frauenhofer Institut fu r Systemtechnik und
A., (1999) Innovationsforschung, Karlsruhe
Casella, A., (1997) “ Free Trade and Evolving Standards” , in Bhagwati, J.,
Hudec, R., (edts.) Fair Trade and Harmonization, vol. 1,
Cambridge, Mass., pp. 119-156
Deardorff, A., Stem, R. Measurement o f nontariff barriers, Ann Arbor :

(1998) University o f Michigan Press
CEN/CENELEC (1994) Common rules fo r standards work, Internal Regulations

Part 2, Brussels
DIN (undated) Europdische Normung, Ein Leitfaden des DIN Deutsches

Institut fur Normung e.V., Berlin
DIN CERTO (undated) Konformitdt und Zertifizierung, Berlin
European Commission Directive 83/189/EWG

(1983)
European Commission Directive 88/182/E WG

(1988)
European Commission Directive 94/10/EG

(1994)
Fischer, R., Serra, P. “ Standards and Protection” , mimeo, Centro de

(1999) Econom'ya Aplicada, Departamento de Ingenier'ya
Industrial, University of Chile

93
Gandal, N., Shy, O., “ Standardization Policy and International Trade” , Tel
(1996) Aviv Sackler Institute o f Economic Studies Working
Paper: 12/96
ISO (1999) ISO/IEC Guide 21:1999, Adoption o f International

Standards as regional or national standards,
http://www. iso.ch/cate/d30223.htm 1
ISO (2000) International Classification fo r Standards,

http://www.wssn.net/WSSN/ics99e.pdf
Jeanneret. M.-H., Verdier, “ Standardization and protection in a vertical differentia

T., (1996) tion model” , European Journal o f Political Economy,
vol. 12, pp. 253-271
Kende, M.,(1992) "Strategic Standardization in Trade with Network Exter

nalities" mimeo (INSEAD, Fontainebleau)
Matutes, C., Regibeau, P., "A selective review o f the economics o f standardization,
(1996) Entry deterrence, technological progress and interna
tional competition", European Journal o f Political
Economy, vol. 12, pp. 183-209
Moenius, J., (1999) “ Information versus Product Adaptation: The Role of

Standards in Trade” , mimeo, UCSD
Swann, P., Temple, P., "Standards and Trade Performance: the UK Ecperience",
Shurmer, M. (1996) The Economic Journal 106, pp. 12997-1313
United Nations, (1975) “ Standard International Trade Classification Revision

2” , Statistical Papers Series M No. 34/Rev. 2, New York
Wallner, K.,(1998) "Mutual Recognition and the Strategic Use of Interna

tional Standards", Stockholm School o f Economics
Working Paper No. 254

Chapter III
Information versus Product Adaptation:

The Role o f Standards in Trade
Johannes Moenius
November 1999
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the commonly held view that country-specific product and
process standards are barriers to trade and that harmonizing standards promotes inter
national trade. The econometric analysis generally confirms that bilaterally shared stan
dards are favorable to trade. However, it does not find that the number o f country-spe
cific standards o f importers is a barrier to trade on average. While country-specific
standards o f importers reduce imports for non-manufactured goods (e.g. agriculture),
they do promote trade in the manufacturing sector. Information costs appear to be an
explanation for this puzzle: if goods have to be adapted to a foreign market, then coun
try-specific standards o f the importing country offer valuable information for adapting
the product to that market. Otherwise, this information would be costly to gather.
The author is indebted to Jim Rauch and David Riker for numerous discussions.
Helpful comments were provided by John Conlisk, Clive Granger and Gordon Hanson.
The author would also like to thank Ulrich Blum, Gisela Eickhoff, Isabelle Junginger
and Armin Topfer from the DIN-Research Center at the Technical University o f
Dresden, Germany, whose financial support is gratefully acknowledged.
94

95
1. INTRODUCTION
The common perception o f economists and politicians alike is that country-

specific standards are barriers to trade. Consequently, internationally shared standards
should be trade-promoting. Examining a simple example, the intuition is clear: since
the US operates on the 110 Volts standard and Germany operates on a 220 Volts basis,
every coffee-maker exported from Germany to the US either has to be modified in
production or the end user has to buy additional adapters and transformers. In both
cases, there are costly modifications or additions. These could be avoided if those two
countries operated on the same Voltage-standard.
The European Union spends enormous efforts in coordinating standards across
Europe in an effort to promote trade among its member nations. In 1975, there were 20
harmonized standards in Europe. In 1999, there are now nearly 5,500. More than 270
Committees work on different projects within the European Standardization Institute
(CEN) alone. Nearly 40 percent of their funds come directly from the European Union.
The CEN has 20 national member institutes that actively contribute to work at CEN as
well as implement European Standards in their national economies.1
The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) main effort is to
harmonize standards around the globe. The ISO alone spends close to $100 million on
these efforts each year. 133 national standardization bodies participate in nearly 3,000
technical work-groups and committees. Approximately 12,000 international standards
are printed on a total number of 320,000 pages of information.2 The motivation for all
these efforts is to promote trade, yet little is known about the magnitude o f the effect o f
1 CEN (1999)
2 ISO (1999)

96
standards on trade. The theoretical literature is inconclusive, and the few empirical
studies suffer from serious data problems.
This paper attempts to fill this gap. It uses a newly constructed panel data set
with data on country-specific and bilaterally shared standards for 471 industries in 12
countries during the time-period 1980-1995. We estimate a gravity relationship that
includes measures of shared and country-specific product and process standards. The
results confirm the general view that shared standards promote trade. On the other
hand, country-specific standards o f importers are expected to reduce trade volumes. If
product adaptation is costly and exporters have to adjust their goods to the foreign
market due to differing country-specific standards, then these differing country-specific
standards should impede trade flows. Surprisingly though, we find that country-
specific (nonshared) standards o f importers are also trade promoting on average.
However, regressions on an industry level reveal that this is not generally the case. In
non-manufacturing industries like agriculture, a large number o f country-specific
standards in the importing country indeed hampers trade as predicted. But in
manufacturing, a positive effect o f the number o f country-specific standards of
importers dominates.
The existing literature does not provide satisfactory answers to that puzzle.
Therefore an alternative explanation is proposed. Standards, whether country-specific
or shared, reduce information costs and allow for easier contracting.3 Country-specific
standards may at the same time increase adaptation costs. But if goods have to be
adapted to foreign markets, for example if consumer tastes or production technologies
3 This conjecture is supported by an unpublished survey of the German DIN-Institute: 40 % of

all respondents indicate that standards allow for easier contracting both nationally and internationally. A
preview of the survey results can be obtained from Bahke (1999)

97
vary across countries, then exporters are assisted by a large number o f informative
standards that describe the export market.4 In non-manufacturing industries, products
are generally homogeneous, so informational requirements are low, and product-
adaptation costs likeiy dominate information costs.5 In manufacturing industries,
however, informational requirements are relatively high. Since standards lower
information gathering costs, the benefits of this cost reduction tend to outweigh the
additional adaptation costs, which may be increased by the same standards. Additional
empirical evidence is supportive o f this claim.
The paper proceeds as follows: section two clarifies the basic concepts and
reviews the theoretical literature. Section three describes the estimation procedure,
section four the data set. Section five presents the empirical evidence. Section six
outlines the transaction-cost argument and contrasts the findings in this paper to the
existing empirical literature. Section seven concludes and presents directions for future
research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, types o f standards are identified and the relevant characteristics
are introduced. The measurement o f shared standards is then described. The discussion
4 See Swann et al. (1996) for a related argument.
5 For example, institutional standards in agriculture are mostly concerned with testing
procedures ensuring certain quality aspects of agricultural products. There are standards to determinate
the content of sodium of vegetable-containing food for babies and infants, to determine the bulk density
of fertilizers, and to determine the diameter of cigarettes. If exporters use differing testing procedures and
quality levels in their own countries (or non at all), then they will likeiy produce varieties that need costly
modification before they are acceptable in the export market. Testing or quality requirements need not be
government enforced: large buyer associations in the export market can also insist on application of
standards, thereby reducing competition from potential importers for local producers.

98
o f previous research follows, and the theoretical predictions o f the different branches of
literature are summarized in a table at the end o f this section.
2.1 What Are Standards?
Standards as used in this paper are product and process specifications intended
to harmonize the treatment of intermediates in the production process or the attributes
o f final goods. The objectives o f standards are to raise the quality o f output, to protect
workers, consumers or the environment from potential hazards, or to ensure
compatibility among products or intermediates. Three types of standards can be
distinguished in terms of their origin. If standards evolve out of the market process,
they are generally referred to as de facto standards. Standards imposed by law are
called de jure standards. The largest number o f standards, however, result from
coordination in committees and standardization institutions like the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the American National Standardization
Institute (ANSI) and the German DIN-Institute. These are generally referred to as
institutional standards.6 This study focuses on institutional standards. In contrast to de
jure standards, the adoption of institutional standards is voluntary. In contrast to de
facto standards, institutional standards are well-documented.
The measure o f standards used in this study is the number of documents that
specify the details o f standards for a particular industry, country, and year. In general,
we count one document as one standard. However, the methods for documenting
institutional standards vary across countries. For example, lets assume the technical
6 There is some overlap between de jure and institutional standards, since the legislator
sometimes changes institutional standards into de jure standards.

99
details about TV-tubes are outlined in one document in Germany, and therefore we
count them as one standard. In Spain, the exact same information is spread over three
documents, which we count as three standards. Although identical in terms of
informational content, our measure indicates that Spain has three times as many
standards as Germany for TV-tubes.7 With this caveat in mind, the measure o f country-
specific standards is just the number o f documents counted for a particular industry and
year.
For shared standards, the estimation procedure does not offer a simple remedy.
Therefore it is necessary to be aware of what we count as a shared standard. If
Germany has one document that describes a certain standard and Spain has three
documents that describe the same standard, then this is counted as three links between
those two countries in a particular industry and year. Therefore, the unit of
measurement for shared standards is links between documents, since measures o f the
informational content of each document are not readily available. For ease of
exposition, the number o f links will be called the number of shared standards
throughout the paper.
The economic analysis below will not distinguish between health, safety and
environmental requirements on the one side and standards to ensure product quality and
compatibility on the other. One reason is, that the numbers of health and environmental
7 In regression analysis, the coefficient on the Spanish standard-counts does not need to be
evaluated differently than the coefficient on German Standard counts. This is due to our logarithmic
specification, where factors that just enter multiplicatively are absorbed in fixed effects. This assumes
that Spain always packages the same amount of information in three times as many documents as
Germany.

100
standards in our database is very small.8 Moreover, institutional standards, which form
the basis of our analysis, are voluntarily adopted by firms. Economic reasoning
suggests that firms will only adopt measures if they benefit from doing so. Therefore, if
firms apply environmental standards voluntarily, they must benefit from it. They also
apply product standards when they gain from increased compatibility with other
products or if adoption o f the standard signals that the product is o f higher quality. In
this respect, health and environmental standards do not differ from quality and
compatibility standards as long as both are voluntarily used. Finally, even if
environmental standards have qualitatively opposite effects on the flow o f trade, they
will only partially offset the effect o f quality and compatibility standards, and the result
will be a bias in the estimated impact o f standards on trade towards zero. Therefore,
any estimation that counts only quality and compatibility standards should find even
more significant effects o f standards on the flow of international trade.
2.2 Previous Research
There are two major findings about the existing theoretical literature: first, only
a very small part of the economics literature on standardization is concerned with trade
issues.910 Therefore, one has to rely on the literature on non-tariff barriers to trade,
8 See table III.2 in the Appendix A. The ISO lists 440 environmental standards out o f a total o f
nearly 12,000 Standards. In our database, the num ber o f health- and environm ental standards seems to be
considerably smaller.
9 For excellent surveys o f the literature on standardization, see e.g. Farrell and Saloner (1987),
Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Matutes and Regibeau (1996).
10 Some exceptions are Matutes and Regibeau (1996), Kende (1991), Gandal and Shy (1996),
Wallner (1998) and Jeanneret and Verdier (1996). Matutes and Regibeau (1996) arrive at the same
evaluation.

101
non-price competitiveness and economic integration as a framework for analyzing the

effect o f harmonizing standards.11 Second, the predictions of the various branches o f
this literature span the entire set o f possible outcomes. For each type o f standard
(country-specific standards of importers and exporters as well as shared standards),
there is at least one theory that predicts a positive effect and another one that predicts a
negative effect. The net effect, from a theoretical point of view, is ambiguous.
For ease o f exposition, the literature is first reviewed along the dimensions
spanned by these branches and then compared in table III. 1. Key terms referred to in
the table are printed in italics in the text. In section six of this paper, the predictions of
the theories are weighed against the results o f the econometric exercises.
First, what we call the mainstream literature on non-tariff barriers to trade is
examined. The predominant view is that country-specific standards of importing
countries are a typical example o f non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB) (Harrigan 1993,
Casella 1997). While the literature on NTBs is huge12, their empirical relevance seems
to be small (Harrigan 1993). This may partly be a measurement problem (Laird and
Yeats 1990). Since coverage ratios (the percentage o f goods in an industry that are
subjected to NTBs) are surprisingly high (Nogues et al 1986, Harrigan 1993), the
measured effect is even more surprisingly low. More recent research confirms the view
that NTBs may have a smaller influence than economists previously assumed
(Hummels 1999). Nevertheless this branch o f the literature predicts a negative effect of
country-specific standards o f importers on imports. Consequently, shared standards
11 W hile non-price competition is a textbook topic, not much work seems to have been devoted
to that in a trade context. Exceptions include A iginger (1997) and Chao and Patokiprapha (1997).
12 See Stem (1973) for an early review o f the literature and Deardorff and Stem (1998) for a
more recent treatment.

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should have a positive effect on imports. There is no prediction for the effect o f
country-specific standards o f exporters.
Some extensions include that low-tech countries have trouble meeting high-tech
standards and that large countries have an incentive to form strategic alliances to
exclude smaller countries (Gandal and Shy 1996, Wallner 1998). As before, this
predicts a negative effect o f country-specific standards of importers and a positive
effect of shared standards.
A version of the "competitive disadvantage" argument (Swann et al. 1996)

claims that a large number o f country-specific process standards raises the costs of local
firms13 and therefore lowers their cost competitiveness. This in turn should promote
imports and reduce the exports o f these highly regulated local firms. On the other hand,
the argument does not provide a prediction for the aggregate effect o f shared standards
on the volume of trade.
Another version o f this argument focuses on country-specific product standards
instead: in industries were there are large buyers who demand tailored products defined
by a large number o f standards, local producers will have a barrier to overcome should
they wish to export these specialized products. They are in a standardization-trap.
Grupp and Schnoring (1990, 1991) find evidence that supports this argument in the pre
deregulation French and Japanese telecommunications industry. This theory predicts a
negative effect of country-specific standards on both imports and exports, but a positive
effect of shared standards.
An alternative branch of the literature is based on a signaling argument:

standards increase the perception o f product quality (Jones and Hudson 1996) and this
*3 This is confirmed by the survey mentioned above. See footnote 3.

103
increased perception of product-quality improves the competitive advantage o f firms

applying them (e.g., Jeanneret and Verdier 1996).14 In the oligopoly frameworks used
for the analysis, a larger number o f standards promotes exports. There is no clear
prediction for the shared standards or country-specific standards of importers.
Finally, standardization may reduce the number of varieties available to
consumers (Farell and Saloner 1986). Although this must be balanced against scale
economies, this loss o f variety may actually reduce trade.15 The effect o f reduced
differentiation may outweigh the effect o f reduced barriers.
Table III. 1 summarizes the predictions. According to table III. 1, shared
standards should most likely be trade-promoting, country-specific standards o f
importers are likely to be import-reducing, and the effect of country-specific standards
o f exporters is indeterminate. Clearly, standards have many counterbalancing effects
on the pattern of trade. Some are more dominant in particular industries. In the
empirical analysis below, we investigate these hypotheses, while allowing for separate
stories in clearly dissimilar industries.
14 See Swann et al. (1996) for an argument that is grounded in the management literature.
15 Matutes and Regibeau (1988) note that standardization may increase the variety available to
consumers in the case o f what they call mix-and-match goods. Shared standards consequently lead to
more trade in this case. This is observationally equivalent to the first branch o f the literature and will
therefore not be treated separately.

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3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS
One of the most successful and therefore widely used frameworks for empirical
analysis of trade-flows between countries is the gravity model.16 The gravity model
predicts that the volume o f trade between two countries is directly proportional to their
economic masses, usually measured by GDP or GNP, as well as other variables that
may promote trade, and is indirectly proportional to distance and other obstacles to
trade. We specify the gravity relationship as a panel. Since we are only interested in the
effect o f standards on trade volumes, this allows us to absorb all factors that are
constant for each country-pair and year in fixed effects. Since the usual gravity model
variables like GDP, population and colonial ties are constant for each country-pair and
year, they are compounded in these fixed effects. As Frankel et al. (1997) point out,
this is the preferred specification. In a monopolistic competition model based on
Krugman (1980), they show that it is required to normalize for growth in real gross
world product. The panel specification accounts for global inflation and growth, which
are also captured in the fixed effects.17 Our first specification estimates the effect of
shared standards (SST) on trade volumes. As in the gravity literature, we estimate our
equation in logs18:
ln(V,jk[) = a + /fln(SSTljkI) + Fjjt + £ijkt [1]
16 Trindad and Rauch (1999) even claim that it is the only successful em pirical framework for
predicting trade flows between countries.
17 Also see Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) for a more detailed discussion on fixed effects
estimation o f gravity relationships.
18 We follow Eichengrcen and Irwin (1998) and add one to the variables in our data before we
take logs. This is necessary since there exist numerous zero values for trade flows between industries and
countries.

105
where V is the bilateral dollar flow o f trade (normally referred to as trade-volume)

between country i and j , t is the time-period, A: is a four-digit SITC-industry, SSTijkl is
the number of shared standards in year /, industry k between countries / and j, Fijt
represents the country-pair-year fixed effect that absorbs all factors affecting trade on a
bilateral basis per year that are not industry-specific, such as the gross national products
and distance, and £jjkt is an error term.
Since there are concerns that omitted industry-specific relative price effects
could bias the estimates o f /?, the country-pair-year fixed effects are replaced by
country-pair-year-aggregate industry fixed effects. In this specification, every two-digit
SITC industry has a separate fixed effect for each year and country-pair. An
endogeneity bias may result from the fact that large industries simply have large
numbers o f standards. Industry-year dummy variables control for size o f industries and
therefore eliminate that potential source o f bias. Our second specification therefore
reads as:
ln(Vijio) = o. + /71n(SSTijkt) + Dkt + Fij(2ic)t + £jjict [2]
Dh is an industry-year fixed effect, and Fij(2k), is the fixed effect per country-pair-year
and two-digit industry, where the latter is represented by (2k).
Equation [ 1] models the effect o f shared standards on the total volume o f trade.
However, the theories also offer interesting predictions about the relationship between
shared standards, country-specific standards of exporters and importers and the volume
o f imports. Our third specification is analogous to [1] and can be written as:

106
ln(IMijkt) = a + y?,ln(SSTijkt) + /Un(CSTEJkt) + y?3ln(CSTItkt) + Fijt + £,jkt [3]
IMljkl are the imports from country j to country /' in industry k at time t. CSTE is the
country-specific stock of standards in the exporting country, and CSTI is the country-
specific stock o f standards in the importing country, again counted per industry and
year. All influences on imports that vary across country-pairs and years but not across
industries are compounded in the fixed effects FIJt. These are, as before, GDPs o f the
exporting and importing country, distance, and other factors that can promote or reduce
imports. The same concerns about bias are present in [3]. Therefore, our fourth
specification is analogous to [2]:
ln(IMjjkt) = a + /?,ln(SSTjjkt) + /Un(CSTEJkt) + ftln(CSTI,kt) + DkI + Fij(2k)t + eijkt [4]
again, Dh is an industry-year fixed effect, and Fijak)t is the fixed effect per country-pair-
year and two-digit industry, where the latter is represented by (2k).
4 DATA DESCRIPTION
The data on trade flows were obtained from the World Trade Database o f
Statistics Canada for the years 1980-1995 for 471 four-digit SITC industries. National
accounts and exchange rate data were gathered from the IMF International Financial
Statistics Yearbook.

107
The main effort involved gathering data on standards and forming a

concordance with the industries in the trade flow data base.19 The German Deutsches
Institut fur Normung (DIN) together with the French Association Franqaise de
Normalisation (AFNOR) and the British Standards Institution (BSI) publish documents
on 520,000 individual standards, standards drafls and technical rules for 16 countries in
a database called PERINORM. 300,000 o f these documents are standards.20 Slovakia
and the Czech Republic were omitted from the sample since trade data were not
available. Another issue is whether to include the U.S. and Japan in the sample.
Comparison with other sources indicate that the data on the standards o f Japanese and
American producers are incomplete. On the other hand, Blind et al. (1999) argue that
the most important standards from these countries have been included. Accordingly, we
expect the standards o f these countries that are included in our data to have a stronger
effect than average standards and estimates consequently to be biased away from zero.
Therefore, the US and Japan were also omitted from our sample.21 Table III.2 lists the
total number of standards in the PERINORM database, the numbers o f standards that
are concatenated with SITC-industries, and information on health- and environment-

standards by country. For comparison, the counts of documents for the US and Japan
are also included in this table.
Recall from above that our unit o f measurement is a count o f the number of
documents. Generally, each standard is published in one separate document. Each
19 Some information about the issues involved are provided in Appendix B. A detailed
description o f the construction o f the database and the concordances can be found in Moenius (1999)
20 See table III.2.
21 As a robustness-check, most o f the regressions reported were also repeated including those
two countries. Qualitative results did not change, as one should expect.

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document contains information on the country o f origin, an industry classification code,

when it was introduced and withdrawn and a list of documents it is linked to
internationally. Documents were counted so that for each country, industry and year,
the stock of standards as listed in the original database was identified. Moreover, links
between documents were counted as bilaterally shared standards.
There are a few important limitations to the data. First, documents differ in their
informational content: the length o f the documents varies from one page to several
hundred pages. Second, standards are not equally important economically: it is likely
that using the same voltage in two countries is more important for trade then using the
same door handles. The counts o f standards employed in the estimation below do not
allow for any evaluation of their informational content, let alone for their economic
importance. Third, as argued by Casella (1997), standards in the process o f European
Unification are not always motivated by economic considerations but are imposed on
new members in order to get access to the "Club". In some pathological cases,
standards have been enforced on countries that were membership-candidates although
they provide no economic benefit to them.22 Finally, there is no clear rule from which
to judge whether the original data are o f sufficient quality, especially in earlier years23
and specific countries24.
22 Iceland, for example, which is not in our sam ple though, had to accept the European Railroad
Standards in their effort to become a candidate for membership in the EU, although there is no railway
system in Iceland.
23 The earliest Standard listed in the PERINORM database dates b ack to 1812. But o f course,
not all standards that ever existed are listed in there. The sample period from 1980 to 1995 was chosen
based on the fact that ample data on previously active, but now withdrawn or replaced standards was
included since the mid-seventies, which hints at a tolerable degrees o f com pleteness in the 1980s.
24 Swann et. al ju st use data from a previous version o f the sam e database starting in 1985.

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5. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section presents empirical evidence on whether country-specific standards

of importers are a barrier to trade and consequently whether shared standards promote
trade. First, the less controversial claim that shared standards promote trade is investi
gated. Recall that the measure o f shared standards is a count of bilateral links between
documents. Bilateral trade-volumes are regressed on counts of shared standards. Then,
we investigate the effect of country-specific standards on import volumes. Imports are
regressed on the counts of shared standards and country-specific standards of importers
and exporters.
5.1 Shared Standards and Trade Volumes
First the basic relationship between shared standards and trade volumes is
established. The estimation results confirm the theoretical prediction that trade
volumes are higher if countries share more standards. Then the issue o f causation is
examined employing Granger-causality tests. There seems to be feedback: shared stan
dards Granger-cause trade volumes, and trade-volumes help predict future counts o f
shared standards.
The Basic Relationship
Regression results for the basic relationship are reported in table III.3. The first
column reports the estimated coefficients o f the basic model: trade-volumes defined as
the sum o f bilateral exports and imports are regressed on the counts o f shared standards
and country-pair-year dummies. The dummies absorb country-pair specific effects like
common language, shared border, and distance as well as year-specific factors such as
the exchange rates and GNPs of the pair o f countries. On average, a one percent

110
increase in the number o f bilaterally shared standards results in a one-third o f one per
cent increase in trade-volume. In the next column, the country-pair-year dummies are
replaced by country-pair-year-two-digit industry dummies. This is to partial out any
potential bilateral industry-specific relative price effects, under the assumption that
these price effects are identical on the 2-digit SITC level for each country-pair. At the
same time, some of the influence of shared standards will be absorbed by this additional
dimension in the dummy-variable set. Surprisingly, both the coefficient and robust t-
statistic on shared standards actually increase when the additional dummy variables are
included. A final issue is that industry-specific technology effects or simple size effects
may induce potential endogeneity. It could be that regression results simply reflect that
large industries have more shared standards. Therefore, a dummy-variable for each
four-digit SITC-industry is interacted with years. O f course, again it is to be expected
that some of the effect caused by shared standards will be compounded with the tech
nology and size effects in the dummy-variables. The results in column three reveal that
the estimated coefficient is still highly significant but is now much smaller.
Trade-data is highly persistent (and so is data on standards) and auto-correlation
is likely to be present. With auto-correlation, test-statistics are incorrect and the esti
mation is inefficient, though the coefficient estimates are unbiased and consistent.
Column four reports the results with the dummy-variable set o f the first column and an
added lagged dependent variable. The coefficient is very close to the one in the first
column, confirming theoretical predictions o f auto-correlated data. The t-statistic on
the measure of shared standards falls, but is still highly significant. Column five repeats
the exercise of column three with a lagged dependent variable, with similar results. We
conclude that shared standards play a statistically significant role in promoting trade.

Ill
How economically important are these results? If we assume an average elasti

city o f 0.35 for ail countries over time, then a one percent increase in bilaterally shared
standards between the US and its trading partners would increase US trade volume by
about 6 Billion Dollars.25
How much o f an increase in trade can be achieved by harmonizing product and

process standards? Excluding Japan and the US, table III.4 reveals that total amounts of
shared standards by country vary by a factor larger than 6. It is certainly wrong to
claim that Australia, which has the lowest count of shared standards, could double its
trade volume if it adopted the amount o f shared standards of France, the country with
the highest counts o f shared standards. However, the econometric evidence does indi
cate that there might be room for increasing trade-volumes through harmonization for
some countries.
Causality Issues
Casella (1997) questions whether it is harmonization that causes trade or

whether trade leads to harmonization. The data-set presented here is certainly not ideal
for answering this question, since harmonization in Europe was an enforced process at
least for the later part of the sample (CEC 1990). But the data is still informative. If
shared standards cause trade, we expect a positive effect o f shared standards that were
introduced in some earlier period on current trade. The reverse hypothesis that trade
causes harmonization is also tested. Knowing that a large number o f countries in our
25 Estimation o f separate coefficients for the countries studied reveals that there is considerable
variation: coefficients assume values between 0.06 and 0.49. The estimated coefficient o f 0.35 can still be
interpreted as an average effect.

112
sample are members o f the European Union and were "forcefully" harmonized, any
interpretation has to exhibit sufficient care.
The methodology applied to investigate these hypotheses is the Granger-causa-
lity test. This test examines whether a certain variable helps forecasting future values
of another variable. The simplest way is to add lagged values of the variable o f interest
to the regression equation and evaluate whether their coefficients can be measured pre
cisely or to construct F-tests if more than one lag is added. Since normal F-tests are not
robust to heterogeneity, an additional indication o f the lagged variable’s predictive
power is whether the added variable contributes to the overall fit of the model. If it
does, then there is hope that it also improves the forecast. Test results are reported for
levels o f variables (tables 5a, b) as well as one year changes (tables 6a, b) to investigate
the sensitivity o f the results to functional form.
The first observation is that the lagged numbers o f shared standards, whether
measured in levels or in changes, have a significant positive effect on current trade
volumes. However, they do not improve the goodness o f fit as measured by adjusted
R2. Since there is strong persistence o f trade-volumes, lagged values of other variables
with high predictive power are hard to find. Therefore we interpret this as evidence that
shared standards help to explain future trade-volumes, although the goodness o f fit of
the model is not improved. The second observation is that lagged trade-volumes have a
significant effect on current standards , but it does not improve the goodness o f fit con
siderably, leading to a similar interpretation.
Closer inspection of the reported results in changes reveals that there seems to
be a time-lag o f about three years, until changes in standards affect trade-volumes, and
similarly in the other direction. A "time-to-build" - interpretation suggests itself, but
requires further research.

113
We conclude that there is feedback between the two variables: larger numbers o f
shared standards increase trade-volumes, and higher trade-volumes in turn spur efforts
to harmonize standards. However, the "chicken and egg" problem remains unresolved.
5.2 Estimation Results for the Import-Equation
This part repeats the econometric exercise for imports only, this time including
the number of country-specific standards o f the importer and exporter as additional
regressors. The surprising result is that country-specific standards in importing coun
tries promote trade on average. They hinder trade only in non-manufacturing industries
like agriculture. In manufacturing, they increase imports.
The Basic Relationship
This time, imports per industry and year for each country pair are regressed on
the number of shared standards, the number o f country-specific standards of importers
and exporters and a set of dummy-variables.

The dummy-variables serve the same purposes as described above. Therefore,
we do not repeat this discussion. The results are reported in table III.7. As column one
indicates, a one percent increase in the number o f bilaterally shared standards results in
a one-eighth percent increase in the volume o f imports. An increase in the number of
country-specific standards o f the exporter increases the volume of trade. This finding is
supportive o f the claim that country-specific standards raise the competitive advantage
o f an industry. One o f the most interesting finding of this paper, though, is that even
the country-specific standards o f importers have a positive coefficient. As can be seen
from column 2 - 5 , the regression results are robust again to country-pair-two digit-

114
industry fixed effects, additional four-digit-industry-year dummies and lagged depen

dent variables.
We conclude that shared standards play a statistically significant role in pro
moting trade, as do country-specific standards of the exporter. Moreover, we reject the
hypothesis that country-specific standards of importers are a barrier to trade on average.
We offer an explanation for this counterintuitive result in section 6.
The Variation across Industries
The econometric exercise o f the previous section was also undertaken for each
one-digit SITC industry separately. Results are reported in table III.8. The first obser
vation is that coefficients exhibit large variation across industries, indicating that pool
ing restrictions can be decisively rejected. Nevertheless, the pooled results are valid if
interpreted as averages. Next, there are negative coefficients on shared standards for
food, beverages and tobacco as well as crude minerals, but positive coefficients on
shared standards for all other industries. Third, country-specific standards o f exporters
generally promote trade independently of the type of industry. Finally, and most inter
estingly, country-specific standards of importers exhibit negative effects in the non
manufacturing industries (0-4). They have positive effects in manufacturing industries
(5-8).
6. RECONCILING THE EVIDENCE WITH ECONOMIC

THEORY
Reviewing the predictions o f the literature, it can be noted that none o f the theo
ries can explain the findings of this paper, though some o f the theories explain part o f

115
the story. In this section, we offer an alternative explanation for the empirical regulari
ties in the data.
The theory o f non-tariff barriers to trade in its mainstream form predicts positive
coefficients on shared standards and negative coefficients on country-specific standards.
Whenever we find positive coefficients on shared standards, we almost always also find
positive coefficients on country-specific standards o f importers. When we find negative
coefficients on the latter, we also find negative coefficients on shared standards. Our
empirical evidence appears to contradict the main stream theory. On similar grounds,
the competitive disadvantage and standardization trap theories can be rejected as only
part o f the story, at best.
The competitive advantage theory correctly predicts a positive coefficient on the
number o f country-specific standards o f exporters. Its second prediction is that the
coefficient on the country-specific standards o f importers should be negative. The
econometric results indicate that this only holds true for non-manufacturing industries,
though one would expect that the competitive advantage theory would be m ost relevant
for manufacturing industries. In manufacturing, however, we find a positive coefficient
on the country-specific standards o f importers. We conclude that this theory does not
offer comprehensive explanation o f the empirical observations.
The loss o f variety approach seems to have some explanatory power for specific
non-manufacturing industries. Recall though that it also predicts that country-specific
standards o f both importers and exporters are trade-promoting, which is not the case in
the industries where we find negative coefficients on shared standards.
We conclude that none o f the existing theories really provides an acceptable
overall explanation for our empirical results. On the other hand, the particular structure

116
o f the results suggests a different explanation, based on information imperfections and

adaptation costs.
Imagine a two-country world without any standards. In each o f the countries
there are low-tech and high-tech industries. If a country wants to export to the other
country, it has to research the technical specifications and preferences that prevail in the
other country. Then it has to modify its domestic products to adapt them to the foreign
market. Both processes are costly. I will refer to the first type of costs as information
costs and the second type as adaptation costs. It seems likely that information costs
increase with the technical sophistication o f the industry.
Now let us assume both countries introduce country-specific institutional stan
dards. Since these standards are well-documented and easily accessible, firms do not
need to gather information on technical specifications and preferences in the market,
thereby reducing search costs. Moreover, instead o f compiling information on different
varieties, it is sufficient to have access to the predominant specification, the standard.
This reduces the total amount o f information that needs to be collected. As a conse
quence, information costs fall. We follow the common assumption that adaptation costs
rise due to the introduction o f country-specific standards.26 Trade-volumes will
increase if the reduction in information costs outweighs the increase in adaptation costs.
If the two countries decide to share some o f their standards, this should increase trade
even more, since now adaptation costs are also dramatically reduced.27 Finally,
26 The assumption o f rising adaptation costs is also confirmed by the survey m entioned above,
see Bahke (1999). The consequences for constant or falling adaptation costs are sim ilar and can be argued
along the same lines. However, there is no possibility to distinguish between the impact o f information
costs and product adaptation costs if the latter also fall.
27 Again, the DIN-survey offers support for this claim (Bahke 1999).

117
importers can gather more information about the quality o f exporters if the exporters
use a large number o f their country-specific standards, as argued by Jones and Hudson
(1996). All that is required is that importers and exporters have mutual access to their
respective trading partner’s country-specific standards. Therefore, even country-spe
cific standards o f exporters should increase trade. This model explains why we find
that all three coefficients are positive.
If informational requirements are small, then the increase in adaptation costs due
to the adoption o f standards may outweigh the reduction o f informational costs. In this
case, we expect to see a negative coefficient on country-specific standards o f importers.
Reductions in variety may lead to negative coefficients on shared standards.
The information gathering costs described above are fixed costs. Product adap
tation costs will likely also have a fixed component. The average costs of these two
combined decrease with the volume o f imports. Therefore the effect o f importer’s
country-specific standards should increase with importer’s market size. On the other
hand, there is no real clear prediction for interactions of country-size with the other
standards-variables. We investigate this hypothesis by including terms that interact the
measures o f standards with the size of the importer and exporter countries, as measured
by GDP. The results are reported in table III.9. The coefficient on the interaction term
we are interested in is positive, as predicted. All other coefficients on interaction terms
are also reported. The results are consistent with our argument that the interaction of
adaptation and transaction costs play a significant role in understanding the effects of
standards on trade. Future research will determine whether this preliminary argument
withstands more rigorous analysis.
How do these findings relate to other empirical studies? Two branches o f the
literature should be considered. As noted above, Harrigan (1993) found that non-tariff

118
barriers to trade are small and in some cases are even trade promoting. Although this is
consistent with the results o f this paper, our methodologies are dissimilar. In the analy
sis of this paper, we include only a subset o f the factors that Harrigan measured as
NTBs. Moreover, while we find clear differences between manufacturing and non
manufacturing industries, there is no pattern in his results. Finally, his measures are
coverage-ratios (percentages of imports in an industry that are ruled under a certain
NTB) of products, while the measure employed here uses counts o f documents.
Two other papers (Swann et al. 1996, Blind et al. 1999) examine the
PER1NORM database, which is the original source o f our information on bilateral stan
dards. These authors distinguish between country-specific and international standards,
but they do not measure whether the standards are shared on a bilateral basis. They
each only study pairs of countries, e.g. trade o f the United Kingdom with G erm any.
Finally, the data set used in this study is about 1,000 times larger. Nevertheless, some
results can be usefully compared.
Swann et al. (1996) also find that both international and country-specific stan
dards promote imports into the United Kingdom. Blind et al. (1999) study the effects o f
standards on German imports, exports and trade-balances. They find that country-spe
cific German standards hinder imports, while international standards promote imports.
While the former study finds results that are similar to the ones presented here, the lat
ter study seems to contradict the results o f this paper. It should be noted that both of the
previous studies investigate country-pairs only, not a multi-lateral data set, and also use
different measures for standards. Therefore we do not interpret these results as contra
dictory to ours. But since Swan et al. (1996) and Blind et al. (1999) use exactly the
same methodology, it is rather these two that contradict each other. The data set pre

119
sented in this paper allowed us to further investigate the contradicting results o f the two
studies and to offer a solution to the puzzle.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper gathers empirical evidence that sheds light on theoretical claims that
country-specific standards o f importers are trade inhibiting and therefore that shared
standards promote trade. The evidence suggests that trade barriers induced by dissimi
lar standards are prevalent in non-manufacturing industries, but in manufacturing,
country-specific standards tend to promote international trade. This evidence is con
sistent with a transaction costs argument based on incomplete information: the absence
o f standards imposes high information costs on trading partners, while standards lower
information costs, even if they are specific to one country. If the costs o f adapting
products to foreign markets are small relative to information costs, a positive effect of
local standards of importers results. Under the assumption that transaction costs are
greater in industries that are more technologically sophisticated, country-specific stan
dards are more important for manufacturing industries. This prediction is supported by
our empirical results.
I plan to explore this data set further in future research. In its current form, the
data set can be used to produce more detailed country-pair and industry studies. It also
offers measures o f informational content and accessibility o f standards, like numbers o f
pages per standard, languages the standard was translated into and, amongst other clas
sifications, whether a standard is a process or a product standard. It also allows to con
struct measures of trade diversion. In an updated version, which will be available soon
and includes more countries, the importance o f institutional standards within as opposed
to between trading blocks can be studied.

120
APPENDIX A: TABLES
Table III.l
Predictions of the Theoretical Literature
Shared Country- Country-

Standards specific specific
Standards Standards
Importer Exporter
NTBs Main-stream/strategic alliances +
Competitive Disadvantage +
Standardization Trap + m
Competitive Advantage m +
Loss o f Variety • + +

121
Table III.2
Countries and Number o f Documents in the PERINORM Database
Number of Number of
Number of Health-Stan- Environmental
Number of Standards in dards in Con Standards in
Standards in Concordance cordance with Concordance
Country PERINORM with SITC SITC* with SITC*
Austria 9,286 5,191 28 39

Australia 10,389 5,460 12 9
Belgium 8,276 3,994 18 19
Switzerland 13,388 8,345 44 24
Germany 47,294 28,939 38 40
Spain 20,240 12,126 41 44
France 40,934 22,958 57 60
Great Britain 27,597 16,304 36 53
Japan 13,804 6,197 1 7
Netherlands 24,837 11,961 111 89
Norway 7,600 4,128 23 21
Poland 18,714 13,012 14 45
Turkey 18,427 12,565 75 57
United States of 21,130 12,117 6 21
America
Sum 281,91 163,29 504 528
6 7
Counts o f health and environmental standards are obtained based on standards-classifi-

cation codes (ICS) 01.040.13 and 13-13.340.99 in the PERINORM database. See M oenius (1999) for
details.

122
Table III.3
Regression Analysis: Trade Volumes on Shared Standards: the Basic
Relationship
Regressand: trade-volume by Four-Digit SITC
R egressors ' :
shared standards 0.32 0.47 0.085 .33 .077

(95.07) (147.73) (21.24) (22.58) (6.84)
Lagged Dependent 0.91 0.81

Variable (1226.98) (688.40)
Country-Pair-Year yes no no yes no

Fixed Effects
Country-Pair-Year- no yes yes no yes

Two-digit Industry-
Fixed Effects
Four-digit Industry- no no yes no yes

Year-Fixed Effects
Number o f 517,491 517,491 517,491 461,110 461,110

Observations
The robust t-statistics o f each coefficient estim ate are reported in parentheses.
* Coefficients o f Estimation with lagged dependent variable where transform ed according to the for
mula , where p is the coefficient to be transform ed and p is the coefficient on the lagged depen-
1 -/7
dent variable

Table III.4
Number of Shared Standards by Country in 1993
Country Number of
Shared
Standards
Australia 11,791
Austria 18,554
Belgium 40,919
France 71,024
Germany 66,908
Netherlands 36,805
Norway 16,339
Poland 19,606
Spain 27,855
Switzerland 36,039
Turkey 19,449
United Kingdom 68,921
Mean 36,184
Standard deviation 21,693
Report only:
Japan 6,236
United States 6,972

124
Table III.5a
Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect o f Shared Standards on
Trade Volumes
Regressand: Trade-Volume by Four-Digit SITC
Regressors :
Lagged shared standards 0.03

(23.39)

Variable (1,015.42) (997.60)
Country-Pair-Year yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2 0.8925 0.8926
Number o f 331,201 331,201

Observations

125
Table III.5b
Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect of Trade Volumes on Shared
Standards
Regressand: Shared Standards by Four-Digit SITC
Regressors:
Lagged Trade Volumes 0.0047 0.0033 0.0031

(23.00) (6.58) (5.29)
Trade Volumes Lagged 0.0019 0.0012

Twice (3.84) (1.79)
Trade Volumes Lagged 0.0012

Three Times (2.04)
Lagged Dependent 1.019 1.016 1.015 1.014

Variable (1,758.50) (1,663.82) (1,630.92) (1,577.60)
Country-Pair-Year yes yes yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R2 0.9467 0.9467 0.9469 0.9466
Number o f 466,290 347,234 307,292 276,219

Observations

126
Table III.6a
Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect o f Shared Standards on
Trade Volumes
Regressand'. Annual Change (A) in Trade-Volume by Four-Digit SITC
Regressors:
Lagged Shared Standards 0.0015 0.00001

(Annual A) (0.31) (0.002)
Shared Standards(Annual A) 0.0035

Lagged Two Times (0.641)
Shared Standards (Annual A) 0.021

Lagged Three Times (3.62)
Shared Standards (Annual A) 0.0087

Lagged Four Times (1-41)
Shared Standards (Annual A) -0.0030

Lagged Five Times (-0.43)
Lagged Dependent -0.29 -0.29 -0.28

Variable (Annual A) (-85.25) (-85.24) (-72.56)
Country-Pair-Year yes yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R~ 0.1092 0.1092 0.1082
Number o f 299,379 299,379 219,461

Observations

127
Table III.6b
Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect of Trade Volumes on
Shared Standards
Regressand: Annual Change (A) in Shared-Standards by Four-Digit SITC
R egressors:
Lagged Trade Volumes 0.0006 0.0017

(Annual A) (1-22) (2-14)
Trade Volumes (Annual A) 0.0023

Lagged Two Tim es (2-75)

Lagged Three Tim es (3.65)

Lagged Four Tim es (3.40)

Lagged Five Tim es (2.92)
Lagged Dependent 0.063 0.057. 0.047

Variable (Annual A) (22.01) (18.43) (13.14)
Country-Pair-Year yes yes yes

Fixed Effects
Adjusted R~ 0.0873 0.0822 0.0819
Number o f 435,204 307,292 199,241

Observations

128
Table III.7
Regression Analysis: Imports on Shared and Country-specific
Standards: the Basic Relationship
Regressand-. Imports by Four-Digit SITC
R egressors’:
Shared standards 0.16 0.034 0.12 -0.0004 0.049

(38.70) (6.65) (7.68) (-0.03) (3.82)
Country-speci fic 0.046 0.13 0.078 0.17 0.025

standards importer (15.91) (36.16) (6.27) (13.16) (2.02)
Country-specific 0.27 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.032

standards exporter (93.09) (40.73) (22.51) (13.75) (2.62)

Variable (931,00) (700.16)
Country-Pair-Year yes no no yes no

Fixed Effects
Country-Pair-Year- no yes yes no yes

Two-digit Industry-
Fixed Effects
Four-digit Industry- no no yes no yes

Year-Fixed Effects
Number o f 745,018 745,018 662,402 662,402 662,402

Observations
* Coefficients o f Estimation with lagged dependent variable where transformed according to the for
mula , where (3 is the coefficient to be transformed and p is the coefficient on the lagged depen-
1- p
dent variable

129
Table III.8
Regression Analysis: Imports on Standards by Industry
Regressand: Imports by Four-Digit SITC
Regressors:
Country-specific Country-specific
shared standards standards Adjusted Num ber o f
standards importer exporter R2 Observations
SITC 0 -0.078 -0.13 0.13 0.39 104,656

(-3.77) (-11.78) (12.18)
SITC 1 -0.35 -0.88 -0.03 0.41 12,870

(-4.08) (-21.90) (-0.78)
SITC 2 -0.039 -0.017 0.072 0.24 83,440

(-2.91) (-1-84) (7.89)
SITC 3 0.40 -0.29 0.35 0.38 17,000

(9.22) (-8.61) (12.30)
SITC 4 -0.077 -0.095 0.006 0.37 10,584

(-0.92) (-2.81) (0.137)
SITC 5 0.025 0.13 0.31 0.56 72,770

(2.45) (15.96) (42.14)
SITC 6 0.001 0.072 0.056 0.50 188,246

(0.202) (11.92) (9.26)
SITC 7 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.62 139,062

(7.66) (31.20) (36.49)
SITC 8 0.13 0.019 0.32 0.58 110,554

(13.07) (3-02) (51.54)
SITC 9 (none) -0.067 0.37 0.25 5,836

(-1.43) (9.88)

Each estimation equation included Country-Pair-Year Fixed Effects.

130
Table III.9
Imports on Standards interacting with Country Size
Regressand: Imports by Four-Digit SITC
shared standards 0.17 0.057 0.30* -0.092*
(6.34) (1-54) (2.31) (-0.62)
Country-specific -0.25 0.15 -0.30* 0.22*

standards importer (-16.62) (6.88) (-4.20) (2.32)
Country-specific 0.40 0.056 0.50* 0.024*

standards exporter (27.14) (2.62) (7.22) (0.26)
Interaction Terms: Standard-Type x IM-country-GDP:
Shared standards 0.015 0.010 0 . 010 ’ 0.025’

(5.08) (2-59) (0.85) (1.68)
Country-speci fic 0.044 0.001 0 . 11* 0 .010 ’

standards importer (22.23) (0.29) (7.16) (0.84)
Country-specific -0.045 0.006 -0.062* 0.001*

standards exporter (-23.38) (2-16) (-7-14) (0.07)
Interaction Terms: Standard-Type x EX-Country-GDP:
Shared standards -0.018 -0.017 -0.037* -o.oi T

(-5.96) (-3.84) (-2.61) (-0.63)
Country-specific 0.013 -0.003 0.007* -0.018*

standards importer (6.40) (-0.92) (0.76) (-1.44)
Country-specific 0.019 0.012 0.018* 0.027*

standards exporter (9.66) (4.21) (2.03) (2.24)

Variable (1,224.69) (873.00)
Country-Pair-Year yes no yes no
Fixed Effects
Country-Pair-Year- no yes no yes
Tw o-digit Industry-
Fixed Effects
Adjusted R~ 0.3931 0.5709 0.8674 0.8788
Observations 745,018 745,018 662,402 662,402
* Coefficients o f Estimation with lagged dependent variable where transformed according to the for
mula , where (3 is the coefficient to be transform ed and p is the coefficient on the lagged depen-
1- p
dent variable

131
APPENDIX B: DATA CONSTRUCTION
The original data source is PERINORM (1998). It contains information o f about

520,000 documents, 300,000 o f which are standards. Fields in the original data table
include country o f origin, an industry classification code, dates introduced and with
drawn, information about related documents, and international links. A detailed
description of the steps involved to construct the data set used in this paper can be
found in Moenius (1999). Some of the major issues are listed here.
- A standard was counted as active from the year introduced until the year it expired, regardless o f the
month it was introduced or withdrawn. If no expiration date was provided in the original database, it
was assumed active.
Expired documents frequently had no industry classification codes that form the basis for the concor
dance with SITC industries. These were recovered from related documents, like consecutive docu
ments or previous draffs, if this information was available there.
- Some documents had expiration dates but no dates when they were introduced. In this case, it was
assumed that they existed for five years, since standards are normally reviewed at this interval.
Many standards had multiple classification codes at different levels o f specificity attached to them,
sim ilar to one-digit versus two- o r three-digit classifications o f industries. Unique classification codes
are necessary to avoid double counting within the same industry. Only the most specific classification
listed with a standard was accepted. If there were multiple classifications at the same level o f specifi
city, the unique classification was chosen randomly.
- Shared standards frequently had differing classification codes across countries. The unique classifica
tion was then determined by a “ majority rule” : if more than one country listed this standard, the clas
sification code that was used by the majority o f countries was also used for classifying the shared
standard.
If a standard had links to documents in other countries, these links were in m ost cases not bilateral, but
only referred to a European or International standard. For example, a French standard just had a link to
an ISO-standard. This ISO-standard then listed links to standards in Belgium, Germany and Spain. In

132
this case, the link from the French standard to the ISO standard was replaced with the links from the
French standard to the related documents in Belgium, Germany and Spain.
Frequently, international links were not symmetric. For example, documents in the Netherlands,
Poland and Turkey reported links to an ISO standard. The ISO standard, however, just reported links
to Norway, Poland and the United States. All o f these links were updated so that each o f the docu
ments in the countries had the full num ber o f links. The standard in Norway, e.g., then had the links
listed to the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United States.

133
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II. The BISTAN Technical Reference M anual...................................... 40

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b, Expenditure share on product j

F,, Country-pair industry fixed effect

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Figure 1: Links between Documents in a Specific Industry and Year for

Figure 2: How Links between Documents Were Found................................... 91

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

Table 1.1: Summary Statistics...................................................................................... 28

Table 1.2: Regressions Comparing the Alternative Measures o f Openness 29

Table 1.4: Regressions with Alternative Definitions o f Hi-Tech Industries.... 31

Table 1.7: Industry-Level Regressions with the Trade Flow Measure

Table 1.9: Industry-Level Regressions with the Tariff Measure o f Openness. 36

Table II. 1: The Content o f the BIST AN Data-table.................................................... 61

Table II.2: Countries and Documents in the PERINORM Database........................ 62

Table II.3: Types o f Documents by Country............................................................... 63

Table II.4: Counts o f Documents by 2-digit SITC and Country................................ 64

Table II.5: Entries into PERINORM by Year and Country....................................... 67

Table II.7a: Analysis o f Variance o f the Log o f Shared Standards for

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n e r. F u r th e r r e p ro d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e rm is s io n .

Table II.8: Content of the PERINORM Database................................................ 73

Table II.9: Missing Values and Recovery Statistics by Variable........................ 75

Table II. 10: Previous and Consecutive Documents by Country........................... 76

Table II. 12: Matching ICS with SITC...................................................................... 78

Table III. 1: Predictions o f the Theoretical Literature............................................ 120

Table III.3: Regression Analysis: Trade Volumes on Shared Standards:

Table III.4: Number of Shared Standards by Country in 1993 ............................ 123

Table III.5a: Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect o f Shared Standards

Table III.5b: Granger-Causality Tests in Levels: Effect o f Trade Volumes

Table III.6a: Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect o f Shared Standards

Table III.6b: Granger-Causality Tests in Changes: Effect o f Trade Volumes

Table III.7: Regression Analysis: Imports on Shared and Country-Specific

Table III.8: Regression Analysis: Imports on Standards by Industry.................. 129

Table III.9: Imports on Standards interacting with Country Size........................ 130

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of th e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n p rohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

R e p r o d u c e d with p e r m i s s io n of t h e co p y rig h t o w n er. F u r th e r r e p r o d u c tio n prohibited w ith o u t p e r m is s io n .

1987 - 94 Information Technology Consultant

1988 - 89 Software-Trainer, Bamberg, Germany

1992 Dipl.-Kfm., Bamberg University, Germany

1992 - 94 Lecturer at the Institute o f Economic Policy Research at the Technical

sectoral pattern of trade, which they interpret as evidence of international technologi

tions in comparative advantage were driven by exogenous shocks to relative produc

There is complete international specialization in the production o f each differ

At each point in time, firms in country c manufacture the differentiated pro

reflects country- and industry-specific resource scarcity, e.g., an upward-sloping sup