This article was downloaded by: [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield]

On: 29 December 2014, At: 11:46

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Cambridge Review of International Affairs

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccam20

United States Hegemony and Globalisation: What Role

for Theories of Imperialism?
a
Ray Kiely
a
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)
Published online: 15 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Ray Kiely (2006) United States Hegemony and Globalisation: What Role for Theories of Imperialism?,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19:2, 205-221, DOI: 10.1080/09557570600723647

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557570600723647

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
Volume 19, Number 2, June 2006
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

United States Hegemony and Globalisation: What Role for

Theories of Imperialism?

Ray Kiely
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS)

Abstract This article examines the return of the subject of imperialism to the social
sciences since 2001, focusing in particular on Marxist and Marxist-related attempts to
reconstruct an analysis of the US-led international order based on this concept. It does so
by first examining attempts to update Marxist and Marxian work to understand
contemporary globalisation, and then points to both the weaknesses of these approaches
and international events that have undermined these theories. The paper then examines the
return of imperialism in some detail. While the international order can still be described as
imperialist, the article is sceptical of many accounts of the ‘new imperialism’. This is partly
because the utility of classical theories was questionable in the pre-1914 era, and are even
more so now. Theorising imperialism in turns of surplus capital or a spatial fix ignores the
direction of capital flows, both before the First World War, and in the current era.
Moreover, as Marxist and Marxian theories of globalisation point out, the current era is
one of greater openness and international integration than the pre-1914 era, and there is
far greater cooperation between the core capitalist states, as well as sovereign states in the
developing world. Contemporary imperialism is characterised by US hegemony but also
greater global interdependence, and US military domination does not guarantee its
economic domination. At the same time however, US hegemony is closely related to neo-
liberalism and, despite as much as because of US intentions, these same policies undermine
the prospects for development in the ‘South’. In this respect, US attempts to ‘Americanise’
the world are undermined by US hegemony and the imperialism of free trade.

This article critically reviews various broadly Marxist attempts to theorise

contemporary globalisation and how this relates to the question of United States
(US) hegemony. It first outlines various theories of transnational capitalism,
capitalist globalisation and empire, which (rightly) question the utility of Marxist
theories of imperialism for understanding the current international order. But at
the same time, they also underestimate the continued centrality of the nation-
state, the concentration of capital flows, and the uneven development in the
international order. Perhaps, above all, the hegemonic role of the US in the
international order is neglected.
The second section examines attempts to revive aspects of classical Marxist
theories of imperialism, particularly those associated with Vladimir Lenin and
Nikolai Bukharin. The utility of these theories for understanding the current
international order—and to an extent the era in which they were applied—is
questioned.

ISSN 0955-7571 print/ISSN 1474-449X online/06/020205–17 q 2006 Centre of International Studies

DOI: 10.1080/09557570600723647
 206 Ray Kiely

Finally, an alternative account is put forward in section three, which draws on

theories of a new imperialism which stresses cooperation as well as competition
between imperialist powers in the context of greater global integration (Albo 2003;
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

Panitch and Gindin 2003; Panitch and Gindin 2004). Section four develops this
approach by more explicitly focusing on the question of ‘development’ and the
South.

Globalisation, Transnational Capitalism and Empire

A number of different Marxist-inspired approaches have attempted to theorise the
relationship between capitalism and contemporary globalisation. This section will
mainly focus on two of these: the theory of transnational capitalism, associated
with Bill Robinson (2004), Jerry Harris (2003) and Leslie Sklair (2001), and the
theory of globalisation as empire associated with Michael Hardt and Toni Negri
(2000; 2004).
The theory of transnational capitalism accepts the view that globalisation
represents ‘an epochal shift’ which is characterised as referring to ‘fundamental
worldwide changes in social structure that modify and even transform
the very functioning of the system in which we live’ (Robinson 2004, 4).
Robinson argues that globalisation must be understood as the fourth period
of international capitalism, following the earlier periods of primitive
accumulation and mercantilism, competitive capitalism, and monopoly
capitalism and imperialism.
Drawing on the neo-Gramscian work of Robert Cox (1981), Stephen Gill (2003)
and Kees van der Pijl (1998), Robinson (2002) argues that globalisation has arisen
as a product of the rise of transnational capital and a transnational capitalist class,
and has been facilitated by the revolution in communications technologies and
transportation, which has created a genuinely global, as opposed to international
economy. This global economy is characterised by capital mobility, globalised
circuits of accumulation, and the fragmentation of production. Globalisation thus
mainly refers to new forms of organising capitalist production beyond the
territorial boundaries of the nation state, and is therefore related to post-Fordist
restructuring since the 1970s. This is reflected in increased direct foreign
investment, including mergers and acquisitions between firms originating in
different countries, the increased practice of subcontracting and outsourcing
by companies to (local and foreign) suppliers, and the increase in trade
between two or more subsidiaries of the same parent company (Robinson 2004, 18,
23– 24, 58, 55).
The extent of capital mobility is exaggerated by theorists of transnational
capitalism (see below), but what interests us here is how these developments are
related to the question of the state, and in particular the hegemonic US state.
Robinson’s (2004, 131) argument is that a new transnational hegemony is
emerging which cannot be reduced to the interests of dominant states. He argues
that a new ‘historic bloc’ has emerged, and that this transnational capitalist class is
committed to the promotion of neo-liberal expansion throughout the world. This
development cannot be explained by reference to US imperialism, or new inter-
imperialist rivalries, but rather by the transnational interpenetration of all nation-
states.
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 207

Robinson accepts that competition and conflict persists, but this ‘is less a case
of national states using their power to win export markets for territorially-based
corporations than one of competition among transnational conglomerates seeking
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

advantage over competitors through corporate dominance achieved via the global
integration of production facilities and seeking the favor of a multiplicity of states’
(Robinson 2004, 140). This argument is linked to the idea that the nation-state is
‘neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but becoming transformed and
absorbed into a TNS (transnational state)’ (Robinson 2002, 210).1 He recognises
that there is no transnational military apparatus of this nascent transnational state,
but argues that the US military is operating not on behalf of the US state, but for
transnational capital in general. Thus, ‘[t]he empire of capital is located in
Washington’ (Robinson 2004, 140).
This last theme has also been developed in the work of Michael Hardt and Toni
Negri. They argue that the old imperialist order has been replaced by a
deterritorialised apparatus of power, which they call ‘Empire’. This new global
order
can no longer be understood adequately in terms of imperialism as it was practiced
by the modern powers, based primarily on the sovereignty of the nation-state
extended over foreign territory. Instead, a ‘network power’, a new form of
sovereignty, is now emerging, and it includes as its primary elements, or nodes, the
dominant nation-states along with supranational institutions, major capitalist
corporations, and other powers. This network power we claim is ‘imperial’ not
‘imperialist’. (Hardt and Negri 2004, xii)
This is different from the old imperialist order, but also, to some extent, from the
post-war international order based on sovereign nation-states with the US as the
hegemonic state. This new system of Empire is based on a three tier pyramid, with
the US state at the top, and other core nation states (the Group of 7 or G7) junior
partners within this top tier. The second tier is made up of transnational
companies and the third tier comprises the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The
challenge to Empire comes from the transnational multitude, a ‘multiple social
subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much
less, indifference) but on what it has in common’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 309, 100).
Perhaps what is common to all these theories is the tendency to set up too rigid
a dichotomy between nation-state and global capital. For example, Burbach and
Robinson (1999, 26) argue that a transnational state ‘has been brought into
existence to function as the collective authority for a global ruling class’. Thus,
states are deemed to act solely on the basis of their functioning according to the
requirements of capitalism. The fact that states do perform certain functions for
the reproduction of capitalism does not mean that states always act in this way, and
that there are no contradictions between state and capital.
The socio-historical ‘separation’ of economy and polity that characterises
capitalist social relations does not mean that ‘unity’ is reestablished by analyses
which assume that the latter simply acts for the needs of the former (Lacher 2005).
We therefore need to understand that states act in their own right, and that such

1
In this respect Robinson’s work differs from neo-Gramscians like Gill (2003, chapters 5
and 7), who links this transnationalisation process more closely to US state strategy.
 208 Ray Kiely

actions may be limited by the requirements of capitalism, but they also have
implications for the expanded accumulation of capital (Harvey 2003). These
abstract points can be applied to the role of the US state in the current international
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

order. It is undoubtedly the case that the world has become more open and
globalised in recent years. However, rather than occurring ‘behind the backs’ of
nation-states, globalisation has actually been promoted by some nation-states.
The US in particular has promoted increased liberalisation in response to
(perceived and real) discrimination against American companies by other nation-
states, and in order to disproportionately benefit from free trade and liberal
finance and investment regimes. One (possibly unintended) consequence of the
liberalisation of finance was that the US benefited through the international role of
the dollar and its consequent capacity to run deficits that would be impossible for
other states, but which may benefit these same states through market access to the
US economy. The US state thus plays a central role in the reproduction of
international capitalism.
Thus, the increased globalisation of capital does not mean the erosion of the
nation-state, or the end of a hierarchical nation-state system. These points of
course became far more apparent with the emergence of the unilateralist Bush
administration. The aggressive foreign policy adopted by this administration
made it clear that state power was far from a relic of a past of national capitalisms
and/or imperialism.

Globalisation and the Revival of Classical Theories of Imperialism

This section draws on the argument so far, and (re)introduces some theories that
claim to better explain the current international order. Given the aggressive
foreign policy of the US, particularly (but not only) after 2001, some Marxists
argue that the world remains imperialist. This imperialist order is usually
characterised as one based on US ‘super-imperialism’, and/or inter-imperialist
rivalries. However these two theories are not incompatible as US super-
imperialism is usually seen as a strategy by Washington designed to pre-empt the
re-emergence of inter-imperialist rivalries.
This section critically surveys these arguments, and suggests that they fail to
adequately account for some very real changes in the international capitalist order
since the 1970s and indeed, since 1945. In criticising these theories, I will suggest
that the theories of transnational capitalism and empire do point to some real
changes that defenders of classical theories of imperialism tend to underestimate.
But at the same time, I will extend the argument made at the end of the previous
section, and focus more closely on the relationship between the US state and
international capitalism, both historically and in the era of globalisation. In doing
so, I will examine more closely the ‘neoconservative’ Bush administration, and
how this relates to both US hegemony and international capitalism.
Classical Marxist theories of imperialism were not without their problems in
terms of their analyses of the period preceding World War I. These theories linked
the rivalry between imperialist powers before 1914 to what they perceived to be a
new stage of capitalism. Thus, Lenin (1975) argued that imperialism had five
characteristics: concentration of capital which led to monopoly; the merger of
bank and industrial capital (financial capital); the export of capital; the formation
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 209

of trusts and cartels; and the territorial division of the world. Monopoly was for
Lenin a key characteristic and this was linked to the concentration of production,
seizure of raw materials, the rise of national banks and colonial policy. This
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

tendency towards monopoly did not mean the end of competition but rather its
intensification. Bukharin (1973) developed this contention further, arguing that
the world economy was dominated by competing blocs of nationally organised
capital.
Lenin was certainly right to point to increased territorial expansion, capital
export and inter-imperialist rivalry. But his account of the (causal) links between
them is largely unconvincing. Britain did not have close links between industry
and finance, and the British state maintained its commitment to free trade. Indeed,
British colonial acquisition was intended to defend free trade against the more
exclusive trade policies of its rivals, and British finance played a prominent role in
financing competitors. Moreover, there was no close link between foreign
investment and colonial expansion.
The proportion of investment in the Empire increased from 36% from 1860 to
1870, to 47% by 1901 to 1910, and then slightly declined to 46% from 1911 to 1913.
However, the Dominions and India (that is, existing colonies) accounted for most
of this investment. The proportion of total investment in Africa (excluding South
Africa) stood at only 2.5% in 1913. From 1900 to 1913, the US accounted for 20%,
Latin America around 22%, and Europe 6% of British foreign investment.
In terms of British exports, the Empire accounted for 34% from 1881 to 1890, 34%
(1901 – 1910) and 36% (1911 –1913), but again the Dominions (18% in 1911 –1913)
and India (11.5% in 1911 –1913) were far more important than Africa (2%). On the
eve of war, Europe (36%), South America (12%) and the US (9%) were also more
important (Barratt-Brown 1970, 110).
In the case of other imperialist powers, trade between these countries was more
important than trade with the colonies. In 1913, 68% of France’s trade was with
other ‘Northern’ countries, while the figure for Germany was 53%, the US 74%,
and other Western European countries 70%. As a whole, in the period from 1880 to
1938, only 17% of total developed world exports went to the periphery, and of
these, only half went to the colonies (Bairoch 1993, 72– 73). This reflected a high
growth in world trade, which actually existed alongside high average tariff rates
in what became the developed capitalist countries, policies that were
implemented in order to protect emerging economies from import competition
from established producers, primarily in Britain. Average tariffs on manufactured
goods in Austria-Hungary were 18 –20%, France 20%, Germany 13%, Sweden
20 –25%, and the US 44% (Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996, 8).
It could thus be argued that for the countries that first followed Britain to
developed status, this was the beginning of their process of industrial
development. Thus, if we are to understand increased openness as one (neo-
liberal) definition of globalisation (Sachs and Warner 1995; Lindert and
Williamson; Desai 2002), then the pre-1914 era was not one that can be
characterised as globalisation. This is a significant point for understanding
the reality of imperialism and development in the current era of globalisation,
one I return to below.
If Marxist theories of imperialism suggest that there is a close connection
between monopoly capital, capital export, and colonial expansion, then the figures
above seriously undermine this argument (Warren 1980). In fairness, Lenin barely
 210 Ray Kiely

mentioned the scramble for Africa and he explicitly rejected the argument that
colonialism and imperialism were one and the same. Bukharin also drew out the
contradiction between the practice of each state protecting its own state (and
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

colonies) through tariffs, while simultaneously demanding the right to sell freely
in other territories.
Britain did attempt to continue a policy of business as usual, and promoted
free trade, but with the development of new industrial rivals who themselves
were expanding their empires, the context had changed and there was clearly a
new era of inter-imperialist rivalry.2 It was this conflict that, for Lenin and
Bukharin, made war necessary. Indeed, this era of protectionism was closely
linked to territorial expansion, as Britain apart, the colonial powers exercised
protectionist policies designed to secure the raw materials and markets of their
newly acquired territories. As Rudolf Hilferding (1981, 45), another classical
Marxist theorist of imperialism, put it, ‘tariff and expansion became the common
demand of the ruling class’. In this respect at least, the views of Lenin and
Bukharin were convincing.
But Lenin and Bukharin both linked imperialism—including the export of
capital to the colonies and semi-colonies—to the necessity of renewed capital
accumulation, suggesting that this opened up new fields for surplus capital in
search of new profits. Certainly the new imperialist wave of the late nineteenth
century took place in the context of the prolonged recession from 1873 to 1896, but
this recession was not overcome by exporting capital to the colonies and semi-
colonies. Lenin’s own evidence showed that most capital was exported to other
core countries, which supposedly suffered from an excess of surplus profits. This
suggests that the new era of imperialism was not the product of a stagnant,
decaying capitalism in the core countries, but rather was the product of a new era
of capitalist expansion, even if this was one that started in a recessionary phase
(Olle and Schoeller 1982).
Despite these problems, some Marxists have attempted to revive the analyses
of Lenin and Bukharin and argue that inter-imperialist rivalries have continued
since the end of the Cold War, and that these are between states which are
undoubtedly capitalist. Thus, according to this theory, the 1991 Gulf War upheld
US power against Germany and Japan. Similarly, the war over Kosovo in 1999 was
less about humanitarian intervention and the disciplining of the repressive regime
in Serbia, and more about military and economic expansion into central and
Eastern Europe, not least at the expense of Russia. The 2001 conflict in
Afghanistan was about the exercise of US power against Russia, Iran and Europe.
In all these cases then, and despite the rhetoric of humanitarian values and
freedom, the wars were largely concerned with the exercise of state power (Rees
2000). This ‘realist’ analysis of state power is often augmented by the assumption
that the dominant powers also need to exercise such power in order to sustain
capitalist accumulation. This is sometimes related to the (Leninist) idea that
surplus capital must search for new areas of capital accumulation, and must

2
This is the main flaw in the work of Gallagher and Robinson (1953) on the imperialism
of free trade. They argue that there was a substantial continuity in the nature of imperialism
throughout the 19th century, underestimating the fact that the expansion of so many powers
reflected a changed context, and therefore considerable discontinuity with the situation
before the 1880s.
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 211

therefore exercise war in order to find new ‘spatial fixes’, and this may
simultaneously involve the search for new, essential resources to sustain capital
accumulation (Harvey 2003; Klare 2004). Thus, the 2003 conflict in Iraq was a war
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

exercised by the US for guaranteed long-term oil supplies, which involved the
defeat of rivals like France and Germany, as well as potential long-term rivals such
as Russia and China (Morgan 2003). In some cases this war is even linked to the
idea of a return to colonialism, in which the US constructs a puppet state in order
to promote US interests in Iraq and the Middle East (Ali 2004).
This understanding of imperialism as inter-imperialist rivalry is not
incompatible with the idea that the world is dominated by one super-imperialist
state, the US, which has successfully pre-empted the rise of competitors since the
end of the Cold War. Thus, Peter Gowan (2001, 81) highlights ‘the central fact of
contemporary international relations’, which is that the United States ‘has
acquired absolute military dominance over every other state or combination of
states on the entire planet’. This indisputable fact is often linked to the more
contentious claim that this military power is sufficient to secure the (economic)
dominance of the US by preventing the rise of (economic) rivals. Thus, Gowan
(2002, 22) claims that ‘US policies are tending to conflict with the collective
interests of major capitalist centres’. Harvey (2003, 85) argues that the invasion of
Iraq constitutes ‘an attempt to control the global oil spigot and hence the global
economy through domination of the Middle East’ and ‘a powerful military
bridgehead on the Eurasian land mass which, when taken together with its
gathering alliances from Poland down through the Balkans, yields it a powerful
geo-strategic position in Eurasia with at least the potential to disrupt any
consolidation of Eurasian power.’ Therefore, for these theorists of a new
imperialism, inter-imperialist rivalries persist, or at least have the potential to
return, and this ultimately guides the actions of the super-imperialist US. Lenin
and Bukharin thus remain indispensable guides for understanding contemporary
international politics (Callinicos 2002; 2003; 2005).
There is undoubtedly something in this analysis. There is plenty of evidence
which suggests that US actions are often guided by the idea of preventing the rise
of potential competitors. Unlike theories of transnational capitalism, this
approach correctly focuses on the continued importance of the nation-state, and
the dominant US state in the international order. But there are equally serious
weaknesses in this analysis. These relate to the question of cooperation between
states, the growth of an increasingly integrated world market, the causes of war
and conflict, and how these relate to an adequate theory of contemporary
imperialism. It is these features that have been emphasised by those advocating an
understanding of the ‘new imperialism’ (Albo 2003; Panitch and Gindin 2003;
2004; 2006).

Globalisation and the New Imperialism

Advocates of a new imperialism take some of the concrete manifestations of
globalisation seriously, but attempt to incorporate them into an understanding of
an international order still based on nation-states. They explicitly contrast
contemporary imperialism with the classical era of imperialism, and make some
convincing points. First, relations between the major powers have changed
 212 Ray Kiely

substantially since 1945. There is far more cooperation between major states,
which is reflected in the rise of international organisations and summits. This was
in part facilitated by cooperation against the communist world, but even in the
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

post-Cold War era the major capitalist states have continued to cooperate.
As theories of transnational capitalism point out (see above), this has not
meant the end of economic competition, but in the current international order the
likelihood of this competition leading to military rivalry between the major
nation-states is unlikely. As we have seen, theories of transnational capitalism
contend that competition in the era of globalisation only exists between
companies and not between nation-states. This argument under-estimates
continued rivalries between states, such as disagreements at the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or even disagreement over war in Iraq in 2003. However,
these disagreements do not add up to a return to inter-imperialist rivalry of the
sort that existed prior to 1914 or 1939. Indeed, apart from the Iraq war of 2003,
there was a high degree of cooperation between the most powerful capitalist states
over post-Cold war interventions. This does not apply to all states, and US
primacy may be linked in some respects to attempts to pre-empt the rise of China
and Russia. The resurgence of inter-imperialist rivalries in these cases is therefore
a more open question, but even then, military ‘competition’ reflects perceived
future rivalries rather than ones that exist in the present order.
As things stand then, we have an international order in which competition
exists alongside high levels of cooperation between the major states, led by the US.
That country has certain advantages over other major states and the developing
world (see below), but other states are happy to cooperate in this order provided
some gains are made for all. This is not an argument that suggests that gains are
distributed equally, but it is one that suggests that considerable gains are made by
dominant actors in other states. To an extent, this point applies to the developing
world, but it is in relations with parts of the South that the contradictions of the
international order are most acute. These issues are addressed in more detail
below, but for the moment, the point that needs to be emphasised is that while
capitalist competition exists in acute forms, contrary to Lenin and Bukharin and
their contemporary followers, this does not necessarily lead to military competition
(Panitch 1994; 2000; Albo 2003; Panitch and Gindin 2003; Kiely 2005a). In this
respect at least, the most useful classical Marxist theory for understanding current
realities is Kautsky’s (2002) theory of ultra-imperialist cooperation between the
core capitalist states.3
The main trend before World War I was the concentration of capital on a
national level, with colonial annexation facilitating market access, investment and
raw materials. Today we have a far greater internationalisation of capital, which
flows mainly between First World countries. The concentration of flows between
core states is not so different from the pre-1914 era. What is novel, however, is the
rise of manufacturing in the periphery and most crucially, the fact that the capital
that is invested in developing countries does not originate from one nation. This

3
There are of course significant differences, not least in the fact that such cooperation is
organised by a hegemonic US power. Kautsky also underestimated the significance of
uneven development. Nevertheless, given the degree of cooperation between core capitalist
states and the fact that continued competition does not necessarily give rise to inter-
imperialist rivalry, the international order is best described as ultra-imperialist.
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 213

does not mean that capital is no longer tied to particular nation states, but it does
mean that the world cannot be divided into exclusive blocs. Economic competition
has in many ways intensified, but in a context of increased openness, rather than
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

the context of colonial monopoly and territorial acquisition that characterised the
pre-1914 period (apart from the British Empire).
In the current order, power is exercised more by directly ‘economic’, rather
than ‘political’ or military means (Green 2002; Went 2002). Of course this does not
preclude the fact that there are social and political forces in the developing world,
as well as producers and consumers in the advanced capitalist countries, that
benefit from the export of particular commodities, but such trade is not a
functional necessity in the way that Lenin’s theory of surplus capital or Harvey’s
notion of a spatial fix implies. Moreover, access to these commodities is different
from the period before 1914. Thus, if we take the example of the Middle East and
oil, the common argument made is that the US wants to secure access to or control
over Middle East oil.
At some level of generalisation this may well be true, although this alone can
hardly explain the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2003, not least because the
US could have secured more diplomatic relations with its old ally, Saddam
Hussein, in order to secure Iraqi oil. Moreover, the question then becomes one of
access for whom—is it for the US alone or its allies? Similarly, if it is about
control of Iraqi oil to gain leverage over potential rivals, then there is the
question of how, in the context of a relatively open international oil market,
exclusive access to Iraqi oil can secure such leverage. Some of these factors may
have influenced the decision to go to war and neoconservative thinking on how
the war may secure US hegemony (see below). However, this is not the same
thing as assuming that this decision was a rational one, both on its own terms,
and in terms of assuming the longer terms interests of American capital.
In other words, simplistic critiques of the ‘war for oil’ too often assume that
there is a straightforward causality between oil on the one hand, and a war led by
the US for American capital on the other. As Simon Bromley states (2005, 253),
the form of control that the United States is now seeking to fashion is one that is
open to the capital, commodities and trade of many states and firms. It cannot be
seen as an economically exclusive strategy, as part of a predatory form of hegemony.
Rather, the United States is seeking to use its military power to fashion a geopolitical
order that provides the political underpinning for its preferred model of the world
economy: that is, an increasingly open liberal international order.

Given the planned preferential treatment given to US companies in post-war Iraq,

the intentions of neoconservatives partially challenged this idea, but it did not
represent a return to the territorial monopoly system of the pre-1914 period, and
so it was unlikely that in the long-term, non-American companies would be
excluded from Iraq.
These points reflect one of the features of the contemporary world economy
that theories of transnational capitalism correctly allude to, but do not
satisfactorily theorise, namely, the wider and deeper integration of international
capital. This is an issue that is closely related to the rise of neo-liberalism
and the changing fortunes of US hegemony in the international order. The
end of one of the key features of the Bretton Woods post-war order in the early
 214 Ray Kiely

1970s—the gold-dollar link and fixed exchange rates—was instigated by the US in

an effort to recover its competitive position in the world economy.
In the 1970s, successive US governments pursued expansionary monetary
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

policies and a relatively weak dollar, in order to increase production both at home
and expand exports abroad. However, the policy led to inflation and potentially
undermined the international role of the dollar. This led to a new era in the last
two years of the Carter administration (1979 – 80), and especially under Ronald
Reagan, when the money supply came under tighter control, alongside tax cuts for
the rich and increased deregulation of capital investment. From 1982 onwards,
there was a big increase in military spending and a marked intensification of Cold
War hostilities.
Increased military spending and tax cuts led to a big increase in the
government’s budget deficit. At the same time, the US benefited from the
continued international demand for the dollar, the main international currency,
which allowed it to run massive trade deficits that could be financed through
attracting dollars back into the US. In the early 1980s, this was achieved through a
policy of high interest rates, which undermined full employment in the United
States and development in the Third World (Kiely 2005b, chapters 3 and 5).
In the 1990s, when the government budget briefly became solvent, the trade
deficit continued to increase, and this was financed through the selling of
government debt securities (bonds), and facilitated by the promotion of
liberalisation of overseas financial markets, which could guarantee continued
flows into the US economy, thus financing the ongoing deficit. Since the arrival of
the Bush administration in 2001, the Federal budget deficit has grown from 1.8%
of GDP to an estimated 3.7% (2003) and 4.3% for 2004, while the trade deficit grew
from a record $435 billion in 2001, to a new record of $489 billion by 2003 (Brenner
2003; Monthly Review 2003). These deficits have been financed by foreigners
speculating in the stock market, buying real estate, acquiring firms or setting up
new sites, and buying US Treasury bonds. Equity purchases fell by 83% from 2000
to 2002 as share prices fell, and so there has been a sustained movement into
buying government bonds. In 2001, 97% of the US current account deficit was
financed by foreign purchases of these bonds. From 1992 to 2001, the foreign share
of US national debt increased from 17% to 31% (Monthly Review 2003, 11).
The US deficits reflect the increasing integration of international capital, and
the dilemmas of cooperation in this increasingly interdependent world. The US
remains the hegemonic power and in some respects other states are happy for this
to occur. This is because the US incurs most of the costs of policing the
international order, through its high military budget, which stood at $399 billion
in 2004, which was almost as large as that of the rest of the world combined, and
29 times as large as the combined spending of those identified as rogue states that
comprised the axis of evil.4
Moreover, there are sound economic reasons why other states are not entirely
opposed to the US deficits, and that is because they sustain reasonably high levels
of growth in the American economy, which in turn serves to stimulate demand for
capital seeking to sell goods in the US market. In this respect then, the US acts as a

4
In 2003, these were Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. See
,www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade ., accessed 28 February 2006.
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 215

market of last resort to the rest of the world. But at the same time, there are
tensions within this system, which can be traced back to the problems of the
Bretton Woods order.
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

Whether or not these tensions will lead to the erosion of US hegemony need
not concern us here. What these tensions do suggest however, is that increased
openness and integration in the international economy is qualitatively different
from the era of classical imperialism. Indeed, the neo-liberal era effectively started
with the Reaganite switch to high interest rates in the early 1980s, and since then,
the world economy has been characterised by delicate balancing acts based above
all on movements in the main currencies. These currency movements are
designed to deal with the question of the US trade deficit in a way that could
secure growth in all the major regions of the world economy. This has not worked,
and generalised recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s have also been
accompanied by slow rates of growth and recession in one or more of the main
regions in the world economy. At the same time, economic tensions, particularly
over trade, have existed side by side with this cooperation, but this has occurred in
the context of managing and maintaining increased integration and greater
openness (Albo 2003). Moreover, this is an order based not only on increasingly
open capital flows, but also one that is regulated by sovereign states, rather than
the colonies of the pre-1914 order.
The points made by theories of the new imperialism are thus generally
convincing. On the other hand, most of their focus is on the relations between the
core capitalist states, and there is a comparative neglect of the relations between
core states, and the US state in particular, and the states of the developing world.
Certainly Panitch and Gindin (2003, 30 – 32) acknowledge that the contradictions
of American empire are most acute in the relations between the US and the ‘non-
integrating Gap’, but have little more to say on this point. The final section
attempts to develop some broad points that point the way forward in terms of a
fuller explanation.

The New Imperialism and the Question of Development in the South

A full examination of the relationship between the US and states in the developing
world lies beyond the scope of this article, but a few observations can be made.
This can be done by first examining the most overt example of imperialism, that of
military intervention in the South. Certainly, such intervention is designed to
maintain and promote US hegemony, but this has less to do with the
‘accumulation needs’ of American capital, and much more to do with
Washington’s policing role in an increasingly integrated international economic
order based on sovereign nation-states. Above all, contemporary US imperialism
attempts to incorporate ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ states into the liberal international order,
or what is sometimes called the liberal or democratic zone of peace (Doyle 1983;
Starr 1997).
But such a perceived incorporation is unlikely to happen, and it is here that the
question of development is crucial. It is not only that war is likely to lead to both
innocent deaths and nationalist reaction in cases of occupation, as Iraq has made
clear. It is also in part because there is an unwarranted assumption that liberalism
is the norm and that this can simply be imposed as a model, bound to promote
 216 Ray Kiely

economic growth, prosperity and peace in the periphery. Certainly one can
recognise the progressiveness of liberal democracy as against authoritarian
dictatorship, but one should not conflate this normative position with technocratic
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

models that attempt to impose the former on so-called failed or rogue states. This
is not a position that endorses cultural relativism but rather one that recognises the
different social realities that exist in different parts of the world—if this is
relativism, then it is socially and politically grounded. Moreover, it is also
historically grounded, for it recognises that liberal democracy in the Western
world was itself the outcome of social and political struggles, and violent conflict.
Seen in this way, US military interventions are too often based on ideological
illusions.
But perhaps most crucially, there are stronger political economy grounds for
suggesting that integration is unlikely to work, not only in the failed and rogue
states, but throughout the developing world. This is because it is questionable that
openness in itself is conducive to the development of the periphery. This is so for two
reasons. First, financial lberalisation can have the effect of undermining stability
and increasing uncertainty in countries where productive investment is crucial to
development. The use of hedge funds is certainly necessary to secure against
uncertainty in an era of floating exchange rates, but these same funds are then
used to speculate in ways that intensify the uncertainty that they were meant to
alleviate in the first place. For example, in the 1990s, and in the context of trade
liberalisation and increased financial flows into Latin America (which led to over-
valued exchange rates, sometimes formalised by currency pegs to the dollar),
cheap imports flooded the market, which in turn led to a decline in manufacturing
value added.
The neo-liberal rationale for financial liberalisation was to tap both domestic
and foreign savings and thus increase investment rates, but both actually fell in
the 1990s: savings, from 22% to 17% of GDP in Argentina from 1989 to 1999, from
28% in 1985 to 20% of GDP in Brazil from 1985 to 2001, and from 30% to 18% of
GDP in Mexico from the early 1980s to 2001 in Mexico; investment, from 27% to
20% of GDP in Argentina from the mid 1980s to late 1990s; from 25% to 20% of
GDP in Brazil from 1989 to 2001, and from 26% to 21% of GDP in Mexico from 1981
to 2001 (Saad-Filho 2005, 226).
The combination of high interest rates and exchange rates, which served to
encourage capital inflows, also encouraged cheap imports and undermined both
investment and exports. Instead, this combination fuelled consumer-led booms,
which were bound to end when deficits became unsustainable and foreign
investors were no longer so willing to hold national currencies. This led to
financial crashes in Mexico in 1995, Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001. Financial
liberalisation therefore failed to promote development in Latin America.
Furthermore, such liberalisation can encourage the outflow of capital away
from the periphery and into the core, not least to the US. This diversion of funds
can undermine potential for investment, even if, by allowing the US to live beyond
its means, it simultaneously acts to secure market access to the US for some
producers in the developing world.
Second, increased openness has included policies of trade and investment
liberalisation, and these too are not necessarily conducive to the development of
poorer countries. One likely effect of free trade is the reinforcement of some
countries producing lower value goods such as primary products or low cost
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 217

manufacturing, while others produce high-cost manufacturing and services. Free

trade policies undermine the prospects for state policies that are designed to
promote dynamic comparative advantages and to shift to higher value
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

production. Investment is potentially developmental, but the removal of state

regulations designed to promote higher value production and accrue beneficial
spin-offs such as use of local skilled labour and suppliers undermines the
prospects for these benefits being realised. This is reflected in both the continued
concentration of capital and trade shares in the core capitalist countries.
The share of Africa and Latin America in world trade has fallen in the era of
contemporary globalisation: Africa’s share declined from 4.1% in 1970 to 1.5% in
1995, and Latin America’s from 5.5% to 4.4% over the same period (UNCTAD
1998, 183). The share increased for Asia, from 8.5% to 21.4%, but as we have seen
this was not because of unambiguously open trade policies, still less because of
neo-liberal policies. In 1960, Africa’s share of total merchandise exports was 5.6%,
and Latin America’s 7.5%; by 2002, Africa’s share had declined to 2.1% and Latin
America’s to 5.4% (UNCTAD 2004, 51). In services, concentration was even
greater: in 2002, developed countries accounted for 73.2% of the total value of
service exports, Central and Eastern Europe 4.2%, and developing countries just
22.6%. Africa and Latin America’s share have both declined since 1980 (UNCTAD
2004, 61).
Thus, the era of globalisation has seen a decline in shares of world trade and
investment for much of the developing world. These figures illustrate a parallel
with the period before 1914, one that undermines views associated with surplus
capital and spatial fixes on the one hand, and neo-liberal convergence on the other.
As we saw above, the pre-1914 period can be seen as an era where some
developed countries began to catch up with the world market leader of the time,
Great Britain. They did so in part by protecting themselves from foreign (mainly
British) competition.
In the context of the neo-liberal globalisation of the early 21st century, such a
strategy is increasingly unavailable to today’s developing countries (Chang 2002).
The regional exception to this rule is East Asia, which has won increasing shares of
world trade and investment. Historically, it has done this not through adopting
neo-liberal policies, but through developmental states actively directing
investment into strategic and dynamic sectors of the economy.
For this reason, many critics of neo-liberalism call for more interventionist
states in the developing world, alongside progressive social models in Europe, to
challenge US-led neo-liberal capitalism (Gallagher 2005). This view represents a
powerful critique of neo-liberalism, and rightly suggests that neo-liberalism does
not provide a route to a dynamic, let alone progressive, capitalism in the
developing world. But this view also under-estimates the realities of the existing
international economic order.
Certainly in East Asia, there has been a shift towards neo-liberalism, which
pre-dates the financial crisis of 1997– 1998, as domestic capitalist classes and state
elites increasingly pressurised states to carry out neo-liberal reforms. These
reforms were generally extended with the onset of crisis, and even in China there
have been some concessions to neo-liberal policies since accession to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the full impact of which is uncertain. More
generally, the view being promoted here is that while neo-liberalism may not be
conducive to capitalist development in the periphery, from the viewpoint of
 218 Ray Kiely

domestic capitalist classes there, this is irrelevant, for they happily buy into the
US-led neo-liberal international order (Albo 2003).
Of course this does not mean anything like complete convergence between
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

different states, not least because states in the developing world vary according to
their previous success in developing competitive economic sectors. Nevertheless,
for much of the South, neo-liberalism is unlikely to promote capitalist
development on a scale likely to promote integration into the core, and this has
negative implications for US hegemony. This can be seen most clearly through a
brief consideration of the neo-conservative influence on US foreign policy in the
era of President George W Bush.
Rather than seeing the Bush administration in terms of its functionality to US
capital (see for example, Callinicos 2003), it should be regarded as an attempt to
use military and unilateral means to ‘Americanise’5 the world. This is a strategy
that combines hard, military power with an older liberal internationalism based
on incorporating non-liberal states into the US-led ‘international community’. On
the one hand, the Bush administration argued that it was ‘time to reaffirm the
essential role of American military strength’ and that, given the existence of rogue
states in the international order, the US retains the option of ‘preemptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security’ (National Security Strategy
2002, 29, 15). On the other hand, US military power will serve the means of
expanding liberal universalism, ‘based on non-negotiable demands of human
dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and
private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance’
(National Security Strategy 2002, iii). While the former statements represent a
break from the partial movement towards multilateralism in the 1990s, in that it is
more openly unilateralist, the extent of this shift should not be exaggerated.
The Clinton presidency was prepared to use force and marginalise the United
Nations in the process of doing so, as the intervention in Kosovo made clear.
Under Clinton, the US also became increasingly wary of the WTO, particularly
with the breakdown of talks at Seattle in late 1999. Moreover, the multilateral
commitment to free trade was not regarded as being incompatible with US
interests. The Bush administration essentially accepted the idea that military
power alone was sufficient to secure its hegemonic status, but even in Iraq, it
quickly became clear that this was untrue.
The limits of military power are all the more clear in cases of relations between
other core capitalist states, and emerging powers from within the developing
world, such as China and India (Kiely 2005a, chapters 4 and 6). This again in part
reflects the higher degree of global economic integration, which undermines any
simplistic assertion of power based solely on military resources. But equally, if this
military power is to be used to construct a world of liberal, sovereign states
promoting neo-liberal policies, then it is unlikely to succeed.
In terms of the strategy, four important tensions exist: first, between the
unilateral means by which this was to be achieved and the perceived outcome of
an expanding liberal order, with some neoconservatives coming perilously close

5
This term refers to perceived Americanisation, which in reality is a highly contested
term with multiple meanings. Here it means the extension of liberal democracies and
‘market economies’ existing under benign US hegemony.
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 219

to embracing an older style empire led by the US;6 second, between continued US
hegemony and this liberal core of states, which could presumably undermine
American economic hegemony; and third, in the way in which Washington was
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

prepared to compromise its policy by aligning with non-liberal states and

allowing the policy of market expansion to effectively ‘trump’ the idea of
expanding formal democracy into something far more substantive (Kiely 2005a,
chapter 6). But equally, despite these differences over means, the endgame of
globalisation remained intact in the Bush years—indeed, the second and third of
these tensions applied as much to the Clinton administration’s endorsement of
globalisation as much as to Bush’s unilateralism (Smith 2005). And this relates to
the fourth tension, which is that between the assumed outcome of a high growth
market economy with a liberal democratic polity, and the promotion of open trade
and investment regimes that effectively undermine such an outcome. These
policies were not adopted by the already developed states in their era of catch-up
with the already developed powers, and openness was only endorsed once
development had taken place. In this respect, we live in an era of free trade and
financial imperialism (Kiely 2005a, chapter 7).

Conclusion
This article has considered the claims of both Marxist-inspired theories of
globalisation and classical Marxist arguments which suggest that we are still
living in an era of imperialism. Theories of transnational capitalism were
examined, and these at least have attempted to combine an understanding of
important changes in the international order, above all increased global
integration through the promotion of more open economies. But these theories
also tend to underestimate the continued centrality of the nation-state, and the
hierarchical nature of both the international state system and global capital flows.
A theory of imperialism therefore remains indispensable for understanding both
the contemporary world order, and the place of the South in that order.
The alternative put forward in this article suggests the need to situate
contemporary imperialism in the context of cooperation as well as competition
between the core nation-states, the promotion of a more open international
economy, and the consequent greater integration or ‘globalisation’ of capital. The
US remains the most powerful nation-state, and continues to enjoy considerable
economic advantages over its competitors. It is also the main military power, and
this plays some role in policing the international order, even if this is neither
sufficient nor necessary to maintain US economic hegemony.
For the South, development is undermined by the (selective) commitment to
‘universal’ free trade and the contradictory role of finance in further facilitating
the concentration of capital in the developed world. The US and other core
capitalist states have attempted to expand the ‘liberal core’ of developed states,

6
Thus, some neoconservatives outside the Bush administration criticised its foreign
policy for not being sufficiently belligerent, and called for a programme for absolute
domination—a world away from the idea that US power can be justified by the idea that it
represents the global good (Boot 2003). However, most neoconservatives still advocate the
idea of empire through sovereign states, even if they are prepared to compromise this
sovereignty.
 220 Ray Kiely

albeit in ways that are often self-serving, but greater openness actually serves to
discourage such incorporation. Since 2001, this has involved the greater use of
unilateral military power, but this has been ineffective and only served to further
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

undermine the legitimacy of US hegemony. Above all, however, the promotion of

greater openness through trade and financial liberalisation undermines the
developmental prospects for the South. In this respect, US hegemony hinders the
so-called Americanisation of the world.

References
Albo, G (2003) ‘The Old and New Economics of Imperialism’, in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys
(eds), The Socialist Register 2004 (London, Merlin), 88 – 113
Ali, T (2004) Bush in Babylon (London, Verso)
Bairoch, P (1993) Economics and World History (London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf)
Bairoch, P and Kozul-Wright, R (1996) Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on
Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy (Geneva, UNCTAD
Discussion Paper 113)
Barratt-Brown, M (1970) After Imperialism (London, Merlin)
Boot, M (2003) ‘The Case for American Empire’, Weekly Standard, October 15
Brenner, R (2003) ‘Towards the Precipice’, London Review of Books, 25:3, , www.lrb.co.uk . ,
15 – 22
Bromley, S (2005) ‘Oil and United States Hegemony’, Government and Opposition, 40:2,
238– 255
Bukharin, N (1973) Imperialism and World Economy (London, Merlin)
Burbach, R and Robinson, B (1999) ‘The Fin De Siecle Debate: Globalisation as Epochal Shift’,
Science and Society, 63:1, 5– 30
Callinicos, A (2002) ‘Marxism and Global Governance’, in David Held and Anthony
McGrew (eds), Governing Globalization (Cambridge, Polity), 249– 266
Callinicos, A (2003) The New Mandarins of American Power (Cambridge, Polity)
Callinicos, A (2005) ‘Imperialism and global political economy’, International Socialism, 108,
109– 128
Chang, HJ (2002) Kicking Away the Ladder (London, Anthem)
Cox, R (1981) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory’, Millennium, 10:2, 126– 155
Desai, M (2002) Marx’s Revenge (London, Verso)
Doyle, M (1983) ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs: Part One’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 12:3, 205– 235
Gallagher, K (ed) (2005) Putting Development First (London, Zed)
Gallagher, J and Robinson, R (1953) ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History
Review, 6:1, 1 – 18
Gill, S (2003) Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Palgrave, Macmillan)
Gowan, P (2001) ‘Neoliberal Cosmopolitanism’, New Left Review, II:11, 70 – 85
Gowan, P (2002) ‘The American Campaign for Global Sovereignty’, The Socialist Register
2003 (London, Merlin), 1 – 28
Green, P (2002) ‘“The Passage from Imperialism to Empire”: A Commentary on Empire by
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’, Historical Materialism, 10:1, 29 –77
Hardt, M and Negri, T (2000) Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University
Press)
Hardt, M and Negri, T (2004) Multitude (New York, Penguin)
Harris, J (2003) ‘Transnational Competition and the End of US Economic Hegemony’,
Science and Society, 67:1, 68– 80
Harvey, D (2003) The New Imperialism (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Hilferding, R (1981) Finance Capital (London, Routledge)
Kautsky, K (2002) ‘Ultra-Imperialism’, Workers Liberty, 2:3, 73 – 79
Kiely, R (2005a) Empire in the Age of Globalization (London, Pluto)
Kiely, R (2005b) The Clash of Globalisations (Leiden, Brill)
 US Hegemony and Globalisation: Theories of Imperialism 221

Klare, M (2004) Blood and Oil (London, Hamish Hamilton)

Lacher, H (2005) ‘International Transformation and the Persistence of Territoriality: Toward
a New Political Geography of Capitalism’, Review of International Political Economy, 12:1,
26– 52
Downloaded by [Computing & Library Services, University of Huddersfield] at 11:46 29 December 2014

Lenin, V (1975) Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Moscow, Progress)

Lindert, P and Williamson, J (2001) ‘Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?’,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 8228 (Cambridge, Massachusetts,
NBER)
Monthly Review (2003) ‘Editorial: What Recovery?’, Monthly Review, 54:11, 1 – 11
Morgan, P (2003) ‘Iraq’, in Farah Reza (ed), Anti-Imperialism: A Guide for the Movement
(London, Bookmarks), 107– 116
National Security Strategy (2002) ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America’, , www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. , accessed 28 February 2006
Olle, W and Schoeller, W (1982) ‘Direct Investment and Monopoly Theories of Imperialism’,
Capital and Class, 16, 41 – 60
Panitch, L (1994) ‘Globalisation and the State’, in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds), The
Socialist Register 1994 (London, Merlin), 60 – 93
Panitch, L (2000) ‘The New Imperial State’, New Left Review, II:1, 5– 20
Panitch, L and Gindin, S (2003) ‘Global Capitalism and American Empire’, in Leo Panitch
and Colin Leys (eds), The Socialist Register 2004 (London, Merlin), 1 – 42
Panitch, L and Gindin, S (2004) ‘Finance and American Empire’, in Leo Panitch and Colin
Leys (eds), The Socialist Register 2005 (London, Merlin), 46 – 81
Panitch, L and Gindin, S (2006) ‘“Imperialism and Global Political Economy”—A Reply to
Alex Callinicos’, International Socialism, 109, 194– 199
Pijl, K (1998) Transnational Classes and International Relations (London, Routledge)
Rees, J (2000) ‘Oil, Gas and NATO’s New Frontier’, New Political Economy, 5:1, 100– 104
Robinson, W (2002) ‘Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalization of the State’,
in Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith (eds), Historical Materialism and Globalization (London,
Routledge), 210– 229
Robinson, W (2004) A Theory of Global Capitalism (Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins
University Press)
Saad-Filho, A (2005) ‘The Political Economy of Neoliberalism in Latin America’, in Alfredo
Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston (eds), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (London, Pluto),
222–229
Sachs, J and Warner, A (1995) Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration
(Washington DC, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1)
Sklair, L (2001) The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford, Blackwell)
Smith, N (2005) The Endgame of Globalization (New York, Routledge)
Starr, H (1997) ‘Democracy and Integration: Why Democracies Don’t Fight Each Other’,
Journal of Peace Research, 32:2, 153– 162
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1998) World Investment Report 1998
(Geneva, UNCTAD)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2004) World Investment Report 2004
(Geneva, UNCTAD)
Warren, B (1980) Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (London, Verso)
Went, R (2002) ‘Globalization in the Perspective of Imperialism’, Science and Society, 66:4,
473–497