GR NO.

183591

FACTS:

 The signing of MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not materialized. The GRP and MILF peace panels
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities and the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on
August 27, 1998.
 Early 2000 President Joseph Estrada declared and carried all-out-war against MILF for attacking several
municipalities in Central Mindanao and taking control of the Town Hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. When
President Gloria Arroyo assumed office peace talks with MILF resumed.
 Formal Peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, outcome was the
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the aspect of Security, Rehabilitation
and Ancestral Domain. Second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 ended
in signing of the implementing guidelines on the Security aspect leading to a ceasefire status between two
parties. Nonetheless, there were many incidents of violence between government forces and MILF from 2002 to
2003.
 In 2005 several exploratory talks were held between two parties that leads to the crafting of the final form of
MOA-AD and was set to signed on August 5, 2008.
 On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the
MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional.
 August 4, 2008, the Court issued a TRO commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease
and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. Meanwhile, several other Province, Municipal and Cities also file a
petition praying that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Court ordered the consolidation of the
petitions.
 On August 28, 2008, the Executive Department pronounced that it would no longer sign the MOA-AD.
Petitioners-in-intervention maintain that despite the supervening events and foregoing declarations and acts of
the Executive Department, there remains a justiciable controversy, a conflict of legal rights by the parties that
ought to be adjudicated by this Court and contended that case at bench have not been mooted, or, even if so,
the issues they raised fall within the exceptions to the moot and academic principle. The OSG insist that the
petitions and petitions-in-intervention must be dismissed on the ground of mootness, supervening events
having rendered the assailed MOA-AD inexistent, and all the reliefs prayed for satisfied and fulfilled.
 The OSG argues that a ruling by this Court on the constitutionality of the MOA-AD violates the doctrine of
separation of powers as the negotiation of the MOA-AD embraced in the President’s power and in the nature of
a political question, outside the pale of judicial review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Philippines would be binding itself:

a) To create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a judicial, territorial
or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) To revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) To concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of R.A No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1997)
HELD:

YES, the signing of the MOA, the Government of the republic of the Philippines would be binding itself to create
and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial, or political subdivision
not recognized by law. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associate state.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even
the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. The
Concept implies power that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any
part of Philippine territory for independence. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
GR. No. 159402

FACTS:

Respondent discovered that a portion of their land registered under transfer certificate title no. T-58894 of the Baguio
City land records was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
the petitioner.

On August 11, 1995, the respondent agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the
petitioner in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, petitioner failed to pay despite of repeated verbal
and written demands.

On April 29, 1998, the respondent filed an action for collection against the petitioner and some of its officials. Petitioner
and its co-defendant invoke an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358 and asserted that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered
into the performance of governmental function.

On November 10, 1998, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. The
petitioner then commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA. The CA dismissed the petitioner for certiorari.

February 21, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs, ATO appealed to the CA, which affirmed the
RTC’s decision.

The petitioner appealed petition for review on certiorari to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner ATO could be sued without the State’s Consent.

HELD:

YES,

The Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings
being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s property. SC further added that the Doctrine of Sovereign immunity was not an
instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen and it could not be set up by State against an action for payment by
the owners.
GR. No. 171396

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, commanding the AFP to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated.

The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20 th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power 1 and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.

During dispersal of the rallyist along EDSA, police warrantless arrested petitioner Randolf S. David together with his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of Akbayan party-list.

On March 3, 2006, President issued PP 1021 declaring the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

Petitioner Randolf S. David filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Court ruled that PP 1017 is only partly unconstitutional in the part that the President, in the absence of legislative
legislation, cannot take over privately owned public utility and private business. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
GR NO. 148560

FACTS:

The Petitioner Josepf Ejercito Estrada is to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An act defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon the Court that assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. According to him, the said law
suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecution; and it
abolish the elements of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code, all of which is a clear
violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

On April 11, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of case for the remand of case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary
to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeable, the ground raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.

On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan find that there is a probable cause exist in the PLUNDER case and issued a warrant
of arrest of the accused. On June 14, 2001, petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for
vagueness.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PLUNDER law is unconstitutional for being vague.

HELD:

NO, if the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which the petitioner is alleged
to have committed. The Court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense.
GR No. L-19555

FACTS:

Respondent Ramos is the tenant of petitioner Ramas. Ramos informed petitioner of his desire to change their contract
from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy. Petitioner Ramas refused the request. Respondent Ramos filed a petition with
the Court of Agrarian Relations praying that he be allowed to change their tenancy contract. Petitioner opposed the
petition as groundless and violating their gentleman’s agreement.

During the pendency of the case, respondent moved to suspend the proceedings questioning the constitutionality of
Section 14 of RA No. 1199. This Motion was denied. The Respondent Court uphold the Constitutionality of Section 14 of
R.A No. 1199.

Petitioner questioned the agrarian’s court action in proceeding with the hearing and deciding the same, and ordering
execution despite the pendency of a similar case raising the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 1199.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CAR can proceed with the hearing of the case even though the constitutionality of a law is being
questioned in another similar case.

HELD:

Yes, The Court find no error or irregularity in court’s proceeding with the case. The mere fact that constitutionality of the
law is raised in another case pending in the Supreme Court is not a valid reason for suspending the proceedings in this
case. Law is considered valid until declared unconstitutional, until then the courts are in duty bound to enforce them.
GR No. L-4974

FACTS:

Defendant-respondent and four other people were charged with complex crime of rebellion with murders and arsons.
Defendant filed a motion to quash the information against him on the grounds that the information did not conform to
the prescribed form, that it charge for more than one offense, and that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The Motion was denied by the Trial Court.

The Court found the defendants guilty as principals of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arson, and
robberies and was sentenced to reclusion Perpetua then filed an Appeal. They contended that: the trial court erred in
declaring that the crime committed by them was that of “rebellion complexed with multiple murder, arson, and
robberies”; information against them charging for more than one offense is in violation of Section 12, rule 106 of the old
Rules of Court; the court of first instance did not have jurisdiction to try the cases against them; their constitutional
rights were violated because the documentary evidence presented against them was illegally seized or had come from
doubtful sources; the reconstitution of the exhibits that were destroyed, and claim that the reconstituted exhibits
should not be considered in this appeal; and that they were not afforded the time and freedom to prepare for their
defense.

Appellant Jose Lava did not take the witness stand to testify in his own behalf. Instead, he presented witnesses to testify
on his good moral character, his strong conviction, and his good citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether an accused can be acquitted because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct.

Whether or not the contentions of the appellants are meritorious.

HELD:

No, Court ruled that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. When the Court believes that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, it
must convict him notwithstanding evidence of his good moral character and previous exemplary conduct.

Only the first contention of the appellant was upheld by the Court. Court ruled that the crime of rebellion cannot be
complexed with other common crimes. Other contentions were found no merit by the Court.