a CHAPTER TWO a Understanding the Role of Conflict in Budgeting Irene S Rubin suficient io sty all requests and it generates competion for care re sources. Moreover, budget ars may ot age On key paces that are made through the budgetary proces, such as who will bea the heatest but en of taxation, wich programs wil be expanded or contacted, or whether is acepiable to ran ade. Oceasinaly tensions exaate 38 they did in De ‘ember 195 and January 1996, when disagreements about how to balance the ‘budget shut doen the federal government. But the relive rary of open con- ict and disruption alls atenton tothe mechanisms ia budgeting for handling ‘ompeiton and controversy. Because budgets must be passed regualy in oF er for government to carry on, budgets hare developed an aay oft ‘igus to suppressor manage disagreements and pate he baget moe or less The resulting level of conflict may actualy be 100 low fra democratic sc ty Vib clashing interests may be necessary to engage the publ, the pres, andthe elected ois, to make them pay attention o publi less before po ley is detennined. intrest have been obscure nthe budget and people can ot See how the badge clates to thet wellbeing of needs, they wl ft ones the outomes. If czas fel that thet partipation n budgetary dec Son making i unwelcome, they may note but processes an then com Plain socterouly about the ovicomes, Without sme conf, goverment Insitutions may not work 3s intende A system of eheks and Balances, of c= ‘sendemic to budgeting, The amount of money avalable ie never ARTHUR HEREOF NRUTINREENG 31 ‘shared power betwen insttatons of government i ined to prevent hsey {son and ensre paricpation of reevant partis. Coat Du into tis Moves. The gol fr public manages and Dudgeers shoul be obey art Inte relevant picydaagreements Bu keep the resulting argumests moderate snd construct “Controlling the vel of confit snot ean. Fiscal ses oF spending cubacks nay intensity competion. The emergence of ew Interests or mote powerful temands on the badge may exaggerate the level of tension. Divided gover rBent—a ciel execute of oe party and a leisative Body dominied bythe fiber paty—can result in cascading ers to block one another's proposals Fear that dlsagreements may ge tof ard may result In aoidng or sp sting confit ater than managing ths exacerbating underiyg prob {ime of govemance. The sources or level of conflict cannot always be contains, ‘utconft en ofea be chante in consrctive rather thn destructive way. ‘This chapter adresses confle in the budget under four headings: nase sources of cof, routines and norms that hold dowa the oeta evel of font, factors that increase this ase level, and approaches cont man agement that voi the extemes of suppression of csrptive ight INTRINSIC SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN BUDGETING Demands on the budget souinly exceed resource evel. As 9 consequence, programs, regions, cts, and interest groups compe with one another for resources Deson-making power is widely dlspersed among variety of but etary actors who ofen disagree om who shoul ge what from the bude. There decison makes ote ackey for power to contol aleatons. Competition Among Projects and Programs Het and appointed ofl sometimes make competion among programs Dr project or proposed tems of expenditure an explicit part ofthe budget rocess. At the federal ler the bade process requires Congress to allocsie ‘pending beeen functions and betwen commiles and subcommiees. At ‘he state and local Levels a fequeny wed proces called arsed ute Ing requires compotion snd proszaion athe margins ofthe bug. Cp ‘al budgeting tthe state and loal eel fequently ena formal competion 2nd choice between projet Representative CharesSteolm (1896) described this competition atthe federal lee: "Next week the Badge Commitee on whic am prvleged 0 sere, esha to begin the process of puting together the budget esa 'on for cal year 1997. This process wl eure many tough choies a pi thls are set among worthy programs... But eset al programs il be ian snk OF TIEN REI nthe sm ost, compting or pion sa we seco determine {2B teat locate te teense coming tt the US easy” ip. #3521 ithe sate st local lees, rst ase bugeing makes compeston exit ‘ite marine ofthe badge Program managers cate sto fined pe Grats. ncn ere they nee hat were eed out fhe maintenance efor budget, and Rens they want tha wll Improve efleey, expand Servis, reduce bale orsatily de Te ems on each it mst be Fanicodered and merge wh silt coming om other departments nd frogs. Te merge it of pote sanded noner of importnce wt tone ns ox ach ees onthe ufded list has oral competes wh othe anfended eqns Rab, 1981), Budget choses at become highly emotional, with song onions on ech side, Plane argue about whether alloetios shouldbe increased for de fens, ols, or psn or wheter hey shoul Be el ots 30 ing be increeed om soil verve, lato, bell, ad icone Suppo ‘Budget choices may become partly emodonal when they ae viewed in terms of clas For example, some people consider ax breaks fr busines 0 De corporat welt,” we ters consier ich brs exer for eae om Bodgtary dcvon makers ying detemine what cat and what to fund cen dsgreson wht ers 0 ue Thi ak of eeement goes wel Beyond ‘hosing betwen programs. als nes choice ete pil 0 pe Sng expenses, or moe ncromly,Beecen euipment and sas prevention Sn soprano: goverment provision af services, coneacg ot a eva ‘eatin: and etal and pel goal Conflict Among Strategies for Service Delivery Decisions sbout how 0 lver services ate often made on emavional ether ‘han technical grounds. For example, on one side may be people who believe ‘that equipment shoud replace employees: on the oe sie are those who ar ‘ue that machines take the fobs of people who need them. Simla, some ecson makers may support prevention suategies wil others support sup ‘resson (of crime, cre, deseo eal migration), Prevention tens to be cheaper but les dramatic than suppression, Supression cal for higher level of il and often higher eves of wisi and satiacion. With good pe ‘vemive programs some problems never occu 0 the puble never sees the ‘robem, let alone watches professionals wrest it othe ground. The results ‘ten it coward suppresion even when prevention is more cost-effective ‘One atlground in sevice delivery has een the choice between ws Pub- ‘cemployees or contact workers, Whether contacting out wil ave money OF ‘otis perenl dget question, bu the matter maybe deed on nonin {al grounds. Amayor ora governor may want ould a nainal reputation 3s ORSUADNG MEAREOF COST RGM 33 4 privat, arguing for contacting at every tur The legate maybe op yousdiopivazation fr equally politica reasons. Othe roles maybe eves Government employees and their unions allen are agains contacting for fear of losing theo. ‘Bruce Walin (1997) tells the story of Republican governor In Masichu ses who ws "enerto privat” anda sate leslie respons a tte em Pojees that was skepccal of the governors claims abot the succcses of Contracting, After 3 sries of proposals an! boeing actions, the reslt was ‘fadualytoproved list of requirements before contacting cul be chosen fhe service detivery option. These requirements inside ceifale savings, ‘pes competion for contac, and maintenance of vie aly. COMPETITION AMONG ACTORS FOR CONTROL OF BUDGET ALLOCATIONS art ofthe reason for lek of agreement priors and service delivery smolts is that so many eifeent actors with dere ttets have he ‘he decisionmaking. They jockey fr power over budget decisions. Fragmented budgetary power leads toa series of bun confit tat py aang tall levels of government. The executive and legislative branches have contested over tne for ental oer the budget. Over the yeas, the exe ve role as become lager, with inereased esposibiity for gathering. eX ining, and paring down deporemena requests This responsibity Pas oen beer delegate tothe Budge ofce, cresting tensions within the executive March betwen the badget oe and the departments, On the legate side ofthe budget equation, the fagnentation of budget poser may ead 1 compe ‘tion among commitees or between commie ang the leadership of exch ous. With respect tothe oe ofthe pub, some eitzens and meres ous fel that they shoud play a larger and mere consequent rte in budgeting than the role Hat profesional budgeters and bureau chiefs ae comfortable having thm play ‘Tension Between Executive and Legislative Branches scademics often describe bag processes in the United Sate in whieh the ‘executive propses the budget and the legiatre examines that proposal and ‘coeps, jets, oF meds i In fat, however tbe respective oles of hee ‘cute andthe legslatee branches in badging have often been conte 28d ave sited around considerably “The colonial experience nthe United Stats let behind public ero omer (at evecuives anda strong sentient in avr of legislative power Goverment34 nooner aes mere na te, budgets wore simple Departments made requests dec 1 a Faaive commie and request fr peynent were approved by lgiative com tens This legislatively dominated process can tll be found in many ountes, some smaller ces, and afew sates. "As soley became more urbanized and the role of goverment grew and ‘budgets expanded, demand grew for more contol over spending totals and more log tothe expentures than could be provide by 2 disparate repre: etative body with tle expertise. Legiatres that had consisted primary f ot exclusively of propery owners radoally comet ince epresenatives of the working class ae well threatening the wellhy with xation to serve the oor, Build rade, nd improve sanitation. The css co the well odo seemed potently confscatory- Wel publezed asances of corruption furthered sen timent agains giltive bles, Reform movements shifts bulge power increasingly tothe executive branch, in the sometimes fle hope tat he ciet ecutive would nt represent the poor against the ach, would not be cOrupL Sn would contra cons, The execitive banch Was expeted 1 olet budget equ analyze them, cut hems back, 3p present 2 Balanced proposal ote Tegslative body Te lepiltve Body was expected to review the proposal, 1 esing i necessary. ’ the national level, Congress gave major budgeting power to the president {n 1021, But some budgetary power shied ack fo Congres in 1974, whee it Increne ie abit to check the assumpuons inthe preside’ budget and Come up with ts own budget proposals necessary. The change ete about it part asa congressional ection oa president who ineinaly wie spend Ingthat Congres ad authorized, Congress increases power to conta uch {ncarsons ont reogativs A bit of budget power shifted hack the pes ‘en in 1996, when Congres ante he present ncreaseé power to reduce congressional approved spending. "Te line tem veto act passed in 196 gives the president “enhanced rscis- ‘Son powers, wbich enable hi o cancel or rescind dla amounts of sere ‘ionary Budget authority within an appropriation bil unless Congress votes to approve a the presidents cancelation. Congress deapproves, the pres eat can then veto the dsappoval bil. A two-thirds majority of Congress ‘would be requied to override the presidents veto. Presidents have lag wanted the power to veto line es, supposedly to tliminte the “pork” that legislators include in appropriation bis. However, po ebay evr lated na ne ofthe budget Many governors have fine Item vetoes, bur such vetoes seMom make much franca impact on the bu fet. They do make it ease forthe governors who have them to exet policy Alomlnance over thet leslaures. The goverors ae more key to exe such oniel when the legislature sof the opposite party (Abney and Laut, 1985 Gosling 1886 Rese 1997). WoBSTMONG HEMEL OF COUCH 3 ‘The ine tem veto at theft evel sully to lead o major retons in spending butt does shit some power tom Congress to the president. Sen ‘or Robert Byrd (1996), along ie deender of congressional prerogatives, ‘apposed lng the present such enhanced budgetary powers. He argue, “This sozaled lneitem veto act should be more appropriately beled "The President Always Wins Bl’ From now on the Reavy hand ofthe President wi bbeused slp down Congressional opposion wherever may ei. 2937) Although Bye may have overstated the case, the question resins Why dd CCongess wie the present more budgetary power! The measure probaly passed bose of Congress een alte ops a consutonal smendmeat tobalacethe budget despite widely publicized promises todo so, and because ofthe consequent nee for Congress appear edo something else that would ‘urengten the mechanism to lance the baget Loser and Reicha, 1997) ‘An increase in partsanship ma also have been involved with Demacras = suming hat the measure would strengthen the Democrat president, ad Re- publican inking paral though In some site and local governments, the movement 0 executive dom ance ove the Budget sipped the legate ranch of most of ts budgetary ower. In recent years, especaly at the state level here have Been esos to restore some balance ing leilaues Some addon rte n budgeting, ‘tthe local lee, several pate have appeared. In one pater, he cy oun hires a manager to run the Budge forthe, andthe coun main tans considerable budget authority or sel. In the second pater, a song major continues to dominate he budget, wit elativey insted powers forthe tun In some cites where the mayor dominates the budget, fea that aval in the oun wil use budge nforzation against the mayor has encouraged the major to keep budget information ot ofthe councils hands. Such poi may "ate tensan betwen the executive ae leave branches. For example, 5 Louls, Geraldine Osborn, who was the cai ofthe ways and means com ite ofthe board of akermen, complained btesly that she cou get noi Formation about conracs that the mayer claimed saved the city money {interview with author, Jan 12,1990) Asa result, she elé up the budget nan Hort o get the lnlormatian. The major in ten sucessfully Yok a een, the public to prevent the boar of alierme fom delaying the badge. ‘Tension Between the Central Budget Office ‘and Departments and Agencies ‘The model of executive dominance ove the budget assumes that the chit ex estv, alongwith his or het budget tf wil soit request fom the de Dartmenis and examin them n deta before preparing the executive's Dodge Proposal and handing it over tothe legate to review Part of the Budge236 ruse KEINE ‘ofc’ role this mol isto conto departmental spending, Department heads often come to se the Budget oie aban opponent intron wih heir vial work. From the budget olice's perepecve, the departments often pay {ames proposing to cut what eannot be eut and exaggerating neds ‘One mini re chief marized the tension in he following ens An ‘overstated version would be [that] the deparemens view the budget ofce as ‘oloreoodiate sus the budget fice would view the departments as not understanding the whol picture, The realy salt ster than that... There ae dys when we ight lke eats and dogs. We ae fighting cus” (A. Brana, Interview wich autor. Poets, Ariz, Dec. 1, 1990). The chi’ relerence to “sue tetiets the terson bebween those who iar hard hats and uniforms and do the work of the ct and thor eho dressup tina of, and make ‘ules for those who acta do the work ‘The ite chiefs perception ofthe budget office at cute and naysaer was confirmed by budget decors, One anton, uring an interview, stamped 8 ‘ecap of paper withthe word no! He si, "Tati what the budget oe is ‘Sbowt.” The interviewer responded, “snot excise about nos it al shout yeses" "Ve," the decor replied, “butt stats with no, 0 ge the ds ‘usion going” (A Set, interview with author, Rochester, NYO 6, 1983) Departments’ response to thie wal of noe has often been to sisenze sound the objection, An observer in Tampa argued that before the cy changed is pater of budgeting, the departments woul routinely iy t eae Budgst cts as If they had no responsibilty for budget ttl, “The ie chet would {lose a fie station ina wealthy nlghbarood, Knowing it woud (have to) be restored during the year” (R Weblingiterview with author, Jan 190) In ‘sponse, the mayor an budget ofc changed the budgetary proces 0 that de artment heads had to make thir own cuts and ould mo longer force the budget fice to make these decison for her, Roy Meyer (1994 has demon: strated tat federal agencies, 0, tr wo get around no though 2 vce of strategies that are eventually eaght and cura by budget aie. Part ofthe animus of department and program directo against he budget lice i the sometimes excessive rule making that budget oes engage into ‘aainaia nancial condos. For example, one municipal badge decor de feribed one control function, sot contol, that esque Toated im Budget ocr: ‘Wehies psonatorntin eye, We at aio fhe number of ns tthe ay and wht evel hey ae Wha cach cot Te mb of sons is deena in he get sgotons. cote ey ck eff and ow ch oe as be peor each ew poston Is postin ‘Sse thre afresh he be ee {or approval ad en gosta personne We re he ing Ur Sean get Seti wth ut, Tampa a “= ESTE TE EOF COM ENG 3 ‘Ac the fara level resentment agains the Ofc of Management and Bud {e¢ (OMB) became appazer ring the National erformance Review (NPR) be {nin 1993. During ths process, oficial from seross many agencies met and sessed wha hey would keto see change about managerert inthe feds goverment. They complained most tery about the General Services Ad Binistration, the agency hat conta rentl of space and purchasing, an ne fice of Pesonnel Managemen, the ofce that conta testing and hiring td monitored vl service regulations. But agency staff aleo complained bout ‘he OMB because hey blamed or euting her Budget requests Some agency officials also fee thatthe OMB apportionment process was hear-handed ‘Tension in Congress Between Legislative Committees ‘and Between Committees and Leadership ‘tia the executive branch, agencies iy to out the budget fice to ge a: ional resources andthe budget office ies to catch the agencies Jing ‘Within legiative Bodies, commitees and subcommitees may Jockey fo ‘reased power and eommties may compete with legslative leadership for 8 ‘ein budget negotiations. Power over bageting shits location oer ine. For example, in 1974 the Congresronal Budget A rested budget com ses o draw up veal prove, estimate revenue fol, and asia ges 0 the committee or spending ard waton The new budget commer ould ‘ave dramatically shied power away om the appropriations and taxation om tees, but afc they were not et up ae stong xpercommitee. They were _adependent ofthe revenue an appropriations commie and hebce were po ial rial, whore power was somewhat curled bythe competion. As ong, ‘sthere were no major cu, the budget commie didnt exert mich contol ver the eer comics, y 1980 there wae more empha on cubacs, and ‘he pres of reconcing the budget committer’ total with her comsmitecs subtotals pve the budge committer the ability omplement hel et es tution. (Fr information onthe period up 01979, se Shick, 1980) During the 1980s, pressure to reduce defcs and ongoing disagreements over prorties between Congress and the resident ese in summit neo talons Between the exsctive and leiative branches for multiyear udget ‘ages (For Background on summits inthe 196s, see White and Wildavsh 1989) These agreement shied budget power conad he leadership and away from the commits, inctuding the badge commie. The power athe House Speaker compared 6 ha ofthe commites was marked during he summit e tations in 1995, but by the end of 1996 commie had egun teaser, Sone of thei rains! budgetary power Foc example, Representative Bl Archer, chair ofthe Howse Ways apé Means ‘commits, bad yelded is oe inthe summit negations in 1995 snd 1996 to House Speaker Newt Cingrich and Majority Lesder Richard Armey- But on38 pono oF aves REC ssa TERE OF COUT NG 3 December 27,196, he vist Presiden Clinton in search of common ground (2) ths resp annem th strecommite te. Th for resumed negotiations. The visi wos ncerpeted as a ear ntcain of bis ‘ame rool ae np Ou Conte ole even ienton to play dec role inthe 1987 negotiations Clint Seth, director of ‘apron We tela eing on vpn te as oe, wes ‘ax lila fis the aecouncng fem Delt & Touche, aged that the oma, 0 amen wee pee, edd ov. Te Commie trough ses ache inte actin cage Moving Conn tev eign tas opin blo te Ct lhnegh be ecin ‘Mtsenoe te Comptes acl aetinn m aeoneece pus ‘omumltees had o play larger ole in 997 because the Republicans had ‘Sallermojorty an might eed the support of Boras, a support hat cou be forged only n commit (Chand, 1996). Anthe example of his conic. is eisevssed in the accompanying inser) "hor rg icy isi rene wa ms of 10D te dome ‘Spoker Newt Gingrich Verses the Gmuntie n the Howse coneence Foor Spates Newt Ging etn ager power in i own Nands in (3) be at te eee f dene ross an st heed {eos wage bad eonctaton paces bps commits ey wee oso st ans ht ea os poate nd Ws ecko oul et come ap wih proposals that ied ‘nolo of oferty, a no ewe wl 2 et ee ee ee earn comeaumainier toes! {See nde lode oun hat. -- Manton 1955, ‘ent ns ted un 90, the 974 ete badge coms sp eo a0 ‘pe reoltos which re appoved Oy Congress ht conan peng ni Sse: abi, 199.9. 78-77 Fevers fr oat working oa lr art of pt. The co Ics ve sapped opie ot es met the ages ie bude esa toe, Tae cmaunees spurte propa ae alle ese sof lego. ten cls the Omnibus Resin A ‘Tension Between Community Members rhe ya ore gon hot i tri ten ‘or Interest Groups and Professional Staff oe ae eee ‘Atbough the cie executive, the budget office the deprimeet heads, and eg {Burs aes nglatn, cian bl were ay gusranee Ca ; ae eee ee eee eee Instore te the key acorn te budgetary process andthe ones most key to epeaton apse he ch tice ‘compete or argue with one another over money, cizens and interest groups sa ce Sha steer picnic eo i 7 tive ao been inporant budget ators fom nef tine. They have fen fos toring ces has cn verso puts thee ‘wanted mare inuence over budget pris and aecations, an government retson tl Some of the commits embes who feud these su ofcils have had mite feelings about thes parcpation. These has bee en ‘Ea stipe of any nen were et oper with nse fion between echnical expertise onthe one hand and epresetativeness and “Ceagresman Ls mito protested the ea oe power of th comm Public acountabliy on theater teeth doug a iy epson parla sje aes Professionals in agencies often tink tha the badge shoul eet ther best a ee ay ate am ou by hpi af be he esate techni etimats of neds, demands, and cots, and that opening the budget foe a ben develop Og is anger Ths reontiaon i to cizens an interest groups i ikl o ost ore and induce technically nua ew nie east, ser mamer ad compen of ropa Ineficet solutions. Budget stl ae ls ky to see eizen partition as Sich teen oi commits fan aod Wis, Mee of stimulating demands tha he goverment cannot ford o sat, resulting in he yer a2 feos aC defi fnaning excessive borrowing, or allenatedtizens. Asking people what (0) Ta ros oes ebro ower nthe Lei who wil oe, ‘hy want and then telling them they cannot have It ely to ouse ites oly mee pen eer wat ou Te Cmte pve anes Hows he Congest ype A csonnang bout Thee ect hin eld cas or ted the resentment. Cizens ae interest goups may se thelr excuson fom the Dad etary proces san indcton that government i out o tel coal tt cnante sm acy ped et ha ceed lng ee "A the local level these tensions often rest in pro foma budget hesring. ee ee oar meine an ee meaar eel ‘where the citizens are not really listened to or where the éecisions have been Fran any mencret oh prey oh igen eerie wre 987 ‘each before the hearing This solution leat eins, who ether cease 1040 yn or onan RENE (MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH CONFLICT budgetrs—techicl sl s wel a elected and appoint fficals—have de ‘veloped a number of ways to dal wih the intently high level of entity ‘the Budgetary proces, Some mechan limit the scape of con, some ob- sce the isues over which controversy might oecut, and eters discourage ‘ose who would challenge the slau quo. Nore of Behavior have evolved 12 ‘minimize contronaons, and patterns of brgsining fave emerged hae ‘hase consensus, Decision makers may allocate resources across he board. to avoid comparison between programs o interest groups. Resources are dis tubated tht everyone may et iti anno one feet out. Adit tors may ake thei programs out of he most itensely competitive par ofthe ‘badger and put them into parts ofthe Budge where they have fewer oF 20 vale for funding. Incrementalism, ‘ne st of ous that mininizes cof has ben cal increments. In Sneremental budgeting, 2 dtinction i made betwen the budgetary base, mount that probably will not be questioned every year, andthe proposed i ‘rea, wich wile seize. The imi scope of the examination reduces the number of items tha potenlly compete with one anotee. A second fea ture of inrementalism Is the wideypread use of simple formulas to allocate taudget increases, One formula divides new money among departments and Drograms inthe sae proprio ab thei existing share ofthe budge. A de- Daten that received 10 percent ofthe entre budget would receive 10 percent, the new money. Another formula gives every department the same percent 2g increase. Such simple rules make comparisons among programs unnees. ‘Sty and educe competition, Nondecision Making. I government does not make decisions oeopen dcisone made the pst, may avoid controversies. One way to defet potentially contentious deiions is to promot the dea tat dscusson of he sei inappropriate (Bachrach 3nd Bartz, 1962, 1963). Another apprach st stop monitoring the sever of pol Sey problems or odin them a= no serious. common vacant denying oe sponsibility for 3 problem, The legtinacy of complainants or claimants may be dened. Thus oe cy ounal mere eased fund equest fom th sete for abused spouses ‘eens, he sid “they are all a bunch of kes." A mayor eased iste 1 oss EDEN AID sity manager and puble wosks department hed ignored 2 ize suggestion for (las expensive wll inte ofa water tower becase It was a technica master andthe ze lacked expertise “Those who avr sparculr policy that already exists may strive to kep the issue off the agenda for dscusion, Cal for public hearings and examination ts ity’ ecanomie development plicy are met with responses rom te pl ley supporers, eich as“ ant broke, and i ai, dos fi,” and “Any breath of agreement wil eave aay busines; you cant discuss sich ses publicly" Other versions ofthis agument aze hat we ae doing the best econ feo dont complain) or we have spent lor of tie and work on his (80 dort ‘ind it by asking questions). Tough such means, lected and appointed of ‘as sometimes dcourage dcussion of contoveal sss. Decentralization Another common sed mechanism fr hanaling cot decentralization of thudgetary decison making, The more enalized budgeing is the more di ferent programs have fo be inorder to compete with one another. ection ‘aking decetalza, compsrsons among tems of spending can be made ‘within a program ox department, thus Uniting the seope of comparisons. De ‘Ceitalizaton of badge derision can aso help defuse the tension between the ‘budget office andthe program o department heads, because ina decentralized pwoces the budget office does ess iain microanaging Norms Norm of budging hve eval 1 nimi the ope competion between epurmen snr ot cept ay “we ae ber oF oe de ‘Shing ante ae "Se stamens wold ine rein Ase ‘odean pots would look see negate te pograsDes 4} enwand progam had sul avon rere compsto and ere {Tc insead on advertising te on programs rege Obscuring Interests Sudgeters typically lay au the badge in such 2 way that itis dficufor oDe Interest to see how fring in compan other interests. A chamber of Commerc, which consis of owners of smal business na town, woul ave ‘Sard tne sing in he budget whether small business owners wee geting ewer pli dolas than sme other group. I individuals and intrest gous do no now that hey ae geting less than ethers, they ae ess key make ‘demands onthe budge in order catch up with vals. ‘One reason that budgets obscure intsets maybe more historia than in tenn Inthe fees ofthis century, reformers advocated departmental bud fps broken dowa by ine items, These lin lems were to be asocated with42 wooo cms perc work plan. fie depute planned o put ou fity Asin a year it would probably need to pay so many eighties so much in wages, would hae 12 ‘maintain apd heat so many fe sabons, and it would have to feed so many owes daw the re tracks. eoken dove this may, the ose cou be com ated with has af ther departments ad the reationship beeen wor 36 omplished and spending needed could be esubiished Alhovgh clearly an vance tthe ime, line item budgets by department obscured programs athe tnuget anc made't unclear who benefited rom pubic spending programs. Line- em badging has persisted in many nite of government othe present dy History isnot the whole answer, however. Even modern budgets based on programs rather than online tems may not make I een who Deets fom ‘which expenditure. Budgeters may define programs so that they exssct Sev tral interests without showing how each interest benef fom the progam. For ‘example, a economic development program may suggest hat the whoe com ‘munity Benes without speling out the dls that go abo or tain, without estimating the dol losses from tax incentives that go tO new bus nesses, or without presenting de eaptal outlays made to increase profitably for land developers. One reason that programs are defined in this fashion is ‘help gather te greatest posible suppor for them. Another motivation sto pe ‘vent entcem of spending proposals that sera uni But even with he bet of Imetions, iis ie fr analysts o figure out with any precision who bene fits from sich programs. For example, how many jobs are rated when a bus ‘ess esa tax reakt How many of those jos can be abut to he tax beak (oF would have oczuted anyway Answers ae else, Regaclss of whether buagetrshaveltentionalyobscuted interests nthe toad the efect has Ben to lower the eel of cont among terest groups ant between interest groups andthe goverment ‘Rabbit Gardens ‘One way of handing the stress betwen eiltve Does and easctives i for the exewatve to set aig small amourte of money for the legislature to allo ‘ate Such setasies are meaphorially init creating a vegetable garden for rabbits that they wl leave the main garéea alone. lected ofc ten fee hat they have to bring some projects to thei discs inorder tobe e- lected, Ife executives male csier othe eilatrs toe elect, they an defuse some ofthe legislators eos to discredit the east for plies fain, The costs need not be get, the projets may be worthwhile, and the Stet sharing drains some of the tension out of natural antagonist, Escaping Competition specially when fcal stress intensifies nd badge ae tl, te level of com etton in some areas of the budget may become intense. Program that have ‘nough of he own resources oat ca ate thst own resoures thay ty 1 NoaSTNEN HE BOLE OFCOM IDM seo ofthe competitive envionment and st up onthe oe wih earmsibed Fevenues fa program is se up ae an enterprise fnd and its revenues cove ls expenditures, is no longer in competion with other prograzs. Spel purpose governments and autores also reduce competition. ‘Typical, peti purpose governments and autores have only ene function 0 hee ‘annot be any balgeary tradeoffs betwee functions. Escape fom the competitive pars ofthe budget occurs a al lees of gov ernment. At the federal level, some programs are taken “olf budget.” that, they no longer count toward aggregate totals and they usualy escape fom ‘ross he-oard cuts or ater tues applied to “on-budget” programs. Some rogram are ake of budget and then ate restored to budget satus. While the program’ supporters want 1 be off budget. supporters of other programs want the hase of cuts to be as broad as posible so that ex in the peo trams donot have to be a dep, The dein ogo off budgets Ike 10 be ones. ‘Congressman Charles Stenolm argued stongy agains recent proposal 10 take the maneporton trust fn ot ofthe provisions ofthe Budge Enforce rent Ac He argued that that decision woul gvetansporation programs ‘rity abowe al ther programs when infact hey shoud compete wih other programs ‘cate when programs forest, hets, er zen, ou ass fone earch and nan ther inert popams ae eigen ‘ese rapt ot ofthe ate or earspraton pei lang spc tae oe st nde lence te piace sf stared gine which 0 reso balding conte for eesng 3a eed budget. uppers of al ter eral programs understands, wl be fares wing to acepe etc the ow porams i anepratn.0 tty ober ei acid progam, exempt Fem aig he bre. The ‘tety athe paces wl be severly undermined yee eons of ane poration spening esi nr pach os 320 ttion teyondnlnary nese: whch propa] ng in ctl dele ‘Gm [Sten 1096, p. HSE) Consensual Bargaining ‘Te act that budgetary power i widely shared mong people who often have seen interest means tht some kind of Bargaining mst out in ode 12 Produce a budge, Claris! bargaining encourages each pay 10 ake an ex {rem potion because the resolion soften to spt the dfeence, Whoever fae the mos extreme inal postion allen gate the mot However. aking ‘tern postions rks failed negations. By contrast, Darganing in budge Ing encourages moderate stances by ignoring the more extreme ones. The dit ference may be pt betwen remain actors o eaining postions. Becase44 usc vane ENG ‘budgeting must come up with an agreement stances that work agunst that ‘agreement ar ote unwelcome. That not to argue tat budget negotiators never ake extreme psitons, ony that there's 2 tendency in budgeting to put [shrather than eward extreme positions bese of the widely shared dese 10 complete the bargaining succestly. For years during the 1980s, afer Congress had rejected some of Present Reagan proposals the president resubmited the same extreme proposals, Conger rete he requests a dead on areal,” The presidents proposal os. ts legumacy because he proposed what knew was ot acceptable. His ro- os was therefore ignored in the 1990s, determine efor io bslane the budget an eliminate pr ticular programs resulted in dep cut for some agencies and progrms. Given ‘he tadona roles of auhoraingcommitees a advocates and propia ‘commitees ae budget contol, one would hive expected the authorizing ‘ommitees o take a more protective Toe ofthe pogams and the appropri ‘one comers to suppor ut ctv a, very ie of his tension was apparent, A congressional safer explained why, "Altowgh the appropeations ‘Somunitecs ae required by Badge ws to come nner cing a he a ‘orizationcommitices ae nt so regulate, they (he abortion coma {ees] woud Took foci they ai not also acheve zo the bucge aw. They ‘would not on look foci bu especally Deeause thet formal role in bu ‘ting mite, they would be puting themseves ou ofthe cea of meget ‘tons, outde ofthe desion making that would continu without them.” In ‘other words, taking» poston to far outee an emerging aren of consensus ‘makes i ely thatthe coms wil be ignored. Many ofthe most difieit budgetary problems over the pas fen years have been aresedin summa negotiations. Summits allow bargaining to 69 fon in private, without the negovsoes having o justify intermediate stances ot ‘plain compromises, The lack of nest play toa Broader auence on te bystep bois also works toward taking moderate and elite ances rather than extreme ones that appeal to parol constivercies. The negotiator an focus on finding common ground sn working outa compromise acceptable to both sides that stator adveses the probier (our, 198). The need for potilans to avoid bam, expecially when dealing wit stesso decisions suchas budget es also leads o strong incentives to come up with consensus ‘econ, ths avidin extreme postions In mm bagaiting 0 defi ‘duction, “decison makers may nd themselves situation Where they have ‘common interein desing the inevitable lame by aniving at 2 consensos {olution Thue o one histo ick tel neck at: everyone provides pois) ‘over for eversone ele, making i fit for a tre plea! oppanent 1 ‘alse the sue, When works bes this approach may even yield political div ‘ends—for aking the hard. gusy stand (which etejane ese is Ing 25 swe)” (eave, 1986, p38). URN THEMREOF CNR IS ETNG 4 FACTORS THAT INCREASE CONFLICT though cori is outinely damped down in budgeting, 2 amb of fc fs can exaggerate the level of tension. For some ofthese factors thee are possil sltons, but in many cases these soluons are obsute or polly ‘ult plement. ‘One major factor that increases the level of cont reduced resources without a commensuste reduction inthe level of neds, demands, oF expec tition. Ta limitations, indexing, deep fecesion,inereaed tax breaks, and {rosin oft economlease ca al euce Ze leve of resenbes. revere i eden without decreasing demands, confit ove ited resources is kely {o ineease. At the national and sate level, recessions reduce revenues while ‘tthe same time ineeasing the ned for serves, 2s mere people lose their Jobs, poy les ono axes, require unemployment compensation, and Increase their ned for food stamp, The conf Zeduing satis for his king fs tation ae fo boro or draw down money tom sna funds Redacing ned for ple spending as revenues go down is oten beyond the bly of government, Wear ater on roads isnot reduced when revenge trowth taper ofthe need for dr rekabtaton faites doesnot decrease tecause the money to fund them fa here. The rests key to be ite ‘Se ging abou prone. But whe need may remain high, expectations ‘an be lowered and the level of fective demand canbe eral. Educating the public about the avalably of resoures and about what they can expec. inthe way of eervice from so many colle of revenue can hep alleviate eon fict and moderate demands, Expectations can also be lowered for department heads and program drecor. The budget process cn cual departmental de ‘mands by sting caps for Dodges requests, “ust sa decrese In everues can exaggerate conic, so can a increase demancs. The increasing ‘certain Benefits. An aglpg population rane oven meee apt PB Toss sade! hein are cee ner o proportion. ote TESTE or fewer dlls iniensilrg *he-compettion athe nage “The budget process may either encourage or scourage the atlaton of demands. At times i hs been necessary to increase public palpation i budgeting. As the cty manager of Phoenix noted, one of the major changes in budring overtime was the degre of openness of the budget process. Wien community needs were bigh and public ust was low, the cy opened tp the budgetary proces and gave the counal more input (F.Falbanks, Cy Manager Pheri Are, interview with author, Dec. 1990) The resll was ‘more presue oa the bulge.46 mgpomno¢onewenrocC ts possible wo open up the budget proces and stil keep expectations mod sate Dayion, Obi, found (el ba Anancal ens that regured public ap- ‘rol of higher levels of ation. To ep develop public confidence tat the iy mos eaposive an wel un, the budget fice inte the pull 1 partie pein pty sting, Commniy prot boards were established. To hanile ‘el concerns thatthe publ acked siicsent knoedge, cy sta educated ‘he community cour members abou the budget process and revee limits tons “Some staf people sy,'But we ant tut hem’ OK, hen tin nlghbor hood leaders. "Thee elects potential ncghborhood leaders and takes them "hough sic months of work programs apd educates them. Many then cur for ‘ty priony board, Then we 49 expe alning far te prory boar, People [ite rom ae eve to another Even if you dot ike them they are dum Ine (P Woodie, omer rector ofthe adget Otc, Dayton, Ole eve ‘wth author Oe 20,1989) In additon, cy sf ered ae sal for the plot beads. Sums of money wee set aide forthe publ demandes projec two or more groups could ere on priors, he could get acess oa aditional po! of esoures. De ‘ite the openess ofthe process and the slctation of budget requests, the res id not become excessively confital One ean i tht he sty-five ‘elghborhoad groupe were forced into coaitons inorder oe hl fu Ing. Anotier reason is thatthe pris boards’ recommendations were not binding: department heads could turn down 2 community recommends! ph wf they had gd reason fr doing o. The ety eounelineude the pir ity board recommendations, 2 comunity pubbe opinion survey, technical ‘ondlon atement, and ober input making is commendations. Ifa al posible, the commsnyfecommended projets were funded, but everyone's ‘Concerns were consider Tr the budgetary process bs decentralized to deparments of community soups without suleent 2 prior constraints on demands, the request that esl ray far exceed esources, ead to excessive competion among requests, ‘sd xeate many angry ees, Conserely,entalaing the budge process ean ‘leo exacerbate cone. A highly centralized budget process ores tadecfts that would otherwie be made rt departments oe made by the ental bu ft office or inthe eet executive's fice. Rather than comparing lied ‘umber of roughly comparable options, the bucget ace may be required to ‘Compare any incommensrate programs wth dierent funding mechanisms, foils constituencies, ad degrees of eflectveess, Departments may push all ‘el options forward, rather than wnnowing tern st thus eeaing many ‘more competing option from which to choose. Responses 1 this surfeit of Competton ioche requiring the departments to winnow ft and avis teal choices between optons by fonding across the Baad at lowe-hat wanstsmnc rR OFC MAU: 4 ‘Budget actors ae likely to Become move combstive ithe chil ekeaive x cof one pois party and te legate majority i ofthe oter party. Plies parisanship encourages thwarting ofeach eter proposal, cet king and Dame smarting, extreme public postions, and a goneral reluctance to com ‘promise Inthe 1995 negotiations between the Democratic president and the Republican Congress to agfee on a plan to balance the budget by 202, the two sides were reportedly close onthe dolar amour, but the negotiations foundered possby because the Republicans a Congres feared that the Dem trai pesdent wold et all he credit for achieving 2 deal. Also, 2 noted arly, chil executives at beste level ae more kal 1 se aie Hem veto {o oerale the proces ofthe leglatae the leshatve mantis the op poste pay ‘the local level an elected ofa poltical party may be es obvious— any elctons are formally nonpartisan, though the candates may represent {point of view or polit platform. ln nonpartisan stations, the tensions be tween the legislative and executive branches may rise and ll depending on trheter there 2 viable candidate for mao ia the coun. The potent al may tr to use budget nformation to atack the mayor Mayors may espond by withholding potently damaging budget information rom the cure ‘A perception of unfairness can make budgeting more contentious. T3x in creases that unduly burden one group ae tik to generate controversy. Se ‘ee that are perceived as deproprtonately aimed ata parcular group such {subsidies for wealthy eal esate developers or bousing for one racial group, ‘may provoke pubbe ote: "A sugested ert, the budget format makes it posse to compte win nes and losers, the losers ae Iie to protest, Some budgets ist goals such 1s redeveloping the downtown area, revialsng inner-city neighborhoods, housing the hoteles, or holding he line on property axes 1 tse pols ae linked fo programmatic spending ina clea wa} 11 maybe possible for the reader ofthe budget to igure out which interest groups have received what falar amounts. To tone dwn the lve of confit the goals can be ase in ch way 2 0 crosret soil cleavages. Ths, Bester housing or ll may be {beter goa or conic eduction than more bousing forthe poor or minor ‘ies job growth maybe 2 beter gol than renewing the downtown o seit {zing neighbors nally, budgeting conflicts are made worse by the occurrence of huge ressy problems involving iulple, conflicting interests, such 28 the rai {rowing cot of health cae or ding nner cites. For messy problems the NP Fen soliton in the past bas been either co ignore them to deine them rk ‘ate rather than publi probens or to approse them incrrmenaly «small piece at tine I snot les that such problems can be solved through these Tow cones options48 sas or aa ETN MANAGING FOR HEALTHY LEVELS OF CONFLICT any sources conic inthe budget are not conrlabe I is 4 posible eka level of cone and achieve sat evel the te, Nevertheess the evel ff confit ic budgeting ca often be increased or decreased. la many cases, te evel of confit i eld down sofa that real needs 2nd prieties cannot be ‘expessed. Fear of controled confi nd fer tat newcomers wil undo ok eas ten esl sn supresion and evasion of conf, rather than artes lion and resbiaton. Suppression or evasion of caf sometimes prevents ‘overnment om addressing important public problems. Als, confit ao nce techniques sometimes alienate ciizens and reduce the legitimacy of sovernment i the la evel, gvernments often hold earings onthe budget ater allo cation deesions have been made. Thi racic reduces conf because does ‘ot alow izes express prices that may difer rom those the sal and ‘ec ial But alo eds eynichim and anger in etoens who fel ma ripulated. When paleo hua lizens or ignore her qestons fn effort to keep controversial sues of the agenda, cae ay become Ia furated (Lo, 1990, Fear of uncotroled con ko contbuts to a poly of not sharing budgetary information, est be used against he oficial who ei ulate I Lack of budgetary iformstion allows eens to tld up flee Be les abou ihe laelfcency and waste in goverment. The gals o¥ght tobe widespread sharing of budgetary information, « budgetary process thal em ourages the articulation of imeress, and management that handles potential ont consritvely Public ofl should see cze opinions on what government should be ing. Some governments donot dot for fetta the public wl make oo ‘many demands, or demands that are too expensive. Bu inappropriate requess an be minimized by an educatian process that outlines ory, legal con Staints,and revene estimates ina convincing Way. If ctzens demand 00 many poets. one sli sto sequence them vera prig of years. Not ll ‘emands canbe meta the shoe a, bt many demands ae reli, neces sar. and appropriate and ean be sas in he long. eizens weet trate demands and government were ose them, cizens woul key feel that they cont goverament far more than they do ns. Sometimes the sequencing of projes ove time becomes symbol, 2s when aus capil bet ists the same projet from year to yar and never Funds it aldermen pu pret nthe bet hat wile lated in her distrets and ‘en ake some ce for geting the tens Sa the budget, even i he projets arent funded. This practice can breed cynicism othe exten that tis under. ‘Stood; but ii not completely slight of hand, Deeause the projects wil be SONG THEREOF RETIN funded if money becomes alle, et if thee ae nsficen fons, and pt forward to anther year for anther chance at funng (Adams, 198), ven with appropriate sequencing of projects a¢ public budgets cosine to tighten the need for ade-ofs increases These Fades mean that one de- tient or program sikay to gan resources tthe expense of oes, thse {oreniyng nemal competion budgets have no devises and pb ‘crdible set of cira for cuts epaements may conse efots o eu hele ‘proposals o be plitaly based, Consequenty they ete the ay aed wth {emoch public and intrest group support 3 they can muster fo deen heir Duet. The rest ia politie confi that maybe fel 1 resoive More ‘over, those who wn hind of coast are es biel 0 be efficent ane: fective managers and more likely tobe managers Who can gue mebiize 2 set of supporters Is usally beter o crest and galn support for 2 ceibie Setofeitra for cbc, Sach criteria wl os elizunate the tendency to bring ineonsiuents, bu they may make onsen: suppert one far ariong many. Sometines what ie need not a whole new set of rier but 3 recon craton or modieaton ofthe eer that were aed fr te ina locaton, ‘Any sarc evouree canbe budgeted, whichis to sa allocated interest ways “among those who demand th rerouree, Dacor could allocate ives to tans ‘lant patients based on which patents aze closest o death, Changing th terion for allocation to gve prio to those mos likly o survive many years In gnd heath wold cern hus some potential recipes, pss ling them: but the apparet log of theater citron could mut the level of i ism, The sume i re i budgeting dais, The tequcement i © ome up ‘vith clear and eazonable criteria fo loeaons ane publicize them widely ‘cata amount of open competition betwees programs hase on such teva seat. Admiistators esto consider which prggams sit the times, ‘which ones are more urgent, wbich ones are more popular. which ones are Inore costefctve, sues, even ficult ones, an be deeded public settings {5 long asthe numberof lsues presen stone te isnot 10 large an ‘ough infomation i eculated 0 alow infeed choices. Ahough const ‘rng lat of tess onetime is coafusng, 1 can be advanageots fo have Sevetl issues on the tbl at nee 0 that aloe one areas alanced by = tin elsewhere wh respect to the same interest or een ours. ‘When tel isu are adéressed io pli, ca ls be helpful to ste ture the debertion by crating groups eepresnting the diferent interests and equing them to workout a soluon ata least minimaly satis al of ‘her, This stractureteorens the energy that was going Into mining the ‘aus quo into forging unexpected coalitions 2nd working out sitions. Inter ‘Sst groupe may be ove sen to and understand the requements of aher interest groupe forthe rst ime, The norttal patterns or itrest groupsto act insolation or with eer sar groupe Tey seldom view themselves as part50 voto cr memset: ‘of ysom or visualize he impact oftheir choices on others, Ara esl thet ‘demands may Decome exreme, making resolution more diffe, ules some "Hrvture i imposed on ther partition. Seting up Separate temporary organization o dea with controversial bud get mates has the abdiona! advange of taking the blame sa fom pol ‘ans, This special bse lasing commission determined whieh military bases ‘would be elosed, insulating leiatrs rom harming thir own districts othe Ais ofthe ales, 1 policymakers do not wp separate structces to make cus and ake the ‘est potas, they ma Seek other ways of avoiding Dame They Tay. oF ‘example, obsute te inpct of cus on programs. Decision makers sometines fear tht making lesrer how a program ha been hurt wil tvate supporters, esting sharp and open cnfts ete suppores and dears. The dows “leo obscuring the impact of ut that pograss manages may be unable t “convince lisators tht programs cannot absoro more cuts and stil Keep on, Ata satsfctory level The temptation onthe part ofthe elected ofa st esp eting is enoemous, Because there seem to be pla eos “Thee ae budgetary paths art the peoblem ofcominous erosion of pro- rams, One i coma of sis forthe level of services tobe provided for a fren evel of program funding program managers budget proposal sy that for this much money the agency can provide this mach service of sch and set uly and for tat much money ican rowde that ch addtanal Service and tat much acional gual, The eel executive and he Iga ture decide onthe level they wish ad fd hat evel. This Kind of badge pro posal makes the impact of cus om propre very clea. Cts made in this fGehion il sk mobilizing program supporters to reverse the decisions, Du they also eae pressure to examine the impacts of cls in grester etal and ‘come up with states shat cold moderate the eet on cents or bent ‘aries, Could cients ofthis program ealstaly be Served by other programs instead Ie there anotber may of delivering these services that is more coe sffetiv? Can demand be moderated by the action of fee or cost-sharing Seangemenst decison makers can anticipate tat groupe of beneficiaries ‘willbe hurt and hence may oppose a decison. they may beable diminish the flees and eam the opposition. CONCLUSION Budgeting is intrinsically conflictual As 2 esl, budgetary ates have deve. ‘oped anime of mechanisms tat outnely euce the lee of conti. How ‘re, the lev! of conf nthe budgetary press can be jerked upward by 2 arly of crumstnces, cing acl sues and eubocks, change in bud OBTAIN THEREOF RUTICEMEETG § ft processes that encourage new demands, and divided goverment or eee tonal ale Fear of excessive Ives of conc and wnwtlingnes to ceopen issues that Inve been stein ways that Benet ne sie to a dispute have ote resulted fn the suppression of conic rather tha its arclation and reoion, Keep jg the eel of conic to ow no only threatens demoeatc partition an {he operation of democratic isitutions, # also feds izen alienation ana fanger at government. More open sharing of infomation and opinions with ‘rete stetoa to managing the cesuling confit usualy a Deter option thanconft suppression ina democrtc ore. NocaTbudgeteated cones ‘an be managed, but some an. With more open information and more wise oni, Budgeting i lie to be much moe neesting co the publ an they sre more likely to partipate ln pint sting and performance evalvavon. “The tol or managing conc incade moderating demands through fees an cot sharing; sting mits for bulge fequests;eucating new parc pant 2 hey are fami with eal nancial, and technical constraints; and egatitng agreement on the ciera used fraction. Othe major ways of handing conflet involve cresting special purpose structures to force those ‘with opposing lees to dacuss che problem and come up with mutually Shtstactory proposals and to butler elected oa fom the heat of thir decisions. “As buigeers gain confidence in tei aity to keep conics within ace able imi, they should become more comfortable a shaig information and fotcingctizen opinions. Problems aremere key tobe acute and sabe, fd hae are more ely feel that they conto government and that ‘working wel References ‘ney, a Lau “The Lne em tothe Sats An suet or ae ein ora ntact fc Parent Pabe Admin Rees 1985 450), 37237 ‘Aan, 6 7. Te Pits of Capt! eset: TCs of ei, ID: St tery of New Yor res, 98, ‘crac and Bartz MLS “Two Faces of Pome” American otal Sia Re ie 162 568, 47-952 ‘aerah, a Bt, M.S. “Decons n Noo Dens A Acai Fame ork Amen Pa Scenes Ree 953513) 552-6 yd “Lnete Yeo” Canreinnal Ro, Ma 27,1996. 2357. ‘Chane, c. “Archer Mets Chino Sep Common Grind Sou 0a Bu.” ashing Pt Des 29,199652 swomrocor aon aN nou, Sa Diapeomen Seema Aerials, sug: Die ‘iy of Pag Pres, 1995, Cosi, 1.1 "yseosn Hem Veto ese” Pabie Adminstration Rees 1986; 46), 291-30. amin, Cngeina Rard, Ot 31, 195, p 20P9-E2080 Joye? Gx a Recher RD. "Th etl ie io Vt: Whats and What "it Do” Pec asin Rew, 198757, 95-108 1b, CH. Smal Pert ers Consent: Sata Ons ofthe Propet Ta ent ey Vives of Calorie Pes, 1950 Meyers, RT Stile Badpng. Ana Abr: airs of Mihigan es, 1984 ton Bei 19875718) 510-6. 1 “ating OTe ed eg tg Prone 191,110). 5°18 ain 15 The cof Publ adoring: Gating an Spending Boring a a ‘ang (le) Chaba, NC House, 197 Schick, A Congres and Mane. Watington, DC rb se 1980 Smith San Dering. Grameen Congres. (2nd asin, 0 CongessoalQurey Pes, 150 Sel, € Congreso Rn Ap 1.1996, p HBS ‘Wali B The Ned fora evzaon Paces Lens rom Developmen an lesen” abe Advasaton Rees 997.520), 11-20 were BK. Tae Pts fae ace" oral of Pb Pl, 1985, 6 388 Wie J, and Wid, A he Df and he ube nes The eh fr es ‘Bagge 8D Beale: Univer of Cala Pes, 1985 a (CHAPTER TAREE Financial Management Reform in the Federal Government Jerry MeCatery ound financial management an snail systems ae crcl 10 the su erst pecormance of goverment. These systems incude the following functions of subsystems: taxation, accounting, budget formulation, 1 source allcation decision making, appotonment, etext, obligation and recaton of budgeted funds cas hanagement and investment, Dzong tnd debt management, fund managemert, ating and reporting on nancial aus and performance. Financial management systems support othe in portant functions of government, sich a ong ange source planing, human "esource management, contacting, purchasing ocala assets, property an agement, inventory contol and management, risk management, policy and ‘rogram anaiss, and evaluation Financial systems are ruil to exuablishing bd mainaning management contol procesesin oth the pubic and private Financial management systems alow jason wo carry ot its program ‘mate missions, Accoumting, budgeting, and avcting systems ae msinained 40 thatthe aces ofthe jurisdiction are pesorme in a manner itended to avoid or o detect and corcet faut, sate, ane misuse of funds. Financial management alto enale management of infemation systems that support ‘hese efforts, Accurting information systems must be capable of produing financial reports that relate how revenes are elcid, budgeted, expends and invested, and of proving beginning and end-ofpevod account and fund