Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434.

March 3, 2004
FACTS:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentationn in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a naturall-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, the petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent. Petitioners also questioned the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting
Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7), Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
the basic issue of the case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen?;
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the qualifications of
presidential candidates?

HELD:
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for
the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority, and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of
the matter–perhaps the most significant consideration–is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month, and year of birth of respondent FPJ,
can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions no distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines. “There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In re Ching, Bar Matter 914 (1999)
6/17/2020
0 COMMENTS

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath

FACTS: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen,
and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching
finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually passed
the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen
before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen
but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in
1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner,
acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has
always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in
La Union.

DECISION: The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.

RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had
reached the age of majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one
(21) years. The Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was
extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special
circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he
is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The
rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he
belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never
thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC (MARCH 8, 2016; G.R. NO. 221697)
CASE DIGEST: MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES,
Petitioners, vs. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
Respondents. (March 8, 2016; G.R. No. 221697).

Grace Poe-Llamanzares wishes to run for the Office of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines. However, she's a foundling. Her parents are unknown. Mr. and Mrs.
Militar who found the infant Grace in a church gave her to Mr. and Mrs. Poe, her
adoptive parents.

Under the Constitution, no person who is not a natural-born citizen shall serve as
President of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Is Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen or something

in between?

HELD: Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from the
1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that
their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA
show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would
either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
CASE DIGEST: MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION 41 SCRA
292

A. FACTS OF THE CASE:

On February 08, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant.

In the interview for the application of the said passport visa, Lau Yuen Yeung stated that
she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she plans to visit her great
grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping in the Philippines.

She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one
month. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate

her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.

At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a
few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

B. ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT LAU YUEN YEUNG IPSO FACTO BECAME A FILIPINO CITIZEN
UPON HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

C. RULING:

It was held that Lau Yuen Yeung have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on 25
January 1962.

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,

native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified
to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
COQUILLA VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:07 PM
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998,
he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making
several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November
10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which
was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed
the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for
this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy,
thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus
fully justified.

AZNAR vs COMELEC
JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña
G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 –Political Law-Citizenship
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of
Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the
evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning
candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be
presumed.

HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any
of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;

2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and

3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.

The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3)
mentioned hereinabove or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship.

The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law” and has no retroactive effect.

The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

MERCADO vs MANZANO GR No. 135083

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado, private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano, and GabrielV. Daza were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998elections.The results of the election were as
follows:Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petitionfor disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that the privaterespondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted thepetition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy ofprivate respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen
and under Sec. 40 of theLocal Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from runningfor
any elective position.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.

The board of canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC

En banc reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position.

Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice
mayor.

This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private
respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party in
the disqualification case.
2. Whether or not dual citizenship is ground for disqualification.
HELD:
1. On the issue of whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering thathe was not the original
party in the disqualification case, the Supreme Court ruled thatunder Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known
as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if therehas yet been no final judgment rendered. Private respondent argues that petitioner hasneither
legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "adefeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot beproclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimatelydisqualified by final and executory judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumesthat,
at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC,there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vicemayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only secondto private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation
at thattime. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondentfrom the race at the
time he sought to intervene.

2. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli
. Such a person,ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli
; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such
children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. There may be other situations in
which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above
cases are possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition. With respect to dual
allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649

(2013)
ISSUE: Is the rule on succession in the Local Government Code applicable?

FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural bon Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship upon his
naturalization as an American citizen. Subsequently, he renounced his American
citizenship and ran as a Mayor of Lanao del Norte. After he was proclaimed the winner,
the COMELEC anulled such proclamation and consequently directed that the order of
succession under the Local Government Code be followed. Maquiling, another candidate
for mayor, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the election
intervened the case, claims that he should be proclaimed as the winner.

DECISION: No, it is not applicable.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado's candidacy

involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission on election offenses as
provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding
the office. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have
been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. The old doctrine was that the vice mayor or the vice governor, as the
case may be, shall succeed the disqualified winning candidate, not the candidate for the
same position who had received the next highest vote.

POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies
those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is
a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the
country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his
American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship,
Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his
American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that the
renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one
making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the
subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a
mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a
country".On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one.
Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the
decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. They are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding
upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that Arnado
used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American citizenship. This
was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado only used his U.S.
passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that he only used his U.S.
passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet issued. The
COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine
passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31
March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March
2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which
also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel
dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado
also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon
arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24
November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was
issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport
even after he already received his Philippine passport. Arnados travel records show that
he presented his U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23
March 2010. These facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts
that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his Philippine
passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be considered as isolated
acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who are
exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual citizens who
wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards
continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special privilege for these dual
citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code..
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No.
136781. October 6, 2000]
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition
for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives
although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the
ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the
law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
 of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure
meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as
the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and
coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are
entitled to, based on proportional representation.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMELEC (404 SCRA 719)

ALSE 2013: ALDANA, BARRIENTOS, BELLOSILLO, BRIONES, CASTANEDA, DELOS SANTOS, DE JESUS,
GODUCO, IBARRA, LAGROSAS, MANGAHAS, PENA

FACTS:

The COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 ON March 26, 2001 where it approved the participation
of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party- list elections.

April 10, 2001: Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein
respondents be deleted from the Certified List of Political parties/ Sectoral Parties/Organizations/ Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections. Also asked as an alternative that the votes cast
for the said respondents not be counted or canvasses, and that latter’s nominees not be proclaimed

April 11, 2001: Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna- Youth also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.

April 17, 2001: Bayan Muna filed a Petition challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution no. 3785

May 9, 2001: Court ordered a consolidation of the 2 Petitions before it.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party- list elections2.Whether or not the party- list system is
exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations3.Whether or not the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

HELD:

This case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party- list participants.
Case Digest: Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)

FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of
COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by
the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved
using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed
by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

DECISION: Dismissed

RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5
of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in
computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec
11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (3) No.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Case Digest: Ang Ladlad v Comelec, GR 190582 (2010)

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional
guaranteesagainst the establishment of religion. insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma. 2. Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened
FACTS: The COMELEC (Second Division)dismissed the Petition for registration of the petitioner on moral
grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual
immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines
but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it ³ or any of itsnominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulationsrelating to the elections. Furthermore,
states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to anenvironment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith.

DECISION: Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was
a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The
proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct
prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed
to substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society. The
LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the basis of
their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws
nor by any international laws to which we adhere.

CASE DIGEST: ATONG PAGLAUM V COMELEC, GR 203766

FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on
Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being
qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al
then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.

DECISION: Remanded to COMELEC

RATIO DECIDENDI: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections.
However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system,
thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying
petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the
coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. Moreover, Section 5(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of
Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the
party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-
sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second,
the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the
three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and
party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTM) was among the accredited candidatesfor party-list
representative during the national and local elections held on May 13, 2013The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) partially proclaimed 14 party-list groups, whichobtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the
party-list system and were thus entitled to neguaranteed seat each, and fourteen party list groups as initial
winners in the party-list election.There were 58 available seats for party-list. The COMELEC proclaimed that
not all of the 58available party list can be allocated so as not to prejudice the proclamation of other
parties,organizations, or coalitions, which may later on be established to be entitled to additional seats.AKMA-
PTM contends that the proclamation of initial winners with additional seats on thesecond round was hasty
and premature because at the time the canvassing for party-list was still ongoing,there were still uncanvassed
and untransmitted results from Mindanao, as well as uncanvassed overseasand local absentee votes, and the
results of the special elections in several areas of the country had yet tobe transmitted. It contends that there is
an invalid and unjust allocation of additional seats to the “two-percenters”, to the prejudice of other party-list
groups, such as AKMA-PTM.

ISSUES:DID COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOCATING THEADDITIONAL SEATS FOR THE
PARTY-LIST CANDIDATES PROCLAIMED AS WINNERS?

RULING:NO. COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim the winning candidates if the remaininguncanvassed
election returns will not affect the result of the elections.An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot
be the basis of a subsequent proclamation.A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless
the board of canvassers considers allreturns and omits none. However, this is true only where the election
returns missing or not counted willaffect the results of the election.In this case, COMELEC based its ruling on
its national canvass reports for party-lists. As of May28, 2013, AKMA-PTM garnered 164,980 votes and
ABANTE KA had 111,429 votes. On July 18, 2013,AKMA-PTM’s votes slightly increased to 165,784, while
ABANTE KA had a total number of 111,625.Therefore, there was no significant change in the rankings, as per the
latest canvas.

G.R. No. 105371 – 227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights –
Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation
(PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking
privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine
postal service free of charge. The PPC then was under the leadership of Postmaster
Jorge Sarmiento. The PPC itself was under the Department of Transportation and
Communication then headed by Secretary Pete Prado.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the
expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal
service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that
the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. As a result, the PPC issued a
circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the
validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of
the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is
valid.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection
clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its
operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s
franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the
removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure.
This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the
franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the
loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether
from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The
problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws
on all persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw
the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary
is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes).
This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a
law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has
been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it
does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and
the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it
should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary
for such privilege.

Case Digest: Santiago vs Guingona

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection
of respondent as Senate minority leader

FACTS: During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen.
Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2,
Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member
of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had
voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had
chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo
warranto.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times.
When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the
number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous
words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it
thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said
body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other
than the usual meanings of these terms.In effect, while the Constitution mandates that
the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one
half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.

Case Digest: Avelino vs Cuenco

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the
court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to
formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to
delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters
employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and
Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was
recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

RATIO DECIDENDI: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations
in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare
the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.
And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit
of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.